LATEST EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATE AUGUST 2026
This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through August 31, 2026. The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.
See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and
persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.
REGULATORY UPDATES
President
Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Export Control Regulations
August 12, 2026: 91 Fed. Reg. 53179: On August 17, 2001, the President issued Executive Order 13222 pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). In that order, the President declared a national emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States related to the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (50 U.S.C. 4601 et seq.). Because the implementation of certain sanctions authorities, including sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of such Export Administration Act of 1979, consistent with section 1766(b) of Public Law 115-232, the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 note), is to be carried out under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the national emergency declared on August 17, 2001, must continue in effect beyond August 17, 2026. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13222, as amended by Executive Order 13637 of March 8, 2013.
Note the Export Administration Act expired in 2001. The continuation of the national emergency keeps provisions of the EAA enacted.
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Rebuilding The United States Navy And America’s Shipbuilding Industrial Base
August 13, 2026: The President issued a memo directing the Department of War to restore both capacity and competition to the maritime industrial base as it expands the U.S. naval force structure. The Secretary of War, in consultation with the Secretary of Navy, shall:
- Develop a plan to replace the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System and Advanced Weapons Elevators with steam and hydraulic systems for the construction of CVN-81;
- Pursue more direct investments in the American shipbuilding industrial base based off of the successful “Finland model”;
- Foreign shipbuilders that make substantial and durable investments into America’s shipyards and train an all-American workforce for the jobs they create will be temporarily permitted to build up to two ships in their parent shipyards that will be delivered to bridge gaps on a quick turnaround, while additional ships will be built in revitalized American shipyards.
- Establish a fifth Naval shipyard, the first in over 80 years, to increase the Nation’s submarine and aircraft carrier repair capacity;
- Establish a Component Repair Center capable of holding, repairing, and refurbishing critical components for all current major submarine programs; and
- Undertake a full review, reform, and reorganization of Naval Sea Systems Command to address chronic challenges in American naval shipbuilding.
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Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)
Data Collection Modernization (DCM) Coming September 14, 2026 Modernizing DDTC’s Licensing Experience
August 5, 2026: DDTC announced the initial production release of the Data Collection Modernization (DCM) initiative, deploying to the DECCS Production environment on September 14, 2026.
The Data Collection Modernization initiative is a multi-phase effort to modernize how DDTC collects, manages, and uses data across its digital services. This initial release focuses on enhancements to the licensing experience that improve data quality, streamline application submission, and deliver a more modern, user-friendly experience for industry users.
This release affects:
- Web (UI) license submissions
- Batch license submissions
Organizations that submit applications through batch processes should ensure their systems are prepared for the September 14, 2026, production deployment.
Updated user guides will be published prior to the release.
If you have questions regarding this release, please contact the DECCS Help Desk at 202-663-2838 | DDTCCustomerService@state.gov.
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events
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Rescission of Syria’s Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism
August 24, 2026: Marc Rubio, the Secretary of State, authorized the formal rescission of Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST), following the conclusion of the mandatory 45-day Congressional notification period. The Secretary of State also delisted Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) designation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). These actions represent another historic step by President Trump to give the Syrian people a path to prosperity.
In the past year the Trump Administration has taken unprecedented steps to provide sanctions relief for the benefit of the Syrian people. The historic June 2025 Executive Order ‘Providing for the Revocation of Syria Sanctions’ accelerated the process of sanctions relief for Syria, including by terminating the Syria Sanctions Program and the national emergency with respect to Syria, and directing reviews on various Syria-related sanctions and terrorist designations.
These actions were all taken in recognition of the positive actions taken and further commitments by the Syrian government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa to fully distance Syria from acts of international terrorism. In the past year, the Government of Syria has taken significant steps to counter terrorism, to include formally joining the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in November and conducting operations to disrupt the terror networks of ISIS, al-Qa’ida, Hizballah, and Iran-aligned groups. Rescinding Syria’s designation as an SST and HTS’ designation as an SDGT eliminates the final major barriers for private sector investment in Syria and promotes Syria’s economic recovery and reintegration into the global economy.
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/20260824-Advisory-for-Syria-State-Final-1.pdf
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International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Extension of Temporary Modification of Category XI(b) of the U.S. Munitions List
August 27, 2026: 91 Fed. Reg. 55461: DDTC placed on public inspection in the Federal Register the continuation of the temporary modification to USML Category XI(b). Originally published on July 1, 2014 (79 FR 37536), extended through August 30, 2021 (84 FR 45652) and August 30, 2026 (86 FR 48021) the Department is now extending the temporary modification until August 30, 2028.
The scope of control in existence prior to December 30, 2014 for USML Category XI paragraph (b) and directly related software in paragraph (d) remains in effect. This clarification was achieved by reinserting the words “analyze and produce information from” and by adding software to the description of items controlled in USML Category XI(b).
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Modification of Civil Aircraft to Incorporate Aircraft Survivability Equipment
August 27, 2026: 91 Fed. Reg. 55457: DDTC released an Interim Final Rule (IFR), effective October 12, 2026 that:
- Revises the U.S. Munitions List (USML) to exclude certain civil aircraft that have been modified to incorporate directed Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) (USML XI(a)(4)), specifically infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) and infrared or ultraviolet missile warning systems necessary for the operation of DIRCM
- Revises the ITAR to exclude certain temporary imports and reexports of ASE from ITAR requirements, while incorporated into civil, provided specific conditions are met.
Following the effective date of the IFR, routine maintenance on an aircraft removed from the USML under this rule will no longer be subject to the ITAR defense services requirement while ASE-specific maintenance will remain a defense service. This change will facilitate timely and efficient maintenance of those aircraft by U.S. persons, including aircraft manufacturers.
DDTC is seeking public comments on this IFR for 30 days. Interested parties may submit comments by September 27, 2026, using one of the methods described in the interim final rule.
The DDTC fact sheet outlining the changes is found here:
https://deccs.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=2f1a251897878fd0fe5c39b0f053af03
The IFR is found here:
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2026-17660
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30-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Application for Permanent/Temporary Export or Temporary Import of Classified Defense Articles and Classified Technical Data
August 31, 2026: 91 Fed. Reg. 55966: DDTC is seeking public comments on the Application for Permanent/Temporary Export or Temporary Import of Classified Defense Articles and Classified Technical Data.
In accordance with Part 123 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), any person who intends to permanently export, temporarily export, or temporarily import classified defense articles, including classified technical data must first obtain Directorate of Defense Trade Controls authorization. The “Application for Permanent/Temporary Export or Temporary Import of Classified Defense Articles and Classified Technical Data” (Form DSP-85) is used to obtain permission for the permanent export, temporary export, or temporary import of classified defense articles, including classified technical data, covered by the U.S. Munitions List (USML). This form is an application that, when completed and approved by the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (PM/DDTC), Department of State, constitutes the official record and authorization for all classified commercial defense trade transactions, pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act and the ITAR.
DDTC is soliciting public comments to permit the Department to:
- Evaluate whether the proposed information collection is necessary for the proper functions of the Department.
- Evaluate the accuracy of our estimate of the time and cost burden for this proposed collection, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used.
- Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected.
- Minimize the reporting burden on those who are to respond, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.
DDTC is accepting comments up to September 30, 2026.
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DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website
August 1 through 31, 2026: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at
- Australian Maritime Technologies Pty Ltd changed its name to BMT Maritime Design & Engineering Pty Ltd.
- Sopra Steria India Limited changed its addresses located at:
- Seaview Special Economic Zone Building 4, Plot No. 20 & 21, Sector – 135 Noida Gautam Buddha Nagar, U.P. 201304, India; and
- Institutional Plot No. B-9 Sector 132, Noida, 20134, India
To: Tower-A, B-9, Sector – 132 Gautam Budda Nagar Noida – 201304, Uttar Pradesh, India.
- Schenker Sp. z.o.o., a DSV entity, located at ul. Zwirki i Wigury 16C 02-092 Warszawa Poland changed its name and address to:
- DVS Road Sp. z.o.o.
- Ozarowska,nr 40/42, lok —, miejsc. Duchnice
05-850 Ozarow Mazowiecki Poland
- DVS Air & Sea Sp, z.o.o.
- Ozarowska 40/42, Duchnice
PL-05-850 Ozarow Mazowiecki, Poland
- DSV Contract Logistics Sp. z.o.o.
- Sokolowska 64
PL-05-806 Pecice Poland
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DDTC Final Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations Posted To Website
August 1, 2026: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following Final CJ Determinations for CJ’s adjudicated between July 8, 2026 and July 29, 2026, on its website at:
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&kb_number=KB0011272
| Model Name | Manufacturer | Description | Final Determination | Final Determination Date |
| Nd:YAG Laser Rod (Part Number 11NY-4-46-F/F-A/A) and Nd:YAG Laser Slabs (Part Numbers 11NYSP-4.5/4.5-30-F/F-N/N and 11NYSP-4/4-30-F/F-N/N) | Laser Materials Corporation | Nd:YAG laser rod and laser slabs manufactured to customer’s size and doping specifications | USML Category XII(e)(21) | 7/8/2026 |
| Compact Embedded Network 6300/3300 Embedded Router/Switch System, CEN-9600 Series, Part Number CEN90201 | GET Engineering Corporation | Rugged tactical secure mobile network router | Seek a CCATS | 7/8/2026 |
| NLEFIA LLC Firearm Training | NLEFIA, LLC | Semi-automatic firearms training: pistol, rifle, and shotgun instruction | Seek a CCATS | 7/8/2026 |
| Switch, SP2T, Model DS0860/B1, Rev A | Daico Industries, Inc. | Radiofrequency (RF) switch for routing RF signals that operates at a frequency band from 10 to 1,000 MHz | Seek a CCATS | 7/8/2026 |
| Ultra-lightweight Modular Chassis for Schmidt-Rubin K31 Rifle; Model MC-K31-1, Version 1.0; Part Number: MC-K31-1 | Wonjin Cho | Aftermarket modular aluminum chassis/stock for bolt-action rifle | CCL ECCN 0A501.y.1 | 7/8/2026 |
| Owl XD Tyton | Owl Cyber Defense Solutions, LLC | Securely enables cloud-based iOS and iPadOS software updates for devices operating in air-gapped networks | Seek a CCATS | 7/8/2026 |
| Puncturing Cutter, Model and Part Number 1SE608 | Vectra CO. D.B.A. EaglePicher Technologies, LLC. |
Pyrotechnic-actuated cutter designed to puncture a pressurized vessel so that the stored gas can be released in a controlled fashion | Seek a CCATS | 7/8/2026 |
| Rectifiers, Model 925434-4B Rev. AW, Part No. SA8137; Model 2904394 Rev. G, Part No. SA10635; and Model 925214 Rev. K, Part No. SA10758 | Corfin Holdings Inc. | Three high-reliability rectifier assemblies used for mission-critical power electronics for specific applications | USML Category XII(e)(1) | 7/29/2026 |
| SMT Circulator X-Band, Model Number: X-Band, Part Number: 72831-G001 | TTM Technologies, Inc. | used for high performance surface-mount phased array radar antennas, electronic warfare, and communication systems | USML Category XI(c)(6) | 7/29/2026 |
| Titanium Diboride (TiB2) Advanced Ceramic Material | Leeta Materials | An advanced ceramic material composed primarily of titanium and boron | Seek a CCATS | 7/29/2026 |
| Mobile Additive Manufacturing Container (MAMC), Model MAMC v01, Part Number MAMC-001 | Sparrow Engineering, Inc. | Transportable, self-contained additive manufacturing and IT system integrating commercial 3D printers, computing, and power systems for general-purpose production in remote or infrastructure-limited environments | Seek a CCATS | 7/29/2026 |
| Roshel Senator APC/ERV Model: Senator | Roshel, LLC | Armored Ford F-550 which is capable of off-road use and has the capacity to transport 12 personnel and deploy 10 personnel | USML Category VII(e) | 7/29/2026 |
| Copper Nickel Socket Weld Pipe Union, Model and Part Number 803-6397430 Rev A | Monarch Supply Co. | 1/2″ Union, Socket Weld (S/W), 90/10 Copper Nickel (CuNi), 400# | EAR99 | 7/29/2026 |
| 515.4 Calibration Mix | Restek Corporation | reference standard used by environmental testing labs for use in instrument calibration and sample spiking for soil and water (EPA) testing | USML Category XIV(e)(1) | 7/29/2026 |
| Thin Line Towed Array Handling System (TLTAHS), Model: 1.4, Part Number: 77C965000G2, and six subassemblies | Lockheed Martin Corporation | Handling system for towed passive sonar arrays used with submarines (and six subassemblies) | USML Category XX(c) | 7/29/2026 |
| Passive Acoustic Drone Detection System | Texas International Group | Detection system based on analyzing the sound signature of drones | Seek a CCATS | 7/29/2026 |
| Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Training (CBRN Consequence Management, CBRN Awareness for First Responders, CBRN Awareness for Complex Terrorist Attack Response) |
One Thirty Nine Consulting LLC | Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Consequence Management Courses |
Not defense services | 7/29/2026 |
| UH-60 Machine Gun Mount, Part Number MAS-214 | Military Systems Group, Inc. | Machine gun mount system | USML Category I(h)(4) | 7/29/2026 |
| AtomEngine | Battle Road Digital, LLC | Planet scale modeling and simulation software | With Entity Catalog USML Category IX(b)(4)(ii) Without Entity Catalog: |
7/31/2026 |
| Gadolinium Gallium Garnet (GGG) Single-Crystal Substrates with Undoped, Single-Crystal Yttrium Iron Garnet (YIG) Film, Part Numbers MM-M2-T1-G1-D2, MM M2 T2-G1-D2, and MM-M2-T8-G1-D2 |
Metamagnetics, Inc. | Base materials that provide structure, insulation, and connective pathways for integrated circuits | Part Numbers MM-M2-T1-G1-D2 and MM M2 T2-G1-D2: USML Category XVIII(e)
Part Number MM-M2-T8-G1-D2: RWA |
7/31/2026 |
| Lidar for Situational Awareness (LiSA), Part Number 110630-0001 | Areté Associates | Lidar used for helicopter operation in clear and degraded visual environments | USML Category XII(b)(6) | 7/31/2026 |
| CSIR IP Core, Version 5.1 | STE North America, Inc. d.b.a. iDirect Government, LLC |
Communication signal interference removal software | USML Category XI(d) | 7/31/2026 |
| Mounting Plate Assembly, Model 125E3301-101 Rev 1 | USM Aerostructures, Corp. | Mounting plate assembly | CCL ECCN 9A610.x | 7/31/2026 |
| Zeeland Multi-Spectral RFI/IR Tarp, Model: Zeeland RFI/IR multipurpose Tarp Ver1.0, Part Number: 1500101132BAIR | V Technical Textiles Inc. (submitted on behalf of the OEM by Mohawk Global Trade Advisors) | Multi-purpose camouflage material designed to reduce electro-magnetic detectability across the infrared and radio-frequency ranges | USML Category XIII(j)(1) | 7/31/2026 |
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Bureau of Political-Military Affairs – Foreign Military Arms Sales
BPMA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sales to the following countries, the details of which can be found at the links below:
- S. Concludes $302 Million Security Cooperation Loan to Albania, Advancing Military Modernization and Strengthening European Defense
- Norway – 155mm High Explosive (HE) M795 Projectile
- Qatar – KC-46A Aerial Refueling Aircraft
- Italy – Guidance Section Single Variant Air-to-Air Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System-II
- Norway – UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters
- Korea – AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II Missiles
- Iraq – Bell 412 and Bell 407M Helicopters
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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
DPAS Directive Allocation Order and Additional Requirements for Recoverable Critical Minerals and Materials
August 6, 2026: 91 Fed. Reg. 50701: BIS published a temporary final rule to restrict the exportation of black mass and tungsten waste and scrap without a license. Specifically, as of August 27, 2026, U.S. persons engaged in the sale of black mass and tungsten waste and scrap must allocate 100 percent of monthly sales to U.S. persons, unless an adjustment or exception is obtained in advance from BIS via a DPAS authorization. This temporary final rule applies to U.S. persons engaged in the sale of black mass (Schedule B codes 8549.13.00.00, 8549.14.00.00, and 8549.19.00.00) and tungsten waste and scrap (Schedule B code 8101.97.00.00).
This action is taken pursuant to section 101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (‘‘DPA’’ or the ‘‘Act’’), the Defense Priorities and Allocations System (15 CFR part 700) and Presidential Determination Pursuant to Section 101 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as Amended, on Recoverable Critical Minerals and Materials, dated July 30, 2026 (‘‘DPA Determination on Recoverable CMMs’’), in which the President authorized the Department of Commerce (‘‘Commerce’’) to address the scarcity of recoverable critical minerals and materials (‘‘CMMs’’).
BIS invites the public to submit comments on whether any additional sales requirements are necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense. Comments must be received by November 4, 2026.
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-08-06/pdf/2026-16078.pdf
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Streamlining Export Controls for Drone Exports
August 14, 2026: 91 Fed. Reg. 52501: BIS issued a Final Rule that eases export controls on certain Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs or Drones) and related parts, components, accessories, attachments, technology and software regulated under the EAR.
Specifically, ECCN 9A012 that regulated controls on UAVs/Drones is revised eliminating wind gust tolerance as a parameter for determining UAVS controls and increases the control parameter for endurance to less than or greater than 3 hours. (note by way of revision of this ECCN, UAVs or drones previously classified as EAR99 are lifted to this ECCN)
Drones with less than 3 hours of endurance, provided that they are not MT controlled based on range and payload, are exportable to most countries without a license.
Drones with an endurance greater than 3 hours are NS1 controlled meaning export licenses are required except for Canada, United Kingdom and Australia.
New ECCN entries are added in 9A012 to capture drones/UAVs incorporated cameras described in ECCN 6A003.b.3, 6A003.b.4.b, and radars in 6A008.d to .h.
UAV and unmanned airships incorporating lasers enumerated in ECCN 6A005 and inertial measuring equipment or systems using accelerometers or gyros specified in ECCNs 7A001, 7A002, 7A003 or 7A005 are also described in the expanded ECCN 9A012.
Conforming changes are made to remove national security controls on software and technology for UAVS with an endurance under 3 hours.
The EAR maintains military end user/end user controls for UAVS with the lower endurance drones and their associated technology and software. To effect this change BIS has added ECCNs 9A012, 9D001, 9D002 and 9E001 to Supplement No. 2 to part 744 – Items Subject to Military End Use End User Restrictions.
To date UAVs have not been regulated in ECCN 9A610, based on historical aspect of military UAVs, however as UAVs have evolved with commercial UAVs being modified after development for military use, and smaller or less capable UAVs being designed and developed for military application that provide significant military advantage, but not a critical one that would warrant control in the ITAR USML. BIS identified that after interagency review it has been agreed that some military UAVs and remotely piloted vehicles can be captured in ECCN 9A610.a rather than ECCN 9A012 when “specially designed” to provide military capabilities not described on the ITAR USML. Provided as illustrative reference is Supplement No 1 to Part 744 which described “military end uses” which BIS believes is informative in assessing design or modification for military under ECCN 9A610.a including performing military reconnaissance, surveillance or combat support.
The Final Rule also updates the availability for use of license exception Strategic Trade Authorization for certain transactions involving UAVs.
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-08-14/pdf/2026-16628.pdf
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Streamlining Export Controls for Drone Exports – Correction
August 28, 2026: 91 Fed. Reg. 55457: BIS published a correction to its Interim Final Rule (IFR) Streamlining Export Controls for Drone Exports, 91 Fed. Reg. 52501, published on August 14, 2026.
On page 52507, in Supplement No.1 to Part 774, in the third column, on the 14th line from the top, ‘‘List of Items Controlled[MISSING]’’ should read ‘‘List of Items Controlled’’.
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-08-28/pdf/C1-2026-16628.pdf
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Department of War – Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA)
Export Control License Frequently Asked Questions
August 19, 2026: DTSA posted to its website Export Control License Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs). The FAQs are at https://www.dtsa.mil/SitePages/assessing-and-managing-risk/department-of-war-export-control-license-faqs.aspx.
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Federal Communications Commission
Federal Communications Commission is Seeking Comment on Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Certain Foreign-Produced Military-Grade Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components for Non-U.S. Government, Including Those With Swarming Capabilities
August 3, 2026: 91 Fed. Reg. 48870: The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is accepting comments on proposing to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain military-grade foreign-made UAS and UAS critical components that are found on the FCC’s Covered List.
On December 22, 2025, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) added all UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country to the Covered List. This action was based on a National Security Determination from an Executive Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national security agencies, determining (among other things) that UAS produced in a foreign country pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of United States persons.
On August 3, 2026, PSHSB initiated another proceeding to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as ‘‘military-grade.’’
PHSB considers military-grade UAS and UAS critical components to be any of the following:
- UAS that weigh 55 pounds or more on takeoff, i.e. UAS that are not ‘‘small unmanned aircraft’’ pursuant to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules.
(2) UAS capable of dispensing ‘‘economic poison’’ under FAA rules.
(3) UAS that contain or integrate sensors capable of thermal imaging (i.e. the capability to capture and translate the difference in temperature between objects, as well as an object’s heat signature and residual heat signature).
(4) UAS that contain or integrate sensors capable of Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), a ‘‘remote sensing technology that measures distance by illuminating a target with a laser and analyzing the reflected light.’’
(5) UAS docking stations, defined as multipurpose systems that enable UAS to land safely, take off, recharge and/or replace batteries, and transfer data and payload.
(6) UAS ‘‘specially designed to incorporate a defense article.’’
(7) Swarming UAS, defined as:
- Ground control stations purpose- built for, or UAS integrated with flight control or vehicle management systems specially designed for, managing drone swarms, consisting of UAS that operate autonomously (without human intervention) to coordinate with each other, avoid collisions, maintain formations, and dynamically respond to changes in operational or threat environments, or if weaponized, synchronize targeting activities across multiple drones; or
- UAS purpose-built to perform flights in coordinated and synchronized formations, including applications such as multi-UAS light shows, where numerous illuminated UAS work together to create synchronized aerial displays.
This prohibition on importation and marketing would not apply to any non- military-grade UAS or UAS critical components, nor would it apply to any domestically produced UAS or UAS critical components or to any other already-authorized covered equipment. It would also only apply to covered UAS and UAS critical components and would therefore not apply to any UAS or UAS critical components that are exempt from the Covered List— including UAS and UAS critical components identified on the Defense Contract Management Agency’s (DCMA’s) Blue UAS Cleared List; UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as ‘‘domestic end products’’ under the Buy American Standard, 48 CFR 25.101(a); and UAS and UAS critical components granted a Conditional Approval by the Department of War or the Department of Homeland Security.
Comments are due to the FCC on or before September 2, 2026.
The details of the Request for Comment and interpretive explanations of “military grade” UAS and UAS critical components can be found at:
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-08-03/pdf/2026-15659.pdf
LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES |
This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.
Fines and Penalties
Chinese National Pleads Guilty to Trying to Obtain U.S. Military Equipment
August 10, 2026: The Department of Justice announced that Dingwei Chen, a 29-year-old citizen of the People’s Republic of China, plead guilty in federal court in Salt Lake City to violating the Arms Export Control Act. U.S. District Judge David Sam accepted Chen’s guilty plea and scheduled sentencing for Oct 19. Chen faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison.
Chen attempted to purchase military-grade satellite modems and radios manufactured for the U.S. military by American companies. The specific communications hardware Chen attempted to buy may not be legally exported from the United States without a license from the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, which generally does not issue licenses to export military goods and services to China.
“Chen tried to divert sensitive U.S. military technologies to the People’s Republic of China, technologies the PRC could have used against us in the future,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg. “These advanced technologies are a product of United States ingenuity and investment, and the National Security Division will act together with our partners across the government to enforce our laws to protect the military advantage bestowed by such technologies.”
According to court records, Chen worked with others in China to try and acquire these sensitive communications systems from foreign arms dealers on the black market. They discussed various methods to export them to China. Initially, Chen and his co-conspirators sought to transship the goods through Switzerland; then they spoke about picking them up in Saipan; finally, they decided to smuggle through Mexico.
After making an initial down payment of over $40,000 U.S. dollars, Chen and his co-conspirators switched to cryptocurrency, noting that “cold wallets are essentially anonymous bank accounts. Each transaction processed through them is private and untraceable.” They went on to pay roughly $30,000 worth of USDT, which is a type of cryptocurrency. These down payments related to the purchase of 10 modems.
To avoid detection, Chen and his co-conspirators communicated using an encrypted app. Using the encrypted app, Chen claimed this was merely an initial deal, and he had funding to buy tens of millions of dollars’ worth of additional military equipment.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-pleads-guilty-trying-obtain-us-military-equipment
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Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Rice Lake Weighing Systems, Inc.
August 12, 2026: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $60,764 settlement with Rice Lake Weighing Systems, Inc. (“Rice Lake”), a Wisconsin-based manufacturer of weighing equipment. Rice Lake agreed to settle its and its Italian subsidiary’s potential civil liability for eight apparent violations of OFAC sanctions on Iran that occurred when its Italian subsidiary, Dini Argeo S.r.l. (“Dini”), exported goods to Iran through a distributor in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with the knowledge that these goods were ultimately destined for Iran. Specifically, between July 2019 and November 2021, Dini exported weighing equipment to a distributor located in the UAE with the knowledge that those goods would be reexported to an end-user in Iran. OFAC determined that these apparent violations were voluntarily self-disclosed and non-egregious.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/936706/download?inline
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U.S. Department of State Concludes $36 Million Settlement Resolving Export Violations by BAE Systems, Inc. (BAE)
August 13, 2026: BAE Systems, Inc. settled allegations that it violated the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in connection with unauthorized exports, retransfers of defense articles to multiple countries, including in one case to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and unauthorized furnishing of defense services, as well as violations of applicable terms, conditions, and provisos of Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) authorizations.
BAE agreed to pay a fine of $36,000,000 for 104 violations of the ITAR that occurred between May 2019 and March 2025 and will, among other things, appoint an independent external compliance monitor to oversee implementation of corrective actions.
The violations involved:
- Unauthorized exports of technical data related to wiring boards for use in global positioning system (GPS) receivers described in USML Category XI(c)(2), to a manufacturer located in the PRC, a destination proscribed by the ITAR;
- Unauthorized exports of technical data involving:
- Printed wiring boards (PWB) controlled under USML Category XI(c)(2) for integration into military GPS associated with an expired Manufacturing License Agreement;
- 2,4-Dinitroanisole (DNAN) explosive mixture, controlled under USML Category V(a)(11), in connection with a Request for Quote (RFQ); and
- A summary sheet of trim and stability calculations, controlled under USML Category VI(g) technical data, in connection with an RFQ;
- Unauthorized furnishing of defense services involving:
- Site acceptance testing, specialty maintenance, and operation consulting on Range Instrumentation Radars (RIR) and Electro-Optical Tracking Systems, controlled under USML Category XI(a)(3)(iv); and
- Qualification testing of support equipment controlled under USML Categories II, IV, VIII, and XI for F-16 aircraft
- Unauthorized export of a T700 Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC), controlled under USML Category XIX(e), when shipping personnel mistakenly picked and shipped the FADEC as an item subject to the EAR;
- Unauthorized retransfers of a USML Category VIII(i) paint specification directly related to the F-35 Active Inceptor System defense articles when the project team transferred to the paint specification to a U.K. supplier;
- Violations of terms, conditions, and provisos of over 120 agreements dating back to 2011; and
- Violations of terms, conditions, and provisos of licenses or exemptions involving the use of 22.C.F.R 123.4(a)(1) and temporary exports under a DSP-73 license.
BAE identified in its voluntary disclosure to DDTC that the violations are the result of:
- Insufficient written policies;
- Trade compliance’s lack of experience;
- Frequent changes in export personnel that led to an ineffective transition process for managing authorizations;
- Inadequate management of agreements; and
- An insufficient IT system to track authorizations;
Details of the violations can be found at:
- https://deccs.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=a3c3f9631ba60750fd4d87f4604bcbd7
- https://deccs.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=9bc3b9631ba60750fd4d87f4604bcb62
- https://deccs.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=dfc3f9631ba60750fd4d87f4604bcbd2
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BIS Reaches Administrative Enforcement Settlement with Plexon, Inc.
August 14, 2026: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry Security (“BIS”) released its settlement with Plexon, Inc. (“Plexon”). BIS charged Plexon with eight violations of the EAR when it made eight shipments, without a license, of its Neural Recording Data Acquisition System (“ Omniplex System”) and accessories to Academy of Military Medical Sciences (“AMMS”), a party identified on the Entity List.
The eight shipments, involving the Omniplex Systems, occurred between February 10, 2022 and August 30, 2023. Omniplex System is a machine that uses electrodes place in the brains of animals to acquire data and to identify and categorize spikes made by individual neurons in the brain. OmniPlex is classified as ECCN 4A994.k. BIS in a 2018 Advance Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM) declared brain-computer interfaces, artificial intelligence brain modeling, an other items as potential emerging technologies that could be determined essential to national security of the U.S.
AMMS was added to the Entity List on December 17, 2021 due to its use of biotechnology processes to support the Chinese military end uses and end users, including purported brain-control weaponry. The Entity List identifies parties and addresses in which a license is required for export of specified items subject to the EAR. An export to a party listed on the Entity List is prohibited.
BIS fined Plexon $1,700,000 for the eight shipments with a total value of approximately $178,721
The BIS Charging and Settlement letters are found at:
https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/plexon-inc.-8-14-2026.pdf
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BIS Reaches Administrative Enforcement Settlement with Container Manufacturing Ltd.
August 24, 2026: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry Security (“BIS”) released its settlement with Container Manufacturing Ltd (“Container Manufacturing”). BIS fined Container Manufacturing $1,000,000 for 10 violations of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”), eight involving in engaging in a prohibited activity, and two acting with knowledge of a violation. These violations occurred between March 23, 2023 and March 7, 2025 and involved the sale and export of EAR99 items with a Harmonized Tariff Schedule (“HTS”) identified on the Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions to a Russian End User. At the time of export, commodities with a HTS on the Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions require a BIS export license for export to Russia. The exported items had an HTS of 8466.94, 8462.29 and 4016.93 and include various parts for aluminum metalworking tools valued at $264,721.
On February 24, 2022, BIS implemented broad export controls on Russia. As part of those controls, effective March 3, 2022, BIS imposed an additional license requirement for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) to or within Russia of any items subject to the EAR if identified under certain HTS codes. The March 2022 rule also added Supplement No. 4 to Part 746—HTS Codes that require a license for export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) to or within Russia—which identified HTS codes subject to the license requirement then set forth in paragraph § 746.5(a)(1)(ii).
Between March 23, 2023 and March 7, 2025 Container Manufacturing made 8 shipments without the required licenses from BIS to an unnamed Russian company identified as Company 1 in which it had a longstanding relationship. Four of these shipments involved transshipments through a third country distributor Company 2 located in the U.A.E.
BIS charged Container Manufacturing with two instances of acting with knowledge of a violation when it proceeded with shipments to Company 1 that transshipped through a distributor, Company 3 located in Turkey, after Container Manufacturing was informed by its bank that the dealings with Company 1 may be subject to U.S. legal restrictions. In a December 26, 2024 email to COMPANY 1, Container Manufacturing communicated that it had “received notification from the bank that the two pending wire payments will NOT be processed due to the embargo on Russia.”
BIS stated in its charging letter the bank notice “presented a red flag that Container Manufacturing should have resolved or justified before proceeding with further exports to COMPANY 1.” Rather than contacting the bank for clarification or seeking clarification from outside counsel to resolve the red flag, Container Manufacturing had Company 1 reissue the bank transfer under the name of one of Company 1’s business partners to evade the bank’s screening process.
Container Manufacturing subsequently transshipped the items through Turkey and misrepresented the Turkish distributor, Company 3, on the Shipper’s Letter of Instruction as the Ultimate Consignee and “Direct Consumer.” Prior SLIs involving Company 3 had identified the company as a “Reseller.”
Container Manufacturing, despite the red flags presented by the bank and instructions from Company 1 to alter transaction structure to obfuscate its role in the transaction, proceeded with the shipments in violation of the EAR.
The Charging and Settlement Letters are found at:
https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/container-manufacturing-ltd-8-24-2026.pdf
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Arms Dealer Sentenced to Prison for Conspiring to Export American Made Ammunition Used in War Against Ukraine
August 24, 2026: The Department of Justice, Eastern District of New York, sentenced Manfred Gruber, an Italian national, to 18 months in prison for conspiracy to commit export control violations. Gruber pleaded guilty to the charge on March 30, 2026.
The defendant, Manfred Gruber, was the Director of Sales for Italian Company-1, a large wholesale distributor of firearms and ammunition. The defendant served as a key member of an international procurement network for Russia during its war against Ukraine, purchasing ammunition from the United States and reexporting it to Kyrgyzstan in violation of DOC licenses issued to Italian Company-1, which required that the ammunition stay in Italy. The defendant did not apply for, obtain, or possess a license to export or reexport ammunition to Kyrgyzstan.
The defendant illegally exported ammunition worth over $540,000 from the United States to Kyrgyzstan, via companies that the defendant and his co-conspirator controlled in Italy. After reaching Kyrgyzstan, most of this ammunition was subsequently reexported to Russia.
In one example of the defendant’s illegal transactions, U.S. Company-1, headquartered in Nebraska, had a license to lawfully export ammunition to Italian Company-1, but the ammunition could not be reexported out of Italy. In violation of the license, the defendant, using a cutout company, Italian Company‑2, reexported U.S. Company-1 ammunition to Sergei Zharnovnikov, an arms dealer from Kyrgyzstan who has since pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate export controls by sending U.S.-made firearms and ammunition to Russia. A contract found on Zharnovnikov’s phone indicated that he had contracted with a Russian company for ammunition manufactured by U.S. Company-1. Zharnovnikov was sentenced to 39 months’ imprisonment earlier this year. See United States v. Zharnovnikov, 25‑cr‑45 (HG).
In addition, U.S. Company-2, headquartered in Tennessee, had a license to lawfully export ammunition to Italian Company‑1, but the ammunition could not be reexported out of Italy. The defendant exported the ammunition from U.S. Company-2 to Italy, and then reexported the U.S. Company-2 ammunition from Italy to Kyrgyzstan.
The defendant was aware that U.S. law prohibited the reexport of U.S. ammunition without further licenses, which he did not obtain. To help the unlawful export scheme succeed, the defendant took steps to disguise the true destination of the ammunition. For example, in encrypted messages on or about September 23, 2023, the defendant and a co-conspirator discussed splitting up a shipment of 100,000 bullets. In the defendant’s words, this was necessary “so it goes unnoticed” by “FBI.”
“The defendant was held accountable for his scheme to send military‑grade ammunition to Kyrgyzstan before reexporting the ammunition to Russia to support its war effort,” stated United States Attorney Nocella. “Today’s sentencing reaffirms that people who illegally divert weapons will be brought to justice.”
“Manfred Gruber’s guilty plea reflects our unwavering commitment to enforcing U.S. export-control laws and protecting national security. His actions undermined federal regulations designed to safeguard our defense materials, and this outcome demonstrates that violations of these laws will be addressed with the utmost seriousness,” stated FBI Assistant Director in Charge Barnacle.
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Florida Firearms Parts Dealer Pleads Guilty to Exporting Weapons Components as Part of Russia-Based Scheme
August 25, 2026: Maxim Larin pleaded guilty in federal court in Brooklyn, NY to conspiracy to violate the Export Control Reform Act and attempting to violate the Arms Export Control Act in connection with his shipment of weapons parts and accessories to Kazakhstan. The proceeding was held before United States District Judge Nina R. Morrison. When sentenced, the defendant faces a maximum sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment. As part of his plea, the defendant agreed to forfeit $250,000 and dozens of weapons parts and accessories seized from his residence.
“Motivated by greed, the defendant placed his own self-interest above the safety and security of our country and its allies by shipping export-controlled weapons parts to a volatile area of the world,” stated United States Attorney Nocella. “Today’s guilty plea should serve as a warning to all who seek to evade our nation’s export regulations for their own gain and for the benefit of our adversaries. Our Office and our law enforcement partners will vigorously investigate, prosecute, and hold to account those who compromise our national security.”
Larin is the owner of several U.S. based companies which deal in weapons parts and sensitive firearms accessories. Larin used his businesses to sell export-controlled weapons parts and accessories to his co-defendant based in Russia. The items Larin shipped to Kazakhstan were on the Commerce Control List (“CCL”) and designated as export restricted because their reshipment could be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy or national security.
As early as December 2022, Larin agreed with his Russia-based co-defendant to undervalue and mislabel the contents of the packages he was exporting. When asked by his co-defendant to falsely label the contents of a specific parcel, Larin replied “we can do that.” U.S. Customs and Border Protection records show the package was mislabeled and the value of its contents was listed as thousands of dollars less than its actual value. Larin also flagged for his co-defendant that certain items could be seized by U.S. authorities and suggested that items be repackaged to make them less conspicuous.
In approximately May 2023, Larin agreed with his co-defendant to ship semi-automatic enhanced triggers, hi-speed triggers, and charging handles to Kazakhstan. These items, which enhance the performance of firearms, were all included on the CCL and their export to Kazakhstan was prohibited. Larin suggested the items could be seized by U.S. authorities and agreed to falsely declare the contents of the package and its value. Rather than state that the parcel contained firearms parts, Larin listed its contents as a “light switch.”
In December 2023, Larin agreed to acquire a Raptar target acquisition device for his co-defendant. The Raptar is a firearms accessory which helps users acquire targets at long ranges. Given its obvious military application, the Raptar is included on the United States Munitions List, a list of items which cannot be exported from the United States without the approval of the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, a unit within the U.S. Department of State. Larin obtained the Raptar device from another company and signed an agreement which specified that the item could not be shipped internationally. Although he knew about this prohibition, Larin shipped the Raptar to a co-conspirator in the United States who attempted to ship it to Kazakhstan in violation of U.S. export laws. The device was intercepted and seized by HSI in California.
Larin was arrested in Florida in August 2025.
Note: The supplier’s notice to Larin that the Raptar device couldn’t be shipped abroad was both a best practice and protected the U.S. seller and was a bonus for law enforcement.
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Russian National Living in Florida Convicted for Scheme to Illegally Export Aircraft Parts from the United States to Russia
August 28, 2026: A Florida resident and Russian national, Alexander Mamonov, 62, was convicted on all charges following a jury trial related to a scheme to illegally export aircraft parts from the United States to Russia and the state-owned Russian airline, PJSC Aeroflot.
“This guilty verdict – on all counts – shows the United States government’s resolute commitment to upholding our export-control laws and to prosecuting those who violate them,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg. “The National Security Division and our U.S. Attorney’s Offices and law enforcement partners will continue to safeguard U.S.-controlled items from being exported unlawfully.”
“Mamonov illegally exported nearly one million dollars of aviation parts to Russia by lying to U.S. suppliers about their destination, and this conviction on all counts holds him accountable,” said Assistant Director Roman Rozhavsky of the FBI’s Counterintelligence and Espionage Division. “The FBI and its partners will continue to prioritize the enforcement of export laws and sanctions to defend the homeland. Let this verdict serve as a warning to anyone considering smuggling U.S. technology to our adversaries.”
“Russia cannot evade American sanctions and export controls by routing its purchases through South Florida,” said U.S. Attorney Jason A. Reding Quiñones for the Southern District of Florida. “You cannot put a fake destination on a shipping label and make American export laws disappear. This defendant conspired to secretly funnel nearly $1 million in American aircraft parts to Russia and Aeroflot, then used false destinations and financial transactions to conceal what he was doing. Yesterday, a federal jury held him accountable on every count. We will continue to aggressively pursue those who use our district, our financial system, or American businesses to undermine U.S. national security.”
Mamonov was convicted in the Southern District of Florida of 12 counts related to that scheme, including conspiracy to violate the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), illegal export of items subject to ECRA, conspiracy to commit smuggling, smuggling of goods, submitting false or misleading export information, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. U.S. District Court Judge Kathleen M. Williams scheduled sentencing for Nov. 20.
The defendant was charged by indictment in April 2025, alongside Ignat Vakorin of Russia. Vakorin remains a fugitive in wanted status.
Following Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce increased restrictions on exports to Russia and issued a temporary denial order barring Aeroflot from receiving U.S.-origin goods. According to court documents and testimony, Mamonov is a former Aeroflot employee who relocated from Russia to South Florida. After the U.S. Department of Commerce increased restrictions on Russian exports, Mamonov conspired with Vakorin to acquire and illegally ship over $900,000 in aircraft parts to Russia and to Aeroflot. Mamonov and Vakorin misled U.S. suppliers into believing the parts were being sent to other destinations, such as the United Arab Emirates and China.
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BIS Investigates Apex Logistics over Nvidia Servers: First Freight Forwarder Targeted
August 28, 2026: According to the Tech Times, the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security is “examining whether Singapore-based Apex Logistics — a wholly owned subsidiary of Swiss shipping giant Kuehne+Nagel — transported Nvidia AI server hardware to China in violation of US export restrictions, in what would mark the first-ever enforcement action against a transportation company for participating in the illegal semiconductor trade.” The investigation involves 47 shipments containing an unknown number of Nvidia servers.
As noted in the article, BIS has put freight forwarders on “written notice” and has published “Freight Forwarder Guidance and Best Practices on its website found at: https://www.bis.gov/learn-support/export-compliance-programs/freight-forwarder-guidance.
The complete article is found at:
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Ohio State University Agrees to $2.1M Settlement to Resolve Allegations that it Failed to Disclose Employees’ Ties to the People’s Republic of China in Applications for Federal Research Funding
August 31, 2026: Ohio State University (OSU), a public university in Columbus, Ohio, has agreed to pay a total of $2,100,000 to resolve civil allegations that it failed to disclose OSU employees’ affiliations with and support from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in connection with federal research funding.
“American universities that benefit from the federal government’s support for scientific research and advancement must fully disclose all foreign funding in their grant applications,” said Assistant Attorney General Brett A. Shumate of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “We will continue to hold accountable any university that fails to comply with disclosure requirements designed to protect research security and federally-funded scientific achievements.”
“Together with the Department of Justice and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), we have secured a major financial recovery on behalf of the American public,” said Robert Steinau, Senior Official at the NASA Office of Inspector General. “The settlement and accompanying compliance agreement send a clear message: We will not tolerate institutions that conceal foreign ties and compromise national security. Our cutting-edge research must not fall into the hands of our adversaries.”
This settlement relates to NASA and National Science Foundation (NSF) grants that provided funding to OSU from November 2012 to August 2023. In the funding application process, NASA and NSF required OSU to disclose, among other things, foreign government support received by any principal investigator (PI) or co-PI on the grant application. Further, since 2011, federal law prohibits the use of grant funds for collaborations with the PRC, PRC Universities, or any PRC-owned companies. The settlement resolves allegations that OSU failed to disclose the collaboration and affiliation with, or funding received from, the PRC by certain OSU employees working on NASA and NSF grants.
Specifically, the settlement resolves allegations that since 2014, annual Faculty Activity Reports submitted to OSU identified affiliations with PRC universities and state-run research organizations, but OSU did not disclose this information to NASA or NSF. In addition, OSU learned in 2019 that a Principal Investigator (PI) on NASA grants was a participant in a Thousand Talents Program, a program established by the PRC to recruit individuals with knowledge or access to foreign technology intellectual property, but OSU did not notify NASA or NSF until four years later in 2023. The United States identified additional OSU employees who worked on those grants and were affiliated with, or collaborated with, or received funding from, the PRC.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1459616/dl
Sanctions
Department of State
Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures Against Foreign Persons, Including a Ban on U.S. Government Procurement
August, 4, 2026: 91 Fed. Reg. 49481: The Department of State made a determination that a number of foreign persons have engaged in activities that warrant the imposition of measures pursuant to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA). The measures when into effect on July 24, 2026.
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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security
Removal From the Entity List
August 24, 2026: 91 Fed. Reg. 54657: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by removing Atempo Proje Taahhut Ses ve Goruntu Sistemleri Anonim Sirketi Istanbul Subesi, Bulent Ecevit Bulvar in Turkey from the Entity List)
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-08-24/pdf/2026-17230.pdf
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Revisions to the Entity List
August 24, 2026: 91 Fed. Reg. 54658: Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) revises the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by removing two addresses associated with Arrow Electronics (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd. from the Entity List under the destination of China, People’s Republic of (China).
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2026-08-24/pdf/2026-17231.pdf
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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
The following is a summary of OFAC actions for August 1 through August 30, 2026.
- Issuance of Amended Venezuela-related General License and Frequently Asked Question
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260803
- Counter Terrorism Designations Removals and Update
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260805
- Targeting Enablers of the Cuban Regime’s Arms Imports and Foreign Military Cooperation
- Cuba-related Designations; Issuance of Cuba-related Frequently Asked Question
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260806
- Counter Terrorism and Iran-related Designations; Counter Narcotics Designations Removals; Issuance of Amended Iran-related Frequently Asked Question
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260807
- Advancing the United States’ Campaign to Address the Threat Posed by the International Criminal Court
- https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/08/advancing-the-united-states-campaign-to-address-the-threat-posed-by-the-international-criminal-court/
- International Criminal Court-related Designations; Venezuela-related Designation; Issuance of International Criminal Court-related General License
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260818
- Treasury Sanctions Major Ecuador-Based Cocaine Network Linked to Violent Gangs and Mexican Cartels
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0610
- Treasury Increases Sanctions on Hizballah and Targets Network Smuggling Millions in Cash for Hizballah
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0611
- Imposing Sanctions on Cuban Regime Actors Associated with Marxist Subversive Networks and Corrupt Economic Dealings
- Counter Narcotics, Counter Terrorism, Cuba-related, and Iran-related Designations; Issuance of Russia-related General License; Issuance of Associated Frequently Asked Questions
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260820
- Issuance of Venezuela-related General Licenses and Associated Frequently Asked Question
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20260821
- Treasury Launches Unprecedented Campaign Against Iranian Regime on Economic D-Day
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0613/
- United States Implements Operation Economic Outcast with Sanctions Targeting Iran’s Military Activities and Procurements, and Petroleum and Petrochemical Product Traders
- Treasury and State Departments Deliver Additional Sanctions Relief on Syria
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0612/
- Removal of Syria’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism and Associated Sanctions List Updates; Iran-related Designations; Updates to Iran-related General Licenses
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