Updates

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through June 30, 2022.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

 

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

 

June 7 through 24, 2022: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

• Change in Name from Cyalume Technologies, Inc., to Safariland, LLC, due to acquisition;
• Change in Name and Address from GECAS Australia Pty Ltd at 572 Swan Street, Burnley, Victoria 3121, Australia to AerCap Australia Pty Ltd at c/o TMF Corporate Services (Aust) Pty Limited, Suite 1, Level 11, 66 Goulburn Street, Sydney, New South Wales 2000, Australia due to acquisition;
• Change in Address for Mitsubishi International Corporation from 655 3rd Avenue, New York, New York 10017 to 151 W. 42nd Street, New York, New York 10036-6641;
• Change in Name and Ownership from APSYS SAS to Airbus Protect SAS due to merger with Airbus CyberSecurity SAS;

 

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Department of Defense

 

June 17, 2022: The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) is renaming the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudications Facility (DOD CAF) to better reflect personnel vetting into the future. DoD CAF is now DCSA Consolidated Adjudication Services (CAS). The renaming to DCSA CAS does not change any internal or external organizational reporting relationships, missions, resources, or support functions. DCSA, through the CAS, will continue to deliver informed and timely adjudicative decisions for the Federal Government to enable operational readiness in keeping with risk management principles.

 

https://www.dcsa.mil/About-Us/News/News-Display/Article/3067652/renaming-of-the-dod-caf/

 

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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

BIS Updates The EAR Adopting Prior Notification Requirements To Congress For Small Arms

 

June 1, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 32983: In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to add a new section, § 743.6, “Prior Notifications To Congress” of exports of semiautomatic firearms, to adopt a congressional notification requirement for certain license applications having semiautomatic firearms that are (i) classified under Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 0A501.a and (ii) valued at $4 million or more. The congressional notification requirement will not apply if the total value of the application is valued at $4 million or more, but contains 0A501.a semiautomatic firearms valued at less than $4 million. Further, the congressional notification requirement will not apply to license applications if the 0A501.a semiautomatic firearms are destined for countries in Country Group A:5 or A:6 (see supplement no.1 to part 740 of the EAR), with the exception of Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey. The congressional notification requirement will also not apply to exports to personnel and agencies of the U.S. Government under License Exception GOV (§ 740.11(b) of the EAR) or when for the official use by an agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While the ITAR's congressional notification requirement is informative for developing new § 743.6 of the EAR, BIS is utilizing a different scope for this congressional notification requirement. Under the EAR, exporters can make a good faith estimate of the quantity and value of exports needed over the standard four-year validity period of a BIS license. This can include a license covering multiple purchase orders or anticipated purchase orders. Under the ITAR, DSP-5 licenses are generally tied to a single purchase order. To account for these differences, BIS is using $4 million as the value for the congressional notification requirement under § 743.6, which is an equivalent annual average of $1 million in potential exports per year during the validity period of the license. Essentially, the value threshold in § 743.6 will be four times the value of the ITAR's value threshold in ITAR §123.15(a)(3) reflecting the difference in licensing requirements. Additionally, because these semiautomatic firearms are less sensitive than the fully-automatic firearms that continue to be controlled under USML Category I of the ITAR, the congressional notification requirement will not apply to the group of allied countries referenced above.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/01/2022-11761/adoption-of-congressional-notification-requirement-for-certain-semiautomatic-firearms-exports-under

 

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U.S. Census Bureau

 

June 30, 2022: The U.S. Census Bureau has researched the reporting of two data elements in the AES, reporting the USPPI Address and State of Origin and discovered that over 12 percent of the EEI contained differences even though the definitions are merely identical.  As a result, the Census Bureau’s Trade Regulations Branch (TRB) contacted USPPIs whose USPPI Address State and State of Origin did not match to educate and train on the AES filing requirements.  The overall goal of this research is to determine if the removal of the State of Origin data element would have any risk to the Census Bureau’s statistical processing.

Below is a common example of how to properly report the USPPI Address and State of Origin data elements:

A U.S. company, Pack, Inc. (Pack), headquartered in Texas sold goods to a foreign buyer in the United Kingdom. The goods originated in several states and were consolidated by a freight forwarder in California to be prepared for export.  Pack could not determine the state where the highest value of goods originated.  Therefore, to be compliant with the FTR, the USPPI Address and State of Origin shall be California, where the goods were consolidated.  This is the case, even if Pack does not own/lease the consolidation facility.  Pack would be incorrect if they reported their headquarters in Texas as the USPPI Address and State of Origin because that is not the location where the goods actually began their journey to the port of export.

For reference, the definitions from section 30.6 of the FTR are provided below:

(a)(1)(ii) Address of the USPPI. In all EEI filings, the USPPI shall report the address or location (no post office box number) from which the goods actually begin the journey to the port of export even if the USPPI does not own/lease the facility.  For example, the EEI covering goods laden aboard a truck at a warehouse in Georgia for transport to Florida for loading onto a vessel for export to a foreign country shall show the address of the warehouse in Georgia. For shipments with multiple origins, report the address from which the commodity with the greatest value begins its export journey. If such information is not known, report the address in the state where the commodities are consolidated for export.

(a)(4) U.S. state of origin. The U.S. state of origin is the 2-character postal code for the state in which the goods begin their journey to the port of export. For example, a shipment covering goods laden aboard a truck at a warehouse in Georgia for transport to Florida for loading onto a vessel for export to a foreign country shall show Georgia as the state of origin. The U.S. state of origin may be different from the U.S. state where the goods were produced, mined, or grown. For shipments of multi-state origin, reported as a single shipment, report the U.S. state of the commodity with the greatest value. If such information is not known, report the state in which the commodities are consolidated for export.

 

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

 

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines, and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Sanctions

 

The U.S. Department of State:

 

June 9, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 35281: Based upon a review of the Administrative Record assembled pursuant to Section 219(a)(4)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)(4)(C)) (“INA”), and in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Department of State continues to designate al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (and Other Aliases) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/09/2022-12356/review-of-the-designation-as-foreign-terrorist-organizations-of-al-qaida-in-the-arabian-peninsula

 

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Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

June 6, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 34154: In response to the Russian Federation's (Russia's) further invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Department of Commerce amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 71 entities under 71 entries to the Entity List. These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security interests or foreign policy of the United States and will be listed on the Entity List under the destinations of Belarus and Russia.

 

For the reasons described above, this final rule adds the following 71 entities under 71 entries to the Entity List and includes, where appropriate, aliases:

 

Belarus:

• Joint Stock Company Eleron.

 

Russia:

• A. Kharkevich Institute for Information Transmission Problems (IITP), Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS);
• Ak Bars Holding;
• AO Rubin;
• Branch of AO Company Sukhoi Yuri Gagarin Komsomolsk on Amur Aircraft Plant;
• Branch of PAO Il—Aviastar;
• Branch of RSK MiG Nizhny Novgorod Aircraft Construction Plant Sokol;
• Chkalov Novosibirsk Aviation Plant;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Aeropribor Voskhod;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company All Russian Scientific Research Institute Gradient;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Almatyevsk Radiopribor Plant;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Experimental Design Bureau Elektroavtomatika in the name of P.A. Efimov;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Industrial Controls Design Bureau;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Kazan Instrument Engineering and Design Bureau;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Microtechnology;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Phasotron Scientific Research Institute of Radio Engineering;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Radiopribor;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Ramensk Instrument Engineering Bureau;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Research and Production Center SAPSAN;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Rychag;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Scientific Production Enterprise Izmeritel;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Scientific Production Union for Radioelectronics named after V.I. Shimko;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Taganrog Communications Scientific Research Institute;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Urals Instrument Engineering Plant;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Vzlet Engineering Testing Support;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Joint Stock Company Zhiguli Radio Plant;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Public Joint Stock Company Bryansk Special Design Bureau;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Public Joint Stock Company Moscow Institute of Electro Mechanics and Automation;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Public Joint Stock Company Stavropol Radio Plant Signal;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Public Joint Stock Company Techpribor;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, Ramensky Instrument Engineering Plant;
• Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, V.V. Tarasov Avia Avtomatika;
• Design Bureau of Chemical Machine Building KBKhM;
• Far Eastern Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Center;
• Gazprom Neft Shelf;
• Ilyushin Aviation Complex Branch: Myasishcheva Experimental Mechanical Engineering Plant;
• Institute of Marine Technology Problems Far East Branch Russian Academy of Sciences;
• Irkutsk Aviation Plant;
• Joint Stock Company Aerocomposit;
• Joint Stock Company Avtomatika;
• Joint Stock Company Bryansk Electromechanical Plant;
• Joint Stock Company Eleron;
• Joint Stock Company Experimental Design Bureau named after A.S. Yakovlev;
• Joint Stock Company Federal Research and Production Center Altai;
• Joint Stock Company Head Special Design Bureau Prozhektor;
• Joint Stock Company Ilyushin Aviation Complex;
• Joint Stock Company Lazurit Central Design Bureau;
• Joint Stock Company Ramensky Instrument Engineering Plant;
• Joint Stock Company Research and Development Enterprise Protek;
• Joint Stock Company SPMDB Malachite;
• Joint Stock Company Votkinsky Zavod;
• Kalyazinsky Machine Building Factory Branch of RSK MiG;
• Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research;
• NPP Start;
• OAO Radiofizika;
• A. Voronin Lukhovitsk Aviation Plant, branch of RSK MiG;
• Public Joint Stock Company Voronezh Joint Stock Aircraft Company;
• Radio Technical Institute named after A. L. Mints;
• Russian Federal Nuclear Center—All Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics;
• Shvabe JSC;
• Special Research Bureau for Automation of Marine Researches Far East Branch Russian Academy of Sciences;
• Special Technological Center LLC;
• Petersburg Marine Bureau of Machine Building Malakhit;
• Petersburg Naval Design Bureau Almaz;
• Petersburg Shipbuilding Institution Krylov 45;
• Strategic Control Posts Corporation;
• Systems of Biological Synthesis LLC;
• TsKB MT Rubin;
• Vladimir Design Bureau for Radio Communications OJSC;
• A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences; and
• Voentelecom JSC.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/06/06/2022-12144/additions-of-entities-to-the-entity-list

 

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June 16, 2022: The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an order temporarily denying all export privileges for Belavia Belarusian Airlines (Belavia) due to ongoing violations of the comprehensive export controls imposed on Belarus by the Commerce Department. The flag carrier and state-owned national airline of Belarus, Belavia has been providing flight services for passengers and cargo on U.S.-origin aircraft in violation of U.S. export controls. This is the first enforcement action taken by BIS against an airline in Belarus under the stringent export controls imposed by the United States in response to Belarus’s steadfast support of Russia’s unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine.

 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3029-2022-06-16-bis-press-release-belavia-tdo/file

 

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June 24, 2022: The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued orders denying the export privileges of three Russian airlines – Nordwind Airlines, Pobeda Airlines, and S7 Airlines – due to ongoing apparent violations of the comprehensive export controls imposed on Russia by the Commerce Department. These three Temporary Denial Orders (TDOs) terminate the right of these airlines to participate in transactions subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), including exports and reexports from the United States. These TDOs are issued for 180 days and may be renewed.

 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3038-2022-06-24-bis-press-release-nordwind-pobeda-s7-temporary-denial-orders/file

 

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June 30, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 38920: In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 36 entities under 41 entries to the Entity List. These 36 entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. These entities will be listed on the Entity List under the destinations of the People’s Republic of China (China), Lithuania, Pakistan, the Russian Federation (Russia), Singapore, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Some entities are added under multiple entries, accounting for the difference in the total number of entities and entries in this rule. This rule also revises eleven existing entries under the destinations of Belarus, China, Russia, and Slovakia and corrects one existing entry on the Entity List under the destination of Pakistan. Lastly, this rule removes two entities and one address for a non-listed entity, consisting of one removal of an entity and one removal of an address under the destination of China, and one removal under the destination of Pakistan. The removals from the Entity List are made in connection with requests for removal that BIS received pursuant to the EAR and a review of the information provided in those requests.

 

Six entities under ten entries are added to the Entity List on the basis of § 744.11(b) and under the destinations of China, Lithuania, Russia, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. These six entities and their identified subsidiaries are added to the Entity List with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR. BIS will review license applications for items for these entities under a policy of denial apart from food and medicine designated as EAR99, which will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. No license exceptions are available for exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) to these entities.

 

• Connec Electronic Ltd. (added under China and the United Kingdom);
• King Pai Technology Co., Ltd. (added under China, Russia, and Vietnam);
• Sinno Electronics Co., Ltd. (added under China and Lithuania);
• Winninc Electronic (added under China);
• World Jetta (H.K.) Logistics Limited (added under China); and
• Promcomplektlogistic Private Company (added under Uzbekistan) for providing support to Russia’s military and/or defense industrial base.

 

 

The following twelve entities are added to the Entity List on the basis of § 744.11(b) under the destination of China.  These entities are added for their activities contrary to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. Specifically, these entities use deceptive practices to supply or attempt to supply Iran with U.S-origin electronics that would ultimately provide support to Iran’s military. These entities are added to the Entity List with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR. BIS will review license applications for items for these entities under a presumption of denial. No license exceptions are available for exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) to these entities.

 

• At One Electronics;
• Blueschip Company Limited;
• Chen Zhouqian;
• Chipwinone Electronics;
• Chuangxinda ElectronicsTech Co., Ltd.;
• Ehang International Trade Limited;
• Gaohui HK Electronics;
• ICSOSO Electronics Company Limited;
• Shenzhen Avanlane;
• Suntric Company Limited;
• Wayne Weipeng; and
• Yiru Zhuang.

 

 

Eight entities under nine entries to the Entity List on the basis of § 744.11(b) under the destinations of China and Singapore, with one of the entities listed under both destinations.  All of the eight entities are added to the Entity List for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of military applications, contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. These entities are added to the Entity List with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR. BIS will review license applications for items for these entities under a presumption of denial. No license exceptions are available for exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) to these entities.

 

The entities are as follows:

• Beijing Highlander Digital Technology Co. Ltd (added under China and Singapore);
• China Academy of Science—Shenyang Institute of Automation;
• China State Shipbuilding Corp.—Systems Engineering Research Institute;
• CSSC Electronic Technology;
• Highlander (Hong Kong) Maritime Navigation Science and Technology LLC;
• Laurel Technologies Co. Ltd.;
• Sansha Highlander Marine Information Technology Co. Ltd.; and
• Sanya Highlander Huanyu Ocean Information Technology Corporation.

 

 

Two entities are added to the Entity List on the basis of § 744.11(b) under the destination of Russia.

The two entities are added on the basis of their attempts to procure items, including U.S.-origin items, for activities contrary to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. Specifically, Intertech Rus LLC and Laboratory Systems and Technologies LTD are acting as agents, fronts, or shell companies for OOO Intertech Instruments, an entity added to the Entity List under the destination of Russia on March 4, 2021 (86 FR 12531). The two entities are added to the Entity List with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR. BIS will review license applications for items for these entities under the license review policies specified in §§ 744.2(d) (restrictions on certain nuclear end-uses), 744.3(d) (restrictions on certain rocket systems and unmanned aerial vehicles end uses), and 744.4(d) (restrictions on certain chemical and biological weapons end-uses) of the EAR. No license exceptions are available for exports, reexports, or transfers (incountry) to these entities.

 

• Laboratory Systems and Technologies LTD; and
• Intertech Rus LLC.

 

 

Two entities are added to the Entity List on the basis of § 744.11(b) under the destination of Russia.

These two entities are added for actions contrary to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. These entities are added to the Entity List with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR. BIS will review license applications for items for these entities under a case-by-case license review policy. No license exceptions are available for exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) to these entities.

 

• FASTAIR; and

 

Four entities are added to the Entity List on the basis of §§ 744.11(b), 744.2 and 744.3.

The four entities are added for actions contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States, and because these entities pose an unacceptable risk of using or diverting items subject to the EAR to certain nuclear end-uses and certain rocket systems and unmanned aerial vehicles end-uses. These entities are added to the Entity List with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR. BIS will review license applications for items for these entities under a presumption of denial. No license exceptions are available for exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) to these entities.

 

• Gulf Trade House FZC; UAE;
• Industrial Process Automation; Pakistan;
• Jim Corporation; Pakistan; and
• Maira Trade International; Pakistan.

 

Al Noor Alaili Trading Company (ANATCO) is added to the Entity List on the basis of § 744.11(b) under the destination of the UAE. ANATCO is added for preventing the accomplishment of an End Use Check (EUC) by precluding access to, refusing to provide information to, and/or providing false or misleading information about parties to the transaction or the item to be checked. This entity is added to the Entity List with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR. BIS will review license applications for items for this entity under a presumption of denial. No license exceptions are available for exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) to this entity.

 

Scott Technologies FZE: UAE is added to the Entity List on the basis of § 744.11(b) for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items on behalf of entities listed on the Entity List, in circumvention of the licensing requirements set forth in § 744.11 of the EAR. Specifically, Scott Technologies FZE was added for re-exporting aircraft parts to Syria. A license is required for all items subject to the EAR. BIS will review license applications for items for this entity under a presumption of denial. No license exceptions are available for exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) to this entity.

 

The following entities under to the Entity List including, where appropriate, aliases:

China:

• At One Electronics;
• Beijing Highlander Digital Technology Co. Ltd;
• Blueschip Company Limited;
• Chuangxinda Electronics-Tech Co.;
• Chen Zhouqian;
• China Academy of Science - Shenyang Institute of Automation;
• China State Shipbuilding Corp. - Systems Engineering Research Institute;
• Chipwinone Electronics Co., Limited;
• Connec Electronic Ltd.;
• CSSC Electronic Technology;
• Ehang International Trade Limited;
• Gaohui HK Electronics;
• Highlander (Hong Kong) Maritime Navigation Science and Technology LLC;
• ICSOSO Electronics Co. Ltd.;
• King Pai Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Laurel Technologies Co. Ltd.;
• Sansha Highlander Marine Information Technology Co. Ltd.;
• Sanya Highlander Huanyu Ocean Information Technology Corporation;
• Shenzhen Avanlane;
• Sinno Electronics Co., Ltd.;
• Suntric Company Limited;
• Wayne Weipeng;
• Winninc Electronic;
• World Jetta (H.K.) Logistics Limited; and
• Yiru Zhuang Lithuania; Sinno Electronics.

 

Pakistan:

• Industrial Process Automation;
• Jim Corporation; and
• Maira Trade International.

 

Russia:

• Avcom-Technique;
• FASTAIR;
• Intertech Rus LLC;
• KingPai Technology Int’l Co., Limited; and
• Laboratory Systems and Technologies LTD.

 

Singapore:

• Beijing Highlander Digital Technology Co., Ltd.

 

United Arab Emirates

• Al Noor Alaili Trading Company;
• Gulf Trade House FZC; and
• Scott Technologies FZE.

 

United Kingdom:

• Connec Electronic.

 

Uzbekistan:

• Promcomplektlogistic Private Company.

 

Vietnam:

• KingPai Technology Int’l Co., Limited.

 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulations-docs/federal-register-notices/federal-register-2022/3053-87-fr-38920-entity-list-rule-effective-6-28-22-published-6-30-22/file and https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/federal-register-notices#fr38920

 

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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

June 1, 2022: the U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control has published three new Frequently Asked Questions related to the Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Sanctions.

Question 1048: After the relevant 365-day divestment period, are U.S. financial institutions required to block the attempted purchase or sale of Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies' (CMIC) securities covered by Executive Order (E.O.) 13959, as amended?

 

Answer: No.  E.O. 13959, as amended, does not require U.S. financial institutions to block transactions.  However, transactions that would be prohibited under E.O. 13959, as amended (including an attempted sale of covered securities by a U.S. person made to effect the divestment of CMIC securities after the 365-day divestment period), must be rejected and reported to OFAC within 10 business days.  Consistent with FAQ 863, U.S. financial institutions may continue to intermediate purchases or sales by or from non-U.S. persons to or for non-U.S. persons.

 

 

Question 1047: For the purposes of Executive Order (E.O.) 13959, as amended, can holders of Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies' (CMIC) securities receive stock splits, cash dividends, or dividend reinvestments related to the covered securities, and are U.S. financial institutions allowed to process transactions related to this activity?

 

Answer: U.S. persons who hold securities of CMICs identified pursuant to E.O. 13959, as amended, may continue to receive cash dividends and stock splits related to such covered securities, and U.S. financial institutions may continue to process such transactions.  However, purchases of CMIC securities effected through dividend reinvestments constitute purchases that are prohibited pursuant to E.O. 13959, as amended.  U.S. persons may, however, continue to facilitate the distribution of dividend reinvestments for non-U.S. persons after the relevant divestment period.

 

Question 1046: Are U.S. persons required to divest their current holdings of Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies' (CMIC) securities before the end of the relevant 365-day divestment period pursuant to section 1(c) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13959, as amended?

 

Answer: U.S. persons are not required to divest their holdings of CMIC securities during the relevant 365-day divestment period and may continue to hold such securities after the divestment period.  E.O. 13959, as amended, permits purchases or sales made solely to effect the divestment of CMIC securities, but only during the 365-day divestment period.  Accordingly, any such purchase or sale is prohibited after the 365-day divestment period, absent OFAC authorization.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/added/2022-06-01 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220601

 

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June 2, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued Russia-related General License 25B, General License 36, General License 37 and General License 38.

 

General License 25B: All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications involving the Russian Federation that are prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), are authorized. The exportation or reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to the Russian Federation of services, software, hardware, or technology incident to the exchange of communications over the internet, such as instant messaging, videoconferencing, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos, movies, and documents, web browsing, blogging, web hosting, and domain name registration services, that is prohibited by the RuHSR, is authorized.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl25b.pdf

 

General License 36: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions involving Public Joint Stock Company Severstal or any entity in which Public Joint Stock Company Severstal owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, August 31, 2022, provided that any payment to Public Joint Stock Company Severstal or any other blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl36.pdf

 

General License 37: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions involving Nord Gold PLC or any entity in which Nord Gold PLC owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, July 1, 2022, provided that any payment to Nord Gold PLC or any other blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl37.pdf

 

General License 38: All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the processing of pension payments to U.S. persons that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 are authorized, provided that the only involvement of blocked persons is the processing of funds by financial institutions blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl38.pdf

 

The OFAC is taking further action to degrade the key networks used by Russia’s elites, including President Vladimir Putin, to attempt to hide and move money and anonymously make use of luxury assets around the globe. OFAC targets a Kremlin-aligned yacht brokerage, several prominent Russian government officials, and a close Putin associate and money manager, Sergei Roldugin, who is a custodian of President Putin’s offshore wealth. In order to further tighten and enforce existing sanctions, this action further identifies yachts and aircraft in which sanctioned Russian elites maintain interests.

 

The OFAC also designated six individuals pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059 because of their support for, or actions on behalf of, the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG), a violent Mexico-based organization that traffics a significant proportion of the fentanyl and other deadly drugs that enter the United States. OFAC’s action is the result of a collaboration between the U.S. Treasury Department, the Government of Mexico, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). U.S. Customs and Border Protection also provided support to this case.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

• Faizullin, Irek Envarovich of Russia;
• Flores Mendoza, Severo of Mexico;
• Gasilov, Andrei Valeryevich of Russia;
• Godoy Arellano, Esther of Mexico;
• Gonzalez Anguiano of Mexico;
• Gorkov, Sergey Nikolaevich of Russia;
• Grigorenko, Dmitriy Yuryevich of Russia;
• Kochman, Evgeniy Borisovich of Russia, Monaco and France;
• Mirtova, Elena Yuryevna of Russia;
• Montero Pinzon, Julio Cesar of Mexico;
• Mordashov, Alexey Aleksandrovich of Russia;
• Mordashov, Kirill Alekseyevich of Russia;
• Mordashov, Nikita Alekseyevich of Russia;
• Mordashova, Marina Aleksandrovna of Russia;
• Nisanov, God Semenovich of Russia and Azerbaijan;
• Novitsky, Evgeny Grigorievich of Russia;
• Reshetnikov, Maxim Gennadyevich of Russia;
• Rincon Godoy, Angelberto of Mexico;
• Rincon Godoy, Julio Efrain of Mexico;
• Roldugin, Sergei Pavlovich of Russia;
• Savelyev, Vitaly Gennadyevich of Russia;
• Slyusar, Yury Borisovich of Russia; and
• Zakharova, Mariya Vladimirovna of Russia.

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

• Imperial Yachts SARL of Russia;
• Ironstone Marine Investments of Cyprus;
• JSC Argument of Russia;
• Limited Liability Company Algoritm of Russia;
• Limited Liability Corporation Gelios of Russia;
• Non-Profit Partnership Revival Of Maritime Traditions of Russia;
• Nord Gold PLC of the United Kingdom, Russia, Burkina Faso, and Guinea;
• O'Neill Assets Corporation of Cyprus;
• OOO Bilding Menedzhment of Russia;
• OOO Nord Marin Inzhiniring of Russia;
• OOO Nord Marine of Russia;
• OOO Yakht-Treid of Russia;
• Public Joint Stock Company Severstal of Russia;
• SCF Management Services Cyprus LTD of Cyprus;
• Severgroup Limited Liability Company of Russia; and
• SRL Skyline Aviation of San Marino.

The following vessels have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

• Flying Fox (ZGHN) Yacht 9, 022GRT Cayman Islands flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9829394;
• Graceful (UBGV8) Yacht 2,685GRT Russia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 1011551;
• Madame Gu (ZGCW7) Yacht 2,991GRT Cayman Islands flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 1011331;
• Nega (J8Y4483) Yacht Russia flag; Vessel Registration Identification RS 130280;
• Olympia (ZCGR) Yacht 776GRT Cayman Islands flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 1006960;
• Sea Rhapsody (V7VR9) Yacht 1,503GRT Marshall Islands flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 1010648; and
• Shellest (UBAO8) Yacht Russia flag; Vessel Registration Identification RS 150443.

The following aircraft have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

• 3A-MGU; Aircraft Model AS365 Dauphin; Aircraft Manufacturer's Serial Number (MSN) 6959; Aircraft Tail Number 3A-MGU;
• P4-MGU; Aircraft Manufacture Date 18 Feb 2013; Aircraft Model A319; Aircraft Manufacturer's Serial Number (MSN) 5445; Aircraft Tail Number P4-MGU; and
• T7-OKY; Aircraft Manufacture Date 2014; Aircraft Model BD700-1A10 Global 6000; Aircraft Manufacturer's Serial Number (MSN) 9576; Registration Number T7-OKY.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220602 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0802 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0803

 

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June 6, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) updated its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

• Cavara, Marinko of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
• Seranic, Alen of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220606

 

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June 6, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has published new Frequently Asked Questions and amended Frequently Asked Questions.

Question 1055: Do the new investment prohibitions of Executive Order (E.O.) 14066, E.O. 14068, or E.O. 14071 (collectively, “the respective E.O.s”) prohibit U.S. persons from lending funds to, or purchasing an equity interest in, entities located outside of the Russian Federation?  

Answer: No, provided that (i) such funds are not specifically intended for new projects or operations in the Russian Federation and (ii) the revenues of the entity located outside the Russian Federation are not predominantly derived from its investments in the Russian Federation.  For the purposes of assessing the foregoing, U.S. persons, including U.S. financial institutions, may reasonably rely upon the information available to them in the ordinary course of business.

Question 1054: Do the new investment prohibitions of Executive Order (E.O.) 14066, E.O. 14068, or E.O. 14071 (collectively, “the respective E.O.s”) prohibit U.S. persons from purchasing debt or equity securities issued by an entity in the Russian Federation?

Answer: Yes, the respective E.O.s prohibit U.S. persons from purchasing both new and existing debt and equity securities issued by an entity in the Russian Federation.  However, the new investment prohibitions of the respective E.O.s do not prohibit U.S. persons from selling or divesting, or facilitating the sale or divestment of, debt or equity securities issued by an entity in the Russian Federation to a non-U.S. person (see FAQs 1049 and 1053).  Please note that U.S. persons are not required to divest such securities and may continue to hold such previously acquired securities.  Moreover, the conversion of depositary receipts to underlying local shares of non-sanctioned Russian issuers would not be considered a prohibited “new investment” in the Russian Federation under the respective E.O.s.

Additionally, the purchase of shares in a U.S. fund that contains debt or equity securities issued by entities in the Russian Federation generally would not be considered a prohibited “new investment,” under the respective E.O.s, so long as these holdings represent less than a predominant share by value of debt or equity securities issued by entities in the Russian Federation.  As a result, U.S. persons may continue to invest in the fund, and the fund may continue to operate.  Generally, the fund may also divest itself of these prohibited holdings.

Please note that transactions must not involve blocked persons or other prohibited transactions unless exempt or otherwise authorized by OFAC.

Question 1053: Under the new investment prohibitions of Russia-related Executive Order (E.O.) 14066, E.O. 14068, or E.O. 14071 (collectively, “the respective E.O.s”), are transactions related to divestment permissible?

Answer: Yes.  Transactions related to the divestment or the facilitation of divestment of a pre-existing investment, including a pre-existing investment in an entity, project, or operation in the Russian Federation, are not prohibited by the new investment prohibitions of the respective E.O.s.  Such transactions may not involve a blocked person or otherwise prohibited transactions unless exempt or authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

The respective E.O.s prohibit any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a United States person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited if performed by a United States person or within the United States.  Such provisions do not prohibit U.S. persons from facilitating the wind-down or divestment of existing investment in the Russian Federation provided that such facilitation is on behalf of the selling party only.  For example, a U.S. financial institution is not prohibited from advising a client that seeks to sell an equity interest in an entity located in the Russian Federation (i.e., the seller in a divestment transaction).  However, a U.S. person is prohibited from providing any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee to a non-U.S. person that seeks to acquire an equity interest in an entity located in the Russian Federation (i.e., the buyer in such a transaction).

Such provisions also do not prohibit U.S. persons from advising on the requirements of U.S. sanctions laws consistent with OFAC’s Guidance on the Provision of Certain Services Relating to the Requirements of U.S. Sanctions Laws.

Question 1052: Can U.S. persons continue to fund their subsidiaries and affiliates with projects or operations located in the Russian Federation prior to the effective dates of the new investment prohibitions of Executive Order (E.O.) 14066, E.O. 14068, or E.O. 14071 (collectively, “the respective E.O.s”)?

 

Answer: Yes, provided that the use of the funds by the subsidiary or affiliate is consistent with the maintenance, as described in FAQ 1050.  “Maintenance” does not include the expansion of pre-existing projects or operations beyond those in effect prior to the effective dates of the respective E.O. prohibitions.  Therefore, U.S. persons may not fund new or expanded projects or operations undertaken by their subsidiaries and affiliates located in the Russian Federation after the effective dates of the respective E.O. prohibitions.

 

Question 1051: Is the export to the Russian Federation or import from the Russian Federation of goods, services, or technology considered “new investment” for the purposes of Russia-related Executive Order (E.O.) 14066, E.O. 14068, or E.O. 14071 (collectively, “the respective E.O.s”)?

Answer: The prohibitions on “new investment” pursuant to the respective E.O.s do not prohibit the export or import of goods, services, or technology, or related sales or purchases, to or from the Russian Federation, provided that such transaction is made pursuant to ordinary commercial sales terms (e.g., a payment of an invoice for goods made within the contracted time period, where such payment does not involve ongoing participation in royalties or ongoing profits) (see FAQ 1049).  Such transactions can be supported through traditional trade finance products, including commercial letters of credit and documentary collections.  U.S. persons are not prohibited pursuant to the respective E.O.s from entering into new contracts or agreements for such transactions.

However, please note that U.S. persons are prohibited or restricted from exporting, reexporting, or importing certain goods and services involving the Russian Federation, as described by law (see, for example, section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14068; see also FAQ 415).

Question 1050: What types of transactions are considered to be “maintenance” activities described in FAQ 1049 and therefore outside the scope of the “new investment” prohibitions of Russia-related Executive Order (E.O.) 14066, E.O. 14068, or E.O. 14071 (collectively, “the respective E.O.s”)?

Answer: For the purposes of the respective E.O. prohibitions, “new investment” generally excludes the maintenance of investments in the Russian Federation that were made prior to the effective dates of the respective E.O. prohibitions (“pre-existing projects or operations”).  “Maintenance” of investments includes:

• Transactions to ensure continuity of pre-existing projects or operations located in the Russian Federation, including payments to employees, suppliers, landlords, lenders, and partners;
• The preservation and upkeep of the pre-existing tangible property in the Russian Federation; and
• Activities associated with maintaining pre-existing capital investments or equity investments.

As a general matter, “maintenance” includes all transactions ordinarily incident to performing under an agreement in effect prior to the effective date of the respective E.O. prohibitions (“pre-existing agreement”), provided that such transactions are consistent with previously established practices and support pre-existing projects or operations.  However, “maintenance” does not include the expansion of pre-existing projects or operations beyond those in effect prior to the effective dates of the respective E.O. prohibitions, even if pursuant to a pre-existing agreement, where such expansion occurs on or after the effective dates of the respective E.O. prohibitions.  Nor does “maintenance” include commitments pursuant to the exercise of rights under a pre-existing agreement where such commitment is made on or after the effective dates of the respective E.O. prohibitions.

In connection with maintenance activity, U.S. persons also may modify or alter pre-existing agreements, or enter into new contracts or agreements, provided that any transaction under such contracts or agreements are consistent with previously established practices and support pre-existing projects or operations.  For example, a pre-existing agreement may be modified, or new contract established, to substitute suppliers, conduct maintenance or repairs, or comply with new environmental or safety standards.  In assessing whether activity is consistent with past practice, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) will consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including the transaction history between contract parties prior to the effective date of the respective E.O.s.

Note that maintenance activities must not involve blocked persons or other prohibited transactions unless exempt or otherwise authorized by OFAC.

Question 1049: For the purposes of Russia-related Executive Order (E.O.) 14066, E.O. 14068, or E.O. 14071 (collectively, “the respective E.O.s”), what is meant by the term “new investment”?

Answer: For the purposes of the respective E.O.s, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) views “investment” as the commitment of capital or other assets for the purpose of generating returns or appreciation.  OFAC interprets “new” investment as such a commitment made on or after the effective date of the respective E.O. prohibitions.  As a general matter, new investment includes such commitments that are pursuant to an agreement entered on or after the effective dates of the respective E.O. prohibitions.  New investment also includes such commitments pursuant to the exercise of rights under an agreement entered into before the effective dates of the respective E.O. prohibitions, where such commitment is made on or after the effective dates of the respective E.O. prohibitions.  We note, however, that new investment does not include the maintenance of an investment made prior to the applicable effective dates of the respective E.O. prohibitions (see FAQ 1050).

Unless exempt or otherwise authorized by OFAC, transactions that OFAC considers to be “new investment” for the purposes of the respective E.O. prohibitions include:

• The purchase or acquisition of real estate in the Russian Federation, other than for noncommercial, personal use;
• Entry into an agreement requiring the commitment of capital or other assets for the establishment or expansion of projects or operations in the Russian Federation, including the formation of joint ventures or other corporate entities in the Russian Federation;
• Entry into an agreement providing for the participation in royalties or ongoing profits in the Russian Federation;
• The lending of funds to persons located in the Russian Federation for commercial purposes, including when such funds are intended to be used to fund a new or expanded project or operation in the Russian Federation;
• The purchase of an equity interest in an entity located in the Russian Federation (see FAQs 1054 and 1055); and
• The purchase or acquisition of rights to natural resources or exploitation thereof in the Russian Federation.

Examples of transactions that OFAC does not consider to be “new investment” for the purposes of the respective E.O. prohibitions include:

• Entry into, the performance of, or financing of a contract, pursuant to ordinary commercial sales terms, to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology to or from an entity in the Russian Federation (e.g., a payment of an invoice for goods, where payment is made within the contracted time period and such payment does not involve participation in royalties or ongoing profits);
• Maintenance of an investment in the Russian Federation, where the investment was made prior to the effective date of the respective E.O. prohibitions, including maintenance of pre-existing entities, projects, or operations, including associated tangible property, in the Russian Federation (see FAQ 1050); and
• Wind down or divestment of a pre-existing investment, such as a pre-existing investment in an entity, project, or operation, including any associated tangible property, located in the Russian Federation (see FAQs 1053 and 1054).

Even if a transaction is not a prohibited form of “new investment” pursuant to the respective E.O.s, U.S. persons engaging in the transaction must comply with all other relevant sanctions prohibitions, including those pursuant to Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations and Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (see, e.g., FAQ 415).  For example, the respective E.O.s include provisions prohibiting any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a United States person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited if performed by a United States person or within the United States.  For more information, see FAQ 1053.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/added/2022-06-06

 

The following OFAC FAQs have been updated:

 

Questions 1019: For the purposes of Executive Order (E.O.) 14066, what is meant by the term “Russian Federation origin”?

Answer: For the purposes of E.O. 14066, the Office of Foreign Assets Control anticipates publishing regulations defining the term “Russian Federation origin” to include goods produced, manufactured, extracted, or processed in the Russian Federation, excluding any Russian Federation origin goods that has been incorporated or substantially transformed into a foreign-made product.

For information on prohibitions related to new investment pursuant to Russia-related E.O. 14066, E.O. 14068, and E.O. 14071, please see FAQs 1049-1055.

Question 1005: Does Directive 4 under Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation” (Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive) prohibit trading in the secondary markets for Russian sovereign debt?

Answer: No, the Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive does not prohibit trading in the secondary markets for debt or equity of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation (collectively, “Directive 4 entities”), provided that no Directive 4 entity is a counterparty to such a transaction. Please note, however, that Directive 1A under E.O. 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Certain Sovereign Debt of the Russian Federation” (Russia-related Sovereign Debt Directive), prohibits U.S. financial institutions from participation in the secondary market for ruble or non-ruble denominated bonds issued after March 1, 2022 by the Directive 4 entities. Moreover, the “new investment” prohibitions of E.O. 14066, E.O. 14068, and E.O. 14071 prohibit U.S. persons from purchasing debt and equity securities issued by an entity in the Russian Federation.  Please see FAQ 1054.

With respect to the receipt of interest, dividend, or maturity payments made in connection with debt or equity of the Directive 4 entities, please see General License 9A and FAQ 981.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/updated/2022-06-06

 

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June 8, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 35088: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515 (CACR) to further implement portions of the President’s foreign policy toward Cuba. OFAC is also publishing a number of new and updated Frequently Asked Questions.

 

The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is amending the Cuban Assets Control Regulations to implement elements of the policy announced by the Administration on May 16, 2022 to increase support for the Cuban people. This rule authorizes group people-to-people educational travel to Cuba and removes certain restrictions on authorized academic educational activities, authorizes travel to attend or organize professional meetings or conferences in Cuba, removes the $1,000 quarterly limit on family remittances, and authorizes donative remittances to Cuba. These amendments also add or update several cross-references.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/fr87_35088.pdf

 

OFAC issued the following new Frequently Asked Question:

 

Question 1056: What does the June 9, 2022 amendment to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) do?

Answer: Effective June 9, 2022, in consultation with the Department of State, OFAC amended the CACR to implement elements of policy changes announced by the Administration on May 16, 2022 to increase support for the Cuban people.

Professional meetings and conferences in Cuba:  Effective June 9, 2022, OFAC amended 31 CFR § 515.564(a) to include a general license authorizing, subject to conditions, travel-related and other transactions incident to attending or organizing professional meetings or conferences in Cuba, such as professional meetings or conferences to support expanded internet access and remittance processing and to provide additional support and training to independent Cuban entrepreneurs.  OFAC also amended and added cross-references to § 515.564(a) in notes to §§ 515.534, 515.542, 515.547, 515.572, 515.577, and 515.591.

Group people-to-people and other academic educational activities:  Effective June 9, 2022, OFAC amended § 515.565(a) to remove certain restrictions on authorized academic educational activities. OFAC also amended § 515.565(b) to authorize group people-to-people educational travel conducted under the auspices of an organization that is subject to U.S. jurisdiction and that sponsors such exchanges to promote people-to-people contact, provided such travelers are accompanied by an employee, paid consultant, or agent of the sponsoring organization.  Travel-related transactions authorized pursuant to § 515.565(b) must be for the purpose of engaging, while in Cuba, in a full-time schedule of activities that are intended to enhance contact with the Cuban people, support civil society in Cuba, or promote the Cuban people’s independence from Cuban authorities; and will result in meaningful interactions with individuals in Cuba.  This amendment does not authorize individual people-to-people travel.  Travel for tourist activities is not permitted.

Remittances:  Effective June 9, 2022, OFAC amended § 515.570(a) to remove the $1,000 quarterly limit on family remittances to Cuban nationals who are close relatives.  OFAC also added § 515.570(b) to authorize donative remittances to Cuban nationals who are not prohibited officials of the Government of Cuba, prohibited members of the Cuban Communist Party, or close relatives of a prohibited official of the Government of Cuba or prohibited member of the Cuban Communist Party.  Finally, OFAC added a general license in § 515.570(h) authorizing the unblocking and return of previously blocked remittances, provided they would be authorized under the revised § 515.570(a) or (b).

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/added/2022-06-08

 

See the following link for Frequently Asked Questions that OFAC amended related to Cuba:

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/updated/2022-06-08

 

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June 9, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has published new Russia Frequently Asked Questions.

 

Question 1068: For the purposes of the determination made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 on May 8, 2022, “Prohibitions Related to Certain Accounting, Trust and Corporate Formation, and Management Consulting Services” (“the determination”), do accounting services include tax preparation and filing?

 

Answer: Yes.  U.S. persons, wherever located, are prohibited from exporting, reexporting, selling, or supplying, directly or indirectly, accounting services, which would include tax preparation and filing services, to any person located in the Russian Federation, unless otherwise exempt or authorized by OFAC.  Please see FAQ 1059 for more information.  Please note the determination excludes the provision by a U.S. person of any service to an entity located in the Russian Federation that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a United States person, and any service in connection with the wind down or divestiture of an entity located in the Russian Federation that is not owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a Russian person.

 

As noted in FAQ 1067, this determination does not prohibit the export, reexport, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of tax preparation-related software to the Russian Federation, as distinct from tax preparation and filing services.  Please see FAQ 1067 for more information.
Question 1067: Do the prohibitions imposed by the determination made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 on May 8, 2022, “Prohibitions Related to Certain Accounting, Trust and Corporate Formation, and Management Consulting Services” (“the determination”), prohibit U.S. persons from providing software related to accounting, management consulting, or trust and corporate formation to persons located in the Russian Federation? 

 

Answer: The determination does not prohibit U.S. persons from exporting, reexporting, selling, or supplying, directly or indirectly, software to the Russian Federation, nor does the determination prohibit U.S. persons from providing services associated with the export of such software, such as software design and engineering, provided that such associated services do not fall within the categories of management consulting, accounting, or trust and corporate formation.
For example, the following scenario describes activities that would not be prohibited under the determination:

• A U.S. software company signs a contract with a company located in the Russian Federation (“Russian company”) for the design, engineering, licensing, and delivery of software that the Russian company uses to perform its internal accounting.  As part of the contract, the U.S. company provides continuing updates and technical support services related to the software (setting up new users, troubleshooting errors, etc.).

 

The following scenarios illustrate activities that would be prohibited under the determination:

• A U.S. management consulting company signs a contract with a Russian company to assist the Russian company in selecting a new enterprise application software.  This contract includes assessing the needs of the Russian company, providing a list of possible software choices to the company, and providing continuing advisory services on the implementation and use of the software to optimize the Russian company’s profits.

 

Question 1066: Do the prohibitions imposed by the determination made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 on May 8, 2022, “Prohibitions Related to Certain Accounting, Trust and Corporate Formation, and Management Consulting Services,” prohibit the provision of educational services, such as online university courses, on the subjects of accounting, management consulting, or trust and corporate formation to persons located in the Russian Federation?

 

Answer: No, provided such services do not evade or avoid the prohibition on providing the underlying services to persons located in the Russian Federation.

Released on 06/09/2022

 

Question 1065: Do the prohibitions imposed by the determination made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 on May 8, 2022, “Prohibitions Related to Certain Accounting, Trust and Corporate Formation, and Management Consulting Services,” prohibit U.S. persons from serving as voting trustees on behalf of, or for shares of, persons located in the Russian Federation? 

 

Answer: Yes, unless otherwise exempt or authorized by OFAC.

 

Question 1064: Are executive search and vetting services included in the prohibition on management consulting services imposed by the determination made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 on May 8, 2022, “Prohibitions Related to Certain Accounting, Trust and Corporate Formation, and Management Consulting Services”?

 

Answer: Yes.  For the purposes of this determination, OFAC interprets management consulting services to include services related to strategic business advice; organizational and systems planning, evaluation, and selection; development or evaluation of marketing programs or implementation; mergers, acquisitions, and organizational structure; staff augmentation and human resources policies and practices; and brand management.  Please see FAQ 1034 for more information.

 

Question 1063: Do the prohibitions imposed by the determination made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 on May 8, 2022, “Prohibitions Related to Certain Accounting, Trust and Corporate Formation, and Management Consulting Services” (“the determination”), apply only with respect to the formation of new trusts and companies or do the prohibitions also apply with respect to existing trusts and companies?

 

Answer: The prohibitions imposed by the determination do not distinguish between new and existing trusts and companies.  Under the determination, U.S. persons are prohibited from providing trust and corporate formation services to persons located in the Russian Federation, regardless of whether the services are performed as part of the formation of a new trust or company, or as part of the administration or maintenance of an existing trust or company.  Please see FAQ 1034 for more information.

 

In addition, please note that the determination excludes from the scope of the aforementioned services: (1) any service to an entity located in the Russian Federation that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a United States person; and (2) any service in connection with the wind down or divestiture of an entity located in the Russian Federation that is not owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a Russian person.

Released on 06/09/2022

 

Question 1062: Do the prohibitions imposed by the determination made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 on May 8, 2022, “Prohibitions Related to Certain Accounting, Trust and Corporate Formation, and Management Consulting Services,” apply to services provided to a parent company located in the Russian Federation by a U.S. subsidiary?

 

Answer: Yes.  The prohibitions apply to services provided to a company located in the Russian Federation (the “Russian company”) by any U.S. person, including the Russian company’s U.S. subsidiary.

 

Question 1061: Does the determination made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 on May 8, 2022, “Prohibitions Related to Certain Accounting, Trust and Corporate Formation, and Management Consulting Services” (“the determination”), prohibit U.S. persons from working as employees of entities located in the Russian Federation?

 

Answer: Not necessarily.  Under the determination, U.S. persons are prohibited from exporting, reexporting, selling, or supplying, directly or indirectly, management consulting, trust and corporate formation services, and accounting services to persons located in the Russian Federation.  Thus, U.S. persons are prohibited from providing these services to companies located in the Russian Federation (“Russian companies”) in their capacity as employees.  However, the determination does not prohibit U.S. persons from providing other services not covered by this determination as part of their employment by Russian companies.

In addition, please note that the determination excludes from the scope of the aforementioned services:  (1) any service to an entity located in the Russian Federation that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a United States person; and (2) any service in connection with the wind-down or divestiture of an entity located in the Russian Federation that is not owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a Russian person.
Question 1060: Does the determination made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 on May 8, 2022, “Prohibitions Related to Certain Accounting, Trust and Corporate Formation, and Management Consulting Services” (“the determination”), prohibit U.S. persons from serving as directors of companies located in the Russian Federation?

 

Answer: Under the determination, U.S. persons are prohibited from exporting, reexporting, selling, or supplying, directly or indirectly, trust and corporate formation services to persons located in the Russian Federation.  This prohibition on trust and corporate formation services does not, in and of itself, prohibit U.S. persons from serving on the board of directors of a company located in the Russian Federation.

 

However, this determination would prohibit U.S. persons from providing nominee officer or director services in which a U.S. person is contracted to serve as a nominee officer, director, shareholder, or signatory of a legal person on behalf of a person located in the Russian Federation.

 

Question 1059: Does the determination made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 on May 8, 2022, “Prohibitions Related to Certain Accounting, Trust and Corporate Formation, and Management Consulting Services” (“the determination”), prohibit U.S. persons from providing services to persons located outside of the Russian Federation that are owned or controlled by persons located in the Russian Federation?

 

Answer: No, provided that the provision of services is not an indirect export to a person located in the Russian Federation.  For the purposes of this determination, OFAC interprets the “indirect” provision of the prohibited services to include when the benefit of the services is ultimately received by a “person located in the Russian Federation.”

 

In contrast, OFAC would not consider to be prohibited the provision of services to a non-Russian company that has a physical presence and operations outside of the Russian Federation, including such a company owned or controlled by persons located in the Russian Federation, provided that the services will not be further exported or reexported to persons located in the Russian Federation.

 

For example, the following scenarios describe services that would be prohibited under the determination:

• A U.S. corporate service provider administers a trust established under the laws of a U.S. state, where the trust exists predominantly to hold, sell, or purchase assets on behalf of a settlor, trustor, or beneficiary who is an individual ordinarily resident in Russia.
• A U.S. corporate service provider registers a limited liability company in a third country on behalf of an individual ordinarily resident in Russia for the purpose of holding real estate assets, and this company has no other physical presence or operations in the third country.

 

The following scenarios illustrate services to a non-Russian subsidiary of a Russian person that would not be prohibited under the determination:

• A U.S. accounting firm provides tax advisory and preparation services to the U.S. subsidiary of a Russian company.  This U.S. subsidiary has an office and employees in the United States and conducts business in the United States, and the services will not be exported or reexported to the Russian parent company.
• A U.S. management consulting firm provides strategic business advice to the subsidiary of a Russian company located in a third country.  This subsidiary has an office and employees in the third country and conducts business in this third country, and the services will not be reexported to the Russian parent company.

 

Question 1058: For the purposes of section 1(a)(ii) of Executive Order (E.O.) 14071, what is meant by the term “person located in the Russian Federation”?

 

Answer: For the purposes of section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 14071, OFAC interprets “person located in the Russian Federation” to include persons in the Russian Federation, individuals ordinarily resident in the Russian Federation, and entities incorporated or organized under the laws of the Russian Federation or any jurisdiction within the Russian Federation.

Please note that section 1(a)(ii) of E.O. 14071 prohibits the direct or indirect exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of such services determined pursuant to E.O. 14071.  For the purposes of E.O. 14071, OFAC interprets the “indirect” provision of such services to include when the benefit of the services is ultimately received by a “person located in the Russian Federation.”  Please see FAQ 1059 for more information.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/added/2022-06-09

 

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June 10, 2022: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Syria General License 21A, Venezuela General License 39A, and Iran General License N-1, "Authorizing Certain Activities to Respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Pandemic." In addition, OFAC is also publishing a number of updated Frequently Asked Questions.

 

Syria General License 21A: Authorizing certain COVID-19-related transactions prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations. The following transactions and activities that are prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 542 (SySR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 17, 2023:

(1) Exportation of services related to COVID-19. All transactions and activities related to the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of services to Syria that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID-19); and (2) COVID-19-related transactions involving certain blocked persons. All transactions and activities involving the Government of Syria, Polymedics LLC, Letia Company, or any entity in which Polymedics LLC or Letia Company owns, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID-19), provided that any exportation or reexportation of items to Syria must be licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/syria_gl21a.pdf

 

Venezuela General License 39A: Authorizing certain COVID-19-related transactions involving the Government of Venezuela. All transactions and activities involving the Government of Venezuela that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID-19), that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13808 of August 27, 2017, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019, or E.O. 13884 of August 5, 2019, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 17, 2023.

 

Authorizing certain COVID-19-related transactions involving certain banks. All transactions and activities described above involving Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV), Banco de Venezuela, S.A. Banco Universal (Banco de Venezuela), Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo, de la Clase Obrera, Mujer y Comunas, Banco Universal C.A. (Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo), or any entity in which BCV, Banco de Venezuela, or Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo owns, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by E.O. 13850 of November 1, 2018, as amended by E.O. 13857, each as incorporated into the VSR, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 17, 2023.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/venezuela_gl39a.pdf

 

Iran General License N-1: Authorizing certain COVID-19-related transactions prohibited by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. The following transactions and activities that are prohibited by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 (ITSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 17, 2023:

(1) Exportation of goods or technology. All transactions and activities related to the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of goods or technology for use in connection with the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19 (including research or clinical studies related to COVID-19) to Iran or the Government of Iran, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to Iran or the Government of Iran;

(2) Importation of or dealings in certain COVID-19-related goods. All transactions and activities related to the importation into the United States of, or dealings in or related to, goods that previously were exported or reexported to Iran or the Government of Iran pursuant to this general license and that are broken, defective, or non-operational, or are connected to product recalls, adverse events, or other safety concerns, or for routine maintenance or the permanent return of such items to the United States or a third country; and

(3) Exportation or importation of services. All transactions and activities related to the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of services to Iran or the Government of Iran, or the importation into the United States of, or dealings in or related to, Iranian-origin services, in each case that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID-19). (b) Authorizing certain transactions involving the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) or the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). All transactions and activities described above involving CBI, NIOC, or any entity in which NIOC owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by the ITSR, the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 17, 2023.

 

Authorizing certain financial transactions. The processing of funds transfers or trade finance transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to give effect to the transactions and activities authorized in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this general license that are prohibited by the ITSR, GTSR, or E.O. 13224, as amended, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 17, 2023.

Any exportation or reexportation of goods or technology pursuant to the above is subject to the following conditions:

(1) Any goods or technology exported or reexported must: (i) Be designated as EAR99 under the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (EAR); or (ii) In the case of goods or technology that are not subject to the EAR, not be listed on any multilateral export control regime; and

(2) All exports or reexports made pursuant to this general license must be concluded prior to the expiration date of this general license.

 

This general license does not authorize:

(1) The exportation or reexportation of goods or technology to CBI, NIOC, or any entity in which NIOC owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest;

(2) The exportation or reexportation of any goods, technology, or services to military, intelligence, or law enforcement purchasers or importers;

(3) The exportation or reexportation of any goods, technology, or services used to facilitate the development or production of a chemical or biological weapon or weapon of mass destruction;

(4) The unblocking of any property blocked pursuant to any part of 31 CFR chapter V; or

(5) Any transactions or activities otherwise prohibited by the ITSR, the GTSR, or E.O. 13224, as amended, or prohibited by any other part of 31 CFR chapter V, or involving any person blocked pursuant to the GTSR or E.O. 13224, as amended.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/iran_gln1.pdf

 

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June 14, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 8C, "Authorizing Transactions Related to Energy."  In addition, OFAC has published amended Frequently Asked Questions.

 

Russia-related General License 8C: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 involving one or more of the following entities that are related to energy are authorized, through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 5, 2022:

(1) State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs Vnesheconombank;

(2) Public Joint Stock Company Bank Financial Corporation Otkritie;

(3) Sovcombank Open Joint Stock Company;

(4) Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia;

(5) VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company;

(6) Joint Stock Company Alfa-Bank;

(7) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest; or

(8) the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

 

For the purposes of this general license, the term “related to energy” means the extraction, production, refinement, liquefaction, gasification, regasification, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, transport, or purchase of petroleum, including crude oil, lease condensates, unfinished oils, natural gas liquids, petroleum products, natural gas, or other products capable of producing energy, such as coal, wood, or agricultural products used to manufacture biofuels, or uranium in any form, as well as the development, production, generation, transmission, or exchange of power, through any means, including nuclear, thermal, and renewable energy sources.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl8c.pdf

 

See the following link for OFAC’s amended Frequently Asked Questions:

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/updated/2022-06-14

 

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June 15, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating two key supporters of the ethnically motivated violent extremist group known as the Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. RIM was previously designated by the U.S. Department of State as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) organization on April 7, 2020 for having provided training for acts of terrorism. Concurrent with OFAC’s action, the U.S. Department of State also designated an individual for posing a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

• Shevchuk, Stanislav of the Ukraine;
• Thulin, Anton of Sweden; and
• Zhuchkovsky, Alexander of Russia.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220615 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0817

 

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June 16, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned a network of Iranian petrochemical producers, as well as front companies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that support Triliance Petrochemical Co. Ltd. (Triliance) and Iran’s Petrochemical Commercial Company (PCC), entities instrumental in brokering the sale of Iranian petrochemicals abroad. This network helps effectuate international transactions and evade sanctions, supporting the sale of Iranian petrochemical products to customers in the PRC and the rest of East Asia.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

• Bhore, Mohammed Shaheed Ruknooddin of India; and
• Gao, Jingfeng of China.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

• Fanavaran Petrochemical Company of Iran;
• Future Gate Fuel And Petrochemical Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
• GX Shipping FZE of the United Arab Emirates;
• Keen Well International Limited of China;
• Kharg Petrochemical Company Limited of Iran;
• Marun Petrochemical Company of Iran;
• Sky Zone Trading FZE of the United Arab Emirates;
• Teamford Enterprises Limited of China; and
• Youchem General Trading FZE of the United Arab Emirates.

 

See the following links for the names of entities removed from OFAC’s SDN list.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0819 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220616

 

 

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June 17, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Nicaragua-related General License 3. OFAC is also publishing one related Frequently Asked Question.

 

Nicaragua-related General License 3: All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of transactions involving Eniminas, or any entity in which Eniminas owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest that are prohibited by the Nicaragua Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 582 (the NSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, July 18, 2022, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the NSR. This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the NSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the NSR other than the blocked persons described above in this general license, unless separately authorized.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/nicaragua_gl3.pdf

 

The following Frequently Asked Question regarding Nicaragua has been published:

 

Question 1069: What does Nicaragua General License (GL) 3 authorize?

 

Answer: Nicaragua GL 3authorizes U.S. persons to engage in transactions prohibited by the Nicaragua Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 582 (the NSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions involving Empresa Nicaraguense de Minas (Eniminas), or any entity in which Eniminas owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest (collectively, “Blocked Eniminas Entities”), through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, July 18, 2022, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the NSR.

 

After the expiration of this authorization, unless exempt or authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. persons will be prohibited from engaging in transactions with the Blocked Eniminas Entities and must block such entities’ property or interests in property that are in, or thereafter come within, the United States, or the possession or control of a U.S. person.

 

Non-U.S. persons generally do not risk exposure to the U.S. blocking sanctions under the NSR for engaging in transactions with blocked persons, where those transactions would not require a specific license if engaged in by a U.S. person.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/1069

 

In addition, the following names have been added to OFAC's list of Specially Designated Nationals:

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

• Lopez Delgado, Ruy, Carretera Masaya, of Nicaragua.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

• Empresa Nicaraguense De Minas of Nicaragua.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220617

 

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June 17, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) removed the following Venezuelan national and nephew of the first lady Cilia Flores and her husband Nicolás Maduro.

Malpica Flores, Carlos Erik, of Venezuela.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220617_33

 

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June 28, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Russia-Related General License 39, General License 40, General License 41, and General License 42. OFAC is also issuing Russia-Related General License 43. OFAC has published a Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 14068 as well as one new Frequently Asked Question and one amended Frequently Asked Question.

 

Russia-Related General License 39: All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of any transaction involving State Corporation Rostec, or any entity blocked not earlier than June 28, 2022, in which State Corporation Rostec owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, August 11, 2022, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl39.pdf

 

General License 40: All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the provision, exportation, or reexportation of goods, technology, or services to ensure the safety of civil aviation involving one or more of the blocked entities listed in the Annex to this general license and that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 are authorized, provided that:

(1) The aircraft is registered in a jurisdiction solely outside of the Russian Federation; and

(2) The goods, technology, or services that are provided, exported, or reexported are for use on aircraft operated solely for civil aviation purposes.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl40.pdf

 

General License 41: All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the manufacture, sale, and maintenance, including the provision and receipt of warranty and maintenance services, of agricultural equipment, components, and spare parts produced by Nefaz Publicly Traded Company (“Nefaz”) or Public Joint Stock Company Tutaev Motor Plant (“Tutaev Motor Plant”), or any entity in which Nefaz or Tutaev Motor Plant owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 22, 2022, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the RuHSR.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl41.pdf

 

General License 42: All transactions involving the Federal Security Service (a.k.a. Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti) (a.k.a. FSB) prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 are authorized, provided that such transactions and activities are ordinarily incidents and necessary to:

(1) Requesting, receiving, utilizing, paying for, or dealing in licenses, permits, certifications, or notifications issued or registered by the Federal Security Service for the importation, distribution, or use of information technology products in the Russian Federation, provided that

(i) the exportation, reexportation, or provision of any goods or technology that are subject to the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774, is licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce; and

(ii) the payment of any fees to the Federal Security Service for such licenses, permits, certifications, or notifications does not exceed $5,000 in any calendar year;

Note to paragraph (a)(1). Except for the limited purposes described in paragraph (a)(1), this paragraph does not authorize the exportation, reexportation, or provision of goods or technology to or on behalf of the Federal Security Service.

(2) Complying with law enforcement or administrative actions or investigations involving the Federal Security Service; and

(3) Complying with rules and regulations administered by the Federal Security Service.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl42.pdf

 

Russia-Related General License 43: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer of debt or equity of Public Joint Stock Company Severstal (“Severstal”) or Nord Gold PLC (“Nord Gold”), or any entity in which Severstal or Nord Gold owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, purchased prior to June 2, 2022 (“covered debt or equity”) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, August 31, 2022, provided that any divestment or transfer, or facilitation of divestment or transfer, of covered debt or equity, must be to a non-U.S. person. All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of derivative contracts entered into prior to June 2, 2022, that (i) include a blocked person described in paragraph (a) of this general license as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to covered debt or equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, August 31, 2022, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl43.pdf

 

Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 14068:

 

Pursuant to sections 1(a)(i), 1(b), and 5 of Executive Order (E.O.) 14068 of March 11, 2022 (“Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression”) and 31 CFR § 587.802, the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control, in consultation with the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, hereby determines that the prohibitions in section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14068 shall apply to the gold of Russian Federation origin. As a result, the importation into the United States of gold of Russian Federation origin is prohibited, except to the extent provided by law, or unless licensed or otherwise authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220628

OFAC added the following Frequently Asked Question:

Question 1070: What does the gold-related determination pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.)14068 prohibit?

 

Answer: The determination of June 28, 2022, issued pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14068, “Prohibitions Related to Imports of Gold of Russian Federation Origin,” prohibits the importation into the United States of gold of Russian Federation origin.  Please note that per the determination, the importation into the United States of gold of Russian Federation origin that was located outside of the Russian Federation prior to June 28, 2022, is not prohibited.  For information regarding the term “Russian Federation origin,” please see FAQ 1019.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/added/2022-06-28

 

OFAC also amended the following Frequently Asked Question:

Question 1029: How do the prohibitions of Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 and other Russia-related sanctions impact gold-related transactions or persons participating in the gold market?

 

Answer: Gold-related transactions involving the Russian Federation may be sanctionable under E.O. 14024 or other Russia-related sanctions authorities.  For example, E.O. 14024 authorizes sanctions against:

• Persons determined to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in, deceptive or structured transactions or dealings to circumvent U.S. sanctions, including through the use of assets such as gold or other precious metals;
• Persons determined to operate or to have operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy, which could include those engaging in gold-related transactions involving the Russian Federation; and
• Persons that have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, persons blocked under E.O. 14024.  This could include transactions in gold or other precious metals that involve such blocked persons.

 

In addition, gold-related transactions involving Russia or the Russian Federation may be prohibited under E.O. 14024 or other Russia-related sanctions authorities.  For example:

• The determination of June 28, 2022, issued pursuant to E.O. 14068, “Prohibitions Related to Imports of Gold of Russian Federation Origin,” prohibits the importation into the United States of certain gold of Russian Federation origin (see FAQ 1070).
• U.S. persons, including gold dealers, distributors, wholesalers, buyers, individual traders, refineries, and financial institutions, are generally prohibited from engaging in or facilitating prohibited transactions, including gold-related transactions, in which blocked persons have an interest.
• U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in any transaction — including gold-related transactions — involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, pursuant to Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation (Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive).  Please see FAQ 998.
• U.S. financial institutions are also generally prohibited from processing transactions, including gold-related transactions, involving foreign financial institutions that are determined to be subject to the prohibitions of Directive 2 under Executive Order 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions” (Russia-related CAPTA Directive).  Please see FAQ 967 and FAQ 969.
• Non-U.S. persons are prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades or avoids a violation of OFAC sanctions.

 

Sanctioned Russian persons are known to employ a wide variety of measures in their efforts to evade U.S. and international sanctions. As such, U.S. persons, wherever located, including persons that process or facilitate gold-related transactions, must be vigilant against attempts to circumvent OFAC regulations and must take risk-based steps to ensure they do not engage in prohibited transactions.

 

Violations of OFAC regulations may result in criminal or civil penalties. OFAC is closely monitoring any efforts to circumvent or violate Russia-related sanctions, including through the use of gold or other precious metals, and is committed to using its authorities to act against sanctions evaders and promote compliance.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/updated/2022-06-28

 

OFAC also designated 70 entities, many of which are critical to the Russian Federation’s defense industrial base, including State Corporation Rostec, the cornerstone of Russia’s defense, industrial, technology, and manufacturing sectors, as well as 29 Russian individuals. These actions, taken pursuant to Executive Orders (E.O.s) 14024 and 14065, strike at the heart of Russia’s ability to develop and deploy weapons and technology used for Vladimir Putin’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. Concurrent with these sanctions actions, OFAC prohibited the importation of Russian gold into the United States, and Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a joint alert with the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, advising vigilance against Russian and Belarusian export control evasion. Financial institutions and the private sector continue to play a key role in disrupting Russia’s efforts to acquire critical goods and technology to support its war-making efforts.

 

The Director of OFAC, in consultation with the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, determined that the prohibitions of section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14068 shall apply to the gold of Russian Federation origin, with immediate effect.  As a result, the importation into the United States of gold of Russian Federation origin is prohibited, except to the extent provided by law, or unless licensed or otherwise authorized by OFAC. This determination excludes gold of Russian Federation origin that was located outside of the Russian Federation prior to the implementation of this prohibition.

 

In addition, the following names have been added or updated to or removed from OFAC's list of Specially Designated Nationals or updated on the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications (SSI) list:

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

• Afanasyev, Dmitriy Valeryevich of Russia;
• Ananchenko, Aleksandr Evgenyevich of Ukraine;
• Andrianov, Nikolay Valentinovich of Russia;
• Anosov, Viktor Yuryevich of Russia and Ukraine;
• Antonov, Vladimir Nikolaevich of Russia and Ukraine;
• Artyakov, Dmitriy Vladimirovich of Russia;
• Artyakov, Vladimir Vladimirovich of Russia;
• Artyakova, Tatiana Vladimirovna of Russia;
• Borisova, Natalya Vladimirovna of Russia;
• Brovko, Vasily Yuryevich of Russia;
• Chumakov, Aleksey Nikolaevich of Russia;
• Daniltsev, Yuriy Viktorovich of Russia and Ukraine;
• Danylchenko, Halyna Viktorivna of Ukraine;
• Dzinikashvili, Dmitriy Vladimirovich of Russia;
• Enaldiev, Tamerlan Borisovich of Russia;
• Evtushenko, Oleg Nikolaevich of Russia;
• Ezhikov, Vladimir Vladimirovich of Russia;
• Govtvin, Yuriy Nikolaevich of the Ukraine;
• Grigoryev, Andrey Ivanovich of Russia;
• Kandelaki, Tina of Georgia and Russia;
• Khavchenko, Dmitriy Vasilyevich of Russia and Ukraine
• Khotsenko, Vitaliy Pavlovich of Russia and Ukraine;
• Kiryanov, Victor Nikolayevich of Russia;
• Kiryanova, Tatiana Borisovna of Russia;
• Kogogin, Sergei Anatolyevich of Russia;
• Kokorev, Alexander Aleksandrovich of Russia;
• Kokoreva, Natalia Vasilyevna of Russia;
• Koleda, Mariya Vasilyevna of Russia;
• Kondrakhin, Leontiy Andreyevich of Russia;
• Kondrakhina, Melaniya Andreyevna of Russia;
• Koptev, Yury Nikolayevich of Russia;
• Krinitsyn, Oleg Anatolyevich of Russia;
• Kulygina, Olga Ivanovna of Russia;
• Kuznetsova, Anastasiya Viktorovna of Russia;
• Lashkaryova, Nadezhda Vitalyevna of Russia;
• Lelikov, Dmitry Yuryevich of Russia;
• Lenshin, Roman Yuryevich of Russia;
• Litvin, Vladimir Zalmanovich of Russia;
• Nazarov, Aleksander Yuryevich of Russia;
• Osin, Pavel Mikhaylovich of Russia;
• Pereverzeva, Tatiana Viktorovna of the Ukraine;
• Pinchuk, Andrei Yuryevich of of Russia and Moldova;
• Popov, Aleksandr Nikolaevich of Russia;
• Pugachyov, Oleg Ivanovich of Russia;
• Serdyukov, Anatoly Eduardovich of Russia;
• Serdyukov, Sergey Anatolevich of Russia;
• Serdyukova, Natalya Anatolevna of Russia;
• Shevchenko, Yuriy Valeryevich of Russia;
• Sierra, Elena Oduliovna of Russia;
• Smirnova, Natalya Ivanova of Russia;
• Sosonnyy, Aleksey Petrovich of Russia;
• Todorova, Anna Yurievna of Russia and Ukraine;
• Tsyb, Sergey Anatolyevich of Russia;
• Vasileva, Evgeniya Nikolaevna of Russia;
• Volobuev, Nikolai Anatolevich of Russia;
• Vybornykh, Maksim Vladimirovich of Russia; and
• Zaviyalov, Igor Nikolaevich of Russia.

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

 

• 64th GUARDS DETACHED MOTOR RIFLE BRIGADE of Russia;
• 76th Guards Airborne Assault Chernigov Red Banner Order Of Suvorov Division of Russia;
• 234th Guards Airborne Assault Regiment of Russia;
• Advanced Research Foundation of Russia;
• Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Elektron Optronik of Russia;
• Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Nauchno Issledovatelskii Institut Promyshlennogo Televideniya Rastr of Russia;
• Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Nauchno Issledovatelskii Institut Sredstv Vychislitelnoi Tekhniki of Russia;
• Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Nauchno Proizvodstvennoe Predpriyatie Svyaz of Russia;
• Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Ryazanskii Zavod Metallokeramicheskikh Priborov of Russia;
• Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Spetsialnoe Konstruktorskoe Byuro Vychislitelnoi Tekhniki of Russia;
• Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Spetsialnoe Proektno Konstruktorskoe Byuro Sredstv Upravleniya of Russia;
• Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Torgovo-Finansovaya Kompaniya Kamaz of Russia;
• Ao Npp Tsiklon Test of Russia;
• Aviaavtomatika Named After V. Tarasov JSC of Russia;
• Begishevo Airport Joint Stock Company of Russia;
• Bm Bank JSC of Russia;
• Chelnyvodokanal OOO of Russia;
• Closed Joint-Stock Company Scientific Production Enterprise Topaz of Russia;
• Emc Sud Limited of Russia;
• Energotsentr Irkut of Russia;
• Federal Service For Military-Technical Cooperation of Russia;
• Interregional Social Organization Union of Donbas Volunteers of Russia;
• Irkut Corporation Joint Stock Company of Russia;
• Irkut-Avtotrans of Russia;
• Irkut-Remstroi of Russia;
• Irkut-Stanko Service of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company All-Russian Research Institute Signal of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Arzamassky Priborostroitelny Zavod Imeni Plandina of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Center Of Research And Technology Services Dinamika of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Central Research Institute Cyclone of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Concern Avtomatika of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Corporation Moscow Institute of Heat Technology Of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Flight Research Institute N.A. M.M. Gromov of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Ilyushin Finance Company of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Information Security Reform of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Krasnodarskiy Avtocentr Kamaz of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Machine-Building Engineering Office Fakel of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Meteor Plant of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company North Western Regional Center Of Almaz Antey Concern Obukhovsky Plant of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Obninsk Research And Production Enterprise Technologiya of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Permskiy Zavod Mashinostroitel of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Plasma of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Production Association Strela of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Production Association Ural Optical And Mechanical Plant of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Radiopribor of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Radiozavod of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Ramensky Instrument Engineering Plant of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Research And Development Enterprise Almaz of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Research And Production Enterprise Radar Mms of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Research Institute Polyus Of M.F. Stelmakh of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Rt-Tekhpriemka of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Russian Research Institute Electronstandart of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Ryazan State Instrument Making Enterprise of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Scientific And Research Institute Of Electronic Engineering Materials of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Scientific Production Enterprise Kontakt of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Scientific Research Institute Giricond of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Scientific Research Institute Of Electrical Carbon Products of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Scientific Research Institute Platan With Plant of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Shipbuilding Corporation Ak Bars of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Shvabe of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Special Design Bureau Turbina of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Special Relay System Design And Engineering Bureau of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company State Scientific Research Institute Kristall of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Tekhnodinamika of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Trading House Rosel of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company United Engine Corporation of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company Vyatskoye Mashinostroitelnoye Predpriyatiye Avitek of Russia;
• JSC All Russian Research Institute Of Radio Engineering of Russia;
• JSC Scientific And Production Association Of Electro Mechanic of Russia;
• Kaluga Research Institute Of Radio Engineering JSC of Russia;
• Kamaz Publicly Traded Company of Russia;
• Kizlyar Electromechanical Plant JSC of Russia;
• Krylov State Scientific Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise of Russia;
• Leasing Company Kamaz Incorporated of Russia;
• Limited Liability Company Alfa-Invest of Russia;
• Limited Liability Company Kapo-Avtotrans of Russia;
• Limited Liability Company Kapo-Zhilbiltservis of Russia;
• Limited Liability Company Nauchno-Proizvodstvennoye Obyedineniye Radiovolna of Russia;
• Limited Liability Company PFMK of Russia;
• Limited Liability Company Private Security Organization RSB-Group of Russia;
• Limited Liability Company RSB-Group of Russia;
• Mariyskiy Machine-Building Plant Open Joint Stock Company of Russia;
• Mikam Holdings Limited of Russia;
• Moscow Institute Of Electromechanics And Automatics JSC of Russia;
• Nefaz Publicly Traded Company of Russia;
• Non-State Pension Fund First Industrial Alliance of Russia;
• Open Joint Stock Company Ilyushin Aviation Complex of Russia;
• Open Joint Stock Company Khabarovsk Radio Engineering Plant of Russia;
• Open Joint Stock Company Moscow Machinery Building Plant Avangard of Russia;
• Open Joint Stock Company Russian Electronics of Russia;
• Open Joint Stock Company Start Scientific And Production Enterprise of Russia;
• Private Company Promcomplektlogistic of Russia;
• Public Joint Stock Company Research & Production Corporation Istok of Russia;
• Public Joint Stock Company Taganrog Aviation Scientific-Technical Complex of Russia;
• Public Joint Stock Company Tutaev Motor Plant of Russia;
• Public Joint Stock Company United Aircraft Corporation of Russia;
• Public Joint Stock Company Vympel Interstate Corporation of Russia;
• Ramenskoye Design Company Joint Stock Company of Russia;
• Rapart Servisez of Russia;
• Rt-Business Development of Russia;
• Rt-Capital Limited Liability Company of Russia;
• Rt-Inform Limited Liability Company of Russia;
• Rt-Project Technology Open Joint Stock Company of Russia;
• Scientific And Research Institute Ferrit Domen of Russia;
• Sportivno-Ozdorovitelnyi Tsentr Irkut-Zenit of Russia;
• State Corporation Rostec of Russia;
• State Flight Testing Center of Russia;
• State Research Institute Of Aviation Systems State Research Center Of The Russian Federation of Russia;
• The Limited Liability Company Networking Company Irkut of Russia;
• Tipografiya Irkut of Russia;
• Tupolev Public Joint Stock Company of Russia;
• Zalog OOO of Russia.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220628 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0838

 

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June 30, 2022: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is amending the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20220630

 

See the following link for the scope of the amendment:

 

https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20220630_gtsr.pdf

 

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Fines and Penalties

 

June 2, 2022: Janet Sturmer, age 66, of Manassas, Virginia was sentenced to 54 months in federal prison, followed by 3 years of supervised release, for conspiracy to commit mail, wire fraud, and aggravated identity theft.  As part of her guilty plea, Sturmer will be required to pay $4.4 million in restitution.

The sentence was announced by United States Attorney for the District of Maryland Erek L. Barron; Special Agent in Charge Christopher Dillard of the Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General, Defense Criminal Investigative Service - Mid-Atlantic Field Office; and Acting Special Agent in Charge Selwyn Smith of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Baltimore. According to her plea agreement, from October 2015 to March 2017, Sturmer conspired with Peter Unakalu, Khalid Razaq, Brandon Ross, Saulina Eady, Saul Eady, and others to commit wire fraud by posing as navy contracted agents and convincing victim companies that conspiracy members were authorized to order specialized communications equipment without prior payment.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/virginia-woman-sentenced-54-months-federal-prison-identity-theft-scheme-and-ordered-pay

 

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June 6, 2022: The United States of America has been authorized to seize a Boeing 787-8 aircraft and a Gulfstream G650ER aircraft owned and controlled by Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich, pursuant to a seizure warrant from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, which found that the airplanes are subject to seizure and forfeiture based on probable cause of violations of the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) and the recent sanctions issued against Russia.

 

According to the seizure warrant and affidavit unsealed: In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued various sanctions against Russia that impose export controls and license requirements to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. These Russia sanctions include expanded prohibitions on the export, reexport, or in-country transfer of U.S.-manufactured aircraft and aircraft parts and components to or within Russia without a BIS license, and eliminate the availability of any license exception for aircraft owned or controlled, or under charter or lease, by Russia or a Russian national.

The Boeing and the Gulfstream each were reexported to Russia (i.e., flown from a foreign country to Russia) in violation of the ECRA and regulations issued thereunder, including the recent Russia sanctions. The Boeing was flown to Russia on March 4, 2022, without a BIS license, and is now in the United Arab Emirates. The Gulfstream was flown to Russia on March 12 and 15, 2022 without a BIS license, and remains in Russia. The Boeing and Gulfstream are owned and controlled by Roman Abramovich, a Russian national, through a series of shell companies in Cyprus, Jersey, and the British Virgin Islands.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-obtains-warrant-seizure-two-airplanes-russian-oligarch-roman-abramovich-worth

 

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June 6, 2022: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) issued an Administrative Charging Letter against Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich, alleging violations of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) involving flights of two U.S. origin aircraft to Russia without the required export licenses from BIS. These aircraft include a Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner (Tail Number P4- BDL, Manufacturer Serial Number 37306), valued at approximately $350 million, and a Gulfstream G650ER (Tail Number LX-RAY, Manufacturer Serial Number 6417), valued at approximately $60 million.

 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3014-2022-06-06-bis-press-release-abramovich-charging-letter/file

 

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June 6, 2022: Rashad Sargeant, 27, of College Park, Georgia, has been sentenced for his role in trafficking firearms to Barbados. Together with his co-defendant, David Johnson, Sargeant shipped at least 30 firearms to Barbados after obliterating the serial numbers from the firearms and packing them inside false compartments in boxes. Rashad Sargeant has been sentenced to three years, ten months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release after pleading guilty on September 2, 2021.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/third-defendant-sentenced-trafficking-guns-barbados

 

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June 7, 2022: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) issued an Administrative Charging Letter against Kenneth Scott and Scott Communications, Inc. (collectively “Scott”), as well as Mission Communications, LLC (“Mission”) of St. Ignatius, Montana have violated the Export Administration Regulations (“the Regulations” or “the EAR”) regarding the sale of certain radios with the knowledge that they were destined for Iran without the required U.S. Government authorization.

 

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1373-scott-charging-charging-letter-6-7-2022/file

 

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June 8, 2022: The Office of Export Enforcement at the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), issued a Temporary Denial Order (TDO) suspending the export privileges of three U.S.-based companies, Quicksilver Manufacturing Inc., Rapid Cut LLC, and U.S. Prototype Inc., for 180 days for the unauthorized export to China of technical drawings and blueprints used to 3-D print satellite, rocket, and defense-related prototypes. This type of information is subject to strict U.S. export controls due to its sensitivity and importance to U.S. national security. “Outsourcing 3-D printing of space and defense prototypes to China harms U.S. national security,” said Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod. “By sending their customers’ technical drawings and blueprints to China, these companies may have saved a few bucks—but they did so at the collective expense of protecting U.S. military technology.” TDOs are some of the most significant civil sanctions BIS can issue, cutting off not only the right to export items subject to the EAR from the U.S. but also to receive or participate in exports from the United States or reexports of items subject to the EAR. OEE’s order denies Quicksilver Manufacturing Inc., Rapid Cut LLC, and U.S. Prototype Inc., all of the export privileges described in part 764 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which include (but are not limited to) applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license exception, or export control document, or engaging in or benefitting from such transactions, in order to prevent imminent violations of the EAR. The order was issued for a renewable 180-day period and cuts off not only the companies’ ability to export from the United States but also their ability to receive or participate in exports from the United States. As described in the TDO, Quicksilver Manufacturing Inc., Rapid Cut LLC, and U.S. Prototype Inc., collectively utilizing the same rental mailbox, received export-controlled drawings from their domestic customers to 3-D-print requested items. Without their customers’ advance consent or knowledge, these drawings were provided to manufacturers in China to 3-D-print the items without the required U.S. Government authorizations. The items were then imported into the United States to be provided to the ordering customers.

 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3023-2022-06-08-bis-press-release-quicksilver-rapid-cut-and-us-prototype-tdo/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1372-quicksilver-tdo-final-6-7-2022/file

 

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June 9, 2022: Joe Sery, former owner and chief executive officer of Tungsten Heavy Powder & Parts, pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit offenses against the United States, including the unlawful exportation of defense articles on the U.S. Munitions List from the United States to the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, and elsewhere, without first obtaining a valid license or approval for such export from the U.S. Department of State, in violation of federal export laws pursuant to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

 

According to his plea agreement, Sery admitted that, while the CEO of Tungsten Heavy Parts and Powder, he was educated and trained on the requirements of U.S. export control laws, which prohibit the unlicensed export of items and data contained on the U.S. Munitions List. Sery entered into contracts with various defense contractors related to munitions and obtained ITAR-controlled technical data from them.  Thereafter, knowing it was unlawful, he provided this information to a foreign national, his brother, who took the technical data to the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, and elsewhere at Sery’s direction.  Sery also permitted his brother full access to THPP’s file system while overseas, knowing that it contained export-controlled technical data.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdca/pr/former-tungsten-heavy-powder-parts-ceo-pleads-guilty-conspiring-export-united-states

 

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June 16, 2022: Simon Saw-Teong Ang, 64, of Fayetteville, Arkansas, and former University of Arkansas professor was sentenced to 12 months and a day in prison followed by one year of supervised release on one count of making a false statement to the FBI about the existence of patents for his inventions in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

 

According to court documents, there are 24 patents in the PRC, which bear Ang’s name or Chinese birth name. The University of Arkansas, where Ang worked as a professor, required individuals such as Ang to promptly furnish to the university “full and complete” disclosures of inventions, and university policy provided that it, not individual inventors, would own all inventions created by those subject to the policy. This policy was established “in furtherance of the commitment of the university to the widest possible distribution of the benefits of university research, the protection of inventions resulting from such research, and the development of Inventions for the public good.”

 

Despite this requirement, Ang did not disclose his Chinese patents to the university and, when interviewed by an FBI agent, lied about his involvement in the inventions. Specifically, when asked whether his name would be listed as “the inventor” of numerous patents in China, Ang denied being the inventor, despite knowing he was. In addition, Ang also received numerous talent awards from the PRC government, which he did not list on the university’s annual conflict of interest disclosure forms.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-university-arkansas-professor-sentenced-year-and-day-lying-federal-agents-about

 

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June 23, 2022: A federal grand jury in the Northern District of Georgia returned an indictment charging military contractors with an alleged fraud scheme involving government contracts totaling over $7 million.

The three-count indictment charges Envistacom LLC, its President Alan Carson and a vice president Valerie Hayes, and the owner of another company, Philip Flores, each with one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and two counts of major fraud.

 

According to the indictment, from at least September 2014 through at least November 2016, the defendants and others conspired by preparing and procuring purported “competitive quotes” from other companies, which were sham quotes that were intentionally higher than the proposal prices and/or price quotes from Envistacom and Flores’ company to ensure the sole-source awards. The conspirators also concealed that the defendants prepared the independent government cost estimates and other procurement documents for the award of these contracts and made false statements, representations, and material omissions to federal government contracting officials regarding these estimates being legitimate independent cost estimates and the sham quotes being “competitive.”

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/military-contractors-indicted-7-million-procurement-fraud-scheme

 

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June 23, 2022: Shapour Moinian, 67, of San Diego, a former U.S. Army helicopter pilot-turned-civilian-contractor pleaded guilty in federal court, admitting that he acted as an unregistered agent of China and accepted thousands of dollars from representatives of the Chinese government to provide aviation-related information from his defense-contractor employers. He also pleaded guilty to making related false statements during national security background checks.

 

Moinian served in the Army in the United States, Germany, and South Korea from approximately 1977 through 2000. After his service, Moinian worked for various cleared defense contractors in the United States – including in San Diego – as well as the Department of Defense. “Cleared” is a term that indicates a contractor is permitted to work on projects that involve classified information. According to his plea agreement, while Moinian was working for a cleared defense contractor, or CDC, on various aviation projects used by the U.S. military and U.S. intelligence agencies, he was contacted by an individual in China who claimed to be working for a technical recruiting company. This person offered Moinian the opportunity to consult for the aviation industry in China.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-us-military-pilot-admits-acting-paid-agent-china-and-lying-national-security

 

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June 27, 2022: The Department of Justice announced that it signed settlement agreements requiring 16 private employers to pay a total of $832,944 in civil penalties to resolve claims that each company discriminated against non-U.S. citizens in hiring. According to the department, each company posted at least one job announcement excluding non-U.S. citizens on an online job recruitment platform operated by the Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech). One employer posted as many as 74 discriminatory advertisements on Georgia Tech’s platform, while several of the employers posted discriminatory advertisements on other college or university platforms as well. The department determined that the advertisements deterred qualified students from applying for jobs because of their citizenship status, and in many cases, the citizenship status restrictions also blocked students from applying or even meeting with company recruiters.

 

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) generally prohibits employers and recruiters from limiting jobs based on citizenship or immigration status unless required by a law, regulation, executive order or government contract. The INA protects U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, refugees, asylees, and recent lawful permanent residents from citizenship status discrimination in hiring, firing and recruitment or referral for a fee. Regardless of whether colleges or universities run afoul of the INA in the way they operate their job recruitment platforms, employers themselves are liable if the advertisements they post on those platforms violate the INA.

 

The 16 Private Employers that settled with the Department of Justice are: KPMG LLP, Keyot LLC, Area-I, Inc., CapTech, Akuna Capital, American Express Company, Sealed Air Corporation, Clarkston-Potomac Group, Toast, Inc., Blackbaud, Clay Electric Cooperative, Inc., CONMED, Edward Jones Investments, KNAPP Inc., SimpleNexus, LLC, f/k/a L Brewer and Associates, LLC, d/b/a LBA Ware, and The Royster Group, Inc.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-secures-settlements-16-employers-posting-job-advertisements-college

 

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June 28, 2022: A dual citizen of the United States and Iran, Kambiz Attar Kashani, 44, pleaded guilty to conspiring to illegally export U.S. goods, technology and services to end users in Iran, including the Government of Iran, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

According to court documents, Kashani and his co-conspirators, using two United Arab Emirates companies, evaded U.S. export laws between February 2019 and June 2021 by procuring electronic goods, technology, and services from U.S. technology companies for end-users in Iran without obtaining the required licenses or other authorization from the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Kashani acted at the direction of an arm of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI). CBI has been designated by OFAC for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support to known terrorist organizations.

 

Kashani faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison, and he has agreed to pay a $50,000 fine, in addition to any forfeiture owed. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-citizen-pleads-guilty-conspiring-provide-electronic-equipment-and-technology-government

 

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