Consultants Corner

MARCH 2022 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATION UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through March 31, 2022. The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

Department of State

DDTC Issues Interim Final Rule To Amend The First Chapter Of The ITAR

March 23, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 16396: The U.S. Department of State has issued an interim final rule to amend the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) Part 120 (first chapter) to better organize the purposes and definitions of the regulations. The rule consolidates and co-locates authorities, general guidance, and definitions. This rule restructures Part 120 of the ITAR to better organize the definitions previously found in that part and other parts of the ITAR and to consolidate provisions that provide background information or otherwise apply throughout the regulations. In addition, this rule adds text not previously found in the ITAR and makes clarifying revisions to existing text. None of the revisions change the current scope of the ITAR. This rule is intended to be the first in a series of rulemakings that will further streamline and clarify the regulations.

Prior to this rulemaking, generally applicable information and definitions were spread throughout the ITAR. As a result of this rulemaking, Part 120 is divided into three subparts:

  • Subpart A - General Information;
  • Subpart B - General Policies and Processes; and
  • Subpart C - Definitions.

The division into subparts is intended to provide the reader with a roadmap for the regulations.

  • Subpart A—General Information, consolidates and explains the legislative authority and purpose of the regulations to aid in understanding their importance and source.
  • Subpart B—General Policies and Processes, outlines the general processes and policies of the ITAR.
  • Subpart C—Definitions, provides a consolidated list of defined terms that are applicable throughout the ITAR.

DDTC is also revising those sections affected by this rule that use acronyms to follow a standard format. Where a single term for which there is a known acronym appears on more than two occasions within any one section, the first instance is followed by a parenthetical containing the acronym and subsequent use of the term is by acronym. This will provide consistency of format without sacrificing clarity and limits unnecessary text.

This interim final rule is effective September 6, 2022. If you would like to make a comment about this rule the Department of State is accepting comments through May 9, 2022.

See the Federal Register Notice for the complete changes to the ITAR as well as the Department of State’s website: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/03/23/2022-05629/international-traffic-in-arms-regulations-consolidation-and-restructuring-of-purposes-and and https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events

 

*******

 

Department of State Offers Millions In Rewards For Russian Cyber Criminals

 

March 24, 2022: The U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program is now offering a reward for information on Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers Pavel Aleksandrovich Akulov, Mikhail Mikhailovich Gavrilov, and Marat Valeryevich Tyukov for their alleged involvement in computer intrusions, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and damage to the property of an energy facility offenses. RFJ, which is administered by the Diplomatic Security Service, is offering a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the identification or location of Akulov, Gavrilov, Tyukov, or any other person who, while acting at the direction or under the control of a foreign government, aids or abets a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which may include participation in malicious cyber activities against U.S. critical infrastructure. https://www.state.gov/rewards-for-justice-reward-offer-for-information-on-russian-fsb-officers-conducting-malicious-activity-against-u-s-critical-infrastructure-between-2012-2017/

The U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program is also offering a reward for information on Russia-based hacker Evgeny Viktorovich Gladkikh. RFJ is offering a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to the identification or location of Gladkikh or any other person who, while acting at the direction or under the control of a foreign government, aids or abets a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which may include participation in malicious cyber activities against U.S. critical infrastructure. https://www.state.gov/rewards-for-justice-reward-offer-for-information-on-russian-government-cyber-actor-for-conducting-malicious-activity-against-u-s-critical-infrastructure-in-2017-and-2018/

 

*******

 

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

March 2, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 11802: In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the U.S. Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) is seeking public comments on its Statement of Registration form (Form DS-2032). Interested persons have until May 2, 2022, to submit their comments. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/03/02/2022-04318/60-day-notice-of-proposed-information-collection-statement-of-registration

 

*******

 

DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

March 2 through 29, 2022: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Change in address for CMI Defence America, Inc. from 7205 Sterling Ponds Court, Sterling Heights, Michigan, 48312 to 1920 Opdyke Court, Suite 100, Auburn Hills, Michigan, 48326;
  • Change in name from L3 Westwood Corporation and SPD Electrical Systems, Inc. to L3Harris Maritime Power & Energy Solutions, Inc. due to corporate reorganization;
  • Change in Name of the following L3Harris Technologies, Inc. Australia subsidiaries due to corporate rebranding:
Previous Name Amended Name
Exelis Australia Pty., Ltd. L3Harris Exelis Australia Pty Ltd
Harris Communications (Australia) Pty Ltd L3Harris Communications Australia Pty Ltd
  • Change in Name from Mikuni Corporation Aerospace & Machinery Company to Mikuni Aerospace Corporation due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name from QuantiTech LLC to Axient, LLC due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Address for Claverham Limited from Rivermead Court 2, Kenn Business Park, Clevedon, Bristol BS21 6TH, UK to Fore 1, Fore Business Park, Huskisson Way, Stratford Road, Shirley, Solihull, England, B90 4SS, UK;
  • Change in Name of the following L3Harris Technologies, Inc. UK subsidiaries due to corporate rebranding:
Previous Name Amended Name
L-3 Communications ASA Limited L3Harris Technologies ASA Limited
EDO MBM Technology Limited L3Harris Release & Integrated Solutions Inc.
TRL Technology Ltd. L3Harris TRL Technology Ltd.
  • Change in Name of the following L3Harris Technologies, Inc. UK subsidiaries due to corporate rebranding:
Previous Name Amended Name
L3 Commercial Training Solutions Ltd. L3Harris Commercial Training Solutions Limited
L3Harris Systems UK Limited L3Harris Communications Systems UK Limited
  • Change in Address for MTG Marinetechnik GmbH from Wandsbeker Koenigstrasse 62, 22041 Hamburg, Germany to MTG Marinetechnik GmbH at Budnikowsky-Twiete 7, 22041 Hamburg, Germany;
  • Changes in Name from Yokogawa Electric Corporation and Yokogawa Manufacturing Corporation to Oki Electric Industry Co., Ltd., due to acquisition;
  • Change in Name from Altran Switzerland AG to Capgemini Suisse SA due to acquisition;
  • Change in Name from Air Nostrum Lineas Aereas del Mediterraneo SAU to Air Nostrum Engineering and Maintenance Operations SLU due to corporate rebranding.

 

*******

 

Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

Commerce Takes Additional Actions Related To Exports Of Certain Materials And Adds Parties To The Entity List

March 3, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 12856 and 87 Fed. Reg. 13141: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has taken two additional actions in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, both effective March 3:

  • The first action/final rule builds on existing restrictions BIS put in place on the Russian deepwater oil and gas exploration and extraction industries in 2014 by imposing a policy of denial on such items and applying similarly stringent restrictions on a wide variety of items necessary for refining oil. This rule expands the scope of the sanctions against the Russian industry sector that was originally added to the EAR in August 2014 in response to Russia's 2014 destabilizing conduct in Ukraine and occupation of the Crimea region of Ukraine. See 79 FR 45675 (Aug. 6, 2014). The export controls in this final rule target the oil refinery sector in Russia. This final rule amends part 746 of the EAR (Embargoes and Other Special Controls) to expand the scope of the Russian industry sector sanctions by adding a new general prohibition that will apply to additional Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS)-6 codes and Schedule B numbers for all exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) to or within Russia. Refer to Supplement No. 2 to 22 CFR § 746. file (doc.gov)
  • The second final rule implemented adds 91 new parties in 10 countries to the Commerce Department’s Entity List. The parties were added to the list upon a determination by the interagency End-User Review Committee (ERC), made up of the Departments of Commerce (Chair), Defense, State, Energy, and where appropriate, Treasury, based upon their involvement in, contributions to, or other support of the Russian security services, military and defense sectors, and military and/or defense research and development efforts. These entities are located in: Russia (81), United Kingdom (3), Estonia (3), Spain (2), Malta (2), Kazakhstan (1), Latvia (1), Belize (1), Singapore (1), and Slovakia (1) (NOTE: Total entries is 96 as some entities operate in multiple countries). The entities added to the Entity List via the final rule are as follows:

Belize

  • Ecotherm-Cryo Limited.

Estonia

  • ADIMIR OU;
  • Eastline Technologies OU; and
  • Valery Kosmachov.

Kazakhstan

  • Serniya Engineering.

Latvia

  • Ecotherm-Cryo Limited.

Malta

  • Djeco Group LP; and
  • Malberg Limited.

 

Russia

  • Amur Shipbuilding Factory PJSC;
  • AO Center of Shipbuilding and Ship Repairing JSC;
  • AO Kronshtadt;
  • Avant Space LLC;
  • Baikal Electronics;
  • Center for Technological Competencies in Radiophtonics;
  • Central Research and Development Institute Tsiklon;
  • Crocus Nano Electronics;
  • Dalzavod Ship-Repair Center;
  • Elara;
  • Electronic Computing and Information Systems;
  • ELPROM;
  • Engineering Center Ltd.;
  • Forss Technology Ltd.;
  • Integral SPB;
  • JSC Element;
  • JSC Pella-Mash;
  • JSC Shipyard Vympel;
  • Kranark LLC;
  • Lev Anatolyevich Yershov (Ershov);
  • LLC Center;
  • MCST Lebedev;
  • Miass Machine-Building Factory;
  • Microelectronic Research and Development Center Novosibirsk;
  • MPI VOLNA;
  • N.A. Dollezhal Order of Lenin Research and Design Institute of Power Engineering;
  • Nerpa Shipyard;
  • NM-Tekh;
  • Novorossiysk Shipyard JSC;
  • NPO Electronic Systems;
  • NPP Istok;
  • NTC Metrotek;
  • OAO GosNIIkhimanalit;
  • OAO Svetlovskoye Predpriyatiye Era;
  • OJSC TSRY;
  • OOO Elkomtekh (Elkomtex);
  • OOO Planar;
  • OOO Sertal;
  • Photon Pro LLC;
  • PJSC Zvezda;
  • Production Association Strela;
  • Radioavtomatika;
  • Research Center Module;
  • Robin Trade Limited;
  • R.Ye. Alekseyev Central Design Bureau for Hydrofoil Ships;
  • Rubin Sever Design Bureau;
  • Russian Space Systems;
  • Rybinsk Shipyard Engineering;
  • Scientific Research Institute of Applied Chemistry;
  • Scientific-Research Institute of Electronics;
  • Scientific Research Institute of Hypersonic Systems;
  • Scientific Research Institute NII Submikron;
  • Sergey IONOV;
  • Serniya Engineering;
  • Severnaya Verf Shipbuilding Factory;
  • Ship Maintenance Center Zvezdochka;
  • State Governmental Scientific Testing Area of Aircraft Systems (GkNIPAS);
  • State Machine Building Design Bureau Raduga Bereznya;
  • State Scientific Center AO GNTs RF—FEI A.I. Leypunskiy Physico-Energy Institute;
  • State Scientific Research Institute of Machine Building Bakhirev (GosNIImash);
  • Tomsk Microwave and Photonic Integrated Circuits and Modules Collective Design Center;
  • UAB Pella-Fjord;
  • United Shipbuilding Corporation JSC “35th Shipyard”;
  • United Shipbuilding Corporation JSC “Astrakhan Shipyard”;
  • United Shipbuilding Corporation JSC “Aysberg Central Design Bureau”;
  • United Shipbuilding Corporation JSC “Baltic Shipbuilding Factory”;
  • United Shipbuilding Corporation JSC “Krasnoye Sormovo Plant OJSC”;
  • United Shipbuilding Corporation JSC “SC “Zvyozdochka”;
  • United Shipbuilding Corporation “Pribaltic Shipbuilding Factory Yantar”;
  • United Shipbuilding Corporation “Scientific Research Design Technological Bureau Onega”;
  • United Shipbuilding Corporation “Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard”;
  • Ural Scientific Research Institute for Composite Materials;
  • Urals Project Design Bureau Detal;
  • Vega Pilot Plant;
  • Vertikal LLC;
  • Vladislav Vladimirovich Fedorenko;
  • VTK Ltd;
  • Yaroslavl Shipbuilding Factory;
  • ZAO Elmiks-VS;
  • ZAO Sparta; and
  • ZAO Svyaz Inzhiniring.

Singapore

  • Alexsong PTE LTD.

Slovakia

  • Incoff Aerospace S.R.O.

Spain

  • Invention Bridge SL; and
  • Majory LLP.

United Kingdom

  • Djeco Group LP.

 

*******

Commerce modifies The Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus and Adds Countries Excluded From the FDP Rule  

 March 10, 2022: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) in response to the Russian Federation’s (Russia’s) further invasion of Ukraine, and to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, the Department of Commerce has added new and highly restrictive license requirements and policies for certain transactions involving Russia and Belarus under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Refer to § 746.8. In order to recognize partner countries that have committed to implementing substantially similar new export controls on Russia and Belarus in their domestic laws, the Department of Commerce has published a list of countries (supplement No. 3 to §746) excluded from portions of these new U.S. export controls (§ 746.8(a)(5)).

file (doc.gov)

 

These exclusions apply specifically to certain requirements under the EAR related to foreign-produced items. In this rule, the Department of Commerce adds the Republic of Korea (South Korea) to the list of excluded countries. (See our February 2022 issue for details on the original actions taken against Russia and Belarus)

 

*******

Commerce Consolidates Russian Guidance On Its Webpage

 

The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has created a webpage related to all of the changes that have taken place due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/russia-belarus

 

*******

 

The U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology

 

The U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology issued guidance entitled, “Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information.” The purpose of this publication is to describe procedures for assessing the enhanced security requirements in [SP 800-172]. Compliance with the security requirements is addressed in CUI guidance and the CUI Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) or as supplemented by federal agencies (e.g., Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation). Organizations can use the assessment procedures to generate evidence to support the assertion that the enhanced security requirements have been satisfied. The assessment procedures are typically used as part of an assessment process. An assessment process is an information-gathering and evidence producing activity to determine the effectiveness of the safeguards implemented to meet the set of security requirements specified in [SP 800-172]

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-172A.pdf

 

*******

U.S. Census Bureau

Census Updates HTS Codes Not Schedule B#S For 2022

March 1, 2022: Effective March 1, 2022, all recent updates and corrections to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) are available for use in AES.

Note: There are no changes to Schedule B.

AES accepted shipments with outdated codes during a grace period of 30 days beyond the expiration date of February 28, 2022. Reporting an outdated code after the 30-day grace period will result in a fatal error.

The ACE AESDirect program is updated with the new HTS codes and accepted shipments with outdated codes during the grace period.

The full 2022 Schedule B and HTS tables are available for download at:

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aes/documentlibrary/#concordance

The current list of HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available at:

https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aes/documentlibrary/concordance/hts-not-for-aes.txt

  

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

 This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines, and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Sanctions

 

The President

 

March 3, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 12553: The President continued the National Emergency with respect to Zimbabwe. The actions and policies of certain members of the Government of Zimbabwe and other persons to undermine Zimbabwe's democratic processes or institutions continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared on March 6, 2003, and the measures adopted on that date, on November 22, 2005, and on July 25, 2008, to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond March 6, 2022. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13288.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/03/04/2022-04879/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-zimbabwe

 

*******

 

March 8, 2022: The President signed Executive Order 14066 banning the import of Russian oil, liquefied natural gas, and coal to the United States – a significant action with widespread bipartisan support that  further deprives President Putin of the economic resources he uses to continue his needless war of choice -- the U.S. Treasury released one General License and several Frequently Asked Questions to aid in the wind-down of deliveries of existing purchases that have already been contracted for. The United States continues to take severe action to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its brutal, unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Treasury has targeted the infrastructure supporting President Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, from his cronies to state-owned companies and even the Central Bank, restricting over 80% of the total banking assets in Russia. These actions, in coordination with partners and allies, have isolated Russia from the global financial system and degraded the Kremlin’s ability to project power. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/eo_14066.pdf

*******

 

March 11, 2022: The President Signed Executive Order 14068 prohibiting the following:

  • The importation into the United States of the following products of Russian Federation origin: fish, seafood, and preparations thereof; alcoholic beverages; non-industrial diamonds; and any other products of Russian Federation origin as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce;
  • The exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of luxury goods, and any other items as may be determined by the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury, to any person located in the Russian Federation;
  • New investment in any sector of the Russian Federation economy as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, by a United States person, wherever located;
  • The exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of U.S. dollar-denominated banknotes to the Government of the Russian Federation or any person located in the Russian Federation; and
  • Any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a United States person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited by this section if performed by a United States person or within the United States.

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/14068.pdf

 

*******

 

The U.S. Department of State:

 March 15, 2022: the Department of State has imposed sanctions on the following Russian military leaders.

Specifically, the following 11 individuals are designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 Section 1(a)(i), as persons who operate or have operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy:

  • ALEKSEY KRIVORUCHKO is a Russian Ministry of Defense Deputy Minister of Defense;
  • TIMUR IVANOV is a Russian Ministry of Defense Deputy Minister of Defense;
  • YUNUS-BEK EVKUROV is a Russian Ministry of Defense Deputy Minister of Defense;
  • DMITRY BULGAKOV is a Russian Deputy Minister of Defense and a General of the Army; Bulgakov is the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense’s senior-most officer responsible for logistics matters;
  • YURIY SADOVENKO is a Russian Ministry of Defense Deputy Minister of Defense;
  • NIKOLAY PANKOV is a Russian Ministry of Defense Deputy Minister of Defense;
  • RUSLAN TSALIKOV is a Russian Ministry of Defense Deputy Minister of Defense;
  • GENNADY ZHIDKO is a Russian Ministry of Defense Deputy Minister of Defense;
  • VIKTOR ZOLOTOV is a Russian General of the Army and Commander-in-Chief of Russia’s National Guard Troops. He is a member of Russia’s Security Council;
  • DMITRY SHUGAEV is a senior leader of the Russian Ministry of Defense who is the Director of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s Federal Service for Military Technical Cooperation; and
  • ALEXANDER MIKHEEV is the Director-General of Rosoboronexport, which is Russia’s state-controlled intermediary that carries out foreign trade with respect to military goods. Mikheev has been involved in synchronizing the supplies of weapons and special equipment using the Russian Ministry of Defense’s capabilities; has served as a member of an organizing committee led by Russia’s Minister of Defense of a Russian Ministry of Defense-organized military-focused forum; and has served on a delegation led by Russia’s Minister of Defense.

https://www.state.gov/u-s-announces-sanctions-on-key-members-of-russias-defense-enterprise/

 

*******

 March 24, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 16819: On March 14, 2022, the U.S. Department of State applied the measures authorized in Section 3 of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (Pub. L. 109-353) against the following foreign persons identified in the report submitted pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Act:

  • Zhengzhou Nanbei Instrument Equipment Co. Ltd (People's Republic of China) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
  • Second Academy of Natural Science Foreign Affairs Bureau (SANS FAB) (DPRK) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
  • Ri Sung Chol (aka Ri Su'ng-ch'o'l) (DPRK individual);
  • Ardis Group of Companies LLC (Russia) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
  • PFK Profpodshipnik, LLC (Russia) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
  • Igor Aleksandrovich Michurin (Russian individual).

Accordingly, pursuant to Section 3 of the Act, the following measures are imposed on these persons:

 

  1. No department or agency of the U.S. government may procure or enter into any contract for the procurement of any goods, technology, or services from these foreign persons, except to the extent that the Secretary of State otherwise may determine;
  2. No department or agency of the U.S. government may provide any assistance to these foreign persons, and these persons shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance program of the U.S. government, except to the extent that the Secretary of State otherwise may determine;
  3. No U.S. government sales to these foreign persons of any item on the United States Munitions List are permitted, and all sales to these persons of any defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services under the Arms Export Control Act are terminated; and
  4. No new individual licenses shall be granted for the transfer to these foreign persons of items the export of which is controlled under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 or the Export Administration Regulations, and any existing such licenses are suspended.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/03/24/2022-06200/imposition-of-nonproliferation-measures-against-foreign-persons-including-a-ban-on-us-government

 

*******

 

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

March 8, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 13048: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added new license requirements and review policies for Belarus to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to render Belarus subject to the same sanctions that were imposed on Russia under the EAR effective February 24, 2022. These new sanctions impose new Commerce Control List (CCL)-based license requirements for Belarus; revise the two foreign “direct product” rules (FDP rules) that are specific to Russia and Russian `military end users' to make them also applicable to Belarus and Belarusian `military end-users;' specify a license review policy of denial applicable to all of the license requirements on Belarus that are being added in this rule, with certain limited exceptions; significantly restrict the use of EAR license exceptions; expand the existing `military end use' and `military end user' control scope to include Belarus for all items “subject to the EAR” other than food and medicine designated EAR99, and add two new Belarusian entities to the Entity List as `military end-users.' This rule also imposes a license requirement for nuclear nonproliferation items for exports and reexports to Belarus and removes Belarus from Country Group A:4 under the EAR. In addition, for Belarus and Russia, this rule amends the availability of License Exceptions AVS and ENC and includes clarifying guidance on the availability of CCD. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/03/08/2022-04819/imposition-of-sanctions-against-belarus-under-the-export-administration-regulations-ear

 

*******

 

March 11, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 14785: The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed restrictions on the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of luxury goods to all end-users in the Russian Federation (Russia) and Belarus and to certain Russian and Belarusian oligarchs and malign actors located worldwide. For purposes of these new license requirements, a `luxury good' refers to any item that is identified in new supplement no. 5 to part 746 of the EAR. The license requirement specific to Russia and Belarus for `luxury goods' is added under new § 746.10(a)(1) of the EAR (`Luxury goods' license requirements for Russia and Belarus) (Embargoes and Other Special Controls). The license requirement specific to the designated Russian and Belarusian oligarchs and malign actors for `luxury goods' is added under new § 746.10(a)(2) of the EAR (Worldwide license requirement for `luxury goods' for designated Russian and Belarusian oligarch and malign actors). https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/03/16/2022-05604/imposition-of-sanctions-on-luxury-goods-destined-for-russia-and-belarus-and-for-russian-and

 

*******

 

March 18, 2022: the U.S. Commerce Department, through its Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), publicly identified commercial and private aircraft that have flown into Russia in apparent violation of the EAR. In so doing, BIS is notifying the public that providing any form of service to these aircraft requires authorization. Absent such authorization, any person anywhere—including within Russia—risks violating the EAR and would be subject to BIS enforcement actions which could include substantial jail time, fines, loss of export privileges, or other restrictions. By preventing these aircraft from receiving any service, for example from abroad, international flights from Russia on these aircraft are effectively grounded. https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2022/03/commerce-department-identifies-commercial-and-private-aircraft-exported

 

*******

 

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

March 1, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 11297: On April 15, 2021, President Biden, invoking the authority of, inter alia, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. ) (IEEPA), issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, “Blocking Property With Respect To Specified Harmful Foreign Activities of the Government of the Russian Federation” (86 FR 20249, April 19, 2021).

 

In E.O. 14024, the President found that specified harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation—in particular, efforts to undermine the conduct of free and fair democratic elections and democratic institutions in the United States and its allies and partners; to engage in and facilitate malicious cyber-enabled activities against the United States and its allies and partners; to foster and use transnational corruption to influence foreign governments; to pursue extraterritorial activities targeting dissidents or journalists; to undermine security in countries and regions important to United States national security; and to violate well-established principles of international law, including respect for the territorial integrity of states—constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States and declared a national emergency to deal with that threat.

 

OFAC is issuing the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (the “Regulations”), to implement E.O. 14024, pursuant to authorities delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury in E.O. 14024. A copy of E.O. 14024 appears in appendix A to this part.

 

*******

 

March 1, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated four Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and ISIS-Mozambique (ISIS-M) financial facilitators based in South Africa. ISIS members and associates in South Africa are playing an increasingly central role in facilitating the transfer of funds from the top of the ISIS hierarchy to branches across Africa. The South Africa-based ISIS members designated today pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, have provided support for the aforementioned transfers or served as leaders of ISIS cells in South Africa. The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • ABADIGGA, Abdella Hussein of South Africa;
  • HOOMER, Farhad of South Africa;
  • MBAGA, Peter Charles of South Africa; and
  • MILLER, Siraaj of South Africa.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220301 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0616

 

*******

 

March 2, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 9A, General License 10A, General License 13, and General License 14. In addition, OFAC has published new Frequently Asked Questions and updated several Frequently Asked Questions. OFAC issued this new public guidance to cut off avenues for potential sanctions evasion by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. This guidance makes clear that there should be no loopholes for Russia to evade the unprecedented prohibitions by the United States to lock up Russia’s war chest – Central Bank of the Russian Federation, National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation – that were imposed the week of March 2, 2022.

Russia has taken steps to use exporters to act as their agents and help them raise resources to prop up their currency and fund their priorities. OFAC’s guidance makes clear that such actions on behalf of Russia’s Central Bank are prohibited, closing off attempts to access the U.S. financial system. OFAC issued frequently asked questions (FAQs) for enhanced compliance with U.S. sanctions and further explains recent sanctions actions, including the prohibitions imposed pursuant to Directive 4 under Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the

Russian Federation” (Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive). https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220302 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0624

 

General License 9A: All transactions prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to dealings in debt or equity of one or more of the following entities issued prior to February 24, 2022 (“covered debt or equity”) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, May 25, 2022, provided that any divestment or transfer of, or facilitation of divestment or transfer of, covered debt or equity must be to a non-U.S. person: (1) State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs Vnesheconombank; (2) Public Joint Stock Company Bank Financial Corporation Otkritie; (3) Sovcombank Open Joint Stock Company; (4) Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia; (5) VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company; or (6) Any entity in which one or more of the above entities own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl9a.pdf

 

General License 10A: All transactions prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, February 24, 2022, that (i) include one of the following entities (together, the “Covered Entities”) as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to debt or equity of a Covered Entity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, May 25, 2022, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account: (i) State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs Vnesheconombank; (ii) Public Joint Stock Company Bank Financial Corporation Otkritie; (iii) Sovcombank Open Joint Stock Company; (iv) Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia; (v) VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company; or (vi) Any entity in which one or more of the above entities own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl10a.pdf

 

General License 13: U.S. persons are authorized to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, or certifications, to the extent such transactions are prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to such persons’ day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation, through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 24, 2022. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl13.pdf

 

General License 14: All transactions prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order (E.O). 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation (collectively, “Directive 4 entities”), where the Directive 4 entity’s sole function in the transaction is to act as an operator of a clearing and settlement system, are authorized, provided that: (i) there is no transfer of assets to or from any Directive 4 entity, unless separately authorized; and (ii) no Directive 4 entity is either a counterparty or a beneficiary to the transaction unless separately authorized. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl14.pdf

 

*******

 

March 3, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 15 which, authorizes all transactions prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), involving any entity owned 50 percent or more, directly or indirectly, by Alisher Burhanovich Usmanov that is not listed on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (“blocked Usmanov entity”). All property and interests in property of the blocked Usmanov entities are unblocked, and debits to accounts on the books of a U.S. financial institution of the blocked Usmanov entities are authorized. This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the RuHSR or involving any person blocked or otherwise sanctioned pursuant to the RuHSR, including Alisher Burhanovich Usmanov, or his property or interests in property, other than the blocked Usmanov entities unless separately authorized. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl15.pdf

In addition, the following names have been added to OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN List):

  • ARESHEV, Andrey Grigoryevich of Russia;
  • BESPALOV, Anton Sergeyevich of Russia;
  • BUBNOVA, Irina Sergeyevna of Russia;
  • CHEMEZOV, Alexander Sergeevich of Russia;
  • CHEMEZOV, Stanislav Sergeyevich of Russia;
  • CHUGULEVA, Aleyona Anatolyevna of Russia;
  • DOROKHOVA, Nina Viktorovna of Russia;
  • DUGINA, Darya Aleksandrovna of Russia;
  • FEDIN, Yuriy Sergeyevich of the Ukraine and Russia;
  • GAFNER, Denis Yakovlevich of Russia;
  • GLOTOV, Yevgeniy Eduardovich of the Ukraine;
  • IGNATOVA, Anastasia of Russia;
  • IGNATOVA, Yekaterina Sergeyevna of Russia;
  • ILYASHENKO, Andrey Vitalyevich of Russia;
  • KALABAYEVA, Valeriya of Russia;
  • KAMYSHANOVA, Aleksandra Aleksandrovna of Russia;
  • KIRILLOVA, Anastasiya Sergeyevna of Russia;
  • KNYRIK, Konstantin Sergeyevich of Crimea, Ukraine and Russia;
  • KRANS, Maksim Iosifovich of Russia;
  • KRASOVSKIY, Maksim Borisovich of Russia;
  • MAKSIMENKO, Vladimir Ilich of Russia;
  • MAMAKOVA, Aelita Leonidovna of Russia;
  • NEZHDANOVA, Yevgeniya Vitalyevna of Russia;
  • PESKOV, Dmitriy Sergeevich of Russia;
  • POGREBENKOV, Valeriy Ivanovich of Russia;
  • PRIGOZHIN, Pavel Evgenyevich of Russia;
  • PRIGOZHINA, Lyubov Valentinovna of Russia;
  • PRIGOZHINA, Polina Evgenyevna of Russia;
  • PROKOFYEV, Yuriy Anatolyevich of Russia;
  • ROTENBERG, Boris Borisovich of Russia and Finland;
  • ROTENBERG, Karina Yurevna of Russia and France;
  • ROTENBERG, Liliya Arkadievna of Russia;
  • ROTENBERG, Pavel Arkadyevich of Russia;
  • SAENKO, Sergei Ivanovich of Russia;
  • SHUVALOV, Evgeny Igorevich of Russia;
  • SHUVALOV, Igor Ivanovich of Russia;
  • SHUVALOVA, Maria Igorevna of Russia;
  • SHUVALOVA, Olga Viktorovna of Russia;
  • SINELIN, Mikhail Anatolyevich of Russia;
  • SKOROKHODOVA, Natalya Petrovna of Russia;
  • TATARCHENKO, Denis Sergeyevich of Russia;
  • TOKAREV, Nikolay Petrovich of Russia and Kazakhstan;
  • TOKAREVA, Galina Alekseyevna of Russia;
  • TOKAREVA, Maiya Nikolaevna of Russia and Kazakhstan;
  • USMANOV, Alisher Burhanovich of Russia, Monaco and Uzbekistan; and
  • ZAMLELOVA, Svetlana Georgiyevna of Russia.

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • ALTITUDE X3 LTD of Bermuda;
  • AVANFORT OOO of Russia;
  • AVIASTAR-SP AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISE of Russia;
  • DESIGN BUREAU OF SPECIAL MACHINE-BUILDING of Russia;
  • FIRMA VEARDON OOO of Russia;
  • GEOPOLITICA of Russia;
  • IRKUTSK AVIATION PLANT of Russia;
  • IZHEVSK UNMANNED SYSTEMS RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION ASSOCIATED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY AVANGARD of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY FEDERAL SCIENTIFIC AND PRODUCTION CENTER TITAN BARRIKADY of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY ODK-KLIMOV of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION CORPORATION of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY SALAVAT CHEMICAL PLANT of Russia;
  • JOURNAL KAMERTON of Russia;
  • JSC CENTRAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AUTOMATION AND HYDRAULICS of Russia;
  • JSC NOVOSIBIRSK AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION PLANT NAMED AFTER V.P. CHKALOV of Russia;
  • JSC RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION KVANT of Russia;
  • KATINA DRUSTVO S OGRANICENOM ODGOVORNOSCU ZA NEKRETNINE I UGOSTITELJSTVO of Croatia;
  • KOMSOMOLSK-ON-AMUR AVIATION PLANT of Russia;
  • KURGANMASHZAVOD of Russia;
  • LAKHTA PARK PREMIUM, OOO of Russia;
  • LAKHTA PARK, OOO of Russia;
  • LAKHTA PLAZA, OOO of Russia;
  • LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY NEMCHINOVO INVESTMENTS of Russia;
  • LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY OSTOZHENKA 19 of Russia;
  • MAKEYEV STATE MISSILE CENTER of Russia;
  • NEW EASTERN OUTLOOK of Russia;
  • NIZHNIY NOVGOROD SOKOL AIRCRAFT MANUFACTURING PLANT of Russia;
  • ODK-SATURN PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY of Russia;
  • ODNA RODYNA of Russia;
  • ORIENTAL REVIEW of Russia;
  • OTKRYTYE AKTIVY OOO of Russia;
  • PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY ODK-KUZNETSOV of Russia;
  • PUBLIC JOINT-STOCK COMPANY ODK-UFIMSKOYE MOTOROSTROITELNOYE PRODUCTION ASSOCIATION of Russia;
  • RADIOAVTOMATIKA LLC of Russia;
  • RHYTHM OF EURASIA of Russia;
  • SOVA NEDVIZHIMOST OOO of Russia;
  • G.A. D.O.O. ZA TRGOVINU I USLUGE of Russia;
  • THE PLANAR COMPANY of Russia;
  • UNITED WORLD INTERNATIONAL of Russia;
  • VSEROSSISKIY INSTITUT AVIATSIONNYKH MATERIALOV of Russia; and
  • ZARECHE-4 OOO of Russia.

The following vessel has been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • DILBAR (ZGFO) Yacht 15,917GRT Cayman Islands flag.

The following aircraft have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • LX-MOW; Aircraft Model GVI G650; and
  • M-IABU Aircraft Model Airbus A340-300; Aircraft Manufacturer's Serial Number (MSN) 955; Aircraft Tail Number M-IABU.

 

*******

 

March 4, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued the following three new Frequently Asked Questions regarding Russian sanctions:

 

  • Do I have to wind down energy-related transactions by the expiration date of the Russia-related General License (GL) 8A?
  • My U.S. bank refused to process a requested payment related to energy despite the authorization in Russia-related General License (GL) 8A under Executive Order (E.O.) 14024. What can I do?
  • My company transports Russian oil for sale to the United States and third countries. Can I continue to transport or sell Russian-origin oil without violating sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024?

 

For answers to these FAQs see the following link: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/added/2022-03-04

 

*******

 

March 4, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two key Hizballah financiers operating in Guinea pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. This action is aimed at disrupting Hizballah’s business network in West Africa, which relies on bribery and influence to circumvent the rule of law. In addition to other sources of funding, Hizballah generates revenue from commercial activities across the world to sponsor acts of terrorism. The designation of these financiers demonstrates the Treasury’s ongoing efforts to target the terrorist group’s international commercial activities and its global network of financiers, supporters, donors, and facilitators, which enable Hizballah to persistently threaten the security, stability, and prosperity of Lebanon and other jurisdictions. The Hizballah financiers added to the SDN list are:

 

  • SAADE, Ali of Guinea, Lebanon, and France;
  • TAHER, Ibrahim of Guinea, Lebanon, and the United Kingdom.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0631 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220304

 

*******

 

March 7, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added the following entity to the SDN list:

 

  • KATIBAT AL TAWHID WAL JIHAD (a.k.a. JANNAT OSHIKLARI; a.k.a. KHATIBA AL-TAWHID WAL-JIHAD; a.k.a. TAWHID AND JIHAD BRIGADE; a.k.a. "KTJ") of Syria; Kyrgyzstan; Russia.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220307

 

*******

 

March 8, 2022: As a result of Executive Order 14066, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 16. In addition, OFAC has published new Frequently Asked Questions and updated several Frequently Asked Questions.

 

Russia-related General License 16: Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this general license, all transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) of March 8, 2022, Prohibiting Certain Imports and New Investments With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the importation into the United States of crude oil; petroleum; petroleum fuels, oils, and products of their distillation; liquefied natural gas; coal; and coal products of Russian Federation origin pursuant to written contracts or written agreements entered prior to March 8, 2022 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 22, 2022. (b) This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized.

 

OFAC added the following Frequently Asked Questions:

 

·       Does Executive Order (E.O.) 14066 prohibit dealing in Kazakh-origin crude oil of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (“CPC”)?

 

·       For the purposes of Executive Order (E.O.) of March 8, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports and New Investments With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” what is meant by the terms “Russian Federation origin” and “new investment in the energy sector in the Russian Federation”?

 

·       Are non-U.S. persons exposed to sanctions if they continue to import to non-U.S. jurisdictions certain products of Russian Federation origin that are banned from the United States pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) of March 8, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports and New Investments With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine”?

 

·       Does Russia-related General License (GL) 8A remain valid following the issuance of Executive Order (E.O.) of March 8, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports and New Investments With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine”?

 

·       I have a shipment of a product or products listed in Executive Order (E.O.) of March 8, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports and New Investments With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” en route to the United States that was contracted prior to March 8, 2022. Can I find a new buyer for this shipment, re-direct the shipment to a country other than the United States, or import the product and comply with the import ban?

 

·       Is there a period for U.S. persons to continue imports prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) of March 8, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports and New Investments With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine”?

 

·       Are non-U.S. persons exposed to sanctions if they continue to import to non-U.S. jurisdictions certain products of Russian Federation origin that are banned from the United States pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) of March 8, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports and New Investments With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine”?

 

·       What does Executive Order (E.O.) of March 8, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports and New Investments With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Efforts to Undermine the Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” do?

 

OFAC also updated the following two Frequently Asked Questions:

 

·       My company transports Russian oil for sale to the United States and third countries. Can I continue to transport or sell Russian-origin oil without violating sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024?

·       Can a U.S. financial institution process transactions related to energy where a Russian financial institution sanctioned pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 is involved?

 

Answers to the FAQs can be found at the links below.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220308 and https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl16.pdf and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/added/2022-03-08 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/976

 

*******

 

March 11, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two individuals and three entities for supporting North Korea’s defense industry ongoing development of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs in violation of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). North Korea’s defense industry has conducted 11 ballistic missile launches since the beginning of the year, most recently on March 4, 2022 (EST). This action targets a group of foreign individuals and companies that aid a North Korean defense industry-related procurement agent in Russia; much of this activity also violates UN prohibitions with respect to North Korea. The two individuals are:

 

  • Andreyevich Gayevoy (Gayevoy) of Russia; and
  • Pak Kwang Hun of North Korea.

The three entities are:

 

  • Apollon OOO of Russia;
  • Zeel – M Co., Ltd of Russia; and
  • RK Briz, OOO of Russia.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • AFONIN, Yuriy Vyacheslavovich of Russia;
  • ANDRESOV, Yuriy Nikolaevich of Russia;
  • BELOUS, German Valentinovich of Russia;
  • BESSONOV, Yevgeniy Ivanovich of Russia;
  • CHASOVNIKOV, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, of Russia;
  • DERGUNOVA, Olga Konstantinovna of Russia;
  • DIRKS, Natalia Germanova of Russia;
  • GAYEVOY, Aleksandr Andreyevich of Russia;
  • GEORGIEVA, Elena Aleksandrovna of Russia;
  • KALASHNIKOV, Leonid Ivanovich of Russia;
  • KASHIN, Vladimir Ivanovich of Russia;
  • KNYAGININ, Vladimir Nikolaevich of Russia;
  • KOLOMEITSEV, Nikolay Vasilievich of Russia;
  • KONDRATENKO, Maxim Dmitrievich, of Russia;
  • KOVALCHUK, Boris Yurievich of Russia;
  • KOVALCHUK, Kira Valentinovna of Russia;
  • KOVALCHUK, Stepan Kirillovich of Russia;
  • KOVALCHUK, Tatyana Aleksandrovna of Russia;
  • KULIK, Vadim Valerievich of Russia;
  • KURINNIY, Aleksey Vladimirovich of Russia;
  • LUKYANENKO, Valerii Vasilyevich of Russia;
  • MELNIKOV, Ivan Ivanovich of Russia;
  • NAVKA, Tatiana Aleksandrovna of Russia;
  • NOROV, Erkin Rakhmatovich of Russia;
  • NOVIKOV, Dmitriy Georgievich of Russia;
  • OSADCHIY, Nikolay Ivanovich of Russia;
  • OSTROVSKY, Svyatoslav Evgenievich of Russia;
  • PECHATNIKOV, Anatolii Yuryevich of Russia;
  • PESKOV, Nikolay of Russia;
  • PESKOVA, Elizaveta Dmitriyevna of Russia;
  • PYANOV, Dmitrii Vasilyevich of Russia;
  • SAPELIN, Andrey Yurievich of Russia;
  • TAYSAEV, Kazbek Kutsukovich of Russia;
  • VAVULIN, Dmitri Nikolaevich of Russia;  and
  • ZYUGANOV, Gennady Andreyevich of Russia.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • APOLLON OOO of Russia;
  • RK BRIZ, OOO of Russia; and
  • ZEEL - M CO., LTD. of Russia.

The following vessel has been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • TANGO (E5U3540) Yacht 2,083GRT Cook Islands flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 1010703; MMSI 518100626 (vessel).

The following aircraft have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • P4-MIS; Aircraft Manufacture Date 31 May 2007; Aircraft Model Airbus A319-115.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0651 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220311

 

*******

 

March 11, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 17, General License 18, and General License 19 and Ukraine-related General License 23. OFAC has also published new Frequently Asked Questions and amended one Frequently Asked Question.

 

General License 17: All transactions prohibited by section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order of March 11, 2022, Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the importation into the United States of fish, seafood, and preparations thereof; alcoholic beverages; or non-industrial diamonds of Russian Federation origin pursuant to written contracts or written agreements entered into prior to March 11, 2022, were authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 25, 2022. The general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl17.pdf

 

General License 18: All transactions prohibited by section (1)(a)(iv) of Executive Order of March 11, 2022, Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the transfer of U.S. dollar-denominated banknote noncommercial, personal remittances from: (i) the United States or a U.S. person, wherever located, to an individual located in the Russian Federation; or (ii) a U.S. person who is an individual located in the Russian Federation, are authorized.

 

Note to paragraph (a)(1). Noncommercial, personal remittances do not include charitable donations to or for the benefit of an entity or funds transfers for use in supporting or operating a business, including a family-owned business. (2) Transferring institutions may rely on the originator of a funds transfer with regard to compliance with paragraph (a)(1) of this general license, provided that the transferring institution does not know or have reason to know that the funds transfer is not in compliance with paragraph (a)(1). (b) This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), or involving any person blocked pursuant to RuHSR, unless separately authorized. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl18.pdf

 

General License 19: Individuals who are U.S. persons located in the Russian Federation are authorized to engage in all transactions prohibited by section 1(a)(iv) of Executive Order of March 11, 2022, Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to their personal maintenance within the Russian Federation, including payment of housing expenses, acquisition of goods or services for personal use, payment of taxes or fees, and purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, or public utility services. This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl19.pdf

 

Ukraine-related General License 23: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14065 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the activities described in paragraph (b) by nongovernmental organizations are authorized, including the processing and transfer of funds, payment of taxes, fees, and import duties, and purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, or public utility services. This general license does not authorize any transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to E.O. 14065, unless otherwise authorized. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ukraine_gl23.pdf

 

New Frequently Asked Questions:

 

·       Does the U.S. dollar-denominated banknote export ban imposed by Executive Order (E.O.) of March 11, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression,” prohibit sending noncommercial, personal remittances denominated in U.S. dollars to the Russia Federation (or to individuals ordinarily resident in the Russia Federation)?

 

·       For the purposes of Executive Order (E.O.) of March 11, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression,” what is meant by the terms “Russian Federation origin,” “fish, seafood, and preparations thereof,” “alcoholic beverages,” and “non-industrial diamonds”?

 

·       Are non-U.S. persons exposed to sanctions if they continue to import to non-U.S. jurisdictions certain products of Russian Federation origin that are banned from the United States pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) of March 11, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression”?

 

·       Executive Order (E.O.) of March 11, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression” prohibits the importation into the United States of fish, seafood, and preparations thereof of Russian Federation origin. How does this affect Russia-related General License (GL) 6?

 

·       I have a shipment of a certain product(s) listed in Executive Order (E.O.) 14068 en route to the United States that were contracted prior to March 11, 2022. Can I find a new buyer for this shipment, re-direct the shipment to a country other than the United States, or import the product(s) and comply with the import ban?

 

·       Is there a period of time for U.S. persons to continue importing products prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14068?

 

·       What does Executive Order (E.O.) of March 11, 2022, “Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression,” do?

 

·       Do the prohibitions of Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 and other Russia-related sanctions extend to virtual currency?

 

For answers to these Frequently Asked Questions, see the following link: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/added/2022-03-11

 

The following Frequently Asked Question was amended:

 

  • Are U.S. persons authorized to engage in certain activity with the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic regions of Ukraine or such other regions of Ukraine as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State (collectively, the “Covered Regions")?

 

For the answer to this Frequently Asked Questions, see the following link: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/updated/2022-03-11

 

*******

 

March 15, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added the following individuals to the OFAC SDN List:

 

  • AKHMATOV, Dzhabrail Alkhazurovich of Russia;
  • BULGAKOV, Dmitry of Russia;
  • EVKUROV, Yunus-Bek of Russia;
  • IVANOV, Timur of Russia;
  • KHUTAEV, Khusein Merlovich of Russia;
  • KRIVORUCHKO, Aleksey of Russia;
  • LUKASHENKA, Halina Radzivonawna of Belarus;
  • MIKHEEV, Aleksander Aleksandrovich of Russia;
  • MUSHNIKOVA, Natalia Evgenievna of Russia;
  • PANKOV, Nikolay of Russia;
  • SADOVENKO, Yuriy of Russia;
  • SALAMOV, Nurid Denilbekovich of Russia;
  • SHUGAYEV, Dmitry of Russia;
  • TSALIKOV, Ruslan, of Russia; and
  • ZHIDKO, Gennady of Russia and Uzbekistan.

The following entity has been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • Kurchaloi District Of The Chechen Republic Branch Of The Ministry Of Internal Affairs Of The Russian Federation.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220315

 

*******

 

March 15, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated four individuals and one entity pursuant to the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (the Russia Magnitsky Act). These Russia Magnitsky Act targets were involved in concealing events surrounding the death of renowned Russian whistleblower Sergei Magnitsky, or were connected to gross violations of human rights against Russian human rights defender Oyub Titiev. Treasury is also re-designating Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus, the head of a corrupt government in Belarus whose patronage network benefits his inner circle and regime, and newly designating his wife pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13405.

 

  • The four individuals that were sanctioned on March 15th are:
  • Alyaksandr Lukashenka of Belarus;
  • Halina Radzivonawna Lukashenka of Belarus;
  • Natalia Mushnikova or Russia;
  • Dzhabrail Alkhazurovich Akhmatov of Chechnya.

 

The entity sanctioned on March 15th is:

 

  • Kurchaloi District of the Chechen Republic Branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation of Chechnya.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0654 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220315

 

*******

 

March 17, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), sanctioned Alain Goetz, the African Gold Refinery in Uganda, and a network of companies involved in the illicit movement of gold valued at hundreds of millions of dollars per year from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • GOETZ, Alain Francois Viviane of the United Arab Emirates, Belgium and Turkey

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • AFRICAN GOLD REFINERY LIMITED of Uganda;
  • AGOR DMCC of the United Arab Emirates;
  • AGR INTERNATIONAL LIMITED of the Seychelles;
  • ALAXY of Belgium;
  • CG - VASTGOED INVEST of Belgium;
  • GOETZ GOLD LLC of the United Arab Emirates;
  • OROFINO NV of Belgium;
  • PREMIER GOLD REFINERY LLC of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • WWG DIAMONDS of Belgium.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220317 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0664

 

*******

 

March 18, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Ukraine-/Russia-related General License 24. Under the General License all transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14065 related to the provision or receipt of civil maritime services performed by individuals who are ordinarily resident in the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) or Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) regions of Ukraine, or such other regions of Ukraine as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State (collectively, the “Covered Regions”), are authorized, provided that:

(1) Such services are performed outside the Covered Regions; and

(2) Such services are not performed on behalf of any entity located in, or organized under the laws of, the Covered Regions.

 

This general license does not authorize:

(1) Any new investment in the Covered Regions prohibited by E.O. 14065 unless separately authorized; or

(2) Any transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to E.O. 14065 unless separately authorized.

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ukraine_gl24.pdf

 

OFAC also issued the following additional Frequently Asked Question:

  • Does Executive Order (E.O.) 14066 prohibit dealing in Kazakh-origin crude oil of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (“CPC”)?

 

The answer to this Frequently Asked Question can be found at: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/updated/2022-03-18

 

*******

 

March 18, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated the Los Huistas Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) and its leaders pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059 for drug trafficking that threatens the people and security of the United States and Guatemala. The Los Huistas DTO is the dominant criminal structure in the Guatemalan department of Huehuetenango (along the border of Guatemala and Mexico).

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • MOLINA LOPEZ of Guatemala;
  • MOLINA MONTEJO of Guatemala;
  • MONTEJO SAENZ of Guatemala;
  • MORENO LOPEZ of Guatemala;
  • SALAZAR FLORES of Guatemala;
  • SAMAYOA MONTEJO of Guatemala; and
  • SAMAYOA RECINOS of Guatemala.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • COMPRADORES Y EXPORTADORES DE CAFE CAPTZIN, SOCIEDAD ANONIMA of Guatemala; LOS HUISTAS DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATION of Guatemala.

 

The following deletion has been made to OFAC's SDN List:

  • ROSENTHAL HIDALGO, of Honduras.

 

 

 

March 21, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added the following entity to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE of Sudan.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220321 and

 

*******

 

March 24, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 6A, General License 17A, General License 20, and Ukraine-/Russia-related General License 25. In addition, OFAC has updated two Frequently Asked Questions.

 

General License 6A: All transactions prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to: (1) the exportation or reexportation of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components for medical devices, or software updates for medical devices to, from, or transiting the Russian Federation; (2) the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID-19); or (3) ongoing clinical trials and other medical research activities that were in effect prior to March 24, 2022, are authorized. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl6a.pdf

 

General License 17A: All transactions prohibited by section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order (E.O.) 14068 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the importation into the United States of alcoholic beverages or non-industrial diamonds of Russian Federation origin pursuant to written contracts or written agreements entered into prior to March 11, 2022, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 25, 2022. All transactions prohibited by section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14068 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the importation into the United States of fish, seafood, and preparations thereof of Russian Federation origin pursuant to written contracts or written agreements entered into prior to March 11, 2022 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 23, 2022. This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized. Effective March 24, 2022, General License No. 17, dated March 11, 2022, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License No. 17A. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl17a.pdf

 

General License 20: U.S. persons are authorized to engage in all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the official business of third-country diplomatic or consular missions located in the Russian Federation that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 or section 1(a)(iv) of E.O. 14068. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl20.pdf

 

Ukraine Russia Related General License 25: News reporting organizations that are United States persons, and individuals who are United States persons regularly employed by a news reporting organization, either as journalists (including photojournalists) or as supporting broadcast or technical personnel, are authorized to engage in the following transactions in the Crimea region of Ukraine, the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) or Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) regions of Ukraine, or such other regions of Ukraine as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State (collectively, the “Covered Regions”), to the extent such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to their journalistic activities in the Covered Regions. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ukraine_gl25.pdf

 

Updated Frequently Asked Questions:

I have a shipment of a certain product(s) listed in Executive Order (E.O.) 14068 en route to the United States that was contracted prior to March 11, 2022. Can I find a new buyer for this shipment, re-direct the shipment to a country other than the United States, or import the product(s) and comply with the import ban?

 

Is there a period of time for U.S. persons to continue importing products prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14068?

 

Answers to these updated Frequently Asked Questions can be found at: https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/updated/2022-03-24

 

*******

 

March 24, 2022: In its latest action to impose severe costs on the Russian Federation for its illegal, unwarranted, and baseless war against Ukraine, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated key enablers of the invasion. This includes dozens of Russian defense companies, 328 members of the Russian State Duma, and the head of Russia’s largest financial institution. See the following link for the extensive list of individuals added to OFAC’s SDN List: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0677

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO ELEKTROTYAGA of Russia;
  • AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO GOSUDARSTVENNOE NAUCHNO PROIZVODSTVENNOE PREDPRIYATIE REGION of Russia;
  • AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO PETROVSKII ELEKTROMEKHANICHESKII ZAVOD MOLOT of Russia;
  • AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO RAVENSTVO-SERVICE of Russia;
  • AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO SARATOVSKI RADIOPRIBORNYI ZAVOD of Russia;
  • AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO TURAEVSKOE MASHINOSTROITELNOE KONSTRUKTORSKOE BYURO SOYUZ of Russia;
  • AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO VERKHNEUFALEISKII ZAVOD URALELEMENT of Russia;
  • INTERNATIONAL HELICOPTERS PROGRAMS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY 150 AIRCRAFT REPAIR PLANT of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY 356 AIRCRAFT REPAIR PLANT of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY 711 AIRCRAFT REPAIR PLANT of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY 810 AIRCRAFT REPAIR PLANT of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY AZOVSKI OPTIKO MECHANICHESKY ZAVOD of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY CENTRAL DESIGN BUREAU OF AUTOMATICS of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY CONCERN GRANIT-ELECTRON of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY CONCERN SEA UNDERWATER WEAPON GIDROPRIBOR of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY DAGDIZEL PLANT of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY HELICOPTER SERVICE COMPANY of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY KAZAN HELICOPTERS of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY KRONSHTADT of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY KUMERTAU AVIATION PRODUCTION ENTERPRISE of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY MACHINE BUILDING DESIGN BUREAU of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY NATIONAL HELICOPTER CENTER MIL AND KAMOV of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY PROGRESS ARSENYEV AVIATION COMPANY of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY REDUCTOR of Russia;
    JOINT STOCK COMPANY RESEARCH AND DESIGN INSTITUTE SEA THERMAL ENGINEERING of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY RYAZANSKOE KONSTRUKTORSKOE BJURO GLOBUS of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY SALUTE of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY SEVERNIY PRESS of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY SMOLENSK AIRCRAFT PLANT of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY STATE MACHINE BUILDING DESIGN BUREAU VYMPEL BY NAME I.I. TOROPOV of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY STUPINO ENGINEERING PRODUCTIVE ENTERPRISE of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY ULAN-UDE AVIATION PLANT of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY URAL DESIGN BUREAU DETAL of Russia;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY ZAVOD KULAKOVA of Russia;
  • JSC MBDB ISKRA of Russia;
  • JSC NPO HIGH PRECISION SYSTEMS of Russia;
  • JSC RAWENSTVO of Russia;
  • LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY CENTER OF PURCHASES AND LOGISTICS OF THE HELICOPTER INDUSTRY of Russia;
  • NPK TEKHMASH OAO of Russia;
  • OBSHCHESTVO S OGRANICHENNOI OTVETSVENNOSTYU VR-RESURS of Russia;
  • PUBLIC JOINT STOCK COMPANY ARZAMASSKOE NAUCHNO PROIZVODSTVENNOE PREDPRIYATIE TEMP-AVIA of Russia;
  • RADUGA STATE MACHINE BUILDING DESIGN BUREAU JOINT STOCK COMPANY of Russia;
  • ROSTOV HELICOPTER PRODUCTION COMPLEX of Russia;
  • STATE DUMA OF THE FEDERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION of Russia;
  • STATE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING IMENI V.V. BAKHIREVA of Russia;
  • TACTICAL MISSILES CORPORATION JSC of Russia;
  • TRV AUTO LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY of Russia;
  • VERTOLETY ROSSII AO of Russia.

The following vessel has been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • LENA (ZJL8309) Yacht British Virgin Islands flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9594339.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0677

 

*******

 

March 25, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated five individuals and five entities connected to Burma’s military regime pursuant to Executive Order (E.O) 14014. OFAC also designated six individuals connected to the Nigeria-based terrorist group, Boko Haram. All six were found guilty of establishing a Boko Haram cell in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to raise funds for and provide material assistance to Boko Haram insurgents in Nigeria.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • ADAMU, Salihu Yusuf of Nigeria and the United Arab Emirates;
  • ALHASSAN, Ibrahim Ali of Nigeria;
  • AUNG, Naing Htut of Burma;
  • AUNG, Sit Taing of Burma;
  • HEIN, Zaw of Burma;
  • ISA, Muhammed Ibrahim of Nigeria and the United Arab Emirates;
  • MUHAMMAD, Surajo Abubakar of Nigeria and the United Arab Emirates;
    MUSA, Abdurrahman Ado of Nigeria and the United Arab Emirates;
  • OO, Aung Hlaing of Burma;
  • OO, Ko Ko, Zayyarthiri, Nay Pyi Taw of Burma; and
  • YUSUF, Bashir Ali of Nigeria.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • 66TH LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION of Burma;
  • ASIA GREEN DEVELOPMENT BANK LTD of Burma;
  • HTOO GROUP OF COMPANIES of Burma;
  • INTERNATIONAL GATEWAYS GROUP OF COMPANY LIMITED of Burma; and
    MYANMAR CHEMICAL AND MACHINERY COMPANY LIMITED of Burma.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0679  and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0678 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220325

 

*******

 

March 30, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned an Iran-based procurement agent and his network of companies that procured ballistic missile propellant-related materials for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Research and Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC RSSJO), the IRGC unit responsible for the research and development of ballistic missiles, as well as Iran’s Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI), an element of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO). OFAC is also taking action against a key Iranian intermediary involved in the procurement of parts used to develop missile propellant on behalf of PCI.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • HOSSEINI, Mohammad Ali of Iran.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • JESTAR SANAT DELIJAN of Iran;
    B. SADR CO. of Iran;
  • SAYEHBAN SEPEHR DELIJAN of Iran; and
  • SINA COMPOSITE DELIJAN COMPANY of Iran.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0689 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220330

 

*******

 

March 31, 2022: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is continuing to impose severe costs on the Russian Federation for its unprovoked and unjustified war against Ukraine by targeting operators in the Russian technology sector to prevent it from evading unprecedented multilateral sanctions and procure critical western technology. OFAC designated 21 entities and 13 individuals as part of its crackdown on the Kremlin’s sanctions evasion networks and technology companies, which are instrumental to the Russian Federation’s war machine. Treasury has also determined that three new sectors of the Russian Federation economy are subject to sanctions pursuant to Executive Order 14024 (E.O. 14024).

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • BERNOVA, Evgeniya Vladimirovna of Germany and Russia;
  • BOBKOV, Sergei Alekseevich of Russia;
  • DUBROVINSKIY, Viacheslav Yuryevich of Russia;
  • GLADKIKH, Evgeny Viktorovich of Russia;
  • GRININ, Yevgeniy Aleksandrovich of Russia;
  • KRUGOVOV, Anton Alekseevich of Russia;
  • MALEVANYY, Konstantin Vasilyevich of Russia;
  • NIKOLAEVA, Irina Viktorovna of Russia;
  • PODGORNOVA, Yevgeniya Aleksandrovna of Russia;
  • SOBOLEV, Nikita Aleksandrovich of Russia;
  • TOPCHI, Tamara Aleksandrovna of Russia;
  • YERSHOV, Sergey Aleksandrovich of Russia; and
  • ZAKHAROV, Andrey Georgiyevich of Russia.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • ALEXSONG PTE LTD of Singapore;
  • AO NII VEKTOR of Russia;
  • DJECO GROUP HOLDING LTD of Malta;
  • DJECO GROUP LP of the United Kingdom;
  • INVENTION BRIDGE SL of Spain;
  • JOINT STOCK COMPANY MIKRON of Russia;
  • MAJORY LLP of the United Kingdom;
  • MALBERG LIMITED, of Malta;
  • MALTARENT LTD of Malta;
  • MOLECULAR ELECTRONICS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, JOINT STOCK COMPANY of Russia;
  • OOO FOTON PRO of Russia;
  • OOO NAUCHNO-TEKHNICHESKII TSENTR METROTEK of Russia;
  • OOO PAMKIN KHAUS of Russia;
  • OOO ROBIN TREID of Russia;
  • OOO SERNIYA INZHINIRING of Russia;
  • OOO SERTAL of Russia;
  • PHOTON PRO LLP of the United Kingdom;
  • QUANTLOG OY of Finland;
  • SCI GRIBER of France;
  • SERNIA-FILM CO, LTD of Russia; and
  • T-PLATFORMS of Russia.

 

The following deletions have been made to OFAC's SDN List:

 

  • LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY OZON BANK of Russia; and
  • LLC OZON BANK of Russia.

 https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220331 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0692

 

*******

 

U.S. Departments of Justice and Treasury

 

March 16, 2022: Attorney General Merrick B. Garland and Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen met virtually with representatives from Australia, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Commission, to launch the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) multilateral task force. The task force was first announced by leaders on Feb. 26. The task force, consisting of Finance Ministry and Justice or Home Ministry in each member jurisdiction, each committed to using their respective authorities in concert with other appropriate ministries to collect and share information to take concrete actions, including sanctions, asset freezing, civil and criminal asset seizure, and criminal prosecution.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-departments-justice-and-treasury-launch-multilateral-russian-oligarch-task-force

 

*******

 

Fines and Penalties

 

March 1, 2022: Thomas Harris Jr., 29, of Croydon, PA, was sentenced to three years and 10 months in prison, and three years of supervised release for multiple firearms trafficking offenses stemming from his scheme to sell almost 40 guns to a buyer on the island of St. Lucia. https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/bucks-county-man-sentenced-nearly-four-years-trafficking-firearms-st-lucia

 

*******

 

March 4, 2022: Joe Sery, former owner and chief executive officer of Tungsten Heavy Powder & Parts, and his brother, Dror Sery, were charged in a federal grand jury indictment with violations of federal export laws pursuant to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Tungsten Heavy Powder & Parts, or THPP, is a San Diego-based company that provides tungsten fragments, sub-assemblies, and other weapon grade components for United States military contracts. According to the indictment, between January 1, 2016, and December 12, 2019, Joe Sery entered into contracts with various aerospace and defense companies on behalf of THPP. Joe Sery then obtained  ITAR- controlled technical data and drawings from these companies to allow THPP to fulfill the contracted order. Some of THPP’s projects included the construction of an Advanced Rapid Response Weapon, a 155-millimeter Bi-Modal Warhead, a R9E Warhead, and an 81-millimeter Cowling Cone. These drawings contained information, which is required for the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance, or modification of defense articles. Despite being educated and trained regarding the requirements of ITAR, Joe Sery and his brother Dror Sery – a foreign national and dual citizen of Israel and South Africa – knowingly and willfully exported from the United States to the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India and elsewhere overseas, defense articles covered by the United States Munitions List without first obtaining permission from the United States Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. Joe Sery is expected to be arraigned in federal court on Monday; an arrest warrant has been issued for fugitive Dror Sery. He is believed to be residing in Israel. https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/former-tungsten-heavy-powder-parts-ceo-arrested-and-charged-unlawful-exportation

 

*******

 

March 8, 2022: Two former senior Venezuelan prosecutors have been charged with money laundering for their receipt of bribes in exchange for agreeing not to pursue criminal charges against certain individuals in Venezuela. According to the indictment, Daniel D’Andrea Golindano (D’Andrea), 43, and Luis Javier Sanchez Rangel (Sanchez), 35, both of Venezuela, are each charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and two counts of engaging in monetary transactions in the criminally derived property.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-former-senior-venezuelan-prosecutors-charged-receiving-over-1-million-bribes

 

*******

 

March 29, 2022: The former Comptroller General of Ecuador made his initial appearance in a Miami, Florida courtroom, for allegedly engaging in a scheme to use the U.S. financial system to launder money to promote and conceal an illegal bribery scheme in Ecuador. According to the March 24 indictment, between approximately 2010 and 2016, Carlos Ramon Polit Faggioni (Polit), allegedly solicited and received over $10 million in bribe payments from Odebrecht S.A., the Brazil-based construction conglomerate, in exchange for using his official position as Comptroller General of Ecuador to influence official actions by the comptroller’s office in order to benefit Odebrecht and its business in Ecuador. Additionally, Polit is alleged to have received a bribe from an Ecuadorian businessman in or around 2015 in exchange for assisting the businessman and his company in connection with certain contracts from the state-owned insurance company of Ecuador. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-comptroller-general-ecuador-indicted-alleged-bribery-and-money-laundering-scheme

MARCH 2022 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATION UPDATES Read More »

JANUARY 2022 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATION UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through January 31, 2022. The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company's international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 See also our "Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties" section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

 

Editors Notes Regarding Potential Policy Changes Regarding Russia

 

An astute reader will be aware of the conjecture regarding Russia's potential invasion of the Ukraine and the potential U.S. sanctions on Russia should such an invasion occur, notwithstanding that both countries have been involved in a conflict since Russia's annexation of the Crimea Region of the Ukraine. The potential sanctions would target major Russian banks, savings, and pensions and limit the market for Russia's sovereign debt. The proposed sanctions would also change the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Direct Product Rule making it difficult for Russia to purchase certain U.S. goods, such as semiconductors, or the machines that make such U.S. goods or for others to sell such goods to them where U.S. manufacturing equipment was used for the production of such items.

 

Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

BIS Adjusts Civil Monetary Penalty For Inflation

 

Jan. 4, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 157: The U.S. Department of Commerce has issued a civil monetary penalty adjustment for inflation resulting in an increase for certain export violations described in the Export Administration Regulations:

 

  • 50 U.S.C. 4819, Export Controls Act of 2018 (ECRA) violation increases the maximum per violation from $308,901 to $328,121.

 

*******

 

 

 

BIS Adds Software Specially Designed to Automate the Analysis of Geospatial Imagery to A Highly Controlled ECCN

 

Jan. 6, 2022: 85 Fed. Reg. 459: BIS amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to formally add Software Specially Designed to Automate the Analysis of Geospatial Imagery to the ECCN 0Y521 Temporary Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCN) Series as ECCN 0D521. BIS initially added this software to EAR as ECCN 0D521 on January 6, 2020, and extended the control for a year on January 6, 2021. The U.S. Government submitted a proposal for multilateral controls on this software, but due to the pandemic, the Wassenaar Arrangement did not formally convene in 2020 and, therefore, was unable to consider acceptance of the proposal. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/01/06/2019-27649/addition-of-software-specially-designed-to-automate-the-analysis-of-geospatial-imagery-to-the-export

 

*******

 

Department of Commerce – Census Bureau

 

Census Adjust Civil Monetary Penalty For Inflation

 

Jan. 4, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 157: The U.S. Department of Commerce has adjusted the civil monetary penalty  for inflation for, among other things:

 

  • 13 U.S.C. 304, Collection of Foreign Trade Statistics (2002), each day's delinquency of a violation; total of not to exceed maximum per violation, from $1,436 to $1,525; maximum per violation, from $14,362 to $15,256; and
  • 13 U.S.C. 305(b), Collection of Foreign Trade Statistics (2002), violation, maximum from $14,362 to $15,256

 

*******

 

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

 

Jan. 5 through Jan. 31, 2022: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website:

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

 

  • Change in Name, Address and Ownership of the following Raytheon companies due to their acquisition by Vertex Aerospace LLC:

 

Former Legal Name And Address New Legal Name And Address
Raytheon Technical Services International Company

22265 Pacific Blvd.

Dulles, VA 20166

Vertex Technical Services International Company

555 Industrial Drive South

Madison, MS 39110-9073

 

 

Raytheon Professional Services LLC

1717 E. Cityline Dr.

Richardson, TX 75082

 

 

Vertex Professional Services LLC

555 Industrial Drive South

Madison, MS 39110-9073

Raytheon Systems Israel Company

1801 Hughes Dr.

Fullerton, CA 92834

Vertex Systems Israel Company

555 Industrial Drive South

Madison, MS 39110-9073

 

  • Change in Name from SEAKR Engineering, Inc. to SEAKR Engineering, LLC due to Raytheon Technologies Corporation's acquisition of SEAKR Engineering, Inc.;
  • Change in Address for K Line Logistics, Ltd from 1-8-16, Nihonbashi Honcho, Chuo-ku, Tokyo, 103-0023 Japan to Harumi Island Triton Square Office Tower X 30th Fl., 1-8-10 Harumi Chuo-ku, Tokyo, 104-6030 Japan.
  • Change in Name of the following Babcock Aviation Nordic Region entities due to corporate rebranding:

 

Previous Name Amended Name
Bond Aviation Group Limited Babcock Mission Critical Services UK Limited
World Helicopters Norway AS Babcock Norway AS
Scandinavian Air Ambulance Holding AB Babcock Scandinavia Holding AB
Avincis Mission Critical Services Scandinavia AB Babcock Mission Critical Services Scandinavia AB
Scandinavian Air Ambulance Norge AS Babcock Scandinavian AirAmbulance AS
Scandinavian AirAmbulance AB Babcock SAA FW AB
Scandinavian Medicopter AB (Sweden) Babcock Scandinavian AirAmbulance AB
Scandinavian Medicopter AB (Finland) Babcock Scandinavian AirAmbulance AB Filial I Finland

 

  • Change in Name from Altran UK Limited to Capgemini UK plc due to merger;
  • Change in Name from Peraton Canada Corp. to Arcfield Canada Corp. due to divestiture;
  • Northrop Grumman Integrated Defence Services Pty Limited and Northrop Grumman M5 Network Security Pty Limited are integrated into Northrop Grumman Australia Pty Limited due to corporate restructuring;
  • Change in Address for AECOM from 300 South Grand Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90071 to 13344 Noel Rd., #400, Dallas, TX 75204;
  • Change in names of the following L3 Harris Technologies, Inc., subsidiaries due to corporate rebranding:

 

Previous Name Amended Name
Power Paragon, Inc. L3Harris Maritime & Energy Solutions, Inc
Aerosim Flight Academy L3Harris Aerosim Academy, Inc.
Applied Defense Solutions, Inc. L3Harris Applied Defense Solutions, Inc.
Electrodynamics, Inc. L3Harris Electrodynamics, Inc.
ForceX, Inc. L3Harris ForceX, Inc.
Interstate Electronics Corporation L3Harris Interstate Electronics Corporation
L3 Applied Technologies, Inc. L3Harris Applied Technologies, Inc.
L-3 Communications Flight Capital LLC L3Harris Technologies Flight Capital LLC
 

L3 Fuzing and Ordnance Systems, Inc.

 

L3Harris Fuzing and Ordnance Systems, Inc.

L3 Kigre, Inc. L3Harris Kigre, Inc.
L3 Latitude, LLC L3Harris Latitude, LLC
L3 Unmanned Systems, Inc. L3Harris Unmanned Systems, Inc.
L3 Mustang Technology, L.P. L3Harris Mustang Technology Group, L.P.
NexGen Communications LLC L3Harris NexGen Communications LLC

 

 

Each announcement includes a link to a notice detailing the change and its effects on pending and currently approved authorizations involving the listed entity.

 

*******

 

The Department of State Adjusts Civil Monetary Penalty For Inflation

 

Jan. 10, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 107: The Department of State adjusts the civil penalty for export violations for inflation, as follows:

  • 22 CFR 127.10(a)(1)(i)) is adjusted from $1,197,728 to $1,272,251; and
  • 22 CFR 127.10(a)(1)(ii)) is adjusted from $870,856 to $925,041, or five times the amount of the prohibited incentive payment, whichever is greater.

 

*******

 

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

OFAC Issues New Belarus, Ukraine-Russia Related And Venezuela Related Frequently Asked Question

 

Jan. 7, 2022: OFAC published new guidance related to Belarus, Ukraine-Russia, and Venezuela in its Frequently Asked Questions related to the discontinuation of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a  benchmark reference rate, OFAC is issuing additional guidance.

 

The Belarus, Ukraine-/Russia-related, and Venezuela-related sanctions programs prohibit U.S. persons from dealing in certain new debt of persons identified as subject to these prohibitions. In various FAQs, OFAC provides examples of new debt, such as "bonds, loans, extensions of credit, loan guarantees, letters of credit, drafts, bankers acceptances, discount notes or bills, or commercial paper" issued on or after various specified dates. For the Belarus, Ukraine-/Russia-related, and Venezuela-related sanctions programs, OFAC has indicated that certain changes to contractual terms of loans, contracts, or other agreements that were entered into prior to the effective date of the relevant sanctions prohibitions could convert pre-existing debt that was not subject to the sanctions prohibitions into new debt that is subject to the sanctions prohibitions. Loans, contracts, or other agreements that use LIBOR as a reference rate that are modified to replace such benchmark reference rate will not be treated as new debt for OFAC sanctions

purposes, so long as no other material terms of the loan, contract, or agreement are modified.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/956  

 

*******

 

 

 

OFAC Issues Venezuela-related General License 51

 

Jan. 20, 2022: OFAC issues Venezuela-related General License 51, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 2020 8.5 Percent Bond on or After January 20, 2023." This General License prevents creditors from seizing US-based petroleum refiner CITGO. As a result, during such period, transactions related to the sale or transfer of CITGO shares in connection with the PdVSA 2020 8.5 percent bond are prohibited unless specifically authorized by OFAC. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220120_33

 

*******

 

OFAC Issues Ukraine Related Sanctions General License 13Q

 

Jan. 24, 2022: OFAC issues Ukraine-related sanctions General License 13Q authorizing certain transactions necessary to divest or transfer debt, equity, or other holdings in GAZ Group. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220124#:~:text=U.S.%20Department%20of%20the%20Treasury,-Search&text=OFAC%20is%20issuing%20Ukraine%2Drelated,Certain%20Activities%20Involving%20GAZ%20Group.%22

 

*******

 

OFAC Issues Ukraine Related Sanctions General License 15K

 

Jan. 24, 2022: OFAC issues Ukraine related sanctions General License 15K authorizing certain activities involving GAZ Group to include:

  • Research, design, development, production, modification, upgrade, certification, distribution, and marketing;
  • Provision or receipt of services, including warranty, maintenance, logistics, storage, shipping, insurance, security, brokerage, legal, banking and financial (including financing and renegotiation of debt), technical and engineering, advertising, and customer services;
  • Entry into joint ventures, contract manufacturing agreements, supplier contracts, and other new contracts associated with activities authorized by paragraph (a);
  • Payment and receipt of dividends and other funds owed by or to GAZ Group relating to activities authorized by paragraph (a);
  • The conduct of financial transactions associated with activities authorized by paragraph (a); and Activities necessary for compliance with paragraph (f)(1)(i), including financial auditing services.

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ukraine_gl15k.pdf

 

*******

 

OFAC Updated Its Ukraine Related Frequently Asked Questions

 

Jan. 24, 2022: Due to the issuance of Ukraine-related sanctions General Licenses 13Q and 15K referenced above, OFAC has updated it's Ukraine-related Frequently Asked Questions. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faq/updated/2022-01-24

 

*******

 

 

Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

 

IRS Published The Current List Of Countries That Require Or May Require Participation In, Or Cooperation With, An International Boycott

 

Jan. 3, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 145: In accordance with section 999(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has published a current list of countries that require or may require participation in, or cooperation with, an international boycott (within the meaning of section 999(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986):

  • Iraq;
  • Kuwait;
  • Lebanon;
  • Libya;
  • Qatar;
  • Saudi Arabia;
  • Syria; and
  • Yemen.

 

*******

 

Department of Treasury, as Chair of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)

 

CFIUS Identifies New Zealand As An Excepted Foreign State And Excepted Real Estate Foreign State

 

Jan. 5, 2022, CFIUS identified New Zealand as an eligible foreign state under the "excepted foreign state" and "excepted real estate foreign state" regulations (at 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.218 and 802.214, respectively). CFIUS identified New Zealand as eligible based "on its intelligence-sharing relationship with the United States and its collective defense arrangement and cooperation with the United States." https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius/cfius-excepted-foreign-states

 

CFIUS Publishes Its Determination Related to Australia And Canada Remaining Excepted Foreign States

 

Jan. 7, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 875: CFIUS published the Committee's determination that Australia and Canada have made significant progress toward establishing and effectively utilizing a robust process to analyze foreign investments for national security risks and to facilitate coordination with the United States on matters relating to investment security. This determination satisfies the second criterion in the definition of excepted real estate foreign state under 31 CFR § 802.214 with respect to Australia and Canada. Therefore, Australia and Canada are and will remain excepted real estate foreign states absent further Committee action and notice in the Federal Register. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/01/07/2022-00234/determination-regarding-excepted-real-estate-foreign-states

*******

 

Department of Justice / Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

 

ATF Codifies Certain Provisions Of The Omnibus Consolidated And Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999

 

Jan. 4, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 182: The U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) has amended 27 CFR Part 478 to codify into regulation certain provisions of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999. This rule amends ATF's regulations to account for the existing statutory requirement that applicants for Federal firearms dealer

 

Licenses certify that secure gun storage or safety devices will be available at any place where firearms are sold under the license to non-licensed individuals. This certification is already included in the Application for Federal Firearms License, ATF Form 7/7CR ("Form 7/7CR"). The regulation also requires applicants for manufacturer or importer licenses to complete the certification if the licensee will have premises where firearms are sold to non-licensees. Moreover, the regulation requires that the secure gun storage or safety devices be compatible with the firearms offered for sale by the licensee. Finally, it conforms the regulatory definitions of certain terms to the statutory language, including the definition of "antique firearm," which is amended to include certain modern muzzleloading firearms. These changes are effective Feb. 3, 2022.

 

ATF has also published the "Best Practices Guide for FFLs" as a resource and reference guide about federal gun laws and regulations. The Best Practices Guide encourages FFLs to provide customers with ATF publications to help firearms owners better understand their legal obligations, as well as practical steps they can take to help keep firearms out of the hands of prohibited persons and facilitate safe storage of firearms. Links to ATF publications addressing the following topics are included in the Best Practices Guide: procedures for FFLs to assist unlicensed firearms owners in conducting background checks for private party transfers; compliance with the Youth Handgun Safety Act; records firearms owners should maintain that can assist law enforcement if the owner's firearms are ever lost or stolen; and the legal consequences and public safety dangers of straw purchasing – which involves purchasing a gun for someone who is prohibited by law from possessing one or for someone who does not want his or her name associated with the transaction. https://www.atf.gov/firearms/federal-firearms-licensee-quick-reference-and-best-practices-guide

 

*******

 

U.S. Census Bureau

 

Census Publishes Interim Final Rule On New Control On Cyber Security Items And A New License Exception "Authorized Cybersecurity Exports" (ACE)

 

Jan. 7, 2022: On Thursday, October 21, 2021, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule that became effective January 19, 2022. This interim final rule establishes a new control on cyber security items and a new License Exception "Authorized Cybersecurity Exports" (ACE) that authorizes exports of these items to most destinations except in the circumstances described in the rule. As a result of this rule, the following changes will be made to the Automated Export System (AES) in order for exporters and authorized agents to successfully report Electronic Export Information (EEI) in the AES.

Three Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCN): ECCNs 4A005, 4D004 and 4E001.c are added to the AES ECCN reference table.

 

A new License Code (C64) has been added to the AES: An update has been made to AES to create a new License Code C64 - Authorized Cybersecurity Exports (ACE) that authorizes exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of cybersecurity items and certain IP network surveillance products, which are not also controlled in Category 5—Part 2 of the Commerce Control List (CCL) or for Surreptitious Listening (SL) reasons. License Exception ACE allows the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of 'cybersecurity items' to most destinations, except to destinations listed in Country Groups E:1 and E:2 of supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR).

AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting requirements when using C64 (ACE) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES.

  • Report License Code: C64 Authorized Cybersecurity Exports (ACE)
  • Allowable ECCN's: The following ECCNs are eligible 4A005, 4D001, 4D004, 4E001, 5A001, 5B001, 5D001, and 5E001 to the extent permitted under part 740 of the EAR and the respective ECCN entry.
  • Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
  • Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except '70' (Fixed Transport)

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-10-21/pdf/2021-22774.pdf

 

*******

Other

 

The FBI Investigates A Chinese Investment In An Aircraft Startup Following Allegations Of Improper Technology Transfer To China

 

Jan. 18, 2022: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and a U.S. investment-screening panel are investigating Chinese investment in an aircraft startup following allegations of improper technology transfer to China. Under review is a Chinese government-backed investment company's nearly 47% stake—the largest of any shareholder—in Icon Aircraft Inc., a California-based maker of small recreational, amphibious planes. A group of U.S. shareholders has accused the Chinese firm of hollowing out Icon and moving its technology, which the Americans say has possible military applications, to China. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CIFIUS), an interagency panel that can recommend that the president block or unwind deals on national-security grounds, began its review in late November after the American shareholders urged it to intervene. The FBI has also initiated a separate probe into possible criminal violations related to the deal and the alleged transfer of technology. https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-investment-in-u-s-plane-maker-draws-fbi-national-security-reviews-11642507206?mod=hp_lead_pos4

 

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

 

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines, and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Sanctions

 

Department of State

 

Jan. 21, 2022: 87 Fed Reg 3376: The Department of State has determined that the following three People's Republic of China entities have engaged in activities that require the imposition of measures pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, and the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended:

  • China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) First Academy, and its sub-units and successors;
  • China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) Fourth Academy, and its sub-units and successors; and
  • Poly Technologies Incorporated (PTI) and its sub-units and successors.

 

Accordingly, the following sanctions are being imposed on these entities for two years:

  • Denial of all new individual licenses for the transfer to the sanctioned entities of all items on the U.S. Munitions List and all items the export of which is controlled under the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) of 2018;
  • Denial of all U.S. Government contracts with the sanctioned entities; and
  • Prohibition on the importation into the United States of all products produced by the sanctioned entities.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/01/21/2022-01117/imposition-of-missile-proliferation-sanctions-on-three-entities-in-the-peoples-republic-of-china-prc

 

*******

 

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

Jan. 12, 2022: BIS has issued Orders Denying Export Privileges of the following four individuals:

  • Until June 25, 2029 - On June 25, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Ernestina Hernandez-Juarez ("Hernandez-Juarez") was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a). Specifically, Hernandez-Juarez was convicted of fraudulently and knowingly exporting and sending or attempting to export and send from the United States to Mexico 40 Level III AR500 steel body armor plates. Hernandez-Juarez was sentenced to 18 months in prison and a $100 assessment. https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1349-e2701/file
  • Until September 25, 2026 - On September 25, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Edna Yaritza Zamarripa ("Edna Zamarripa") was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a). Specifically, Edna Zamarripa was convicted of fraudulently and knowingly exporting and sending 2000 rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm caliber ammunition from the United States to Mexico, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced Edna Zamarripa to 46 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment. https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1350-e2702/file
  • Until September 25, 2024 - On September 25, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Consuelo Teresita Zamarripa, a/k/a Consuelo Teresita Ramirez ("Consuelo Zamarripa"), was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a). Specifically, Consuelo Zamarripa was convicted of fraudulently and knowingly exporting and sending 2,000 rounds of 7.62 x 39 mm caliber ammunition from the United States to Mexico, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced Consuelo Zamarripa to 37 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment. https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1351-e2703/file
  • Until October 17, 2024 - On October 17, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Irving Aaron Rodriguez-Solis ("Rodriguez-Solis") was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a). Specifically, Rodriguez-Solis was convicted of fraudulently and knowingly exporting and sending or attempting to export and send from the United States to Mexico 3,000 rounds of 7.62x39 caliber ammunition contrary to 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (b)(2) and (c), and Title 22 C.F.R. §§ 121.1, 123.1, 127.1, and 127.3, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) and 2. Rodriguez-Solis pled guilty to this offense on August 2, 2019. As a result of his conviction, on October 17, 2019, the Court sentenced Rodriguez-Solis to 30 months in prison and a $100 assessment. https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1352-e2704/file

*******

 

Jan. 20, 2022: BIS issued Orders Denying Export Privileges of Khaldoun Hejazi. On March 3, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, Khaldoun Hejazi ("Hejazi") was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C § 2778) ("AECA"). Specifically, Hejazi was convicted of knowingly and willfully conspiring to export, and causing to be exported, firearms from the United States, which were designated as defense articles on the United States Munitions List, without having first obtained the required licenses or written approval from the U.S. Department of State. BIS has denied Hejazi's export privileges under the Export Administration Regulations for a period of five years from the date of Hejazi's conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also revoked any BIS-issued licenses in which Hejazi had an interest at the time of his conviction. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Hejazi to 30 months in prison, three years of supervised release, a $30,000 criminal fine, and a $100 court assessment. https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1353-e2705/file

 

*******

 

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

Jan. 5, 2022:  OFAC sanctioned Milorad Dodik (Dodik), who is a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), as well as one entity under his control, Alternativna Televizija d.o.o. Banja Luka, in response to Dodik's corrupt activities and continued threats to the stability and territorial integrity of BiH. Dodik has used his official BiH position to accumulate personal wealth through graft, bribery, and other forms of corruption. His divisive ethno-nationalistic rhetoric reflects his efforts to advance these political goals and distract attention from his corrupt activities. Cumulatively, these actions threaten the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of BiH and undermine the Dayton Peace Accords, thereby risking wider regional instability. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0549

 

*******

 

Jan. 10, 2022: OFAC designates six officials of the Government of Nicaragua pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13851. President Daniel Ortega and Vice President Rosario Murillo were inaugurated following fraudulent national elections orchestrated by their regime in November 2021, further consolidating their control of power to the detriment of the Nicaraguan people. This designation targets officials of the Nicaraguan military, the Nicaraguan Minister of Defense, the Nicaraguan Institute of Telecommunications and Mail (TELCOR), and the state-owned Nicaraguan Mining Company (ENIMINAS). The six officials that have been designated and added to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list are:

 

  • Bayardo De Jesus Pulido Ortiz;
  • Bayardo Ramon Rodriguez Ruiz;
  • Rosa Adelina Barahona De Rivas;
  • Celina Delgado Castellon;
  • Nahima Janett Diaz Flores; and
  • Ramon Humberto Calderon Vindell.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0552

 

*******

 

Jan. 12, 2022: OFAC designated five Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) individuals and one Russian individual responsible for procuring goods for the DPRK's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile-related programs. These actions are in line with U.S. efforts to prevent the advancement of the DPRK's WMD and ballistic missile programs and impede attempts by Pyongyang to proliferate related technologies. They also follow the DPRK's six ballistic missile launches since September 2021, each of which violated multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). The individuals designated to the SDN list are:

  • ALAR, Roman Anatolyevich of Russia;
  • CHOE, Myong Hyon of North Korea;
  • KANG, Chol Hak of North Korea;
  • KIM, Song Hun of North Korea;
  • O, Yong Ho of North Korea;
  • PYON, Kwang Chol of North Korea; and
  • SIM, Kwang Sok of North Korea.

 

OFAC also added PARSEK LLC of Russia to the SDN list.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0555

 

*******

 

Jan. 18, 2022: OFAC added the following three Hizballah-linked financial facilitators and their Lebanon-based travel company to the SDN list:

 

  • ALAMAH, Jihad Salim of Lebanon;
  • DAOUN, Ali Mohamad of Lebanon;
  • DIAB, Adel of Lebanon; and
  • DAR AL SALAM FOR TRAVEL & TOURISM of Lebanon.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220118

 

*******

 

Jan. 20, 2022: OFAC sanctioned four individuals engaged in Russian government-directed influence activities to destabilize Ukraine. This is the latest action OFAC has taken to target purveyors of Russian disinformation. The four individuals are:

  • Taras Romanovych Kozak;
  • Volodymyr Mykolayovych Oliynyk;
  • VladimirLeonidovich Sivkovich; and
  • Oleh Voloshyn.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0562

 

*******

 

Jan. 21, 2022: OFAC designated Hizballah-affiliated financial facilitator Adnan Ayad, as well as members of an international network of facilitators and companies connected to him and to Adel Diab,

 

Adnan Ayad's business partner and fellow Hizballah financier who was designated by OFAC. The three individuals added to the SDN list are:

  • Adnan Ayad;
  • Jihad Adnan Ayad; and
  • Ali Adel Diab.

 

The ten entities added to the SDN list are:

  • Al Amir Co. for EngineeringConstruction and General Trading SARL;
  • Golden Group SAL Offshore;
  • Golden Group Trading SARL;
  • Hammer and Nail Construction Limited;
  • Hamidco Investment Limited;
  • Inshaat Co SARL;
  • Jammoul and Ayad for Industry and Trade;
  • Land Metics SARL;
  • Landmetics SAL Off-Shore; and
  • Top Fashion Gmbh Konfektionsbügelei.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0564

 

Jan. 31, 2022: OFAC designated 7 Burmese individuals and 2 Burmese entities. The seven individuals added to the SDN list are:

  • OO, Thida;
  • OO, Tin;
  • OO, Tun Tun;
  • TAY ZA, Htoo Htet;
  • TAY ZA, Pye Phyo;
  • THAUNG, Jonathan Myo Kyaw; and
  • ZA, Tay of Burma and Singapore.

 

The two entities added to the SDN list are:

  • Directorate Of Procurement Of The Commander-In-Chief Of Defense Services Army; and
  • KT Services & Logistics KTSL Company Limited.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220131

 

Fines and Penalties

 

Jan. 3, 2022: The U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) reached a settlement agreement with a unit of home rental firm Airbnb, Inc. for violations of U.S. sanctions on Cuba. Airbnb Payments, Inc. agreed to remit $91,172.29 to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of sanctions against Cuba. The apparent violations included payments related to guests traveling for reasons outside of OFAC's authorized categories, as well as a failure to keep certain required records associated with Cuba-related transactions, the Treasury Department said. Airbnb Payments' apparent violations were voluntarily self-disclosed and were non-egregious. https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220103

 

*******

 

 

 

Jan. 6, 2022: Robert Alcantara was charged in a criminal complaint with conspiring to traffic firearms and with making false statements. According to the allegations in the Complaint: From September 2019 up to November 2021, Alcantara and others entered an agreement in which Alcantara purchased the parts for more than 100 "ghost guns," machined the ghost guns at his house in Providence, Rhode Island, and then illegally sold the working and completed ghost guns. On November 20, 2021, law enforcement recovered parts for 45 ghost guns from Alcantara's car. When interviewed by law enforcement, Alcantara falsely told them that he had never sold or transferred ownership of a firearm to any other individual and that he had never transported a firearm to the Dominican Republic. https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/rhode-island-man-charged-manhattan-trafficking-ghost-guns

 

*******

 

Jan. 6, 2022: Xiang Haitao, 44, a Chinese national formerly residing in Chesterfield, Missouri, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit economic espionage. According to court documents, Xiang conspired to steal a trade secret from Monsanto, an international company based in St. Louis, for the purpose of benefitting a foreign government, namely the People's Republic of China. According to court documents, Xiang was employed by Monsanto and its subsidiary, The Climate Corporation, from 2008 to 2017, where he worked as an imaging scientist. Monsanto and The Climate Corporation developed a digital, online farming software platform that was used by farmers to collect, store and visualize critical agricultural field data and increase and improve agricultural productivity for farmers. A critical component to the platform was a proprietary predictive algorithm referred to as the Nutrient Optimizer. Monsanto and The Climate Corporation considered the Nutrient Optimizer a valuable trade secret and their intellectual property. In June 2017, the day after leaving employment with Monsanto and The Climate Corporation, Xiang attempted to travel to China on a one-way airplane ticket. While he was waiting to board his flight, Federal officials conducted a search of Xiang's person and baggage. Investigators later determined that one of Xiang's electronic devices contained copies of the Nutrient Optimizer. Xiang continued on to China, where he worked for the Chinese Academy of Science's Institute of Soil Science. Xiang was arrested when he returned to the United States. Xiang pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit economic espionage and is scheduled to be sentenced on April 7. He faces a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison, a potential fine of $5 million, and a term of supervised release of not more than three years. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-pleads-guilty-economic-espionage-conspiracy

 

*******

 

Jan. 11, 2022: OFAC Settles with Sojitz (Hong Kong) Limited ("Sojitz HK") for $5,228,298 related to apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. Sojitz HK, a Hong Kong, China-based company that engages in offshore trading and cross-border trade financing, has agreed to pay $5,228,298 to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR). The apparent violations occurred when Sojitz HK made U.S. dollar payments through U.S. financial institutions for Iranian-origin high-density polyethylene resin (HDPE) from its bank in Hong Kong to the HDPE supplier's banks in Thailand. In doing so, Sojitz HK caused the U.S. financial institutions that processed the funds to engage in and facilitate prohibited financial transactions related to goods of Iranian origin. The settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that Sojitz HK's apparent violations were non-egregious and voluntarily self-disclosed and accounts for Sojitz HK's remedial response and cooperation with OFAC. https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20220111_sojitz.pdf

 

*******

 

Jan. 13, 2022: Peter Sotis, 57, of Delray Beach, and Emilie Voissem of Sunrise, FL, were convicted in October 2021 following a one-week jury trial in Miami. Sotis was sentenced to 57 months in prison, and Voissem was sentenced to a split sentence of five months in prison and five months of home confinement. According to court documents, the charges stemmed from the defendants' scheme to cause the illegal export of rebreather diving equipment to Libya in August 2016. Rebreathers enable a diver to operate undetected for long periods of time underwater by producing little to no bubbles and by efficiently re-circulating the diver's own breath after replacing its carbon dioxide with oxygen. Because of these enhanced capabilities, rebreathers have dual-use, with both civilian and military applications, and are specifically included on the EAR Commerce Control List, which is the list of dual-use items that are export controlled and licensed by the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC). Such restricted items require a Commerce Department license if the rebreathers are to be exported to any countries with national security concerns, such as Libya. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/south-florida-residents-sentenced-illegally-exporting-controlled-items-libya

 

*******

 

Jan. 14, 2022: A criminal complaint has been unsealed in federal court in Brooklyn charging Kambiz Attar Kashani, a dual citizen of the United States and Iran, with conspiring to illegally export U.S. goods, technology, and services to end-users in Iran, including the Government of Iran, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Kashani was arrested in Chicago, Illinois. The defendant was remanded pending a detention hearing. As alleged, Kashani orchestrated an elaborate scheme to evade U.S. export laws and use the U.S. financial system in procuring U.S. electronic equipment and technology for the Central Bank of Iran, which has been designated by the United States government as acting for or on behalf of terrorist organizations. The defendant allegedly used two United Arab Emirates companies as fronts to procure items from multiple U.S. technology companies, including a company in Brooklyn. https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/us-citizen-charged-conspiring-provide-electronic-equipment-and-technology-government

 

*******

 

Jan 21, 2022: The Department of State entered into a three-year consent agreement with Torrey Pines Logic, Inc. (TPL) of San Diego, California, and Dr. Leonid B. Volfson (Dr. Volfson) regarding violations of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) with a fine of $840,000. TPL and Dr. Volfson voluntarily disclosed portions of the export violations. The AECA and ITAR violations related to unauthorized export of defense articles, unauthorized exports of defense articles to include the People's Republic of China and Lebanon (both prescribed countries pursuant to 22 CFR § 126.1 of the ITAR), engaging in ITAR controlled activities while ineligible, exporting articles without authorization from the Department of State during the CJ review process, making false statements on a CJ request, and failure to maintain and produce records. TPL and Dr. Volfson are debarred from engaging in ITAR controlled activities for 36 months. https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sysparm_referring_url=tear_off&view=true&sys_id=9a8529c31b5dcd90c6c3866ae54bcb32

 

 

*******

 

Jan. 27, 2022: Saber Fakih, 46, of the United Kingdom, plead guilty in federal court in the District of Columbia to violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. According to his plea, Saber Fakih conspired with Bader Fakih, 41, of Canada, Altaf Faquih, 70, of the United Arab Emirates, and Alireza Taghavi, 46, of Iran, to export and attempt to export an Industrial Microwave System (IMS) and counter-drone system from the United States to Iran, without first obtaining the requisite license from the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Fakih pleaded guilty to count two of the indictment.

In addition, a related indictment was unsealed in the District of Columbia, charging Iranian national Jalal Rohollahnejad, 44, with smuggling, wire fraud, and related offenses arising from the same scheme. Rohollahnejad was previously added to the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security Entity List in March 2020 for acting contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests by procuring goods on behalf of a Specially Designated National (SDN). https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/indictment-and-guilty-plea-entered-iranian-export-case

 

 

 

 

JANUARY 2022 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATION UPDATES Read More »

The President Signs Executive Order To Treat Hong Kong As China

By: Carlos Bentancor, Junior Associate & Jenny Hahn, President

Hong Kong Now an Arms Embargoed Destination Announced 7.14.2020 and License Exceptions for EAR Items are Suspended

The President signed an Executive Order (EO) on July 14, 2020, which requires the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong (Hong Kong) to be treated as the People's Republic of China (PRC). The EO states pursuant to section 202 of the United States - Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 that the U.S. Government no longer considers Hong Kong to be autonomous from China and no longer warrants treatment as an entity separate from China. The President directed the heads of various agencies to begin eliminating policy exemptions for Hong Kong. As a result, Hong Kong is now an arms embargoed destination included in the entry for China under section 126.1(d)(1) of the ITAR, and thus subject to a policy of denial for all transfers subject to the ITAR. This action includes all end-users in Hong Kong.

The Department of Commerce separately announced on June 30 the suspension of License Exceptions for Hong Kong.

Background

In May 2020, China announced its plans to impose national security legislation unilaterally and arbitrarily on Hong Kong, and on May 27th, 2020 the U.S. Secretary of State declared the PRC had undermined Hong Kong's autonomy and reported this to the U.S. Congress. China has through a series of ongoing actions continued to follow through imposing national security legislation on Hong Kong undermining Hong Kong's autonomy, leading the U.S. government to take action intended to prevent any sensitive U.S. items from illegal diversion to the PRC or North Korea.

Government Agency Actions

The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) has announced two actions in response to the EO. First, there will be an exception made in favor of Hong Kong persons who reside outside Hong Kong or PRC, who have been previously authorized access to defense articles subject to ITAR, in future licensing; and second, any current, valid, non - exhausted ITAR licenses with Hong Kong as the transferred territory are not affected by the EO, DDTC is not revoking or rescinding previously approved licenses for defense articles or services to Hong Kong.

Prior to the publication of the EO, on June 30, 2020, BIS suspended any License Exception for exports, re-exports, or transfers (in-country) to Hong Kong of items subject to the EAR that would provide Hong Kong with differential treatment than those available to the PRC. On July 14, President Trump signed an Executive Order officially revoking the use of EAR License Exceptions for Hong Kong that will provide differential treatment compared to those applicable to exports to China.

The actions listed above under the ITAR and EAR are just two of the approximately twenty actions to be taken by various government agencies with respect to Hong Kong within 15 days of the Executive Order (i.e., by July 29, 2020).

The President's Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidents-executive-order-hong-kong-normalization/

Recommendations for Exporters:
FD Associates, Inc. strongly encourages all exporters who export products, provide services, or transmit technical data to foreign nationals or entities from Hong Kong, to evaluate these transactions before making any further exports.

To speak to FD Associates, Inc. about the new rules for exports to Hong Kong, please call (703) 847-5801 or send an email to info@fdassociates.net.

The President Signs Executive Order To Treat Hong Kong As China Read More »

US Department Of Commerce Publishes Rules That Greatly Expand The Requirement For Obtaining EAR Licenses

By:  Keil J. Ritterpusch, Senior Compliance Associate, and Jenny Hahn, President

On April 28, 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry & Security (“BIS”) published two new final rules and one proposed rule to the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) which substantially affect U.S. exporters of goods to China, Russia, and Venezuela.  In general, the rule:

  • Broadens license requirements in EAR Section 744.21 to apply to military end users in China and expands the scope of items in the List of Items Subject to the Military End-Use License Requirement of Section 744.21 (Supplement No. 2 to Part 744);
  • Adopts a license review presumption of denial in Section 744.21(e);
  • Broadens the definition of “military end use” by expanding the definition to include any item that supports or contributes to the operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, refurbishing, “development,” or [emphasis added] “production” of military items;
  • Clarifies the controls on exports of “600 series” .y and 9x515.y Export Control Classification Numbers (“ECCNs”) to China, Russia, or Venezuela by relocating them from Section 744.21 to the License Requirements sections of each ECCN;
  • Designates regional stability (“RS”) as the reason for control of these items; and
  • Expands Electronic Export Information (“EEI”) filing requirements for exports to China, Russia, and Venezuela.

The regulatory changes that will affect the greatest number of exporters is the requirement to file EEI for all exports to China, Russia, and Venezuela regardless of value (or end use or end user) of products on the EAR’s Commerce Control List (“CCL”) and to provide the correct export classification on such EEI submissions.  The EEI filing requirement for EAR99 items, which are by definition not included on the CCL, remains the same:  EEI submissions are required for exports of EAR99 items only when the value of the export is $2,500 or more per Harmonized Tariff Schedule (“HTS”) code on the EEI.  We believe the consequence of this regulatory revision is even more widespread than the expanded requirements for obtaining export licenses (and the presumption of denial) for exports to military end uses and military end users in China, Russia, and Venezuela.

The following are some of the key points for exporters related to the regulatory changes:

EEI Submissions for ALL Exports to China, Russia, and Venezuela (Except EAR99 Items):

Effective June 29, 2020, exporters will need to file EEI submissions in the Automated Export System (“AES”) portal within the Automated Commerce Environment (“ACE”) website – ace.cbp.dhs.gov – for ALL exports of items listed on the CCL to China, Russia, or Venezuelaregardless of value, end use, or end user.  Prior to this final rule being published (82 FR 23459), exports that were designated as No License Required (“NLR”) did not require the filing of EEI unless the value of the export transaction was $2,500 or more per HTS code.  Now, only EAR99 items below the $2,500 threshold do not require EEI submissions, per FTR Section 30.37(a).

Correct Export Classification is Required for ALL Exports to China, Russia, and Venezuela:

In addition to requiring EEI submissions for ALL exports of items on the CCL to China, Russia, or Venezuela, the new rule provides that exporters must include the correct Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”) for each item listed on EEI for exports to China, Russia, and Venezuela.  This new requirement underscores the responsibility U.S. exporters have to correctly classify the products they export.

Currently, for exports to China, Russia, and Venezuela, exporters may state on export documents and in the EEI filing (when required by the EAR) that their products are No License Required (“NLR”) – citing license code “C33” on the EEI.  These exporters were not required, by either the EAR or the Foreign Trade Regulations (“FTR”), to provide the exact export classification of the items being exported if the products do not require a license.

Going forward, exporters should not assume that their products that were classified as “NLR” are classified as EAR99 items.  Over the years we have encountered many instances where exporters have believed that “NLR” means “EAR99”.  While all EAR99 products are, in fact, NLR to all worldwide end users, except prohibited end users and sanctioned countries, “”NLR” is not an export classification.  “NLR” is a conclusion under the EAR that results from first determining the export classification, then reviewing the reasons for control for export of products under the ECCN, and, then, determining that No License is Required for the export.  Only after establishing the proper ECCN can one arrive at a conclusion of “NLR”.

It would be a grave mistake for a U.S. exporter to unilaterally state that its products are EAR99 after June 29, without first revalidating the export classification for any export to China, Russia, or Venezuela, because misstatements of export classification on an EEI and failure to file EEI each subject the exporter to a $10,000 fine per violation under the FTR.  Exporters must perform appropriate export classification analysis to avoid substantial risk of misclassification.

Export Licensing is Required for Exports of Most Commodities to China, Russia, or Venezuela Where The End Use is Military or End User is Military … With Presumption of Denial of Said Licenses:

The EAR now requires an export license to be obtained prior to exports to China, Russia, and Venezuela of items that are currently only restricted to terrorism supporting countries under Anti-Terrorism (“AT”) controls of the EAR, when the export is to a military end user or for a military end use.  Moreover, there is an express policy of denial for such export license applications.

Products falling under the following ECCNs will require licenses for export to military end users and military end uses in China, Russia, and Venezuela beginning June 29, 2020:

  • 3A991,
  • 3A992,
  • 3A999,
  • 4A994,
  • 4D994,
  • 5A991,
  • 5B991,
  • 5A992,
  • 5D992,
  • 6A991,
  • 6A993,
  • 6A995,
  • 6A996,
  • 7A994,
  • 8A992, and
  • 9A991.

Beyond the broad expansion of the products that require a license for export to military end uses and military end users in China, Russia, and Venezuela, the new rules also greatly expand the definition of what is a “military end use”.  The new definition is so open-ended that FD Associates would not be surprised to see BIS issue clarifying Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”) or narrow the definition before the new rule goes into effect on June 29, 2020.  Under the new rule, any product that is exported that “supports or contributes to the operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, refurbishing, “development,” or [emphasis added] “production” of any military item is a “military end use”.  There is no limitation for products that are for use both for non-military end uses and military uses.  So, for example, if software that is controlled under ECCN 5D992 – having encryption built-in, but being available for export on a “mass market” basis – is used in China to aid a Chinese company that manufactures both military aircraft parts and commercial aircraft parts, it is arguable that the software would be for a “military end use” under the revised rule.

Recommendations for Exporters:

Potential concerns for exporters arise in product misclassification and failure to conduct appropriate due diligence when conducting business with China, Russia and Venezuela.  While both product classification and transactional due diligence are core tenets of a company compliance program, exporters are on notice that the government is watching and the risks of export violations, government queries, inspections, detentions, seizures, and fines are substantially magnified for transactions involving China, Russia and Venezuela.

In light of the substantial increase in potential liability for exporters, FD Associates, Inc. strongly encourages all exporters who export products to China, Russia and/or Venezuela to evaluate all products that they have self-classified as EAR99 and revalidate the export classification per the Order of Review in the EAR, before exporting to China, Russia and/or Venezuela.

FD Associates, Inc. also recommends that exporters perform added due diligence, including the collection of detailed end use and end user statements and associated research and screening of the end users and end uses of their products in China, Russia, and Venezuela, to validate the actual end users and end uses.  This is especially critical, as a significant percentage of US exports to China, in particular, do not go to the end user or directly to the end use, but instead go through a distributor or a re-seller.  Since exports of otherwise NLR products that are for end use by military end users (or parties on behalf of them) or are for “military end uses” in these countries now requires a license from BIS, it is imperative that  exporters have a sufficient “paper trail” related to the end users and end uses of products they sell to China (as well as Russia and Venezuela).

To speak to FD Associates, Inc. about the new rules for exports to China, Russia, and/or Venezuela, please call (703) 847-5801 or send an email to info@fdassociates.net.

US Department Of Commerce Publishes Rules That Greatly Expand The Requirement For Obtaining EAR Licenses Read More »

DDTC Announces New Policies And Changes Affecting ITAR Registrations, Licensing, Part 130 Reporting, And DDTC Management

COVID 19 has impacted our daily lives. DDTC is no exception. Between the DECCS rollout and COVID 19 telework, DDTC is impacted and has responded with the following policies and changes intended to aid industry and ease the burden on exporters that may be hampered during this period to make filings in accordance with the ITAR timelines or existing export authorizations.

Registrations

  • Effective March 13, 2020, a temporary suspension of the requirement in ITAR Parts 122 and 129 to renew registration as a manufacturer, exporter, and/or broker and pay a fee on an annual basis by extending ITAR registrations expiring on February 29, March 31, April 30, May 31, and June 30, 2020 for two months from the original date of expiration.
  • DDTC is also pursuing a one-time temporary reduction in registration fees for certain categories of DDTC registrants. More information on any change will be provided on DDTC's website.

Voluntary disclosures

  • Voluntary Disclosures can be filed electronically to DTCC-CaseStatus@state.gov
  • DDTC Compliance is now granting an additional 30 days for responses to its request-for-information letters related to voluntary and directed disclosure matters. DDTC Compliance is also considering extensions for the submission of full voluntary disclosures on a case-by-case basis. Extension requests should be sent via email to DTCC-CaseStatus@state.gov on company letterhead in PDF format.

Licensing

Validity period of export licenses

  • Effective March 13, 2020, a temporary suspension, modification, and exception to the limitations on the duration of ITAR licenses contained in ITAR Parts 120-130, including but not necessarily limited to ITAR §§ 123.5(a) (temporary exports), 123.21(a) (duration of licenses), and 129.6(e) (validity of brokering approval), to extend any license that expires between March 13, 2020, and May 31, 2020, for six (6) months from the original date of expiration so long as there is no change to the scope or value of the authorization and no Name/Address changes are required. This six (6) month extension is warranted in light of the unique challenges applicants face in the current environment when attempting to coordinate with U.S. and foreign business partners regarding the scope of applications.

Note: this extension is automatic and requires no action by the license holder

Remote work by company and long term contract employees defined by ITAR 120.39

  • To support remote work in this extraordinary period, effective March 13, 2020, a temporary suspension, modification, and exception to the requirement that a regular employee, for purposes of ITAR § 120.39(a)(2), work at the company's facilities, to allow the individual to work at a remote work location, so long as the individual is not located in Russia or a country listed in ITAR § 126.1. This suspension, modification, and exception shall terminate on July 31, 2020, unless otherwise extended in writing.

Remote work by regular employees (ITAR 120.39) of foreign signatories to TAAs/MLAs or ITAR exemptions

  • Effective March 13, 2020, authorization for regular employees of licensed entities who are working remotely in a country not currently authorized by a TAA, MLA, or exemption to send, receive, or access any technical data authorized for export, reexport, or retransfer to their employer via a TAA, MLA, or exemption so long as the regular employee is not located in Russia or a country listed in ITAR § 126.1. This suspension, modification, and exception shall terminate on July 31, 2020, unless otherwise extended in writing.

Paper filings with DDTC, adjudication of filing will be emailed to the applicant

  • DDTC is implementing new procedures and will send to the contact listed on the application email scans of final action letters for General Correspondence requests submitted in writing. If email information was not provided, final actions will continue to be mailed back to the applicant.
  • DDTC is implementing new procedures and will send to the applicant email scans of unclassified final action letters for DSP-85s submitted in writing. If email information was not provided, final actions will continue to be mailed back to the applicant. The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) will continue to receive original sealed copies through the mail.

Note: Approvals for DSP-5, DSP-61, DSP-73, and TAAs/MLAs/WDAs in DECCS, DDTC's electronic portal and can be retrieved via DECCS 

Expedited requests for licensing in support of U.S Operations

  • DDTC is re-issuing guidance for the expedited authorization of requests submitted in support of U.S. Operations (USOP) at DTCL SOP - USOPS Guidance. Refer to the DDTC website

DDTC to file Congressional Notifications electronically

  • In coordination with Congress and DOD, DDTC has moved to electronic submissions of Congressional Notifications of proposed Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to the Congress.

Other

  • DDTC is leveraging updated staffing protocols to ensure streamlined interagency licensing reviews.

Part 130 Reporting

Updated information repoints of contact

  • To facilitate timely responses to inquiries from the public and regulated industry, DDTC has added additional points of contact on the Key Personnel tab of the About DDTC page on the DDTC website, and additional staffing and IT resources have been added to its Response Team and Help Desk functions.

DDTC Announces New Policies And Changes Affecting ITAR Registrations, Licensing, Part 130 Reporting, And DDTC Management Read More »

DECCS Is Here!

Don’t Panic, Just Enroll

If you are registered as an exporter or manufacturer of defense articles with the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”), you have by now probably noted reference to “DECCS”, the Defense Export Control and Compliance System, either on the DDTC website or in correspondence from or with DDTC.

Do you know what DECCS is?

More importantly, do you understand your responsibilities with DECCS today?

DECCS is DDTC’s new electronic portal for Export Licensing, Registration, Commodity Jurisdictions, Advisory Opinions, Retransfer Requests and in the future for Voluntary Disclosures.

DECCS is borne out of DDTC’s IT Modernization effort which began almost five years ago. After much testing, discussion and work, all of which is still underway, DECCS will formally deploy on Tuesday February 18, 2020.  Per DDTC, DTrade will cease to be available as of 6 PM EST February 14, 2020.

Don’t worry! All registrant information, licensing and digital certificate information tied to your company registrant’s registration code will be migrated to your account in DECCS. NOTHING will be lost.

If you have a valid ITAR registration with DDTC, you need to enroll in DECCS to continue your ITAR licensing or registration activities.

Over the last few weeks DDTC has contacted all registrants and holders of digital certificates via a 3rd party (OKTA) about registering in DECCS. Upon reviewing the email, you will find your user ID for DECCS and a link to start your enrollment process in DECCS.

Unfortunately, as the email did not come from DDTC, but rather OKTA, and references an application program “MyApps”, many exporters have either believed it is junk/spam and deleted it or the email was automatically filtered to junk/spam.

To add some more bad news, the email link/window to register with the link in the window was only 7 days from the date OKTA sent it.  This means if you cannot find the email and have not actioned it by the time you are reading this communique you will have missed the window to respond.  Do not fear! You can easily resolve this problem by contacting the DDTC DTrade/DECCS Help Desk and requesting that the email be resent.  See email addresses below to make this request.

So now that you have completed step 1, your in the DECCS enrollment page, what comes next?

You will provide your user ID and first/last name and phone number.

Click Enroll!

You then will get a notification on the DECCS page that an email is forthcoming from OKTA to complete the DECCS enrollment.

The second email from OKTA will prompt users to create a password and provide a phone number to enable two factor authentications for access to DECCS through the DECCS portal.

Now you are all set… almost! Like any IT system conduct validation testing

Log in and see the two-factor authentication process work.

Once complete you will be able to log into the DECCS portal and conduct business with DDTC, whether it is managing your account and users, preparing or tracking license status, filing registrations.

And the good news is, all licenses submitted in DTrade prior to the conversion will continue to process, as will any registrations that have been submitted. When complete, they will be issued in DECCS.

The phone numbers to call DDTC and request resending of the initial email are 202-663-2838 or 202-663-1282.  To submit requests to DDTC via email, we recommend submitting to the following:

deccspmddtc@midatl.service-now.comDDTCResponseTeam@state.gov; and dtradehelpdesk@state.gov.

DECCS Is Here! Read More »

Traveling With Electronic Devices – Are You Ready?

By Odyssey E. Gray, III, Associate, FD Associates, Inc.

Today’s world is a “smart” world, a world of various electronic devices that provide ever expanding connectivity and access.  As a result of this age of “connectivity,” employers may require their employees to travel internationally, conducting business on their behalf while carrying electronic devices with them.  What if your business involves ITAR controlled products?  Will you receive or hand-carry ITAR regulated technical data on laptops, smart phones or other electronic devices?  Are you remotely logging in to your company server while abroad to access ITAR regulated technical data?  Are there controls in place to protect this data from being accessed by foreign persons while you are abroad?  Is the ITAR technical data being accessed for individual use without further export, or, will you share the ITAR regulated technical data with foreign persons?  Most importantly, does your company understand the authorizations required to allow the export of ITAR technical data on devices being carried internationally? Any export of ITAR controlled technical data requires ITAR authorization for the export.

What if the data being carried internationally is not ITAR regulated?  Would this would mean no controls and thus, no USG authorization required?  This is a common mistake by many who believe that if the data is not ITAR regulated, it is not export controlled.  In fact, if the data is not ITAR controlled, then it is, or may be, subject to the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) and, if subject, the applicable ECCN for the information (technology) will determine whether Department of Commerce approval or EAR license exception is required for its export.

The good news for international travelers is that both the ITAR and the EAR have clear provisions for the license-free export of technical data and technology for employee use abroad under applicable ITAR license exemption and EAR license exception.  The ITAR license exemption is available at ITAR 125.4(b)(9).  The EAR has two applicable license exceptions at EAR Part 740.9 (TMP license exception) and EAR Part 740.14 (BAG license exception).  These authorizations are commonly referred to as “personal use.”

The “personal use exemption” at ITAR Section 125.4(b)(9) authorizes the export, reexport or retransfer of ITAR controlled technical data, including classified information, without a license, by or to a U.S. person, or a foreign person employee of a U.S. person (who has been authorized to receive ITAR regulated technical data under an ITAR DSP-5 employment license) travelling or on temporary assignment abroad for their personal use.

The EAR “personal use exception” at EAR Part 740.9 – TMP (Temporary Imports, Exports, Reexports, And Transfers (In-Country), authorizes the export, reexport or transfer of EAR controlled technology, without a license, by or to a U.S. person, or a foreign person employee of a U.S. person travelling or on temporary assignment abroad for their personal use.

The EAR “personal use exception” at EAR Part 740.14 – BAG (Baggage), authorizes individuals leaving the United States either temporarily (i.e., traveling) or longer-term (i.e., moving) to take to any destination, as personal baggage, the classes of commodities, software and EAR controlled technology described pursuant to this license exception.  License exception BAG authorizes the export of technology as “Tools of Trade” for use in the trade, occupation, employment, vocation, or hobby of the traveler.  License exception BAG also authorizes the export of encryption commodities and software subject to EI controls, if for personal use.

Once you know where your data falls jurisdictionally, you can cite the proper export authority, contingent upon meeting all of the stated requirements of using either ITAR 125.4(b)(9) license exemption or the EAR license exceptions TMP or BAG.

Both the ITAR and EAR require that security precautions (e.g., encryption of the data; firewalls; use of secure network connections or other access restrictions on the electronic device on which the data is stored, e.g., passwords, etc.) are in place on the electronic device to prevent unauthorized access to the controlled information by foreign persons.

The most secure method for access abroad by an employee is the use of a secure encrypted tunnel into the company server (e.g., secure VPN), whereupon data may be viewed and accessed by the employee who is using either a company laptop / electronic device or a personal electronic device.  All technical data remains on the company server and is not downloaded to the local device, except for viewing in an encrypted window.

If the company provides or allows its employee to use a company laptop or electronic device for hand-carry and use abroad while on travel, the device may already be loaded with ITAR controlled information/files (the hard drive should be encrypted and/or password protected).  The company device should contain software that allows the device to be remotely wiped in case of theft or loss.  The employee must maintain positive control and access of the company device with stored information so as not to allow unauthorized access.  If the employee will not keep the laptop with them, at all times, they should plan to store the laptop in a secure place such as a hotel safe.

The company should have a written travel policy, including written processes and procedures, to provide guidance and instruction to all employees traveling to ensure that all regulatory requirements are met to remain compliant with the export of controlled information to the company employee.

Procedures should exist not only for the use of the applicable ITAR exemption or EAR license exception, but as a means to document the information released, to whom it was released, the manner in which the transfer occurred, as well as information concerning the device used to access/carry the data, whether it be a personal device or company device.

It is recommended that the traveler have a proforma invoice describing the device, the data or software installed, to include, any hard copies of data previously exported, and, the applicable ITAR license, license exemption / EAR license, license exception with them at the time of travel.

In addition to the actual export, the regulations require that records for each export be maintained by the exporter (e.g., description of the technical data that was exported; name of the recipient(s); date and time of export; method of transmission, i.e. facsimile, courier, email, meeting).  The same record-keeping requirements that exist for any license approval for exports to foreign parties are the same as those for the use of any ITAR exemption or EAR license exception for exports to employees traveling internationally.

Any exports made beyond the scope of ITAR 125.4(b)(9) or EAR license exceptions TMP or BAG, i.e., not for “personal use,” are subject to the usual export licensing rules under the ITAR or EAR.  In other words, if one seeks to provide controlled data to foreign persons, that export/transfer requires separate authorization, e.g., license approval, ITAR license exemption or EAR license exception.

Fines and penalties for any violation of the ITAR or EAR are applicable, thus, use of these “personal use” authorizations must be within the scope as cited in the ITAR or EAR, respectively.

While these steps might seem burdensome to a small company, did you know that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) issued a new directive in January of this year (2018) which authorizes and provides guidance to CBP in its procedures for “…searching, reviewing, retaining, and sharing information contained in computers, tablets, removable media, disks, drives, tapes, mobile phones, cameras, music and other media players, and any other communication, electronic, or digital devices…”  CBP has authority to search the contents of any electronic device leaving or entering the United States at their discretion.  In 2017 alone, CBP conducted 30,000 searched of electronic devices.

CBP searches are authorized to facilitate border security.  In practice, this means CBP may review and/or copy any information on any electronic device, even those items that are encrypted or password protected.  CBP may make copies of any of the information on the device.  If the information is not accessible, CBP may detain or seize the device to ship it off-site for further analysis and to facilitate CBP review of all information therein.

Even information marked as “Attorney-Client privileged” is subject to review and/or copy.  Individuals, however, should alert and advise CBP if such information exists on the device and its status as “Attorney-Client privileged,” so that CBP is aware that this is protected information.  A best practice would be to utilize the same procedures for confidential business information.  Note, however, CBP may not use the electronic device to access information stored remotely.  This directive is applicable only to the information stored on the actual electronic device.

Consistent with CBP policy, no specific cause is needed for CBP to conduct the search of the device.  The directive does instruct that “CBP will protect the rights of individuals against unreasonable search and seizure and ensure privacy protections while accomplishing its enforcement mission.”   Should CBP wish to review your device, you want to be able to provide CBP with evidence you have complied with applicable U.S. export laws.  A copy of a completed traveler form that identifies the device, the applicable ITAR license exemption / EAR license exception, the reason for travel and the information being carried abroad is a good tool to demonstrate to CBP that you have not violated U.S. export laws.

The primary mission of both the ITAR and the EAR is national security and safeguarding U.S.-origin technology.  The regulations recognize that company employees may require the use of export-controlled data to perform work assignments while abroad, thus, the ITAR 125.4(b)(9) license exemption and EAR license exceptions TMP and BAG for “personal use” permit this type of export.

There is one notable exclusion to the use of the ITAR 125.4(b)(9) exemption.  It cannot be used for the carrying of ITAR controlled data to proscribed countries per ITAR 126.1 (e.g., China, Venezuela, etc.).  Therefore, if a person is travelling to China or Venezuela, for example, on business, or even on personal travel, with their company issued device or a personal device that can access company information, they must know that they cannot lawfully carry or access ITAR technical data or EAR 600-series technical data while they are in ITAR 126.1 countries.  Not only is there no applicable exemption under the ITAR or EAR, but there is a policy of denial for exports to these countries.

In today’s “smart” world, businesses should have travel policies and procedures that comply with the exemptions/exceptions available and protect the export of ITAR technical data or EAR controlled technology.  If you need help with developing a travel policy, FD Associates stands by to assist you.

Traveling With Electronic Devices – Are You Ready? Read More »

Export Compliance Red Flags

By John Herzo, Senior Associate

Everyone involved in export compliance understands that the cornerstone of corporate compliance is a strong export compliance program. A sign that your export compliance program is functioning properly is the ability of your employees to identify and prevent potential export compliance violations before they occur. One essential tool for an effective export compliance program is employee training on the recognition and remediation of "red flags" in export transactions. The goal of this article is to explain what is meant by "red flags" and the forms in which the "red flags" present themselves in prospective export transactions.

Scenario - Missiles, Inc., of the U.S. (Your Company) received a purchase order from ABC GmbH of Germany for sophisticated missile engine components. Per your company's Export Compliance Manual, Missiles, Inc., performed its due diligence on the new customer ABC GmbH. The due diligence determined the following facts about ABC GmbH:

  • ABC GmbH has no company website;
  • ABC GmbH's purchase order was sent to you via a Gmail email account;
  • ABC GmbH's asked if Missiles, Inc., would accept a cash payment for the missile engine components;
  • ABC GmbH's purchase order did not request any ongoing support, which is customary for these products;
  • ABC GmbH is listed on several investment websites as a book store;
  • A Google Earth search identified ABC GmbH at the street address provided and the store front appears to be a book store;
  • Missiles, Inc., ran a denied party screening of ABC GmbH against U.S. Government denied party lists and revealed a hit for ABC GmbH of Germany, but the address is slightly different than the address for ABC GmbH;
  • ABC GmbH asked for the missile engine components to be sent to their freight forwarder in the U.S., and did not note delivery to their address in Germany; but identified for the freight forwarder to contact ABC GmbH for delivery instructions
  • Lastly, ABC GmbH refused to provide an end use statement regarding its intended use of the missile engine components.

Let's analyze the information Missiles, Inc., is presented with:

Denied Party Screening

Red Flag - ABC GmbH's address is similar to one of the parties found on BIS', the Office of Foreign Assets Control's ("OFAC") or other U.S. Government agency's denied parties/persons lists.

The existence of this "red flag" means that Missiles, Inc., will need to perform additional due diligence, e.g., research, to confirm that ABC GmbH is not the party on the subject denied party list. This is a difficult "red flag" to overcome, particularly when viewed in conjunction with the other "red flags" explained below. Missiles, Inc., must have persuasive evidence, not merely a statement in writing, that ABC GmbH is an entirely different organization from the listed entity at a different address. As companies who are prohibited from receiving U.S. exports will take significant steps to conceal their "prohibited" status, Missiles, Inc., must conduct extensive due diligence to overcome this "red flag".

End-Use Statement

Red Flag - ABC GmbH refused to provide an end-use statement regarding how it will utilize the missile engine components after Missiles, Inc., requested the end-use statement.

This "red flag" is a very serious one, particularly in light of the sensitive end use and extensive controls applicable worldwide on missile components. Detailed end-use statements are absolutely essential for items like missile components given that the U.S. Government will only approve export to vetted Governmental end users in "friendly" countries. This "red flag" may also present itself in other obvious ways such as the customer providing limited information on end-use when requested. If the potential customer or purchasing agent understands U.S. export regulations and believes it knows the classification of your product, they may try and tell you that there is no licensing requirement for the export of your product to their country. Therefore, end-use information is not required. The correct response, per EAR Part 744, or the ITAR (if applicable) is that the U.S. Government prohibits sales of any item if it will be used in nuclear production or any unsafeguarded nuclear facility; or any missile or unmanned aerial vehicle capable of a range of 300km or greater; or any chemical or biological end-use. Thus, your company requires end-use information to rule out the requirement for a license per EAR Part 744.

or the ITAR

Product Capability Vs. Customer's Line Of Business

Red Flag - Your due diligence revealed that ABC GmbH is a book store, therefore the product's capabilities, sophisticated missile engine components, does not fit ABC GmbH's line of business.

This is a really impossible "red flag" to overcome. The purchase of sensitive items, like missile components by those not in the same line of business is risky, given the high possibility of diversion to unauthorized end users. The fact that ABC GmbH is a book store was corroborated by Missiles, Inc.'s Google Earth search. As a result, Missiles, Inc. needs additional information for any possibility of overcoming this "red flag".

Technical Level Of End-Use Country

Red Flag - The item ordered is incompatible with the technical level of the country to which it is being shipped.

This "red flag" did not present itself in the scenario above because ABC GmbH is from Germany a highly technical country with active missile development end users. This type of "red flag" typically presents itself when the due diligence reveals export controlled equipment is being requested for purchase and shipment to a country that has no known capability to field or use the equipment.

Payment In Cash

Red Flag - ABC GmbH asked if Missiles, Inc., would accept cash for the missile engine components. The missile engine components are very expensive and would normally call for financing.

This "red flag" is indicative of an entity not wanting a "paper trail" and a sign of possible diversion. Your company's business development and sales force should be able to identify this "red flag" during sales meetings and contract negotiations.

Payment By Another Company

Red Flag - A secondary party requests to pay for another party's purchase.

This "red flag" did not present itself in this scenario. This "red flag" will present itself during the negotiation of the sale or after the sale has been negotiated, but prior to payment. Typically, a U.S. entity requests to pay for the purchase of a foreign entity. In some cases, the foreign customer / end user is from a proscribed country, such as Venezuela. The payment through another party may be a way to avert economic sanction regulations or to otherwise avoid being a party to a transaction. This "red flag" may implicate compliance issues with the OFAC regulations and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

Little Or No Business Background

Red Flag - The customer has little or no business background.

This "red flag" also did not directly present itself in the scenario above. This "red flag" will typically present itself during the negotiation of the sale. Your company's business development personnel or sales force should be able to identify this "red flag" readily through bid and proposal discussions.

Unfamiliar With Product's Performance Characteristics

Red Flag - The customer is unfamiliar with the product's performance characteristics but still wants the product.

This "red flag" did not present itself in our scenario above. This "red flag" typically presents itself during the negotiation of the sale. Your company's business development personnel or sales force should also be able to identify this "red flag" as performance characteristics are essential for applications like missiles.

Decline Of Routine Installation, Training, Or Maintenance Services

Red Flag - ABC GmbH's purchase order did not request maintenance information or a warranty.

This "red flag" presented itself in ABC GmbH's email that contained its purchase order for the missile engine components. The failure to request installation, training or maintenance support where it is ordinarily requested can be a "red flag" indicating diversion to a prohibited end use as the ultimate end user would be denied the ability to receive this support, as well as the parts. This "red flag" typically presents itself during the negotiation of the sale. Your company's business development personnel or sales force should also be able to identify this "red flag".

Delivery Requirements

Red Flag - Delivery dates are vague, or deliveries are planned for out of the way destinations.

This "red flag" did not present itself in the scenario above. Typically, this "red flag" will present itself during the negotiation of the sale. Your company's business development personnel or sales force should be able to differentiate between vague delivery dates for valid business reasons as opposed to vague delivery dates that are "red flags". Deliveries to out of the way destinations will present themselves during the due diligence phase when your company is screening the potential customer. For instance, the customer's address is in the United Arab Emirates, but they are asking for delivery to Uganda. This is a "red flag" that is often able to be overcome when the purchaser is able to explain the logical reasoning behind its request. This "red flag" will need to be addressed in the export license application as verification of address is important.

Delivery To Freight Forwarder

Red Flag - ABC GmbH requested that the missile engine components be delivered to its freight forwarder in the U.S. and did not state to deliver to ABC GmbH in Germany.

Is this a "red flag"? It is often customary for the foreign customer to identify the freight forwarder if they pay the freight charge. This can be a red flag if the purchase order doesn't identify to make the shipment from the U.S. direct to ABC GmbH in Germany. In this scenario, the requirement for the freight forwarder to get instructions for delivery information at a later time is another red flag. Is this a routed transaction, where the responsibility for licensing of controlled exports is placed on the U.S. freight forwarder? If yes, receive and review a copy of their export license before you make delivery to the freight forwarder. This allows you to verify the bona fides of the parties to the export transaction. This "red flag" should be identified by your company's business development personnel, sales force or shipping department as it is not typical to ship missile engine components to only the U.S. freight forwarder without knowledge of direct shipment to the foreign customer.

Shipping Route

Red Flag - The shipping route is abnormal for the product and destination.

This "red flag" did not present itself in the scenario above. This "red flag" presents itself during the negotiation of the sale and the shipping process. Your company's business development personnel, sales force and shipping department should be able to identify this "red flag". This is a risk of diversion when the product is transported on an unusual route.

Packaging

Red Flag - Packaging is inconsistent with the stated method of shipment or destination.

This "red flag" did not present itself in our scenario above. The "red flag" presents itself during the shipping process. Your company's shipping department should be able to identify this "red flag". This "red flag" often indicates a product will be diverted and party maybe used to obfuscate the country of export.

Evasive Customer

Red Flag - When questioned, the buyer is evasive and especially unclear about whether the purchased product is for domestic use, for export, or for reexport.

This "red flag" did not specifically present itself in the scenario above. However, ABC GmbH did refuse to provide an end-use statement, which is a form of evasiveness. This "red flag" may arise during the negotiation of the sale. This is very serious given the strict rules on end use of these types of items. Your company's business development personnel or sales force should also be able to identify this "red flag".

Website

Red Flag - Missiles, Inc.'s due diligence into the bona fides of ABC GmbH revealed that ABC GmbH does not have a company website. While not every company has a website, most companies involved in the use of missile engine components have a website. The failure of your customer to have a website is a "red flag" that your company should perform additional due diligence to determine the bona fides of the customer.

This "red flag" presented itself in the scenario during the performance of Missiles, Inc.'s due diligence. Your company's business development personnel or sales force should also be able to identify this "red flag".

Email Address

Red Flag - ABC GmbH's email to Missiles, Inc., came from a gmail email account as opposed to an ABC GmbH corporate email account. While not every customer will have a corporate email account, most companies involved in the use of missile engine components have a corporate email account. Your customer's failure to have a corporate email account is a "red flag" that your company should perform additional due diligence to determine the bona fides of the customer.

This "red flag" presents itself at the inquiry stage of the sales process. This "red flag" is easily identifiable by your company's customer service, business development and sales personnel.

Conclusion

With the preponderance of red flags present in this scenario, should Missiles, Inc., proceed with the order? What would your company do?

There can be many different "red flags" to export transactions that should put your company on notice that a given transaction has the potential to lead to an export violation and diversion of goods. It is your company's responsibility to address these "red flags" as they present themselves to different departments within your company from business development to shipping. Having a well-established export compliance program that includes specific departmental export compliance training and specific procedures that include "red flag" alerts and reviews will allow your personnel to identify potentially suspect export transactions and further research them to ensure the transaction is valid before proceeding.

We have utilized the "red flags" published on the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security's ("BIS")[1] webpage as a guide for this article.

Export Compliance Red Flags Read More »

Violations Of The Foreign Trade Regulations, Easy To Do, Costly To Resolve

By Jenny Hahn, President

Your company exports commodities to locations all over the world. Sometimes you file your own Automated Export System (AES) records and other times your company contracts with freight forwarders to do these filings on your behalf.

 Recently your company received a demand letter from US Customs for $10,000 payment of a fine associated with an AES filing that your company made. The demand letter advised you used the wrong port of export code in the AES filing.

Can you really be fined $10,000 for such a simple error?

The answer is yes.

US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) has the legal authority via the Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR) to impose fines against companies who report incorrect information in the AES system. (Note: AES is converting to ACE February 28, 2016).

Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), exporters are obligated to electronically file Electronic Export Information (EEI) regarding their transactions in addition to the requirement in the FTR. Each EEI submission must contain a myriad of information per the FTR, including:

  • The United States Principal Party in Interest (USPPI) – usually the seller in the United States;
  • The USPPI Federal Employee Identification Number (EIN);
  • The address for the USPPI
  • The Carrier and its Standard Carrier Alpha Code;
  • The Authorized Agent of the USPPI – if the EEI is not being filed by the USPPI;
  • The Ultimate Consignee (Foreign Party) – the Foreign Principal Party in Interest (FPPI);
  • The address for the FPPI;
  • The Intermediate Consignee (Foreign Party), if any;
  • The address for the Intermediate Consignee, if there is one;
  • The Country that your exporting to;
  • The State of Origin of the export shipment;
  • The Schedule B # for the commodity/commodities being exported;
  • The Commodity Description, quantity, weight, and US$ value (based on sales price);
  • The origin of the commodity (domestic or foreign);
  • The US export classification of the commodity (e.g., USML Category XI(a)(5)(i), ECCN 3A611.a, or EAR99;
  • ITAR specific information related to the commodity, if applicable (i.e., USML classification, DDTC registration number)
  • The License #, code or license exception;
  • The Port of Export;
  • The Mode of Transportation (e.g., Air, Vessel, Ground/Truck);
  • Whether the Export is a “Routed Transaction”?
  • Whether the Export is between “Related Companies”?

There are different filing timelines imposed in the ITAR versus the EAR and exporters should be aware of the requirements for each.

Companies using AESDirect (where they file the AES record themselves) should have an internal process to verify that the information they file is accurate, since the export will actually take place after the freight leaves the company dock. The exporter at the time of preparation of the AES record, may not be specifically aware of what the flight or vessel details will be, including what the port of export will be.

The FTR provides exporters with up to 24 hours to correct any of the data fields in the AES filing after the export has occurred.

After that timeframe, any correction to the AES Record could cause CBP to impose a fine of $10,000 on your company per EEI submission. The fine amount can quickly escalate if you have more than one AES violation. To mitigate such penalties, it is recommended that your company file a Voluntary Self-Disclosure (VSD) with the Census Bureau as soon as possible after learning that the company may have submitted erroneous EEI or failed to submit EEI where it was required under the FTR.

Depending on the nature of the AES correction, disclosure to the Department of State or Commerce (BIS Office of Export Enforcement) may also be required.

As noted above, there are many fields that can be completed incorrectly. Audits of shipments where EEI submission was required have resulted in the identification of common errors in the following EEI fields:

  • Port of Exit;
  • License Code;
  • Commodity Classifications under the EAR;
  • Schedule B;
  • Foreign Consignees; and
  • Ultimate Consignees.

And what about not filing AES when you should have? That is a much more complicated and significant issue. Remember, AES is required for all ITAR and 600/500 series ECCNs, regardless of value or destination. *The rules for filing AES on other EAR controlled commodities differ depending on whether you are using a BIS license or BIS license exception, exporting as No License Required (NLR), if the value is below $2,500 and if the destination is in a proscribed country. There is clearly a lot to know about a set of regulations that have the potential to cause significant fines for simple errors.

Performing AES reviews by trade compliance personnel is an important part of your overall compliance program. If shipping clerks in your company are authorized AESDirect users, the shipping supervisor should review within 24 hours after shipment to verify the accuracy of the EEI submitted. Internal Trade Compliance personnel should also make a thorough inspection of the AES data an integral part of their periodic shipment reviews.

Don’t let AES filing errors cost your company big dollars in fines! Ensure your shipping and compliance personnel are properly trained on the FTR requirements and conduct periodic reviews.

*This article doesn’t address OFAC or NRC license requirements for AES filings. However, should you have such exports, ensure that EEI is submitted through AES/ACE.

Violations Of The Foreign Trade Regulations, Easy To Do, Costly To Resolve Read More »

Bureau Of Industry And Security, Department Of Commerce Final Rule Amendments To The Export Administration Regulations Affecting The Licensing Policy For Cuba

By Odyssey E. Gray, III

The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security issued a final rule, published in the Federal Register, effective November 9, 2017, which enumerated amendments to the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) in connection with implementation of U.S. policy in accordance with the National Security Presidential Memorandum on Strengthening the Policy of the United States Towards Cuba (“NSPM”), issued under the current administration on June 16, 2017.

The NSPM’s stated goals are “to enhance compliance with United States law; hold the Cuban regime accountable for oppression and human rights abuses; further the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of the Cuban people; and lay the groundwork for empowering the Cuban people to develop greater economic and political liberty.”  The NSPM makes limited changes to the historic policy changes towards Cuba enacted under the Obama administration that are intended to benefit U.S. commerce and the citizens of Cuba, not its governmental regime.

It is important to note that the statutory embargo of Cuba remains in place whereby items subject to the EAR are subject to a general policy of denial unless the transactions are eligible for review as provided in Part 746 of the EAR, Embargoes and Other Special Controls.  Specifically, § 746.2(b) provides policy guidance under the EAR with respect to Cuba.

This final rule makes revisions to § 746.2 of the EAR by amending the Note 2 to paragraph (b)(3)(i) in connection with licensing policy for Cuba, amending License Exceptions found at §§ 740.12, 740.19 and 740.21 (Gift Parcels and Humanitarian Donations (“GFT”), Consumer Communications Devices (“CCD”), and Support for the Cuban People (“SCP”)), respectively, of the EAR to conform with the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) amendment which defines what are “prohibited officials of the Government of Cuba,” and revises § 740.21 (License Exception SCP) to further support free enterprise in Cuba.

In accordance with section 3(a) of the NSPM, Note 2 to EAR 746.2(b)(3)(i) clarifies that BIS will deny license applications for export or reexport to Cuba which include certain entities or subentities the State Department identifies on its List of Restricted Entities and Subentities associated with Cuba, also referred to as the “Cuba Restricted List,” unless the transactions are consistent with the policy and criteria specified in the NSPM.  The Cuba Restricted List is now available in the Federal Register and the Department of State website at https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/cubarestrictedlist/index.htm.

Also in accordance with section 3(a) of the NSPM, sections of the EAR License Exceptions GFT, CCD, and SCP are amended pursuant to the aforementioned OFAC amendment to include certain additional individuals that would be deemed ineligible Cuban government officials which, in turn, would exclude the use of the GFT, CCD, and SCP License Exceptions for exports and reexports to Cuba.

License Exception SCP (§ 740.21) authorizes the export and reexport of certain items to Cuba that

are intended to improve the living conditions of the Cuban people; support independent economic activity and strengthen civil society in Cuba; and improve the free flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people.  Three times since its inception, License Exception SCP has been amended to add additional categories of commodities for export and reexport.

Under this final rule, and to expand opportunities for free enterprise in Cuba pursuant to section 2(d) of the Cuba NSPM, the EAR language identifying specific items, activities and end use activities eligible for License Exception SCP has been simplified and expanded to a single provision that authorizes “the export and reexport to Cuba of items, without specifying types, for use by the Cuban private sector for private sector economic activities.”  Limitations of SCP are crafted to ensure any revenue generated is not to the benefit of the state or state-owned facilities.  In addition, no exports or reexports may contribute to the operation of the state.  Eligible items for export or reexport under the provisions of this license exception continue to be only those items designated as EAR99 or controlled for Anti-Terrorism reasons only.

With these changes, more opportunities exist for U.S. exporters related to commerce in Cuba, however, these opportunities also implement additional layers of scrutiny to ensure that only eligible parties, items and end uses are the basis of proposed transactions.  Exporters are advised that they should fully research the many restrictions on exports or reexports to Cuba, particularly when contemplating use of one of the EAR License Exceptions for proposed transactions.

As reported in the media, travel restrictions for U.S. citizens are enhanced based on the limitations that such activities benefit the Cuban government who owns a large number of the hotels in Cuba.

Bureau Of Industry And Security, Department Of Commerce Final Rule Amendments To The Export Administration Regulations Affecting The Licensing Policy For Cuba Read More »