MARCH 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through March 31, 2023. The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

REGULATORY UPDATES

President

President Biden Continued The National Emergency Regarding Ukraine

March 2, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 13285: President Biden has continued for one year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13660 of March 6, 2014, as expanded by Executive Order 13661 of March 16, 2014, Executive Order 13662 of March 20, 2014, and Executive Order 14065 of February 21, 2022, and relied on for additional steps taken in Executive Order 13685 of December 19, 2014, and Executive Order 13849 of September 20, 2018, with respect to Ukraine.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/02/2023-04522/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-ukraine

*******

President Biden Continued The National Emergency Regarding Venezuela

March 2, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 13287: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for one year the national emergency regarding Venezuela declared in Executive Order 13692 of March 8, 2015, and relied on for additional steps taken in Executive Order 13808 of August 24, 2017, Executive Order 13827 of March 19, 2018, Executive Order 13835 of May 21, 2018, Executive Order 13850 of November 1, 2018, Executive Order 13857 of January 25, 2019, and Executive Order 13884 of August 5, 2019.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/02/2023-04531/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-venezuela

*******

President Biden Continued The National Emergency Regarding Zimbabwe

March 2, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 13289: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for one year the national emergency regarding Zimbabwe declared in Executive Order 13288 of March 6, 2003, as expanded by Executive Order 13469 of July 25, 2008, and as relied on for additional steps taken in Executive Order 13391 of November 22, 2005.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/02/2023-04532/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-zimbabwe

*******

President Biden Continued The National Emergency Regarding Iran

March 13, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 15595: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for 1 year the national emergency with respect to Iran declared in Executive Order 12957 of March 15, 1995. On May 6, 1995, the President issued Executive Order 12959, imposing more comprehensive sanctions on Iran to further respond to this threat. On August 19, 1997, the President issued Executive Order 13059, consolidating and clarifying those previous orders. The President took additional steps pursuant to this national emergency in Executive Order 13553 of September 28, 2010; Executive Order 13574 of May 23, 2011; Executive Order 13590 of November 20, 2011; Executive Order 13599 of February 5, 2012; Executive Order 13606 of April 22, 2012; Executive Order 13608 of May 1, 2012; Executive Order 13622 of July 30, 2012; Executive Order 13628 of October 9, 2012; Executive Order 13645 of June 3, 2013; Executive Order 13716 of January 16, 2016, which revoked Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, 13645, and provisions of Executive Order 13628; Executive Order 13846 of August 6, 2018, which revoked Executive Orders 13716 and 13628; Executive Order 13871 of May 8, 2019; Executive Order 13876 of June 24, 2019; Executive Order 13902 of January 10, 2020; and Executive Order 13949 of September 21, 2020. The emergency declared by Executive Order 12957 constitutes an emergency separate from that declared on November 14, 1979, by Executive Order 12170, in connection with the hostage crisis. This renewal, therefore, is distinct from the emergency renewal of November 8, 2022.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/13/2023-05300/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-iran

*******

Presidential Biden Waived Statutory Requirements Pursuant to Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as Amended, on Department of Defense Supply Chains Resilience

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense

March 2, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 13015: President Biden waived statutory requirements pursuant to Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (the “Act”) (50 U.S.C. 4533). President Biden determined, pursuant to section 303(a)(7)(B) of the Act, that action is necessary to avert shortfalls in critical Department of Defense supply chains that would severely impair national defense capability. Therefore, President Biden waived the requirements of section 303(a)(1)-(a)(6) of the Act for supply chains enumerated in the June 2021 White House report titled “Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-Based Growth: 100-Day Reviews Under Executive Order 14017” and the February 2022 Department of Defense report titled “Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains: An Action Plan Developed in Response to President Biden's Executive Order 14017,” specifically for defense organic industrial base supply chains critical to the Department of Defense and critical supply chains for electronics, kinetic capabilities, castings and forgings, minerals and materials, and power and energy storage. Ensuring a robust, resilient, and sustainable domestic industrial base is essential to our national security and the preservation of domestic critical infrastructure.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/02/2023-04421/presidential-waiver-of-statutory-requirements-pursuant-to-section-303-of-the-defense-production-act

*******

President Biden Announced A National Cybersecurity Strategy

March 2, 2023: The White House has announced a National Cybersecurity Strategy. This strategy seeks to build and enhance collaboration around five pillars: (i) Defend critical infrastructure, (ii) Disrupt and dismantle threat actors, (iii) Shape market forces to drive security and resilience, (iv) Invest in a resilient future, and (v) Forge international partnerships to pursue shared goals. To realize the vision these pillars layout, the strategy calls for making two fundamental shifts in how the United States allocates roles, responsibilities, and resources in cyberspace. In realizing these shifts, the strategy aspires not just to improve U.S. defenses, but to change those underlying dynamics that currently contravene its interests.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-2023.pdf

*******

President Biden Signed A Presidential Determination (PD) Authorizing The Use Of Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III Authorities To Rebuild And Expand The Nation's Domestic Hypersonics Industrial Base

March 6, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 13657: President Joe Biden has signed a presidential determination (PD) authorizing the use of Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III authorities to rebuild and expand the nation's domestic hypersonics industrial base. The authority specifically targets air-breathing engines, advanced avionics, guidance systems, as well as constituent materials for hypersonic systems. The Department of Defense is leveraging this authority to strategically accelerate the transition of operational prototypes and advanced manufacturing technologies across the spectrum of airbreathing engines and advanced avionics position, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems. Kinetic capabilities, including those for hypersonic systems, were one of the key focus areas in President Biden's Executive Order 14017, "America's Supply Chains." The efforts executed under these authorities will be part of a larger DoD strategy to ensure the United States preeminence in these game-changing technologies as well as a partnership with allied nations seeking similar capabilities. The PD allows the Office of Defense Production Act Investments (DPAI), part of the Manufacturing Capability Expansion and Investment Prioritization (MCEIP) office, to leverage DPA Title III purchases and purchase commitments to support the modernization and expansion of the hypersonics industrial base. Applications for funding related to the above authority may be submitted through the DPA Title III Open Funding Opportunity Announcement.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/06/2023-04617/presidential-determination-pursuant-to-section-303-of-the-defense-production-act-of-1950-as-amended

*******

President Biden Signed Executive Order Regarding Operational Use Of Commercial Spyware

March 27, 2023: President Biden signed Executive Order that the United States Government shall not make operational use of commercial spyware that poses significant counterintelligence or security risks to the United States Government or significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or foreign person. In furtherance of the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States, this order accordingly directs steps to implement that policy and protect the safety and security of United States Government institutions, personnel, information, and information systems; discourage the improper use of commercial spyware; and encourage the development and implementation of responsible norms regarding the use of commercial spyware that are consistent with respect for the rule of law, human rights, and democratic norms and values. The actions directed in this order are consistent with the policy objectives set forth in section 6318 of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (NDAA FY 2023) (Public Law 117-263) and section 5502 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (NDAA FY 2022) (Public Law 117-81).

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/03/27/executive-order-on-prohibition-on-use-by-the-united-states-government-of-commercial-spyware-that-poses-risks-to-national-security/

*******

President Biden Pursuant To Section 303 Of The Defense Production Act Of 1950 Determined Printed Circuit Boards and Advanced Packaging Are Essential To National Defense

March 27, 2023: President Biden pursuant to Section 303 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (the “Act”) (50 U.S.C. 4533), determined that printed circuit boards and advanced packaging, their components, and the manufacturing systems that produce such systems and components are industrial resources, materials, or critical technology items essential to national defense; without Presidential action under section 303 of the Act, United States industry cannot reasonably be expected to provide the capability for the needed industrial resource, material, or critical technology item in a timely manner; and purchases, purchase commitments, or other action pursuant to section 303 of the Act are the most cost-effective, expedient, and practical alternative method for meeting the need. Action to expand the domestic production capability for printed circuit boards and advanced packaging is necessary to avert an industrial resource or critical technology item shortfall that would severely impair national defense capability.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/03/27/memorandum-on-presidential-determination-pursuant-to-section-303-of-the-defense-production-act-of-1950-as-amended-on-printed-circuit-boards-and-advanced-packaging-production-capability/

*******

President Biden Continues The Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative

March 30, 2023: President Biden and the United States continues to put human rights at the center of U.S. foreign policy. The Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative – launched at the first Summit for Democracy as part of the Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal – is a multilateral effort intended to counter state and non-state actors’ misuse of goods and technology that violate human rights. During the Year of Action following the first Summit, the United States led an effort to establish a voluntary, nonbinding written code of conduct outlining political commitments by Subscribing States to apply export control tools to prevent the proliferation of goods, software, and technologies that enable serious human rights abuses. Written with the input of partner countries, the Code of Conduct complements existing multilateral commitments and will contribute to regional and international security and stability.

In addition to the United States, the governments that have endorsed the voluntary Code of Conduct are: Albania, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Kosovo, Latvia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The Code of Conduct is open for all Summit for Democracy participants to join.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3257-2023-03-30-bis-press-release-echri-code-of-conduct/file

*******

U.S. Congress

The U.S. House Of Representatives Passed House Bill H.R. 1093 That Requires The Department Of State To Report To Congress On State Department Efforts To Implement The Advanced Capabilities Pillar Of The Trilateral Security Partnership Between Australia, The United Kingdom (UK), And The United States (AUKUS)

March 22, 2023: The U.S. House of Representatives passed House bill H.R. 1093, that requires the Department of State to report to Congress on State Department efforts to implement the advanced capabilities pillar of the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States. (One of the goals of the partnership is to develop and provide joint advanced military capabilities, such as artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and electronic warfare.)

The report must include (1) the average and median times for the U.S. government to review applications for export licenses for defense articles or services to the governments and persons (entities and individuals) of Australia or the UK, (2) information about certain violations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations by the governments or persons of Australia or the UK, and (3) recommended changes to the export control laws and regulations of the three partnership countries to implement the partnership.

https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1093?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22hr1093%22%7D

*******

Department of State

DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

March 1 through 31, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

Change in Name from S.C. Harris Assured Communications S.R.L. to L3Harris Assured Communications Romania S.R.L. due to corporate restructuring;
Change in Name from TAE Aviation Pty Ltd. to TAE Aerospace Pty Ltd. due to merger;
Change in Name from AeroTech Pro to Sabena technics ATP due to acquisition;
Change in Names from Herley Industries Inc. and Herley-CTI Inc. to Herley Industries LLC and Herley-CTI LLC due to a reincorporation after sale to CAES Systems Holdings LLC.

*******

The U.S. Department Of State Updates The DS-6004, DS-4294, and DSP-85 Forms To Include A Block For Voluntary Disclosure Numbers

March 2, 2023: The U.S. Department of State’s IT Modernization Team updated the DS-6004 (Block 10), DS-4294 (Block 11), and DSP-85 (Block 9) forms in the DECCS Licensing application by adding new voluntary disclosure field questions. This update will allow industry to report a disclosure previously filed with the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance (DTCC) when submitting one of the listed licenses. If you have any questions on the new field updates, please submit a support ticket on DECCS Self-Service.

Due to the update referenced above, the U.S. Department of State recommend that all users of DECS clear their cache to ensure that they can view the latest updates.

Reference this FAQ for how to clear your cache:

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/)?id=ddtc_public_portal_faq_detail&sys_id=d7f093331b2624502dc36311f54bcbd7

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events

See our July 2022 newsletter for more details on the Open General Licenses

******

The Department Of State, Directorate Of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Extends Validity Period Of Open General Licenses By Three Years

March 27, 2023: On July 13, 2022, the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) issued two open general licenses as part of a pilot program pursuant to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. parts 120-130, § 120.22(b). These open general licenses were originally published with a validity period of one year, effective August 1, 2022, through July 31, 2023.

DDTC has now updated both open general licenses to extend their validity period by three years and update citations for certain referenced ITAR sections that have since moved. Extending the validity period of the open general licenses by three years was necessary in order to allow DDTC to collect sufficient data to consider the usefulness of the Open General License pilot program and to provide industry with sufficient certainty to be able to rely on the open general licenses without fear that they could expire more quickly than a traditional license.

DDTC has also made other non-substantive edits to both open general licenses to clarify that multiple defense articles need not be reexported or retransferred simultaneously and that the open general licenses can be used to reexport or retransfer a single defense article.

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events

*******

U.S. Department of Defense

The U.S. Department Of Defense Is Proposing To Amend The DFARS To Enable The Defense Contract Management Agency To Obtain Export Authorizations From Certain Contractors

March 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 17357: The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is proposing to amend the DFARS to enable the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to obtain export authorizations from certain contractors. Specifically, when a contract requires government quality assurance surveillance oversight and has delivery to, or production or performance in, government quality assurance countries, DoD proposes to require the contractor to provide relevant export authorizations ( i.e., export license exemptions, export license exceptions, export licenses, or other approvals) to the cognizant DCMA administrative contracting officer along with contact information for the empowered official or the export point of contact. Government quality assurance countries include the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Republic of Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

DCMA has found that a significant amount of time is required to determine whether or not a contractor's export license allows for foreign auditors to perform required quality assurance functions in lieu of DCMA. Currently, DCMA is not able to review the export authorization unless their personnel travel to the contractor's worksite. If DCMA is able to receive and review an export authorization from the contractor to determine whether or not they can delegate the work to foreign auditors, this problem would be resolved.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/22/2023-05676/defense-federal-acquisition-regulation-supplement-export-controlled-items-dfars-case-2018-d053

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Taiwan

March 1, 2023: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy one hundred (100) AGM-88B High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM); twenty-three (23) HARM training missiles; two hundred (200) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); four (4) AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM Guidance Sections; and twenty-six (26) LAU-129 multi-purpose launchers. Also included are LAU-118A missile launchers with Aircraft Launcher Interface Computer (ALIC); HARM missile containers; AIM-120 control sections and containers; AIM-120C Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM); dummy air training missiles (DATM), integration and test support and equipment; munitions support and support equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories and repair and return support; classified software; maintenance and maintenance support; classified publications and technical documentation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost is $619 million. The principal contractors will be Raytheon Missiles and Defense, Tucson, AZ; and Lockheed Martin Corporation, Bethesda, MD. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement would be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor(s).

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-f-16

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Australia

March 7, 2023: The Government of Australia has requested to buy up to two hundred fifty-five (255) Javelin FGM-148F missiles (includes five (5) fly-to-buy missiles). Also included are U.S. technical assistance, consisting of Tactical Air Ground Missiles (TAGM) Project Office technical assistance and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost is $60.18 million. The prime U.S. contractor will be the Javelin Joint Venture between Lockheed Martin in Orlando, FL, and Raytheon Missiles and Defense in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-javelin-fgm-148f-missiles
*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

March 7, 2023: The Government of Japan has requested to buy up to five (5) E-2D Advanced Hawkeye Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft; twelve (12) T56-A-427A Engines (10 installed, 2 spares); six (6) Multifunction Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio System Terminals (5 installed, 1 spare); five (5) APY-9 Radars (installed); five (5) AN/AYK-27 Integrated Navigation Control and Display Systems (installed); twelve (12) LN-251 Embedded Global Positioning Systems/Inertial Navigation Systems with Embedded Airborne Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module or M-Code Receiver (10 installed, 2 spares); and six (6) ALQ-217 Electronic Support Measures Systems (5 installed and 1 spare). Also included are aircraft ancillary equipment; modifications; spare and repair parts; support equipment; publications and technical documentation; software; personal protective equipment; personnel training and training equipment; ferry services; U.S. Government and contractor logistics, engineering, and technical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $1.381 billion. The principal contractor will be Northrop Grumman Corporation Aerospace Systems, Melbourne, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-e-2d-advanced-hawkeye-ahe-airborne-early-warning-and-control

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Australia

March 16, 2023: The Government of Australia has requested to buy up to two hundred (200) Tomahawk Block V All Up Rounds (AUR) (RGM-109E); and up to twenty (20) Tomahawk Block IV All Up Rounds (AUR) (RGM-109E). Also included is support for all three segments of Australia’s Tomahawk Weapon System (TWS) including the All Up Round (AUR), the Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System (TTWCS), and the Theater Mission Planning Center (TMPC). The support consists of unscheduled missile maintenance; spares; procurement; training; in-service support; software; hardware; communication equipment; operational flight test; engineering and technical expertise to maintain the TWS capability; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost is $895 million. The prime U.S. contractor will be Raytheon Missiles and Defense, Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-tomahawk-weapon-system

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Poland

March 16, 2023: The Republic of Poland has requested to buy eight hundred (800) AGM-114R2 Hellfire missiles; and four (4) M36 Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM). Also included is Tactical Aviation Ground Munition Program Office technical assistance; Security Assistance Management Directorate technical assistance; Joint Attack Munition Systems technical assistance; Classified and Unclassified publications; spare parts; repair and return; storage; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated cost is $150 million. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Corporation, Orlando, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-hellfire-missiles

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Greece

March 17, 2023: The Government of Greece has requested to buy sixty-three (63) Assault Amphibious Vehicles, Personnel Variant (AAVP-7A1), nine (9) Assault Amphibious Vehicles, Command Variant (AAVC-7A1), four (4) Assault Amphibious Vehicles, Recovery Variant (AAVR-7A1), and sixty-three (63) 50-Caliber Machine Guns (Heavy Barrel). Also included are MK-19 Grenade Launchers, M36E T1 Thermal Sighting Systems (TSS), supply support (spare parts), support equipment (including special mission kits/tools/Enhanced Applique Kits (EAAK)), training, technical manuals (unclassified), technical data, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical support and assistance (including Contractor Engineering Technical Services (CETS)), Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) management services, parts obsolescence remediation, calibration services, transportation, Follow-on Support (FOS), Return, Repair and Reshipment of unserviceable repairable. There is not a principal contractor associated with this potential sale. Consequently, there are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/greece-assault-amphibious-vehicles-aavs

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Bahrain

March 29, 2023: The Government of Bahrain has requested to buy equipment and services to refurbish twenty-four (24) Excess Defense Article (EDA) AH-1W multi-role helicopters. Included are services to refurbish a full-motion Aircraft Procedures Trainer (APT), M272A1 missile launchers and spare T-700-GE-401 aircraft engines, spare parts, support, training, publications, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $350 million. The principal contractor will be Bell Corporation, Fort Worth, TX. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/bahrain-ah-1w-helicopter-refurbishment

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Kuwait

March 29, 2023: The Government of Kuwait has requested to buy additional Cartridge Actuated Device/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD) and support that will be added to a previously implemented case that was under the Congressional notification threshold. The original FMS case, valued at $48.2 million, included CAD/PAD items and support for Calendar Years 2025-2026 (CY25-CY26). This notification is for CAD/PAD items and support of Kuwait’s F/A-18 and KC-130/J aircraft fleet. Also included is engineering, technical, and program support and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated cost is $59.1 million. The principal contractors are currently unknown, as there will be competitive contract solicitations after FMS case implementation. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kuwait-cartridge-actuated-devicepropellant-actuated-devices-cadpad-and

*******

Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

March 2, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), issued a Tri-Seal Compliance Note: Cracking Down on Third-Party Intermediaries Used to Evade Russia-Related Sanctions and Export Controls to alert the international community, the private sector, and the public to attempts by malign actors to continue to try to evade sanctions and export controls to support Russia’s military-industrial complex in support of Russia’s illegal and unprovoked war against Ukraine. The Compliance Note details how Russia uses third-party intermediaries and transshipment points to circumvent restrictions and obscure the true identities of Russian end users. The Compliance Note provides common red flags that can indicate a third-party intermediary may be engaged in efforts to evade sanctions or export controls.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20230302_33 and https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20230302_compliance_note.pdf

*******

The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and U.S. Customs & Border Protection

New BIS License Types C65 – (TGL) Temporary General License and C66 – (SCAL) Supply Chain Authorization Letter

March 15, 2023: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and U.S. Customs & Border Protection, created two new License Types for the Automated Export System.

New License Code C65 (TGL):

An update has been made to AES to create new License Codes C65 “Temporary General License” (TGL), which authorizes certain exports, reexports, in-country transfers, and exports from abroad destined to or within China or Macau by companies not headquartered in Country Groups D:1 or D:5 or E (see supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) to continue or engage in integration, assembly (mounting), inspection, testing, quality assurance, and distribution of items covered by ECCN 3A090, 4A090, and associated software and technology in ECCN 3D001, 3E001, 4D090, or 4E001; or any item that is a computer, integrated circuit, “electronic assembly” or “component” and associated software and technology, specified elsewhere on Commerce Control List (supplement no. 1 to part 774), which meets or exceeds the performance parameters of ECCN 3A090 or 4A090. The full terms of this Temporary General License are described in General Order No. 4 of in paragraph (d) in supplement no. 1 to part 736 of the EAR.

AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C65 (TGL) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES.

Report License Code: C65 Temporary General License (TGL)
Allowable ECCNs: 3A090, 4A090, 3D001, 3E001, 4D090, 4E001, or any item that is a computer, integrated circuit, “electronic assembly” or “component” and associated software and technology, specified elsewhere on Commerce Control List (supplement no. 1 to part 774), which meets or exceeds the performance parameters of ECCN 3A090 or 4A090.
Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)

Please refer to “General Order No. 4” in paragraph (d) in supplement no. 1 to part 736 of the EAR for additional requirements for this Temporary General License. This does not authorize the export, reexport, in-country transfer, or export from abroad to “end-users” or “ultimate consignees” in China or Macau. This Temporary General License does not overcome the license requirements of §§ 744.11 or 744.21 when an entity listed in supplements no. 4 or 7 to part 744 is a party to the transaction as described in § 748.5(c) through (f) of the EAR, or when there is knowledge of any other prohibited end use or end user. This Temporary General License is only for companies that engage in the specific activities authorized under this Temporary General License. This Temporary General License and its associated License Code (TGL) are valid for use through April 7, 2023.

New License Code C66 (SCAL):

An update has been made to AES to create License Type Code C66 “Supply Chain Authorization Letter” (SCAL). The BIS Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Administration issued a number of such letters in response to specific requests based on exigent circumstances of actual or potential supply chain disruptions. Recipients of Supply Chain Authorization Letters must comply with the specific terms issued by BIS in such letters. A Supply Chain Authorization Letter is only valid for use by the original recipient of the letter or by parties authorized therein.

AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C66 (SCAL) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES. Supply Chain Authorization Letter

Report License Code: C66 Supply Chain Authorization Letter (SCAL)
Allowable ECCNs: All, including EAR99.
Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)

https://content.govdelivery.com/bulletins/gd/USDHSCBP-34ee05e?wgt_ref=USDHSCBP_WIDGET_2#:~:text=An%20update%20has%20been%20made,or%20E%20(see%20supplement%20no.

*******

U.S. Census Bureau

New AESDirect Navigation in Modernized ACE Portal

March 29, 2023: Census launched the AESDirect User Interface (UI) in the Modernized ACE portal to the Account level. In response to some changes in the Modernized ACE portal, ACE filers are now required to launch the AESDirect UI from the Account menu by selecting “Submit AES Filing”. Below are the steps of the required navigation to launch the AESDirect UI moving forward:

Step 1 – Sign in to the Modernized ACE portal at: https://ace.cbp.gov/;

Step 2 – Launch ‘Exporter’ under the ‘Accounts’ drop-down menu;

Step 3 – Select the appropriate Exporter Account to use by clicking the hyperlink for the account under the ‘Account Name’ column; and

Step 4 – Click “Submit AES Filing” on the right side of the screen to launch the AESDirect UI.

LATEST SANCTIONS, FINES & PENALTIES

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

Sanctions

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

March 2, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 13673: The Bureau of Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 37 entities under 38 entries to the Entity List. These entities are listed under the destinations of Belarus (1), Burma (3), the People's Republic of China (China) (28), Pakistan (4), Russia (1), and Taiwan (1). Some entities are added under multiple entries, accounting for the difference in the totals. This final rule also modified ten existing entries on the Entity List under the destination of China. For the reasons described above, this final rule adds the following 37 entities under 38 entries to the Entity List and includes, where appropriate, aliases:

Belarus:

DMT Trading LLC.

Burma:

FISCA Security & Communication Co., Ltd.;
Ministry of Transport and Communications; and
Naung Yoe Technologies Co., Ltd.

China:

4Paradigm Technology Co., Ltd.;
AIF Global Logistics Co., Ltd.;
Aispeed Industry Ltd.;
Arttronix International (HK) Ltd.;
Baoding Giant Import and Export Co., Ltd.;
Baoding Shimaotong Enterprises Services Co., Ltd.;
Beijing Zhengyuan Chuangshi Consulting Co., Ltd.;
BGI Research;
BGI Tech Solutions (Hongkong) Co., Ltd.;
Forensic Genomics International;
Galaxy Electronics;
Gaobeidian Kaituo Precise Instrument Co., Ltd.;
Hongtai Electric Ltd.;
Inspur Group Co., Ltd.;
Jotrin Electronics Ltd.;
Korchina Logistics (HK) Ltd.;
Liang Ping Huang;
Loongson Technology;
Luo Dingwen;
Nanjing colpak Mechanical Equipment Co., Ltd.;
Nanjing Jiuding Refrigeration & Air-conditioning Equipment Co., Ltd.;
National Research Center for Parallel Computer Engineering and Technology;
Qingdao National Laboratory of Marine Science and Technology;
Rayscience Optoelectronics Innovation Co., Ltd.;
Sunton Tech Hong Kong Ltd.;
Suzhou Centec Communications Co., Ltd.;
Suzhou Centec Technology Co., Ltd.; and
Wuxi Institute of Advanced Technology.

Pakistan:

Abdul Razaq Asim;
Add-On Technology;
Dynamic Engineers; and
Nanjing Jiuding Refrigeration & Air-conditioning Equipment Co., Ltd.

Russia

DMT Electronics.

Taiwan

Neotec Semiconductor Ltd.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/06/2023-04558/additions-and-revisions-of-entities-to-the-entity-list

*******

March 24, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 17706: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 32 persons to the Unverified List (UVL). Of the 32 persons being added, one is under each of the following destinations: Bulgaria, Canada, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore; 14 are under the destination of China, two are under the destination of Germany, four are under the destination of Turkey, and five under the destination of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Supplement no. 6 to part 744 is amended:

Bulgaria:

Vera Yordanova.

Canada:

Skymount Drones.

China:

Airpart Consolidated Trading;
ECOM International (HK) Co., Ltd.;
Guangzhou Trusme Electronics Technology Co., Ltd.;
HK P&W Industry Co. Ltd. (HKPW);
Jet-Prop International Forwarding (HK) Ltd.;
Kesina Services;
Lightstar Technology Ltd.;
Shandong Yuehaitongxin Keji Ltd.;
Shengwei Technology Co., Ltd.;
Small Leopard Electronics Co., Ltd.;
Solar Way (Hong Kong) Ltd.;
Sunway Technology Electronics Ltd.;
USETA Tech (HK) Ltd.; and
Winners Global Trading Co.

Germany:

In Time Forwarding & Courier e.K; and
One Light GMBH.

Indonesia:

PT Smart Cakrawala Aviation.

Israel:

CNG Labs.

Malaysia:

Golden Gamp Sdn Bhd.

Saudi Arabia:

Al Gihaz Co., Ltd. for Contracting and Trading.

Singapore:

Smart Cakrawala Aviation.

Turkey:

BLC Havacilik Saglik Medikal Insaat Elektrik Ic ve Dis Ticaret;
Odak Kimya; Piro Deniz Motorlari; and
Üçüzler Lojistik Gida Tekstil.

United Arab Emirates:

Al Kabiru Trading LLC;
BNS Hardware;
Delma Industrial Supply & Marine Services;
Diamond River General Trading; and
Masoud Afghan General Trading.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/24/2023-06171/revisions-to-the-unverified-list

*******

March 28, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 18983: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding eleven entities to the Entity List under the destinations of Burma, the People's Republic of China (China), Nicaragua, and Russia. These eleven entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. In this rule, BIS also amends the EAR to explicitly confirm that the foreign policy interest of protecting human rights worldwide is a basis for adding entities to the Entity List.

Burma:

Miya Win International Ltd.;
Myanmar New Era Trading Company Ltd.; and
Suntac Group.

China:

Luopu Haishi Dingxin Electronic Technology Co., Ltd.;
Moyu Haishi Electronic Technology Co., Ltd.;
Pishan Haishi Yong'an Electronic Technology Co., Ltd.;
Urumqi Haishi Xin'an Electronic Technology Co., Ltd.; and
Yutian Haishi Meitian Electronic Technology Co., Ltd.

Nicaragua:

Nicaraguan National Police (NNP).

Russia:

Aviatech Supply Ltd.; and
Aviazapchast PLC.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/30/2023-06663/additions-to-the-entity-list-amendment-to-confirm-basis-for-adding-certain-entities-to-the-entity

*******

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

March 1, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three entities and two individuals illicitly generating revenue in support of the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

Hwang, Kil Su of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and North Korea; and
Pak, Hwa Song of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and North Korea.

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

Chilsong Trading Corporation of North Korea;
Congo Aconde SARL of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and
Korea Paekho Trading Corporation of North Korea.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1313 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20230301

*******

March 2, 2023: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has published an Alert "Notice of Fraudulent Communications Requesting Payments involving OFAC" to make the public aware of telephone, email, and letter scams involving individuals falsely claiming to represent OFAC and requesting payments. One example involves timeshare fraud schemes, where scammers have falsely claimed that OFAC has “blocked” payments of taxes made by the timeshare owner.

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20230302_ofac_alert_timeshare_fraud.pdf

OFAC also issued Iran General License O "Authorizing Wind-Down and Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions Involving Certain Vessels" and two related Frequently Asked Questions (1119 and 1120).

Iran General License O: The following transactions are authorized through 12:01 a.m. Eastern daylight time, June 30, 2023, provided that any payment to a blocked person, including any blocked entity described below in this general license, must be made into a blocked account and reported to the Office of Foreign Assets Control consistent with § 501.603 of the Reporting, Procedures, and Penalties Regulations, 31 CFR part 501:

(1) All transactions prohibited by section 5 of Executive Order (E.O.) 13846 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of any transaction involving any vessel in which one or more entities described below in this general license, have an interest, including the vessels described in the Annex to this general license (the “blocked vessels”); and

(2) All transactions prohibited by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 (ITSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to any of the following activities involving the blocked vessels or entities described below in this general license:

(i) The safe docking and anchoring of any of the blocked vessels in port;

(ii) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; and

(iii) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.

The authorizations of this general license apply to the following entities:

(1) Golden Lotus Oil Gas and Real Estate Joint Stock Company;

(2) Swedish Management CO SA;

(3) Shanghai Xuanrun Shipping Company Limited;

(4) Global Marine Ship Management Co., Ltd.; or

(5) Any entity in which one or more of the above entities own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

This general license does not authorize:

(1) The offloading of any Iranian-origin petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products;

(2) The entry into any new commercial contracts involving the blocked vessels or the entities described in above in this general license. Any transactions otherwise prohibited by section 5 of E.O. 13846 or the ITSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to section 5 of E.O. 13846 or the ITSR other than the blocked entities described above unless separately authorized.

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/iran_glo.pdf

Question 1119: Does General License (GL) O authorize all wind-down transactions for any vessel that was blocked on March 2, 2023? What if the vessel contains Iranian-origin merchandise?

Answer: Iran GL O authorizes U.S. persons to wind down all transactions otherwise prohibited by section 5 of Executive Order 13846 involving any vessel blocked as part of the March 2, 2023 designation (“blocked vessels”), subject to certain conditions. This includes, among other activities, the unloading of any non-Iranian merchandise loaded on the blocked vessel as of March 2, 2023, provided there is no other sanctions nexus.

U.S. persons are separately prohibited, pursuant to the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 (ITSR), from engaging in most Iran-related transactions. Accordingly, for blocked vessels containing Iranian-origin merchandise or involving persons ordinarily resident in Iran, Iran GL O provides a separate, more limited authorization under the ITSR. This narrower authorization under the ITSR allows only transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to certain limited safety and environmental situations: the safe docking and anchoring of any of the blocked vessels in port, the preservation of the health and safety of the crew, or emergency repairs or environmental mitigation or protection activities. The offloading of Iranian-origin petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products, regardless of the situation, is not authorized pursuant to Iran GL O and requires a specific license from OFAC.

U.S. financial institutions may also process transactions conducted by non-U.S. persons if such transactions would be authorized for U.S. persons pursuant to Iran GL O. Iran GL O is in effect until 12:01 Eastern daylight time, June 30, 2023. Persons unable to complete authorized transactions involving the blocked vessels specified in Iran GL O before its expiration are encouraged to seek guidance from OFAC in advance of that date. As with all OFAC GLs, Iran GL O only authorizes against the authorities identified in the GL and contains certain conditions.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/1119

Question 1120: Do non-U.S. persons risk exposure to U.S. sanctions for engaging in transactions that U.S. persons would be authorized to engage in under Iran General License (GL) O?

Answer: No. Non-U.S. persons generally do not risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in activities or facilitating transactions for such activities that would be authorized for U.S. persons pursuant to GL O. Non-U.S. persons unable to wind down transactions in accordance with Iran GL O before 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 30, 2023, are encouraged to seek guidance from OFAC in advance of that date.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/1120

In addition, the following updates have been made to OFAC's list of Specially Designated Nationals:

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

Bushehr Petrochemical Company of Iran;
Corporativo Title I, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
Corporativo Ts Business Inc, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
Global Marine Ship Management CO., LTD. of China;
Golden Lotus Oil Gas And Real Estate Joint Stock Company of Vietnam;
Integracion Badeva, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
JM Providers Office, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
Promotora Vallarta One, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
Recservi, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
Servicios Administrativos Fordtwoo, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
Shanghai Xuanrun Shipping Company Limited, of China;
Shiraz Petrochemical Company of Iran;
Swedish Management CO SA, of the United Arab Emirates; and
TS Business Corporativo, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico.

The following vessels have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

AMIAS Chemical/Products Tanker Vietnam flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9342786;
Cattle Force Livestock Carrier Togo flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9175901;
Dolphin LPG Tanker Sao Tome and Principe flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9052331;
Forever Rich Chemical/Products Tanker Hong Kong flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9203928;
Full Star Chemical/Products Tanker Hong Kong flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9773301;
Gas Cathar LPG Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9250505;
Gladiator Tug Togo flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 7621011;
Golden Bridge Bulk Carrier Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9218301;
Golden Light 09 Bulk Carrier Vietnam flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9445057;
Golden Phoenix Bulk Carrier Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9224790;
Hercules Offshore Tug/Supply Ship Togo flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9558517;
Jamaica Crude Oil Tanker Vietnam flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9230098;
Lauren LPG Tanker Tuvalu flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9249685;
Liang Sheng Chemical/Products Tanker Hong Kong flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9526693;
Rising Eagle Bulk Carrier St. Vincent and the Grenadines flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9073672;
Rising Falcon Bulk Carrier St. Vincent and the Grenadines flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9105396;
Rising Harrier Bulk Carrier St. Vincent and the Grenadines flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9122291;
Xuan Ning Chemical/Products Tanker China flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9349095;
Yong Xiang 29 Chemical/Products Tanker China flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8744107;
Yong Xin Chemical/Products Tanker Hong Kong flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9203930.

https://www.state.gov/designating-iran-sanctions-evaders/ and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20230302

*******

March 3, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Elena Anatolievna Lenskaya, Andrei Andreevich Zadachin, and Danila Yurievich Mikheev for their involvement in serious human rights abuse against human rights defender, prominent opposition leader, author, and historian Vladimir Kara-Murza (Kara-Murza). These individuals are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world.

Kara-Murza has been a major advocate for the adoption of Magnitsky-style sanctions authorities by the United States, Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom to target human rights abusers and corrupt actors in Russia. U.S. Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) called Kara-Murza “one of the most passionate and effective advocates for passage of the Magnitsky Act.” Sergei Magnitsky, the namesake of Magnitsky sanctions, was an attorney and auditor who uncovered a large-scale tax fraud scheme by Russian officials and was then arrested and detained by Russian authorities, subjected to physical abuse and psychological pressure, and died in a pretrial detention center in Moscow.

Kara-Murza was arrested in Moscow in April 2022 for speaking out against Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Since then, the Kremlin has had additional politically motivated charges brought against Kara-Murza, and he currently faces the prospect of more than 35 years in prison. Governments and human rights organizations around the world have called for Kara-Murza’s release. In January 2022, the Department of State launched the “Without Just Cause” campaign, which calls for the release of Kara-Murza and other political prisoners globally. In May 2022, Amnesty International determined Kara-Murza to be a prisoner of conscience. In November 2022, Canada designated all three individuals for systematic human rights violations in Russia against opposition leaders, including Vladimir Kara-Murza.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

Kozlov, Ilya Pavlovich of Russia;
Lenskaya, Elena Anatolievna of Russia;
Mikheev, Danila Yurievich of Russia;
Mishchenko, Diana Igorevna of Russia;
Sviridenko, Oleg Mikhailovich of Russia; and
Zadachin, Andrei Andreevich of Russia.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1320 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20230303

********

March 8, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned several Iranian regime officials and entities, including two senior officials in Iran’s prison system who have been responsible for serious human rights abuses against women and girls. OFAC also took action against the top commander of the Iranian army and a high-ranking leader in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as an Iranian official who was central to the regime’s efforts to block internet access. Finally, OFAC is sanctioning three Iranian companies and their leadership for enabling the violent repression by the Iranian Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) of peaceful protestors, including many women and girls. Iran’s prisons are notorious for mistreatment, abuse, and death. Women prisoners, especially, suffer sexual violence, torture, and other cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

Abdollahinejad, Bahram of Iran;
Amiri, Mahdi of Iran;
Asgharian, Reza of Iran;
Bakhshi, Dariush of Iran;
Chaharmahali, Ali of Iran;
Mousavi, Sayyed Abdolrahim of Iran;
Ramezanian Sani, Gholamreza of Iran; and
ShahsavarI, Habib of Iran.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

Entebagh Gostar Sepehr Company of Iran;
Naji Pars Amin Institute of Iran; and
Naji Pas Company of Iran; of Iran.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1327 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20230308

*******

March 9, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 39 entities constituting a significant “shadow banking” network, one of several multi-jurisdictional illicit finance systems which grant sanctioned Iranian entities, such as Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Commercial Co. (PGPICC) and Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd. (Triliance), access to the international financial system and obfuscate their trade with foreign customers. Iranian exchange houses create front companies abroad to enable trade on behalf of their Iranian clients, with foreign currency transactions maintained via internal ledgers. PGPICC is the marketing arm of sanctioned Iranian petrochemical conglomerate Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company (PGPIC), which generates the equivalent of tens of billions of dollars annually for the Iranian regime.

OFAC also designated a network of five companies and one individual for supporting Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) procurement efforts. This People’s Republic of China-based network is responsible for the sale and shipment of thousands of aerospace components, including components that can be used for UAV applications, to the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA). HESA has been involved in the production of the Shahed-136 UAV model that Iran has used to attack oil tankers and has exported to Russia. HESA was designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 on September 17, 2008, for being owned or controlled by Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and for having provided support to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The following individual has been added to OFAC's SDN List:

Yuan, Yun Xia of China.

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

Al Kashaf Petroleum And Petrochemical Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
Albahr Alaahmar Energy FZE of the United Arab Emirates;
Albahr Alaahmar Offshore Refined Oil Product Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
Alliance Energy PVT. Limited of Pakistan;
Alshivan Line Trading FZE of the United Arab Emirates;
Bavi General Trading Co L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
Bordo Plastic Materials Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
Dayan Global Trade Dis Ticaret Ithalat Ihracat Sanayi Ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi of Turkey;
Dragon Trading Limited of the Marshall Islands;
Fairtrade Non Edible Oil And Liquefied Natural Gas Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
Famin FZE of the United Arab Emirates;
Foraben Trading Limited of China;
Global Visiness PTE. LTD., of China and Singapore;
Glotreasure Company Limited of China;
Goldenix Co., Limited of China;
Greenland Oil & Gas Trading FZE of the United Arab Emirates;
Guilin Alpha Rubber & Plastics Technology CO., LTD of China;
Hangzhou Fuyang Koto Machinery CO., LTD of China;
Herstel Trading Limited of the Marshall Islands;
HK Sihai Yingtong Industry Co., Limited of China;
Hongkong Canway Co., Limited of China;
Hongkong Well International Trading Limited of China;
Horryzin International Trade Co., Limited of China;
Jin Xin Nuo Trading Limited of China;
Kambiz Nabizadeh And Partners Exchange of Iran;
Longford Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
Lowell Limited of China;
Marafi International Trading Co., Limited of China;
Mehr Petrochemical Company of Iran;
Melikal For Medical & Medicine Trading Co., Limited of China;
Multi Well Trading Co., Limited of China;
Naab Kimya Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi of Turkey;
Nashville HK Limited of China;
Ningbo More Interest I/E CO., LTD. of China;
Nord Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
QI Group Limited of China;
Raven International Trade Limited of China;
S&C Trade PTY CO., LTD of China;
Salita Trade Limited of China;
Shams Alrabeea Chemicals Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
Shenzhen Caspro Technology CO., LTD of China;
Sparrow Trading FZE of the United Arab Emirates;
Unite Resources Co., Limited of China; and
Univest Limited of China.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1330 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1331 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20230309

*******

March 15, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) made the following Balkans-related Designations and Counter Narcotics Designation to its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List:

Gacanin, Edin of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Dubai, United Arab Emirates; and The Netherlands;
Mehmedagic, Osman of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
Stankovic, Dragan of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20230315

*******

March 21, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), designated four entities and three individuals in Iran and Turkey for their involvement in the procurement of equipment, including European-origin engines of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in support of Iran’s UAV and weapons programs. This procurement network operates on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which oversees several firms involved in UAV and ballistic missile development.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

Bukey, Murat of Turkey;
Mahmoudi, Asghar of Iran;
Paidar, Amanallah of Iran.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

Defense Technology And Science Research Center of Iran;
Farazan Industrial Engineering, Inc. of Iran;
Ozone Havacilik Ve Savunma Sanayi Ticaret Anonim Sirketi of Turkey; and
Selin Technic Co of Iran.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1355 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20230321

*******

March 24, 2023: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended the Belarus Sanctions Regulations and reissued them in their entirety.

OFAC also published an alert, "Sanctions Risks Associated with Provision of Jet Fuel to the Burmese Military."

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20230324_ofac_alert_jet_fuel.pdf

OFAC also designated two individuals and six entities that are connected to Burma’s military and that have enabled the military regime’s continuing atrocities, including through the importation, storage, and distribution of jet fuel to Burma’s military. These actions come as the military regime prepares to mark the 78th Armed Forces Day. The two individuals and six entities are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O) 14014.

OFAC also designated three entities and nine individuals and identifying one presidential aircraft as blocked property, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14038. These designations build on sanctions imposed on individuals and entities in Belarus in response to the ongoing brutal crackdown against the pro-democracy movement and civil society surrounding the fraudulent August 2020 presidential election. These actions also underscore the United States’ willingness to hold the regime in Minsk to account for its complicity in the Russian Federation’s ongoing unjustified war of choice against Ukraine.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

Baldouskaya, Alena Anatolieuna of Belarus;
Duk, Dzyanis Uladzimiravich of Belarus;
Fedasenka, Katsyaryna Alyaksandrauna of Belarus;
Ivankovich, Valery Valerievich of Belarus;
Karpenka, Ihar Vasilyevich of Belarus and Russia;
Kuntsevich, Alena Kanstantsinauna of Belarus;
Latt, Tun Min of Burma;
Nikiforovich, Sergei Olegovich of Belarus;
Soe, Win Min of Burma;
Tkachou, Alyaksandr Henadzievich of Belarus;
Yuzhyk, Alyaksandr Uladzimiravich of Belarus.

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

Asia Sun Group of Burma;
Asia Sun Trading Co. Ltd. of Burma;
Cargo Link Petroleum Logistics Co. Ltd. of Burma;
Open Joint Stock Company Belarusian Automobile Plant of Belarus;
Open Joint Stock Company Minsk Automobile Plant of Belarus;
Star Sapphire Group Of Companies of Burma;
Star Sapphire Group Pte. Ltd., of Singapore; and
Star Sapphire Trading Company Limited of Burma.

The following aircraft have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

EW-001PA; Aircraft Manufacture Date 29 Jan 2002; Aircraft Model B.737-8EV BBJ2; Aircraft Manufacturer's Serial Number (MSN) 33079; Aircraft Tail Number EW-001PA.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20230324 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1365 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1364

*******

March 28, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action in coordination with counterparts in the United Kingdom to designate key individuals supporting the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (al-Assad) and the production or export of Captagon, a dangerous amphetamine. The trade in Captagon is estimated to have become a billion-dollar illicit enterprise. These designations, some of which are being implemented pursuant to the Caesar Syrian Civilian Protection Act of 2019 (“Caesar Act”), also highlight the important role of Lebanese drug traffickers, some of whom maintain ties to Hizballah in facilitating the export of Captagon. This action also underscores the al-Assad family's dominance of illicit Captagon trafficking and its funding for the oppressive Syrian regime.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

Abu Zureik, Imad of Syria;
Al-Assad, Samer Kamal of Syria;
Al-Assad, Wassim of Syria;
Daqqou, Hassan Muhammad of Syria;
Qaddour, Khalid of Syria; and
Zaitar, Noah of Syria and Lebanon.

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

Al-Israa Establishment For Import And Export of Lebanon; and
Hassan Daqqou Trading of Lebanon.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1369 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20230328

*******

March 30, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned one individual, Mkrtychev Ashot, for attempting to facilitate arms deals between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Sanctions and export controls imposed by a coalition of over 30 countries have constrained Russia’s ability to replace lost military equipment and supplies with modern technology. At the same time, the United States and its partners are continuing to provide Ukraine with advanced weapons to defend itself against Russia’s brutal war of choice.

Between the end of 2022 and early 2023, Mkrtychev worked with DPRK officials to obtain over two dozen kinds of weapons and munitions for Russia in exchange for materials ranging from commercial aircraft, raw materials, and commodities to be sent to the DPRK. Mkrtychev’s negotiations with DPRK and Russian officials detailed mutually beneficial cooperation between North Korea and Russia to include financial payments and barter arrangements. He confirmed Russia’s readiness to receive military equipment from the DPRK with senior Russian officials. Mkrtychev’s negotiations with those officials indicated that necessary Russian preparations for a proposed deal were complete and that they were ready to receive materials from and transfer materials to the DPRK. He also provided DPRK officials with information from Russian officials, likely connected to his attempts to obtain military equipment for Russia from DPRK. Lastly, Mkrtychev worked with a Russian individual to locate commercial aircraft suitable for delivery to the DPRK.

The following individual has been added to OFAC's SDN List:

Mkrtychev, Ashot of Slovakia.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1377 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20230330

*******

March 31, 2023: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issued Global Magnitsky General License 7, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Tabacalera del Este S.A. or Tabacos USA Inc. Pursuant to the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement."

Global Magnitsky General License 7: All transactions prohibited by the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 583 (GMSR), involving Tabacalera del Este S.A. (“TABESA”), Tabacos USA Inc. (“Tabacos”), or any entity in which TABESA or Tabacos owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to payments under the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), entered into on November 23, 1998, between certain U.S. state and territory attorneys general and certain tobacco companies, are authorized.

This general license does not authorize any transaction otherwise prohibited by the GMSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the GMSR other than the blocked persons described in paragraph (a) of this general license, unless separately authorized.

OFAC is also issued one Global Magnitsky-related Frequently Asked Question (1121).

Question 1121: What does Global Magnitksy General License 7, Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Tabacalera del Este, S.A. or Tabacos USA Inc., Pursuant to the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, authorize?

Answer: Global Magnitsky General License 7 authorizes certain transactions involving the blocked entities Tabacos USA Inc. (Tabacos) and Tabacalera del Este S.A. (Tabesa) (or any entity in which Tabesa or Tabacos owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest) that are ordinarily incident and necessary to payments under the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) entered into on November 23, 1998, between certain U.S. state and territory attorneys general and certain tobacco companies. On January 26, 2023, OFAC designated former Paraguayan president Horacio Manuel Cartes Jara (Cartes) pursuant to Executive Order 13818 for involvement in corruption and also designated Tabacos for being owned or controlled by Cartes. On March 31, 2023, OFAC identified Tabesa as an entity that is owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by Cartes and added Tabesa to the SDN List.

Global Magnitsky General License 7 does not authorize debits to any blocked account on the books of a U.S. financial institution or any other transactions otherwise prohibited by the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations.

Additionally, the following name has been added to OFAC's list of Specially Designated Nationals:

Tabacalera Del Este S.A. of Paraguay.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1121 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230331 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931551/download?inline

*******

Fines and Penalties

March 1, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $332,500 settlement with Godfrey Phillips India Limited ("GPI"). GPI, a Mumbai, India-registered tobacco company, has agreed to settle its potential civil liability for five apparent violations of the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 510. Specifically, between July and August 2017, GPI requested payment in U.S. dollars for its indirect exportation of tobacco to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. One of these five payments was directed to the foreign branch of a U.S. financial institution. OFAC determined that GPI did not voluntarily self-disclose the apparent violations and that the apparent violations constitute a non-egregious case.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20230301_33 and https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20230301_gpi.pdf

*******

March 2, 2023: Two Kansas men, Cyril Gregory Buyanovsky, 59, of Lawrence, and Douglas Robertson, 55, of Olathe, were arrested on charges related to a years-long scheme to circumvent U.S. export laws that included the illegal export of aviation-related technology to Russia after Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, and the imposition of stricter restrictions on exports to Russia.

According to the indictment, Buyanovsky and Robertson owned and operated KanRus Trading Company, which supplied Western avionics equipment (i.e., electronics installed in aircraft) to Russian companies and provided repair services for equipment used in Russian-manufactured aircraft. Since 2020, the defendants have conspired to evade U.S. export laws by concealing and misstating the true end users, value, and end destinations of their exports and by transshipping items through third-party countries. For example, between November 2020 and February 2021, the defendants received avionics equipment, including a computer processor bearing a sticker identifying Russia’s Federal Security Services (FSB), from a Russian company for repair in the United States. The defendants concealed the true end user and end destination by providing a fraudulent invoice to the shipment company identifying the end destination as Germany.

As further alleged, on Feb. 28, 2022, the defendants attempted to export avionics to Russia. U.S. authorities detained the shipment, and the U.S. Department of Commerce informed the defendants that a license was required to export the equipment to Russia. In an April 2022 communication, Robertson expressed to a Russia-based customer that “things are complicated in the USA” and that “[t]his is NOT the right time for [more paperwork and visibility].” Subsequently, in May, June, and July 2022, the defendants illegally transshipped avionics through Armenia and Cyprus to Russia without obtaining the required licenses.

The defendants are charged with conspiracy, exporting controlled goods without a license, falsifying and failing to file electronic export information, and smuggling goods contrary to U.S. law. If convicted, they face a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for each count of exporting controlled goods without a license, up to 10 years in prison for each count of smuggling, and up to five years in prison for each count of conspiracy and falsifying export information. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factor.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-us-citizens-arrested-illegally-exporting-technology-russia

*******

March 2, 2023: Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Ericsson), a multinational telecommunications company headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden, has agreed to plead guilty and pay a criminal penalty of more than $206 million after breaching a 2019 Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA). Ericsson breached the DPA by violating the agreement’s cooperation and disclosure provisions. Based on the same underlying criminal conduct that gave rise to the DPA, Ericsson will plead guilty to engaging in a long-running scheme to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) by paying bribes, falsifying books and records, and failing to implement reasonable internal accounting controls in multiple countries around the world.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ericsson-plead-guilty-and-pay-over-206m-following-breach-2019-fcpa-deferred-prosecution

*******

March 8, 2023: The United States of America obtained a warrant to seize a Boeing 737-7JU aircraft owned by PJSC Rosneft Oil Company (Rosneft), a Russian integrated energy company headquartered in Moscow, Russia headed by Igor Ivanovich Sechin. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York authorized the seizure, finding probable cause that the Boeing aircraft was subject to seizure based on violations of the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) and the recent sanctions issued against Russia.

Since February 2022, when the Russia sanctions went into effect, the plane has left and reentered Russia at least seven times, in violation of federal law. The Boeing jet, which was manufactured in the United States, was last in the United States in March 2014 and is currently believed to be in, traveling to, or from Russia.

Rosneft—which is headed by sanctioned oligarch Igor Ivanovich Sechin, who owns the Boeing aircraft. The Boeing was flown from a foreign country to Russia in violation of the Export Control Reform Act (“ECRA”), and regulations issued thereunder, including the Russia sanctions. The Boeing is believed to be valued at over $25 million.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/united-states-obtains-warrant-seizure-airplane-owned-russian-oil-company-valued-over

*******

March 9, 2023: Nathan Nichols, a 46-year-old resident of Corpus Christi, TX was sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas to 27 months in federal prison, immediately followed by two years of supervised release. He pleaded guilty to conspiring to steal government property and operating an illegal gambling business on March 21, 2022.

In July 2021, authorities executed a search warrant at Nichols’ residence. They discovered sensitive military equipment, including laser range finders, thermal scopes, night vision scopes, night vision goggles, and laser aiming devices that belonged to the U.S. Army. During his trial, Nichols admitted that he conspired with others to steal sensitive U.S. Army property valued at $2,176,000 from Fort Hood in June 2021. He had been in contact with one of the people responsible for the theft and requested pictures of the property before agreeing to buy it for resale. After he obtained the items, Nichols listed them for sale on eBay.

In a separate case, Nichols admitted that from March 2018 to August 2019, he operated illegal gambling businesses in Corpus Christi. Nichols was the co-owner of Theo's Bar and owner and operator of Lady Luck. Both facilities contained illegal sweepstakes games that people play by using computers and monitors rather than casino-style equipment. The games are software-based and function as traditional slot-machine games or “8-liners,” but the reels are simulated on a computer screen rather than on mechanical reels. People playing the machines place bets before each spin and receive winnings in cash.

With his guilty pleas, Nichols agreed to forfeit $2,185,218.73 in proceeds from his illegal activities.

https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/texas-man-imprisoned-conspiring-steal-sensitive-military-equipment-running-illegal

*******

March 9, 2023: A federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment charging an Iranian national with the unlawful export of electrical cables and connectors from the United States to Iran through Hong Kong. According to court documents, Mehdi Khoshghadam, a.k.a. “David Lei,” and “Pouyan,” an Iranian national residing in Tehran, Iran, were indicted by a grand jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on one count of conspiracy, one count of violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. The indictment also includes a forfeiture allegation seeking all proceeds of the alleged crimes. A warrant has been issued for Khoshghadam’s arrest, and he remains a fugitive.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/iranian-national-charged-illegally-exporting-electrical-equipment-iran

*******

March 9, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 14601: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Edgar Ariel Bernal-Gonzalez for five years until June 10, 2026. On June 10, 2021, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Edgar Ariel Bernal-Gonzalez (“Bernal-Gonzalez”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Bernal-Gonzalez was convicted of smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico approximately 50 rounds of 9 mm ammunition, approximately 50 rounds of .38 caliber ammunition, one MEC-GAR Colt 38 magazine, one AK-47 Quad rail system, and 12 rubber rifle rail guards. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Bernal-Gonzalez to 10 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/09/2023-04821/in-the-matter-of-edgar-ariel-bernal-gonzalez-11932-lake-june-road-balch-springs-tx-75180-order

*******

March 9, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 14598: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Erick Samuel Chavez Gonzalez for seven years until August 12, 2027. On August 12, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, Erick Samuel Chavez Gonzalez (“Chavez Gonzalez”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Chavez Gonzalez was convicted of knowingly and willfully attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico various rifles and handguns. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Chavez Gonzalez to 37 months in prison, with credit for time served, three years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/09/2023-04820/in-the-matter-of-erick-samuel-chavez-gonzalez-pluton-1708-satelite-cd-juarez-chih-mexico-order

*******

March 9, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 14600: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Mohammad Khazrai Shaneivar for ten years until October 1, 2030. On October 1, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Mohammad Khazrai Shaneivar (“Shaneivar”) was convicted of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq.) (“IEEPA”). Specifically, Shaneivar was convicted of exporting and causing to be exported goods from the United States to Iran without the required authorizations from the United States Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Shaneivar to a $100,000 criminal fine in lieu of probation or imprisonment and a $100 assessment.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/09/2023-04823/in-the-matter-of-mohammad-khazrai-shaneivar-16-udine-court-richmond-hill-ontario-l4c8c6-canada-order

*******

March 9, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 1414599: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Parisa Mohamadi for ten years until September 10, 2029. On September 10, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Parisa Mohamadi (“Mohamadi”) was convicted of two counts of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq.) (“IEEPA”). Specifically, Mohamadi was convicted of exporting and causing to be exported goods from the United States to Iran without the required authorizations from the United States Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced Mohamadi to 24 months in prison on each count, to run concurrently and with credit for time served, two years of supervised release, and a $200 assessment.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/09/2023-04822/in-the-matter-of-parisa-mohamadi-2906-fletcher-parkway-apartment-c-el-cajon-california-92020-order

*******

March 21, 2023: The U.S. Department of Justice unsealed two indictments charging multiple defendants with violations of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for their roles in separate schemes to procure and export U.S. technology to Iran between 2005 and 2013. In connection with this announcement, the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated three of the defendants and four entities for their involvement in the procurement of equipment that supports Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and weapons programs.

United States v. Paidar et al.

According to the indictment, between 2012 and 2013, defendants Amanallah Paidar of Iran, and Murat Bükey, of Turkey, conspired to procure and export U.S. technology for Iran through their companies Farazan Industrial Engineering in Iran, and Ozon Spor Ve Hobbi Ürünleri, in Turkey. Specifically, Paidar and Bükey exported from the United States and transshipped through Turkey a device that can test the efficacy and power of fuel cells and attempted to obtain a bio-detection system that has application in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) research and use.

Bükey, who was extradited to the United States from Spain in July 2022, pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the AECA and IEEPA in December 2022. He was sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to 28 months in prison, with credit for time served. He will be removed from the United States after completing his sentence. Paidar is a fugitive and remains at large.

United States v. Mahmoudi, et al.

According to the indictment, between 2005 and 2009, defendants Agshar Mahmoudi of Iran; Bahram Mahmoudi Mahmoud Alilou of Iran; and Shahin Golshani of the United Arab Emirates (UAE); conspired to obtain U.S. technology, including a high-speed camera that has known nuclear and ballistic missile testing applications, a nose landing gear assembly for an F-5 fighter jet, and a meteorological sensor system, through their companies Aran Modern Devices Kish Company, in Iran; and Modern Technologies, in the UAE. The defendants are fugitives and remain at large.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-and-sentence-connection-attempts-acquire-military

*******

March 24, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 17793: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Jesus Adrian Ramirez for ten years until December 16, 2030. On December 16, 2020, Ramirez was convicted of smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico firearms and firearm components, including one 40 round AK- 47 variant firearm magazine, two AK-47 variant firearm barrels, two AK-47 variant firearm bolts, two AK-47 variant firearm bolt springs, two AK-47 variant firearm gas pistons, and one AR variant firearm unfinished lower receiver. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Ramirez to 46 months of confinement with credit for time served, three years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/24/2023-06133/in-the-matter-of-jesus-adrian-ramirez-534-n-maknab-drive-apt-c-nogales-az-85621-and-154-w-mendibles

*******

March 24, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 17793: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Manuel Alonso Enriquez for ten years until September 17, 2030. On September 17, 2020, Enriquez was convicted of knowingly and unlawfully attempting to export from the United States to Mexico 3,000 rounds of 7.62 x 39 caliber ammunition. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Enriquez to 37 months in prison, three years of supervised release, a $150 criminal fine, and a $100 assessment.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/24/2023-06121/in-the-matter-of-manuel-alonso-enriquez-12129-st-laurence-avenue-el-paso-texas-79936-order-denying

*******

March 24, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 17794: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Gerardo Emmanuel Sifuentes for ten years until September 17, 2030. On September 17, 2020, Sifuentes was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Sifuentes was convicted of smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico approximately 5,000 rounds of 7.62 x39 caliber ammunition, an Anderson Manufacturing AR-15 rifle, and a Beretta 9mm handgun. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Sifuentes to 46 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and a $250 fine.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/24/2023-06131/in-the-matter-of-gerardo-emmanuel-sifuentes-247-val-verde-street-el-paso-tx-79905-3916-order-denying

*******

March 24, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 17795: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Erik Aguero for ten years until July 15, 2031. On July 15, 2021, Aguero was convicted of smuggling, and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico, various firearms defined under Category I of the United States Munitions List without the required license or written authorization. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Aguero to 48 months of confinement with credit for time served, three years of supervised release, a $100 assessment, and a $1,000 criminal fine.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/24/2023-06127/in-the-matter-of-enrique-reyes-morales-inmate-number-54549-509-fci-allenwood-low-federal

*******

March 24, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 17796: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Randy Lew Williams for ten years until March 3, 2031. On March 3, 2021, Williams was convicted of knowingly and willfully exporting and causing to be exported from the United States to Iraq Glock 19 gun barrels; Glock 19 slides, a Glock 19 recoil spring assembly, a Glock 19 slide stop lever, a Glock 19 trigger mechanism housing with ejector, and a Glock 19 trigger with trigger bar, which are designated as defense articles on the United States Munitions Lists, without having first obtained from the Department of State a license for such export or written authorization. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Williams to 40 months of confinement, two years of supervised release, and a $300 assessment. Williams was also placed on the U.S. Department of State’s debarred list.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/24/2023-06126/in-the-matter-of-randy-lew-williams-4009-oxford-way-norman-ok-73072-3231-order-denying-export

*******

March 24, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg 17797: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Genovevo Alvarez-Ronquillo for ten years until October 13, 2030. On October 13, 2020, Alvarez-Ronquillo was convicted of multiple counts of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Alvarez-Ronquillo was convicted of fraudulently and knowingly receiving, concealing, buying, selling, and facilitating the transportation, concealment, and sale of merchandise, specifically firearms, from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Alvarez- Ronquillo to 78 months in prison, two years of supervised release, and a $2,400 special assessment.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/24/2023-06132/in-the-matter-of-genovevo-alvarez-ronquillo-inmate-number-04312-151-fci-allenwood-low-federal

*******

March 24, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 17798: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Joseph Ormond Kirk for five years until October 5, 2026. On October 5, 2021, Kirk was convicted of smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico various firearms. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Kirk to 18 months of confinement, two years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/24/2023-06129/in-the-matter-of-joseph-ormond-kirk-iii-13204-saxby-court-austin-tx-78729-order-denying-export

*******

March 24, 2023: Igor Panchernikov, 41, a former Corona, CAresident who once served in the United States Air Force Reserves, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act. He has been in federal custody since July 2022 after being extradited to the United States from Israel.

According to his plea agreement, from December 2016 to May 2018, Panchernikov conspired with other individuals to knowingly export from the United States to Russia defense articles without obtaining from the State Department a valid license or other approval for such exports.

Panchernikov’s accomplices purchased defense articles – including thermal riflescopes, weapons sights, monoculars, and night vision googles – from various online sellers located in the United States and directed the sellers to mail those items to Panchernikov’s residence in Corona. At his Corona residence, Panchernikov received at least 19 defense articles that his co-conspirators purchased from online sellers. After receiving these items, Panchernikov inspected the items to ensure that they were undamaged and operational. Pursuant to his co-conspirators’ instructions, Panchernikov then mailed two of the items to accomplices in Russia and mailed 17 defense articles to Elena Shifrin, 61, of Mundelein, Illinois, who then mailed these items to Russia.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/former-us-serviceman-pleads-guilty-exporting-defense-items-such-night-vision-goggles

*******

March 27, 2023: Dariush Niknia was sentenced to two years and ten months in prison, and Richard Lant, was sentenced to 24 months of home detention and fined $7,500 for conspiracy to export to an embargoed country, Iran.

According to court documents, between May and October 2015, Niknia, Lant, and others conspired to unlawfully sell and supply 500 Russian-made tank helmets to Niknia’s contact in Tehran, Iran. The helmets were to be configured for a Russian-produced T-72S battle tank and were required to have a five-pin plug, a feature that is necessary to enable a tank communication device.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-edca/pr/elk-grove-and-las-vegas-residents-sentenced-conspiring-violate-us-trade-embargo-iran

*******

March 29, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 18518: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Obed Rafael Cuevas-Serratos for nine years until August 3, 2030. On August 3, 2021 Cuevas-Serratos was convicted of smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico approximately 13000 rounds of 7.62-millimeter ammunition. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced CuevasSerratos to 30 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/29/2023-06418/in-the-matter-of-obed-rafael-cuevas-serratos-1502-calle-del-norte-apt-11-laredo-tx-78041-6000-order

*******

March 29, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has renewed for 180 days the Temporary Denial Orders denying the export privileges of PJSC Aeroflot of Russia.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1486-e2825/file

*******

March 29, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has renewed for 180 days the Temporary Denial Orders denying the export privileges of UTair Aviation JSC of Russia.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1487-e2826/file

*******

March 29, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has renewed for 180 days the Temporary Denial Orders denying the export privileges of Azur Air of Russia.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1488-e2827/file

*******

March 29, 2023: A federal jury convicted three military contractors on one count of conspiring to defraud the United States and two counts of major fraud. According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, former Envistacom LLC President and co-founder Alan Carson, former Envistacom Vice President Valerie Hayes, and the owner of another company, Philip Flores, conspired to defraud the United States at least from September 2014 through November 2016, by preparing and procuring sham quotes for government contracts totaling over $7.8 million. Carson, Hayes, and Flores also fraudulently prepared “independent” government cost estimates and other procurement documents for the award of these contracts and made false statements, representations, and material omissions to federal government contracting officials regarding these estimates being legitimate independent cost estimates and the sham quotes being “competitive.”

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/military-contractors-convicted-7-million-procurement-fraud-scheme

*******

March 30, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a settlement with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”). Wells Fargo agreed to remit $30,000,000 to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of sanctions against Iran, Syria, and Sudan. For about seven years beginning in 2008 and ending in 2015, Wells Fargo and its predecessor, Wachovia Bank (“Wachovia”), provided a foreign bank located in Europe with software that the foreign bank then used to process trade finance transactions with U.S.-sanctioned jurisdictions and persons. Wachovia, at the direction of a mid-level manager, customized a trade insourcing software platform for general use by the European bank that Wachovia knew or should have known would involve engaging in trade-finance transactions with sanctioned jurisdictions and persons.

The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that Wells Fargo’s 124 apparent violations, which occurred between approximately December 27, 2010, and December 7, 2015, were voluntarily self disclosed. Moreover, while OFAC determined that the apparent violations were egregious, the failure by Wells Fargo to identify and prevent the apparent violations was not a result of a systemic compliance breakdown within the broader Wells Fargo organization, which OFAC acknowledges had a historically strong overall sanctions compliance program.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20230330_33 and https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20230330_wells_fargo.pdf

*******

March 30, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 19057: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Jose Luis Alonso for seven years until January 13, 2029. On January 13, 2022, Alonso was convicted of attempted smuggling from the United States to Mexico one (1) AM 15 pistol, one (1) .22 caliber rifle, and one (1) 12-gauge shotgun. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Alonso to 24 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/30/2023-06635/in-the-matter-of-jose-luis-alonso-3433-nottingham-drive-brownsville-tx-78526-and-2719-gibraltar

*******

March 30, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 19058: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Ye Sang “Ivy” Wang for ten years until December 21, 2031. On December 21, 2021, Wang was convicted of conspiring to willfully export from the United States to China, controlled military equipment and supplies for profit without the required licenses. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced Wang to 30 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and a $20,000 criminal fine. Pursuant to Section 1760(e) of the Export Control Reform Act (“ECRA”), the export privileges of any person who has been convicted of certain offenses, including, but not limited to, 18 U.S.C. 371, may be denied for a period of up to ten (10) years from the date of his/her conviction. 50 U.S.C. 4819(e). In addition, any Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) licenses or other authorizations issued under ECRA, in which the person had an interest at the time of the conviction, may be revoked.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/30/2023-06631/order-denying-export-privileges-in-the-matter-of-ye-sang-ivy-wang-972-red-granite-road-chula-vista

*******

March 30, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 19059: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Mario Ramirez-Rios for ten years until October 23, 2030. On October 23, 2020, Ramirez-Rios was convicted of attempted smuggling from the United States to Mexico: 3,280 rounds of 7.62 x 39mm ammunition and 200 rounds of 9 mm ammunition, items designated as defense articles on the United States Munitions List without the required license or written approval. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Ramirez-Rios to 46 months of confinement with credit for time served and a $100 special assessment.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/30/2023-06634/in-the-matter-of-mario-ramirez-rios-3724-magali-circle-brownsville-texas-78521

*******

March 31, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a settlement with Uphold HQ Inc. (“Uphold”). Uphold agreed to remit $72,230.32 to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of sanctions against Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. Between March 2017 and May 2022, Uphold or its affiliates processed 152 transactions totaling $180,575.80 in apparent violation of OFAC’s sanctions against Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. These apparent violations included processing transactions for customers who self-identified as being located in Iran or Cuba and for employees of the Government of Venezuela. The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that Uphold’s apparent violations were non-egregious and voluntarily self-disclosed.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230331_33 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931556/download?inline