Sign up now for our summer ITAR Export Traning Webinars & Workshops!
More Information about our Training Webinars & Workshops

DECEMBER 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through December 31, 2023.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

 

The President

 

President Biden Issued Executive Order On Taking Additional Steps With Respect to the Russian Federation’s Harmful Activities

 

December 22, 2023: Pursuant to the Constitution and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, President Biden, in view of the Russian Federation’s continued use of its military-industrial base to aid its effort to undermine security in countries and regions important to United States national security, including its reliance on the international financial system for the procurement of dual-use and other critical items from third countries, and in order to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14024 of April 15, 2021, expanded by Executive Order 14066 of March 8, 2022, and relied on for additional steps taken in Executive Order 14039 of August 20, 2021, Executive Order 14068 of March 11, 2022, and Executive Order 14071 of April 6, 2022 amended Executive Order 14024. A new Section 11 was added to Executive Order 14024, which imposes sanctions  on a foreign financial institution if it has:

(i)   conducted or facilitated any significant transaction or transactions for or on behalf of any person designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) Executive Order 14024for operating or having operated in the technology, defense and related materiel, construction, aerospace, or manufacturing sectors of the Russian Federation economy, or other such sectors as may be determined to support Russia’s military-industrial base by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State; or
(ii)  conducted or facilitated any significant transaction or transactions, or provided any service, involving Russia’s military-industrial base, including the sale, supply, or transfer, directly or indirectly, to the Russian Federation of any item or class of items as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation.

 

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/12/22/executive-order-on-taking-additional-steps-with-respect-to-the-russian-federations-harmful-activities/

 

*******

 

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

DDTC Name and Address Changes Posted To Website

 

December 14 through 20, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

 

  • Change in Name from Teledyne FLIR Detection, Inc. to Teledyne FLIR Defense, Inc., due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name from Qualitair & Sea International to Qualitair & Sea Dimotrans Group due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Address for Fokker Technologies Holding B.V. and Fokker Aerostructures B.V. from Industrieweg 4, 3351 LB Papendrecht, the Netherlands to Anthony Fokkerweg 4, 3351 NL Papendrecht, the Netherlands;
  • Change in Address for Verify Europe Ltd. from 8 Clarendon Drive, Wymbush, Milton Keynes, Bucks, England MK8 8ED to 25 Shirwell Crescent, Furzton, Milton Keynes, Buckinghamshire, England, United Kingdom, MK4 1GA; and
  • Change in Name from Datron World Communications, Inc. to Cyberlux Corporation due to acquisition;
  • Change in Name from Elmtek Proprietary Limited to Aurizn Defence Proprietary Limited due to merger;
  • Change in Name from General Electric International Operations Company’s Israel operations to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name from Pinnacle Solutions, Inc. to Pinnacle Solutions, LLC due to acquisition by NANA Regional Corporation, Inc.

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To South Korea

 

December 1, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Republic of Korea of F-35 Munitions and related equipment for an estimated cost of $271 million. The Government of the Republic of Korea has requested to buy thirty-nine (39) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); two (2) AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM Guidance Sections; eighty-eight (88) KMU-556 Tail Kits for the GBU-31v1 Joint Direct-Attack Munition (JDAM); eighty-six (86) Mk-84 General Purpose (GP) 2000-lb bombs for the GBU-31v1 JDAM; seventy (70) KMU-557 Tail Kits for the GBU- 31v3 JDAM; seventy (70) BLU-109C/B 2000-lb bombs for the GBU-31v3 JDAM; seventy-eight (78) KMU- 572 Tail Kits for the GBU-54 Laser JDAM (LJDAM); two hundred sixty-nine (269) MAU-169 Computer Control Groups/Guidance Sections for the GBU-12 Paveway II; two hundred sixty-nine (269) MXU-650 Air Foil Groups for the GBU-12 Paveway II; three hundred forty-two (342) Mk-82 500-lb GP bombs for the GBU-12 Paveway II or GBU-54 LJDAM; twelve (12) Mk-82 inert bombs; thirty-five (35) GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb-Increment 1 (SDB-I) All-Up-Rounds (AUR) with containers; and one hundred eighteen (118) GBU-53 Small Diameter Bomb-Increment 2 (SDB-II) AURs. Also included are AIM-120 control section spares and containers; DSU-38 Laser Illuminated Target Detectors; SDB-I Tactical Training Rounds and carriage systems; SDB-II Practical Explosive Ordnance Disposal Trainers (PEST) and Weapon Load Crew Trainer (WLCT) units; FMU-139 fuzes; Common Munitions Built-in-Test (BIT)/Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); ADU-891 adapter group computer test sets; Mk-84 practice bombs and other training bombs/components; munitions support and support equipment including propellant and explosive charges; classified software delivery and support; spare parts, consumables, and accessories, and repair and return support; major modifications, maintenance, and maintenance support; transportation and airlift support; classified/unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; contractor logistics support (CLS); studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/korea-f-35-munitions

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Australia

 

December 1, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Australia of AUKUS-related Training and Training Devices and related equipment for an estimated cost of up to $2.0 billion. The Government of Australia has requested to buy articles and services in support of the Trilateral AUKUS Pillar I program. Included are training devices, personnel training, planning, and Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) services; support equipment; special tools; training software and courseware; design; supply chain and industrial base support; facilities and construction support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; test and trials support; studies and surveys; other related elements of engineering and repair services for associated equipment and program support; and other related elements of logistic and program support. U.S. training of private Australian industry personnel will occur only after explicitly authorized by the U.S. Department of State in accordance with U.S. law.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-aukus-pillar-i-training-and-training-devices

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To The United Arab Emirates

 

December 4, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the United Arab Emirates of AN/TPQ-50 Radar and related equipment for an estimated cost of $85 million. The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested to buy eighteen (18) AN/TPQ-50 Radar Systems – man portable version. Also included are 107mm High Explosive (HE) rockets (for CONUS testing only); Computer Digital Military Laptop Radar Control Display units; 5kW Advanced Medium Mobile Power Source (AMMPS) Trailer-Mounted, Diesel Engine Driven Power Unit PU-2001; spares; mission equipment; communication and navigation equipment; support equipment; repair parts; special tools and test equipment; technical data and publications; site survey; U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/united-arab-emirates-antpq-50-radar

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To The Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia

 

December 4, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of RE-3A Tactical Airborne Surveillance System Aircraft Modernization and related equipment for an estimated cost of $582 million. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested to buy aircraft hardware and software modifications and support to replenish and modernize its RE-3A Tactical Airborne Surveillance System (TASS) aircraft, including: seven (7) Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) (EGI) security devices, Airborne, with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) or M-Code capability, and five (5) L3Harris BlackRock Communications Intelligence Sensor Suites. Also included are KY-100M narrowband/wideband secure communications terminals; KIV-77 MODE 4/5 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) cryptographic appliques; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; integrated electronic intelligence (ELINT)/signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems; L-3 Communication Systems-West (CSW) multiband receivers/transmitters; ARC-210 radios; high frequency (HF) radios; secure communications equipment; precision navigation and cryptographic devices; aircraft support and support equipment; test and integration support; equipment; spare and repair parts; consumables and accessories; repair and return support; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/saudi-arabia-re-3a-tactical-airborne-surveillance-system-aircraft

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Germany

 

December 7, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Germany of MK 54 Lightweight Torpedoes and related equipment for an estimated cost of $300 million. The Government of Germany has requested to buy up to eighty (80) MK 54 All Up Round Lightweight Torpedoes (LWT). Also included are MK 54 Mod 0 LWT spare parts; Recoverable Exercise Torpedoes (REXTORPs) with containers; handling shapes and containers; torpedo spare parts; tools for mounting and dismounting of Air Launch Accessories (ALAs); equipment for analysis of REXTORP exercise shots; REXTORP maintenance equipment; training; publications; support and test equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/germany-mk-54-lightweight-torpedoes

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Israel

 

December 9, 2023: The Secretary of State has approved the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Israel of 120mm M830A1 High Explosive Anti-Tank Multi-Purpose with Tracer (MPAT) tank cartridges and related equipment for an estimated cost of $106.5 million. The Government of Israel has requested to buy thirteen thousand nine hundred eighty-one (13,981) 120mm M830A1 High Explosive Anti-Tank Multi-Purpose with Tracer (MPAT) tank cartridges. Also included are publications and technical documentation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/israel-m830a1-120mm-tank-cartridges

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Romania

 

December 12, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Romania of Javelin Missiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $80 million. The Government of Romania has requested to buy two hundred sixty-three (263) Javelin FGM-148F Missiles; and twenty-six (26) Javelin Light Weight Command Launch Units (LWCLU). Also included are enhanced producibility basic skills trainers; missile simulation rounds; Security Assistance Management Directorate (SAMD) technical assistance; Tactical Air Ground Missiles (TAGM) Project Office technical assistance; other associated equipment and services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/romania-javelin-missiles

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Poland

 

December 13, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Poland of Communications Equipment and related elements of logistics and program support for an estimated cost of $255 million. The Government of Poland has requested to buy communications equipment, including AN/PRC-117G, AN/PRC-152A, AN/PRC-158, AN/PRC-160, AN/PRC-163, and AN/PRC-167 radios; Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers enabled by Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) or M-Code; support equipment; spare parts; technical manuals and publications; new equipment training; U.S. Government and contractor technical engineering, logistics, and personnel services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-communications-equipment

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To The Taipei Economic And Cultural Representative Office In The United States Of Command, Control, Communications, And Computers (C4) Life Cycle Support

 

December 15, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States of Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) Life Cycle Support and related equipment for an estimated cost of $300 million. The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy follow-on life cycle support to maintain Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) capabilities managed under its Syun An program. The C4 capabilities consist of previously procured Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems-Low Volume Terminals (MIDS-LVT) and Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) equipment, as well as procurement of spare and repair parts; repair and return of equipment; technical documentation; personnel training; software and hardware; software development; maintenance of Continental United States (CONUS) technical laboratories; U.S. Government and contract engineering and technical support; logistics; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-31

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

 

December 15, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Japan of AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $224 million. The Government of Japan has requested to buy one hundred twenty (120) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); and three (3) AIM-120C-8 guidance sections. Also included are AIM-120 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM), missile containers, and control section spares; Common Munitions Built-in-Test Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); ADU-891 Adapter Group Test Sets; munitions support and support equipment; spare and repair parts, consumables, and accessories, and repair and return support; contract logistics support (CLS); classified software delivery and support; classified/unclassified publications and technical documentation; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-aim-120c-8-advanced-medium-range-air-air-missiles-amraam

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Greece

 

December 15, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Greece of UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters and related equipment for an estimated cost of $1.95 billion. The Government of Greece has requested to buy thirty-five (35) UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters; eighty (80) T700-GE 701D engines (70 installed, 10 spares); forty-four (44) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (35 installed, 9 spares); eighty-five (85) H-764U Embedded Global Position Systems with Inertial Navigation (EGI) and country unique selective availability anti-spoofing module (SAASM) (or future replacement) (70 installed, 15 spares); and eighty-five (85) AN/ARC-231A VHF/UHF/LOS SATCOM radio systems. Also included are AN/ARC-231 Receivers/Transmitters RT-1808A (or future replacement); VHF/UHF/LOS SATCOM radios; APR-39C(V)1/4 Radar Warning Receivers; AVR-2B Laser Detecting Sets; APX-123A Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Transponders; ARC-220 High Frequency (HF) radios with KY-100M; VRC-100 Ground Stations; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKLs); KIV-77 Common IFF Applique Crypto Computers; COMSEC Encryption devices; AN/ARN-147(V) Very High Frequency Omni-Directional Range (VOR)/Instrument Landing System (ILS) Receiver Radios; AN/ARN-149(V) Low Frequency (LF)/Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) Radio Receivers; AN/ARN-153 Tactical Air Navigation System (TACAN) Receiver Transmitters; AN/APN-209 Radar Altimeters; AN/ARC-210 radios; EBC-406HM Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs); Encrypted Aircraft Wireless Intercommunications Systems (EAWIS); Improved Heads Up Displays (IHUD); Signal Data Converters for IHUD; Color Weather Radars; MX-0D EO/IR with Laser Designators; EO/IR Cabin Monitoring Systems; EO/IR Digital Video Recorders; AN/ARC-201D RT-1478D radios; Engine Inlet Barrier Filters (EIBF); Ballistic Armor Protection Systems (BAPS); Internal Auxiliary Fuel Tank Systems (IAFTS); Fast Rope Insertion Extraction Systems (FRIES); External Rescue Hoists (ERH); Rescue Hoist Equipment Sets; Dual Patient Litter System (DPLS) Sets; Martin Baker Palletized Crew Chief/Gunner Seats with crashworthy floor structural modifications; External Stores Support System (ESSS); Integrated Tow Plates Production Assets; Universal Software Loading Kits; 60kVA Generator Kits; Instrument Panels; DF-500 Personal Location Systems; Trakkabeam Searchlights; External Gun Mount Systems; M-134 Mini Gun Systems; M-240 machine guns; 7.62mm Cartridges; 2.75” Rockets; Flare IR Countermeasure M206; Decoy Flare CM M211; CTG Impulse BBU-35/B; CTG, 25.4mm, Decoy, Chaff, M839/RR170/ Series; M255A2 MK-66 Night Reliability Indicator (NRI); Cartridge, Aircraft Fire Extinguisher; Cartridge, Impulse; Thruster Control Unit (TCU) -3/A; Cartridge, Aircraft; Black Hawk Aircrew Trainer (BAT); Black Hawk Maintenance Trainer (BHMT-M); Black Hawk Avionics Trainer; Maintenance Blended Reconfigurable Avionics Trainer (MBRAT); CAPT-E-Visual & Control System (CAPT-E VCS); training devices; helmets; transportation; organizational equipment; spare and repair parts; support equipment; tools and test equipment; technical data and publications; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/greece-uh-60m-black-hawk-helicopters

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

 

December 15, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Japan of AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder Missiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $59.03 million. The Government of Japan has requested to buy forty-four (44) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II Tactical Missiles; and twenty-nine (29) AIM-9X Sidewinder Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM). Also included are missile containers; spare and repair parts; repair of repairables; support and test equipment; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; technical assistance, engineering, and logistics support services; transportation and program support; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-aim-9x-block-ii-sidewinder-missiles

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Italy

 

December 15, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Italy of M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $400 million. The Government of Italy has requested to buy twenty-one (21) M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS); and one (1) M31A2 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary (GMLRS-U) High Explosive (HE) Pods with Insensitive Munitions Propulsion System (IMPS). Also included are Universal Fielding Modules; towbar toolkits and sets; crypto-fill cable; AN/PRC-158 Multi-Channel Tactical Radio installation kits; Multi-Channel AN/PRC-158 radios; RF-7800i CU100 radio router; HARRIS installation kits for 160W high frequency (HF) radio system; HF AN/PRC-160W-HF radios; Simple Key Loader (SKL) AN/PYQ-10 (C); RF-7800i Tactical Intercom System installation kit; RF7800i Tactical Intercom System; Fire Control Panel Trainer (FCPT) hardware and software; Missile Common Test Device Trainer (MCTD-T), slim; Panasonic Toughbook ruggedized laptop with 30ft cables and power adapters and internal CD ROM drive; RF-7800i Tactical Intercom System training hardware; RF-7800i and CU100 training rigs, test equipment, and Golden System for operator and maintenance training; Launcher Adapter Group (LAG) and Sling; Launcher Control Unit (LCU); Weapons Control Unit (WCU); MCTD V.4 hardware and spares; MCTD V.4 software and publications; spare parts; Maintenance Support Device (MSD) V.4; Wireless AT-Platform Test Set (WATS); guided missile organizational tool kit; Hydraulic Servicing Unit (HSU); Interactive Electronic Technical Manual (IETM) development; Direct Support (DS)/General Support (GS) tool kits; Gas Particulate Filter Unit (GPFU); Forward Repair System (FRS); Positioning Navigation Assembly (PNA) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) Global Positioning System/Precise Positioning Service (GPS/PPS); Common MLRS SPORT Test Program Set (CMST) hardware and software development; mobile Standard Automotive Tool Set (SATS); RF7800i Tactical Intercom System spare package; Technical Manual Unit organizational Repair Parts and Special Tools List (RPSTL); Technical Manual operator’s manual; Launch POD/container (LP/C) trainer M68A2; GMLRS-U flight surveillance kit; and other related elements of program and logistic support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/italy-m142-high-mobility-artillery-rocket-systems-himars

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To The Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia

 

December 22, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of Blanket Order Training and related equipment for an estimated cost of $1 billion. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested a continuation of a blanket order training program inside and outside of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that includes, but is not limited to, flight training; technical training; professional military education; specialized training; Mobile Training Teams (MTTs); Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT); Extended Training Service Specialists (ETSS); and English language training. These blanket order training cases will cover all relevant types of training offered by or contracted through the U.S. Air Force or Department of Defense Agencies (DOD). This training for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) and other Saudi forces will include such subjects as civilian casualty avoidance; the laws of armed conflicts; human rights; command and control; and targeting via MTTs and/or broader Programs of Instruction (POIs). Program management; trainers, simulators; travel; billeting; and medical support may also be included.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/saudi-arabia-blanket-order-training-0

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To NATO

 

December 22, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the NATO Support and Procurement Agency of Stinger missiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $780 million. The NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), as Lead Nation on behalf of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, has requested to buy nine hundred forty (940) FIM-92K Stinger Block I Missiles. Also included are Battery Coolant Units (BCU); metal containers; U.S. Government and contractor production, technical, and engineering assistance; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/nato-support-and-procurement-agency-nspa-stinger-missiles

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To NATO

 

December 22, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the NATO Support and Procurement Agency of C-17 Maintenance and related equipment for an estimated cost of $150 million. NATO Support and Procurement Agency as Lead Nation has requested to buy contractor logistics support for the C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability program; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/nato-support-and-procurement-agency-nspa-c-17-maintenance

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Israel

 

December 29, 2023: The Secretary of State has approved the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Israel of M107 155mm projectiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $147.5 million. The Government of Israel has requested 155mm ancillaries (fuzes, primers, and charges) that will be added to previously implemented cases. This amendment will increase the total case value above notification thresholds and thus requires notification of the entire case. The original FMS cases, valued at $96.51 million, included four thousand seven hundred ninety-two (4,792) rounds of M107 155mm artillery ammunition (MDE); fifty-two thousand two hundred twenty-nine (52,229) rounds of M795 155mm artillery ammunition (non-MDE); and thirty thousand (30,000) M4 propelling charges (non-MDE), along with publications; associated technical documentation; and logistics support services, which have subsequently been delivered.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/israel-155mm-artillery-ammunition

 

*******

 

Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (CIO), Department of Defense (DoD)

 

The DOD Proposed To Establish Requirements For A Comprehensive And Scalable Assessment Mechanism To Ensure Defense Contractors And Subcontractors Have, As Part Of The Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Program

 

December 26, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 89058: The DoD proposed the establishment of requirements for a comprehensive and scalable assessment mechanism to ensure defense contractors and subcontractors have, as part of the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Program, implemented required security measures to expand the application of existing security requirements for Federal Contract Information (FCI) and add new Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) security requirements for certain priority programs. DoD currently requires covered defense contractors and subcontractors to implement the security protections set forth in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800–171 Rev 2 to provide adequate security for sensitive unclassified DoD information that is processed, stored, or transmitted on contractor information systems and to document their implementation status, including any plans of action for any NIST SP 800–171 Rev 2 requirement not yet implemented, in a System Security Plan (SSP). The CMMC Program provides the Department the mechanism needed to verify that a defense contractor or subcontractor has implemented the security requirements at each CMMC Level and is maintaining that status across the contract period of performance, as required.

 

If adopted, the CMMC program will require most contractors handling Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) to obtain a third-party certification that they have successfully implemented the 110 cybersecurity controls in the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP) 800-171. It should be noted that contractors handling CUI are already required to comply with NIST SP 800-171 through Defense Acquisition Regulatory Supplement (DFARS) 252.204-7012, but only a self-attestation is currently required. Failure to obtain a CMMC certification will mean a contractor is prohibited from performing an awarded contract.

 

Contractors not handling CUI – but instead, FCI – will also be required to obtain a Level 1 assessment, which is a self-certification consistent with the requirements in FAR 52.204-21.

 

Highlights of the Proposed Regulations

While the proposed regulations are comprehensive, the following are some highlights:

  • The DoD proposes an aggressive rollout, with self-assessments required on all new contracts immediately after the final rule is effective and third-party assessments on all contracts at the start of Phase 2, which is six months after the final rule implementation.
  • While Level 2 is a split level (with some assessments being self-assessments and some being third-party assessments), the DoD assumes the vast majority of Level 2 assessments will be conducted by a Certified Third-Party Assessment Organization (C3PAO) (4,000 entities conducting a self-assessment versus 76,598 entities receiving a third-party assessment).
  • Third-party assessments are to last for three years, although the time may be shortened if the contractor makes modifications to an assessed system. Companies waiting on a third-party assessment may be competing with companies that are getting a second assessment when trying to schedule an assessment with a C3PAO.
  • The proposed rule contains enormous False Claims Act (FCA) risk: Level 1 assessments must be certified by a company executive to the DoD, and third-party Level 2 assessments require a company executive to file an affirmation with the DoD upon the close of the third-party assessment and annually thereafter. There is no doubt that the DoD will argue that these certifications are material.
  • Managed service providers (MSPs) play a crucial role in the CMMC ecosystem, particularly for small and medium-sized businesses. It is not clear what MSPs will be required to do (i.e., a Level 2 assessment) to be able to continue in that role for their clients.
  • Small businesses, subcontractors and non-U.S. companies will be required to comply with the same set of requirements consistent with the type of information they are creating or handling. There are no blanket exemptions except for contracts for the purchase of commercial off-the-shelf products or contracts under the micro-purchase threshold.
  • It remains to be seen how this rule will be implemented through the federal supply schedule and other agency-agnostic contracts such as NASA’s Solutions for Enterprise-Wide Procurement (SEWP).

 

Comments regarding the proposed requirements must be received by February 26, 2024.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/26/2023-27280/cybersecurity-maturity-model-certification-cmmc-program and https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2023/12/department-of-defense-releases-long-awaited-cmmc-proposed-rule (Source: H&K Insights, 27 Dec 2023) [Excerpts] and Principal Author: Eric S. Crusius, Holland & Knight LLP

 

*******

 

The Department of State Temporarily Modified The Note To Paragraph (h)(1) Of USML Category VIII With Regard To Certain Commodities Used In The KF-21 Aircraft Or Variants Thereof

 

December 4, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 84072: The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs temporarily modified the Note to paragraph (h)(1) of USML Category VIII with regard to certain commodities used in the KF-21 aircraft or variants thereof. The Department assessed that it is in the security and foreign policy interests of the United States to allow manufacturers to apply for export authorizations to participate in the development of the KF–21 aircraft by reusing certain defense articles described in paragraph (h)(1), which are specially designed for the U.S. aircraft listed therein, without removing those defense articles from the USML simply because they are re-used in the KF–21. Accordingly, pursuant to ITAR § 126.2, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs temporarily modified the Note to paragraph (h)(1) of USML Category VIII such that parts, components, accessories, and attachments specially designed for aircraft identified in paragraph (h)(1) are not released from that paragraph due to their reuse in the KF–21 aircraft or variants thereof. The Department assessed that this temporary modification does not change the export jurisdiction or classification of any existing commodities, as it only prevents the possibility of future release from paragraph (h)(1) due to use in the KF–21, which has not yet entered into production. Therefore, when the KF–21 enters production, any paragraph (h)(1) commodities authorized for export for this purpose will retain their current export classification described in paragraph (h)(1). This temporary modification is effective until December 1, 2024, or when terminated by the Department, whichever occurs first.

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=57881adf1b3275d0c6c3866ae54bcb01

 

*******

 

Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

December 7, 2023: The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released three rules as part of a broad effort to ease several categories of export licensing requirements and expand the availability of export license exceptions for key allied and partner countries, as well as for members of certain multilateral export control regimes.

 

The first rule changes licensing requirements for certain Australia Group (AG)-controlled pathogens and toxins (and their related technologies) so that no license is required to AG countries, unless the item is also subject to Chemical Weapons Convention controls. It also removes crime control licensing requirements for Austria, Finland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland. These countries are in the Global Export Controls Coalition (GECC) (countries listed in Supplement 3 to part 746 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)) and maintain a commitment to protecting human rights. 88 Fed. Reg. 85479.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/08/2023-26532/allied-governments-favorable-treatment-revisions-to-certain-australia-group-controls-revisions-to

 

The second rule expands license exception eligibility to additional countries for certain missile technology items, excluding any countries of concern for missile technology reasons or that are subject to a U.S. arms embargo (i.e., countries specified in Country Groups D:4 or D:5). For example, certain components used in or for the “production” of civil manned aircraft will now be eligible for an EAR license exception to countries that are in both Country Group A:2 and the GECC.  The second rule also updates list-based controls to align with recent Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) control list changes.  88 Fed. Reg. 85487.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/08/2023-26682/export-administration-regulations-for-missile-technology-items-2018-2019-and-2021-missile-technology

 

The third rule seeks public comment on ways to facilitate the use of License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA), including by clarifying which items are eligible for STA to certain destinations, and proposing a number of changes intended to increase the usage of STA and reduce the burden on exporters, reexporters, and transferors, while at the same time still ensuring that U.S. national security and foreign policy interests are protected for items authored under STA. For example, the rule proposes to allow National Security (NS)-only reason for control items received under STA to be reexported between or among countries that are in both A:5 and the GECC with authorization from the competent authorities of those countries under license exception Additional Permissive Reexports (APR). 88 Fed. Reg. 85734.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/08/2023-26681/proposed-enhancements-and-simplification-of-license-exception-strategic-trade-authorization-sta

 

*******

 

Departments of Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, State and Treasury

 

Departments of Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, State, and Treasury Jointly Advise Maritime and Transportation Industry on Know-Your-Cargo Policy

 

The Department of Justice, Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), and Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a joint compliance note highlighting common tactics deployed by malign actors in the maritime and other transportation industries as well as recent enforcement actions taken in response to alleged violations. This note marks the first collective effort by the five agencies to inform the private sector about enforcement trends and provide guidance to the business community on compliance with U.S. sanctions and export laws. The Departments of Justice, Commerce, and the Treasury have previously issued two tri-seal compliance notes.

 

The compliance note describes various deceptive shipping and transportation tactics deployed by malign actors to facilitate the illicit transfer of cargo. In addition, the note advises companies doing business in these industries to implement and strengthen their compliance controls as necessary, especially when operating in high-risk areas or with counterparties who exhibit odd behavior. The note further identifies several compliance practices that may assist companies in identifying potential efforts to evade U.S. laws.

The compliance note also highlights criminal and civil enforcement authorities that the relevant agencies have taken to combat the illicit shipment of cargo, as well as recent enforcement actions. These cases include the first-ever criminal resolution by the Department of Justice against a bareboat charter of a crude oil tanker carrying contraband Iranian oil and civil enforcement actions taken by BIS and OFAC imposing civil monetary penalties.

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events and https://www.justice.gov/media/1327981/dl?inline

 

*******

U.S. Census Bureau

 

Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages

December 21, 2023: To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

 

Response Code: 126

Narrative: Conveyance Name Not Allowed for MOT

Severity: Fatal

Reason: The Mode of Transportation selected does not allow a Conveyance Name to be reported.

 

Resolution: A Conveyance Name/Carrier Name is only allowed to be reported for vessel, air, rail, or truck modes of transportation.

Verify the Mode of Transportation Code and the Conveyance Name/Carrier Name, correct the shipment, and resubmit.

 

Response Code: 651

Narrative: Vehicle Information Required for Export Information Code

Severity: Fatal

Reason: The Export Information Code is reported as HV for personally owned vehicles being exported as household effects, but the Used Vehicle Information is not included.

 

Resolution: Used Vehicle Information must be reported if the Export Information Code is HV. See ‘Appendix E, Commodity Filing Export Information’ of the AESTIR for a complete listing of all the Export Information Codes and their reporting guidelines.

Verify the Export Information Code, correct the shipment and resubmit.

LATEST FINES, PENALTIES AND SANCTIONS

 

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Fines and Penalties

 

December 6, 2023: A federal indictment was unsealed in the District of Oregon charging a Belgian national in connection with the export of sensitive, military-grade technology from the United States to end users in the People’s Republic of China. Hans Maria De Geetere, 61, of Knokke-Heist, Belgium, has been charged with one count of obtaining goods intended for China in violation of the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) and four counts of making false statements.

 

According to court documents, between April 2021 and August 2023, De Geetere, who owned and operated a Belgium-based supply chain management and procurement services company called Knokke Heist Support Corporation Management (KHSCM), attempted to illegally procure for export to China controlled accelerometers valued at more than $930,000.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-or/pr/belgian-national-faces-federal-charges-illegally-procuring-critical-us-technology-end

 

*******

 

December 8, 2023: The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia announced the seizure of three domains used by Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs), Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), and their members associated with Lebanese Hizballah. According to court records, the United States obtained court authorization to seize three domains registered to Verisign, Inc. – ctexlb.com, imarwaiktissad.com, and russia-now.com.  These three domains are subject to seizure as assets of entities and organizations engaged in planning or perpetrating acts of terrorism against the United States, its citizens and residents, and their property. These domains also afford a source of influence over those entities and organizations. The seizure of these domains will cut off that source of support and influence.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/edva-seizes-three-domains-used-lebanese-hizballah-and-its-affiliates

 

*******

 

December 8, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a settlement with Nasdaq, Inc.  Nasdaq agreed to remit $4,040,923 to settle its potential civil liability for a former wholly owned foreign subsidiary’s apparent violations of sanctions on Iran.  This former subsidiary engaged in the exportation of services to Iran and the Government of Iran, thereby committing 151 apparent violations of OFAC sanctions on Iran.  The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that Nasdaq’s conduct was non-egregious and voluntarily self-disclosed.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231208_33 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932386/download?inline

 

*******

 

December 13, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $1,207,830 settlement with CoinList Markets LLC.  CoinList agreed to settle its potential civil liability arising from processing 989 transactions on behalf of users ordinarily resident in Crimea between April 2020 and May 2022, in apparent violation of OFAC’s Russia/Ukraine sanctions.  The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that CoinList’s conduct was non-egregious and not voluntarily self-disclosed.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231213_33 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932406/download?inline and

 

*******

 

December 19, 2023: The Justice Department unsealed an indictment charging Iranian national Hossein Hatefi Ardakani and co-defendant Gary Lam, who worked for a Chinese company, with crimes related to the procurement of U.S.-manufactured dual-use microelectronics for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization’s (ASF SSJO) one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program.

 

According to the indictment, between at least in or around September 2014 and September 2015, Ardakani and Lam, who was based in China and Hong Kong, as well as other associates, conspired to illegally purchase and export from the United States to Iran dual-use microelectronics that are commonly used in UAV production, including high electron mobility transistors (HEMTs), monolithic microwave integrated circuit (MMIC) power amplifiers, and analog-to-digital converters. Each of these components are subject to U.S. export controls for anti-terrorism, national security and regional stability reasons.

 

The indictment further alleges that on four separate occasions Ardakani and his co-conspirators used a web of foreign companies to accomplish their obfuscation and evasion efforts. For example, between June and September 2015, Ardakani and Lam caused an unwitting French company to purchase from a U.S. company several pieces of analog-to-digital converters with applications in wireless and broadband communications, radar and satellite subsystems, multicarrier, multimodal cellular receivers, antenna array positioning and infrared imaging. Lam then caused a division of the French company to ship the analog-to-digital converters to Hong Kong, where they were reexported to Iran. A variation of this tactic – involving witting and unwitting companies in Canada, Hong Kong, and China – was used on the other three occasion

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iranian-national-charged-unlawfully-procuring-microelectronics-used-unmanned-aerial-vehicles

 

*******

 

December 21, 2023: Robert Alcantara was sentenced to 68 months in prison for trafficking firearms.  According to the charging documents and other filings and statements made in court:

From approximately 2017 until January 2022, Alcantara operated a “ghost gun” factory out of his home in Rhode Island.  Alcantara purchased ghost gun kits at gun shows and other places and then machined the kits into working firearms.  Once he had completed the untraceable firearms, he exported and sold them to the Dominican Republic.  Most of those guns were handguns, but a number were rifles.  Alcantara and others then laundered the proceeds of his gun sales.

 

On November 20, 2021, Alcantara was stopped in his vehicle in possession of kits to build approximately 45 ghost guns. Alcantara was interviewed by law enforcement agents and stated that he was planning to turn the 45 kits into working firearms, and he had 50 additional similar ghost guns at his home.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/rhode-island-man-sentenced-68-months-prison-trafficking-over-one-hundred-ghost-guns

*******

 

December 21, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $466,200 settlement with Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange (PURE). PURE agreed to settle its potential civil liability for 39 apparent violations of OFAC’s Ukraine-/Russia-Related sanctions.  Between May 2018 and July 2020, PURE engaged in transactions related to four insurance policies involving a blocked Panama-based company owned by Specially Designated National Viktor Vekselberg (Vekselberg). The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that PURE’s apparent violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and were non-egregious.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231221_33 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932486/download?inline

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88567: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Stephanie Joahna Gloria (“Gloria”) for seven years until May 23, 2029. On May 23, 2022, Gloria was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Gloria was convicted of smuggling from the United States to Mexico 3,200 rounds of Winchester 5.56-millimeter ammunition. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced Gloria to 70 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28273/in-the-matter-of-stephanie-joahna-gloria-inmate-number-74313-509-fci-aliceville-federal-correctional

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88569: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Donald Robert Witherow (“Witherow”) for three years until October 13, 2025. On October 13, 2022, Witherow was convicted of smuggling firearms ammunition and firearms magazines from the United States to the Netherlands. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Witherow to 12 months and one day of imprisonment, one year of supervised release and a $200 assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28275/in-the-matter-of-donald-robert-witherow-6651-buffalo-road-cresson-pa-16421-order-denying-export

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88571: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Edson Daniel Montelongo (“Montelongo”) for ten years until June 22, 2032. On June 22, 2022 Montelongo was convicted of smuggling various firearms from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 70 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $500 special assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28271/in-the-matter-of-edson-daniel-montelongo-inmate-number-75304-509-fci-bastrop-po-box-1010-bastrop-tx

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88564: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Rolondo Alexei Pupo-Abrahantes (“Pupo-Abrahantes”) for ten years until November 16, 2032. On November 16, 2022 Pupo-Abrahantes was convicted of conspiring to smuggle various firearms from the United States to Ecuador. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 30 months in prison, two years of supervised release and a $300 special assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28277/in-the-matter-of-rolondo-alexei-pupo-abrahantes-inmate-number-76860-509-fci-pollock-po-box-4050

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88565: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Jonathan Yet Wing Soong (“Soong”) for ten years until April 28, 2033. On April 28, 2023 Soong was convicted of knowingly and willfully exporting from the United States to Beihang University, an entity on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, EAR99 CIFER (Comprehensive Identification from Frequency Responses) software, a tool that allows a user to develop a dynamic model of an aircraft using system identification techniques, without having first obtained the required authorization from the Department of Commerce. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Soong to 20 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, $100 assessment and $168,885 in restitution.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28268/in-the-matter-of-jonathan-yet-wing-soong-inmate-number-03089-510-usp-lompoc-us-penitentiary-3901

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88566: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Javier Alonso Galvan-Hernandez (“Galvan-Hernandez”) for ten years until May 11, 2032. On May 11, 2022 Galvan-Hernandez was convicted of smuggling various firearms from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 84 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $200 special assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28274/in-the-matter-of-javier-alonso-galvan-hernandez-inmate-number-79786-509-fci-bastrop-po-box-1010

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88568: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Angel Huerta-Garay (“Huerta-Garay”) for tens years until April 26, 2032. On April 26, 2022 Huerta-Garay was convicted of exporting and sending, and attempting to export and send, various firearms from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 52 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28276/in-the-matter-of-angel-huerta-garay-inmate-number-67193-509-fci-beaumont-po-box-26020-beaumont-tx

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88570: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Jose Luis Garcia (“Garcia”) for ten years until December 14, 2031. On December 14, 2021 Garcia was convicted of conspiring to smuggle firearms from the United States to Mexico without first having obtained the required export license and authorization from the U.S. Department of State or U.S. Department of Commerce. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Garcia to 57 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, $20,000 criminal fine and a $100 assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28270/in-the-matter-of-jose-luis-garcia-inmate-number-21856-509-fci-bastrop-federal-correctional

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88572: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Tina Chen, a/k/a Ya When Chen, a/k/a Wen Tina Chen, a/k/a Tina Dunbar, a/k/a Tina Dubner (“Chen”) for ten years until February 23, 2033. On February 23, 2023 Chen was convicted of exporting goods from the United States to Iran without the required licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets Control. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced Chen to 13 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28278/in-the-matter-of-tina-chen-aka-ya-when-chen-aka-wen-tina-chen-aka-tina-dunbar-aka-tina-dubner-inmate

 

Sanctions

 

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

December 5, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added forty-two entities under forty-four entries to the Entity List. These entities are listed under the destinations of Armenia (3), Belarus (1), Belgium (3), China, People’s Republic of (China) (1), Cyprus (4), Germany (1), Kazakhstan (1), Netherlands (1), Russia (28), and the United Arab Emirates (1). Two entities are added to the Entity List under two destinations, accounting for the difference in the totals. These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.

 

Specifically, eleven entities are directly tied to or associated with the joint Iranian-Russian efforts to develop and construct a UAV production facility in the “Alabuga Special Economic Zone,” which is intended to produce thousands of Shahed-136 drones in support of Russia’s war effort against Ukraine.  Two entities were added for engaging in illicit efforts to acquire and divert the highest priority U.S.-origin electronic components with military applications, including in connection with avionics, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (drones, or UAVs), electronic warfare receivers, and military radar. Thirteen entities were added for engaging in dealings with entities on the Entity List, including entities designated as Russian military end users, or entities subject to sanctions administered by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).  Sixteen other entities were added pursuant to two BIS enforcement actions involving the acquisition and diversion of U.S.-origin electronic and avionic components on behalf of parties in Russia.

 

Armenia:

  • Aram Kocharyan;
  • ARM-BEKAR LLC; and
  • Hermine Kocharyan.

 

Belarus:

  • Nanotech Ltd.

 

Belgium:

  • European Technical Trading BV;
  • Hans Maria De Geetere; and
  • Knokke-Heist Support Management Corporation.

 

China:

  • Planet Technology.

 

Cyprus:

  • Alexander Nikolayevich Vadyunin;
  • Eriner Limited;
  • OOO Aviation Service Int’l; and
  • The Mother Ark.

 

Germany:

  • FTL GmBH.

 

Kazakhstan:

  • Elem Group, LLC.

 

The Netherlands:

  • Hasa Nederland B.V.

 

Russia:

  • Aircompany North-West LLC;
  • Alexander Nikolayevich Vadyunin;
  • AO Geomir;
  • AO SET-1;
  • Argussoft Company LLC;
  • AST Components;
  • ATB Electronica LLC;
  • Digicom, LTD.;
  • Dolphin Alabuga LLC;
  • Elektrokom VPK;
  • Inelso LLC;
  • Intekh LLC;
  • JSC Yue Complex Service Solutions;
  • North-West Technics LLC;
  • OOO Alabuga-Volokno;
  • OOO Albatross;
  • OOO Alb.Aero;
  • OOO Assistagro;
  • OOO Aviation Service Int’l;
  • OOO Druzhba;
  • OOO Geomiragro;
  • OOO SMU5;
  • OOO Ural-Trast;
  • PF RIELTA LLC;
  • Prius Electronics LLC;
  • PT Air;
  • RosAero JSC; and
  • YE-International AO.

 

United Arab Emirates:

  • RosAero FZC.

 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3390-press-release-12-5-entity-list-package-hans-de-geetere/file and https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2023-26935.pdf

 

*******

 

December 7, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 85209:  The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) renewed the temporary denial order for Belavia Belarusian Airlines of Belarus for one year until December 7, 2024 for its continued use of ECCN 9A991 aircraft.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/07/2023-26896/belavia-belarusian-airlines-4a-nemiga-str-minsk-belarus-220004-order-renewing-temporary-denial-of

 

*******

 

December 14, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 86623: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) renewed the temporary denial order for Nordwind Airlines of Russia for one year until December 14, 2024 for its continued use of ECCN 9A991 aircraft.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/14/2023-27475/nordwind-airlines-leningradskaya-str-building-25-office-27-28-moscow-region-khimki-city141402-russia

*******

 

December 14, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 86626:  The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) renewed the temporary denial order for Siberian Airlines d/b/a S7 Airlines of Russia for one year until December 14, 2024 for its continued use of ECCN 9A991 aircraft.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/14/2023-27476/siberian-airlines-dba-s7-airlines-633104-novosibirskaya-obl-g-ob-prospekt-mozzherina-d-10-ofis-201

 

*******

 

December 14, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 86628:  The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) renewed the temporary denial order for Pobeda Airlines of Russia for one year until December 14, 2024 for its continued use of ECCN 9A991 aircraft.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/14/2023-27474/pobeda-airlines-108811-russian-federation-moscow-p-moskovskiy-kievskoe-shosse-22nd-km-41-moscow

 

*******

 

December 20, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 87897: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 persons to the Unverified List (UVL). The 13 persons are added to the UVL on the basis that BIS was unable to verify their bona fides. All 13 persons are being added under the destination of the People’s Republic of China (China). The 13 persons added to the UVL are:

 

  • Beijing Jin Sheng Bo Yue Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Beijing Shengbo Xietong Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Fulian Precision Electronics (Tianjin) Co., Ltd.;
  • Guangzhou Xinwei Transportation Co., Ltd.;
  • Guangzhou Xinyun Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Nanning Fulian Fu Gui Precision Industrial Co., Ltd.;
  • Ningbo MOOF Trading Co., Ltd.;
  • Plexus (Xiamen) Co., Ltd.;
  • PNC Systems (Jiangsu) Co., Ltd.;
  • Shenzhen Bozhitongda Technologic Co., Ltd.;
  • Shenzhen Jia Li Chuang Tech Development Co., Ltd.;
  • Shenzhen Jingelang Co., Ltd.; and
  • Xi’An Yierda Co., Ltd.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/20/2023-27928/additions-to-the-unverified-list

 

*******

 

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

December 1, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Luis Miguel Martinez Morales (Martinez) for his role in corruption in Guatemala wherein he engaged in widespread bribery schemes, including schemes related to government contracts. Martinez is being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world. Martinez was added to OFAC’s SDN List.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1941 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231201_33

 

*******

 

December 1, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on three entities and identified as blocked property three vessels that used Price Cap Coalition services while carrying Russian crude oil above the Coalition-agreed price cap. These sanctions build on Treasury’s previous actions in October and November of this year and represent once again Treasury’s commitment, alongside its Coalition partners, to responsibly reduce oil revenues that the Russian government uses to fund its war against Ukraine.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • HS Atlantica Limited of Liberia; [RUSSIA-EO14024].
  • Sterling Shipping Incorporated of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • Streymoy Shipping Limited of the United Arab Emirates.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • HS Atlantica (5LIP5) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9322839;
  • NS Champion (A8FD9) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9299719; and
  • Viktor Bakaev (D5BN6) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9610810.

 

Russia Related General License 78:

 

All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one of the following activities involving the blocked persons or vessels described below are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 29, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (RuHSR):

(1) The safe docking and anchoring of any of the blocked vessels listed in paragraph (b) of this general license (“blocked vessels”) in port;

(2) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; or

(3) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.

 

The authorization of this general license applies to the following blocked persons and vessels listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and any entity in which any of the following persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest:

(1) Sterling Shipping Incorporated (registered owner of NS Champion; IMO 9299719);

(2) Streymoy Shipping Limited (registered owner of Viktor Bakaev, IMO 9610810); and

(3) HS Atlantica Limited (registered owner of HS Atlantica, IMO 9322839).

 

This general license does not authorize:

(1) The entry into any new commercial contracts involving the property or interests in property of any blocked persons, including the blocked entities and vessels described above;

(2) The offloading of any cargo onboard any of the blocked vessels, including the offloading of crude oil or petroleum products of Russian Federation origin, except for the offloading of cargo that is ordinarily incident and necessary to address vessel emergencies authorized pursuant to this general license;

(3) Any transactions related to the sale of crude oil or petroleum products of Russian Federation origin;

(4) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 2 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions;

(5) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or

(6) Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the RuHSR, including transactions involving the property or interests in property of any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, other than transactions involving the blocked persons or vessels above in this general license, unless separately authorized.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1940 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231201 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932361/download?inline

 

*******

 

December 4, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted several individuals for their role in undermining the peace, security, and stability of Sudan. These designations support diplomatic efforts by the international community to end the conflict and demonstrate the U.S. commitment to achieve a civilian government and a transition to democracy.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Abbas, Mohamed Atta Emoula of Sudan;
  • Al-Hussein, Taha Osman Ahmed of the United Arab Emirates, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and
  • Salah, Salah Abdallah Mohamed of Egypt and the Sudan.

 

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1947 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231204

 

*******

 

December 5, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 11 entities and seven individuals pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14038 and one individual pursuant to E.O. 14024. This action increases the pressure on Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s (Lukashenka) authoritarian regime for its brutal suppression of Belarus’s democratic civil society, corrupt financial enrichment of the Lukashenka family, and complicity in Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine.

 

OFAC also targeted a network led by Belgium-based Hans De Geetere that is involved in procuring electronics with military applications for Russian end-users. The network consists of nine entities and five individuals based in Russia, Belgium, Cyprus, Sweden, Hong Kong, and the Netherlands.

 

Concurrent with OFAC’s action, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) unsealed two separate indictments against Hans De Geetere related to his years-long scheme to unlawfully export sensitive, military-grade technology from the United States to end users located in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. The U.S. Department of Commerce is also concurrently adding Hans De Geetere and five entities to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List. Additionally, Belgian authorities took action against De Geetere on charges related to his global illicit procurement scheme.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Babarikin, Vadim Aleksandrovich of Belarus;
  • Beun Kimberley Catriona Lucinda, Eeklo of Belgium and The Netherlands;
  • De Geetere, Hans of Belgium;
  • De Geetere, Tom of Belgium;
  • Gaichuk, Nikolai Nikolaevich of Belarus;
  • Kulemekov, Vladimir of Russia;
  • Moroz, Alexander Ivanovich of Belarus;
  • Petrovich, Viktor Evgenievich of Belarus;
  • Shakutsin, Aliaksandr Vasilevich of Belarus;
  • Shautsou, Dzmitry Yauhenievich of Belarus;
  • Shkadarevich, Alexei Petrovich of Belarus;
  • Skvortsov, Sergey of Sweden and Russia; and
  • Topuzidis, Pavel Georgievich of Belarus.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Ahetei Limited of Cyprus;
  • Belarusian Production And Trade Concern Of Timber Woodworking And Pulp And Paper Industry of Belarus;
  • Eriner Limited of Cyprus;
  • European Technical Trading of Belgium;
  • European Trading Technology B.V. of The Netherlands;
  • Hasa Nederland B.V., Of The Netherlands and Belgium;
  • JSC Minsk Mechanical Plant Named After S.I. Vavilov Management Company Of Belomo Holding of Belarus;
  • JSC Zenit Belomo of Belarus;
  • Knokke Heist Support Corporation Management of Belgium;
  • Lar Vorto Services Limited of Cyprus;
  • M And S Trading of China;
  • OJSC Horizont Holding Management Company of Belarus;
  • Open Joint Stock Company Alevkurp of Belarus;
  • Open Joint Stock Company Amkodor Management Holding Company of Belarus;
  • Planar Research And Production Holdings For Precision Engineering of Belarus;
  • Republican Production And Trade Unitary Enterprise Management Company Of The Holding Belarusian Cement Company of Belarus;
  • Republican Unitary Enterprise Beltamozhservice of Belarus;
  • Scientific Technical Center Lemt Belomo of Belarus;
  • Tabak Invest LLC of Belarus; and
  • The Mother Ark LTD of Cyprus.

 

Belarus General License 10:

 

All transactions prohibited by the Belarus Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 548 (BSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving Tabak Invest LLC (“Tabak Invest”), or any entity in which Tabak Invest owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 2, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account at a U.S. financial institution in accordance with the BSR.

 

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the BSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the BSR other than the blocked persons described above in this general license, unless separately authorized.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1949 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1948 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932376/download?inline

 

*******

 

December 6, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has sanctioned 15 Mexican individuals— several of whom are U.S. fugitives—and two Mexico-based companies linked, directly or indirectly, to the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO). The BLO continues to be one of the most powerful drug trafficking organizations in the world and is heavily involved in the transportation and distribution of deadly drugs, including fentanyl, to the United States. It has been one of the largest suppliers of cocaine to the U.S. market for over two decades.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Aleman Meza, Oscar of Mexico;
  • Bastidas Erenas, Juan Pablo of Mexico;
  • Beltran Araujo, Amberto of Mexico;
  • Beltran Araujo, Mario German of Mexico;
  • Caro Monge, Jesus Jose Gil of Mexico;
  • Caro Quintero, Jose Gil of Mexico;
  • Estevez Colmenares, Ricardo of Mexico;
  • Estrada Gutierrez, Jose de Jesus of Mexico;
  • Flores Ortiz, Francisco Abraham of Mexico;
  • Franco Figueroa, Ulises of Mexico;
  • Gastelum Iribe, Oscar Manuel of Mexico;
  • Inzunza Noriega, Pedro of Mexico;
  • Leon Rodriguez, Juvenal of Mexico;
  • Lopez Lopez, Servando of Mexico; and
  • Pulido Diaz, Oscar of Mexico.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Difaculsa, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico; and
  • Editorial Mercado Ecuestre, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1952 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231206

 

*******

 

December 7, 2023:  the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 13 individuals and entities responsible for providing tens of millions of dollars’ worth of foreign currency generated from the sale and shipment of Iranian commodities, backed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), to the Houthis in Yemen. Through a complex network of exchange houses and companies in multiple jurisdictions, these persons, under the auspices of U.S.-sanctioned Houthi and IRGC-QF financial facilitator Sa’id al-Jamal, serve as an important conduit through which Iranian money reaches the country’s militant partners in Yemen.

 

OFAC in coordination with the United Kingdom also designated two individuals associated with an advanced persistent threat (APT) group that is sponsored by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and has targeted individuals and entities in the United States, United Kingdom, and other allied and partner countries.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Alodhari, Khaled Yahya Rageh of Yemen;
  • Deniz, Fadi of Lebanon, Turkey, United Kingdom, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis;
  • Duri, Ahmet of Turkey;
  • Hudroj, Bilal of Lebanon;
  • Korinets, Andrey Stanislavovich of Russia; and
  • Peretyatko, Ruslan Aleksandrovich of Russia.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Abu Sumbol General Trading L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Davos Exchange And Remittances Company Khaled Al Athari And Partner General Partnership of Yemen;
  • Deniz Capital LLP, of the United Kingdom;
  • Deniz Capital Maritime Inc, of Saint Kitts and Nevis;
  • Hodroj Exchange S.A.R.L of Lebanon;
  • OOO Russtroi-SK of Russia;
  • Pirlant Istanbul Kuyumculuk Ticaret Limited Sirketi of Turkey;
  • Vanessa Group Limited of the United Kingdom; and
  • Vanessa Imex Group Ithalat Ihracat Ve Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi of Turkey and Lebanon.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1961 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1962 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231207

 

*******

 

December 8, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 20 individuals for their connection to human rights abuse in nine countries. An additional two individuals were sanctioned under the Department of State’s counterterrorism authority. Furthermore, the Department of State likewise designated individuals in Russia, Indonesia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for visa restrictions pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Annual Appropriations Act. These actions are taken in concert with measures imposed by partners in the United Kingdom and Canada, which have similarly utilized economic measures to deter human rights abuse globally.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Andre, Johnson of Haiti;
  • Ardestani, Mohammad Mahdi Khanpour of Iran;
  • Biel, Gordon Koang of South Sudan;
  • Bozize, Jean-Francis of the Central African Republic;
  • Byabashaija, Johnson of Uganda;
  • Destina, Renel of Haiti;
  • Farahani, Majid Dastjani of Iran and Venezuela;
  • Gao, Qi of China;
  • Hanafi, Khalid of Afghanistan;
  • Hassan Aliyani, Ahmed Mahamud of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania;
  • Hoth, Gatluak Nyang of South Sudan;
  • Hu, Lianhe of China;
  • Innocent, Vitel’homme of Haiti;
  • Joseph, Wilson of Haiti;
  • Koijee, Jefferson of Liberia;
  • Mahmood, Fariduddin of Afghanistan;
  • Ngoma, Willy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
  • Nkalubo, Mohamed Ali of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda;
  • Rukunda, Michel of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
  • Salleh Adoum Kette, Mahamat of the Central African Republic;
  • Wajang, Joseph Mantiel of Sudan and South Sudan; and
  • Yakutumba, William Amuri of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

 

Global Magnitsky-related Frequently Asked Question 1145:

 

Question 1145: What if a governing institution in Afghanistan is led by an individual who has been blocked pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations?

 

Answer: Generally, the designation of an individual with a leadership role in a governing institution does not itself block the governing institution.  Accordingly, engaging in a routine interaction with a governing institution in which a blocked individual is an official, but that does not directly or indirectly involve the blocked individual in question, is not prohibited.  This applies to any designated individual in Afghanistan who has a leadership role in a governing institution in Afghanistan, including any individual blocked pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations (GMSR).  For example, making a customs payment to a governing institution in Afghanistan led by a blocked individual would not be prohibited by the GMSR.  However, engaging directly or indirectly with that blocked individual, such as receiving an invoice bearing the blocked individual’s signature for a commercial transaction, would be prohibited by the GMSR unless authorized by OFAC or exempt.

 

In addition, certain humanitarian-related transactions involving individuals blocked pursuant to the GMSR may be authorized by general licenses (GL) in the GMSR related to certain international organizations (IOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), official business of the United States government (USG), or agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components, or software updates for personal, non-commercial use (Ag-Med).  For more information on these GLs, please consult OFAC ‘s Supplemental Guidance for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and FAQs 1105, 1106, 1107, and 1108.

 

For information on transactions involving governing institutions in Afghanistan led by an individual or entity designated under the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, or Executive Order 13224, please consult Afghanistan-related GL 20 and FAQ 993.

 

If individuals or entities, including IOs, NGOs, or financial institutions, have questions about engaging in or processing transactions related to these authorizations, they can contact the OFAC Compliance Hotline via email at OFAC_Feedback@treasury.gov.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1972 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231208 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1145

 

*******

 

December 11, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two former Afghan government officials — Mir Rahman Rahmani (M. Rahmani) and his son, Ajmal Rahmani (A. Rahmani), collectively known as “the Rahmanis” — for their extensive roles in transnational corruption, as well as 44 associated entities. These individuals and entities are designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world. Through their Afghan companies, the Rahmanis perpetrated a complex procurement corruption scheme resulting in the misappropriation of millions of dollars from U.S. Government-funded contracts that supported Afghan security forces.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Rahmani, Ajmal Of Greece, United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Hungary, Belgium, Cyprus Saint Kitts and Nevis; and
  • Rahmani, Mir Rahman of Afghanistan, Cyprus, and Saint Kitts and Nevis.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Alphaone Pharmaceutical B.V., of The Netherlands;
  • Ascent Holdings Limited of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Buoyant Holdings Limited of Cyprus;
  • C.H. Dream Creators Holdings LTD of Cyprus;
  • Fidelis Logistic And Supply Services of Afghanistan;
  • Lego Investments Eood of Bulgaria;
  • NAI Energy Europe GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • NAI Energy Europe Verwaltungs GMBH of Germany;
  • NAI Europe Energy GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • NAI Logistics B.V. of the United Arab Emirates and The Netherlands;
  • NAI Logistics Limited of Cyprus;
  • NAI Management GMBH of Germany;
  • Ocean Estate Company Limited of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Ocean Estate GMBH, of Austria;
  • Ocean Europe Cy Limited of Cyprus;
  • Ocean Properties GMBH of Austria;
  • Orbit International FZE of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Ozean Baustoffe GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Development Real Estate GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Group GMBH of Germany;
  • Ozean Horizont Baumaschinen & Bauequipment GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Horizont Bauwerke GMBH of Germany;
  • Ozean Horizont Erdarbeiten GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Horizont Objektplanung GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Horizont Projektentwicklungs GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Horizont Spezialtiefbau GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Immobilien Management GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Immobilien Projektentwicklung GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Immobilien Projektentwicklung Verwaltungs – GMBH of Germany;
  • Ozean Real Estate GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Pyramaxia Immoprojekt GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Pyramaxia Limited of Cyprus;
  • Pyramaxia Real Estate Development GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Pyramaxia Real Estate GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Rahmani Group International JLT of the United Arab Emirates;
  • RG Group FZE of the United Arab Emirates;
  • RG Holdings LTD of Cyprus;
  • RG Immoprojekt GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • RG Real Estate Development GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • RG Real Estate GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Riseonic Holdings LTD of Cyprus; Secure Movement Logistics Services of Afghanistan;
  • The Fern Limited of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • ZEM Holdings LTD of Cyprus.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1973 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231211

 

*******

 

December 12, 2023: G7 Leaders reaffirmed their support for an independent, democratic Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is implementing the commitments made by G7 Leaders by taking action against third-country actors who materially support Russia’s war, targeting Russian military procurement networks and those who help Russia acquire machine tools, equipment, and key inputs; and further curtailing Russia’s use of the international financial system to further its war in Ukraine. OFAC sanctioned over 150 individuals and entities supplying Russia’s Military Industrial base. Please see the list of sanctioned individuals and entities via the link below.

 

Concurrently, the Department of State is imposing sanctions on over 100 entities and individuals, including those engaged in sanctions evasion in numerous third countries, complicit in furthering Russia’s ability to wage its war against Ukraine and responsible for bolstering Russia’s future energy production and export capacity.

 

Russia Related General License 79:

 

All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked entities are authorized through 12:01 a.m. Eastern daylight time, March 11, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):

(1) Limited Liability Company Kyiv Square;

(2) Highland Gold Mining Limited;

(3) Limited Liability Company Kismet Capital Group; or

(4) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly,  individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

Russia Related General License 80:

 

All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or the facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity of Highland Gold Mining Limited (Highland Gold), or any entity in which Highland Gold owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, purchased prior to December 12, 2023 (“Covered Debt or Equity”), to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 11, 2024.

 

All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of Covered Debt or Equity that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, December 12, 2023, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, March 11, 2024.

 

All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, December 12, 2023, that

  • include a blocked person described in this general license as a counterparty or
  • are linked to Covered Debt or Equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. Eastern daylight time, March 11, 2024, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1978 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231212 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932396/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932401/download?inline

 

*******

 

December 13, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed a fourth round of sanctions on Hamas since the October 7 terrorist attack on Israel. This action targets key officials who perpetuate Hamas’s violent agenda by representing the group’s interests abroad and managing its finances. OFAC closely coordinated with the United Kingdom to concurrently designate several key Hamas officials.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Al-Din, Haroun Mansour Yaqoub Nasser of Turkey and Palestine;
  • Al-Wardian, Hassan of Palestine;
  • Awadallah, Nizar Mohammed of Palestine;
  • Baraka, Ali Abed Al Rahman of Lebanon;
  • Barhum, Ismail Musa Ahmad of Palestine;
  • Kaya, Mehmet of Turkey;
  • Obeid, Maher Rebhi of Lebanon and Jordan; and
  • Yaghmour, Jihad Muhammad Shaker of Turkey and Israel.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1981 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231213

 

*******

 

December 14, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the United Kingdom are jointly taking action against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF), Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The U.K. is taking its first action pursuant to new Iran-related authorities, targeting eight actors, including the head of the IRGC-QF and individuals linked to Iran’s support for Hamas and PIJ. The U.K.’s new sanctions authority has been developed to respond to unprecedented threats from the Iranian regime, including efforts to undermine peace and security across the Middle East and plots to kill individuals on U.K. soil. OFAC is designating an IRGC-QF official involved in support of Hamas.

 

Additionally, OFAC sanctioned the Malas Mañas transnational criminal organization (TCO), a human smuggling and narcotics trafficking organization based in Sonora, Mexico, along with two individuals in its support network.

 

Human smuggling organizations like Malas Mañas value profit over human life, endanger the lives of migrants, and undermine the U.S. asylum system.  In addition to human smuggling, Malas Mañas traffics deadly drugs, including illicit fentanyl and methamphetamine, thereby threatening the national security of the United States and Mexico.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Roman Flores, Luis Eduardo of Mexico;
  • Salazar Ballesteros, Joel Alexandro of Mexico; and
  • Zaree, Majid of Iran.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Malas Manas of Mexico.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1987 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231214

 

*******

 

December 19, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on 10 entities and four individuals based in Iran, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Indonesia supporting Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production. This network, led by Iran-based Hossein Hatefi Ardakani, has facilitated the procurement of U.S.- and foreign-origin components worth hundreds of thousands of dollars for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC ASF SSJO) and its UAV program.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Ardakani, Gholamreza Ebrahimzadeh of Iran;
  • Ardakani, Hossein Hatefi of Iran;
  • Dewanto, Agung Surya of Indonesia; and
  • Mohammadabadi, Mehdi Dehghani of Iran.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Arta Wave SDN BHD of Malaysia;
  • Basamad Electronic Pouya Engineering Limited Liability Company of Iran;
  • Dirac Technology HK Limited of China;
  • Integrated Scientific Microwave Technology SDN BHD of Malaysia;
  • Kavan Electronics Behrad Limited Liability Company of Iran;
  • Nava Hobbies SDN BHD of Malaysia;
  • Saman Industrial Group of Iran;
  • Skyline Advanced Tecnologies SDN BHD of Malaysia;
  • Surabaya Hobby CV of Indonesia; and
  • Teyf Tadbir Arya Engineering Company of Iran.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2004 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231219

 

*******

 

December 20, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) continued to tighten enforcement of the price cap on Russian oil by building on previous actions targeting shipowners and vessels implicated in transporting Russian crude oil above the cap. In line with actions previously taken by partners in the Price Cap Coalition, OFAC designated a Government of Russia-owned ship manager as well as several obscure oil traders who have emerged as frequent participants in the seaborne transportation of Russian-origin oil following the imposition of the price cap.

 

OFAC has also, in coordination with the Price Cap Coalition, updated the Guidance on Implementation of the Price Cap Policy for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin. These actions are in line with commitments made by Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) on December 6, 2023 to tighten compliance and enforcement of the price cap policy on Russian oil, including by imposing sanctions on those engaged in deceptive practices and by updating compliance rules and regulations as necessary.

 

The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has published Updated Guidance on the Implementation of the Price Cap Policy for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin. Additionally, OFAC is issuing Russia-related General License 81, “Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions Involving Certain Persons or Vessels Blocked on December 20, 2023,” and Russia-related General License 82, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving SUN Ship Management D Ltd.”

 

Russia Related General License 81:

 

All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one of the following activities involving the blocked persons described below are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 19, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (RuHSR):

(1) The safe docking and anchoring in the port of any vessels in which any person or entity listed below in this general license has a property interest (“blocked vessels”);

(2) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; or

(3) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.

 

The authorization above applies to the following blocked persons listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and any entity in which any of the following persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest:  (1) SUN Ship Management D Ltd;

(2) Covart Energy Limited;

(3) Voliton DMCC; and

(4) Bellatrix Energy Limited.

 

Russia Related General License 82:

 

All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of any transaction involving SUN Ship Management D Ltd (SUN Ship), or any entity in which SUN Ship owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 19, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

Additionally, OFAC has updated its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Bellatrix Energy Limited of China;
  • Covart Energy Limited of China and Russia;
  • Sun Ship Management D LTD of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • Voliton Dmcc of the United Arab Emirates.

 

The following vessel has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • SANAR 15, Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9777670.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2008 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931036/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932461/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932466/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231220

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a Determination Pursuant to Section 11(a)(ii) of E.O. 14024, as amended by the E.O. of December 22, 2023, and a Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i)(B) of E.O. 14068, as amended by the E.O of December 22, 2023. Additionally, OFAC amended the Determination issued on June 28, 2022, “Prohibitions Related to Imports of Gold of Russian Federation Origin.”

OFAC is also issued Russia-related General License 83, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Imports of Certain Categories of Fish, Seafood, and Preparations Thereof Prohibited by Executive Order 14068,” General License 84, “Authorizing Transactions Related to Closing a Correspondent or Payable-Through Account,” and General License 85, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions and the Closure of Accounts Involving Expobank Joint Stock Company.”

 

Russia Related General License 83:

 

All transactions prohibited by the determination of December 22, 2023 made pursuant to section 1(a)(i)(B) of Executive Order (E.O.) 14068, as amended by E.O. of December 22, 2023 (“Prohibitions Related to Imports of Certain Categories of Fish, Seafood, and Preparations Thereof”), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the importation into the United States of seafood derivative products, pursuant to written contracts or written agreements entered into prior to December 22, 2023 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 21, 2024.

 

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized.

 

Russia Related General License 84:

 

U.S. financial institutions that maintain correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts for any foreign financial institution subject to the correspondent account or payable-through account (CAPTA) prohibition of section 11(b)(i) of Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, as amended, are authorized, during the 10-day period beginning on the effective date of the imposition of the prohibition, to engage in the following transactions:

(1) Processing only those transactions through the account, or permitting the foreign financial institution to execute only those transactions through the account for the purpose of, and necessary for, closing the account; and

(2) Transferring the funds remaining in the correspondent account or the payable-through account to an account of the foreign financial institution located outside of the United States and closing the correspondent account or the payable-through account.

 

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the RuHSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized.

 

Russia Related General License 85:

 

All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of any transaction involving Expobank Joint Stock Company (Expobank), or any entity in which Expobank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 21, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to

(i) the closing of an account of a person, wherever located, who is not a blocked person (“the account holder”), held at Expobank, or any financial institution in which Expobank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, and

(ii) the unblocking and lump sum transfer of all remaining funds and other assets in the account to the account holder, including to an account of the account holder held at a non-blocked financial institution, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. Eastern daylight time, March 21, 2024.

 

In addition, OFAC has issued 12 new, Russia-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 1146-1157) and amending several Russia-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 973, 1070, and 1126). See the links below for the new and revised FAQs.

 

Furthermore, OFAC published a Compliance Advisory to provide guidance to foreign financial institutions on the amendments to E.O. 14024, including practical guidance on how to identify sanctions risks and implement corresponding controls.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932446/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932451/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/923986/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932471/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932476/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/added/2023-12-22 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/updated/2023-12-22 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932436/download?inline

 

*******

 

December 28, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated one individual and three entities responsible for facilitating the flow of Iranian financial assistance to Houthi forces and their destabilizing activities. Among those designated is the head of the Currency Exchangers Association in Sana’a, and three exchange houses in Yemen and Türkiye. These persons have facilitated the transfer of millions of dollars to the Houthis at the direction of U.S.-designated Sa’id al-Jamal, who is affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).

 

The following individual have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Al-Hadha, Nabil Ali Ahmed of Yemen.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Al Aman Kargo Ithalat Ihracat Ve Nakliyat Limited Sirketi of Turkey;
  • Al Rawda Exchange And Money Transfers Company of Yemen; and
  • Nabco Money Exchange And Remittance Co. of Yemen.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2014 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231228