AUGUST 2022 UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through August 31, 2022.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

 

The President

 

President Biden Continues The Export Administration Act Of 1979 For 1 Year

 

August 5, 2022: Fed. Reg. 48077: President Biden has determined that the national emergency declared on August 17, 2001, must continue in effect beyond August 17, 2022, as the implementation of certain sanctions authorities, including sections 11A, 11B, and 11C of such Export Administration Act of 1979, consistent with section 1766(b) of Public Law 115-232, the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 note), is to be carried out under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Thus, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the President has continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13222, as amended by Executive Order 13637 of March 8, 2013.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/08/05/2022-17049/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-export-control-regulations

 

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Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

 

August 8 through 29, 2022: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Change in Name for JENOPTIK Advanced Systems GmbH to VINCORION Advanced Systems GmbH due to acquisition;
  • Change in Name and Ownership for Oasis Systems, LLC to Engineering Research and Consulting, LLC due to acquisition;
  • Change in Name for Hawker Pacific NZ Limited to Jet Aviation NZ Limited due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name and Ownership for Triumph Aerospace, Inc. and its subsidiaries, due to acquisition:
Old Name New Name
Triumph Group, Inc. Radius Aerospace, Inc.
Triumph Fabrications – Fort Worth, Inc. Radius Aerospace – Fort Worth, Inc.
Triumph Fabrications – San Diego, Inc. Radius Aerospace – San Diego, Inc.
  • Change in Name for Hawker Pacific Asia Pte Ltd to Jet Aviation (Asia Pacific) Pte Ltd due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name for RUAG Australia Pty Ltd at C/o Finlaysons, Level 7, 43 Franklin Street, Adelaide, SA 5000 Australia to Rosebank Engineering Pty Ltd at 836 Mountain Highway, Bayswater, 3153 Victoria, Australia due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Address for Ametrine, Inc., 1007 North Orange Street, 4th Floor, Wilmington, Delaware 19801 to Ametrine, Inc. at 900 E Old Settlers Blvd, Suite 300, Round Rock, Texas 78664;
  • Change in Name for Jeppesen Poland Sp. z.o.o. to Boeing Poland Sp. z.o.o. due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name for Hawker Pacific Asia Pte Ltd (Philippines Branch) to Jet Aviation (Asia Pacific) Pte Ltd (Philippines Branch) due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name and Ownership for Progeny Systems Corporation to Progeny Systems, LLC due to acquisition by General Dynamics Mission Systems, Inc.;
  • Change in Name and Ownership for JENOPTIK Power Systems GmbH to VINCORION Power Systems GmbH due to acquisition;
  • Change in Name for Wärtsilä Defense, Inc. to Defense Maritime Solutions, Inc., due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Address for Avanade Spain S.L.U., Paseo de Gracia 11, 08007 Barcelona, Spain to Avanade Spain S.L.U. at Passeig Saint Gervasi n 51, planta 4, modulo B, 08022 Barcelona, Spain;
  • Change in Name for BAE Systems (International) Limited – Japan or BAE Systems (International) Limited Japan to BAE Systems Japan GK due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Address for STACATO LLC, 192 Halpine Road, Apt 3401, Rockville, MD 20852 to STACATO LLC, 12300 Carroll Ave., Rockville, MD 20852;
  • Change in Name and Ownership for Emirates Advanced Investments Group, LLC to Aerospace Investment Company due to acquisition by Aerospace Investment Company;
  • Change in Name for Airbus Operations GmbH and Premium AEROTEC GmbH to Airbus Aerostructures GmbH due to corporate reorganization;
  • Change in Address for Aero Precision Industries, Inc. at 2525 Collier Canyon Rd., Livermore, CA 94551 to 15501 SW 29th Street, Suite 101, Miramar, FL 33027;
  • Change in Address for General Dynamics Land Systems – Force Protection Inc. at 9801 Highway 78 Ladson, South Carolina 29456 to Edgefield Test Center, 2055 US Highway 25 N Edgefield, South Carolina 29824;
  • Change in Address for General Dynamics Land Systems – Australia Pty. Ltd. at 26 Williams Circuit, Pooraka, South Australia 5095, Australia to 01A, Innovation House, 50 Mawson Lakes Boulevard, Mawson Lakes, South Australia 5095, Australia.

 

 

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DDTC Final CJ Determinations Posted To Website

 

Editors note: To our readers, we have added recent Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) determinations to our newsletter. We believe some readers will find the government determinations enlightening.

 

June 8, 2022 through July 5, 2022: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following Final CJ Determinations on its website at: https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=6ea6afdcdbc36300529d368d7c96194b

 

Model Name Description Final Determination Date Final Determination Applicant
Palledrone-MX, Model Number MX01-0122, Part Number DMX22 Palledrone-MX, a heavy-lift drone designed to carry large payloads (up to 100 pounds) for up to 30 miles that is operated from a ground station laptop using open-source mission planning software 2022-07-05 Seek CCATS Rotor-X LLC
X-59 Quiet Supersonic Technology Low-Boom Flight Demonstrator, and Parts, Components, Accessories, Attachments, and Systems Therefor A U.S. government technology demonstrator, part of a research project to conduct flight validation of design tools and technologies applicable to low sonic boom aircraft in order to advance supersonic civilian passenger flight; the X-59’s constituent elements, including its engine 2022-07-05 USML Category XIX(a)(1) and (f)(1) – engine and specially designed parts, components, accessories, and attachments CCL ECCN 9A991.b – X-59 aircraft RWA – other X-59 parts, components, accessories, attachments, and systems Lockheed Martin Corp
Perimeter Surveillance Radar Software Version PSR EC and UC Perimeter surveillance software that enables connections between radars described on the USML and a computer to list radar contacts, as well as their precise speed and location 2022-06-24 USML Category XI(d) Teledyne Technologies Incorporated
Coil Form (Bobbin), Part Number 408246 A rigid plastic spool consisting of a tubular body with two round flanges at either end of the tube 2022-06-24 EAR99 Cosmo Plastics Co
Haven Retriever, Part Number 01 A spacecraft under development that can autonomously detect and track other satellites in real time using imaging, infrared, radar, or laser systems 2022-06-24 USML Category XV(a)(2) In Orbit Aerospace Inc
M1 Hardware Portal, Version 1 A standardized communication protocol, agnostic to the equipment it is connected to, that enables improved efficiency in facility management through smart hardware and robotics 2022-06-23 EAR99 Service Robotics & Technologies
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), Model Number M1025, Serial Number 013471 HMMWV that is designed to be an armament carrier and is based on the M966 TOW Missile HMMWV variant 2022-06-21 USML Category VII(b) Kenvas, Inc
Bus Defender with General Integrated Circuit and Bus Defender with Application Specific Integrated Circuit Hardware and firmware deployed in-line with a 1553 data bus to detect and block attacks 2022-06-21 Seek CCATS Peraton Corp
Software and Technology for Vericut Verification, Vericut Composites, and Vericut Drilling and Fastening Software and technology that simulates Computer Numerical Control (CNC) of manufacturing equipment to provide confidence that valuable resources will not be wasted in the manufacturing process 2022-06-21 USML when customized to simulate defense article production equipment or tooling (e.g., the technical data paragraphs for the following USML categories: VI(f)(5), XIII(k)(1), XVI(d), or XX(c)); otherwise, EAR99 CGTech
Media Swivel Rotary Joint (Two Channel Coolant and Two Channel Air), Part Number P770HP-2/2HANS1 A device for transferring cooling fluids and cooling air between the base of a radar station and its rotating antenna 2022-06-21 USML Category XII(e)(1) United Equipment Accessories, Inc
Fusion Imaging Monocular AGM F14, Models AP and APW, Part Numbers 7152521111012F14 and 7152521121012F14 Thermal imaging and night vision devices 2022-06-13 USML Category XII(c)(1)(ii) AGM Global Vision LLC
TAKBox System, Model Revision A, Part Number MST-000048-000 i A rugged field-case desktop computer with peripherals in a pelican case that includes interfaces to connect to power, USB, and Ethernet 2022-06-08 Seek CCATS Human Systems Integration, Inc.

 

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Effective September 6, 2022, All DECCS Applications Will Reflect Revised ITAR Citations

 

August 29, 2022: The U.S. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) announced that its website and the Defense Export Control and Compliance System (DECCS) application are being updated with the new ITAR citations to reflect regulatory changes taking effect on Sept. 6, 2022, as a result of the ITAR Reorganization Rule 1 (87 FR 16396, Mar. 23, 2022). Updates are being made on a rolling basis. As DDTC updates its web pages, some ITAR references on the website may be temporarily outdated. DDTC expects these changes to be completed and updated no later than September 9th.  Effective September 6, all DECCS applications (Registration, Licensing, Advisory Opinions, and Commodity Jurisdictions) will reflect the revised ITAR citations.

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events

 

Editors Note: The revised citations for definitions in the ITAR Part 120 will create requirements for the update of training programs, compliance plans, manuals and procedures, which should be updated as soon as possible.

 

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U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry & Security

 

BIS Issued An Interim Final Rule That Establishes New Export Controls On Four Technologies That Meet The Criteria For Emerging And Foundational Technologies

 

August 12, 2022: The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule that establishes new export controls on four technologies that meet the criteria for emerging and foundational technologies under Section 1758 of the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) and are essential to the national security of the United States. These Section 1758 technologies support the production of advanced semiconductors and gas turbine engines. These four technologies are among the items that the 42 Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement reached a consensus to control at the December 2021 Plenary. The United States additionally controls a wider range of technologies, including additional equipment, software, and technology used to produce semiconductors, beyond the items agreed upon in the Wassenaar Arrangement.

 

The four technologies covered by the rule include two substrates of ultra-wide bandgap semiconductors: Gallium Oxide (Ga2O3), and diamond; Electronic Computer-Aided Design (ECAD) software specially designed for the development of integrated circuits with Gate-AllAround Field-Effect Transistor (GAAFET) structure; and Pressure Gain Combustion (PGC) technology.

 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3116-2022-08-12-bis-press-release-wa-2021-1758-technologies-controls-rule/file

 

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U.S. Senate

 

Senator Rubio Calls For New Export Control Laws To Protect America’s National And Economic Security

 

August 18, 2022: U.S. Senator Marco Rubio called for new export control laws to protect America’s national and economic security due to a report that the U.S. Department of Commerce approves nearly every request to sell semiconductors, aerospace components, artificial intelligence assets, and other sensitive technologies to Chinese companies, according to an analysis of trade data conducted by the Wall Street Journal.

During last month’s debate over the $280 billion CHIPS and Science Act, Rubio criticized the lack of safeguards in the bill, specifically calling attention to the flexibility granted to Commerce to broaden the definition of “legacy chips.” The Journal’s new analysis suggests Commerce will continue to expand the type of semiconductors U.S. companies are allowed to produce in China.

https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2022/8/rubio-calls-for-new-export-control-laws and https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-approves-nearly-all-tech-exports-to-china-data-shows-11660596886

 

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

 

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines, and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Sanctions

 

The U.S. Department of State:

 

ODTC Posts Frequently Asked Questions Regarding New Temporary Open General Export Licenses 1 and 2

 

August 1, 2022: The U.S. Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) post Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) regarding the two new temporary Open General Export Licenses that went into effect August 1, 2022.  See the following link to review the FAQs:

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_faq_cat&topic=6acdbfe8db3bc30044f9ff621f96197e&subtopic=56bf93251b8159d0c6c3866ae54bcbd8#56bf93251b8159d0c6c3866ae54bcbd8

 

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Visa Restrictions Imposed By The Department of State

 

August 2, 2022: The United States is committed to working alongside our allies and partners to further impose severe consequences on President Putin and his enablers for Russia’s unconscionable war against Ukraine.

 

The Department of State imposed the following Visa restrictions:

  • Visa restrictions on 893 Russian Federation officials, including members of the Federation Council and members of Russia’s military, pursuant to a policy under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that restricts visa issuance to those who are believed to have supported, been actively complicit in, or been responsible for ordering or otherwise directing or authorizing actions that threaten or violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of Ukraine.
  • Visa restrictions on 31 foreign government officials who have acted to support Russia’s purported annexation of the Crimea region of Ukraine pursuant to a policy under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of INA that restricts visa issuance to those who are believed to have supported, been actively complicit in, or been responsible for ordering or otherwise directing or authorizing actions that threaten or violate the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of Ukraine.

 

The Department of State designated the following Russian oligarchs, Dmitriy Pumpyanskiy, Andrey Melnichenko, And Alexander Ponomarenko.

 

The Department of State designated the following four individuals and one entity that are or are enabling illegitimate political leaders installed by Russia or its proxy forces to undermine political stability in Ukraine in support of Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine. The four individuals and the entity were designated pursuant to Section 1(a)(ii)(F) of E.O. 14024 for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in, activities that undermine the peace, security, political stability, or territorial integrity of the United States, its allies, or its partners, for or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, directly or indirectly, the Government of the Russian Federation:

  • Salvation Committee For Peace And Order;
  • Kostyantyn Volodymyrovych Ivashchenko;
  • Volodymyr Vasilyovich Saldo;
  • Kyrylo Serhiyovych Stremousov; and
  • Sergey Vladimirovich Yeliseyev.

 

Pursuant to Section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the Department of State designated Joint Stock Company State Transportation Leasing Company (JSC GTLK).

 

Pursuant to Section 1(a)(vii) of E.O. 14024, the Department of State designated the following four JSC GTLK subsidiaries for being owned or controlled by or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, JSC GTLK. These companies leased JSC GTLK’s transportation equipment outside of Russia and /or enabled JSC GTLK to access capital from western financial markets to fund its activities:

  • GTLK Europe Designated Activity Company;
  • GTLK Europe Capital Designated Activity Company;
  • GTLK Middle East Free Zone Company; and
  • GTLK Asia Limited.

 

Under the leadership of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Russian Federation has systematically focused on exploiting high-technology research and innovations to advance Russia’s defense capabilities. Putin has also repeatedly underscored his concerns about Russia’s access to microelectronics.  Advanced technologies such as microelectronics are used in numerous weapon systems used by Russia’s military.  The Department of State imposed sanctions on numerous Russian high-technology entities as a part of the United States’ efforts to impose additional costs on Russia’s war machine, as follows:

 

  • Federal State Institution Of Higher Vocational Education Moscow Institute Of Physics And Technology (Moscow Institute Of Physics And Technology) (MIPT);
  • Skolkovo Foundation;
  • Skolkovo Institute Of Science And Technology (Skoltech) ;
  • Technopark Skolkovo Limited Liability Company;
  • Joint Stock Company Penzensky Nauchno Issledovatelsky Elektrotekhnichesky Higher Education Institution;
  • JSC Zelenograd Nanotechnology Center;
  • Joint Stock Company Institute Of Electronic Control Computers Named After I.S. Bruk;
  • Federal State Institution Federal Scientific Center Scientific Research Institute For System Analysis Of The Russian Academy Of Sciences;
  • Scientific And Production Association Of Measuring Equipment JSC;
  • Mitishinskiy Scientific Research Institute Of Radio Measuring Instruments;
  • Joint Stock Company Research Institute Of Electronic And Mechanical Devices;
  • JSC Svetlana Poluprovodniki;
  • Joint Stock Company Design Center Soyuz;
  • OJSC Scientific Research Institute Of Precision Mechanical Engineering;
  • Public Joint Stock Company Kremny;
  • Joint Stock Company Institute For Scientific Research Microelectronic Equipment Progress;
  • Joint Stock Company Voronezhsky Factory Poluprovodnikovykh Priborov Sborka;
  • Open Joint Stock Company Scientific And Production Enterprise Pulsar;
  • LLC Scientific Production Enterprise Digital Solutions;
  • Joint Stock Company Design Technology Center Elektronika;
  • Joint Stock Company Vologodsky Optiko Mekhanichesky Factory;
  • Federal State Budgetary Scientific Institution Research And Production Complex Technology Center;
  • JSC Scientific Research Institute Submicron; and
  • Academician A.L. Mints Radiotechnical Institute Joint Stock Company.

 

https://www.state.gov/imposing-additional-costs-on-russia-for-its-continued-war-against-ukraine/

 

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August 10, 2022: 87 Fed Reg 48748: The U.S. Department of State, Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance pursuant to section 38(g)(4) of the AECA and section 127.7(b) and (c)(1) of the ITAR, denied export privileges and statutorily debarred the following ten individuals as of the date of this notice:

 

  • Awer, Akeem Shonari;
  • Cabalceta, Oben;
  • Camaj, Rrok Martin;
  • Guerra, Claudia;
  • Sin, Aydan;
  • Sobrado, Roger;
  • Wang, Shaohua;
  • Wang, Ye Sang;
  • Xie, Tuqiang; and
  • Zhang, Jian.

 

At the end of the three-year period following the date of this notice, the above-named persons remain debarred unless a request for reinstatement from statutory debarment is approved by the Department of State.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/08/10/2022-17123/bureau-of-political-military-affairs-statutory-debarment-under-the-arms-export-control-act-and-the

 

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Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

August 2, 2022: The U.S. Commerce Department, through its Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), updated its list of aircraft that have flown into Russia or Belarus in apparent violation of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding the first 25 foreign-produced aircraft that BIS has identified as apparently violating the EAR’s de minimis threshold for U.S. components. There are now a total of 183 aircraft identified on the list for apparent violations of U.S. export controls. Based on publicly available information, BIS has identified aircraft subject to the EAR flying from third countries to Russia (since March 2—see background on EAR restrictions below) or Belarus since April 8 (see background on EAR restrictions below), all of which are owned or controlled by, or under charter or lease to, Belarus, Russia, or Russian or Belarusian nationals. In addition to U.S.-origin aircraft, foreign-produced aircraft that exceed a de minimis amount – greater than 25 percent – of controlled U.S.-origin content by value are also subject to the EAR. As a result, BIS identified 25 foreign-produced aircraft that are subject to the EAR due to meeting this de minimis threshold that has apparently violated BIS’s stringent export controls on Russia. A complete list of the 183 aircraft identified on the list for apparent violations of U.S. export controls is included at the following link:

 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3108-2022-08-02-bis-press-release-gp10-list-foreign-produced-de-minimis-additions/file

 

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August 24, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 51876: The Department of Commerce amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding seven entities under seven entries to the Entity List. These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States and will be listed on the Entity List under the destination of the People’s Republic of China (China). The seven entities are:

 

  • China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) 9th Academy 771 Research Institute;
  • China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) 9th Academy 772 Research Institute;
  • China Academy of Space Technology 502 Research Institute;
  • China Academy of Space Technology 513 Research Institute;
  • China Electronics Technology Group Corporation 43 Research Institute;
  • China Electronics Technology Group Corporation 58 Research Institute; and
  • Zhuhai Orbita Control Systems.

 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/federal-register-notices-1/3122-87-fr-51876-entity-list-rule-8-24-22/file

 

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August 24, 2022: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) denied the export privileges of the following individuals:

  • Aaron Abraham Villa (Mr. Villa) under the Export Administration Regulations for a period of five years from the date of Mr. Villa’s conviction on January 14, 2021, for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a). Specifically, Mr. Villa was convicted of knowingly and unlawfully concealing, buying, or facilitating the transportation and concealment or exportation of a Glock 21C .45 caliber Roni pistol conversion kit and magazines from the United States to Mexico, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Mr. Villa had an interest at the time of his conviction.

 

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1388-e2737/file

 

  • Ronald Adjei Danso (Mr. Danso) under the Export Administration Regulations for a period of five years from the date of Danso’s conviction on September 15, 2020, for violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C § 2778) (AECA). Specifically, Mr. Danso was convicted of knowingly and willfully attempting to export from the United States to the Republic of Ghana 20 firearms, which are designated as defense articles on the United States Munitions List, without first obtaining from the Department of State a license for such export or written authorization. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Mr. Danso had an interest at the time of his conviction.

 

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1389-e2738/file

 

  • Julio Cesar Vega-Amaral (Mr. Vega-Amaral) under the Export Administration Regulations for a period of seven years from the date of Mr. Vega-Amaral’s conviction on February 12, 2020, for violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a). Specifically, Mr. Vega-Amaral was convicted of knowingly attempting to export and exporting, from the United States to Mexico, merchandise, articles, and objects, to wit: 4,325 live rounds of ammunition consisting of various calibers, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Mr. Vega-Amaral had an interest at the time of his conviction.

 

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1390-e2739/file

 

  • Irina Morgovsky (Ms. Morgovsky) under the Export Administration Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Ms. Morgovsky’s conviction on October 31, 2018, for violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C § 2778) (AECA). Specifically, Ms. Morgovsky was convicted of, among other things, knowingly and willfully and intentionally conspiring to export components for the production of night-vision and thermal devices designated as defense articles on the United States Munitions List from the United States to Russia, without having first obtained from the Department of State a license for such export or written authorization for such export. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Ms. Morgovsky had an interest at the time of her conviction.

 

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1391-e2740/file

 

  • Naum Morgovsky (Mr. Morgovsky) under the Export Administration Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Mr. Morgovsky’s conviction on November 13, 2018, for violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C § 2778) (AECA). Specifically, Mr. Morgovsky was convicted of, among other things, knowingly and willfully and intentionally conspiring to export components for the production of night-vision and thermal devices designated as defense articles on the United States Munitions List from the United States to Russia without having first obtained from the Department of State a license for such export or written authorization for such export. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Mr. Morgovsky had an interest at the time of her conviction.

 

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1392-e2741/file

 

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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

August 1, 2022:  The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against companies used by Iran’s Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Commercial Co. (PGPICC), one of the nation’s largest petrochemical brokers to facilitate the sale of tens of millions of dollars worth of Iranian petroleum and petrochemical products from Iran to East Asia. PGPICC is a subsidiary of Iran’s petrochemical conglomerate Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Co. (PGPIC), which accounts for half of all of Iran’s total petrochemical exports. These actions are taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13846 and follows OFAC’s July 6, 2022, designation of an Iranian oil and petrochemical network selling Iranian petroleum and petrochemicals to purchasers in East Asia and the June 16, 2022, designation of international sanctions evasion network supporting Iranian petrochemical sales.

 

In a separate but related action, the Department of State also designated two entities that have engaged in the purchase, acquisition, sale, transport, or marketing of Iranian petroleum and petroleum products, including providing logistical support to the Iranian petroleum trade, pursuant to E.O. 13846.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Blue Cactus Heavy Equipment And Machinery Spare Parts Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Farwell Canyon Hk Limited of China;
  • Golden Warrior Shipping Co. Limited of China;
  • Pioneer Shipmanagement PTE. LTD., of Singapore;
  • Pznfr Trading Limited of China;
  • Shekufei International Trading Co., Limited of China.

 

The following vessel has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Glory Harvest (3FYH7) LPG Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9143506.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0901 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220801

 

Editors Note: When booking sea freight transportation, be sure your freight forwarder is validating the vessels used to transport your freight against the U.S. Denied Parties List.

 

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August 2, 2022: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 40A, General License 43A, General License 47, General License 48, and General License 49. OFAC is also publishing three Frequently Asked Questions.

 

General License 40A: All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the provision, exportation, or reexportation of goods, technology, or services to ensure the safety of civil aviation involving one or more of the blocked entities listed in the Annex to this general license and that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 are authorized, provided that:

(1) The aircraft is registered in a jurisdiction solely outside of the Russian Federation; and

(2) The goods, technology, or services that are provided, exported, or reexported are for use on aircraft operated solely for civil aviation purposes.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl40a.pdf

 

General License 43A: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity of Public Joint Stock Company Severstal (“Severstal”) or Nord Gold PLC (“Nord Gold”), or any entity in which Severstal or Nord Gold owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, purchased prior to June 2, 2022 (“covered debt or equity”) to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, August 31, 2022. Except as provided above, all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of derivative contracts entered into prior to June 2, 2022, that (i) include a blocked person described above as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to covered debt or equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, August 31, 2022, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR). U.S. financial institutions are authorized to unblock covered debt or equity that was blocked on or after June 2, 2022, but before June 28, 2022, provided that the unblocked covered debt or equity is solely used to effect transactions authorized above.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl43a.pdf

 

General License 47: All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked persons that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, September 1, 2022, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):

(1) Skolkovo Foundation;

(2) Skolkovo Institute of Technology;

(3) Technopark Skolkovo Limited Liability Company;

(4) Federal State Institution of Higher Vocational Education Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology;

(5) Publichnoe Aktsionernoe Obschestvo Magnitogorskiy Metallurgicheskiy Kombinat;

(6) Joint Stock Company Government Transport Company; or

(7) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl47.pdf

 

General License 48: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity of one or more of the following entities purchased prior to August 2, 2022 (“covered debt or equity”) to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 3, 2022: (i) Publichnoe Aktsionernoe Obschestvo Magnitogorskiy Metallurgicheskiy Kombinat;

(ii) Joint Stock Company Government Transport Company; or

(iii) Any entity in which one or more of the above entities own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of covered debt or equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 31, 2022, provided that such trades were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern daylight time, August 2, 2022.

 

All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of derivative contracts entered into prior to August 2, 2022, that (i) include a blocked person described in paragraph (a) of this general license as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to covered debt or equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 3, 2022, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl48.pdf

 

General License 49: All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of any transaction involving MMK Metalurji Sanayi Ticaret Ve Liman Isletmeciligi Anonim Sirketi (MMK Metalurji), or any entity in which MMK Metalurji owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 31, 2023, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl49.pdf

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Guryev, Andrey Andreevich of Russia;
  • Guryev, Andrey Grigoryevich of Russia;
  • Ivashchenko, Kostyantyn Volodymyrovych of Ukraine;
  • Kabaeva, Alina Maratovna of Russia and Uzbekistan;
  • Melnichenko, Andrey Igorevich of Russia and Belarus;
  • Ponomarenko, Alexander Anatolevich of Russia, Ukraine, and Cyprus;
  • Popova, Natalya Valeryevna of Russia;
  • Pumpyanskiy, Dmitriy Aleksandrovich of Russia;
  • Saldo, Volodymyr Vasilyovich of the Ukraine;
  • Stremousov, Kyrylo Serhiyovych of Russia and the Ukraine;
  • Urusov, Anton Sergeevich of Russia;  and
  • Yeliseyev, Sergey Vladimirovich of Russia.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Academician A.L. Mints Radiotechnical Institute Joint Stock Company of Russia;
  • Dzhi Ai Invest OOO, of Russia;
  • Federal State Budgetary Scientific Institution Research And Production Complex Technology Center of Russia;
  • Federal State Institution Federal Scientific Center Scientific Research Institute For System Analysis Of The Russian Academy Of Sciences of Russia;
  • Federal State Institution Of Higher Vocational Education Moscow Institute Of Physics And Technology of Russia;
  • GTLK Asia Limited of China;
  • GTLK Europe Capital Designated Activity Company of Ireland;
  • GTLK Europe Designated Activity Company of Ireland;
  • GTLK Middle East Free Zone Company of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Investitsionnaya Kompaniya Mmk-Finans of Russia;
  • Joint Stock Company Design Center Soyuz of Russia;
  • Joint Stock Company Design Technology Center Elektronika of Russia;
  • Joint Stock Company Institute For Scientific Research Microelectronic Equipment Progress of Russia;
  • Joint Stock Company Institute Of Electronic Control Computers of Russia;
  • Joint Stock Company Penzensky Nauchno Issledovatelsky Elektrotekhnichesky Higher Education Institution of Russia;
  • Joint Stock Company Promising Industrial And Infrastructure Technologies of Russia;
  • Joint Stock Company Research Institute Of Electronic And Mechanical Devices of Russia;
  • Joint Stock Company State Transportation Leasing Company of Russia;
  • Joint Stock Company Vologodsky Optiko Mekhanichesky Factory of Russia;
  • Joint Stock Company Voronezhsky Factory Poluprovodnikovykh Priborov-Sborka of Russia;
  • JSC Scientific Research Institute Submicron of Russia;
  • JSC Svetlana Poluprovodniki of Russia;
  • JSC Zelenograd Nanotechnology Center of Russia;
  • Limited Liability Company Active Business Consult of Russia;
  • LLC Scientific Production Enterprise Digital Solutions of Russia;
  • Mitishinskiy Scientific Research Institute Of Radio Measuring Instruments of Russia;
  • Mmk Metalurji Sanayi Ticaret Ve Liman Isletmeciligi Anonim Sirketi of Turkey;
  • OJSC Scientific Research Institute Of Precision Mechanical Engineering of Russia;
  • Open Joint Stock Company Scientific And Production Enterprise Pulsar of Russia;
  • Public Joint Stock Company Kremny of Russia;
  • Publichnoe Aktsionernoe Obschestvo Magnitogorskiy Metallurgicheskiy Kombinat of Russia;
  • Salvation Committee For Peace And Order of the Ukraine;
  • Scientific And Production Association Of Measuring Equipment JSC of Russia;
  • Skolkovo Foundation of Russia;
  • Skolkovo Institute Of Science And Technology of Russia; and
  • Technopark Skolkovo Limited Liability Company of Russia.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Alfa Nero (ZCTL4) Yacht 2,159GRT Cayman Islands flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 1009376; and
  • Axioma (9HA3697) Yacht Malta flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9571143.

 

The following deletions have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACTIVE BUSINESS CONSULT of Russia;
  • “ABC LLC” of Russia; and
  • Limited Liability Company Activebusinesscollection of Russia.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220802

 

OFAC issued the following Frequently Asked Questions:

 

Question 1075: Is PhosAgro PJSC blocked as a result of the designation of Andrey Grigoryevich Guryev and Andrey Andreevich Guryev? 

 

Answer: No. OFAC has not designated PhosAgro PJSC and based on information available to OFAC, PhosAgro PJSC is not owned 50% or more by blocked persons or otherwise considered the blocked property of Andrey Grigoryevich Guryev and Andrey Andreevich Guryev.

 

As a general matter, agricultural and medical trade are not the target of sanctions imposed by the United States on Russia in response to its unprovoked and brutal war against Ukraine, and OFAC has issued General License 6B to authorize certain transactions prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (RuHSR) related to agricultural commodities (including fertilizer), agricultural equipment, medicine, and medical devices, among other things.  For information on exemptions and authorizations pursuant to the RuHSR related to fertilizer and other agricultural commodities, please see “OFAC Food Security Fact Sheet: Russia Sanctions and Agricultural Trade” and “Fact Sheet: Preserving Agricultural Trade, Access to Communication, and Other Support to Those Impacted by Russia’s War Against Ukraine.”

Question 1074: Is EuroChem Group AG blocked as a result of the designation of Andrey Igorevich Melnichenko?

 

Answer: No. OFAC has not designated EuroChem Group AG and based on information available to OFAC, EuroChem Group AG is not owned 50% or more by blocked persons or otherwise considered the blocked property of Andrey Igorevich Melnichenko.

 

As a general matter, agricultural and medical trade are not the target of sanctions imposed by the United States on Russia in response to its unprovoked and brutal war against Ukraine, and OFAC has issued General License 6B to authorize certain transactions prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (RuHSR) related to agricultural commodities (including fertilizer), agricultural equipment, medicine, and medical devices, among other things.  For information on exemptions and authorizations pursuant to the RuHSR related to fertilizer and other agricultural commodities, please see “OFAC Food Security Fact Sheet: Russia Sanctions and Agricultural Trade” and “Fact Sheet: Preserving Agricultural Trade, Access to Communication, and Other Support to Those Impacted by Russia’s War Against Ukraine.”

 

Question 1073: Is Sheremetyevo International Airport blocked as a result of the designation of Alexander Anatolevich Ponomarenko?

 

Answer: No.  OFAC has not designated Sheremetyevo International Airport and based on information available to OFAC, Sheremetyevo International Airport is not owned 50% or more by blocked persons or otherwise considered the blocked property of Alexander Anatolevich Ponomarenko.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/added/2022-08-02

 

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August 3, 2022: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended Russia-related General Licenses (GLs) 40A, 47, and 48, which were issued on August 2, 2022, to clarify that the licenses apply to Joint Stock Company State Transportation Leasing Company.  The August 2, 2022, GLs did not include the term ‘Leasing’ in the company’s name. The GLs are otherwise unchanged.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220803

 

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August 8, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned virtual currency mixer Tornado Cash, which has been used to launder more than $7 billion worth of virtual currency since its creation in 2019. This includes over $455 million stolen by the Lazarus Group, a Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) state-sponsored hacking group that was sanctioned by the U.S. in 2019, in the largest known virtual currency heist to date. Tornado Cash was subsequently used to launder more than $96 million of malicious cyber actors’ funds derived from the June 24, 2022, Harmony Bridge Heist and at least $7.8 million from the August 2, 2022, Nomad Heist. This action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13694, as amended, and follows OFAC’s May 6, 2022 designation of virtual currency mixer Blender.io (Blender).

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0916

 

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August 15, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) updated its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List per the Global Magnitsky Designations.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Cephus, Sayma Syrenius of Liberia;
  • McGill, Nathaniel of Liberia; and
  • Twehway, Bill of Liberia.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220815

 

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August 25, 2022: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Iran General License M-2, “Authorizing the Exportation of Certain Graduate Level Educational Services and Software”. In addition, OFAC is amended one related Frequently Asked Question.

 

General License M-2:  Accredited graduate and undergraduate degree-granting academic institutions located in the United States (collectively, “U.S. academic institutions”), including their contractors, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, September 1, 2023, to engage in the following activities with respect to Iranian students:

(1) Online Educational Services. The provision of online educational services related to graduate educational courses provided that the courses are the equivalent of courses ordinarily required for the completion of graduate degree programs in the humanities, social sciences, law, or business or are introductory science, technology, engineering, or mathematics courses ordinarily required for the completion of graduate degree programs in the humanities, social sciences, law, or business, and participation in all activities related to the provision of such online educational services to Iranian students.

(2) Exportation of Software. The exportation of software to Iranian students to facilitate participation in the activities authorized in this general license or (ii) paragraph (b)(1)(iii) of Iran General License G, provided such software is designated as EAR99 under the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (EAR), or constitutes information or software not subject to the EAR pursuant to 15 CFR § 734.3(b)(3).

 

Iranian students are individuals located in Iran or located outside Iran but who are ordinarily resident in Iran, who are eligible for non-immigrant classification under categories F (students) or M (non-academic students), and have been granted a non-immigrant visa by the U.S. State Department, but are not physically present in the United States due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/iran_glm2.pdf

 

OFAC updated the following Frequently Asked Question:

 

Question 853: Can U.S. academic institutions provide online learning services to Iranian students who are not physically present in the United States because of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic?  Can U.S. technology companies provide software and services to assist Iranian students in accessing online coursework?

 

Answer: General licenses issued under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR) authorize certain U.S. academic institutions and other U.S. persons to provide certain services and software to Iranian students.  These general licenses include:

 

  • General License G (GL G) authorizes accredited graduate and undergraduate degree-granting U.S. academic institutions, including their contractors, to export services to students located in Iran, or located outside of Iran but who are ordinarily resident in Iran (“Iranian students”), to sign up for and participate in certain undergraduate level online courses, notably:  (i) courses in the humanities, social sciences, law, or business that are the equivalent of courses ordinarily required for the completion of undergraduate degree programs in the humanities, social sciences, law, or business; and (ii) introductory undergraduate level science, technology, engineering, or mathematics courses ordinarily required for the completion of undergraduate degree programs in the humanities, social sciences, law, or business.  In addition, under Section 560.405 of the ITSR, certain transactions ordinarily incident to a licensed transaction are also authorized.  OFAC interprets Section 560.405 of the ITSR to authorize certain transactions ordinarily incident to courses authorized by GL G, including the giving of assignments and testing and grading of Iranian students.
  • General License M-2 (GL M-2) authorizes, on a time-limited basis, accredited graduate and undergraduate degree-granting U.S. academic institutions, including their contractors, to export additional services to those Iranian students who are eligible for non-immigrant classification under categories F (students) or M (non-academic students), and have been granted a nonimmigrant visa by the U.S. State Department, but are not physically present in the United States due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  Specifically, GL M-2 authorizes the provision of certain online educational services related to: educational courses that are (i) the equivalent of courses ordinarily required for the completion of graduate degree programs in the humanities, social sciences, law, or business; and (ii) introductory science, technology, engineering, or mathematics courses ordinarily required for the completion of graduate degree programs in the humanities, social sciences, law, or business.  OFAC interprets Section 560.405 of the ITSR to authorize certain transactions ordinarily incident to courses authorized by GL M-2, including the giving of assignments and testing and grading of Iranian students. GL M-2 also authorizes the exportation of certain software to facilitate the participation of certain Iranian students in certain online educational activities, as explained further below.  GL M-2 authorizes covered activities through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, September 1, 2023.
  • Section 560.540 of the ITSR and General License D-1 authorize the exportation to Iran of certain services and software incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, and blogging.  OFAC interprets these authorizations to cover video conferencing software and related services, as well as educational technology software and related services, that allow students to view courses and course materials, complete tests and assignments, receive grades, participate in discussions, and other similar course-related online activity, provided that the software meets the additional criteria of the applicable authorization.  For more guidance on Section 560.540 of the ITSR and General License D-1, please see FAQs 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, and 443.  In addition, GL M-2 also authorizes the exportation of certain software in order to facilitate participation in online educational activities described in GL G and GL M-2 by Iranian students who are eligible for non-immigrant classification under categories F (students) or M (non-academic students), and have been granted a nonimmigrant visa by the U.S. State Department, but are not physically present in the United States due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

 

To export services to Iranian students that fall outside of these authorizations, U.S. persons may apply for a specific license through the OFAC License Application Page.  OFAC is committed to mitigating the adverse impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and prioritizes the review of specific license applications to provide online learning services to Iranian students who are not physically present in the United States because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

 

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Fines and Penalties

 

August 8, 2022:  The United States of America has been authorized to seize an Airbus A319-100 (the “Airbus”) owned and controlled by sanctioned Russian oligarch Andrei Skoch, pursuant to a seizure warrant from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which found that the airplane is subject to seizure and forfeiture based on probable cause of violation of the federal anti-money laundering laws.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/united-states-obtains-warrant-seizure-airplane-sanctioned-russian-oligarch-andrei-skoch

 

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August 10, 2022:  Arif Ugur, 53, a former Cambridge man plead guilty in Boston in connection with his scheme to illegally export defense technical data to foreign nationals in Turkey for the fraudulent manufacturing of various United States military parts, in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) later determined that some of the parts were substandard and unsuitable for use by the military.

 

Mr. Ugur pleaded guilty to two counts of wire fraud, two counts of violating the Arms Export Control Act, and one count of conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act. Mr. Ugur was indicted on July 21, 2021.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/former-cambridge-man-pleads-guilty-wire-fraud-and-illegally-exporting-defense-articles

 

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August 26, 2022: The U.S. Department of State has concluded administrative settlements with Ryan Adams, Marc Baier, and Daniel Gericke, respectively, to resolve alleged violations of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq., and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. Parts 120-130.  The Department of State and Mr. Adams, Mr. Baier, and Mr. Gericke have reached these settlements following an extensive compliance review by the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance in the Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

 

The administrative settlements between the Department of State and Mr. Adams, Mr. Baier, and Mr. Gericke, who are three former U.S. Intelligence operatives, pursuant to ITAR § 128.11, address the charge of unauthorized furnishing of defense services involving electronic systems, equipment, and software that were specially designed for intelligence purposes that collect, survey, monitor, exploit, analyze, or produce information from the electromagnetic spectrum to foreign persons in the United Arab Emirates. The three worked as cyber spies for the United Arab Emirates and admitted to hacking American networks that helped the UAE spy on human rights activists, journalists, and governments.

 

Under the terms of the Consent Agreements, Mr. Adams, Mr. Baier, and Mr. Gericke will be administratively debarred and thereby prohibited from participating directly or indirectly in any activities subject to the ITAR for three years.

 

https://www.state.gov/u-s-department-of-state-concludes-settlements-of-alleged-export-violations-by-ryan-adams-marc-baier-and-daniel-gericke/ and https://www.reuters.com/world/state-dept-concludes-settlements-with-ex-us-intel-operatives-who-worked-uae-2022-08-26/

 

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August 31, 2022: The United States obtained a warrant to seize a Boeing 737-7EM aircraft owned by PJSC LUKOIL, a Russian multinational oil and gas corporation headquartered in Moscow, Russia. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas authorized the seizure, finding probable cause that the Boeing aircraft was subject to seizure based on violations of federal law.

 

Earlier this year, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued sanctions against Russia in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The sanctions impose export controls and license requirements to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. The Russia sanctions expanded prohibitions on the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of, among other things, U.S.-manufactured aircraft to or within Russia without a valid license or license exception.

 

According to court documents, LUKOIL owns the Boeing aircraft – bearing the tail number VP-CLR and the manufacturer serial number 34865 – which flew into and out of Russia in violation of the Department of Commerce’s sanctions against Russia.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-obtains-warrant-seizure-45-million-airplane-owned-russian-energy-company-pjsc