Updates

JANUARY 2024 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through January 31, 2024.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

REGULATORY UPDATES

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

Anticipated ITAR Rulemaking Developments for 2024

January 4, 2024: The State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) recently updated its list of planned rulemaking concerning the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and U.S. Munitions List (USML).

Anticipated Developments

DDTC’s anticipated rulemaking list includes 16 intended actions, as well as a civil monetary penalty adjustment. The following are some of the significant rulemaking items.

Proposed Revisions to Defense Services. DDTC plans to publish a proposed rule regarding the ITAR’s control of defense services. Specifically, the proposed rule involves “revisions to definitions and controls related to defense services.” Although this planned rulemaking is new to the regulatory agenda, it is already going through its final interagency review, as DDTC submitted it for that clearance in early November. This proposal will be the fourth proposed rule by DDTC concerning defense services. It published the first proposed rule in 2011, the second in 2013, and the third in 2015. Each time, DDTC conceded that the current rule is “overly broad.”

The ITAR’s defense services controls have been essentially unchanged for four decades—with two notable changes. First, in 1984, when DDTC added the definition of defense services to the ITAR, it changed its policy by controlling technical assistance “regardless of whether technical data will be used or disclosed.” In making that “significant” change, DDTC stated that it was previously the agency’s practice to control assistance “only if it involved the disclosure of technical data or the use of technical data that was not exempt from the licensing requirements of Part 125.” Second, in 1997, DDTC amended the definition to cover military training, now appearing within ITAR § 120.32(a)(3).

USML Revisions. In addition to the defense services proposed rule, DDTC intends to issue the following three rulemakings concerning USML revisions:

  • An interim final rule “to revise and exclude entries on the [USML] that no longer warrant inclusion and to add entries for critical and emerging technologies that do.”
  • A proposed rule that will seek to revise several areas of the USML that may involve revisions to Category IV and XV and circuit boards and semiconductors covered within Category XI(c).
  • A final rule that will respond to public comments and complete the control criteria revisions from the April 2023 interim final rule to Category XI(c)(5), which involves certain high-energy storage capacitors.

DDTC’s regulatory agenda also includes a proposal to modernize the USML and Supplement No. 1 to Part 126 to enhance their “clarity, consistency, and ease of use.” The agenda additionally includes issuing a final rule to address the public comments DDTC received for the USML revisions to Categories IV, V, VIII, XI, and XV that took place through an interim final rule in 2018.

Proposed Registration Fee Increase. DDTC expects to issue a proposed rule to increase the ITAR’s registration fees. The last fee change occurred in 2008, with other previous changes occurring in 2004, 1997, and 1985. The ITAR’s registration fees were the subject of litigation in 2015 concerning DDTC’s ability to raise those fees, but that case did not address the merits because the plaintiff lacked standing. This proposed rule is going through a final interagency review, and DDTC expects to publish it for public comment in the first half of 2024.

Final Rule Concerning Technical Data Releases to Foreign Persons. DDTC plans to issue a final rule to change how the ITAR handles “deemed exports” and “deemed reexports” of technical data to foreign persons so that there is “a release only to any countries in which that foreign person currently holds citizenship or permanent residency.” Both situations currently control such releases “to all countries in which the foreign person has held or holds citizenship or holds permanent residency.” DDTC issued a proposed rule regarding this rulemaking in February 2022.

Final Revisions Clarifying Non-Controlled Events. DDTC intends to issue a final rule amending ITAR § 120.54 to add two activities that are not exports, reexports, retransfers, or temporary imports. As DDTC explained in the proposed rule, the two activities cover:

  • “the taking of defense articles outside a previously approved country by the armed forces of a foreign government or United Nations personnel on a deployment or training exercise is not a controlled event, provided there is no change in end-use or end-user”; and
  • “the transfer of a foreign defense article originally imported into the United States that has since been exported out of the United States, is not a controlled event, unless certain enumerated circumstances have occurred.”

Notably, DDTC acknowledged that the rule intends to “codify” the agency’s “long-standing policy” that these two activities “are not controlled events.”

Proposed Rule Concerning Regular Employees. DDTC intends to issue another proposed rule seeking to revise the meaning of a regular employee within ITAR § 120.64. Specifically, the proposed revisions would update the definition by allowing “subject persons to work remotely, and to clarify the contractual relationships that meet the definition of regular employee.” The first proposed rule, published in May 2021, received several public comments critical of the proposed approach to distinguish between contract employees based on the duration of employment.

Proposed Rule Consolidating Licensing Provisions and Exemptions. DDTC plans to issue a proposed rule involving the consolidation of ITAR Parts 123, 124, and 125. That consolidation will place most licensing exemptions into Part 125, while Part 123 will focus on the licensing requirements and Part 124 will focus on the licensing process. The Defense Trade Advisory Group (DTAG) recently reviewed this consolidation process in October 2023.

Final Rule Concerning the Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Exemption. DDTC is preparing a final rule “to expand the list of personal protective equipment covered by the exemption in ITAR section 123.17.” DTAG reviewed this exemption in May 2021 and submitted proposed revisions based on its recommendations.

Corrections and Clarifications. DDTC expects to build upon the initial Part 120 consolidation effort with a final rule covering non-substantive corrections and clarifications. DDTC calls this corrections and clarifications rule “ITAR Reorg 1.5.”

https://www.stagg.law/insights/anticipated-itar-rulemaking-developments-for-2024/ and https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain?operation=OPERATION_GET_AGENCY_RULE_LIST&currentPub=true&agencyCode=&showStage=active&agencyCd=0600&csrf_token=BF6B3C61CAF8BE26D24EF0A905F8FE61840DA695942104980FE1A083F9518CC504B25D8BCB417A2685F9343620BDA15DED13

*******

DDTC Updates The Civil Penalty Amount For Inflation

January 5, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 700: The U.S. Department of State adjusted the civil monetary penalties (CMP) for regulatory provisions maintained and enforced by the Department of State. The revised CMP adjusts the amount of civil monetary penalties assessed by the Department of State based on the December 2023 guidance from the Office of Management and Budget and by recent legislation. For violations of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) the penalty is now:

  • The greater of $1,238,892 or the amount that is twice the value of the transaction that is the basis of the violation with respect to which the penalty is imposed.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/01/05/2023-29003/department-of-state-2024-civil-monetary-penalties-inflationary-adjustment

*******

DDTC Name and Address Changes Posted To Website

January 5 through 12, 2024: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Change in Name and Address from General Electric International, Inc. at Bureaux 17 et 18 Immeuble Crystal 3, Boulevard des Almoahades, 3 Eme Etage, Casablanca 20030, Morocco to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC – Morocco at CFC Tower Lot 57, 5th Floor, Avenue Main Street, Casa Anfa, Hay Hassani, Casablanca 20250, Morocco due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name from L3Harris Micro Pty Limited to L3Harris Space and Airborne Systems Australia Pty Ltd., due to corporate rebranding;
  • Fokker Technologies Holding B.V. and its operating units in The Netherlands have completed an internal corporate reorganization resulting in the following changes:
    • Fokker Landing Gear B.V. and Fokker Elmo B.V. will change their main addresses to Anthony Fokkerweg 4, 3551 NL Papendrecht, the Netherlands.
    • Fokker Landing Gear B.V. and Fokker Technologies Holding B.V. will merge into Fokker Aerostructures B.V.
    • Fokker Aerostructures B.V. will become a direct subsidiary of Fokker Technologies Group B.V. and will change its name to GKN Fokker Aerospace B.V. (“GKN Fokker Aero”).
    • GKN Fokker Aero will, on occasion, use the trade names “Fokker Landing Gear”, “Fokker Technologies Holding,” and “Fokker Aerostructures” but Fokker Landing Gear B.V. and Fokker Technologies Holding B.V. will no longer exist as separate legal entities.
    • Fokker Elmo B.V. will remain a separate legal entity owned by GKN Fokker Aero;
  • Change in Name from Consilium Technology Proprietary Limited to Aurizn Solutions Proprietary Limited due to merger;
  • Raytheon Company’s headquarters change in Address from 870 Winter Street, Waltham, Massachusetts 02451 to 1100 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, Virginia 22209; and
  • Change in Name from Airbus Group India Private Limited to Airbus India Private Limited due to corporate rebranding.

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Australia

January 10, 2024: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Australia of General Tomahawk Weapons System Support Services Uplift and related equipment for an estimated cost of $250 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The Government of Australia has requested to buy services to support the Tomahawk Weapon System, including general weapons support services; logistics support management; material support; engineering technical support; management of technical data; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-general-tomahawk-weapons-system-support-services-uplift

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Egypt

January 10, 2024: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Egypt of Light Tactical Vehicle Chassis and Fleet Build and related equipment for an estimated cost of $200 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The Government of Egypt has requested to buy additional light tactical vehicle chassis and fleet build that will be added to a previously implemented case. The original Foreign Military Sales case, valued at $41.9 million, included 4-Man REV1-B Rolling Chassis with 190 horsepower (HP) diesel engines upgraded to 205HP turbocharged engines; training for chassis assembly process, operations, and maintenance; spare and repair parts; testing equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/egypt-light-tactical-vehicle-chassis-and-fleet-build

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Egypt

January 10, 2024: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Egypt of 28-Meter Patrol Craft Kits and related equipment for an estimated cost of $129 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The Government of Egypt has requested to buy additional non-Major Defense Equipment (MDE) 28-meter patrol craft production kits and technical support. The kits consist of Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats, forward-looking infrared systems, and computer packages; technical and logistics support services; transportation; spare parts, materials, equipment, and components; and other related elements of logistical and program support.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/egypt-28-meter-patrol-craft-kits

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Kosovo

January 11, 2024: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Republic of Kosovo of Javelin Missiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $75 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The Republic of Kosovo has requested to buy two hundred forty-six (246) Javelin FGM-148F missiles (includes six (6) fly-to-buy missiles); and twenty-four (24) Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Units (LWCLU). Also included are Javelin LWCLU Basic Skills Trainers; Javelin Outdoor Trainers; Missile Simulation Rounds; Outdoor Training Instructor Stations (OTIS); Battery Coolant Units (BCUs); System Integration and Check out (SICO); Life Cycle Support (LCS); Javelin Restricted Interactive Electronic Technical Manual (IETM); Javelin Operator Manual and Technical Assistance (TAGM); tools; Javelin gunner training; Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO) training; Javelin maintenance training; and other elements of logistics and program support.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kosovo-javelin-missiles

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Croatia

January 26, 2024: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Croatia of UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters and related equipment and services for an estimated cost of $500 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The Government of Croatia has requested to buy eight (8) UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters; nineteen (19) T700-GE 701D engines (16 installed, 3 spares); twenty (20) AN/ARC-231A RT-1987 very high frequency (VHF) / ultra high frequency (UHF) / Line of Sight (LOS) satellite communications (SATCOM) radios; ten (10) AN/AAR-57 Counter Missile Warning Systems (CMWS); twenty (20) H-764U Embedded Global Position Systems with Inertial Navigation (EGI) and Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) (or future replacement); and eighteen (18) M240H machine guns. Also included are: AN/ARC-231 RT-1808A (or future replacement) VHF/UHF/ LOS SATCOM radios; APR-39C(V)1/4 radar warning receivers; AVR-2B laser detecting sets; APX-123A Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders (or future replacement); ARC-220 high frequency (HF) radio with KY-100M; VRC-100 ground stations; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loader (SKL); KIV-77 Common Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) crypto applique computers; KY-100M; communications security (COMSEC) encryption devices AN/ARN-147(V) VHF Omni-Directional Range (VOR)/instrument landing system (ILS) receiver radio; AN/ARN-149(V) low frequency (LF)/automatic direction finder (ADF) radio receiver; AN/ARN-153 tactical air navigation system (TACAN) receiver-transmitter; AN/APN-209 radar altimeter; AN/ARC-210 radios; EBC-406HM emergency locator transmitter (ELT); Encrypted Aircraft Wireless Intercommunications Systems (EAWIS); Improved Heads-Up Display (IHUD); signal data converters for IHUD; signal data converters for heads-up display (HUD); forward-looking infrared (FLIR) with electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) capabilities; EO/IR cabin monitoring systems; EO/IR digital video recorder; AN/ARC-201D RT-1478D (or future replacement); Enhanced Ballistic Armor Protection Systems (EBAPS); Internal Auxiliary Fuel Tank Systems (IAFTS); Fast Rope Insertion & Extraction System (FRIES); External Rescue Hoist (ERH); rescue hoist equipment sets; Dual Patient Litter System (DPLS) Sets; Martin Baker palletized Crew Chief/Gunner seats with crashworthy floor structural modifications; External Stores Support System (ESSS); Integrated Tow Plates Production Assets; universal software loading kits; 60k volt-ampere (VA) generator kits; instrument panel sets; external gun mount systems; Black Hawk Aircrew Trainer (BAT); Black Hawk Maintenance Trainer (BHMT-M); Black Hawk Avionics Trainer; Maintenance Blended Reconfigurable Avionics Trainer (MBRAT); training devices; helmets; transportation; organizational equipment; spare and repair parts; support equipment; tools and test equipment; technical data and publications; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/croatia-uh-60m-black-hawk-helicopters-0

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Türkiye

January 26, 2024: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Republic of Türkiye of F-16 Aircraft Acquisition and Modernization and related equipment for an estimated cost of $23.0 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The Republic of Türkiye has requested to buy 40 new F-16 aircraft and to modernize 79 existing F-16 aircraft to V-Configuration. The request includes: thirty-two (32) F-16 C Block 70 aircraft; eight (8) F-16 D Block 70 aircraft; forty-eight (48) F110-GE-129D engines (40 installed, 8 spares); one hundred forty-nine (149) Improved Programmable Display Generators (iPDG) (40 installed, 10 spares, 99 for modernization program (79 installed, 20 spares)); one hundred forty-nine (149) AN/APG-83 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Scalable Agile Beam Radars (SABR) (40 installed, 10 spares, 99 for modernization program (79 installed, 20 spares)); one hundred sixty-nine (169) Modular Mission Computers (MMC) 7000AHC (or available mission computer) (40 installed, 10 spares, 119 for modernization program (79 installed, 40 spares)); one hundred fifty nine (159) Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS) Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) (EGI) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) or M-Code capability and Precise Positioning Service (PPS) (40 installed, 8 spares, 111 for modernization program (79 installed, 32 spares)); one hundred sixty-eight (168) Integrated Viper Electronic Warfare Suite (IVEWS) or equivalent Electronic Warfare (EW) systems (40 installed, 10 spares, 118 for modernization program (79 installed, 39 spares)); eight hundred fifty-eight (858) LAU-129 guided missile launchers; forty-four (44) M61 Vulcan cannons (40 installed, 4 spares); sixteen (16) AN/AAQ-33 Sniper Advanced Targeting Pods (ATP); one hundred fifty-one (151) Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Joint Tactical Radio Systems (MIDS-JTRS) (40 installed and 4 ground terminals, 8 spares, and 99 for modernization program (79 installed and 4 ground terminals, 16 spares)); nine hundred fifty-two (952) Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) AIM-120C-8 or equivalent missiles; ninety six (96) AMRAAM guidance sections; eight hundred sixty-four (864) GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs Increment 1 (SDB-1); two (2) GBU-39(T-1)/B SDB-1 guided test vehicles; two (2) GBU-39(T-1)/B SDB-1 practice bombs; ninety-six (96) AGM-88B High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM); ninety-six (96) AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missiles (AARGM); ten (10) AARGM Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM); eleven (11) AARGM control sections; twelve (12) AARGM guidance sections; four hundred one (401) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder missiles; twelve (12) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder Captive Air Training Missiles (CATMs); forty (40) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder tactical guidance units; twelve (12) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder CATM guidance units; twelve (12) MK82 Inert Filled general purpose bombs; eight hundred fifty (850) Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) KMU-556 tail kits for GBU-31; two hundred (200) JDAM KMU-557 tail kits for GBU-31v3; three hundred eighty-four (384) JDAM KMU-559 tail kits for GBU-32; three (3) JDAM KMU-572 tail kits for GBU-38 or Laser JDAM GBU-54; one thousand fifty (1,050) FMU-152 fuzes. Also included are AMRAAM CATMs; AIM-9X Sidewinder training missiles and Active Optical Target Detectors (AOTD); HARM control sections, rocket motors, and warhead spares; FMU-139 Joint Programmable Fuzes; DSU-38 Laser Guidance Sets for GBU-54; missile containers; AN/ARC-238 radios; AN/APX-127 or equivalent Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIFF) Combined Interrogator Transponders (CIT) with mode 5; Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS) II or Scorpion Hybrid Optical-based Inertial Tracker (HObIT) helmet mounted displays; Infrared Search and Track (IRST) pods; AN/ALE-47 Countermeasure Dispenser Systems (CMDS); KY-58 and KIV-78 cryptographic devices; Simple Key Loaders (SKLs); additional secure communications, precision navigation, and cryptographic equipment; Flight Mission Planning Systems (FMPS); Remote Operated Video Enhanced Receivers (ROVER) 6i/6Sis; Tactical Network ROVER kits, and STINGER Multi Bi-Directional (MBI) antennas; SNIPER pod pylons; impulse cartridges, chaff, flares, and ammunition; bomb components and Common Munitions Built-in-Test Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); Rackmount Improved Avionics Intermediate Shop (RIAIS); Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD); Triple Missile Launcher Adapters (TMLA); aircraft, avionics, and weapons integration, test support, and equipment; major modernization upgrade kits for F-16 Block 40 and Block 50+ aircraft and Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) modifications; aircraft and engine repair and refurbishment after maintenance; engine and aircraft spare and repair parts, consumables, and accessories and repair and return support; aircraft, engine, ground, and pilot support equipment; Classified/Unclassified Computer Program Identification Number (CPIN) systems; electronic warfare database support; pylons, launcher adaptors, weapon interfaces, bomb and ejection racks, conformal fuel tanks, and travel pods; precision measurement equipment laboratory and calibration support; Classified/Unclassified software and software support; Classified/Unclassified publications, manuals, and technical documentation; maps and mapping data; facilities and construction support; simulators and training devices; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistical and program support.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/turkiye-f-16-aircraft-acquisition-and-modernization

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Greece

January 26, 2024: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Greece of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL) aircraft and related equipment for an estimated cost of $8.6 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The Government of Greece has requested to buy up to forty (40) F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL) aircraft; and forty-two (42) Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines (40 installed, 2 spares). Also included are AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; KGV-135A embedded secure communications devices; Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD); impulse cartridges, chaff, and flares; Full Mission Simulators and system trainers; electronic warfare systems and Reprogramming Lab support; logistics management and support systems; threat detection, tracking, and targeting systems; Contractor Logistics Support (CLS); classified software and software development, delivery and integration support; transportation, ferry, and refueling support; weapons containers; aircraft and munitions support and support equipment; integration and test support and equipment; aircraft engine component improvement program (CIP) support; secure communications, precision navigation, and cryptographic systems and equipment; Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment; spare and repair parts, consumables, and accessories, and repair and return support; minor modifications, maintenance, and maintenance support; personnel training and training equipment; classified and unclassified publications and technical documents; warranties; and U.S. Government and engineering, technical, and logistics support services, studies, and surveys; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/greece-f-35-joint-strike-fighter-conventional-take-and-landing-ctol

*******

Michael Vaccaro Named The New Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Defense Trade

January 16, 2024: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) welcomed Michael Vaccaro, the new permanent Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Defense Trade. As of Tuesday, January 16, 2024, DAS Vaccaro began overseeing DDTC’s mission to ensure commercial exports of defense articles and defense services advance U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives.

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events

*******

Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

BIS Published Frequently Asked Questions for “Export Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing Items” (SME IFR) and “Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Updates and Corrections” (AC/S IFR)

January 2024: The Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”) address comments received in response to the “Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use” (October 7 IFR)(87 Fed. Reg. 62186, October 13, 2022) and amend the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME), advanced computing items, and supercomputers more effectively and to address ongoing national security concerns that items in these rules can be used for military modernization and other applications such as the development and production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). See the following link for the list of FAQs and answers:

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/policy-guidance/3434-2023-frequently-asked-questions-003-clean-for-posting/file

********

BIS Increases The Civil Penalty Amount For Inflation

January 15, 2024: 88 Fed. Reg. 89300: Effective on January 15, 2024, the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security adjusted its penalties for violations of Export Controls Act of 2018 (2018), from a maximum of $353,534 to $364,992 pursuant to the 2024 the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as amended by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/27/2023-28484/civil-monetary-penalty-adjustments-for-inflation

*******

BIS Enhances Its Voluntary Self-Disclosure Process

January 16, 2024: Accordingly, to better support industry’s and academia’s compliance efforts and to further

streamline BIS’ internal processes, BIS announced that it was making several key updates

regarding our Voluntary Self-Disclosure (VSD) process.

 

Manner of Submission

BIS strongly encourages the submission of VSDs via email. Electronic submissions of initial notifications, extension requests, and narrative accounts of disclosure through the email address bisvsdintake@bis.doc.gov will allow BIS to receive, monitor, and track submissions more effectively, thus enabling a quicker and more responsive interface with those making disclosures. The submissions can also be electronically signed. As before, BOS will continue to accept hard-copy, written paper submissions for VSDs, but BIS has made a change to its VSD webpage to encourage parties to provide an email address in any hard-copy submission to allow for more expedient follow-up and response.

 

Abbreviated Narrative Account of Certain Disclosures

Regarding VSDs that involve only minor or technical infractions, BIS implemented a “fasttrack”

resolution policy on June 30, 2022. Under this dual-track system, VSDs falling under this

category now receive a warning or no-action letter within 60 days of final submission. The current

updates further enhance the “fast-track” resolution policy by adopting an abbreviated “narrative

account” option for the overwhelming majority of VSD submissions.

 

Specifically, parties disclosing violations where no aggravating factors are present may now

submit an abbreviated narrative account as part of their disclosure. The abbreviated narrative account

should briefly describe the nature of the violations as outlined in Section 764.5(c)(3), but need not

include all of the accompanying documentation outlined in Section 764.5(c)(4), unless specifically

requested by the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE). Additionally, parties submitting such

abbreviated narratives do not need to conduct the full five-year lookback recommended in Section

764.5(c)(3), unless specifically requested by OEE.

 

If OEE suspects the presence of aggravating factors that are not disclosed, the OEE Director

will request a full narrative account, including the five-year lookback, with accompanying

documentation. For VSDs that involve circumstances with aggravating factors, submitting parties

should continue to conduct a thorough review of all export-related transactions where possible

violations are suspected. In those instances, BIS continues to recommend that the review of the

suspected violations cover a period of up to five years prior to the date of the initial notification,

consistent with Section 764.5(c)(3).

 

Aggravating factors are addressed in Section IIl(A) of Supplement No. 1 to Part 766. Section 764.5(c)(3) of the EAR outlines the contents of the VSD narrative, which should include:

(i) The kind of violation involved, for example a shipment without the required license or dealing with a party denied export privileges;

(ii) An explanation of when and how the violations occurred;

(iii) The complete identities and addresses of all individuals and organizations, whether foreign or domestic, involved in the activities giving rise to the violations;

(iv) License numbers;

(v) The description, quantity, value in U.S. dollars and ECCN or other classification of the items involved; and

(vi) A description of any mitigating circumstances.”

 

Section 764.5(c)(4)(ii) reads: “Any relevant documents not attached to the narrative account must be retained by the person making the disclosure until OEE requests them, or until a final decision on the disclosed information has been made. After a final decision, the documents should be maintained in accordance with the recordkeeping rules in part 762 of the EAR.”

 

Parties should continue to note, however, that, as explained in Section 764.5(c)(3), “[a]ny violations not voluntarily disclosed do not receive consideration under this section.”

 

What Makes a Violation Significant?

Many apparent violations are minor or technical ones, the result of a good-faith misinterpretation or the checking of a wrong box on a form. If no aggravating factors are present, BIS will generally consider these violations minor and address them through the “fast track” for resolution. Resolutions for minor violations include either a no-action determination letter or a warning letter. In contrast, significant violations are those involving aggravating factors that may result in an administrative penalty or other action.

 

In BIS’ April 18, 2023 policy memorandum, BIS noted that parties could bundle multiple minor

or technical violations – i.e., those without aggravating factors – into one overarching submission, if

the violations occurred close in time. Now, BIS’ VSD webpage further clarifies that parties can

bundle these disclosures for submission on a quarterly basis. This clarification will help streamline

the process for minor or technical infractions and help us to more easily fast-track a response.

 

Treatment of Unlawfully Exported Items

By definition, a party making a voluntary self-disclosure believes that a violation may have

occurred. Therefore, when dealing with an item subject to a VSD, the party making the disclosure is

prohibited from engaging in the activities listed in Section 764.2(e), such as buying, disposing of,

transferring, or storing the item. BIS recognizes that the list of activities prohibited by Section

764.2(e) is an expansive one, and BIS also understand that parties who disclose violations often seek

to take corrective actions. Accordingly, parties may request special permission from BIS to engage

in activities that would otherwise be prohibited by Section 764.2(e).

 

While these requests must be formally submitted to BIS’ s Office of Exporter Services, the VSD webpage updates notify the regulated community that to help expedite the requests, BIS suggest that courtesy copies of such requests be sent to O EE via email. BIS will then work with the Office of Exporter Services to help expedite its review and analysis of the request to ensure decisions to grant such requests are appropriate, thereby allowing the items to be placed back into the lawful stream of commerce.

 

In addition, the VSD webpage updates now make clear that any person (i.e., not just a party

submitting a VSD) may notify the OEE Director that a violation has occurred and request permission

from the Office of Exporter Services to engage in otherwise prohibited activities. OEE will consider

such disclosures to have fulfilled the requirements of Section 764.S(f) even when the request does not

disclose a violation by the submitter (assuming there was no violation by the submitter to disclose),

but instead just seeks permission to engage in otherwise prohibited activities.

 

Furthermore, for parties seeking to return an unlawfully exported item back to the United States from abroad, OEE’s presumptive recommendation will be for BIS to authorize such reexports, regardless of who is seeking such permission.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/enforcement/3435-vsd-policy-memo-01-16-2024/file

*******

BIS Deploys Assessment On The Use Of Mature-Node Chips

January 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is conducting a comprehensive assessment of the use of mature-node semiconductor devices in the supply chains that support—directly or indirectly—U.S. national security and critical infrastructure.  The intent of the survey is to identify how U.S. companies are sourcing mature-node semiconductors, also known as legacy chips. This analysis will inform U.S. policy to bolster the semiconductor supply chain, promote a level playing field for legacy chip production, and reduce national security risks posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The assessment was requested by the Secretary of Commerce in response to findings in a Congressionally mandated report released in December 2023 that assessed the capabilities of the U.S. microelectronics industrial base to support U.S. national defense.

The survey will be performed under Section 705 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 to evaluate the extent of, and visibility into, the use of mature-node chips manufactured by PRC-based companies in supply chains of critical U.S. industries like telecommunications, automotive, medical device, and the defense industrial base.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3437-2024-01-18-bis-press-release-legacy-chip-survey-final/file

*******

BIS Strengthens Controls Against Russia And Belarus In Response To Russia’s Continued War Against Ukraine

January 23, 2024: The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) strengthened its existing controls under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) against Russia and Belarus in response to the Russian Federation’s (Russia’s) ongoing aggression against Ukraine and Belarus’s complicity in the invasion.  This action expands the scope of the EAR’s Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions by adding 94 6-digit Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes to the list of items requiring a license for export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to Russia or Belarus.

The expanded list of items includes certain chemicals, lubricants, and metals, and it covers the entirety of Chapter 88 of the HTS (aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof), thereby further restricting Russia’s access to inputs for its defense industrial base and better aligning U.S. controls with those implemented by U.S. partners and allies.  The rule also expands controls on certain EAR99 antennas, antenna reflectors, and parts thereof to further restrict these items from going to Iran and Russia, including when produced abroad with U.S. technology or software.

This action also removes the lowest-level military and spacecraft-related items (i.e., .y items) from being eligible for de minimis treatment when incorporated into foreign-made items for export from abroad or reexport to Russia or Belarus.

Finally, the new rule makes several clarifying changes, including by adding an exclusion from BIS license requirements in situations involving transactions that are related to deployments by the Armed Forces of Ukraine to or within the temporarily occupied Crimea region of Ukraine and covered regions of Ukraine.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3439-commerce-strengthens-rules-against-russia-and-belarus/file

*******

BIS Published A Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) For Establishing New Requirements For Infrastructure As A Service Providers (Iaas Or “Cloud Infrastructure Providers”)

January 29, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 5698: The Department of Commerce (Department) published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for establishing new requirements for Infrastructure as a Service providers (IaaS or “cloud infrastructure providers”). The NPRM outlines proposed requirements to address the risk of foreign malicious actors using U.S. cloud services that could be used in malicious cyber-enabled activity to harm U.S. critical infrastructure or national security, including to train large artificial intelligence (AI) models.

This NPRM demonstrates the Biden-Harris Administration’s proactive efforts to address the potential national security risks associated with frontier AI models and the abuse of U.S. cloud infrastructure by malicious actors and is a significant step in implementing the President’s Executive Order (EO) on “Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Use and Development of Artificial Intelligence” (EO 14110) and the National Cybersecurity Strategy.

The proposed rule introduces potential regulations that require U.S. cloud infrastructure providers and their foreign resellers to implement and maintain Customer Identification Programs (CIPs), which would include the collection of “Know Your Customer” (KYC) information. Similar KYC requirements already exist in other industries and seek to assist service providers in identifying and addressing potential risks posed by providing services to certain customers.  Such risks include fraud, theft, facilitation of terrorism, and other activities contrary to U.S. national security interests.

The NPRM also authorizes the imposition of certain special measures that can restrict malicious cyber-enabled actors’ access to U.S. IaaS. In this NPRM, the Department seeks feedback on a number of issues, including: minimum verification standards, access, and record-keeping requirements that providers must adopt; the procedures by which the Secretary of Commerce decides when and how to impose a special measure; and the definitions of several key IaaS and AI-related terms as they apply to the regulations.   This NPRM incorporates many of the public comments received in response to a September 24, 2021, Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM). That ANPRM sought feedback on how the Department should implement various provisions of EO 13984, “Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber Enabled Activities.” Based on these comments, the Department has drafted the proposed rule to clarify requirements for the public in ways that are consistent with industry and public understanding of IaaS-related products and services.   The deadline for public comments is April 29, 2024.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3443-2024-01-29-bis-press-release-infrastructure-as-as-service-know-your-customer-nprm-final/file and https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/01/29/2024-01580/taking-additional-steps-to-address-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-significant-malicious

******

U.S. Census Bureau

The U.S. Census Bureau Updated AES Tables Regarding Schedule B, Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), and HTS Codes That Are Not Valid

January 2, 2024: The Schedule B, Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), and HTS Codes That Are Not Valid for AES tables have been updated to accept the changes to the January 1, 2024 codes.

AES will accept shipments with outdated codes during a grace period for 30 days beyond the expiration date of December 31, 2023Reporting an outdated code after the 30-day grace period will result in a fatal error.

The ACE program has been updated with the 2024 codes and will accept shipments with outdated codes during the grace period as well.

The 2024 Schedule B and HTS tables are available for downloading at:

http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aes/documentlibrary/#concordance

The current list of HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available at:

https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aes/documentlibrary/concordance/hts-not-for-aes.txt

Editors tip: Now is the time for exporters to reverify their HTS and Schedule B # classifications to ensure codes used exist in the 2024 tables.

*******

AES Response Messages Updates

January 17, 2024:  When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected.  If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation.  Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN.  However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.

To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

 

Response Code: 341

Narrative:     Ultimate Consignee Must Be Reported Within 4 Days

Severity:       Warning

Reason:        The Party Type is C for Ultimate Consignee and the ‘To Be Sold en Route’ indicator is reported as Yes.

Resolution:  Incomplete Ultimate Consignee information may be declared on an EEI when a ‘To Be Sold en Route’ declaration has been made.  However, the actual Ultimate Consignee must be declared within 4 days of the Estimated Departure Date.

Verify the ‘To Be Sold en Route’ indicator, correct the shipment and resubmit.

 

Response Code:  8VW

Narrative:     Value/Shipping Weight Out of Range

Severity:       Verify

Reason:        For the reported Schedule B/HTS Number, the Value of Goods/Shipping Weight ratio is outside of the expected range.

Resolution:  For a particular Schedule B/HTS Number reported, the value of goods divided by the shipping weight should fall within a certain parameter based on historical statistical averages for that commodity.  Ratios outside this pre-determined parameter might indicate either a keying error or misclassification of the product. Verify the Value of Goods, Shipping Weight and Schedule B/HTS Number, correct the shipment and resubmit (if necessary).  If the line item is verified correct as reported, no action is necessary.

*******

Department of the Treasury

Treasury Increases The Civil Penalty Amount For Inflation

January 11, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 2139: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended its regulations to implement for 2024 the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as amended by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015.  This regulatory amendment adjusts for inflation the maximum amount of the civil monetary penalties that may be assessed under relevant OFAC regulations.  This regulatory amendment took effect on Friday, January 12, 2024.

Maximum CMP Amounts For Relevant Statutes

TWEA $105,083 to $108,489;

IEEPA $356,579 to $368,136;

AEDPA $94,127 to $97,178;

FNKDA $1,771,754 to $1,829,177; and

CDTA $16,108 to $16,630.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240111 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932506/download?inline

In The News

Nvidia Semiconductors Acquired By Chinese Entities Despite US Ban

January 15, 2024: Chinese government and military-linked institutions – including AI research institutes and universities – have reportedly succeeded in acquiring Nvidia semiconductors over the past year, skillfully evading stringent export bans by the US. As detailed in comprehensive tender documents reviewed by Reuters, this revelation underscores the complexities surrounding the U.S.-China technological landscape and raises questions about the efficacy of export controls.

The acquisitions, involving small quantities of Nvidia semiconductors, were not facilitated by Nvidia itself or its approved retailers, but rather by lesser-known Chinese suppliers. Notably, the procured Nvidia chips include the A100, H100, A800, and H800 models, all of which were subject to U.S. export bans implemented in the last two years. The U.S. export bans targeted specific Nvidia chips with potential military applications, aiming to curtail China’s access to advanced technologies. Despite these targeted measures, the tender documents reviewed by Reuters indicate a successful circumvention of these restrictions, bringing to light the challenges faced by the United States in imposing comprehensive controls on semiconductor exports.

The list of purchasers includes not only elite universities but also entities subject to U.S. export restrictions, such as the Harbin Institute of Technology and the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China. The procurement of Nvidia chips by these entities, accused of involvement in military matters, showcases the multifaceted nature of this technological landscape. It is noteworthy that none of the entities mentioned in the Reuters review responded to requests for comment. The acquisition of Nvidia chips, renowned for their prowess in AI applications, enhances China’s potential breakthroughs in AI. This, in turn, could contribute to the development of sophisticated computing systems with military applications. The use of these semiconductors may bolster China’s AI capabilities, posing challenges to U.S. technological dominance in this critical field.

https://thetechportal-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/thetechportal.com/2024/01/15/nvidia-semiconductors-acquired-by-chinese-entities-despite-us-ban-report/?amp

LATEST FINES, PENALTIES AND SANCTIONS

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

Fines and Penalties

January 2, 2024: The New Hampshire charity NuDay, a/k/a NuDay Syria, was sentenced in federal court for export offenses.  NuDay was sentenced to five years of probation, the maximum penalty for an organizational defendant.  NuDay was also ordered to pay a $25,000 fine.  On September 8, 2023, NuDay pleaded guilty to three counts of Failure to File Export Information. NuDay was founded by Nadia Alawa as a non-profit charity in 2013 and is headquartered in Windham, New Hampshire.  Alawa served as NuDay’s President, and several family members served as board members and employees.

 

Between 2018 and 2021, NuDay made over 100 shipments to Syria, a country that was subject to sanctions and export restrictions.  NuDay claimed that these shipments were worth over $100 million.  NuDay had the items shipped to Mersin, Turkey, where another company would transship them into Syria.  U.S. Department of Commerce regulations require exporters, such as NuDay, to report true and accurate information about the items being exported, including the shipment’s description, end user, and monetary value.  However, NuDay falsely reported that the end destination of the shipments was Turkey and not Syria, and artificially deflated the value of the goods to be below the $2,500 reporting threshold.  Alawa’s Facebook messages indicated that she and NuDay were aware of export restrictions, including the need to obtain export licenses, but ignored them.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-nh/pr/nuday-charity-sentenced-illegal-exports-syria

*******

January 3, 2024: Three siblings admitted to buying, transporting and concealing ammunition intended to be smuggled into Mexico. Rolando Herrera, 26, plead guilty to these charges and to another charge of conspiracy to smuggle ammunition with intent to promote a felony. His sisters, Ashley Herrera, 22, and Yamileth Herrera, 21, entered their guilty pleas on Dec. 12, 2023. All are U.S. citizens and maintain residences in Laredo and in Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, Mexico.

Between May 16, 2023, through May 24, 2023, the siblings placed orders at a local sporting goods store for 7,000 rounds of 5.56-millimeter ammunition. Ashley placed the first order of 3,000 rounds which she and Rolando picked up at the store. Ashley later placed a second order in another person’s name for 3,000 rounds who picked up that ammunition and delivered it to the Herreras’ parents’ home. Yamileth later ordered and picked up 1,000 rounds of ammunition.

Rolando admitted he intended to smuggle the ammunition to persons in Mexico, provided the funds for all purchases and requested his sisters order the ammunition for him.

Ashley transported cartons of 6,000 rounds of ammunition to her parents’ home where she and Yamileth moved them into a bedroom where it remained concealed until Rolando would pick it up to smuggle to Mexico.

Law enforcement intercepted Yamileth Herrera who was in possession of 1,000 rounds she had just purchased.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdtx/pr/siblings-convicted-purchasing-7000-rounds-ammunition-transport-across-border

*******

January 8, 2024: A U.S. Navy service member, Petty Officer Wenheng Zhao, 26, aka Thomas Zhao (Zhao) was sentenced to 27 months in prison and ordered to pay a $5,500 fine for transmitting sensitive U.S. military information to an intelligence officer from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in exchange for bribery payments.

According to court documents, Zhao pleaded guilty in October 2023 to one count of conspiring with the intelligence officer and one count of receiving a bribe.

Zhao, who worked at Naval Base Ventura County in Port Hueneme and held a U.S. security clearance, engaged in a corrupt scheme to collect and transmit sensitive U.S. military information to the intelligence officer in violation of his official duties.

Between August 2021 and at least May 2023, Zhao received at least $14,866 in at least 14 separate bribe payments from the intelligence officer. In exchange for the illicit payments, Zhao secretly collected and transmitted to the intelligence officer sensitive, non-public information regarding U.S. Navy operational security, military trainings and exercises, and critical infrastructure. Zhao entered restricted military and naval installations to collect and record this information.

Zhao transmitted plans for a large-scale maritime training exercise in the Pacific theatre, operational orders and electrical diagrams and blueprints for a Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar system located in Okinawa, Japan.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-navy-sailor-sentenced-27-months-prison-transmitting-sensitive-us-military-information

*******

January 18, 2024: Ilya Kahn, 66, a citizen of the United States, Israel and Russia, and resident of Brooklyn, New York, and Los Angeles, California, was arrested on January 17, 2024, in Los Angeles for his alleged involvement in a years-long scheme to secure and unlawfully export sensitive technology from the United States for the benefit of a Russian business. The business was sanctioned by the U.S. government following Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and whose clients included elements of the Russian military and the Federal Security Service (FSB), the main successor agency to the Soviet Union’s KGB.

According to court documents, Kahn is charged by criminal complaint with conspiracy to violate the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA). Kahn will make his initial appearance in the Central District of California.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/businessman-arrested-scheme-illegally-export-semiconductors-and-other-controlled-technology

*******

January 18, 2024: Jalal Hajavi (Hajavi) was sentenced to 24 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release for criminal conduct in connection with a scheme to unlawfully export heavy equipment from the United States to Iran by routing the shipments though the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Hajavi was convicted by a jury in September 2023, of conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), smuggling, and unlawfully exporting and reexporting goods from the United States to Iran without a license.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/exporter-sentenced-prison-shipping-heavy-equipment-iran-violation-us-sanctions

*******

January 25, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 4901: The Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”), U.S. Department of Commerce, through its Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”), renewed the temporary denial order (“TDO”) issued against Venezuela-based cargo airline Empresa de Transporte Aéreocargo del Sur, S.A., a/k/a Aerocargo del Sur Transportation Company, a/k/a EMTRASUR (“EMTRASUR”) on July 25, 2023 for a period of 180 days on the ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/01/25/2024-01411/order-renewing-temporary-denial-of-export-privileges

*******

January 30, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed a civil penalty of $153,175 against Wabtec Corporation (Wabtec), a global manufacturer and supplier of rail technology headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to resolve 43 violations of the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (antiboycott regulations) alleged in BIS’s Proposed Charging Letter. Wabtec voluntarily disclosed the conduct to BIS, cooperated with the investigation by BIS’s Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC), and took remedial measures after discovering the conduct at issue, which resulted in a significant reduction in the penalty.

As part of the BIS settlement, Wabtec admitted to the conduct set forth in a Proposed Charging Letter, which alleged 43 violations of Section 760.5 of the EAR (Failing to Report the Receipt of a Request to Engage in a Restrictive Trade Practice or Foreign Boycott Against a Country Friendly to the United States). Specifically, between February 2018 and July 2022, on forty-three occasions, Wabtec received a request from a customer in Pakistan to refrain from importing Israeli-origin goods into Pakistan in fulfillment of its orders. Wabtec failed to report to BIS the receipt of these requests, as required by Section 760.5 of the EAR, thereby giving rise to the 43 alleged violations.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3444-antiboycott-1-30-2024/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/antiboycott/alleged-antiboycott-violations-2024/1591-a773/file

*******

January 31, 2024: Four Chinese nationals were charged in an indictment in the District of Columbia with various federal crimes related to a years-long conspiracy to unlawfully export and smuggle U.S.-origin electronic components from the United States to Iran.

According to court documents, Baoxia Liu, aka Emily Liu; Yiu Wa Yung, aka Stephen Yung; Yongxin Li, aka Emma Lee; and Yanlai Zhong, aka Sydney Chung, unlawfully exported and smuggled U.S. export controlled items through China and Hong Kong ultimately for the benefit of entities affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), which supervises Iran’s development and production of missiles, weapons, and military aerial equipment to include Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).

According to the indictment, beginning as early as May 2007 and continuing until at least July 2020, the defendants utilized an array of front companies in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to funnel dual-use U.S.-origin items, including electronics and components that could be utilized in the production of UAVs, ballistic missile systems, and other military end uses, to sanctioned Iranian entities with ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) such as Shiraz Electronics Industries (SEI), Rayan Roshd Afzar, and their affiliates.

The defendants are charged with conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), violating IEEPA, smuggling goods from the United States, and one count of submitting false or misleading export information. If convicted, the defendants face a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for violating the IEEPA; up to 10 years in prison for smuggling goods from the United States; and up to five years in prison for each count of conspiracy and submitting false or misleading export information. Arrest warrants have been issued for Liu, Yung, Li and Zhong who all remain fugitives.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-nationals-charged-illegally-exporting-us-origin-electronic-components-iran-and

Sanctions

U.S. Department of State

January 17, 2024: The Department of State announced the designation of Ansarallah, commonly referred to as the Houthis, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group, effective 30 days from January 17, 2024.

Since November, the Houthis have launched unprecedented attacks against international maritime vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, as well as military forces positioned in the area to defend the safety and security of commercial shipping.  These attacks against international shipping have endangered mariners, disrupted the free flow of commerce, and interfered with navigational rights and freedoms.  This designation seeks to promote accountability for the group’s terrorist activities.  If the Houthis cease their attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the United States will reevaluate this designation.

The Houthis must be held accountable for their actions, but it should not be at the expense of Yemeni civilians.  As the Department of State moves forward with this designation, it is are taking significant steps to mitigate any adverse impacts this designation may have on the people of Yemen.  During the 30-day implementation delay, the U.S. government will conduct robust outreach to stakeholders, aid providers, and partners who are crucial to facilitating humanitarian assistance and the commercial import of critical commodities in Yemen.  The Department of the Treasury is also publishing licenses authorizing certain transactions related to the provision of food, medicine, and fuel, as well as personal remittances, telecommunications and mail, and port and airport operations on which the Yemeni people rely.

https://www.state.gov/terrorist-designation-of-the-houthis/

*******

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

January 25, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 4804: In response to the Russian Federation’s (Russia’s) ongoing aggression against Ukraine and Belarus’s complicity in the invasion, the Department of Commerce is strengthening its existing sanctions under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) against Russia and Belarus, including by expanding the scope of the EAR’s Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions and making certain changes to the licensing requirements that apply to the occupied Crimea region of Ukraine as well. Additionally, this rule revises recent restrictions targeting Iran’s supply of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to Russia. This rule also refines certain existing export controls on Russia and Belarus. The Department of Commerce is taking these actions to enhance the effectiveness of its controls on these countries and to better align them with those implemented by U.S. allies and partners.

This rule revises the EAR to enhance and strengthen the existing sanctions against Russia and Belarus by expanding the scope of the Russian and Belarusian industry sector sanctions to better align them with the controls that have been implemented by U.S. allies and partners imposing substantially similar controls on Russia and Belarus, including a control added on Iran pursuant to the Iran UAV rule, that targeted Iran’s supply of UAVs to Russia (88 FR 12150, February 27, 2023) (Iran UAVs rule). For similar policy reasons, this rule also refines other controls on Russia and Belarus that were imposed in response to Russia’s February 2022 further invasion of Ukraine.

This rule enhances and strengthens the sanctions that have been implemented on Russia, Belarus, the occupied Crimea region of Ukraine, and Iran under the EAR, as described under sections A and B below. The regulatory revisions described under Section A. Imposition of new export controls on Russia, Belarus, and Iran, including changes to align controls with those imposed by U.S. allies and partners include:

  • Expansion of Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions that apply to items listed in supplement no. 4 to part 746 to add additional items to align with controls imposed by U.S. partners and allies and to make other changes to render the EAR’s controls stronger, more effective, and easier to understand; Expansion of items that require a license under §746.7 when destined to Iran and under §746.8 when destined to Russia or Belarus under supplement no. 7 to part 746 to add an additional item to align with controls imposed by U.S. partners and allies and to make other changes to render the EAR’s controls stronger, more effective, and easier to understand; and
  • Eliminating the lowest-level military and spacecraft-related items (i.e., .y items) from being eligible for de minimis treatment when incorporated into foreign-made items for export from abroad or reexport to Russia or Belarus. A. Imposition of New Export Controls on Russia, Belarus, and Iran, Including Changes To Align Controls With Those Imposed by U.S. Allies and Partners.

This rule expands the scope of the Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions (§746.5 of the EAR) by adding additional items to supplement no. 4 to part 746 that will require a license under §746.5(a)(1)(ii), as described further below. This rule also adds an additional item to supplement no. 7 to part 746 that will require a license under §746.7 when destined to Iran and under §746.8 when destined to Russia or Belarus.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulations-docs/federal-register-notices/federal-register-2024/3442-89-fr-4804-russian-and-belarus-sanctions-rule-effective-1-23-24-and-published-1-25-24/file and https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/regulations/federal-register-notices#89FR4804

*******

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

January 11, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) updated its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List:

The following individual have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Mikheychik, Vladimir Vladimirovich of Russia.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Ashuluk Firing Range of Russia; and
  • Vladimirovka Advanced Weapons And Research Complex of Russia.

The following aircraft have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • RF-78757; Aircraft Manufacture Date 27 Apr 1988; Aircraft Mode S Transponder Code 1533A5; Aircraft Model IL-76MD; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 83484547; Aircraft Tail Number RF-78757;
  • RF-82011; Aircraft Manufacture Date 31 Dec 1986; Aircraft Mode S Transponder Code 15405B; Aircraft Model AN-124; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 9773054616023; Aircraft Tail Number RF-82011; and
  • RF-86898; Aircraft Manufacture Date 28 Jan 1982; Aircraft Mode S Transponder Code 155372; Aircraft Model IL-76; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 23435028; Aircraft Tail Number RF-86898.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240111

*******

January 12, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two companies in Hong Kong (PRC) and the United Arab Emirates for shipping Iranian commodities on behalf of the network of Iran-based, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)-backed Houthi financial facilitator Sa’id al-Jamal. OFAC is also identified four vessels as blocked property in which these companies have an interest. The revenue from the commodity sales supports the Houthis and their continued attacks against international shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

These action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority in Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. Sa’id al-Jamal was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, on June 10, 2021 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF. The IRGC-QF was designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007 for providing support to multiple terrorist groups.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Cielo Marine LTD of China; and
  • Global Tech Marine Services Inc of the Marshall Islands and the United Arab Emirates.

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Fortune Galaxy (3E2520) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9257010; MMSI 352001505;
  • Mehle (3E3893) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9191711; MMSI 352002537;
  • Molecule (TJMC241) Crude Oil Tanker Cameroon flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9209300; MMSI 613003214; and
  • Sincere 02 (3E4733) Oil Products Tanker Kiribati flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9226011; MMSI 352002984.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2022 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240112

*******

January 16, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Venezuela-related General License 5N “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 2020 8.5 Percent Bond on or After April 16, 2024.”

Venezuela-related General License 5N: On or after April 16, 2024, all transactions related to, the provision of financing for, and other dealings in the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 2020 8.5 Percent Bond that would be prohibited by subsection l(a)(iii) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13835 of May 21, 2018, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019, and incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized.

This general license does not authorize any transactions or activities otherwise prohibited by the VSR, or any other part of 31 CFR chapter V.

Effective January 16, 2024, General License No. 5M, dated October 18, 2023, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License No. 5N.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932511/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240116

*******

January 17, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing a new Counter Terrorism-related Frequently Asked Question (1158).

Frequently Asked Question (1158): On January 17, 2024, the Department of State (State) announced the designation of Ansarallah under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, effective February 16, 2024.  What will be the impact of this action?  What steps are the U.S. government taking to ensure that commercial goods and humanitarian assistance continues to flow to the Yemeni people?

Answer: Following the designation of Ansarallah (commonly referred to as “the Houthis”) under E.O. 13224, as amended, on February 16, 2024, OFAC will add the group to the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List) as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.  As a result of the designation, transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States involving Ansarallah will be blocked, unless they are otherwise authorized.  Note that Yemen is not subject to jurisdiction-based sanctions, nor will it become subject to jurisdiction-based sanctions on February 16, 2024.

In order to ensure that the humanitarian aid community and commercial actors can continue providing humanitarian aid and commercial goods in Yemen, on January 17, 2024, OFAC issued five general licenses (GLs) to authorize certain categories of transactions, including:  (1) agriculture, medicine, and medical devices; (2) telecommunications mail, and certain internet communications; (3) personal remittances; (4) refined petroleum products (including fuel); and (5) operation and use of ports and airports for import of goods.  These GLs will take effect on February 16, 2024, the same date on which the designation will take effect.

The above GLs supplement broad preexisting humanitarian GLs in the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR) covering the United States government, certain international organizations and entities, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and for the provision of food, other agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices.  For more information on these baseline humanitarian general licenses, please consult OFAC’s Supplemental Guidance for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance, and FAQs 1105, 1106, 1107, and 1108.  Other humanitarian-related guidance documents are available in the NGO section of OFAC’s Information for Industry Groups webpage.  OFAC also intends to issue further public guidance specifically related to the Ansarallah designation on or before February 16, 2024.

Non-U.S. persons may engage in or facilitate transactions for which a U.S. person would not require a specific license pursuant to the GTSR without exposure to sanctions under the GTSR or E.O. 13224, as amended.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240117_33 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1106

*******

January 17, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Alberto Pimentel Mata (Pimentel) for his role in exploiting the Guatemalan mining sector through widespread bribery schemes, including schemes related to government contracts and mining licenses. Pimentel is being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world. This action follows the Department of State’s October 2023 announcement of visa restriction on Pimentel and other individuals for their involvement in significant corruption.

Corrupt and anti-democratic acts undermine Guatemala’s public institutions and threaten the stability of Guatemala and the region as a whole. This action demonstrates the U.S. government’s continued commitment to promote accountability for corrupt and undemocratic actors in Guatemala and expands upon the Administration’s efforts to address corruption as a root cause of irregular migration through the northern Central America region.

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Pimentel Mata, Alberto of Guatemala.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2024 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240117

*******

January 17, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued issuing Counter Terrorism General License 22, “Transactions Related to the Provision of Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, Medical Devices, Replacement Parts and Components, or Software Updates Involving Ansarallah,” General License 23, “Authorizing Transactions Related to Telecommunications Mail, and Certain Internet-Based Communications Involving Ansarallah,” General License 24, “Authorizing Noncommercial, Personal Remittances Involving Ansarallah,” General License 25, “Authorizing Transactions Related to Refined Petroleum Products in Yemen Involving Ansarallah,” and General License 26, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Necessary to Port and Airport Operations Involving Ansarallah.”

General License 22: All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the provision (including sale) of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components for medical devices, or software updates for medical devices to Yemen, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for provision to Yemen, are authorized.

For the purposes of this general license, agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices are defined as follows:

(1) Agricultural commodities.  Agricultural commodities are products that:

(i) Fall within the term “agricultural commodity” as defined in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602); and

(ii) Are intended for ultimate use in Yemen as:

(A) Food for humans (including raw, processed, and packaged foods; live animals; vitamins and minerals; food additives or supplements; and bottled drinking water) or animals (including animal feeds);

(B) Seeds for food crops;

(C) Fertilizers or organic fertilizers; or

(D) Reproductive materials (such as live animals, fertilized eggs, embryos, and semen) for the production of food animals.

(2) Medicine.  Medicine is an item that falls within the definition of the term “drug” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

(3) Medical devices.  A medical device is an item that falls within the definition of “device” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

This General License takes effect February 16, 2024.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932516/download?inline

General License 23: All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, with respect to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications to, from, or in Yemen are authorized.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932521/download?inline

General License 24: All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the transfer of noncommercial, personal remittances to or from an individual in Yemen, are authorized, provided the individual is not a person whose property or interests in property are blocked pursuant to the GTSR.

Noncommercial, personal remittances do not include charitable donations of funds to or for the benefit of an entity or funds transfers for use in supporting or operating a business, including a family-owned business.

Transferring institutions may rely on the originator of a funds transfer with regard to compliance, provided that the transferring institution does not know or have reason to know that the funds transfer is not in compliance.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932526/download?inline

General License 25: All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the provision (including sale) of refined petroleum products for personal, commercial, or humanitarian use in Yemen are authorized.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932531/download?inline

General License 26: All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the operation of, or import or export of goods or transit of passengers through, ports and airports in Yemen are authorized.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932536/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240117

*******

January 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is taking its first oil price cap enforcement action of 2024, targeting a shipping company linked to a price cap violation.

The United States is part of an international coalition of countries (the Price Cap Coalition), including the G7, the European Union, and Australia, that have committed to prohibit the import of crude oil and petroleum products of Russian Federation origin. These countries, home to many best-in-class financial and professional services, have also committed to restrict a broad range of services related to the maritime transport of crude oil and petroleum products of Russian Federation origin (“Russian oil”)—unless that Russian oil is bought and sold at or below the specific price caps established by the Coalition or is authorized by a license. This policy is known as the “price cap.” The price cap is intended to maintain a reliable supply of crude oil and petroleum products to the global market while reducing the revenues the Russian Federation earns from oil after its own war of choice against Ukraine inflated global energy prices.

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Hennesea Holdings Limited of the United Arab Emirates.

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Aristo (5LJI7) Chemical/Products Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9327413; MMSI 636022549;
  • Hai II (D5HH9) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9259599; MMSI 636016693;
  • HS Arge (5LIK5) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9299745; MMSI 636022360;
  • HS Buraq (5LIK9) Products Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9381732; MMSI 636022364;
  • HS Esberg (5LIN6) Products Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9410894; MMSI 636022386;
  • HS Everett (5LIP7) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9410870; MMSI 636022403;
  • HS Glory (D5OH4) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9249087; MMSI 636018127;
  • HS Legend (5LIK7) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9381744; MMSI 636022362;
  • HS Star (D5RV6) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9274446; MMSI 636018885;
  • LA Pride (5LHW6) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9274616; MMSI 636022251;
  • Mona (5LIS6) Chemical/Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9314818; MMSI 636022424;
  • Nellis (5LJI8) Chemical/Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9322267; MMSI 636022550;
  • Osperous (5LHE4) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9412995; MMSI 636022098;
  • Peria (5LIZ6) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9322827; MMSI 636022479;
  • Sara II (5LJI4) Chemical/Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9301615; MMSI 636022546;
  • Sensus (5LHJ7) Products Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9296585; MMSI 636022146; and
  • UZE (5LHB3) Chemical/Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9323338; MMSI 636022072.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2028 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240118

*******

January 18, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 13H, “Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024,” and Russia-related General License 86, “Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions Involving Certain Persons or Vessels Blocked on January 18, 2024.” OFAC is also amending Frequently Asked Question 1157.

Russia-related General License 13H: U.S. persons, or entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person, are authorized to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, certifications, or tax refunds to the extent such transactions are prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to the day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation of such U.S. persons or entities, through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 17, 2024.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932541/download?inline

Russia-related General License 86: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one of the following activities involving the blocked persons described below are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 17, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (RuHSR):

(1) The safe docking and anchoring in port of any vessels in which any person or entity listed in this general license has a property interest (“blocked vessels”);

(2) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; or

(3) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.

The authorization of this general license applies to Hennesea Holdings Limited (Hennesea) and any entity in which Hennesea owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932546/download?inline

Frequently Asked Question 1157: For the purposes of the determination of December 22, 2023 pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14068, as amended by E.O. 14114 of December 22, 2023, (Seafood Determination) what is meant by the terms “salmon,” “cod,” “pollock,” and “crab”? 

Answer: For the purposes of the Seafood Determination, OFAC anticipates publishing regulations defining these terms to include articles defined at the following Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS) subheadings:

  • “Salmon:” articles defined at HTSUS subheadings 0302.13.0013, 0302.13.0014, 0302.13.0022, 0302.13.0032, 0302.13.0042, 0302.13.0053, 0302.13.0054, 0302.13.0062, 0302.14.0003, 0302.14.0004, 0302.14.0062, 0303.11.0000, 0303.12.0012, 0303.12.0022, 0303.12.0032, 0303.12.0052, 0303.12.0062, 0303.13.0000, 0303.91.4040, 0304.41.00, 0304.41.0010, 0304.41.0020, 0304.41.0090, 0304.52.00, 0304.52.0010, 0304.52.0015, 0304.52.0020, 0304.52.0090, 0304.81.1000, 0304.81.5010, 0304.81.5090, 0305.20.4020, 0305.41.0000, 0305.69.4000, 1604.11.2020, 1604.11.2030, 1604.11.2090, 1604.11.4010, 1604.11.4020, 1604.11.4030, 1604.11.4040, 1604.11.4050, including any subsequent revisions to the list of HTSUS classifications.
  • “Cod:” articles defined at HTSUS subheadings 0302.51.0010, 0302.51.0090, 0303.63.0010, 0303.63.0090, 0304.44.0010, 0304.44.0015, 0304.53.0010, 0304.53.0015, 0304.71.1000, 0304.71.5000, 0304.95.1010, 0304.95.1015, 0304.95.1020, 0305.32.0010, 0305.32.0090, 0305.51.0000, 0305.62.0010, 0305.62.0025, 0305.62.0030, 0305.62.0045, 0305.62.0050, 0305.62.0060, 0305.62.0070, 0305.62.0080, including any subsequent revisions to the list of HTSUS classifications.
  • “Pollock:” articles defined at HTSUS subheadings 0302.55.1100, 0302.55.5000, 0302.59.5010, 0303.67.0000, 0304.44.0025, 0304.53.0025, 0304.75.1000, 0304.75.5000, 0304.79.1010, 0304.94.1005, 0304.94.1010, 0304.94.1090, 0304.94.9000, 0304.95.1030, 0305.69.1022, 0305.69.1042, 1604.19.1000, 1604.19.2500, including any subsequent revisions to the list of HTSUS classifications.
  • “Crab:” articles defined at HTSUS subheadings 0306.14.2000, 0306.14.40, 0306.14.4003, 0306.14.4006, 0306.14.4009, 0306.14.4012, 0306.14.4015, 0306.14.4020, 0306.14.4030, 0306.14.4090, 0306.33.2000, 0306.33.4000, 0306.93.2000, 0306.93.4000, 1605.10.0510, 1605.10.0590, 1605.10.2010, 1605.10.2022, 1605.10.2025, 1605.10.2030, 1605.10.2051, 1605.10.2059, 1605.10.2090, 1605.10.4002, 1605.10.4005, 1605.10.4010, 1605.10.4015, 1605.10.4025, 1605.10.4030, 1605.10.4035, 1605.10.4040, 1605.10.6010, 1605.10.6090, including any subsequent revisions to the list of HTSUS classifications.

Additionally, these terms apply to products of salmon, cod, pollack and crab classified under the HTSUS subheadings 0301.99.0390, 0302.59.1100, 0304.95.1005, 0304.95.1090, 0304.99.1104, 0304.99.1109, 0304.99.1183, 0305.20.4065, 0305.39.6180, 0305.49.4020, 0305.49.4045, 0305.59.0001, 0305.72.0000, 0305.79.0000, 1603.00.9090, 1604.19.2200, 1604.19.3200, 1604.19.4100, 1604.19.5100, 1604.19.6100, 1604.19.8200, 1604.20.0510, 1604.20.0590, 1604.20.1000, 1604.20.1500, 1604.20.2000, 1604.20.2500, 1604.20.3000, 1604.20.4000, 1604.20.5010, 1604.20.5090, 1604.20.6010, 1604.20.6090, including any subsequent revisions to the list of HTSUS classifications.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1157 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240118

*******

January 19, 2024: OFAC released the first video in its “OFAC Basics” video series.  The OFAC Basics: Sanctions List Search video provides viewers with a brief tutorial on how to use OFAC’s Sanctions List Search Tool and recommended steps for assessing a potential match to one of OFAC’s published sanctions lists.  The “OFAC Basics” series serves as a companion series to the “Introduction to OFAC” series.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aQAb7Cf6keI and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A1QAv7eNgVo

*******

January 22, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Counter Terrorism General License 27, “Authorizing Civil Aviation Safety and Wind Down Transactions Involving Fly Baghdad.”  OFAC is also issuing one new Counter Terrorism Frequently Asked Question (1159).

Counter Terrorism General License 27: All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the provision, exportation, or reexportation of goods, technology, or services to ensure the safety of civil aviation involving Fly Baghdad are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 22, 2024, provided that the goods, technology, or services that are provided, exported, or reexported are for use on aircraft operated solely for civil aviation purposes.

All transactions prohibited by the GTSR that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving Fly Baghdad are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 22, 2024, provided that any payment to Fly Baghdad must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the GTSR.

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the GTSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the GTSR other than Fly Baghdad, unless separately authorized.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932556/download?inline

Counter Terrorism Frequently Asked Question 1159: What transactions does Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR) General License (GL) 27 authorize?

Answer: Wind down transactions:  GL 27 authorizes all transactions prohibited by the GTSR that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving Fly Baghdad through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 22, 2024, provided that any payment to Fly Baghdad must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the GTSR.  This includes transactions necessary to wind down leases, refueling contracts, and other commercial agreements with Fly Baghdad or to repossess aircraft leased to Fly Baghdad.

U.S. persons are not required to seek a license from OFAC to initiate legal proceedings against Fly Baghdad, including lawsuits for the repossession of aircraft from Fly Baghdad, although a specific license is required to enter into a settlement or enforce an order transferring property blocked pursuant to the GTSR.

Civil aviation safety transactions:  GL 27 authorizes all transactions prohibited by the GTSR that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the provision, exportation, or re-exportation of goods, technology, or services to ensure the safety of civil aviation involving Fly Baghdad through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 22, 2024, provided that the goods, technology, or services are for use on aircraft operated solely for civil aviation purposes.  This includes transactions necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft crew and passengers and the safe operation of aircraft owned or operated by Fly Baghdad and used solely for civil aviation purposes, including maintenance, insurance, and ground services ordinarily incident and necessary to such activities.

U.S. and non-U.S. persons may need to obtain a license from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) for the export or reexport or certain items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) involving Fly Baghdad or other Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1159

*******

January 22, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Iraqi airline Fly Baghdad and its CEO for providing assistance to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and its proxy groups in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. OFAC is also designating three leaders and supporters of one of the IRGC-QF’s main Iran-aligned militias in Iraq, Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), as well as a business that moves and launders funds for KH. This action underscores the ongoing threat the IRGC-QF and its proxy network pose to U.S. personnel and the region. KH has carried out a series of sharply escalating drone and missile attacks against U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria since Hamas’s horrific attack on Israel on October 7. KH and other Iran-aligned militia groups in Iraq have consistently issued statements in support of Hamas’s terrorism and declared their commitment to attacking U.S. personnel.

This action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, which targets terrorists and their supporters. The Treasury Department designated the IRGC-QF as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 25, 2007 for providing support to multiple terrorist groups, and the Department of State designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act on April 8, 2019. State designated KH as an SDGT pursuant to E.O. 13224 and as a FTO pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act on July 2, 2009.

OFAC has updated its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List:

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Al-Azzawi, Riyadh Ali Hussein of Iraq;
  • Al-Hamidawi, Awqad Muhsin Faraj of Iraq;
  • Al-‘Ibudi, Hossein Moanes of Iraq;
  • Al-Shabbani, Basheer Abdulkadhim Alwan of Iraq;
  • Hirzallah, Muhammad Fallah Kamil of Palestine;
  • Hirzallah, Na’im Kamil Raghib of Palestine;
  • Hirzallah, Salah Kamil Raghib of Palestine;
  • Hirzallah, Samir ‘Abd Al-Mu’in ‘Abd of Palestine;
  • Hirzallah, Thair Abd Al Raziq Shukri of Israel;
  • Shamlakh, Ahmed of Palestine;
  • Shamlakh, Alaa of Turkey and Palestine;
  • Shamlakh, Imad Younes of Palestine; and
  • Shamlakh, Zuhair of Palestine.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Al-Markaziya Li-Siarafa of Palestine and Turkey;
  • Al-Massal Land Travel And Tourism Company of Iraq;
  • Arab China Trading Company of Turkey;
  • Fly Baghdad Airlines Company of Iraq;
  • Herzallah Exchange And General Trading Company LLC of Palestine; and
  • Samir Herzallah And Brothers For Money Exchange And Remittances of Palestine.

The following aircraft have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • YI-BAF; Aircraft Model B 737; Aircraft Operator Fly Baghdad; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 32412; Aircraft Tail Number YI-BAF; and
  • YI-BAN; Aircraft Model B 737; Aircraft Operator Fly Baghdad; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 35064; Aircraft Tail Number YI-BAN.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240122 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2037

*******

January 23, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in coordination with Australia and the United Kingdom, designated Alexander Ermakov (Ermakov), a cyber actor who played a pivotal in the 2022 ransomware attack against Medibank Private Limited, an Australian healthcare insurer.

Australia sanctioned Ermakov for utilizing ransomware to attack the Medibank network and for the exfiltration of sensitive data of 9.7 million users of Medibank services. The United States and the United Kingdom, in solidarity with Australia, are taking action against the same individual because of the similar risk presented by this actor to the United States and the UK.

This action demonstrates that the United States stands with our partners to disrupt ransomware actors who victimize the backbone of our economies and critical infrastructure. Ransomware attacks against healthcare firms, which are frequent targets of ransomware attacks in the United States, present risks to patient care, safety, and sensitive personally identifiable data. Russia continues to provide a safe haven to ransomware actors like Ermakov, enabling cyber actors to freely perpetrate ransomware attacks and other malicious cyber activities from Russia. In addition, Russia has also enabled ransomware attacks by cultivating and co-opting criminal hackers. Treasury has previously stressed that Russia must take concrete steps to prevent cyber criminals from freely operating in its jurisdiction.

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

Ermakov, Aleksandr of Russia.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2041 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240123

*******

January 25, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on key officials of the forces of Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis, for their support to acts of terrorism targeting commercial shipping. This action targets four individuals who have supported the Houthis’ recent attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, including holding civilian crews hostage. Concurrent with OFAC’s designations, the United Kingdom is also imposing sanctions on these key figures of Houthi forces.

On January 17, 2024, the U.S. Department of State announced the designation of Ansarallah as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), effective February 16, 2024. This OFAC designation of Houthi forces officials, taken in advance of the effective date of the designation of Ansarallah, serves to further promote accountability for the group’s recent terrorist attacks. Individuals targeted are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, which targets terrorist groups, their supporters, and those who aid acts of terrorism.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Al-Atifi, Mohamed of Yemen;
  • Al-Nabi, Muhammad Fadl Abd of Yemen;
  • Al-Qadiri, Muhammad Ali of Yemen; and
  • Al-Talibi, Muhammad Ahmad of Yemen.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2048 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240125

*******

January 29, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Venezuela-related General License 43A, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving CVG Compania General de Mineria de Venezuela CA.”

Venezuela-related General License 43A: All transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving CVG Compania General de Mineria de Venezuela CA (Minerven), or any entity in which Minerven owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13850, as amended by E.O. 13857, or E.O. 13884, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 13, 2024.

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the VSR, including any transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the VSR other than the blocked persons described in this general license, Government of Venezuela persons blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13884, Banco Central de Venezuela, or Banco de Venezuela SA Banco Universal.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240129_33 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932561/download?inline

*******

January 29, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets

Control (OFAC) and the United Kingdom took joint action against a network of individuals that targeted Iranian dissidents and opposition activists for assassination at the direction of the Iranian regime. The network is led by Iranian narcotics trafficker Naji Ibrahim Sharifi-Zindashti (Zindashti) and operates at the behest of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Zindashti’s network has carried out numerous acts of transnational repression including assassinations and kidnappings across multiple jurisdictions in an attempt to silence the Iranian regime’s perceived critics. The network has also plotted operations in the United States. This action was taken in conjunction with the unsealing of an indictment by the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The United Kingdom is also designating Mohammad Reza Ansari, who was previously designated by OFAC.

This action was taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13553, which authorizes sanctions on certain persons with respect to serious human rights abuses by the Government of Iran. The MOIS was designated pursuant to E.O. 13553 on February 16, 2012 for being responsible for or complicit in the commission of serious human rights abuses against the Iranian people since June 12, 2009. The MOIS was also concurrently designated pursuant to the counterterrorism authority, E.O. 13224, for its support to multiple terrorist groups, including Hizballah, Hamas, and Al-Qa’ida, and pursuant to E.O. 13572, an authority that targets those responsible for human rights abuses in Syria, for its support to the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate.

OFAC also used powerful tools to protect the Iraqi and international financial system from abuse by terrorist financiers, fraudsters, and money launderers. OFAC issued a finding and notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that identifies Al-Huda Bank, an Iraqi bank that serves as a conduit for terrorist financing, as a foreign financial institution of primary money laundering concern. Along with its finding, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) proposed a rule that would sever the bank from the U.S. financial system by prohibiting domestic financial institutions and agencies from opening or maintaining a correspondent account for or on behalf of Al-Huda Bank. In addition, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is imposing sanctions on the bank’s owner.

Al-Huda Bank and its foreign sponsors, including Iran and its proxy groups, divert funds that could otherwise support legitimate business and the economic aspirations of the Iraqi people. These bad actors fuel violence that threatens the stability of Iraq and the lives of U.S. and Iraqi citizens alike. Treasury remains committed to its longstanding shared work with the Government of Iraq to strengthen the Iraqi economy and protect both the U.S. and Iraqi financial systems from abuse.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Al-Moussawi, Hamad of Iraq;
  • Asan, Nihat Abdul Kadir of Iran and Turkey;
  • Esfanjani, Ali of Iran;
  • Hamidiravari, Reza of Iran;
  • KOCAK, Abdulvahap of Turkey;
  • Kocak, Ali of Turkey;
  • Naserzadeh, Muhammad Reza of Iran;
  • Oztunc, Ekrem Abdulkerym of Iran;
  • Pearson, Adam Richard of Canada;
  • Ryan, Damion Patrick John of Canada;
  • Sharifi-Zindashti, Naji Ibrahim of Iran; and
  • Tamarzadeh Zavieh Jakki, Shahram Ali Reza of Iran.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2052 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2053 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240129

*******

January 30, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two cybersecurity experts affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) for providing ISIS leadership and supporters with cybersecurity training, enabling their use of virtual currency, and supporting the terrorist group’s recruitment.  Additionally, OFAC designated an ISIS financial facilitator involved in transferring funds to ISIS-affiliated individuals in Syria.

These actions reinforce the United States’ commitment to the mission of the Counter ISIS Finance Group (CIFG), a working group of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS comprising over 80 countries and international organizations.  These designations also coincide with the 19th meeting of the CIFG to discuss the disruption of ISIS financing networks worldwide.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Al-Sayyid, Sarah Jamal Muhammad of Egypt;
  • Guzel, Faruk of Turkey; and
  • Salim, Mu’min al-Mawji Mahmud of Egypt.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2056 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240130

*******

January 31, 2024:  The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three entities and one individual located in Lebanon and Türkiye for providing critical financial support to an Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Hizballah financial network. These entities have generated hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of revenue from selling Iranian commodities, including to the Syrian government. These commodity sales provide a key source of funding for the IRGC-QF and Hizballah’s continued terrorist activities and support to other terrorist organizations throughout the region.

OFAC also sanctioned three entities for their role in undermining the peace, security, and stability of Sudan. These designations signal the continued commitment of the United States to identify and isolate funding sources for both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the two main belligerent parties responsible for the conflict in Sudan.

OFAC also designated two entities closely associated with Burma’s military regime, as well as four cronies, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14014. OFAC has coordinated this sanctions action to include individuals and entities that were previously designated by Canada’ on October 31, 2023.

Based on the above, OFAC has updated its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List:

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Al-‘Uwayr, Ibrahim Talal of Turkey and Syria;
  • Htet, Theint Win of Burma;
  • Kyaw, Win Paing of Burma;
  • Min, Tin Latt of Burma; and
  • Zaw, Thein Win of Burma.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Al-Fakher Advanced Works CO. LTD. of Sudan;
  • Alkhaleej Bank CO LTD of Sudan;
  • Hydro Company For Drilling Equipment Rental of Lebanon;
  • Mira Ihracat Ithalat Petrol Urunleri Sanayi Ticaret Limited Sirketi of Turkey;
  • Myanma Five Star Line Company Limited of Burma;
  • Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies of Burma;
  • Yara S.A.L. Offshore Company of Lebanon; and
  • Zadna International Co For Investment LTD of Sudan.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2065 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2066 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2067 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240131

*******

January 31, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issued Burma General License 6, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies.”

Burma General License 6: All transactions prohibited by the Burma Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (BuSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving Shwe Byain Phyu Group of Companies (SBPG) or any entity in which SBPG owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 1, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the BuSR.

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the BuSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the BuSR other than the blocked persons described in this general license, unless separately authorized.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240131 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932566/download?inline

JANUARY 2024 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES Read More »

DECEMBER 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through December 31, 2023.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

 

The President

 

President Biden Issued Executive Order On Taking Additional Steps With Respect to the Russian Federation’s Harmful Activities

 

December 22, 2023: Pursuant to the Constitution and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, President Biden, in view of the Russian Federation’s continued use of its military-industrial base to aid its effort to undermine security in countries and regions important to United States national security, including its reliance on the international financial system for the procurement of dual-use and other critical items from third countries, and in order to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14024 of April 15, 2021, expanded by Executive Order 14066 of March 8, 2022, and relied on for additional steps taken in Executive Order 14039 of August 20, 2021, Executive Order 14068 of March 11, 2022, and Executive Order 14071 of April 6, 2022 amended Executive Order 14024. A new Section 11 was added to Executive Order 14024, which imposes sanctions  on a foreign financial institution if it has:

(i)   conducted or facilitated any significant transaction or transactions for or on behalf of any person designated pursuant to section 1(a)(i) Executive Order 14024for operating or having operated in the technology, defense and related materiel, construction, aerospace, or manufacturing sectors of the Russian Federation economy, or other such sectors as may be determined to support Russia’s military-industrial base by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State; or
(ii)  conducted or facilitated any significant transaction or transactions, or provided any service, involving Russia’s military-industrial base, including the sale, supply, or transfer, directly or indirectly, to the Russian Federation of any item or class of items as may be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation.

 

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/12/22/executive-order-on-taking-additional-steps-with-respect-to-the-russian-federations-harmful-activities/

 

*******

 

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

DDTC Name and Address Changes Posted To Website

 

December 14 through 20, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

 

  • Change in Name from Teledyne FLIR Detection, Inc. to Teledyne FLIR Defense, Inc., due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name from Qualitair & Sea International to Qualitair & Sea Dimotrans Group due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Address for Fokker Technologies Holding B.V. and Fokker Aerostructures B.V. from Industrieweg 4, 3351 LB Papendrecht, the Netherlands to Anthony Fokkerweg 4, 3351 NL Papendrecht, the Netherlands;
  • Change in Address for Verify Europe Ltd. from 8 Clarendon Drive, Wymbush, Milton Keynes, Bucks, England MK8 8ED to 25 Shirwell Crescent, Furzton, Milton Keynes, Buckinghamshire, England, United Kingdom, MK4 1GA; and
  • Change in Name from Datron World Communications, Inc. to Cyberlux Corporation due to acquisition;
  • Change in Name from Elmtek Proprietary Limited to Aurizn Defence Proprietary Limited due to merger;
  • Change in Name from General Electric International Operations Company’s Israel operations to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name from Pinnacle Solutions, Inc. to Pinnacle Solutions, LLC due to acquisition by NANA Regional Corporation, Inc.

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To South Korea

 

December 1, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Republic of Korea of F-35 Munitions and related equipment for an estimated cost of $271 million. The Government of the Republic of Korea has requested to buy thirty-nine (39) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); two (2) AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM Guidance Sections; eighty-eight (88) KMU-556 Tail Kits for the GBU-31v1 Joint Direct-Attack Munition (JDAM); eighty-six (86) Mk-84 General Purpose (GP) 2000-lb bombs for the GBU-31v1 JDAM; seventy (70) KMU-557 Tail Kits for the GBU- 31v3 JDAM; seventy (70) BLU-109C/B 2000-lb bombs for the GBU-31v3 JDAM; seventy-eight (78) KMU- 572 Tail Kits for the GBU-54 Laser JDAM (LJDAM); two hundred sixty-nine (269) MAU-169 Computer Control Groups/Guidance Sections for the GBU-12 Paveway II; two hundred sixty-nine (269) MXU-650 Air Foil Groups for the GBU-12 Paveway II; three hundred forty-two (342) Mk-82 500-lb GP bombs for the GBU-12 Paveway II or GBU-54 LJDAM; twelve (12) Mk-82 inert bombs; thirty-five (35) GBU-39 Small Diameter Bomb-Increment 1 (SDB-I) All-Up-Rounds (AUR) with containers; and one hundred eighteen (118) GBU-53 Small Diameter Bomb-Increment 2 (SDB-II) AURs. Also included are AIM-120 control section spares and containers; DSU-38 Laser Illuminated Target Detectors; SDB-I Tactical Training Rounds and carriage systems; SDB-II Practical Explosive Ordnance Disposal Trainers (PEST) and Weapon Load Crew Trainer (WLCT) units; FMU-139 fuzes; Common Munitions Built-in-Test (BIT)/Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); ADU-891 adapter group computer test sets; Mk-84 practice bombs and other training bombs/components; munitions support and support equipment including propellant and explosive charges; classified software delivery and support; spare parts, consumables, and accessories, and repair and return support; major modifications, maintenance, and maintenance support; transportation and airlift support; classified/unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; contractor logistics support (CLS); studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/korea-f-35-munitions

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Australia

 

December 1, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Australia of AUKUS-related Training and Training Devices and related equipment for an estimated cost of up to $2.0 billion. The Government of Australia has requested to buy articles and services in support of the Trilateral AUKUS Pillar I program. Included are training devices, personnel training, planning, and Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) services; support equipment; special tools; training software and courseware; design; supply chain and industrial base support; facilities and construction support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; test and trials support; studies and surveys; other related elements of engineering and repair services for associated equipment and program support; and other related elements of logistic and program support. U.S. training of private Australian industry personnel will occur only after explicitly authorized by the U.S. Department of State in accordance with U.S. law.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-aukus-pillar-i-training-and-training-devices

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To The United Arab Emirates

 

December 4, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the United Arab Emirates of AN/TPQ-50 Radar and related equipment for an estimated cost of $85 million. The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested to buy eighteen (18) AN/TPQ-50 Radar Systems – man portable version. Also included are 107mm High Explosive (HE) rockets (for CONUS testing only); Computer Digital Military Laptop Radar Control Display units; 5kW Advanced Medium Mobile Power Source (AMMPS) Trailer-Mounted, Diesel Engine Driven Power Unit PU-2001; spares; mission equipment; communication and navigation equipment; support equipment; repair parts; special tools and test equipment; technical data and publications; site survey; U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/united-arab-emirates-antpq-50-radar

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To The Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia

 

December 4, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of RE-3A Tactical Airborne Surveillance System Aircraft Modernization and related equipment for an estimated cost of $582 million. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested to buy aircraft hardware and software modifications and support to replenish and modernize its RE-3A Tactical Airborne Surveillance System (TASS) aircraft, including: seven (7) Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) (EGI) security devices, Airborne, with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) or M-Code capability, and five (5) L3Harris BlackRock Communications Intelligence Sensor Suites. Also included are KY-100M narrowband/wideband secure communications terminals; KIV-77 MODE 4/5 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) cryptographic appliques; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; integrated electronic intelligence (ELINT)/signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems; L-3 Communication Systems-West (CSW) multiband receivers/transmitters; ARC-210 radios; high frequency (HF) radios; secure communications equipment; precision navigation and cryptographic devices; aircraft support and support equipment; test and integration support; equipment; spare and repair parts; consumables and accessories; repair and return support; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/saudi-arabia-re-3a-tactical-airborne-surveillance-system-aircraft

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Germany

 

December 7, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Germany of MK 54 Lightweight Torpedoes and related equipment for an estimated cost of $300 million. The Government of Germany has requested to buy up to eighty (80) MK 54 All Up Round Lightweight Torpedoes (LWT). Also included are MK 54 Mod 0 LWT spare parts; Recoverable Exercise Torpedoes (REXTORPs) with containers; handling shapes and containers; torpedo spare parts; tools for mounting and dismounting of Air Launch Accessories (ALAs); equipment for analysis of REXTORP exercise shots; REXTORP maintenance equipment; training; publications; support and test equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/germany-mk-54-lightweight-torpedoes

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Israel

 

December 9, 2023: The Secretary of State has approved the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Israel of 120mm M830A1 High Explosive Anti-Tank Multi-Purpose with Tracer (MPAT) tank cartridges and related equipment for an estimated cost of $106.5 million. The Government of Israel has requested to buy thirteen thousand nine hundred eighty-one (13,981) 120mm M830A1 High Explosive Anti-Tank Multi-Purpose with Tracer (MPAT) tank cartridges. Also included are publications and technical documentation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/israel-m830a1-120mm-tank-cartridges

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Romania

 

December 12, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Romania of Javelin Missiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $80 million. The Government of Romania has requested to buy two hundred sixty-three (263) Javelin FGM-148F Missiles; and twenty-six (26) Javelin Light Weight Command Launch Units (LWCLU). Also included are enhanced producibility basic skills trainers; missile simulation rounds; Security Assistance Management Directorate (SAMD) technical assistance; Tactical Air Ground Missiles (TAGM) Project Office technical assistance; other associated equipment and services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/romania-javelin-missiles

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Poland

 

December 13, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Poland of Communications Equipment and related elements of logistics and program support for an estimated cost of $255 million. The Government of Poland has requested to buy communications equipment, including AN/PRC-117G, AN/PRC-152A, AN/PRC-158, AN/PRC-160, AN/PRC-163, and AN/PRC-167 radios; Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers enabled by Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) or M-Code; support equipment; spare parts; technical manuals and publications; new equipment training; U.S. Government and contractor technical engineering, logistics, and personnel services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-communications-equipment

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To The Taipei Economic And Cultural Representative Office In The United States Of Command, Control, Communications, And Computers (C4) Life Cycle Support

 

December 15, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States of Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) Life Cycle Support and related equipment for an estimated cost of $300 million. The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy follow-on life cycle support to maintain Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) capabilities managed under its Syun An program. The C4 capabilities consist of previously procured Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems-Low Volume Terminals (MIDS-LVT) and Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) equipment, as well as procurement of spare and repair parts; repair and return of equipment; technical documentation; personnel training; software and hardware; software development; maintenance of Continental United States (CONUS) technical laboratories; U.S. Government and contract engineering and technical support; logistics; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-31

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

 

December 15, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Japan of AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $224 million. The Government of Japan has requested to buy one hundred twenty (120) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); and three (3) AIM-120C-8 guidance sections. Also included are AIM-120 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM), missile containers, and control section spares; Common Munitions Built-in-Test Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); ADU-891 Adapter Group Test Sets; munitions support and support equipment; spare and repair parts, consumables, and accessories, and repair and return support; contract logistics support (CLS); classified software delivery and support; classified/unclassified publications and technical documentation; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-aim-120c-8-advanced-medium-range-air-air-missiles-amraam

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Greece

 

December 15, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Greece of UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters and related equipment for an estimated cost of $1.95 billion. The Government of Greece has requested to buy thirty-five (35) UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters; eighty (80) T700-GE 701D engines (70 installed, 10 spares); forty-four (44) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (35 installed, 9 spares); eighty-five (85) H-764U Embedded Global Position Systems with Inertial Navigation (EGI) and country unique selective availability anti-spoofing module (SAASM) (or future replacement) (70 installed, 15 spares); and eighty-five (85) AN/ARC-231A VHF/UHF/LOS SATCOM radio systems. Also included are AN/ARC-231 Receivers/Transmitters RT-1808A (or future replacement); VHF/UHF/LOS SATCOM radios; APR-39C(V)1/4 Radar Warning Receivers; AVR-2B Laser Detecting Sets; APX-123A Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Transponders; ARC-220 High Frequency (HF) radios with KY-100M; VRC-100 Ground Stations; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKLs); KIV-77 Common IFF Applique Crypto Computers; COMSEC Encryption devices; AN/ARN-147(V) Very High Frequency Omni-Directional Range (VOR)/Instrument Landing System (ILS) Receiver Radios; AN/ARN-149(V) Low Frequency (LF)/Automatic Direction Finder (ADF) Radio Receivers; AN/ARN-153 Tactical Air Navigation System (TACAN) Receiver Transmitters; AN/APN-209 Radar Altimeters; AN/ARC-210 radios; EBC-406HM Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs); Encrypted Aircraft Wireless Intercommunications Systems (EAWIS); Improved Heads Up Displays (IHUD); Signal Data Converters for IHUD; Color Weather Radars; MX-0D EO/IR with Laser Designators; EO/IR Cabin Monitoring Systems; EO/IR Digital Video Recorders; AN/ARC-201D RT-1478D radios; Engine Inlet Barrier Filters (EIBF); Ballistic Armor Protection Systems (BAPS); Internal Auxiliary Fuel Tank Systems (IAFTS); Fast Rope Insertion Extraction Systems (FRIES); External Rescue Hoists (ERH); Rescue Hoist Equipment Sets; Dual Patient Litter System (DPLS) Sets; Martin Baker Palletized Crew Chief/Gunner Seats with crashworthy floor structural modifications; External Stores Support System (ESSS); Integrated Tow Plates Production Assets; Universal Software Loading Kits; 60kVA Generator Kits; Instrument Panels; DF-500 Personal Location Systems; Trakkabeam Searchlights; External Gun Mount Systems; M-134 Mini Gun Systems; M-240 machine guns; 7.62mm Cartridges; 2.75” Rockets; Flare IR Countermeasure M206; Decoy Flare CM M211; CTG Impulse BBU-35/B; CTG, 25.4mm, Decoy, Chaff, M839/RR170/ Series; M255A2 MK-66 Night Reliability Indicator (NRI); Cartridge, Aircraft Fire Extinguisher; Cartridge, Impulse; Thruster Control Unit (TCU) -3/A; Cartridge, Aircraft; Black Hawk Aircrew Trainer (BAT); Black Hawk Maintenance Trainer (BHMT-M); Black Hawk Avionics Trainer; Maintenance Blended Reconfigurable Avionics Trainer (MBRAT); CAPT-E-Visual & Control System (CAPT-E VCS); training devices; helmets; transportation; organizational equipment; spare and repair parts; support equipment; tools and test equipment; technical data and publications; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/greece-uh-60m-black-hawk-helicopters

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

 

December 15, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Japan of AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder Missiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $59.03 million. The Government of Japan has requested to buy forty-four (44) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II Tactical Missiles; and twenty-nine (29) AIM-9X Sidewinder Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM). Also included are missile containers; spare and repair parts; repair of repairables; support and test equipment; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; technical assistance, engineering, and logistics support services; transportation and program support; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-aim-9x-block-ii-sidewinder-missiles

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Italy

 

December 15, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Italy of M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $400 million. The Government of Italy has requested to buy twenty-one (21) M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS); and one (1) M31A2 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary (GMLRS-U) High Explosive (HE) Pods with Insensitive Munitions Propulsion System (IMPS). Also included are Universal Fielding Modules; towbar toolkits and sets; crypto-fill cable; AN/PRC-158 Multi-Channel Tactical Radio installation kits; Multi-Channel AN/PRC-158 radios; RF-7800i CU100 radio router; HARRIS installation kits for 160W high frequency (HF) radio system; HF AN/PRC-160W-HF radios; Simple Key Loader (SKL) AN/PYQ-10 (C); RF-7800i Tactical Intercom System installation kit; RF7800i Tactical Intercom System; Fire Control Panel Trainer (FCPT) hardware and software; Missile Common Test Device Trainer (MCTD-T), slim; Panasonic Toughbook ruggedized laptop with 30ft cables and power adapters and internal CD ROM drive; RF-7800i Tactical Intercom System training hardware; RF-7800i and CU100 training rigs, test equipment, and Golden System for operator and maintenance training; Launcher Adapter Group (LAG) and Sling; Launcher Control Unit (LCU); Weapons Control Unit (WCU); MCTD V.4 hardware and spares; MCTD V.4 software and publications; spare parts; Maintenance Support Device (MSD) V.4; Wireless AT-Platform Test Set (WATS); guided missile organizational tool kit; Hydraulic Servicing Unit (HSU); Interactive Electronic Technical Manual (IETM) development; Direct Support (DS)/General Support (GS) tool kits; Gas Particulate Filter Unit (GPFU); Forward Repair System (FRS); Positioning Navigation Assembly (PNA) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) Global Positioning System/Precise Positioning Service (GPS/PPS); Common MLRS SPORT Test Program Set (CMST) hardware and software development; mobile Standard Automotive Tool Set (SATS); RF7800i Tactical Intercom System spare package; Technical Manual Unit organizational Repair Parts and Special Tools List (RPSTL); Technical Manual operator’s manual; Launch POD/container (LP/C) trainer M68A2; GMLRS-U flight surveillance kit; and other related elements of program and logistic support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/italy-m142-high-mobility-artillery-rocket-systems-himars

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To The Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia

 

December 22, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of Blanket Order Training and related equipment for an estimated cost of $1 billion. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested a continuation of a blanket order training program inside and outside of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that includes, but is not limited to, flight training; technical training; professional military education; specialized training; Mobile Training Teams (MTTs); Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT); Extended Training Service Specialists (ETSS); and English language training. These blanket order training cases will cover all relevant types of training offered by or contracted through the U.S. Air Force or Department of Defense Agencies (DOD). This training for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) and other Saudi forces will include such subjects as civilian casualty avoidance; the laws of armed conflicts; human rights; command and control; and targeting via MTTs and/or broader Programs of Instruction (POIs). Program management; trainers, simulators; travel; billeting; and medical support may also be included.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/saudi-arabia-blanket-order-training-0

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To NATO

 

December 22, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the NATO Support and Procurement Agency of Stinger missiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $780 million. The NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA), as Lead Nation on behalf of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, has requested to buy nine hundred forty (940) FIM-92K Stinger Block I Missiles. Also included are Battery Coolant Units (BCU); metal containers; U.S. Government and contractor production, technical, and engineering assistance; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/nato-support-and-procurement-agency-nspa-stinger-missiles

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To NATO

 

December 22, 2023: The State Department has made a determination to approve the possible Foreign Military Sale to the NATO Support and Procurement Agency of C-17 Maintenance and related equipment for an estimated cost of $150 million. NATO Support and Procurement Agency as Lead Nation has requested to buy contractor logistics support for the C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability program; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/nato-support-and-procurement-agency-nspa-c-17-maintenance

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Israel

 

December 29, 2023: The Secretary of State has approved the possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Israel of M107 155mm projectiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $147.5 million. The Government of Israel has requested 155mm ancillaries (fuzes, primers, and charges) that will be added to previously implemented cases. This amendment will increase the total case value above notification thresholds and thus requires notification of the entire case. The original FMS cases, valued at $96.51 million, included four thousand seven hundred ninety-two (4,792) rounds of M107 155mm artillery ammunition (MDE); fifty-two thousand two hundred twenty-nine (52,229) rounds of M795 155mm artillery ammunition (non-MDE); and thirty thousand (30,000) M4 propelling charges (non-MDE), along with publications; associated technical documentation; and logistics support services, which have subsequently been delivered.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/israel-155mm-artillery-ammunition

 

*******

 

Office of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (CIO), Department of Defense (DoD)

 

The DOD Proposed To Establish Requirements For A Comprehensive And Scalable Assessment Mechanism To Ensure Defense Contractors And Subcontractors Have, As Part Of The Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Program

 

December 26, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 89058: The DoD proposed the establishment of requirements for a comprehensive and scalable assessment mechanism to ensure defense contractors and subcontractors have, as part of the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) Program, implemented required security measures to expand the application of existing security requirements for Federal Contract Information (FCI) and add new Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) security requirements for certain priority programs. DoD currently requires covered defense contractors and subcontractors to implement the security protections set forth in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800–171 Rev 2 to provide adequate security for sensitive unclassified DoD information that is processed, stored, or transmitted on contractor information systems and to document their implementation status, including any plans of action for any NIST SP 800–171 Rev 2 requirement not yet implemented, in a System Security Plan (SSP). The CMMC Program provides the Department the mechanism needed to verify that a defense contractor or subcontractor has implemented the security requirements at each CMMC Level and is maintaining that status across the contract period of performance, as required.

 

If adopted, the CMMC program will require most contractors handling Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) to obtain a third-party certification that they have successfully implemented the 110 cybersecurity controls in the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP) 800-171. It should be noted that contractors handling CUI are already required to comply with NIST SP 800-171 through Defense Acquisition Regulatory Supplement (DFARS) 252.204-7012, but only a self-attestation is currently required. Failure to obtain a CMMC certification will mean a contractor is prohibited from performing an awarded contract.

 

Contractors not handling CUI – but instead, FCI – will also be required to obtain a Level 1 assessment, which is a self-certification consistent with the requirements in FAR 52.204-21.

 

Highlights of the Proposed Regulations

While the proposed regulations are comprehensive, the following are some highlights:

  • The DoD proposes an aggressive rollout, with self-assessments required on all new contracts immediately after the final rule is effective and third-party assessments on all contracts at the start of Phase 2, which is six months after the final rule implementation.
  • While Level 2 is a split level (with some assessments being self-assessments and some being third-party assessments), the DoD assumes the vast majority of Level 2 assessments will be conducted by a Certified Third-Party Assessment Organization (C3PAO) (4,000 entities conducting a self-assessment versus 76,598 entities receiving a third-party assessment).
  • Third-party assessments are to last for three years, although the time may be shortened if the contractor makes modifications to an assessed system. Companies waiting on a third-party assessment may be competing with companies that are getting a second assessment when trying to schedule an assessment with a C3PAO.
  • The proposed rule contains enormous False Claims Act (FCA) risk: Level 1 assessments must be certified by a company executive to the DoD, and third-party Level 2 assessments require a company executive to file an affirmation with the DoD upon the close of the third-party assessment and annually thereafter. There is no doubt that the DoD will argue that these certifications are material.
  • Managed service providers (MSPs) play a crucial role in the CMMC ecosystem, particularly for small and medium-sized businesses. It is not clear what MSPs will be required to do (i.e., a Level 2 assessment) to be able to continue in that role for their clients.
  • Small businesses, subcontractors and non-U.S. companies will be required to comply with the same set of requirements consistent with the type of information they are creating or handling. There are no blanket exemptions except for contracts for the purchase of commercial off-the-shelf products or contracts under the micro-purchase threshold.
  • It remains to be seen how this rule will be implemented through the federal supply schedule and other agency-agnostic contracts such as NASA’s Solutions for Enterprise-Wide Procurement (SEWP).

 

Comments regarding the proposed requirements must be received by February 26, 2024.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/26/2023-27280/cybersecurity-maturity-model-certification-cmmc-program and https://www.hklaw.com/en/insights/publications/2023/12/department-of-defense-releases-long-awaited-cmmc-proposed-rule (Source: H&K Insights, 27 Dec 2023) [Excerpts] and Principal Author: Eric S. Crusius, Holland & Knight LLP

 

*******

 

The Department of State Temporarily Modified The Note To Paragraph (h)(1) Of USML Category VIII With Regard To Certain Commodities Used In The KF-21 Aircraft Or Variants Thereof

 

December 4, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 84072: The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs temporarily modified the Note to paragraph (h)(1) of USML Category VIII with regard to certain commodities used in the KF-21 aircraft or variants thereof. The Department assessed that it is in the security and foreign policy interests of the United States to allow manufacturers to apply for export authorizations to participate in the development of the KF–21 aircraft by reusing certain defense articles described in paragraph (h)(1), which are specially designed for the U.S. aircraft listed therein, without removing those defense articles from the USML simply because they are re-used in the KF–21. Accordingly, pursuant to ITAR § 126.2, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs temporarily modified the Note to paragraph (h)(1) of USML Category VIII such that parts, components, accessories, and attachments specially designed for aircraft identified in paragraph (h)(1) are not released from that paragraph due to their reuse in the KF–21 aircraft or variants thereof. The Department assessed that this temporary modification does not change the export jurisdiction or classification of any existing commodities, as it only prevents the possibility of future release from paragraph (h)(1) due to use in the KF–21, which has not yet entered into production. Therefore, when the KF–21 enters production, any paragraph (h)(1) commodities authorized for export for this purpose will retain their current export classification described in paragraph (h)(1). This temporary modification is effective until December 1, 2024, or when terminated by the Department, whichever occurs first.

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=57881adf1b3275d0c6c3866ae54bcb01

 

*******

 

Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

December 7, 2023: The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released three rules as part of a broad effort to ease several categories of export licensing requirements and expand the availability of export license exceptions for key allied and partner countries, as well as for members of certain multilateral export control regimes.

 

The first rule changes licensing requirements for certain Australia Group (AG)-controlled pathogens and toxins (and their related technologies) so that no license is required to AG countries, unless the item is also subject to Chemical Weapons Convention controls. It also removes crime control licensing requirements for Austria, Finland, Ireland, Liechtenstein, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland. These countries are in the Global Export Controls Coalition (GECC) (countries listed in Supplement 3 to part 746 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)) and maintain a commitment to protecting human rights. 88 Fed. Reg. 85479.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/08/2023-26532/allied-governments-favorable-treatment-revisions-to-certain-australia-group-controls-revisions-to

 

The second rule expands license exception eligibility to additional countries for certain missile technology items, excluding any countries of concern for missile technology reasons or that are subject to a U.S. arms embargo (i.e., countries specified in Country Groups D:4 or D:5). For example, certain components used in or for the “production” of civil manned aircraft will now be eligible for an EAR license exception to countries that are in both Country Group A:2 and the GECC.  The second rule also updates list-based controls to align with recent Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) control list changes.  88 Fed. Reg. 85487.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/08/2023-26682/export-administration-regulations-for-missile-technology-items-2018-2019-and-2021-missile-technology

 

The third rule seeks public comment on ways to facilitate the use of License Exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA), including by clarifying which items are eligible for STA to certain destinations, and proposing a number of changes intended to increase the usage of STA and reduce the burden on exporters, reexporters, and transferors, while at the same time still ensuring that U.S. national security and foreign policy interests are protected for items authored under STA. For example, the rule proposes to allow National Security (NS)-only reason for control items received under STA to be reexported between or among countries that are in both A:5 and the GECC with authorization from the competent authorities of those countries under license exception Additional Permissive Reexports (APR). 88 Fed. Reg. 85734.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/08/2023-26681/proposed-enhancements-and-simplification-of-license-exception-strategic-trade-authorization-sta

 

*******

 

Departments of Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, State and Treasury

 

Departments of Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, State, and Treasury Jointly Advise Maritime and Transportation Industry on Know-Your-Cargo Policy

 

The Department of Justice, Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), and Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a joint compliance note highlighting common tactics deployed by malign actors in the maritime and other transportation industries as well as recent enforcement actions taken in response to alleged violations. This note marks the first collective effort by the five agencies to inform the private sector about enforcement trends and provide guidance to the business community on compliance with U.S. sanctions and export laws. The Departments of Justice, Commerce, and the Treasury have previously issued two tri-seal compliance notes.

 

The compliance note describes various deceptive shipping and transportation tactics deployed by malign actors to facilitate the illicit transfer of cargo. In addition, the note advises companies doing business in these industries to implement and strengthen their compliance controls as necessary, especially when operating in high-risk areas or with counterparties who exhibit odd behavior. The note further identifies several compliance practices that may assist companies in identifying potential efforts to evade U.S. laws.

The compliance note also highlights criminal and civil enforcement authorities that the relevant agencies have taken to combat the illicit shipment of cargo, as well as recent enforcement actions. These cases include the first-ever criminal resolution by the Department of Justice against a bareboat charter of a crude oil tanker carrying contraband Iranian oil and civil enforcement actions taken by BIS and OFAC imposing civil monetary penalties.

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events and https://www.justice.gov/media/1327981/dl?inline

 

*******

U.S. Census Bureau

 

Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages

December 21, 2023: To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

 

Response Code: 126

Narrative: Conveyance Name Not Allowed for MOT

Severity: Fatal

Reason: The Mode of Transportation selected does not allow a Conveyance Name to be reported.

 

Resolution: A Conveyance Name/Carrier Name is only allowed to be reported for vessel, air, rail, or truck modes of transportation.

Verify the Mode of Transportation Code and the Conveyance Name/Carrier Name, correct the shipment, and resubmit.

 

Response Code: 651

Narrative: Vehicle Information Required for Export Information Code

Severity: Fatal

Reason: The Export Information Code is reported as HV for personally owned vehicles being exported as household effects, but the Used Vehicle Information is not included.

 

Resolution: Used Vehicle Information must be reported if the Export Information Code is HV. See ‘Appendix E, Commodity Filing Export Information’ of the AESTIR for a complete listing of all the Export Information Codes and their reporting guidelines.

Verify the Export Information Code, correct the shipment and resubmit.

LATEST FINES, PENALTIES AND SANCTIONS

 

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Fines and Penalties

 

December 6, 2023: A federal indictment was unsealed in the District of Oregon charging a Belgian national in connection with the export of sensitive, military-grade technology from the United States to end users in the People’s Republic of China. Hans Maria De Geetere, 61, of Knokke-Heist, Belgium, has been charged with one count of obtaining goods intended for China in violation of the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) and four counts of making false statements.

 

According to court documents, between April 2021 and August 2023, De Geetere, who owned and operated a Belgium-based supply chain management and procurement services company called Knokke Heist Support Corporation Management (KHSCM), attempted to illegally procure for export to China controlled accelerometers valued at more than $930,000.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-or/pr/belgian-national-faces-federal-charges-illegally-procuring-critical-us-technology-end

 

*******

 

December 8, 2023: The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia announced the seizure of three domains used by Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs), Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs), and their members associated with Lebanese Hizballah. According to court records, the United States obtained court authorization to seize three domains registered to Verisign, Inc. – ctexlb.com, imarwaiktissad.com, and russia-now.com.  These three domains are subject to seizure as assets of entities and organizations engaged in planning or perpetrating acts of terrorism against the United States, its citizens and residents, and their property. These domains also afford a source of influence over those entities and organizations. The seizure of these domains will cut off that source of support and influence.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/edva-seizes-three-domains-used-lebanese-hizballah-and-its-affiliates

 

*******

 

December 8, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a settlement with Nasdaq, Inc.  Nasdaq agreed to remit $4,040,923 to settle its potential civil liability for a former wholly owned foreign subsidiary’s apparent violations of sanctions on Iran.  This former subsidiary engaged in the exportation of services to Iran and the Government of Iran, thereby committing 151 apparent violations of OFAC sanctions on Iran.  The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that Nasdaq’s conduct was non-egregious and voluntarily self-disclosed.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231208_33 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932386/download?inline

 

*******

 

December 13, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $1,207,830 settlement with CoinList Markets LLC.  CoinList agreed to settle its potential civil liability arising from processing 989 transactions on behalf of users ordinarily resident in Crimea between April 2020 and May 2022, in apparent violation of OFAC’s Russia/Ukraine sanctions.  The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that CoinList’s conduct was non-egregious and not voluntarily self-disclosed.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231213_33 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932406/download?inline and

 

*******

 

December 19, 2023: The Justice Department unsealed an indictment charging Iranian national Hossein Hatefi Ardakani and co-defendant Gary Lam, who worked for a Chinese company, with crimes related to the procurement of U.S.-manufactured dual-use microelectronics for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization’s (ASF SSJO) one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program.

 

According to the indictment, between at least in or around September 2014 and September 2015, Ardakani and Lam, who was based in China and Hong Kong, as well as other associates, conspired to illegally purchase and export from the United States to Iran dual-use microelectronics that are commonly used in UAV production, including high electron mobility transistors (HEMTs), monolithic microwave integrated circuit (MMIC) power amplifiers, and analog-to-digital converters. Each of these components are subject to U.S. export controls for anti-terrorism, national security and regional stability reasons.

 

The indictment further alleges that on four separate occasions Ardakani and his co-conspirators used a web of foreign companies to accomplish their obfuscation and evasion efforts. For example, between June and September 2015, Ardakani and Lam caused an unwitting French company to purchase from a U.S. company several pieces of analog-to-digital converters with applications in wireless and broadband communications, radar and satellite subsystems, multicarrier, multimodal cellular receivers, antenna array positioning and infrared imaging. Lam then caused a division of the French company to ship the analog-to-digital converters to Hong Kong, where they were reexported to Iran. A variation of this tactic – involving witting and unwitting companies in Canada, Hong Kong, and China – was used on the other three occasion

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iranian-national-charged-unlawfully-procuring-microelectronics-used-unmanned-aerial-vehicles

 

*******

 

December 21, 2023: Robert Alcantara was sentenced to 68 months in prison for trafficking firearms.  According to the charging documents and other filings and statements made in court:

From approximately 2017 until January 2022, Alcantara operated a “ghost gun” factory out of his home in Rhode Island.  Alcantara purchased ghost gun kits at gun shows and other places and then machined the kits into working firearms.  Once he had completed the untraceable firearms, he exported and sold them to the Dominican Republic.  Most of those guns were handguns, but a number were rifles.  Alcantara and others then laundered the proceeds of his gun sales.

 

On November 20, 2021, Alcantara was stopped in his vehicle in possession of kits to build approximately 45 ghost guns. Alcantara was interviewed by law enforcement agents and stated that he was planning to turn the 45 kits into working firearms, and he had 50 additional similar ghost guns at his home.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/rhode-island-man-sentenced-68-months-prison-trafficking-over-one-hundred-ghost-guns

*******

 

December 21, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $466,200 settlement with Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange (PURE). PURE agreed to settle its potential civil liability for 39 apparent violations of OFAC’s Ukraine-/Russia-Related sanctions.  Between May 2018 and July 2020, PURE engaged in transactions related to four insurance policies involving a blocked Panama-based company owned by Specially Designated National Viktor Vekselberg (Vekselberg). The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that PURE’s apparent violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and were non-egregious.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231221_33 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932486/download?inline

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88567: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Stephanie Joahna Gloria (“Gloria”) for seven years until May 23, 2029. On May 23, 2022, Gloria was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Gloria was convicted of smuggling from the United States to Mexico 3,200 rounds of Winchester 5.56-millimeter ammunition. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced Gloria to 70 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28273/in-the-matter-of-stephanie-joahna-gloria-inmate-number-74313-509-fci-aliceville-federal-correctional

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88569: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Donald Robert Witherow (“Witherow”) for three years until October 13, 2025. On October 13, 2022, Witherow was convicted of smuggling firearms ammunition and firearms magazines from the United States to the Netherlands. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Witherow to 12 months and one day of imprisonment, one year of supervised release and a $200 assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28275/in-the-matter-of-donald-robert-witherow-6651-buffalo-road-cresson-pa-16421-order-denying-export

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88571: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Edson Daniel Montelongo (“Montelongo”) for ten years until June 22, 2032. On June 22, 2022 Montelongo was convicted of smuggling various firearms from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 70 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $500 special assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28271/in-the-matter-of-edson-daniel-montelongo-inmate-number-75304-509-fci-bastrop-po-box-1010-bastrop-tx

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88564: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Rolondo Alexei Pupo-Abrahantes (“Pupo-Abrahantes”) for ten years until November 16, 2032. On November 16, 2022 Pupo-Abrahantes was convicted of conspiring to smuggle various firearms from the United States to Ecuador. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 30 months in prison, two years of supervised release and a $300 special assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28277/in-the-matter-of-rolondo-alexei-pupo-abrahantes-inmate-number-76860-509-fci-pollock-po-box-4050

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88565: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Jonathan Yet Wing Soong (“Soong”) for ten years until April 28, 2033. On April 28, 2023 Soong was convicted of knowingly and willfully exporting from the United States to Beihang University, an entity on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List, EAR99 CIFER (Comprehensive Identification from Frequency Responses) software, a tool that allows a user to develop a dynamic model of an aircraft using system identification techniques, without having first obtained the required authorization from the Department of Commerce. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Soong to 20 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, $100 assessment and $168,885 in restitution.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28268/in-the-matter-of-jonathan-yet-wing-soong-inmate-number-03089-510-usp-lompoc-us-penitentiary-3901

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88566: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Javier Alonso Galvan-Hernandez (“Galvan-Hernandez”) for ten years until May 11, 2032. On May 11, 2022 Galvan-Hernandez was convicted of smuggling various firearms from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 84 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $200 special assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28274/in-the-matter-of-javier-alonso-galvan-hernandez-inmate-number-79786-509-fci-bastrop-po-box-1010

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88568: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Angel Huerta-Garay (“Huerta-Garay”) for tens years until April 26, 2032. On April 26, 2022 Huerta-Garay was convicted of exporting and sending, and attempting to export and send, various firearms from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 52 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28276/in-the-matter-of-angel-huerta-garay-inmate-number-67193-509-fci-beaumont-po-box-26020-beaumont-tx

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88570: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Jose Luis Garcia (“Garcia”) for ten years until December 14, 2031. On December 14, 2021 Garcia was convicted of conspiring to smuggle firearms from the United States to Mexico without first having obtained the required export license and authorization from the U.S. Department of State or U.S. Department of Commerce. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Garcia to 57 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, $20,000 criminal fine and a $100 assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28270/in-the-matter-of-jose-luis-garcia-inmate-number-21856-509-fci-bastrop-federal-correctional

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 88572: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued an Order denying the export privileges of Tina Chen, a/k/a Ya When Chen, a/k/a Wen Tina Chen, a/k/a Tina Dunbar, a/k/a Tina Dubner (“Chen”) for ten years until February 23, 2033. On February 23, 2023 Chen was convicted of exporting goods from the United States to Iran without the required licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets Control. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced Chen to 13 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/22/2023-28278/in-the-matter-of-tina-chen-aka-ya-when-chen-aka-wen-tina-chen-aka-tina-dunbar-aka-tina-dubner-inmate

 

Sanctions

 

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

December 5, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added forty-two entities under forty-four entries to the Entity List. These entities are listed under the destinations of Armenia (3), Belarus (1), Belgium (3), China, People’s Republic of (China) (1), Cyprus (4), Germany (1), Kazakhstan (1), Netherlands (1), Russia (28), and the United Arab Emirates (1). Two entities are added to the Entity List under two destinations, accounting for the difference in the totals. These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.

 

Specifically, eleven entities are directly tied to or associated with the joint Iranian-Russian efforts to develop and construct a UAV production facility in the “Alabuga Special Economic Zone,” which is intended to produce thousands of Shahed-136 drones in support of Russia’s war effort against Ukraine.  Two entities were added for engaging in illicit efforts to acquire and divert the highest priority U.S.-origin electronic components with military applications, including in connection with avionics, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (drones, or UAVs), electronic warfare receivers, and military radar. Thirteen entities were added for engaging in dealings with entities on the Entity List, including entities designated as Russian military end users, or entities subject to sanctions administered by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).  Sixteen other entities were added pursuant to two BIS enforcement actions involving the acquisition and diversion of U.S.-origin electronic and avionic components on behalf of parties in Russia.

 

Armenia:

  • Aram Kocharyan;
  • ARM-BEKAR LLC; and
  • Hermine Kocharyan.

 

Belarus:

  • Nanotech Ltd.

 

Belgium:

  • European Technical Trading BV;
  • Hans Maria De Geetere; and
  • Knokke-Heist Support Management Corporation.

 

China:

  • Planet Technology.

 

Cyprus:

  • Alexander Nikolayevich Vadyunin;
  • Eriner Limited;
  • OOO Aviation Service Int’l; and
  • The Mother Ark.

 

Germany:

  • FTL GmBH.

 

Kazakhstan:

  • Elem Group, LLC.

 

The Netherlands:

  • Hasa Nederland B.V.

 

Russia:

  • Aircompany North-West LLC;
  • Alexander Nikolayevich Vadyunin;
  • AO Geomir;
  • AO SET-1;
  • Argussoft Company LLC;
  • AST Components;
  • ATB Electronica LLC;
  • Digicom, LTD.;
  • Dolphin Alabuga LLC;
  • Elektrokom VPK;
  • Inelso LLC;
  • Intekh LLC;
  • JSC Yue Complex Service Solutions;
  • North-West Technics LLC;
  • OOO Alabuga-Volokno;
  • OOO Albatross;
  • OOO Alb.Aero;
  • OOO Assistagro;
  • OOO Aviation Service Int’l;
  • OOO Druzhba;
  • OOO Geomiragro;
  • OOO SMU5;
  • OOO Ural-Trast;
  • PF RIELTA LLC;
  • Prius Electronics LLC;
  • PT Air;
  • RosAero JSC; and
  • YE-International AO.

 

United Arab Emirates:

  • RosAero FZC.

 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3390-press-release-12-5-entity-list-package-hans-de-geetere/file and https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2023-26935.pdf

 

*******

 

December 7, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 85209:  The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) renewed the temporary denial order for Belavia Belarusian Airlines of Belarus for one year until December 7, 2024 for its continued use of ECCN 9A991 aircraft.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/07/2023-26896/belavia-belarusian-airlines-4a-nemiga-str-minsk-belarus-220004-order-renewing-temporary-denial-of

 

*******

 

December 14, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 86623: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) renewed the temporary denial order for Nordwind Airlines of Russia for one year until December 14, 2024 for its continued use of ECCN 9A991 aircraft.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/14/2023-27475/nordwind-airlines-leningradskaya-str-building-25-office-27-28-moscow-region-khimki-city141402-russia

*******

 

December 14, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 86626:  The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) renewed the temporary denial order for Siberian Airlines d/b/a S7 Airlines of Russia for one year until December 14, 2024 for its continued use of ECCN 9A991 aircraft.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/14/2023-27476/siberian-airlines-dba-s7-airlines-633104-novosibirskaya-obl-g-ob-prospekt-mozzherina-d-10-ofis-201

 

*******

 

December 14, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 86628:  The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) renewed the temporary denial order for Pobeda Airlines of Russia for one year until December 14, 2024 for its continued use of ECCN 9A991 aircraft.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/14/2023-27474/pobeda-airlines-108811-russian-federation-moscow-p-moskovskiy-kievskoe-shosse-22nd-km-41-moscow

 

*******

 

December 20, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 87897: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 persons to the Unverified List (UVL). The 13 persons are added to the UVL on the basis that BIS was unable to verify their bona fides. All 13 persons are being added under the destination of the People’s Republic of China (China). The 13 persons added to the UVL are:

 

  • Beijing Jin Sheng Bo Yue Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Beijing Shengbo Xietong Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Fulian Precision Electronics (Tianjin) Co., Ltd.;
  • Guangzhou Xinwei Transportation Co., Ltd.;
  • Guangzhou Xinyun Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Nanning Fulian Fu Gui Precision Industrial Co., Ltd.;
  • Ningbo MOOF Trading Co., Ltd.;
  • Plexus (Xiamen) Co., Ltd.;
  • PNC Systems (Jiangsu) Co., Ltd.;
  • Shenzhen Bozhitongda Technologic Co., Ltd.;
  • Shenzhen Jia Li Chuang Tech Development Co., Ltd.;
  • Shenzhen Jingelang Co., Ltd.; and
  • Xi’An Yierda Co., Ltd.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/12/20/2023-27928/additions-to-the-unverified-list

 

*******

 

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

December 1, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Luis Miguel Martinez Morales (Martinez) for his role in corruption in Guatemala wherein he engaged in widespread bribery schemes, including schemes related to government contracts. Martinez is being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world. Martinez was added to OFAC’s SDN List.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1941 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231201_33

 

*******

 

December 1, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on three entities and identified as blocked property three vessels that used Price Cap Coalition services while carrying Russian crude oil above the Coalition-agreed price cap. These sanctions build on Treasury’s previous actions in October and November of this year and represent once again Treasury’s commitment, alongside its Coalition partners, to responsibly reduce oil revenues that the Russian government uses to fund its war against Ukraine.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • HS Atlantica Limited of Liberia; [RUSSIA-EO14024].
  • Sterling Shipping Incorporated of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • Streymoy Shipping Limited of the United Arab Emirates.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • HS Atlantica (5LIP5) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9322839;
  • NS Champion (A8FD9) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9299719; and
  • Viktor Bakaev (D5BN6) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9610810.

 

Russia Related General License 78:

 

All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one of the following activities involving the blocked persons or vessels described below are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 29, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (RuHSR):

(1) The safe docking and anchoring of any of the blocked vessels listed in paragraph (b) of this general license (“blocked vessels”) in port;

(2) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; or

(3) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.

 

The authorization of this general license applies to the following blocked persons and vessels listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and any entity in which any of the following persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest:

(1) Sterling Shipping Incorporated (registered owner of NS Champion; IMO 9299719);

(2) Streymoy Shipping Limited (registered owner of Viktor Bakaev, IMO 9610810); and

(3) HS Atlantica Limited (registered owner of HS Atlantica, IMO 9322839).

 

This general license does not authorize:

(1) The entry into any new commercial contracts involving the property or interests in property of any blocked persons, including the blocked entities and vessels described above;

(2) The offloading of any cargo onboard any of the blocked vessels, including the offloading of crude oil or petroleum products of Russian Federation origin, except for the offloading of cargo that is ordinarily incident and necessary to address vessel emergencies authorized pursuant to this general license;

(3) Any transactions related to the sale of crude oil or petroleum products of Russian Federation origin;

(4) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 2 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions;

(5) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or

(6) Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the RuHSR, including transactions involving the property or interests in property of any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, other than transactions involving the blocked persons or vessels above in this general license, unless separately authorized.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1940 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231201 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932361/download?inline

 

*******

 

December 4, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted several individuals for their role in undermining the peace, security, and stability of Sudan. These designations support diplomatic efforts by the international community to end the conflict and demonstrate the U.S. commitment to achieve a civilian government and a transition to democracy.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Abbas, Mohamed Atta Emoula of Sudan;
  • Al-Hussein, Taha Osman Ahmed of the United Arab Emirates, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and
  • Salah, Salah Abdallah Mohamed of Egypt and the Sudan.

 

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1947 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231204

 

*******

 

December 5, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 11 entities and seven individuals pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14038 and one individual pursuant to E.O. 14024. This action increases the pressure on Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s (Lukashenka) authoritarian regime for its brutal suppression of Belarus’s democratic civil society, corrupt financial enrichment of the Lukashenka family, and complicity in Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine.

 

OFAC also targeted a network led by Belgium-based Hans De Geetere that is involved in procuring electronics with military applications for Russian end-users. The network consists of nine entities and five individuals based in Russia, Belgium, Cyprus, Sweden, Hong Kong, and the Netherlands.

 

Concurrent with OFAC’s action, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) unsealed two separate indictments against Hans De Geetere related to his years-long scheme to unlawfully export sensitive, military-grade technology from the United States to end users located in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. The U.S. Department of Commerce is also concurrently adding Hans De Geetere and five entities to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List. Additionally, Belgian authorities took action against De Geetere on charges related to his global illicit procurement scheme.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Babarikin, Vadim Aleksandrovich of Belarus;
  • Beun Kimberley Catriona Lucinda, Eeklo of Belgium and The Netherlands;
  • De Geetere, Hans of Belgium;
  • De Geetere, Tom of Belgium;
  • Gaichuk, Nikolai Nikolaevich of Belarus;
  • Kulemekov, Vladimir of Russia;
  • Moroz, Alexander Ivanovich of Belarus;
  • Petrovich, Viktor Evgenievich of Belarus;
  • Shakutsin, Aliaksandr Vasilevich of Belarus;
  • Shautsou, Dzmitry Yauhenievich of Belarus;
  • Shkadarevich, Alexei Petrovich of Belarus;
  • Skvortsov, Sergey of Sweden and Russia; and
  • Topuzidis, Pavel Georgievich of Belarus.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Ahetei Limited of Cyprus;
  • Belarusian Production And Trade Concern Of Timber Woodworking And Pulp And Paper Industry of Belarus;
  • Eriner Limited of Cyprus;
  • European Technical Trading of Belgium;
  • European Trading Technology B.V. of The Netherlands;
  • Hasa Nederland B.V., Of The Netherlands and Belgium;
  • JSC Minsk Mechanical Plant Named After S.I. Vavilov Management Company Of Belomo Holding of Belarus;
  • JSC Zenit Belomo of Belarus;
  • Knokke Heist Support Corporation Management of Belgium;
  • Lar Vorto Services Limited of Cyprus;
  • M And S Trading of China;
  • OJSC Horizont Holding Management Company of Belarus;
  • Open Joint Stock Company Alevkurp of Belarus;
  • Open Joint Stock Company Amkodor Management Holding Company of Belarus;
  • Planar Research And Production Holdings For Precision Engineering of Belarus;
  • Republican Production And Trade Unitary Enterprise Management Company Of The Holding Belarusian Cement Company of Belarus;
  • Republican Unitary Enterprise Beltamozhservice of Belarus;
  • Scientific Technical Center Lemt Belomo of Belarus;
  • Tabak Invest LLC of Belarus; and
  • The Mother Ark LTD of Cyprus.

 

Belarus General License 10:

 

All transactions prohibited by the Belarus Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 548 (BSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving Tabak Invest LLC (“Tabak Invest”), or any entity in which Tabak Invest owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 2, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account at a U.S. financial institution in accordance with the BSR.

 

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the BSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the BSR other than the blocked persons described above in this general license, unless separately authorized.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1949 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1948 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932376/download?inline

 

*******

 

December 6, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has sanctioned 15 Mexican individuals— several of whom are U.S. fugitives—and two Mexico-based companies linked, directly or indirectly, to the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO). The BLO continues to be one of the most powerful drug trafficking organizations in the world and is heavily involved in the transportation and distribution of deadly drugs, including fentanyl, to the United States. It has been one of the largest suppliers of cocaine to the U.S. market for over two decades.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Aleman Meza, Oscar of Mexico;
  • Bastidas Erenas, Juan Pablo of Mexico;
  • Beltran Araujo, Amberto of Mexico;
  • Beltran Araujo, Mario German of Mexico;
  • Caro Monge, Jesus Jose Gil of Mexico;
  • Caro Quintero, Jose Gil of Mexico;
  • Estevez Colmenares, Ricardo of Mexico;
  • Estrada Gutierrez, Jose de Jesus of Mexico;
  • Flores Ortiz, Francisco Abraham of Mexico;
  • Franco Figueroa, Ulises of Mexico;
  • Gastelum Iribe, Oscar Manuel of Mexico;
  • Inzunza Noriega, Pedro of Mexico;
  • Leon Rodriguez, Juvenal of Mexico;
  • Lopez Lopez, Servando of Mexico; and
  • Pulido Diaz, Oscar of Mexico.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Difaculsa, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico; and
  • Editorial Mercado Ecuestre, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1952 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231206

 

*******

 

December 7, 2023:  the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 13 individuals and entities responsible for providing tens of millions of dollars’ worth of foreign currency generated from the sale and shipment of Iranian commodities, backed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), to the Houthis in Yemen. Through a complex network of exchange houses and companies in multiple jurisdictions, these persons, under the auspices of U.S.-sanctioned Houthi and IRGC-QF financial facilitator Sa’id al-Jamal, serve as an important conduit through which Iranian money reaches the country’s militant partners in Yemen.

 

OFAC in coordination with the United Kingdom also designated two individuals associated with an advanced persistent threat (APT) group that is sponsored by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and has targeted individuals and entities in the United States, United Kingdom, and other allied and partner countries.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Alodhari, Khaled Yahya Rageh of Yemen;
  • Deniz, Fadi of Lebanon, Turkey, United Kingdom, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis;
  • Duri, Ahmet of Turkey;
  • Hudroj, Bilal of Lebanon;
  • Korinets, Andrey Stanislavovich of Russia; and
  • Peretyatko, Ruslan Aleksandrovich of Russia.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Abu Sumbol General Trading L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Davos Exchange And Remittances Company Khaled Al Athari And Partner General Partnership of Yemen;
  • Deniz Capital LLP, of the United Kingdom;
  • Deniz Capital Maritime Inc, of Saint Kitts and Nevis;
  • Hodroj Exchange S.A.R.L of Lebanon;
  • OOO Russtroi-SK of Russia;
  • Pirlant Istanbul Kuyumculuk Ticaret Limited Sirketi of Turkey;
  • Vanessa Group Limited of the United Kingdom; and
  • Vanessa Imex Group Ithalat Ihracat Ve Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi of Turkey and Lebanon.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1961 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1962 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231207

 

*******

 

December 8, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 20 individuals for their connection to human rights abuse in nine countries. An additional two individuals were sanctioned under the Department of State’s counterterrorism authority. Furthermore, the Department of State likewise designated individuals in Russia, Indonesia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for visa restrictions pursuant to Section 7031(c) of the Annual Appropriations Act. These actions are taken in concert with measures imposed by partners in the United Kingdom and Canada, which have similarly utilized economic measures to deter human rights abuse globally.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Andre, Johnson of Haiti;
  • Ardestani, Mohammad Mahdi Khanpour of Iran;
  • Biel, Gordon Koang of South Sudan;
  • Bozize, Jean-Francis of the Central African Republic;
  • Byabashaija, Johnson of Uganda;
  • Destina, Renel of Haiti;
  • Farahani, Majid Dastjani of Iran and Venezuela;
  • Gao, Qi of China;
  • Hanafi, Khalid of Afghanistan;
  • Hassan Aliyani, Ahmed Mahamud of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania;
  • Hoth, Gatluak Nyang of South Sudan;
  • Hu, Lianhe of China;
  • Innocent, Vitel’homme of Haiti;
  • Joseph, Wilson of Haiti;
  • Koijee, Jefferson of Liberia;
  • Mahmood, Fariduddin of Afghanistan;
  • Ngoma, Willy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
  • Nkalubo, Mohamed Ali of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda;
  • Rukunda, Michel of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
  • Salleh Adoum Kette, Mahamat of the Central African Republic;
  • Wajang, Joseph Mantiel of Sudan and South Sudan; and
  • Yakutumba, William Amuri of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

 

Global Magnitsky-related Frequently Asked Question 1145:

 

Question 1145: What if a governing institution in Afghanistan is led by an individual who has been blocked pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations?

 

Answer: Generally, the designation of an individual with a leadership role in a governing institution does not itself block the governing institution.  Accordingly, engaging in a routine interaction with a governing institution in which a blocked individual is an official, but that does not directly or indirectly involve the blocked individual in question, is not prohibited.  This applies to any designated individual in Afghanistan who has a leadership role in a governing institution in Afghanistan, including any individual blocked pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations (GMSR).  For example, making a customs payment to a governing institution in Afghanistan led by a blocked individual would not be prohibited by the GMSR.  However, engaging directly or indirectly with that blocked individual, such as receiving an invoice bearing the blocked individual’s signature for a commercial transaction, would be prohibited by the GMSR unless authorized by OFAC or exempt.

 

In addition, certain humanitarian-related transactions involving individuals blocked pursuant to the GMSR may be authorized by general licenses (GL) in the GMSR related to certain international organizations (IOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), official business of the United States government (USG), or agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components, or software updates for personal, non-commercial use (Ag-Med).  For more information on these GLs, please consult OFAC ‘s Supplemental Guidance for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and FAQs 1105, 1106, 1107, and 1108.

 

For information on transactions involving governing institutions in Afghanistan led by an individual or entity designated under the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, or Executive Order 13224, please consult Afghanistan-related GL 20 and FAQ 993.

 

If individuals or entities, including IOs, NGOs, or financial institutions, have questions about engaging in or processing transactions related to these authorizations, they can contact the OFAC Compliance Hotline via email at OFAC_Feedback@treasury.gov.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1972 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231208 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1145

 

*******

 

December 11, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two former Afghan government officials — Mir Rahman Rahmani (M. Rahmani) and his son, Ajmal Rahmani (A. Rahmani), collectively known as “the Rahmanis” — for their extensive roles in transnational corruption, as well as 44 associated entities. These individuals and entities are designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world. Through their Afghan companies, the Rahmanis perpetrated a complex procurement corruption scheme resulting in the misappropriation of millions of dollars from U.S. Government-funded contracts that supported Afghan security forces.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Rahmani, Ajmal Of Greece, United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Hungary, Belgium, Cyprus Saint Kitts and Nevis; and
  • Rahmani, Mir Rahman of Afghanistan, Cyprus, and Saint Kitts and Nevis.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Alphaone Pharmaceutical B.V., of The Netherlands;
  • Ascent Holdings Limited of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Buoyant Holdings Limited of Cyprus;
  • C.H. Dream Creators Holdings LTD of Cyprus;
  • Fidelis Logistic And Supply Services of Afghanistan;
  • Lego Investments Eood of Bulgaria;
  • NAI Energy Europe GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • NAI Energy Europe Verwaltungs GMBH of Germany;
  • NAI Europe Energy GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • NAI Logistics B.V. of the United Arab Emirates and The Netherlands;
  • NAI Logistics Limited of Cyprus;
  • NAI Management GMBH of Germany;
  • Ocean Estate Company Limited of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Ocean Estate GMBH, of Austria;
  • Ocean Europe Cy Limited of Cyprus;
  • Ocean Properties GMBH of Austria;
  • Orbit International FZE of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Ozean Baustoffe GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Development Real Estate GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Group GMBH of Germany;
  • Ozean Horizont Baumaschinen & Bauequipment GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Horizont Bauwerke GMBH of Germany;
  • Ozean Horizont Erdarbeiten GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Horizont Objektplanung GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Horizont Projektentwicklungs GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Horizont Spezialtiefbau GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Immobilien Management GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Immobilien Projektentwicklung GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Ozean Immobilien Projektentwicklung Verwaltungs – GMBH of Germany;
  • Ozean Real Estate GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Pyramaxia Immoprojekt GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Pyramaxia Limited of Cyprus;
  • Pyramaxia Real Estate Development GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Pyramaxia Real Estate GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Rahmani Group International JLT of the United Arab Emirates;
  • RG Group FZE of the United Arab Emirates;
  • RG Holdings LTD of Cyprus;
  • RG Immoprojekt GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • RG Real Estate Development GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • RG Real Estate GMBH & CO. KG of Germany;
  • Riseonic Holdings LTD of Cyprus; Secure Movement Logistics Services of Afghanistan;
  • The Fern Limited of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • ZEM Holdings LTD of Cyprus.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1973 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231211

 

*******

 

December 12, 2023: G7 Leaders reaffirmed their support for an independent, democratic Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is implementing the commitments made by G7 Leaders by taking action against third-country actors who materially support Russia’s war, targeting Russian military procurement networks and those who help Russia acquire machine tools, equipment, and key inputs; and further curtailing Russia’s use of the international financial system to further its war in Ukraine. OFAC sanctioned over 150 individuals and entities supplying Russia’s Military Industrial base. Please see the list of sanctioned individuals and entities via the link below.

 

Concurrently, the Department of State is imposing sanctions on over 100 entities and individuals, including those engaged in sanctions evasion in numerous third countries, complicit in furthering Russia’s ability to wage its war against Ukraine and responsible for bolstering Russia’s future energy production and export capacity.

 

Russia Related General License 79:

 

All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked entities are authorized through 12:01 a.m. Eastern daylight time, March 11, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):

(1) Limited Liability Company Kyiv Square;

(2) Highland Gold Mining Limited;

(3) Limited Liability Company Kismet Capital Group; or

(4) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly,  individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

Russia Related General License 80:

 

All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or the facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity of Highland Gold Mining Limited (Highland Gold), or any entity in which Highland Gold owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, purchased prior to December 12, 2023 (“Covered Debt or Equity”), to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 11, 2024.

 

All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of Covered Debt or Equity that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, December 12, 2023, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, March 11, 2024.

 

All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, December 12, 2023, that

  • include a blocked person described in this general license as a counterparty or
  • are linked to Covered Debt or Equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. Eastern daylight time, March 11, 2024, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1978 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231212 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932396/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932401/download?inline

 

*******

 

December 13, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed a fourth round of sanctions on Hamas since the October 7 terrorist attack on Israel. This action targets key officials who perpetuate Hamas’s violent agenda by representing the group’s interests abroad and managing its finances. OFAC closely coordinated with the United Kingdom to concurrently designate several key Hamas officials.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Al-Din, Haroun Mansour Yaqoub Nasser of Turkey and Palestine;
  • Al-Wardian, Hassan of Palestine;
  • Awadallah, Nizar Mohammed of Palestine;
  • Baraka, Ali Abed Al Rahman of Lebanon;
  • Barhum, Ismail Musa Ahmad of Palestine;
  • Kaya, Mehmet of Turkey;
  • Obeid, Maher Rebhi of Lebanon and Jordan; and
  • Yaghmour, Jihad Muhammad Shaker of Turkey and Israel.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1981 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231213

 

*******

 

December 14, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the United Kingdom are jointly taking action against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF), Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The U.K. is taking its first action pursuant to new Iran-related authorities, targeting eight actors, including the head of the IRGC-QF and individuals linked to Iran’s support for Hamas and PIJ. The U.K.’s new sanctions authority has been developed to respond to unprecedented threats from the Iranian regime, including efforts to undermine peace and security across the Middle East and plots to kill individuals on U.K. soil. OFAC is designating an IRGC-QF official involved in support of Hamas.

 

Additionally, OFAC sanctioned the Malas Mañas transnational criminal organization (TCO), a human smuggling and narcotics trafficking organization based in Sonora, Mexico, along with two individuals in its support network.

 

Human smuggling organizations like Malas Mañas value profit over human life, endanger the lives of migrants, and undermine the U.S. asylum system.  In addition to human smuggling, Malas Mañas traffics deadly drugs, including illicit fentanyl and methamphetamine, thereby threatening the national security of the United States and Mexico.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Roman Flores, Luis Eduardo of Mexico;
  • Salazar Ballesteros, Joel Alexandro of Mexico; and
  • Zaree, Majid of Iran.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Malas Manas of Mexico.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1987 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231214

 

*******

 

December 19, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on 10 entities and four individuals based in Iran, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Indonesia supporting Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) production. This network, led by Iran-based Hossein Hatefi Ardakani, has facilitated the procurement of U.S.- and foreign-origin components worth hundreds of thousands of dollars for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC ASF SSJO) and its UAV program.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Ardakani, Gholamreza Ebrahimzadeh of Iran;
  • Ardakani, Hossein Hatefi of Iran;
  • Dewanto, Agung Surya of Indonesia; and
  • Mohammadabadi, Mehdi Dehghani of Iran.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Arta Wave SDN BHD of Malaysia;
  • Basamad Electronic Pouya Engineering Limited Liability Company of Iran;
  • Dirac Technology HK Limited of China;
  • Integrated Scientific Microwave Technology SDN BHD of Malaysia;
  • Kavan Electronics Behrad Limited Liability Company of Iran;
  • Nava Hobbies SDN BHD of Malaysia;
  • Saman Industrial Group of Iran;
  • Skyline Advanced Tecnologies SDN BHD of Malaysia;
  • Surabaya Hobby CV of Indonesia; and
  • Teyf Tadbir Arya Engineering Company of Iran.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2004 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231219

 

*******

 

December 20, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) continued to tighten enforcement of the price cap on Russian oil by building on previous actions targeting shipowners and vessels implicated in transporting Russian crude oil above the cap. In line with actions previously taken by partners in the Price Cap Coalition, OFAC designated a Government of Russia-owned ship manager as well as several obscure oil traders who have emerged as frequent participants in the seaborne transportation of Russian-origin oil following the imposition of the price cap.

 

OFAC has also, in coordination with the Price Cap Coalition, updated the Guidance on Implementation of the Price Cap Policy for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin. These actions are in line with commitments made by Leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) on December 6, 2023 to tighten compliance and enforcement of the price cap policy on Russian oil, including by imposing sanctions on those engaged in deceptive practices and by updating compliance rules and regulations as necessary.

 

The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has published Updated Guidance on the Implementation of the Price Cap Policy for Crude Oil and Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin. Additionally, OFAC is issuing Russia-related General License 81, “Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions Involving Certain Persons or Vessels Blocked on December 20, 2023,” and Russia-related General License 82, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving SUN Ship Management D Ltd.”

 

Russia Related General License 81:

 

All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one of the following activities involving the blocked persons described below are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 19, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (RuHSR):

(1) The safe docking and anchoring in the port of any vessels in which any person or entity listed below in this general license has a property interest (“blocked vessels”);

(2) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; or

(3) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.

 

The authorization above applies to the following blocked persons listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and any entity in which any of the following persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest:  (1) SUN Ship Management D Ltd;

(2) Covart Energy Limited;

(3) Voliton DMCC; and

(4) Bellatrix Energy Limited.

 

Russia Related General License 82:

 

All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of any transaction involving SUN Ship Management D Ltd (SUN Ship), or any entity in which SUN Ship owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 19, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

Additionally, OFAC has updated its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Bellatrix Energy Limited of China;
  • Covart Energy Limited of China and Russia;
  • Sun Ship Management D LTD of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • Voliton Dmcc of the United Arab Emirates.

 

The following vessel has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • SANAR 15, Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9777670.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2008 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931036/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932461/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932466/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231220

 

*******

 

December 22, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a Determination Pursuant to Section 11(a)(ii) of E.O. 14024, as amended by the E.O. of December 22, 2023, and a Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i)(B) of E.O. 14068, as amended by the E.O of December 22, 2023. Additionally, OFAC amended the Determination issued on June 28, 2022, “Prohibitions Related to Imports of Gold of Russian Federation Origin.”

OFAC is also issued Russia-related General License 83, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Imports of Certain Categories of Fish, Seafood, and Preparations Thereof Prohibited by Executive Order 14068,” General License 84, “Authorizing Transactions Related to Closing a Correspondent or Payable-Through Account,” and General License 85, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions and the Closure of Accounts Involving Expobank Joint Stock Company.”

 

Russia Related General License 83:

 

All transactions prohibited by the determination of December 22, 2023 made pursuant to section 1(a)(i)(B) of Executive Order (E.O.) 14068, as amended by E.O. of December 22, 2023 (“Prohibitions Related to Imports of Certain Categories of Fish, Seafood, and Preparations Thereof”), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the importation into the United States of seafood derivative products, pursuant to written contracts or written agreements entered into prior to December 22, 2023 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 21, 2024.

 

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized.

 

Russia Related General License 84:

 

U.S. financial institutions that maintain correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts for any foreign financial institution subject to the correspondent account or payable-through account (CAPTA) prohibition of section 11(b)(i) of Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, as amended, are authorized, during the 10-day period beginning on the effective date of the imposition of the prohibition, to engage in the following transactions:

(1) Processing only those transactions through the account, or permitting the foreign financial institution to execute only those transactions through the account for the purpose of, and necessary for, closing the account; and

(2) Transferring the funds remaining in the correspondent account or the payable-through account to an account of the foreign financial institution located outside of the United States and closing the correspondent account or the payable-through account.

 

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the RuHSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized.

 

Russia Related General License 85:

 

All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of any transaction involving Expobank Joint Stock Company (Expobank), or any entity in which Expobank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 21, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to

(i) the closing of an account of a person, wherever located, who is not a blocked person (“the account holder”), held at Expobank, or any financial institution in which Expobank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, and

(ii) the unblocking and lump sum transfer of all remaining funds and other assets in the account to the account holder, including to an account of the account holder held at a non-blocked financial institution, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. Eastern daylight time, March 21, 2024.

 

In addition, OFAC has issued 12 new, Russia-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 1146-1157) and amending several Russia-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 973, 1070, and 1126). See the links below for the new and revised FAQs.

 

Furthermore, OFAC published a Compliance Advisory to provide guidance to foreign financial institutions on the amendments to E.O. 14024, including practical guidance on how to identify sanctions risks and implement corresponding controls.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932446/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932451/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/923986/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932471/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932476/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/added/2023-12-22 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/updated/2023-12-22 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932436/download?inline

 

*******

 

December 28, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated one individual and three entities responsible for facilitating the flow of Iranian financial assistance to Houthi forces and their destabilizing activities. Among those designated is the head of the Currency Exchangers Association in Sana’a, and three exchange houses in Yemen and Türkiye. These persons have facilitated the transfer of millions of dollars to the Houthis at the direction of U.S.-designated Sa’id al-Jamal, who is affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).

 

The following individual have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Al-Hadha, Nabil Ali Ahmed of Yemen.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Al Aman Kargo Ithalat Ihracat Ve Nakliyat Limited Sirketi of Turkey;
  • Al Rawda Exchange And Money Transfers Company of Yemen; and
  • Nabco Money Exchange And Remittance Co. of Yemen.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2014 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231228

 

 

DECEMBER 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES Read More »

NOVEMBER 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through November 30, 2023.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

REGULATORY UPDATES

The President

President Biden Signs Executive Order Establishing Artificial Intelligence Policy for the Federal Government 

November 1, 2023: 88 FR 75191: On October 30, 2023, the Biden Administration issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14110 on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence. It establishes a government-wide effort to guide responsible artificial intelligence (AI) development and deployment through federal agency leadership, regulation of industry, and engagement with international partners.

The E.O. directs over 50 federal entities to engage in more than 100 specific actions to implement the guidance set forth across eight overarching policy areas.

  • Safety and security. The E.O. promotes the development and implementation of repeatable processes and mechanisms to understand and mitigate risks related to AI adoption, including with respect to biosecurity, cybersecurity, national security, and critical infrastructure.
  • Innovation and competition. The E.O. compels actions to attract AI talent to the United States, understand novel intellectual property (IP) questions, protect inventors and creators, and promote AI innovation, including at startups and small businesses.
  • Worker support. The E.O. states that AI adoption may be disruptive to the workforce and directs agencies to research and develop potential mitigations against such disruptions.
  • Consideration of AI bias and civil rights. The E.O. states that AI models may perpetuate biases and their implementation may lead to civil rights violations. The E.O. includes a section on equity and civil rights considerations for use of AI in the criminal justice system and the administration of federal government programs and benefits.
  • Consumer protection. The E.O. instructs agencies to enforce existing, technology-agnostic authorities in an effort to minimize harm to consumers, and to identify needed authorities related to AI.
  • The E.O. calls for the evaluation and mitigation of privacy risks—potentially exacerbated by AI— associated with the collection, use, and retention of user data.
  • Federal use of AI. The E.O. requires the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to establish an interagency council to coordinate AI use by federal agencies and develop guidance on AI governance and risk management activities for agencies. It acknowledges the ubiquity of generative AI (GenAI) tools, and directs agencies to move toward adoption with safeguards in place. The E.O. also calls for additional agency hiring and training activities to increase the AI workforce capacity across the federal government.
  • International leadership. The E.O. declares that the United States should be a global leader in AI development and adoption by engaging with international allies and partners, leading efforts to develop common AI regulatory and accountability principles and advancing responsible global technical standards for AI.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-24283

*******

White House Announces Continuation of National Emergency with Respect to Iran

November 7, 2023: On November 14, 1979, by Executive Order 12170, the President declared a national emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and took related steps to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the situation in Iran.

U.S. relations with Iran have not yet normalized, and the process of implementing the agreements with Iran, dated January 19, 1981, is ongoing.  For this reason, the national emergency declared on November 14, 1979, and the measures adopted on that date to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 2023.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden authorized the continuation for 1 year the national emergency with respect to Iran declared in Executive Order 12170.

The emergency declared by Executive Order 12170 is distinct from the emergency declared in Executive Order 12957 on March 15, 1995.  This renewal, therefore, is distinct from the emergency renewal of March 10, 2023.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/11/07/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-iran-6/

*******

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

DDTC Name and Address Changes Posted To Website

November 13 through 29, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at:

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Change in name from Callenberg Technology AB to Trident BMC AB due to acquisition.
  • Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc. (Israel), 40 Tuval Street, 13th Floor, Ramat Gan 5252247, Israel to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC, 21 Leonardo Da Vinci St., Tel Aviv 6473319, Israel, and all locations in Israel.
  • Change in name from L-3 Communications India Private Ltd. to L3Harris Maritime & Aero Private Ltd. due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in address for Airbus Military, S.L. from Avenida Aragón 404, 28022 Madrid, Spain to Calle Aviocar 2, 28906 Getafe, Madrid, Spain.
  • Change in name from Teledyne FLIR Detection, Inc. to Teledyne FLIR Defense, Inc. due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in name from Babcock Defence and Security Holdings LLP to Babcock Land Defence Limited due to corporate restructuring.
  • Change in address from Warwick House, Farnborough Aerospace Centre, Farnborough, Hampshire, GU14 6YU, United Kingdom to Victory Point, Lyon Way, Frimley, Camberley, Surrey, GU16 7EX, United Kingdom for the following entities due to corporate restructuring:
    • BAE Systems (Defence Systems) Limited
    • BAE Systems (Global Combat Munitions) Limited
    • BAE Systems (International) Limited
    • BAE Systems (Military Air) Overseas Limited
    • BAE Systems (Oman) Limited
    • BAE Systems (Operations) Limited
    • BAE Systems Display Technologies Limited
    • BAE Systems Electronic Systems (Overseas) Limited
    • BAE Systems Global Combat Systems Limited
    • BAE Systems (Global Combat Munitions) Limited
    • BAE Systems Hawk (Synthetic Training) Limited
    • BAE Systems Integrated System Technologies
    • BAE Systems (Marine) Limited
    • BAE Systems Surface Ships Limited
    • BAE Systems Integrated System Technologies (Overseas) Limited
    • BAE Systems Project Services Limited
    • BAE Systems Surface Ships International Limited
    • BAE Systems Global Combat Systems Munitions Limited
    • BAE Systems (Defence Systems) Limited
    • BAE Systems Services Limited

*******

Department of Defense

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Iraq

November 2, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Iraq of Bell Helicopter Contracted Logistics Support (CLS) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $300 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of the possible sale, which will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a strategic partner. Further, the proposed sale will improve the Republic of Iraq’s capability to meet current and future threats by enhancing the strength of its homeland defense. The Republic of Iraq will have no difficulty absorbing these services into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/Press%20Release%20-%2023-63%20Iraq%20CN.pdf

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Romania

November 9, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Romania of M1A2 Abrams Main Battle Tanks and related equipment for an estimated cost of $2.53 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of a NATO Ally which is an important force for political and economic stability in Europe. Further, the proposed sale will improve Romania’s capability to meet current and future threats by providing a credible force that is capable of deterring adversaries and participating in NATO operations. Romania will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/Press%20Release%20-%20Romania%2023-71%20CN.pdf

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To South Korea

November 14, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Republic of Korea of Standard Missile 6 Block I (SM-6 Blk I) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $650 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which will support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a major ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Indo-Pacific region. Further, the proposed sale will improve the Republic of Korea’s capability to meet current and future threats while further enhancing interoperability with the United States and other allies. The Republic of Korea will have no difficulty absorbing these articles into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/Press%20Release%20-%20Korea%2023-78%20CN.pdf

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To South Korea

November 15, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Republic of Korea of AIM-9X Block II and Block II+ (Plus) Sidewinder Missiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $52.1 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which will support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a major ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Indo-Pacific region. Further, the proposed sale will improve the Republic of Korea’s capability to meet current and future threats while further enhancing interoperability with the United States and other allies. Korea will have no difficulty absorbing these articles into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/Press%20Release%20-%20Korea%2023-76%20CN.pdf

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

November 17, 2023:  The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Japan of Tomahawk Weapon System and related equipment for an estimated cost of $2.35 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which will support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a major ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Indo-Pacific region. Further, the proposed sale will improve Japan’s capability to meet current and future threats by providing a long range, conventional surface-to-surface missile with significant standoff range that can neutralize growing threats. Japan will have no difficulty absorbing these articles into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/Press%20Release%20-%20Japan%2023-69%20CN.pdf

*******

Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

FinCEN and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security Announce New Reporting Key Term and Highlight Red Flags Relating to Global Evasion of U.S. Export Controls

November 6, 2023: the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a joint notice highlighting a new Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) key term (“FIN-2023-GLOBALEXPORT”) for financial institutions to reference when reporting potential efforts by individuals or entities seeking to evade U.S. export controls not related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. FinCEN and BIS previously issued two joint alerts in June 2022 and May 2023 urging financial institutions to be vigilant against potential Russian export control evasion in response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. Financial institutions are encouraged to continue to use the key term “FIN-2022-RUSSIABIS” when filing SARs related to suspected Russian export control evasion.

The joint notice emphasizes the importance of financial institutions applying a risk-based approach to trade transactions and remaining vigilant against efforts by individuals or entities seeking to evade export controls, globally. This joint notice highlights global red flag indicators of export control evasion, with a focus on advanced and critical technologies, that also can be applicable to due diligence efforts of exporters in addition to financial institutions.

BIS leverages SARs to investigate violations of U.S. export control regulations. Investigations involving advanced technologies (e.g., advanced semiconductors, quantum, hypersonics) sought by nation state adversaries to support military modernization efforts designed to overcome U.S. military superiority, or mass surveillance programs that enable human rights abuses are being prioritized and worked through the interagency Disruptive Technology Strike Force, co-led by BIS and the Department of Justice.

The joint notice is part of the ongoing efforts by BIS and the U.S. Department of the Treasury to strengthen export controls and prevent global evasion of U.S. export controls. By working together and leveraging their respective expertise, BIS and FinCEN aim to disrupt illicit acquisition activities and enhance the overall security and integrity of the international trade and financial systems.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3380-2023-11-06-bis-release-export-enforcement-and-fincen-joint-alert-3/file

*******

LATEST FINES, PENALTIES AND SANCTIONS

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

Fines and Penalties

November 1, 2023: Four individuals were arrested, and an indictment and criminal complaint were unsealed in the Eastern District of New York regarding two separate conspiracies to unlawfully export controlled, dual-use technologies to Russia following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

A Brooklyn, New York, resident and two Canadian nationals were also arrested in connection with a sophisticated global procurement scheme in which the defendants used two corporate entities registered in Brooklyn to unlawfully source and purchase millions of dollars’ worth of dual-use electronics on behalf of end-users in Russia, including companies affiliated with the Russian military. Some of the electronic components and integrated circuits shipped by the defendants are the same make, model, and part number that have been found in seized Russian weapons platforms and signals intelligence equipment in Ukraine.

Separately, a Brooklyn resident was arrested, and a four-count indictment was unsealed alleging an illegal exports scheme to procure dual-use electronic components for entities in Russia involved in the development and manufacture of drones for the Russian war effort in Ukraine.

According to court documents, Nikolay Goltsev, 37, of Montreal, Canada; Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, 52, of Brooklyn; and Kristina Puzyreva, 32, of Montreal, Canada have been charged in a sanctions evasion and export control scheme, in which millions of dollars’ worth of semiconductors, integrated circuits and other dual-use electronic components were unlawfully exported to Russia through two Brooklyn front companies.

In a four-count indictment unsealed in the Eastern District of New York, Nikita Arkhipov, 39, and Artem Oloviannikov, 37, both of St. Petersburg, Russia; and Nikolay Grigorev, 36, of Brooklyn; are charged with conspiracy and other offenses related to an export control scheme to benefit companies affiliated with the Russian military, including SMT-iLogic, a sanctioned Russian entity that has been identified as part of the supply chain for producing Russian military drones used in Russia’s war against Ukraine.

These actions were coordinated through the Justice and Commerce Departments’ Disruptive Technology Strike Force and the Justice Department’s Task Force KleptoCapture. The Disruptive Technology Strike Force is an interagency law enforcement strike force co-led by the Departments of Justice and Commerce designed to target illicit actors, protect supply chains, and prevent critical technology from being acquired by authoritarian regimes and hostile nation states. Task Force KleptoCapture is an interagency law enforcement task force dedicated to enforcing the sweeping sanctions, export restrictions and economic countermeasures that the United States has imposed, along with its allies and partners, in response to Russia’s unprovoked military invasion of Ukraine.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-arrested-and-multiple-russian-nationals-charged-connection-two-schemes-evade-sanctions

*******

November 3, 2023: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced the imposition of a civil penalty of $44,750 against Forta LLC (Forta), a manufacturer of synthetic reinforcement fibers, located in Grove City, Pennsylvania, to resolve three violations of the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR, 15 C.F.R. parts 730-774) (antiboycott regulations), as alleged in BIS’s Proposed Charging Letter (PCL). Forta voluntarily disclosed the conduct to BIS, cooperated with the investigation by BIS’s Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC), and took remedial measures after discovering the conduct at issue, all of which resulted in a significant reduction in penalty.

As part of the settlement with BIS, Forta admitted to the conduct set forth in the PCL, which alleged violations involving the furnishing of information about business relationships with boycotted countries or blacklisted persons and the failure to report the receipt of a request to engage in a restrictive trade practice or foreign boycott against a country friendly to the United States. Specifically, Forta participated in a trade show in Abu Dhabi in 2019. In connection with the shipment of products and items for display at the trade show, the company furnished to its freight forwarder a commercial invoice/packing list certifying that the goods were not of Israeli origin and not manufactured by a company on the “Israeli Boycott Blacklist.” Furnishing such information is prohibited by Section 760.2(d) of the EAR. In addition, the company failed to report to BIS the receipt of the request to furnish this information as required by Section 760.5 of the EAR.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3377-2023-11-03-forta-antiboycott-settlement/file

*******

November 3, 2023: Pursuant to Section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR Parts 730–774 (2021) (“EAR” or “the Regulations”), the Commerce Department’s Industry and Security Bureau  granted the request of the Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”) to renew the temporary denial order issued in this matter on May 5, 2023. The Bureau has found that renewal of this order, as modified, is necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations and that renewal for an extended period is appropriate because Mahan Airways has engaged in a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR.

  • Mahan Airways of Iran
  • Pejman Mahmood Kosarayanifard, a/k/a Kosarian Fard of the United Arab Emirates
  • Mahmoud Amini of the United Arab Emirates
  • Kerman Aviation, a/k/a GIE Kerman Aviation of France
  • Sirjanco Trading LLC of the United Arab Emirates
  • Mahan Air General Trading LLC of the United Arab Emirates
  • Mehdi Bahrami of Turkey
  • Al Naser Airlines, a/k/a al-Naser Airlines, a/k/a Al Naser Wings Airline, a/k/a Alnaser Airlines and, Air Freight Ltd of the United Arab Emirates
  • Ali Abdullah Alhay, a/k/a Ali Alhay, a/k/a Ali Abdullah Ahmed Alhay of Saudi Arabia
  • Bahar Safwa General Trading of the United Arab Emirates
  • Sky Blue Bird Group, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird Aviation, a/k/a Sky Blue Bird Ltd., a/k/a Sky Blue Bird FZC of the United Arab Emirates
  • Issam Shammout, a/k/a Muhammad Isam Muhammad, Anwar Nur Shammout, a/k/a Issam Anwar of Turkey

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-24310

*******

November 6, 2023: Swift Prepaid Solutions, Inc. d/b/a daVinci Payments (daVinci), a financial services and payments firm based in Buffalo Grove, Illinois, has agreed to remit $206,213 to settle its potential civil liability for 12,391 apparent violations of OFAC sanctions on Crimea, Iran, Syria, and Cuba.

Between November 15, 2017 and July 27, 2022, daVinci, which manages prepaid reward card programs, enabled reward cards to be redeemed from persons apparently resident in sanctioned jurisdictions. The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that daVinci’s conduct was non-egregious and was voluntarily self-disclosed.

Between March 2020 and February 2022, in the course of a compliance review and subsequent investigation, daVinci discovered that on 12,378 occasions it had redeemed prepaid cards for users with Internet Protocol (IP) addresses associated with Iran, Syria, Cuba, and Crimea. After daVinci began preventing access to its platform from IP addresses associated with these sanctioned jurisdictions, the company further discovered it had redeemed prepaid cards for 13 card recipients who had used email addresses with suffixes (sometimes called top-level domains) associated with sanctioned jurisdictions (e.g., Syria is .sy, Iran is .ir) during the redemption process and who were apparently resident therein. Over the course of the relevant time period, this absence of comprehensive geolocation controls led daVinci to process 12,391 redemptions totaling $549,134.89 for cardholders apparently located in sanctioned jurisdictions, resulting in apparent violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201; the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 2 § 560.204; the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 589.287; and the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 542.207 (the “Apparent Violations”).

This enforcement action underscores the importance of obtaining and using all available information to verify a customer’s identity or residency, including by using location-related data, such as IP address and top-level domains, for sanctions compliance purposes. As appropriate, firms providing services through online platforms should integrate such information into a risk-based sanctions compliance program to prevent the provision of services to persons in sanctioned jurisdictions. This case further demonstrates the potential shortcomings of controls that rely on customer-provided information, rather than a holistic information-gathering system that can mitigate evasion or misrepresentation. The action further highlights the value of conducting proactive, self-initiated reviews to identify compliance gaps, disclose any potential violations to OFAC, and taking steps to remediate deficiencies, including by instituting periodic independent testing to ensure adequate controls.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932276/download?inline

*******

November 7, 2023: Matthew S. Axelrod, Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement at the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), issued a Temporary Denial Order (TDO) suspending the export privileges of seven persons and three companies – Nikolay Goltsev, Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, Kristina Puzyreva, Oleg Zenchenko, Yekaterina Vetoshkina, Pavel Chernikov, Vladimir Bochkarev, SH Brothers Group Inc. (SH Brothers), SN Electronics, Inc. (SN Electronics), and Suntronic F.Z.E. (Suntronic). These ten parties are alleged to be part of a sophisticated global procurement scheme that unlawfully sourced and purchased millions of dollars in dual-use electronics for end-users in Russia, including companies affiliated with the Russian military.

These actions are related to an indictment in the Eastern District of New York and are the result of coordination by the Disruptive Technology Strike Force co-led by the Departments of Justice and Commerce and Task Force KleptoCapture. Goltsev, Nasriddinov, Puzyreva, Zenchenko, Vetoshkina, Chernikov, and Bochkarev were indicted in the Eastern District of New York on multiple charges, including conspiracy to violate the Export Control Reform Act. Goltsev, Nasriddinov and Puzyreva were previously arrested on October 31, 2023, pursuant to a criminal complaint. The actions by the Department of Commerce build on the indictment by blocking SH Brothers, SN Electronics, and Suntronic, along with the other parties to the TDO, from access to U.S. origin items and technologies.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3382-2023-11-07-bis-press-release-sh-brothers-tdo/file

*******

November 14, 2023: Pursuant to section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations (the “Regulations” or “EAR”), the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”), U.S. Department of Commerce, through its Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”), has requested the issuance of an Order temporarily denying, for a period of 180 days, the export privileges under the Regulations of:

  • Nikolay Goltsev, a/k/a Nick Stevens, a/k/a Gio Ross of Quebec, Canada.
  • Salimdzhon Nasriddinov of New York, USA
  • Kristina Puzyreva of Quebec, Canada
  • Vladimir Bochkarev of Russia
  • Pavel Chernikov of Russia
  • Yekaterina Vetoshkina of Russia
  • Oleg Zenchenko of Russia
  • SH Brothers Group, Inc. of New York, USA
  • SN Electronics, Inc. of New York, USA
  • Suntronic FZE of the United Arab Emirates

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-25005

*******

November 21, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury, through the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and IRS Criminal Investigation (CI), has taken unprecedented action to hold Binance Holdings Ltd. and its affiliates (collectively, Binance) accountable for violations of the U.S. anti-money laundering (AML) and sanctions laws that protect American national security and the integrity of the international financial system. Binance is the world’s largest virtual currency exchange, responsible for an estimated 60% of centralized virtual currency spot trading.

Binance settled with FinCEN and OFAC for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and apparent violations of multiple sanctions programs. The violations include failure to implement programs to prevent and report suspicious transactions with terrorists — including Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) — ransomware attackers, money launderers, and other criminals, as well as matching trades between U.S. users and those in sanctioned jurisdictions like Iran, North Korea, Syria, and the Crimea region of Ukraine. By failing to comply with AML and sanctions obligations, Binance enabled a range of illicit actors to transact freely on the platform. This settlements are part of a global agreement simultaneous with Binance’s resolution of related matters with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).

FinCEN’s settlement agreement assesses a civil money penalty of $3.4 billion, imposes a five-year monitorship, and requires significant compliance undertakings, including to ensure Binance’s complete exit from the United States. OFAC’s settlement agreement assesses a penalty of $968 million and requires Binance to abide by a series of robust sanctions compliance obligations, including full cooperation with the monitorship overseen by FinCEN. To ensure that Binance fulfils the terms of its settlement — including that it does not offer services to U.S. persons — and to ensure that illicit activity is addressed, Treasury will retain access to books, records, and systems of Binance for a period of five years through a monitor. Failure to live up to these obligations could expose Binance to substantial additional penalties, including a $150 million suspended penalty, which would be collected by FinCEN if Binance fails to comply with the terms of the required compliance undertakings and monitorship.

The monitor will oversee remedial undertakings necessary to address Binance’s failure to comply with its anti-money laundering and sanctions obligations. The monitor will also conduct periodic reviews and report to FinCEN, OFAC, and the CFTC on its findings and recommendations to ensure Binance’s ongoing compliance with the terms of the settlement agreements.

These actions underscore Treasury’s commitment to promoting compliance within the virtual currency industry, including by actively enforcing AML and sanctions laws. Treasury’s authorities to enforce those laws are broad, reaching a wide range of misconduct, and can apply to both U.S. and foreign persons. Wherever located, virtual currency exchanges and financial technology firms should, like any other financial institution, ensure they adopt a managerial commitment to compliance at the very top, and that risk-based programs and controls are integrated effectively into their platforms and technology from “Day One.”

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1925

*******

November 22, 2023: On June 23, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Samantha Coronado (“Coronado”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Coronado was convicted of smuggling 730 rounds of CBC .50 caliber ammunition from the United States to Mexico. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced Coronado to 46 months of confinement, three years of supervised release and a $100 assessment.

The Bureau of Industry and Security has decided to deny Coronado’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of seven years from the date of Coronado’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Coronado had an interest at the time of her conviction.

From the date of this Order until June 23, 2029, Samantha Coronado, with a last known address of Inmate Number: 83982–509, FMC Carswell, Federal Medical Center, P.O. Box 27137, Fort Worth, TX 76127, and when acting for or on her behalf, her successors, assigns, employees, agents or representatives (“the Denied Person”), may not directly or indirectly participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-25838

Sanctions

U.S. Department of State

November 2, 2023: The Department of State imposed sanctions to further target individuals and entities associated with Russia’s war effort and other malign activities. All targets are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, which authorizes sanctions with respect to specified harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation. The Department of State designated a major entity involved in the development, operation, and ownership of Russia’s key Arctic LNG 2 liquified natural gas (LNG) project, as well as the metals and mining sector of the Russian Federation economy, and a network procuring items in support of the production of the KUB-BLA and Lancet suicide drones being used by the Russian military in Ukraine.

  • Limited Liability Company Arctic LNG 2 (LLC Arctic LNG 2)
  • Joint Stock Company Russian Titanium Resources (Rustitan)
  • Anatoliy Nikolaevich Tkachuk
  • Alexey Alexeyevich Novikov
  • Russian Titanium Resources Limited
  • Limited Liability Company Zala Aero
  • A Level Aerosystems Cst
  • Aleksandr Vyacheslavovich Zakharov
  • Svetlana Nikolaevna Zakharova
  • Limited Liability Company Invest Group
  • Maria Aleksandrovna Osetrova
  • Limited Liability Company Scientific And Technical Center Orion
  • Limited Liability Company Doris
  • Lavrentii Aleksandrovich Zakharov
  • Nikita Aleksandrovich Zakharov
  • Limited Liability Company Aeroscan
  • Limited Liability Company Emergency Digital Solutions
  • Limited Liability Company RTK
  • Limited Liability Company Omp
  • Maksim Alekseyevich Kotelnikov
  • Limited Liability Company Hartis DV
  • Dmitriy Alekseyevich Dmitriev
  • Limited Liability Company Id Solution
  • Igor Nikolaevich Ievlev
  • Ooo Mvizion
  • Limited Liability Company Sputnik Electronics
  • Limited Liability Company Technical Center Windeq
  • Limited Liability Company Alfakomponent
  • Limited Liability Company Fotopark
  • Limited Liability Company Bik Inform
  • Limited Liability Company Nanochip
  • Limited Liability Company N Chip Msk
  • Limited Liability Company Sputnik Spetspostavka
  • Limited Liability Company Entep
  • Limited Liability Company Spetstechnotrade
  • Limited Liability Company Orelmetallpolymer
  • Bestop Globle Mfg Limited
  • Limited Liability Company Legion Komplekt (Legion Komplekt)
  • Baltelektron Limited Liability Company
  • Makro Tim Limited Liability Company
  • Dafeng Asia Co LLC
  • Limited Liability Company Advanta Electro
  • Limited Liability Company Comfort Max
  • Neway Technologies Limited
  • LLC Laser Components
  • Limited Liability Company Scientific Production Company Electronic, Optical, And Mechanical Systems
  • Limited Liability Company Stilsoft
  • Limited Liability Company New Technologies
  • Joint Stock Company Npc Spetsneftprodukt
  • Moscow State Technical University Named After N. E. Bauman
  • Limited Liability Company Machine Building Association Pressmash
  • Limited Liability Company Lanmax (Lanmax)
  • Dream Lite Trading LLC
  • Limited Liability Company Mdikam Ek
  • Bliksem Computers & Requisites Trading Company LLC
  • Joint Stock Company Plastmass Plant
  • Gleb Romanovich Trotsenko
  • Limited Liability Company Lex Prime
  • Limited Liability Company Start Aero
  • Limited Liability Company Gleniks Teknolodzhis
  • LLC A Invest
  • Limited Liability Company Infrastructure Corporation Aeon
  • Limited Liability Company Tsrti
  • LLC Bp Inzhiniring
  • LLC Aeon Development
  • Limited Liability Company Ri2
  • Limited Liability Company Yacht Club River Park Nagatino
  • Limited Liability Company Rechnikov Invest
  • Limited Liability Company River Park
  • Limited Liability Company Yup 2
  • Limited Liability Company Ksk Ltd
  • Limited Liability Company Torgrechtrans
  • Limited Liability Company Ahd South Port
  • Limited Liability Company Rassvet
  • Limited Liability Company Flemsted
  • LLC Tsentrtekhkhimmash
  • Qualified Developer Kutuzovskiy 16 Limited Liability Company
  • Limited Liability Company Ahd Kutuzovskiy Towers
  • Elena Igorevna Milskaia
  • Limited Liability Company Kaliningrad Balttrans
  • Limited Liability Company Pozitivinfo
  • Limited Liability Company Prospekt
  • Interregional Public Organization For The Promotion Of Domestic Traditions And Cultural Heritage Veche
  • Salman Soipovich Zakriev
  • Yakub Salmanovich Zakriev
  • Public Legal Company Military Construction Company
  • LLC Abz Belyi Rast
  • Federal Autonomous Institution Roskapstroy
  • Limited Liability Company Roskapstroy Infrastructural Projects
  • Limited Liability Company Roskapstroy Clean Water
  • Limited Liability Company Roskapstroy Novorossiya
  • Aleksey Sergeevich Besprozvannykh
  • Anastasiya Borisovna Bondarenko
  • Viktor Leonidovich Evtukhov
  • Oleg Yurevich Kachanov
  • Dmitriy Aleksandrovich Oguryaev
  • Lev Valentinovich Gershanok
  • Aleksey Mikhaylovich Serko

https://www.state.gov/taking-additional-sweeping-measures-against-russia/

*******

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

November 6, 2023: 88 FR 76128: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of Russia (12), and Uzbekistan (1). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.

Russia

  • Aeroscan Limited Liability Company;
  • Alfakomponent;
  • BIC-Inform LLC;
  • Hartis DV LLC;
  • ID Solution LLC;
  • OOO OMP;
  • Orelmetallpolimer LLC;
  • Spel LLC;
  • Spetstehnotreyd LLC;
  • STC Orion LLC;
  • Technical Center Windeq LLC
  • ZALA Aero Group.

Uzbekistan

  • Mvizion LLC.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-24508

*******

November 14, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued an OFAC Compliance Communiqué: Guidance for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestinian People in response to questions from the NGO community and the general public on how to provide humanitarian assistance while complying with OFAC sanctions.

OFAC issued this guidance to clarify that U.S. sanctions do not stand in the way of legitimate humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people. Donors seeking to support the Palestinian people are encouraged to donate to trusted organizations.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932311/download?inline

*******

November 17, 2023: 88 FR 80955: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding four entities under nine entries to the Entity List. These entities are listed under the destinations of Costa Rica (1), Ecuador (1), India (1) Panama (2), Spain (1), Russia (1), and Venezuela (2). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.

The End-User Review Committee (ERC) determined to add Aerofalcon S.L., under the destination of Spain; Novax Group S.A., under the destinations of Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela, and Russia; and Zero Waste Global SA, under the destinations of Panama and Venezuela, to the Entity List. These entities are added to the Entity List pursuant to § 744.11 of the EAR for engaging in activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. Specifically, these entities were used by their principals to circumvent U.S. sanctions, supplying the representatives of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela with U.S. origin aircraft parts. This circumvention was conducted by, among other efforts, concealing the true end user and end destination of the exports using misrepresentations and fraudulent documents, including the filing of false Electronic Export Information. These entities will be added with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR and a license review policy of presumption of denial.

The ERC also determined to add Si2 Microsystems Private Limited, under the destination of India, to the Entity List. This entity is added to the Entity List for providing support to Russia’s military and/or defense industrial base. Specifically, this entity supplied Russian consignees connected to the Russian defense sector with U.S.-origin integrated circuits after March 1, 2023. These integrated circuits are classified under Harmonized Tariff System (HTS)-6 codes 854231, 854232, 854233, and/or 854239. These HTS–6 codes are identified under supplement no. 4 to part 746 (Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions Pursuant to § 746.5(a)(1)(ii)). All U.S.-origin items classified under these HTS–6 codes have been controlled for export and reexport and transfer within Russia since September 15, 2022. Such U.S.-origin items require a license under § 746.5(a)(1)(ii) of the EAR when destined to Russia or Belarus. Therefore, the documented shipments by this entity to Russia of such U.S.-origin items are contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests under § 744.11(b) of the EAR. This entity will be added with a license requirement for all items subject to the EAR and a license review policy of denial.

Costa Rica

  • Novax Group S.A.

Ecuador

  • Novax Group S.A.

India

  • Si2 Microsystems Private Limited.

Panama

  • Novax Group S.A.;
  • Zero Waste Global SA.

Spain

  • Aerofalcon S.L.

Russia

  • Novax Group S.A.

Venezuela

  • Novax Group S.A.;
  • Zero Waste Global SA.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-25684

*******

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

November 2, 2023: OFAC Issued General License 13G: “Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024”.

General License 13G: U.S. persons, or entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person, are authorized to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, certifications, or tax refunds to the extent such transactions are prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to the day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation of such U.S. persons or entities, through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 31, 2024.

This General License 13G does not authorize: (1) Any debit to an account on the books of a U.S. financial institution of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or (2) Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized.

Effective November 2, 2023, General License No. 13F, dated August 10, 2023, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License No. 13G

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932271/download?inline

*******

November 2, 2023: OFAC Issued General License 74: “Authorizing the Wind Down and Rejection of Transactions Involving East-West United Bank”.

General License 74: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions involving East-West United Bank, or any entity in which East-West United Bank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 31, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

Except as provided in this General License 74, U.S. persons are authorized to reject, rather than block, and return to the originator or originating financial institution or their successor-in-interest, all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the processing of funds involving East-West United Bank, or any entity in which East-West United Bank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, as an originating, intermediary, or beneficiary financial institution, through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 31, 2024.

This general license does not authorize: (1) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 2 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions; (2) Any debit to an account on the books of a U.S. financial institution of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or (3) Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the RuHSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR other than the blocked persons described in this General License 74, unless separately authorized.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932256/download?inline

*******

November 2, 2023: OFAC Issued General License 75: “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Certain Entities Blocked on November 2, 2023”.

General License 75: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or the facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity of the following blocked entities (“Covered Debt or Equity”) to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 31, 2024: (1) Sistema Public Joint Stock Financial Corporation; (2) East-West United Bank; (3) Limited Liability Company Arctic LNG 2; or (4) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

Except as provided in this general license, all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of Covered Debt or Equity that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern daylight time, November 2, 2023 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 31, 2024.

Except as provided in this General License 75 , all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, November 2, 2023 that (i) include a blocked person described in this general license as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to Covered Debt or Equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 31, 2024, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

This general license does not authorize: (1) U.S. persons to sell, or to facilitate the sale of, Covered Debt or Equity to, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked; or (2) U.S. persons to purchase or invest in, or to facilitate the purchase of or investment in, directly or indirectly, Covered Debt or Equity, other than purchases of or investments in Covered Debt or Equity ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer of Covered Debt or Equity as described in thisgeneral license.

This general license does not authorize: (1) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 2 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions; (2) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or (3) Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the RuHSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR other than the blocked persons described in this general license, unless separately authorized.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932261/download?inline

*******

November 2, 2023: OFAC Issued General License 76: “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on November 2, 2023”.

General License 76: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked entities (collectively, the “Blocked Entities”) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 31, 2024, provided that any payment to a Blocked Entity is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR): (1) Sistema Public Joint Stock Financial Corporation; (2) Saint Petersburg Stock Exchange; (3) Limited Liability Company Arctic LNG 2; or (4) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

This general license does not authorize: (1) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 2 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions; (2) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or (3) Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the RuHSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR other than the Blocked Entities described in this general license, unless separately authorized.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932266/download?inline

*******

November 3, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Ekaterina Zhdanova, a Russian national, for her role in laundering and moving funds using virtual currency on behalf of Russian elites. This action is consistent with the G7’s commitment to crack down on sanctions evasion and closing loopholes that allow the Russian state, its elites, proxies, and oligarchs to leverage virtual currency to offset the impact of international sanctions.

In response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, OFAC has imposed expansive economic sanctions on the Russian financial system. In March 2022, Ekaterina Zhdanova (Zhdanova) assisted a Russian client in obfuscating their source of wealth in order to transfer over $2.3 million into Western Europe through a fraudulently opened investment account and real estate purchases. Zhdanova’s services result in the provision of access to Western financial markets for Russian individuals that may otherwise be blocked due to U.S. and international prohibitions. This type of illicit financial activity can be used to evade the multilateral U.S. and international sanctions that impose costs on Russia for its unprovoked war and deny the access of sanctioned Russian individuals and entities to the international financial system.

Zhdanova has also provided services to individuals connected with the Russian Ryuk ransomware group. In 2021, Zhdanova laundered over $2.3 million of suspected victim payments on behalf of a Ryuk ransomware affiliate. Ryuk has been used to target thousands of victims worldwide, including in the United States, across a variety of sectors. In October 2022, U.S. law enforcement specifically identified Ryuk as an imminent and increasing cybercrime threat to hospitals and healthcare providers in the United States.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1874

*******

November 7, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 13 Sinaloa Cartel members—several of whom are fugitives—and four Sonora, Mexico-based entities. Responsible for a significant portion of the illicit fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States, the Sinaloa Cartel is one of the most powerful and pervasive drug trafficking organizations in the world. This action was coordinated closely with the Government of Mexico, including La Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (UIF), Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit.

  • Juan Carlos Morgan Huerta
  • Jose Arnoldo Morgan Huerta
  • Jose Luis Morgan Huerta
  • Miguel Angel Morgan Huerta
  • Martin Morgan Huerta
  • Oscar Murillo Morgan
  • David Alonso Chavarin Preciado
  • Jesus Francisco Camacho Porchas
  • Oscar Enrique Moreno Orozco
  • Ramiro Martin Romero Wirichaga
  • Cristian Julian Meneses Ospina
  • Sergio Isaias Hernandez Mazon
  • Alvaro Ramos Acosta
  • Conceptos Gastronomicos de Sonora, S. de R.L. de C.V.
  • Morgan Golden Mining, S.A. de C.V.
  • Comercializadora Villba Stone, S.A. de C.V.
  • Exportadora del Campos Ramos Acosta, S. de R.L. de C.V.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1887

*******

OFAC Issued General License 76A: “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on November 2, 2023”.

November 8, 2023: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked entities (collectively, the “Blocked Entities”) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 31, 2024, provided that any payment to a Blocked Entity is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR): (1) Sistema Public Joint Stock Financial Corporation; (2) Public Joint Stock Company Saint Petersburg Exchange; (3) Limited Liability Company Arctic LNG 2; or (4) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

This general license does not authorize any transactions prohibited by Directive 2 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions; Any transactions prohibited by Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or any transactions otherwise prohibited by the RuHSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR other than the Blocked Entities described in this General License 76A, unless separately authorized.

Effective November 8, 2023, General License No. 76, dated November 2, 2023, has been replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License No. 76A.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932286/download?inline

*******

November 14, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed its third round of sanctions targeting Hamas-affiliated individuals and entities since the October 7 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel. The action designates key Hamas officials and the mechanisms by which Iran provides support to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The designations are coordinated with action by the U.K. and are aimed at protecting the international financial system from abuse by Hamas and their enablers.

  • Nasser Abu Sharif
  • Muhjat AlQuds Foundation
  • Jamil Yusuf Ahmad ‘Aliyan
  • Akram al-Ajouri
  • Nabil Chouman & Co
  • Nabil Khaled Halil Chouman
  • Khaled Chouman
  • Reda Ali Khamis
  • Mahmoud Khaled Zahhar
  • Mu’ad Ibrahim Muhammed Rashid al-Atili

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231114_33

*******

November 14, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued the OFAC Compliance Communiqué: Guidance for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestinian People in response to questions from the NGO community and the general public on how to provide humanitarian assistance while complying with OFAC sanctions.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury remains committed to denying Hamas access to funds following its heinous terrorist attacks against the people of Israel, while also ensuring legitimate humanitarian aid can continue to flow to the Palestinian people in Gaza. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has continued to use sanctions to degrade and disrupt Hamas’s fundraising network and is working with partners and allies around the globe to combat terrorist financing. Groups such as Hamas raise funds through entities that present themselves outwardly as legitimate charities but are in fact fronts for Hamas’s illicit fundraising, often abusing the good will of donors. OFAC will continue using the tools and authorities at its disposal to sever Hamas’s illicit fundraising avenues.

OFAC is issuing this guidance to clarify that U.S. sanctions do not stand in the way of legitimate humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people. Donors seeking to support the Palestinian people are encouraged to donate to trusted organizations.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932311/download?inline

*******

November 15, 2023: In support of President Biden’s National Drug Control Strategy and in cooperation with the government of Costa Rica, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating a Costa Rican narcotics trafficker, known not only for the volume of drugs he moves but the violence with which he operates, who has played a significant role in Costa Rica’s recent transformation into a major narcotics transit hub.

According to the State Department’s 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Costa Rica has a growing domestic drug consumption problem, as drugs warehoused in Costa Rica increasingly enter the local market and domestic criminal organizations gain influence with increased narcotics revenues. The national homicide rate rose from 11.2 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2021 to 12.6 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2022. The homicide rate in the province of Limon is 35.8 per 100,000 inhabitants. Despite these challenges, Costa Rica works closely with the United States to professionalize police, strengthen citizen security, and increase drug interdictions. However, resource limitations strain Costa Rican law enforcement services and pose significant challenges to future success. This action is the result of close collaboration with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s Costa Rica Country Office.

  • Gilbert Hernan de Los Angeles Bell Fernandez

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231115

*******

OFAC Issued General License 77: “Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions Involving Certain Persons or Vessels”.

November 16, 2023: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one of the following activities involving the blocked persons or vessels described in this general license are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 14, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (RuHSR): (1) The safe docking and anchoring of any of the blocked vessels listed in this General License 77 (“blocked vessels”) in port; (2) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; or (3) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.

The authorizations in this General License 77 apply to the following blocked persons and vessels listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and any entity in which any of the following persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest:

  • Kazan Shipping Incorporated (registered owner of KAZAN, IMO 9258002);
  • Progress Shipping Company Limited (registered owner of LIGOVSKY PROSPECT, IMO 9256066); or
  • Gallion Navigation Incorporated (registered owner of NS CENTURY, IMO 9306782).

This General License 77 does not authorize: The entry into any new commercial contracts involving the property or interests in property of any blocked persons, including the blocked entities and vessels described in this General License 77, except as otherwise authorized; The offloading of any cargo onboard any of the blocked vessels, including the offloading of crude oil or petroleum products of Russian Federation origin, except for the offloading of cargo that is ordinarily incident and necessary to address vessel emergencies authorized pursuant to this General License 77; Any transactions related to the sale of crude oil or petroleum products of Russian Federation origin; Any transactions prohibited by Directive 2 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions; Any transactions prohibited by Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the RuHSR, including transactions involving the property or interests in property of any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, other than transactions involving the blocked persons or vessels in this General License 77, unless separately authorized.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932336/download?inline

*******

OFAC Issued General License 2: “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Orka Holding AD”.

November 16, 2023: All transactions prohibited by the Western Balkans Stabilization Regulations (WBSR), 31 CFR part 588, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving Orka Holding AD, or any entity in which Orka Holding AD owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 15, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the WBSR.

This General License 2 does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the WBSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the WBSR other than the blocked persons described in this general license, unless separately authorized.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932326/download?inline

*******

OFAC Issued General License 3: “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Agricultural Commodities,

Medicine, Medical Devices, Replacement Parts and Components, Software Updates, or Medical Prevention, Diagnosis, or Treatment, or Clinical Trials Involving Orka Holding AD”.

November 16, 2023: All transactions prohibited by the Western Balkans Stabilization Regulations (WBSR), 31 CFR part 588, involving Orka Holding AD, or any entity in which Orka Holding AD owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, related to the following are authorized: (1) the production, manufacturing, sale, transport, or provision of agricultural commodities, agricultural equipment, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components for medical devices, or software updates for medical devices; (2) the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of any disease or medical condition; or (3) the conducting of clinical trials or other medical research.

For the purposes of this General License 3, agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices are defined as follows:

  1. Agricultural commodities. Agricultural commodities are products that fall within the term “agricultural commodity” as defined in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602) and are intended for use as:
    1. Food for humans (including raw, processed, and packaged foods; live animals; vitamins and minerals; food additives or supplements; and bottled drinking water) or animals (including animal feeds);
    2. Seeds for food crops;
    3. Fertilizers or organic fertilizers; or
    4. Reproductive materials (such as live animals, fertilized eggs, embryos, and semen) for the production of food animals.
  2.  Medicine. Medicine is an item that falls within the definition of the term “drug” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
  3. Medical devices. A medical device is an item that falls within the definition of “device” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the WBSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the WBSR other than the blocked persons described in this General License 3, unless separately authorized.

Note to General License No. 3. Nothing in this general license relieves any person from compliance with any other Federal laws or requirements of other Federal agencies.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932331/download?inline

*******

November 16, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is imposing sanctions on three entities and identifying as blocked property three vessels that used Price Cap Coalition service providers while carrying Russian crude oil above the Coalition-agreed price cap. This action underscores Treasury’s commitment, alongside its international partners, to responsibly reducing oil revenues that the Russian government can use to bankroll its invasion of Ukraine.

The United States is part of an international coalition of countries (the Price Cap Coalition), including the G7, the European Union, and Australia, that have agreed to prohibit the import of crude oil and petroleum products of Russian Federation origin. These countries, home to many best-in-class financial and professional services, have also agreed to restrict a broad range of services related to the maritime transport of crude oil and petroleum products of Russian Federation origin—unless that oil is bought and sold at or below the specific price caps established by the Coalition or is authorized by a license. This policy is known as the “price cap.” The price cap is intended to maintain a reliable supply of crude oil and petroleum products to the global market while reducing the revenues the Russian Federation earns from oil after its own war of choice against Ukraine inflated global energy prices.

On October 12, 2023, the Price Cap Coalition published a Coalition Advisory for the Maritime Oil Industry and Related Sectors (“the Advisory”). The Advisory, which is directed at both government and private sector actors involved in the maritime trade of crude oil and refined petroleum products, provides recommendations concerning specific best practices and reflects our commitment to promoting responsible practices in the industry, preventing and disrupting sanctioned trade, and enhancing compliance with the price cap.

  • Kazan Shipping Incorporated
  • Progress Shipping Company Limited
  • Gallion Navigation Incorporated

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1915

*******

November 16, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated eight individuals and six entities pursuant to Western Balkans-related Executive Order (E.O.) 14033 and Russia-related E.O. 14024.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

  • Savo Cvijetinovic
  • BN Inzinjering
  • Petar Djokic

Montenegro

  • Miodrag “Daka” Davidovic
  • Branislav “Brano” Micunovic

North Macedonia

  • Sergey Samsonenko
  • Irina Samsonenko
  • Ratka Kunoska Kamceva
  • Kamchev Konsalting Skopje DOOEL
  • Orka Fajnans Skopje DOOEL
  • Orka Holding AD
  • Sistina Lajf Kear Sentar Skopje DOOEL
  • Bet City International DOO Skopje

Serbia

  • Nenad Popovic
  • Asset Electro LLC
  • Asset Automation LLC
  • Mosen Esset Menedzhment LLC

Russia

  • Joint Stock Company All-Russian Scientific Research Design and Technological Institute of Relay Engineering with Experimental Production
  • VNIIR Promelektro LLC
  • ABS Electrotekhnika LLC
  • VNIIR Gidroelektroavtomatika JSC
  • JSC VNIIR Progress
  • VNIIR Transstroi LLC
  • JSC ABS ZEiM Automation
  • Dominion Tverskaya Yaroslavskaya LLC
  • Dominion Nikolski LLC

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1916

*******

OFAC Issued General License 77: “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, Medical Devices, Replacement Parts and Components, Software Updates, or Medical Prevention, Diagnosis, or Treatment, or Clinical Trials Involving Orka Holding AD”.

*******

November 17, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating six individuals affiliated with the Iran-aligned militia group (IAMG) Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) based in Iraq. Trained, funded, and supported by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), KH is behind a spate of recent attacks against the United States and partners in Iraq and Syria following the horrific attacks by Hamas against Israel. The U.S. Department of State is also designating Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) and KSS leader Hashim Finyan Rahim al-Saraji. KSS, another Iraq-based IAMG that receives support from the IRGC, has planned and been involved in attacks against U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria.

  • Imad Naji al-Bahadli
  • Habib Hasan Mughamis Darraji
  • Ja’afar al-Husayni
  • Khalid Kadhim Jasim al-Skeni
  • Basim Mohammad Hasab al-Majidi
  • Mojtaba Jahandust

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1921

*******

November 29, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned over 20 individuals and entities for their involvement in financial facilitation networks for the benefit of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). Iran generates the equivalent of billions of dollars via commodity sales to fund its destabilizing regional activities and support of multiple regional proxy groups, including Hamas and Hizballah. MODAFL, the AFGS and the IRGC-QF utilize intricate networks of foreign-based front companies and brokers to enable these illicit commercial activities and exploit the international financial system.

Iran

  • Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company
  • Majid A’zami
  • Elyas Niroomand Toomaj
  • Pishro Tejarat Sana Company
  • Seyyed Abdoljavad Alavi

Hong Kong

  • Puyuan Trade Co., Limited
  • HK Sihang Haochen Trading Limited

United Arab Emirates

  • Unique Performance General Trading L.L.C
  • OPG Global General Trading Co. L.L.C
  • JEP Petrochemical Trading L.L.C
  • Future Energy Trading L.L.C
  • Tetis Global FZE
  • Royal Shell Goods Wholesalers L.L.C
  • A Three Energy FZE
  • Transmart DMCC
  • Zabi Vahap
  • Adelina Kuliyeva
  • Mehboob Thachankandy Palikandy
  • Solise Energy

Singapore

  • MSE Overseas PTE. Ltd.
  • Sealink Overseas PTE. Ltd.

*******

November 30, 2023: In coordination with foreign partners, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned eight foreign-based Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) agents that facilitate sanctions evasion, including revenue generation and missile-related technology procurement that support the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. Additionally, OFAC sanctioned cyber espionage group Kimsuky for gathering intelligence to support the DPRK’s strategic objectives.

These actions are in response to the DPRK’s November 21 claimed military reconnaissance satellite launch and demonstrates the multilateral efforts of the United States and foreign partners to hinder the DPRK’s ability to generate revenue, procure materiel, and gather intelligence that advances the development of its WMD program and the unlawful export of arms and related materiel from the DPRK.

  • Kang Kyong Il
  • Ri Sung Il
  • Kang Phyong Guk
  • So Myong
  • Choe Un Hyok
  • Jang Myong Chol
  • Choe Song Chol
  • Im Song Sun
  • Kimsuky

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1938

*******

November 30, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three Mexican individuals and 13 Mexican companies.  These individuals and companies are linked, directly or indirectly, to timeshare fraud led by the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG). CJNG, a violent Mexico-based organization, traffics a significant proportion of the illicit fentanyl and other deadly drugs that enter the United States. OFAC coordinated this action with the Government of Mexico, including its Financial Intelligence Unit, as well as U.S. Government partners, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Drug Enforcement Administration.

  • Teresa De Jesus Alvarado Rubio
  • Manuel Alejandro Foubert Cadena
  • Gabriela Del Villar Contreras
  • Grupo Empresarial Epta, S.A. de C.V.
  • Assis Realty And Vacation Club, S.A. de C.V.
  • Axis Sale & Maintenance Buildings, S.A. de C.V.
  • Comercializadora de Servicios Turisticos de Vallarta, S.A. de C.V.
  • Condos & Vacations Buildings Sale & Maintenance, S.A. de C.V.
  • Grupo Minera Barro Pacifico, S.A.P.I. de C.V.
  • International Realty & Maintenance, S.A. de C.V.
  • Mega Comercial Ferrelectrica, S.A. de C.V.
  • Real Estates & Holiday Cities, S.A. de C.V.
  • Terra Minas e Inversiones del Pacifico, S.A.P.I. de C.V.
  • Banlu Comercializadora, S.A. de C.V.
  • Crowlands, S.A. de C.V.
  • Skairu, S.A. de C.V.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1936

NOVEMBER 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES Read More »

OCTOBER 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through October 31, 2023.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

REGULATORY UPDATES

The President

President Biden Continues National Emergency With Respect To Syria.

October 12, 2023: 88 FR 71271:  On October 14, 2019, by Executive Order 13894, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in and in relation to Syria.

The situation in and in relation to Syria, and in particular the actions by the Government of Turkey to conduct a military offensive into northeast Syria, undermines the campaign to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, endangers civilians, and further threatens to undermine the peace, security, and stability in the region, and continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  For this reason, the President determined that the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13894 of October 14, 2019, must continue in effect beyond October 14, 2023.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act, the President continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13894 with respect to the situation in and in relation to Syria.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-22862

*******

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

DDTC Name and Address Changes Posted To Website

October 2 through 30, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Change in name and address from General Electric International Operations Company (Abu Dhabi), 17th Floor, WTC The Office Tower, Hamdan Street, Box No. 34637, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC – Abu Dhabi at Al Hisn, East 6, C5, Building Amna Ahmed Mohamed Onwani, 621, Zayet The First St., Al Hisn, Abu Dhabi 20035, United Arab Emirates, and all locations in the United Arab Emirates due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in name from NGK Spark Plugs Co., Ltd. to Niterra Co., Ltd. due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc. (Argentina), Enrique Butty 275, 6th Floor, Office 103C, Ciudad Autonoma de Buenos Aires, C1001AFA, Argentina to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC, Sucursal Argentina at Maipu 1300, Piso 9, Ciudad Autonoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina, and all locations in Argentina due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc. DLF Cyber City, Sector 25A DLF Phase III, Building No 7 A, Gurgaon 122002, India and AIFCS Bldg 1, Rafi Marg, New Delhi, India to GE India Industrial Pvt Ltd. A-18 First Floor, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase II, New Delhi 110020, India, and all locations in India due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc. 6F, No. 8, Minsheng E. Rd., Section 3, NanShan Minshen Bldg, Taipei, Taiwan and 7F, No. 8, Minsheng E. Rd., Taipei, Taiwan to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC – Taiwan Branch 15F-2, No. 168 Section 3, Nanjing E. Rd., Taipei City, 10488 Taiwan, and all locations in Taiwan due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in name from Netherlands Ministry of Defence’s Defence Materiel Organisation to Materiel and IT Command, ‘Commando Materieel en IT.’ due to government reorganization.
  • Change in name from Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering Co., Ltd. to Hanwha Ocean Co., Ltd. due to acquisition.
  • Change in name from LR Nederland B.V. to LRQA Nederland B.V. due to corporate rebranding.
  • Change in name from General Electric International, Inc. (Chile) to Industrial C&S Chile SpA. due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in name from Sogeti Deutschland GmbH to Capgemini Engineering Deutschland S.A.S. & Co. KG. due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc., Carrera 7 #166-50, Oficina 02-109 B, Bogota D.C., Colombia to Aviation Systems North America LLC, Sucursal Colombia, Carrera 7 #71-21, Torre B, Oficina 602, Bogota D.C., Colombia due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in name from Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc. to L3Harris Technologies, Inc. due to merger.
  • Change in name from Quantel-USA, Inc. to Lumibird Photonics USA, Inc. due to acquisition by Lumibird.
  • Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc., 5th Floor, Tatweer Tower, King Fahad Road, Riyadh 11433, Saudi Arabia to Branch of General Electric Aviation Systems North America LLC, Building Number 7546, Qurtubah District, Unit 1110, Riyadh 13244, Saudi Arabia due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in names from STS Aviation Services International Limited, NAAS Aviation Services International Limited, and Triumph Aviation Services International Limited to STS Aviation Services Ireland Limited due to merger.
  • Change in name from Pinnacles Solutions, Inc. to Pinnacles Solutions, LLC due to acquisition by NANA Regional Corporation, Inc.
  • Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc., Calle Osiris, Num. 13, Planta 1, Edificio Osiris, Madrid 28037, Spain to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC, Sucursal en Espana, Spaces Rio, Calle de Manzanares, 4, Madrid 28005, Spain due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc, C Ring Road, Najma Intersection, Doha, Qatar to GE Aviation Systems North America QSTP-B, Qatar Science & Technology Park-B, Al Gharafa Street, Al Rayyan, Education City, Doha, Qatar due to corporate reorganization.

*******

DDTC Final Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations Posted to Website

October 11, 2022 through May 25, 2023: On October 12, 2023 the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following Final CJ Determinations for CJ’s adjudicated between October 11, 2022 and May 25, 2023, on its website at:

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=6ea6afdcdbc36300529d368d7c96194b

Readers may find these determinations helpful when performing self-classification work.

Model Name Description Final Determination Date

 

Final Determination Manufacturer
Gerber files for a printed circuit board (part number 33244-20 PCB) used for proof-of-concept during the development of a Variable Emissivity Panel for Identification of Friend or Foe (VEPIFF) Gerber files describing a flexible printed circuit board 2023-05-25 USML Category XI(d) Intellisense Systems, Inc
Talyn Platform, Model & Version 1 Unmanned aerial electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) cargo transportation platform that can operate without airport infrastructure 2023-05-25 Seek CCATS Talyn Air, Inc
Quad Element P I N Photodiode, Part Number OG-QPPP-7000-25 An InGaAs-based PIN photodiode 2023-05-25 USML Category XII(e)(1) Optogration, Inc
SAFEScreen Psychophys-iological Touch Screen Stress Analyzer (PTSSA)TM An investigative tool to determine deceptiveness or inappropriate (unlawful) behavior patterns of individuals being tested 2023-05-25 EAR99 THORAD LLC
2x Extender, See-spot Device for ECOSI, Part Number 14245-3082 Provides magnification and greater daylight operation capabilities to the ECOSI (a device used to see the infrared spot on targets produced by coded target markers and laser target designators) 2023-05-25 CCL ECCN 7A611.x Optics 1, Inc
Griffin ESAF Det Socket Kapton Disc, part number 332400-C; Initiator Kapton Sleeve, part number 332629-002 B; and Initiator Polyimide Wrap, part number 332845-A Electrically insulating pieces 2023-05-25 EAR99 Excelitas Technologies Corp
NW-230 Engine, Model and Part Number: NW-230 A two-stroke reciprocating engine system planned for use in unmanned systems including aerial vehicles 2023-05-25 EAR99 Northwest ULD, Inc
Written training material or PowerPoint presentations for de-escalation training, post traumatic stress disorder counselor training, and humanitarian aid Training and humanitarian assistance including food, water, and clothing 2023-05-25 EAR99 National De-escalation Training Center
Training on the Operation and Use of the Mi-17 Helicopter Training of foreign personnel on the operation and use of the utility transport model of the Mi-17 helicopter in an Mi-17 simulator 2023-05-25 USML Category VIII(i) Concord XXI USA, LLC
Microneedle Sensor Patch for Continuous Interstitial Fluid Cortisol Measurement A skin-worn continuous cortisol monitor device that can detect circulating levels of cortisol to assess cognitive performance and fatigue 2023-05-25 EAR99 Biolinq Incorporated
Mask Light Amplified Microphone, Part Number: N1001682-00 Hands-free supplemental cockpit lighting for fixed wing aircraft that use electret microphones 2023-05-25 CCL ECCN 9A610.x Gentex Corporation
Rapid Attack Payload Targeted Release (RAPTR) System, consisting of 1) RAPTR Control Module, Part Number 1C0512; 2) RAPTR Energetic Module, Part Number D12476; 3) RAPTR Handheld, Part Number EB0721-600; 4) RAPTR Adapter Plate, Part Number F22104 Weaponization system for unmanned air and vehicle platforms, and its constituent elements 2023-05-23 RAPTR System: USML Category IV(a)(6) 1) Control Module: USML Category IV(c) 2) Energetic Module: USML Category V(a)(15) 3) Handheld: Category USML Category IV(c) 4) Adapter Plate: USML Category IV(c) Ensign-Bickford Aerospace & Defense Company
Optical Transceiver, D-Lightsys, consisting of part numbers ACSM2410IP201 and ACSM2410IP202, firmware version 1.0.901-629-4494 Electro-optical transceiver consisting of a pair of transmitter and receiver modules 2023-05-18 USML Category VIII(h)(1) Radiall America, Inc
LED 360-degree Situational Awareness Kit with Infrared, Model 07630, NSN 6220-01-629-4494 360-degree situational awareness infrared external lighting kit 2023-05-18 CCL ECCN 0A606.y.12 Truck-Lite Co., LLC
100G Ethernet Network Switch with RESCUE module, Model and Version Number: SX-154-4110, Part Number: SX1544110 An electronic component used to provide encrypted bridging between different security domains 2023-05-18 USML Category XIII(b)(4) Spectranetix, Inc
Avcon King Air Hardpoints, Model KA HARDPOINT Kit consisting of Internal mounts and racks that, once installed, allows for the attachment of external stores on the wings of certain models of the King Air aircraft 2023-05-15 EAR99 Butler National Corporation
IXD Tera, Model V1.3 (1 Gigabit) (part number IXD-MC) and Model 2.0 (10 Gigabit) (part number IXD-HC) Hardware and operating system software in a custom configuration to provide uni-directional and bidirectional transfers between two networks 2023-05-15 Seek CCATS Owl Cyber Defense Solutions, LLC
XDE Radium, part numbers XDE‐RAD‐OWT‐OI‐LOQ v1.4 (optical) and XDE‐RAD‐OWT‐DI‐LOQ (digital) Security device for computers and networks 2023-05-15 Seek CCATS Owl Cyber Defense Solutions, LLC
Aeternus and LLUL-21 3D Printed Night Vision Housings 3D printed night vision housings designed for handheld or helmet-mounted devices 2023-04-13 EAR99 Low Light Innovations LLC
Joint Chemical Agent Detector – Solid Liquid Adapter (JCAD-SLA) Kit, Part Number: 5-15-35000 A chemical particulates kit that gives operators the ability to identify trace amounts of solid and liquid residues, including explosives, narcotics, pharmaceuticals, and fourth generation agents 2023-04-13 CCL ECCN 1A607.j Smiths Detection US, LLC
Joint Chemical Agent Detector – Solid Liquid Adapter (JCAD-SLA) Kit, Part Number: 5-15-35000 A chemical particulates kit that gives operators the ability to identify trace amounts of solid and liquid residues, including explosives, narcotics, pharmaceuticals, and fourth generation agents 2023-04-13 CCL ECCN 1A607.j Smiths Detection US, LLC
Holographic Enabled Display System, Version 3.0 (HEDS3), and Augmented Reality Display System (ARDS) Holographic display systems that overlay information received from sensors on what the user is viewing 2023-04-13 EAR99 Creative Microsystems Corporation
GC Patrol Shield Model 3.1 A lightweight shield that exceeds the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) NIJ 0108.01 Level III Standard 2023-03-22 USML Category XIII(e)(5) Graphene Composites Usa, Inc
LumY, Model 2302 V2, Part Number 12002 Through-wall radar sensor capable of 2 dimensional detection 2023-03-22 USML Category XI(a)(3)(xvi) Lumineye Inc
Foresight Advisory Services, Model Number: LNGVWS-FO01 Part Number: 001, and Foresight Facilitation Training, Model Number: LNGVWS-FA01 Part Number: 001 Foresight advisory services on long-range thinking and strategic planning using futures literacy, futures studies, and foresight, and training in facilitation for foresight, to empower groups in their search of insights when doing foresight exercises 2023-03-17 EAR99 Longviews S.R.L.
Mode-locked Laser, Model MLO-100, Part Numbers MLO-100-100 and MLO-100-200 and Mode-Lockable Fiber Laser Oscillator, Model FO-100, Part Numbers FO-100-100 and FO-100-200 A laser and a mode-lockable fiber laser oscillator, which is a component of the laser 2023-03-14 EAR99 Vescent Photonics LLC
Back Driven Recovery Assist, Secure and Traverse System (BDRAST) Control Module Part Number: 0711617-001 An integrated hydraulic control module, designed to control the hydraulics in a helicopter RAST system 2023-03-14 USML Category VIII(h)(5) Arkwin Industries, Inc
Fuel System Preservation Cart, Model & Part Number: S-277LM Fuel filtration cart for a military aircraft 2023-03-14 CCL ECCN 9B610.a Maney Aircraft, Inc
Fuselage Section of an A-4N Skyhawk Aircraft, Serial Number 14483 A-4N Skyhawk fuselage that does not include the wings, tail, engine, sensors, avionics, communications, or navigation systems 2023-03-14 CCL ECCN 9A610.x Top Aces Corp
Advanced Technology Search Tool; Crossover Scenario Modelling Tool; Capability Spider Chart; and Dynamic Technology Database Software and digital tools for assessing technology competitiveness and identifying critical areas of investment 2023-03-14 EAR99 TechNext, Inc
tM 35, Part Number: 72020 A thermal imaging device that can be attached to a rifle scope and can also be used as a stand-alone monocular 2023-02-22 USML Category XII(c)(2)(i) Swarovski Optik North America
2001 AMGN, Model M1043A2, VIN: 190440 Vehicle, model M1043A2, VIN 190440 2023-02-22 USML Category VII(b) Dakap s.r.o.
Chilled Water Expansion Tank, Part Number: 142-232ITAR Expansion Tank for a naval warship 2023-02-06 CCL ECCN 8A609.x Samuel Pressure Vessel Group Inc
VXE30 Unmanned Aerial System, Part Number: 107-102560 Vertical Take Off and Landing (VTOL) small Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) designed for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 2023-02-06 Seek CCATS Edge Autonomy Holdings, LLC
Enhanced Waterside Security Barrier (EWSB), Version 1 & Version 2, Part Numbers: 3114M-001 & 3144M-00 A floating barrier system designed to protect ships and waterfront assets from waterside threats 2023-01-31 Seek CCATS Oceanetics
DCON Mitt, Model DCON-MITT, Part Number: CW-MFMT-CT10-01MT Absorbent microfiber mitt used to remove contaminants from surfaces 2023-01-31 EAR99 Tradeways, Ltd
Advanced Tactics Courses Close Air Support (CAS) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) courses 2023-01-20 USML Category IX(e)(3) The Vidar Group, LLC
3D Hyperspectral Imaging, Model: Visualizer 3.1, Update 3.1 A radiation-imaging algorithm used to estimate the energy, and distribution in space, of radiation sources 2023-01-12 Seek CCATS H3D, Inc
FuzeX, Model and Version Number: FuzeX An inert system that acts as a safe classroom alternative to aid in the training and education of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel in Render Safe Procedures (RSPs) 2023-01-12 CCL ECCN 0A614.a Explotrain, LLC
MAGCOM Version 1, Part Number 01000064 A wireless transmission system that converts an input signal to magnetic waves for both transmission and reception of the received magnetic waves, which are then converted to an output signal 2023-01-11 USML Category XII(e)(8) ZRF, LLC
Mediator Fluid A solution of one or more ferrocene derivatives, lithium chloride (LiCl), and water, used as a liquid desiccant to absorb moisture in certain applications 2023-01-11 USML Category V(f)(4)(xv) Palo Alto Research Center (PARC)
Multi Weapon Aiming Device, Model and Version: MWAD Version 1, Part Number: MB-MWAD A ballistic computer that digitally displays range and azimuth for indirect fire weapon systems 2023-01-11 USML Category XII(c)(2)(iii) MATBOCK, LLC
LX32 A component for a PIN-diode linear attenuator 2022-12-30 USML Category XII(e)(1) Teledyne Technologies Incorporated
“Bread Box” Small Explosive Protective Transport Bag Protective bag for transporting small explosives and energetics 2022-12-30 EAR99 Hazard Protection Systems, Inc
Multicoupler Frame, Part Number SP-4326-1 A frame that holds up to four one-to-four multicouplers and allows radiofrequency signals to be distributed to multiple receiving devices 2022-12-30 Seek CCATS Silver Palm Technologies, LLC
Helios, Versions: 1.0-1.2 Cybersecurity platforms designed to mitigate against memory corruption exploits 2022-12-30 Seek CCATS Idaho Scientific, LLC
Max-Viz 1400 Enhanced Vision System Cameras; P/Ns 756500103, 756500104, 756500105, 756500106, 756500107, and 756500108 Aircraft camera designed to enhance situational awareness during takeoff and landing 2022-12-30 CCL ECCN 6A003.b.4.b Astronics PECO, Inc
FLIGHTLAB AH-64E Flight Dynamics Development Model, Version FDM-AH-64E-A AH-64E simulation software used to perform variable fidelity modeling and engineering analysis 2022-12-30 USML Category VIII(i) Advanced Rotorcraft Technology, Inc
Polyalphaolefin Resistant Shielded 760 Double End Z Shape Right Angle Cable Assy, Part Number: 178-6784-001 A shielded cable assembly that is incorporated into a multi-function radar that is used in an air defense system 2022-12-30 USML Category XII(e)(1) Teledyne Technologies Incorporated
Advanced Pilot Training for the Mi-17 Helicopter Advanced pilot training on foreign origin Mi-17 helicopters 2022-12-30 USML Category VIII(i) Concord XXI USA, LLC
Remote Initiation System Wireless detonation system for energetic charges 2022-12-30 Seek CCATS Ensign-Bickford Aerospace & Defense Company
Ultra 8000 Series Multi-Sensor Airborne Gimbals, Models 8000, 8500, 8500 XR, and 8500 FW 9” stabilized gimbal assemblies incorporating an InSb midwave-infrared (MWIR) focal plane array (FPA). The different sub-models have different tracking and zoom capabilities 2022-12-30 CCL ECCN 6A003.b.4.a Teledyne Technologies Incorporated
FuseBlox, Part Number 001AZ-103 A self-aligning docking and connection device that can dock without requiring relative velocity between the docking spacecraft 2022-12-30 CCL ECCN 9A515.x SpaceWorks Enterprises, Inc
Hearing Protection Helmet (HPH) System, Models HPH-Basic, HPHComm-Boom, HPH-Comm-Cup, and HPH-Comm-SPP Helmet providing hearing protection, head protection, and communication capabilities 2022-12-30 Seek CCATS Creare LLC
Night Vision Goggle (NVG) Flight Training to Foreign Military Personnel Night Vision Goggle (NVG) Flight Training to Foreign Military Personnel 2022-12-30 USML Category XII(f) Concord XXI USA, LLC
Multi-Function Stationary Infantry Target (MF-SIT) lifter with LOMAH, Model and Part Number MFSIT-155 and Stationary Armor Target (SAT) with LOMAH, Model and Part Number SAT-AA25 Stationary ballistic targets upgraded with a location of miss and hit (LOMAH) electronic device that indicates performance accuracy 2022-12-30 USML Category IX(a)(1)(ii) InVeris Training Solutions, Inc
Cuvier Deep Hybrid Autonomous Underwater Vehicle, Model Cuvier Deep; and Cuvier Deep Hybrid Autonomous Underwater Vehicle – Future Configuration Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (UAVs) 2022-12-21 CCL ECCN 8A001.c 3D at Depth, Inc
Inlet Shell, Outlet Shell, and Diaphragm (Part Numbers M0 101793, A2 101792, and M0 101663) for Diaphragm Tank Machined tank shell of aluminum, machined tank shell of aluminum with helicoil inserts, and formed diaphragm of Viton-F 2022-12-21 Seek CCATS Benchmark Space Systems, Inc
Metallic Hose Assemblies, Part Numbers AE1002867H and AE100120H v.A Metallic hose assemblies, pneumatic 2022-12-21 USML Category XX(c) Danfoss Power Solutions II, LLC
Procurement Specification – Cathelco Marine Growth Prevention System (MGPS), Model and Version Number: Specification PS-256-01 Technical information created for the purpose of qualifying equipment proposed for an ITAR vessel 2022-12-13 USML Category VI(g) EVAC North America Inc
Advanced Architecture Phase, Amplitude and Time Simulator (A2PATS) Test environment for electronic subsystems of various platforms 2022-11-25 USML Category XI(a)(11) Textron, Inc
Ball Screw Assembly, part numbers 2417 and 2418 (sub-supplier part numbers TS05957-0500-02 and TS05957-0400-02) Screw spindle shaft and a nut packaged as an assembly with recirculating balls 2022-11-22 Seek CCATS Learjet Inc
Ball screw assembly for a missile flight control surface Ball Screw Assembly 2022-11-22 CCL ECCN 9A604.x Learjet Inc
Glass Preform, Part Number: R-9869 Glass preform for a naval gun round 2022-11-22 EAR99 Electro-Glass Products, Inc
Overvoltage Spark Gap, Part Number OGP-44R-21 Rugged ceramic-metal Krypton-filled switch used in a crowbar circuit 2022-11-09 USML Category XII(e)(1) Excelitas Technologies Corp
Thermal Module, Model No. ODI 384, version 1.0, Part No. ODI-MOD384 A 384×288 focal plane array thermal sensor linked to a control board and to a 1280×1024 micro-LED display, intended for OEMs to build into their hand-held or riflescope enclosure 2022-11-09 USML Category XII(e)(4) Outcome Driven Innovation Inc
Common Control Module (CCM), Part Number A0033 System that augments a UAV flight control system 2022-11-09 USML Category VIII(h)(17) The SURVICE Engineering Company
Bid Information for Ocean Research Vessel No. NCPOR/VOM-14/1/2022 Information associated with a response to a Tender Notice issued by India’s National Centre for Polar & Ocean Research (NCPOR) for a new Ocean Research Vessel 2022-11-02 Seek CCATS TAI Engineers LLC
Container MK 825 MOD 0, Model DL8410944, Part Number: 8410944 Shipping and storage container for a missile 2022-11-02 USML Category IV(c) B&P Manufacturing
Project Hermes Radar An airborne detect and avoid radar for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) operating in the 15.4-16.6 GHz range 2022-11-02 CCL ECCN 6A008.e Echodyne Corp
Ruggedized Drone Mitigation System, Model Number DD-SP360 and Ruggedized Handheld Drone Mitigation Unit, Model Number HH-SP1 Ruggedized drone mitigation systems using a dual-band, dual-antenna system that provides 360-degree coverage for a range up to five kilometers 2022-11-02 USML Category XI(a)(4)(iii) Vigilant Drone Defense Inc
C137 Ammunition Container, Part Number: 9804981 Container used for the storage and transportation of a rocket 2022-11-02 USML Category IV(c) Nammo Defense Systems Inc
Information associated with the design of an Ocean Research Vessel Information associated with a proposal for the design of the NOAA Class B Ocean Research Vessel 2022-11-02 Seek CCATS TAI Engineers LLC
Hi-Q Antennae, Models: Hi-Q-4-OTM, Hi-Q-4.5-OTM, Hi-Q-5-OTM, Hi-Q-6-OTM, Hi-Q-OTM-HVY, and Hi-Q-MRZR High frequency tunable antennnas that resonate and receive radio frequency signals in the HF 1.8 Mhz to 30 Mhz spectrum 2022-10-31 CCL ECCN 3A611.x Viking Exports LLC
Ultra 6000 A medium-wave infrared (MWIR) thermal imaging system for commercial airborne operations 2022-10-31 CCL ECCN 6A003.b.4.a Teledyne Technologies Incorporated
(1) Sea Scan Ranger, (2) Ranger 750, and (3) Ranger 1500 Synthetic Aperture Sonars (SAS), without real-time processing, designed for Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) 2022-10-31 CCL ECCN 6A991: (1) and (2); Seek CCATS: (3) Atlas North America, LLC
Odyssey International Autonomous navigation and hazard avoidance software for unmanned maritime and ground platforms 2022-10-31 USML Category VI(g) Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc
GSM Geo-Location Cellphone geolocation software 2022-10-28 Seek CCATS Defentek Inc
Nomex False Deck Panel, Part Numbers 100009, 100156, 100164, 221910, 221911, 221912, and SM3252 False deck panel for use inside navy vessels. The panel operates as a floor for the sailors to walk on 2022-10-28 CCL ECCN 8A609.x Plascore, Inc
T Series Gamma Detector Module, Model T410 Modules that detect gamma radiation from a standoff distance 2022-10-11 Seek CCATS H3D, Inc

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=6ea6afdcdbc36300529d368d7c96194b

*******

Department of Defense

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Oman

October 3, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Oman of TOW 2B Radio Frequency Missiles (BGM-71F-7-RF) and Support and related equipment for an estimated cost of $70 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of Oman, a friendly country that continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. Further, the proposed sale will improve the Royal Army of Oman’s capability to meet current and future threats by enhancing the strength of its homeland defense. Oman will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and services into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/oman-tow-2b-radio-frequency-missiles-bgm-71f-7-rf-and-support

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Spain

October 4, 2023 – The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Spain of PATRIOT Configuration-3+ Modernized Fire Units and related equipment for an estimated cost of $2.8 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by improving the security of a NATO ally which is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. Further, the proposed sale of the PATRIOT missile system will improve Spain’s missile defense capability, increase the defensive capabilities of its military, and support its goal of improving national and territorial defense and interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces. Spain will use the PATRIOT to defend its territorial integrity and for regional stability. Spain will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/spain-patriot-configuration-3-modernized-fire-units

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Finland

October 23, 2023 – The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Finland of Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missiles-Extended Range (AARGM-ER) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $500 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by improving the security of a NATO Ally that is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. Further, the proposed sale will improve Finland’s capability to meet current and future threats by strengthening its self-defense capabilities and ensuring interoperability with United States and other allied forces. Finland will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/finland-advanced-anti-radiation-guided-missiles-extended-range-aargm

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Lithuania

October 23, 2023 – The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Lithuania of AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $100 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a NATO Ally that is an important force for ensuring peace and stability in Europe. Further, the proposed sale will be for use with the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) and will improve Lithuania’s capability to conduct self-defense and regional security missions while enhancing interoperability with the U.S. and other NATO members. Lithuania will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/lithuania-aim-120c-8-advanced-medium-range-air-air-missiles-amraam

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To The United Kingdom

October 23, 2023 – The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the United Kingdom of Joint Air-to-Ground Missiles (JAGM) for an estimated cost of $957.4 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a NATO Ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. Further, the proposed sale will improve the United Kingdom’s capability to meet current and future threats. The United Kingdom will use the enhanced capability to strengthen its homeland defense and deter regional threats. The United Kingdom will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and services into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/united-kingdom-joint-air-ground-missiles-jagm

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

October 24, 2023 – The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Japan of Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM) Block 2B Tactical Missiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $74.6 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a major ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Indo-Pacific region. Further, the proposed sale will improve Japan’s capability to meet current and future threats by providing significantly enhanced self-defense for surface units defending/transiting/patrolling critical air and sea lines of communication and will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-rolling-airframe-missiles-ram-block-2b-tactical-missiles

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Latvia

October 24, 2023 – The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Latvia of M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and related equipment for an estimated cost of $220 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which will support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a NATO Ally that is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. Further, the proposed sale will improve Latvia’s capability to meet current and future threats and will enhance its interoperability with U.S. and other allied forces. Latvia will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/latvia-m142-high-mobility-artillery-rocket-systems

*******

Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

Commerce Issued Rule to Strengthen National Security Partnership to Secure Semiconductor Supply Chains with Republic of Korea

October 13, 2023: The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a rule updating the general authorizations for Samsung and SK hynix— companies headquartered in the Republic of Korea (RoK) – for their semiconductor fabrication facilities in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Samsung’s and SK hynix’s PRC facilities are Validated End-Users (VEUs). VEUs can apply for, and after national security review and approval by the U.S. government, obtain a general authorization to acquire certain items rather than seeking multiple individual licenses. The updated rule updates the items that may be exported to these companies under the VEU authorization.

The updated rule allows these companies to continue their operations in the PRC. The VEU authorizations announced in the updated rule reflect close consultations between the United States and ROK through various channels, including the Korea-U.S. Supply Chain and Commercial Dialogue (SCCD) and the SCCD Working Group on Export Controls announced in November 2022.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/docman/?task=doc_download&gid=3351

*******

BIS Announces Implementation of 2022 Wassenaar Arrangement Decisions

October 17, 2023: 88 FR 71932: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) maintains, as part of its Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the Commerce Control List (CCL), which identifies certain items subject to Department of Commerce jurisdiction. During the December 2022 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA) Plenary meeting, Participating States of the WA (Participating States) made certain decisions affecting the WA dual-use and munitions control lists, which BIS is now implementing via amendments to the CCL. BIS seeks comments on restricting STA eligibility for countries in EAR Country Group A:5 of certain technology for the development of supersonic aero gas turbine engine components controlled under ECCN 9E003.k, formerly controlled under ECCN 9E001 as part of its ongoing assessment of current export control licensing policy.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-22299

*******

BIS Implements Export Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing Items

October 25, 2023: 88 FR 73424: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released the interim final rule (IFR) “Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use”, which amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement controls on advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs), computer commodities that contain such ICs, and certain semiconductor manufacturing items. The IFR also made other EAR changes to ensure appropriate related controls, including on certain “U.S. person” activities. The IFR updated the technical parameters used for classifying items controlled under ECCN 3A090 to counter workarounds for the former controls that entailed using larger numbers of smaller data chips to match the power of one restricted chip.

The IFR also created new .z paragraphs for nine ECCNs (3A001.z, 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 5A002.z, 5A004.z, 5A992.z, 5D002.z, and 5D992.z) to capture items the BIS determined have performance levels that meet or exceed relevant parameters, and in certain cases, requires exporters to identify the .z items in the electronic export information filing and/or the commercial invoice for export clearance.

Additionally, the IFR expanded the end-use controls in EAR §744.23, imposing a license requirement on the export, reexport, and transfer of advanced computing items identified in ECCN 3A090, 4A090 or one of the new .z paragraphs to or within any country that is not a D:1, D:4, D:5 country, or the reexport and in-country transfer from or within Macau or a D:5 country of 3E001 items developed by an entity or parent entity based in Macau or a D:5 country.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-23049

*******

BIS Announces 90 Day Moratorium on Firearms and Ammunition Export Licenses

October 27, 2023: Effective October 27, 2023, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) paused for approximately 90 days the issuance of new export licenses involving certain firearms, related components, night vision devices and ammunition under its jurisdiction and the provision of new export assistance activities for such products to all non-governmental end users worldwide, apart from those in certain destinations to facilitate a review of export control policies. The BIS may take additional steps to further U.S. national security and foreign policy interests following the review. During this “pause” period, the BIS will further assess current firearm export control review policies to determine whether any changes are warranted to advance U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. The review will be conducted with urgency and will enable the Department to assess and mitigate the risk of firearms being diverted to entities or activities that promote regional instability, violate human rights, or to refuel criminal activities more effectively. This pause applies to the issuance of new licenses involving certain firearms, related components, night vision devices, and and ammunition controlled under four Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs): ECCN 0A501, ECCN 0A502, ECCN 0A504, and ECCN 0A505. Only applications for firearms, night vision devices, and ammunition regulated by the EAR to non-governmental end users located in Ukraine, Israel, and Country Group A:1 will be considered.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/policy-guidance/3374-2023-10-27-bis-faqs-firearms-pause-and-review/file

*******

U.S. Census Bureau

Census Bureau Issues Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages

October 18, 2023: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected.  If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation.  Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN.  However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.

To help stakeholders take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

Fatal Error Response Code:  161

Narrative:     Equipment Number Not Allowed for MOT

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        The Mode of Transportation Code reported does not allow an Equipment Number.

Resolution: One or more Equipment Numbers may be reported for vessel, air, rail or truck shipments.  An Equipment Number cannot be reported for any other Mode of Transportation.

Verify the Mode of Transportation Code and the Equipment Number, correct the shipment and resubmit.

Response Code:  851

Narrative:     Improbable Commodity for Air Shipment

Severity:       Verify

Reason:        For the reported Schedule B/HTS Number, a Mode of Transportation of Air is improbable for this commodity.

Resolution: Certain products are highly unlikely to be exported with a Mode of Transportation Air.  This might indicate either a keying error or misclassification of the product.

Verify the Mode of Transportation and the Schedule B/HTS Number, correct the shipment and resubmit (if necessary).  If the information is verified correct as reported, no action is necessary.

For a complete list of AES Response Codes, their reasons, and resolutions, see Appendix A – Commodity Filing Response Messages.

It is important that AES filers correct Fatal Errors as soon as they are received in order to comply with the Foreign Trade Regulations.  These errors must be corrected prior to export for shipments filed predeparture and as soon as possible for shipments filed postdeparture but not later than five calendar days after departure.

For further information or questions, contact the U.S. Census Bureau’s Trade Data Collection Branch. Telephone: (800) 549-0595, select option 1 for AES.

*******

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

Sanctions

U.S. Department of State

October 20, 2023: The State Department designated three entities pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The three entities, based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), have worked to supply missile‐applicable items to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program.

The Department of State designated General Technology Limited, Beijing Luo Luo Technology Development Co Ltd., and Changzhou Utek Composite Company Ltd. pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use such items, by Pakistan.

General Technology Limited has worked to supply brazing materials, which are used to join components in ballistic missile rocket engines, and in the production of combustion chambers. Beijing Luo Luo Technology Development Co Ltd. has worked to supply mandrels and other machinery, which can be used in the production of solid‐propellant rocket motors and can be controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime. Changzhou Utek Composite Company Ltd. has worked since 2019 to supply D‐glass glass fiber, quartz fabric, and high silica cloth, all of which have applications in missile systems.

https://www.state.gov/united-states-sanctions-entities-contributing-to-ballistic-missile-proliferation/

*******

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

October 6, 2023: 88 FR 70352: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 49 entities under 52 entries to the Entity List. These entries have been listed under the destinations of the People’s Republic of China (China) (42), Estonia (1), Finland (1), Germany (1), India (3), Turkey (2), United Arab Emirates (1), and the United Kingdom (1). These entities have been added to the Entity List for providing support to Russia’s military and/or defense industrial base. Specifically, these entities supplied Russian consignees connected to the Russian defense sector with U.S.-origin integrated circuits after March 1, 2023. These integrated circuits are classified under Harmonized Tariff System (HTS)- 6 codes 854231, 854232, 854233, and/or 854239. These HTS–6 codes are identified under supplement no. 4 to part 746 (Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions Pursuant to § 746.5(a)(1)(ii)). All U.S.-origin items classified under these HTS–6 codes have been controlled for export and reexport and transfer within Russia since September 15, 2022. Such U.S.- origin items require a license under § 746.5(a)(1)(ii) of the EAR when destined to Russia or Belarus.1 Therefore, the documented shipments by these entities to Russia of such U.S.- origin items are contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests under § 744.11(b) of the EAR.

China

  • Ace Electronics (HK) Co., Limited;
  • Alliance Electro Tech Co., Limited;
  • Alpha Trading Investments Limited;
  • Asialink Shanghai Int’l Logistics Co., Ltd.;
  • Benico Limited;
  • C & I Semiconductor Co., Ltd.;
  • Check IC Solution Limited;
  • Chengdu Jingxin Technology Co. Ltd.;
  • China Shengshi International Trade, Ltd.;
  • E-Chips Solution Co. Ltd.;
  • Farteco Limited;
  • Glite Electronic Technology Co., Limited;
  • Global Broker Solutions Limited;
  • Grants Promotion Service Limited;
  • Guangdong Munpower Electronic Commerce Co. Ltd.;
  • Huayuanshitong Technology Co. Ltd.;
  • IMAXChip;
  • Insight Electronics;
  • Kingford PCB Electronics Co., Ltd.;
  • Kobi International Company;
  • Most Technology Limited;
  • New Wally Target International Trade Co., Limited;
  • Nuopuxun Electronic Technology Co., Limited;
  • Onstar Electronics Co. Ltd.;
  • PT Technology Asia Limited;
  • Robotronix Semiconductors Limited;
  • Rui En Koo Technology Co. Ltd;
  • Shaanxi Yingsaeir Electronic Technology Co. Ltd.;
  • Shanghai IP3 Information Technology Co. Ltd.;
  • Shenzhen One World International Logistics Co., Limited;
  • Shvabe Opto-Electronics Co. LTD.;
  • Suntop Semiconductor Co., LTD.;
  • Tordan Industry Limited;
  • TYT Electronics Co. Ltd.;
  • UCreate Electronics Group;
  • Wargos Industry Limited;
  • Win Key Limited;
  • Xin Quan Electronics Hong Kong Co., Limited;
  • ZeYuan Technology Limited;
  • Zhejiang Foso Electronics Technology Co. Ltd.;
  • Zixis Limited; and
  • Zone Chips Electronics Hong Kong Co., Limited.

Estonia

  • Elmec Trade OU.

Finland

  • PT Technology Asia Limited.

Germany

  • Interquest GmbH.

India

  • Abhar Technologies and Services Private Limited;
  • C & I Semiconductor Co., Ltd.; and
  • Innovio Ventures.

Turkey

  • LL Chip Elektrik Elektronic Paz; and
  • Scitech Tasimacilik Ticaret Limited

United Arab Emirates  

  • Hulm al Sahra Elect Devices TR.

United Kingdom

  • China Shengshi International Trade Ltd.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3349-bis-press-release-entity-list-additions-49-russi/file

*******

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

October 3, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 28 individuals and entities involved with the international proliferation of illicit drugs, including a China-based network responsible for the manufacturing and distribution of ton quantities of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and MDMA precursors. These individuals and entities designated by OFAC are also involved in the global trafficking of xylazine and “nitazenes,” which are highly potent and often mixed with illicit fentanyl or other drugs.

  • Wang Shucheng
  • Du Changgen
  • Hubei Vast Chemical Co., Limited
  • Hebei Guanlang Biotechnology Co., Limited
  • Hebei Xiuna Trading Co., LTD.
  • Shanghai Jarred Industrial Co., LTD.
  • Hanhong Pharmaceutical Technology Co., LTD
  • Gan Xuebi a.k.a Bella Chen
  • Song Xueqin a.k.a. Shelly Song
  • Yang Qi a.k.a. Daisy Yang
  • Gao Lanfang
  • Wang Mingming
  • Wang Mingjing
  • Hebei Crovell Biotech Co., LTD.
  • Zhang Wei
  • Qingdao Cemo Technology Develop Co., LTD
  • Hebei Yaxin Restaurant Management Co., LTD.
  • Jinhu Minsheng Pharmaceutical Machinery Co. LTD.
  • Shen Xingbiao
  • Valerian Labs, Inc. and Valerian Labs Distribution Corp.
  • Bahman Djebelibak a.k.a. Bobby Shah
  • Jiangsu Bangdeya New Material Technology Co., LTD.
  • Wang Jiantong
  • Xia Fengbing
  • Xingtai Dong Chuang New Material Technology Co., LTD.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1779

*******

October 12, 2023: The Price Cap Coalition issued an advisory to provide recommendations concerning specific best practices in the maritime oil industry. The advisory reflects efforts to promote responsible practices in the industry to prevent and disrupt sanctioned trade and enhance compliance with the price caps on crude oil and petroleum products of Russian Federation origin, put in place by the G7, the European Union, and Australia (“the Price Cap Coalition” or “Coalition”).

The advisory is directed at both government and private sector actors (“industry stakeholders”) involved in the maritime trade of crude oil and refined petroleum products. The Coalition is committed to encouraging responsible maritime trade in crude oil and petroleum products within a reputable, safe, and secure market. Recent developments in the maritime oil trade, described below, expose industry stakeholders to increased safety, environmental, economic, reputational, financial, logistical, and legal risks. The advisory outlines best practices industry stakeholders can adopt to reduce risks while promoting the safe flow of oil on the market. The recommendations build upon previous guidance issued by the Price Cap Coalition such as the May 2020 Sanctions Advisory for the Maritime Industry, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) December 2020 Maritime Guidance, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) February 2023 Guidance on Implementation of the Price Cap Policy, OFAC’s April 2023 Alert on Possible Evasion of the Russian Oil Price Cap, OFSI’s UK Maritime Services Ban and Oil Price Cap Industry Guidance, and the European Commission’s Oil Price Cap Guidance.

Increased Risks from Recent Developments in the Maritime Oil Trade

Geopolitical changes continue to impact and shape the world’s maritime oil trade, shifting trade routes, broadening the scope of shipping service providers, and, at times, resulting in loss of transparency. As “shadow” trade has become more pronounced, often involving actors and cargo affiliated with countries and persons subject to sanctions or associated with other illicit activity. This shadow trade is characterized by irregular and often high-risk shipping practices that generate significant concerns for both the public and private sectors. These heightened risks include but are not limited to:

  • Maritime Safety and Marine Environment: The vessels engaged in this shadow trade, sometimes called the “shadow fleet,” are typically older ships, many of which are operating past their traditional lifespans. These vessels are often registered with flag states that fail to meet their international obligations. There is also an increased risk of falsified registration. Vessels in the shadow trade may fabricate or neglect the appropriate surveys or inspections and lack regulatory certificates required under international conventions. Additionally, crews employed on shadow fleet vessels may face pressure to disregard prudent shipboard practices, including those provided by the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (“STCW”). These factors (i.e., vessel age; substandard certifications; inadequate safety and maintenance standards performed by substandard flags or unrecognized organizations; imprudence by crew) could increase the likelihood of marine casualties.
  • Insurance and Economic: Oil spills can create tremendous environmental damage and impose immense economic costs on coastal states. Ships involved in the shadow trade may rely on unproven Protection and Indemnity (P&I) insurance providers that operate in jurisdictions with opaque or limited regulation, and insufficient capital, reinsurance arrangements, and/or technical expertise to handle a major claim in the event of a marine casualty. Accordingly, it is more challenging to hold such vessels accountable for the heavy economic burden generated by environmental damage.
  • Reputational, Logistical, and Financial: Actors involved in the shadow trade often conceal their ownership structures and the origin of their cargo. The ownership of shadow fleet tankers may be concealed through complex corporate arrangements, with a recent increase of single vessel fleets. These vessels may disable or manipulate AIS systems to conceal illicit activity or other information about their voyages. Such deceptive practices may cause industry stakeholders to unknowingly engage in transactions that are inconsistent with industry stakeholders’ compliance policies, affect industry stakeholders’ reputations, and trigger de-risking behavior from counterparties. This de-risking can result in loss of access to reputable service providers, financing, customers, and ports.
  • Legal and Sanctions: A coalition of over thirty countries have adopted a variety of economic measures in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, including the oil price cap policy implemented by the Price Cap Coalition. Bad actors may use deceptive practices to gain or maintain access to Price Cap Coalition services to transport Russian oil or petroleum products 3 to be sold above the price cap or to engage in activity that may otherwise violate the Coalition’s sanctions, laws, or regulations.

Recommended Actions

The following recommendations are best practices that the Coalition encourages industry stakeholders to adopt, subject to applicable laws and regulations and, as appropriate according to their risk, based on: (i) their role; (ii) the information available to them; and (iii) the types of transactions in which they engage:

Recommendation 1: Require appropriately capitalized P&I insurance. The shadow trade involves ships that may rely on unknown, untested, sporadic, or fraudulent insurance. Without legitimate, continuous insurance coverage, these ships may be unable to pay the costs of accidents in which they are involved, including oil spills, which entail tremendous environmental damage and safety risks and associated costs. The Coalition encourages industry stakeholders to require that vessels have continuous and appropriate maritime insurance coverage for the entirety of their voyages. The Coalition further recommends that industry stakeholders require vessels to be insured by legitimate insurance providers with sufficient coverage for CLC9 liabilities. If an industry participant is engaging with a ship that is not insured by such a legitimate insurance provider, the industry participant should conduct sufficient due diligence to ensure that the insurer can cover all relevant risks. Such due diligence could include, as feasible, a review of an insurer’s financial soundness, track record, regulatory record, and/or ownership structure.

Recommendation 2: Receive classification from an International Association of Classification Societies10 member society. The information gathered by classification societies is useful in enabling insurers, port states, and other industry stakeholders to make informed decisions about the seaworthiness of vessels. Some ships involved in the shadow trade have shifted away from industry standard classification societies, and instead use societies that are not a part of, or have been removed from, the International Association of Classification Societies. The Coalition encourages11 industry stakeholders to ensure counterparties receive classification from IACS member classification societies to ensure vessels are fit for the service intended.

Recommendation 3: Best-practice use of Automatic Identification Systems (“AIS”). Consistent with the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (“SOLAS”), industry stakeholders should promote the continuous broadcasting of AIS throughout the lifetime of a voyage. If a ship needs to disable its AIS in response to a legitimate safety concern, the ship should document the circumstances that necessitated disablement. Industry stakeholders should also vigilantly monitor irregular AIS patterns or data that are inconsistent with actual ship locations. By requiring that ships with which they engage use AIS in accordance with the SOLAS, industry stakeholders will improve their understanding of vessels’ activities, and reduce their exposure to criminal actors and associated risks.

  • If accessible, complement AIS Tracking with Long-Range Identification and Tracking

(“LRIT”). In instances of AIS outages or suspected AIS manipulation, industry

stakeholders such as flagging registries that have access to LRIT should use it to determine the true location of vessels, including, where feasible, those leased to third parties. For those industry stakeholders who have access to LRIT, combining AIS and LRIT is a best practice for mitigating risk.

Recommendation 4: Monitor high-risk ship-to-ship transfers. While ship-to-ship (STS) transfers (the transfer of cargo between ships at sea) are often conducted for legitimate purposes, such transfers can also be used to conceal the origin or destination of cargo in circumvention of sanctions or other regulations. Furthermore, STS transfers of crude oil or petroleum products outside of safe and sheltered waters entail heightened environmental and safety risks. Industry stakeholders should recognize these enhanced risks and, as appropriate to their role, conduct enhanced due diligence in the context of STS transfers, including the notification of STS oil cargo transfers as required by Annex I of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (“MARPOL“), especially in areas at higher risk for illicit trading activity or AIS manipulation. It is also recommended that industry stakeholders verify oil record logs to hold accountable record of cargo movements aboard vessels.

Recommendation 5: Request associated shipping and ancillary costs. The inflation of shipping and ancillary costs (e.g., freight, customs, insurance), or the bundling of such costs, are tactics that may be used to conceal that Russian oil was purchased above the price cap. The billing of commercially unreasonable or opaque shipping and ancillary costs should be viewed as a sign of potential price cap evasion. Shipping, freight, customs, and insurance costs are not included in the price caps and must be invoiced separately and at commercially reasonable rates. Industry stakeholders involved in the Russian oil trade that use “Cost, Insurance, Freight” contracts or whose counterparts use such agreements should require an itemized breakdown of all costs to determine the price paid for oil or petroleum products. This may require that industry stakeholders update contractual terms and conditions with sellers or counterparts or adjust invoicing models to show the price of the oil until the port of loading and the price for transportation and other services separately.

Recommendation 6: Undertake appropriate due diligence. Industry stakeholders should carry out appropriate due diligence. Heightened diligence may be appropriate for ships that have undergone numerous administrative changes (e.g., re-flagging). Industry stakeholders may also wish to conduct increased diligence when dealing with intermediary companies (e.g., management companies, traders, brokerages, etc.) that conceal their beneficial ownership or otherwise engage in unusually opaque practices. Such companies may be more likely to engage in deceptive practices and expose counterparties to heightened risks. Industry stakeholders’ due diligence should be calibrated according to the specificities of their business and the related risk exposure. Due diligence is especially important where market assessments indicate that Russian oil prices exceed the price cap, and Coalition services are being used or sought.

Recommendation 7: Report ships that trigger concerns. If an industry participant is aware of potentially illicit or unsafe maritime oil trade, including suspected breaches of the oil price cap, they should report this to relevant authorities. By reporting these concerning behaviors, industry stakeholders can collectively help protect the trade from malign activity, while promoting safety and integrity across the market.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1797

*******

October 12, 2023: OFAC Issued General License No. 73: “Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions Involving Certain Persons or Vessels”.

General License No. 73: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one of the following activities involving the blocked persons or vessels described in paragraph are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 8, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (RuHSR): (1) The safe docking and anchoring of any of the blocked vessels listed this general license (“blocked vessels”) in port; (2) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; or (3) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.

The authorizations in this general license apply to the following blocked persons and vessels listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and any entity in which any of the following persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest: (1) Ice Pearl Navigation Corp (registered owner of YASA GOLDEN BOSPHORUS, IMO 9334038); or (2) Lumber Marine SA (registered owner of SCF PRIMORYE, IMO 9421960).

The general license does not authorize: (1) The entry into any new commercial contracts involving the property or interests in property of any blocked persons, including the blocked entities and vessels described in this general license, except as otherwise authorized; (2) The offloading of any cargo onboard any of the blocked vessels, including the offloading of crude oil or petroleum products of Russian Federation origin, except for the offloading of cargo that is ordinarily incident and necessary to address vessel emergencies authorized pursuant to this general license; (3) Any transactions related to the sale of crude oil or petroleum products of Russian Federation origin; (4) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 2 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions; (5) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or (6) Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the RuHSR, including transactions involving the property or interests in property of any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, other than transactions involving the blocked persons or vessels in this general license, unless separately authorized.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932196/download?inline

*******

October 18, 2023: In response to the signing of an electoral roadmap agreement between Venezuela’s Unitary Platform and representatives of Maduro, and in support of the Venezuelan people, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued 4 General Licenses suspending select sanctions. The OFAC also published a FAQ related to the suspension of sanctions and the newly-issued General Licenses.

  • General License 44 authorizes transactions involving the oil and gas sector in Venezuela. The license will be renewed only if Venezuela meets its commitments under the electoral roadmap as well as other commitments with respect to those who are wrongfully detained.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932231/download?inline

  • General License 43 authorizes dealings with Minerven – the Venezuelan state-owned gold mining company – which Treasury assesses would have the effect of reducing black-market trading in gold.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932226/download?inline

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1822

*******

October 18, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 11 individuals, eight entities, and one vessel based in Iran, Hong Kong, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Venezuela that are enabling Iran’s destabilizing ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs. The persons designated have materially supported Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), or their subordinates in the production and proliferation of missiles and UAVs.

  • Fanavaran Sanat Ertebatat Company of Iran
  • Armin Ghorsi Anbaran of Iran
  • Hossein Hemsi of Iran
  • Saberin Kish Company of Iran
  • Alireza Matinkia of Iran
  • Electro Optic Sairan Industries Co. of Iran
  • Sarmad Electronic Sepahan Company of Iran
  • Ghasem Damavandian of Iran
  • Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani of Iran
  • Seyed Hojatollah Ghoreishi of Iran
  • Jaber Reihani of Iran
  • Seyed Hamzeh Ghalandari of Iran
  • Cargo Vessel PARNIA of Iran
  • Lin Jinghe A/K/A Gary Lam of the PRC
  • Yongxin Li A/K/A Emma Lee of the PRC
  • Yiu Wa Yung A/K/A Stephen Yung of the PRC
  • Nanxigu Technology Co., Limited of Hong Kong
  • Dali RF Technology Co., Limited of Hong Kong
  • ICGOO Electronics Limited of Hong Kong

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231018_33

*******

October 18, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on ten key Hamas terrorist group members, operatives, and financial facilitators in Gaza and elsewhere including Sudan, Turkey, Algeria, and Qatar. The action targets members managing assets in a secret Hamas investment portfolio, a Qatar-based financial facilitator with close ties to the Iranian regime, a key Hamas commander, and a Gaza-based virtual currency exchange and its operator. The designations are part of a continuous effort by the United States to root out Hamas’s sources of revenue in the West Bank and Gaza and across the region and is taken in close coordination with regional partners and allies.

  • Musa Muhammad Salim Dudin of Palestine
  • Abdelbasit Hamza Elhassan Mohamed Khair of Sudan
  • Amer Kamal Sharif Alshawa of Turkey
  • Ahmed Sadu Jahleb of Egypt
  • Aiman Ahmad Al-Duwaik of Jordan
  • Walid Mohammed Mustafa Jadallah of Jordan
  • Muhammad Ahmad ‘Abd Al-Dayim Nasrallah of Jordan
  • Ayman Nofal of Palestine
  • Buy Cash Money and Money Transfer Company of Palestine

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1816

*******

October 20, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two individuals and four entities that form a core part of Specially Designated National (SDN) and Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik’s (Dodik) patronage network. Members of this network, which include Dodik’s adult children, facilitate Dodik’s ongoing corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) RS entity, allowing him to siphon public funds from the RS and enrich himself and his family at the expense of BiH citizens and functional governance in the country.

Dodik previously served as a member of BiH’s Presidency and is widely known for openly calling for, and supporting, the unilateral transfer of state competencies from the BiH government to the RS, one of two entities that comprise BiH. Dodik has used his official BiH position and a network of personal ties and companies to accumulate personal wealth through graft, bribery, and other forms of corruption. His divisive ethno-nationalistic rhetoric reflects his efforts to advance these political goals and divert attention from his corrupt activities. Additionally, Dodik has publicly denigrated other ethnic and religious groups within BiH, further sowing division and political gridlock.

  • Igor Dodik of Bosnia and Herzegovina
  • Gorica Dodik of Bosnia and Herzegovina
  • Global Liberty d.o.o. Laktasi of Bosnia and Herzegovina
  • Agro Voce d.o.o. Laktasi of Bosnia and Herzegovina
  • Agape Gorica Dodik i Ivana Dodik s.p. Banja Luka of Bosnia and Herzegovina
  • Fruit Eco d.o.o. Gradiska of Bosnia and Herzegovina

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1825

*******

October 25, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 8H, authorizing transactions related to energy involving certain entities.

For the purposes of the general license, the term “related to energy” means the extraction, production, refinement, liquefaction, gasification, regasification, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, transport, or purchase of petroleum, including crude oil, lease condensates, unfinished oils, natural gas liquids, petroleum products, natural gas, or other products capable of producing energy, such as coal, wood, or agricultural products used to manufacture biofuels, or uranium in any form, as well as the development, production, generation, transmission, or exchange of power, through any means, including nuclear, thermal, and renewable energy sources.

The general license does not authorize:

  • Any transactions prohibited by Directive 1A under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Certain Sovereign Debt of the Russian Federation;
  • The opening or maintaining of a correspondent account or payable-through account for or on behalf of any entity subject to Directive 2 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions;
  • Any debit to an account on the books of a U.S. financial institution of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation; or
  • Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR other than the blocked persons described in paragraph (a) of this general license, unless separately authorized.

The entities authorized by the General License are:

  • State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs Vnesheconombank
  • Public Joint Stock Company Bank Financial Corporation Otkritie
  • Sovcombank Open Joint Stock Company
  • Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia
  • VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company
  • Joint Stock Company Alfa-Bank
  • Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank
  • Bank Zenit Public Joint Stock Company
  • Bank Saint-Petersburg Public Joint Stock Company
  • Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest; or
  • The Central Bank of the Russian Federation

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932246/download?inline

*******

October 27, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed a second round of sanctions on key Hamas-linked officials and financial networks following the October 7 barbaric attacks on Israel and its civilian population. The action targets additional assets in Hamas’s investment portfolio and individuals who are facilitating sanctions evasion by Hamas-affiliated companies. Treasury is also designating a Hamas official in Iran and members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as a Gaza-based entity that has served as a conduit for illicit Iranian funds to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).

  • Khaled Qaddoumi of Jordan
  • Ali Morshed Shirazi of Lebanon
  • Mostafa Mohammad Khani of Iran
  • Ali Ahmad Faizullahi of Iran
  • Al-Ansar Charity Association of Palestine
  • Nasser Al Sheikh Ali of Palestine
  • Zawaya Group for Development and Investment Co. LTD of Sudan
  • Zawaya Group for Development Investment Sociedad Limitada of Spain
  • Larrycom for Investment Company of Sudan
  • Alaeddin Senguler of Turkey
  • Gulsah Yigidoglu of Turkey
  • Arwa Mangoush of Turkey

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1845

*******

October 31, 2023: Pursuant to Executive Order 14014, “Blocking Property With Respect to the Situation in Burma” (the “Order”), the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) determined, in consultation with the Department of State that the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) is a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of Burma, and that the following activities by a U.S. person are prohibited on or after December 15, 2023 except to the extent provided by law, or unless licensed or otherwise authorized by OFAC: the provision, exportation, or reexportation, directly or indirectly, of financial services to or for the benefit of MOGE or its property or interests in property.

All other activities with MOGE or involving MOGE’s property or interests in property are permitted, provided such activities are not otherwise prohibited by law, the Order, or any other sanctions program implemented by OFAC. Therefore, the following persons and entities have been added to the SDN list:

  • Swe Swe Aung of Burma
  • Maung Maung Aye of Burma
  • Zaw Min of Burma
  • Charlie Than of Burma
  • Kan Zaw of Burma
  • Sky Royal Hero Company Limited of Burma
  • Suntac International Trading Company Limited of Burma
  • Suntac Technologies Company Limited of Burma

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231031

Fines and Penalties

October 4, 2023: 88 FR 68568: On December 1, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, Carlos Eduardo Zepeda (“Zepeda”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Zepeda was convicted of smuggling from the United States to Mexico approximately 800 rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Zepeda to 24 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment. BIS received notice of Zepeda’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 554. As provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or the “Regulations”), BIS provided notice and opportunity for Zepeda to make a written submission to BIS. 15 CFR 766.25. BIS has not received a written submission from Zepeda. BIS has decided to deny Zepeda’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of seven years from the date of Zepeda’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Zepeda had an interest at the time of his conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21900

*******

October 4, 2023: 88 FR 68567: On May 24, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Jacques Yves Sebastien Duroseau (“Duroseau”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371, 50 U.S.C. 4819, section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) (“AECA”), and 18 U.S.C. 554. Specifically, Duroseau was convicted of conspiring to illegally export and smuggle firearms and controlled equipment from the United States to Haiti, as well as transporting United States Munitions List-controlled firearms and Commerce Control List-controlled riflescopes without a license to the Haitian Army. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Duroseau to 60 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release and a $400 assessment. BIS received notice of Duroseau’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 371, 50 U.S.C. 4819, section 38 of the AECA and 18 U.S.C. 554. BIS provided notice and opportunity for Duroseau to make a written submission to BIS, as provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or the “Regulations”). 15 CFR 766.25. BIS has not received a written submission from Duroseau. The BIS has decided to deny Duroseau’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Duroseau’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Duroseau had an interest at the time of his conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21901

*******

October 4, 2023: 88 FR 68566: On October 21, 2021, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Saphara Lynn Anderson (“Anderson”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371. Specifically, Anderson was convicted of conspiring to export ammunition from the United States to Mexico. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced Anderson to probation for 60 months and a $100 special assessment. BIS received notice of Anderson’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 371. As provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or the “Regulations”), BIS provided notice and opportunity for Anderson to make a written submission to BIS. 15 CFR 766.25. BIS has not received a written submission from Anderson. The BIS has decided to deny Anderson’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of seven years from the date of Anderson’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Anderson had an interest at the time of her conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21899

*******

October 4, 2023: 88 FR 68565: On March 2, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Leonel Molina, Jr. (“Molina”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Molina was convicted of smuggling from the United States to Mexico Wolf 7.62x39mm caliber ammunition, without a license or written approval from the United States Department of Commerce. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Molina to 46 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment. BIS received notice of Molina’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 554. As provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or the “Regulations”), BIS provided notice and opportunity for Molina to make a written submission to BIS. 15 CFR 766.25. BIS has not received a written submission from Molina. The BIS has decided to deny Molina’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Molina’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Molina had an interest at the time of his conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21902

*******

October 13, 2023: 88 FR 70928: On April 21, 2022, the BIS issued an order denying Aviastar—TU’s (“Aviastar”) export privileges for a period of 180 days on the ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The renewal is based upon the facts underlying the issuance of the TDO and the renewal orders subsequently issued in this matter on October 17, 2022, and April 14, 2023, as well as other evidence developed during this investigation. This evidence demonstrates that Aviastar has acted, and continues to act, in blatant disregard for U.S. export controls and the terms of existing TDOs. The TDO, initially issued on April 21, 2022, was based on evidence that Aviastar violated the Regulations by operating multiple aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights into and out of Russia after March 2, 2022 from destinations including, but not limited to, Hangzhou, China; Shenzhen, China; and Zhengzhou, China from/to Novosibirsk, Russia and Abakan, Russia, without the required BIS authorization.

Further evidence indicated that Aviastar also operated aircraft subject to the EAR on domestic flights within Russia, potentially in violation of Section 736.2(b)(10) of the Regulations.

BIS also presented evidence that, while subject to a TDO, Aviastar operated aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights both into and out of Russia, in violation of the Regulations and the terms of the existing TDO.

Specifically, previous renewal orders detailed Aviastar’s continued operation of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, on flights into and out of Russia from/to Zhengzhou, China and Hangzhou, China, as well as on domestic flights within Russia.

In its September 19, 2023 request for TDO renewal, BIS submitted evidence that Aviastar violated the TDO and/or the Regulations by operating aircraft subject to the EAR and flown into Russia on or after March 2, 2022, on flights within Russia, in apparent violation of Section 736.2(b)(10) of the Regulations, as well as the TDO.

First, Aviastar—TU, 5 b. 7 Leningradsky prospekt, g. Moskva, 125040, Moscow, Russia, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:

  1. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control document;
  2. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
  3. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.

Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:

  1. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of Aviastar any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  2. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by Aviastar of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby Aviastar acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  3. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from Aviastar of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  4. Obtain from Aviastar in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
  5. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by Aviastar, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by Aviastar if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.

Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to Aviastar by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-22614

*******

October 13, 2023: 88 FR 70925: On October 13, 2022, the BIS issued an order denying URAL’s export privileges for a period of 180 days on the ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. Evidence presented by BIS indicated that, after the initial October 13, 2022, TDO issued, URAL continued to operate aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights both into and within Russia, in violation of the Regulations and the TDO itself.

Specifically, the April 10, 2023, renewal order detailed URAL’s continued operation of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, on flights into and out of Russia from/to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and Khujand, Tajikistan, as well as within Russia. Since that time, URAL has continued to engage in conduct prohibited by the TDO and Regulations. In its September 15, 2023, request for renewal of the TDO, BIS submitted evidence that URAL continues to operate aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b, both on flights into and within Russia, in violation of the April 10, 2023 TDO and/or the Regulations. Specifically, BIS’s evidence and related investigation demonstrates that URAL has continued to operate aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, on flights into and out of Russia from/to Dushanbe, Tajikistan, Tamchy, Kyrgyzstan, and Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, as well as domestically within Russia.

First, URAL Airlines JSC, Utrenniy Lane 1-g, Yekaterinburg, Russia 620025, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:

  1. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control document;
  2. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
  3. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.

Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:

  1. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of URAL any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  2. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by URAL of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby URAL acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  3. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from URAL of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  4. Obtain from URAL in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
  5. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by URAL, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by URAL if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.

Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to URAL by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-22604

*******

October 25, 2023: 88 FR 73309: The Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce (“BIS”), has notified Dina Zhu, of Lawrenceville, GA (“Zhu”), of its intention to initiate an administrative proceeding against Zhu pursuant to section 766.3 of the Export Administration Regulations, through the issuance of a Proposed Charging Letter to Zhu that alleges that Zhu committed one violation of the Regulations, specifically: 15 CFR 764.2(c)—Attempted Unlicensed Export to China.

On or about November 30, 2018, Zhu engaged in conduct prohibited by the Regulations by attempting to export optical sighting devices, items subject to the Regulations, and valued at approximately $25,000, from the United States to the Peoples Republic of China, via Hong Kong, without the required Department of Commerce export license. At the time of the attempted export, the items were classified under export control classification 0A987 and controlled on Crime Control grounds.

Pursuant to Section 742.7 of the Regulations, a Department of Commerce export license was required before the items could be exported to Hong Kong or China. OEE was able to interdict this transaction by issuing the courier a re-delivery order to return or unload the shipment pursuant to Section 758.8 of the Regulations.

BIS and Zhu have entered into a Settlement Agreement pursuant to Section 766.18(a) of the Regulations, whereby they agreed to settle this matter in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth therein;

First, for a period of one (1) year from the date of the Order, Zhu, with a last known address of 101 Windsor Chase Drive, Lawrenceville, GA 30043, and when acting for or on her behalf, her successors, assigns, representatives, agents, or employees (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Denied Person”), may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the Regulations, including, but not limited to:

  1. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license exception, or export control document;
  2. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the Regulations; or
  3. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or from any other activity subject to the Regulations.

Second, no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:

  1. Export or reexport to or on behalf of the Denied Person any item subject to the Regulations;
  2. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by the Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby the Denied Person acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
  3. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from the Denied Person of any item subject to the Regulations that has been exported from the United States;
  4. Obtain from the Denied Person in the United States any item subject to the Regulations with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
  5. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by the Denied Person, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by the Denied Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing.

Third, any licenses issued under the Regulations in which Zhu has an interest as of the date of this Order shall be revoked by BIS.

Fourth, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in Section 766.23 of the Regulation, any person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to Zhu by affiliation, ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct or trade or related services may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.

Fifth, as authorized by Section 766.18(c) of the Regulations, the denial period shall be imposed and extended for a second year, but for that second year shall be suspended for a probationary period and shall thereafter be waived, provided that Zhu has not committed another violation of ECRA, the Regulations, or any order, license or authorization issued under ECRA or the Regulations. If Zhu commits another violation of ECRA, the Regulations, or any order, license or authorization issued under ECRA or the Regulations during the two-year period from the date of the Order the suspended portion of the Order may be modified or revoked by BIS pursuant to Section 766.17(c) of the Regulations. If the suspension of the denial is modified or revoked, BIS may extend the active denial period up to two-years from the date of the Order.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-23571

OCTOBER 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES Read More »

SEPTEMBER 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through September 30, 2023.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

REGULATORY UPDATES

The President/Executive Branch

Presidential Determination Issued Continuing the Sanctions in Cuba

September 18, 2023: 88 FR 64347: On September 13, the President extended for one year the exercise of certain authorities with respect to Cuba under the Trading with the Enemy Act, which was scheduled to expire on September 14, 2023. The president determined that the continuation of the exercise of those authorities with respect to Cuba for 1 year is in the national interest of the United States.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-20302

*******

Presidential Determination Issued Designating Major Drug Transit or Major Drug Illicit Countries

September 27, 2023: 88 FR 66673: The President issued a Presidential Determination, pursuant to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (FRAA), identifying the following countries as major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.

A country’s presence on the foregoing list is not necessarily a reflection of its government’s counterdrug efforts or level of cooperation with the United States. Consistent with the statutory definition of a major drug transit or major illicit drug producing country set forth in sections 481(e)(2) and 481(e)(5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, the reason countries are placed on the list is the combination of geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to be transited or produced, even if a government has engaged in robust and diligent narcotics control and law enforcement measures.

The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 amended the definition of major drug source countries to include source countries of precursor chemicals used to produce illicit drugs significantly affecting the United States. For countries with large chemical and pharmaceutical industries, preventing precursor chemicals from being diverted to the production of illicit drugs is a particularly difficult challenge, including for the United States and other countries with strict regulatory regimes to prevent diversion. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been identified as a major source country due to this change in legislation, and the United States strongly urges the PRC and other chemical source countries to tighten chemical supply chains and prevent diversion.

Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, the President designated Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela as having failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to both adhere to their obligations under the international counternarcotics agreements and to take the measures required by section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. The President also determined, in accordance with provisions of section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that United States programs that support Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela are vital to the national interests of the United States.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21378

*******

Department of State

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Bulgaria

September 1, 2023: The State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria of Stryker Vehicles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $1.5 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally. The proposed sale will improve Bulgaria’s rapid infantry deployment and force projection capability. Bulgaria will use this enhanced capability to strengthen its homeland defense and deter regional threats. Bulgaria will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and services into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/bulgaria-stryker-vehicles

********

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Poland

September 12, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Poland of an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $4.0 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on September 11, 2023. The proposed sale will support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization Ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. Further, this proposed sale will improve Poland’s missile defense capability and contribute to Poland’s goal of updating its military capability while further enhancing interoperability with the United States and other allies. Poland will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-integrated-air-and-missile-defense-iamd-battle-command-system-1

********

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To South Korea

September 13, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Republic of Korea of F-35 Aircraft and related equipment for an estimated cost of $5.06 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The proposed sale will improve the Republic of Korea’s capability to meet current and future threats by providing credible defense capability to deter aggression in the region and ensure interoperability with U.S. forces. The proposed sale will augment the Republic of Korea’s operational aircraft inventory and enhance its air-to-air and air-to-ground self-defense capability. The Republic of Korea already has F-35s in its inventory and will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/korea-f-35-aircraft

********

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Poland

September 13, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Poland of F-16 Sustainment and related equipment for an estimated cost of $389 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The proposed sale will improve Poland’s capability to meet current and future threats by increasing the reliability of their F-16 fleet. Poland has purchased sustainment support for the F-16s in its inventory for many years and will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-f-16-sustainment

********

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Canada

September 15, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Canada of munitions and other systems to be integrated into MQ-9Bs for an estimated cost of $313.4 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.  The proposed sale will improve Canada’s capability to meet current and future threats by enabling unmanned surveillance and reconnaissance patrols of its northern arctic territories. It will also enable Canada to optimally fulfill its North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) and NATO missions while increasing interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces. Canada will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/canada-mq-9b-integrated-systems

********

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Kuwait

September 20, 2023:  The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Kuwait of Repair and Recertification of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missiles and support for an estimated cost of $150 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the infrastructure of a Major Non-NATO ally that has been an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. It will also improve Kuwait’s capability to sustain their missile density and ensure readiness for air operations. Kuwait will use this capability as a deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen homeland defense. Kuwait will have no difficulty absorbing this infrastructure, support, and associated services into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kuwait-repair-and-recertification-patriot-advanced-capability-3

********

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Saudi Arabia

September 21, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement (CLSSA) Program, Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II and related equipment for an estimated cost of $500 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. This proposed sale will support U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives by supporting a strategic partner’s self-defense and promoting stability in the Middle East. It will also maintain Saudi Arabia’s capability to meet current and future threats by allowing the RSLF to continue to purchase needed spare/repair parts, through their current CLSSA program, to replenish in-country stocks required for general maintenance and sustain the operability of RSLF equipment. The RSLF has participated in the CLSSA program since 1965 and will have no difficulty absorbing these items into its armed forces.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/saudi-arabia-cooperative-logistics-supply-support-arrangement-clssa

********

Department of State Lifts Defense Trade Restrictions on Cyprus

September 14, 2023: 88 FR 63016: On August 18, 2023, the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) announced Secretary Blinken’s certification of the statutory requirements to lift the defense trade restrictions relating to the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) for Fiscal Year 2024. Accordingly, the Department has published a Federal Register notice amending § 126.1(r) of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which continues the suspension of defense trade restrictions for the ROC and its status as a proscribed destination from October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-19851

********

DDTC Issues New ITAR Compliance Risk Matrix

September 15, 2023: The Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) issued a new ITAR Compliance Risk Matrix, accompanied by a supplemental risk matrix specific to universities. These risk matrices are intended to assist organizations in assessing their level of ITAR compliance risk and assist in the evaluation of potential compliance risks that are specific to each organization and that, if left unaddressed, may lead to ITAR violations.  The new risk matrices are available for download on the DDTC website.

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=aff9e5101bd975102b6ca932f54bcbf7

********

United States Hosts Inaugural Plenary Meeting on the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative Voluntary Code of Conduct

September 15, 2023: The U.S. Department of State hosted the inaugural plenary meeting of Subscribing States to the voluntary Code of Conduct of the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative (ECHRI) in Washington, D.C. on September 14-15. ECHRI was launched at the first Summit for Democracy in 2021 as part of the Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal.  ECHRI is a multilateral effort intended to counter state and non-state actors’ misuse of goods and technology to commit serious violations or abuses of human rights by using export controls in pursuit of national security interests.

The Code of Conduct released at the second Summit for Democracy in 2023 is the result of a U.S.-led effort to establish voluntary, nonbinding political commitments by Subscribing States to apply export controls in preventing the proliferation of goods, software, and technologies that could enable serious human rights abuses.

The plenary session marked the first in-person meeting of the 25 Subscribing States and non-government stakeholders to discuss implementation of the Code of Conduct and further integrate human rights criteria into export control regimes. The two-day event also focused on best practices for information sharing and efforts to strengthen consideration of human rights in export controls.

https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-hosts-inaugural-plenary-meeting-on-the-export-controls-and-human-rights-initiative-voluntary-code-of-conduct/

********

DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

September 14 through 27, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Change in name from Kratos RT Logic, Inc. to Kratos S1, Inc. due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in name from GS Optics LLC to Gooch and Housego LLC due to acquisition.
  • Change in name from CTS-Nordic Aktiebolag to Cubic Technologies Sweden AB
  • Change in address for Milestone Aviation Group Limited, Vertical Aviation No 1 Limited, and Vertical Aviation No 2 Limited from Minerva House, 2nd Floor, Simmonscourt Road, Ballsbridge, Dublin, D04 H9P8, Ireland to Dolmen House, 3rd Floor, 4 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin, D02 E024, Ireland.

*******

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security

Commerce Amends the EAR Re: Transfer of Access Information and Release of Software (Source Code and Object Code)

September 18, 2023: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to make a technical correction that also serves to clarify provisions of the EAR pertaining to the release of “software” as set out in the sections on release and transfer of access information. This final rule clarifies an ambiguity in the EAR by adding a cross-reference addressing transfer of access information in the section on releases of “technology” and “software,” as was originally intended. In addition, the final rule adds a clarifying note that, for purposes of transfer of access information, a release of “software” includes both source code and object code.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/docman/?task=doc_download&gid=3331

*******

Commerce Adds Seven HTS Codes and Updates the High Priority List of Critical Items Required by Russia for Its War Effort

September 19, 2023: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced important updates to its list of controlled “common high priority” items identified as critical to Russia’s war effort following productive meetings with key members of the Global Export Control Coalition. BIS has added seven new Harmonized System (HS) codes to the list, including bearings needed for heavy vehicles or other machinery and antennae used for navigation systems. Most of these HTS codes in the list require prior approval for export. Additionally, Tier 3 has been divided into mechanical and non-mechanical items to provide greater clarity. As published in BIS’ previous guidance involving the nine HS codes in Tiers 1 and 2 of highest priority, exporters and reexporters are strongly encouraged to conduct due diligence when encountering the listed HS codes to identify possible third-party intermediaries and attempts at evasion of U.S. export controls.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3332-2023-09-14-bis-press-release-quad-meeting-hs-code-update-final/file

*******

United States-Australia-Canada-New Zealand-United Kingdom Release Joint Guidance on Countering Russian Evasion

September 26, 2023: As a follow-up to the establishment of the “Export Enforcement Five” or “E5” partnership to coordinate on export control enforcement issues in June 2023, the governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States issued joint guidance to industry and academia identifying high priority items critical to Russian weapons systems and urging specific actions to prevent diversion of these items to Russia through third countries. Since February 24, 2022, BIS has implemented a series of stringent export controls that restrict Russia’s access to the technologies and other items that it needs to sustain its illegal war in Ukraine. These controls target Russia’s defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors, and have been expanded to Russia’s oil refining, industrial, and commercial sectors, as well as to luxury goods used by Russian elites. BIS’s controls have also been applied to Belarus for its substantial enabling of Russia’s invasion and have been continually updated to align with GECC allies and partners, which include the E5.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/docman/?task=doc_download&gid=3337

*******

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

Reminder to file the 2023 Annual Report of Blocked Property

September 22, 2023: On July 3, 2023, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a recent actions notice, reminding holders of property blocked pursuant to OFAC sanctions regulations published in Chapter V of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) of the requirement to provide OFAC with an Annual Report of Blocked Property (ARBP).  Persons subject to this reporting requirement must submit a comprehensive report, as outlined in 31 C.F.R. § 501.603 of the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations (RPPR), of all blocked property held as of June 30 of the current year by September 30.

The annual reports must be filed using the mandatory spreadsheet form TD-F 90-22.50.  Completed forms should be sent to ofacreport@treasury.gov or filed through the OFAC Reporting System (ORS).  Failure to submit a required ARBP by September 30 constitutes a violation of the RPPR.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230922

*******

International Organizations

New WTO Publication Provides Insights into The World of Export Regulations and Controls

September 15, 2023: A new WTO publication explores for the first time how the different national export-related frameworks developed beyond the WTO operate in practice and how they are linked to the multilateral trading system. “The book is intended to serve as a guide for policymakers, government officials, academia and members of the public with an interest in the areas covered,” said Suja Rishikesh Mavroidis Director of the WTO’s Market Access Division, in a foreword to the publication. “By fostering a better understanding of the existing international agreements regulating exports and how they link to the multilateral trading system, the WTO can help to strengthen global cooperation, promote transparency and perhaps even inspire future agreements seeking to strike a balance between advancing international trade and protecting the global community against potential risks”, she said.

In terms of the products affected by export-related measures, the publication notes that chemical products are the most frequently affected, followed by optical and measuring instruments, and different types of machinery and pharmaceuticals.  The “General Exceptions” provision under Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was the most frequently cited WTO basis for the export-related QRs — 73 per cent of the total — with paragraph (b) of Article XX regarding measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” cited in 38 per cent of the export measures.

https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news23_e/pf23_15sep23_e.htm

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

Sanctions

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

September 25, 2023: The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released a rule adding 28 entities to the Entity List, 11 of which are based in the People’s Republic of China (China), 5 in Russia, 5 in Pakistan, along with others located in Finland, Oman, Germany, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The entities listed in action were added to the Entity List for having been involved, being involved, or posing a significant risk of being or becoming involved in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy of the United States. Among those entities listed, nine entities under the destinations of China, Finland, Germany, and Russia have been implicated in a conspiracy to violate U.S. export controls, including a scheme to supply the Special Technology Center, an entity on the BIS Entity List, with components to make unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU).

China

  • Asia Pacific Links Ltd.;
  • Guilin Alpha Rubber & Plastics Technology Company Limited;
  • Hangzhou Fuyang Koto Machinery Company Limited;
  • Nanjing Institute of Astronomical Optics and Technology;
  • Raven International Trade Limited;
  • S&C Trade PTY Company Limited;
  • Shenzhen Caspro Technology Company Limited;
  • Speed Business Trading (HK) Ltd.;
  • Sunrising Logistics (HK) Ltd.;
  • Well Fair International (Hong Kong) Ltd.;
  • Yun Xia Yuan.

Finland

  • Evelog Oy;
  • Luminor Oy;
  • Siberica Oy.

Germany

  • ICW-Industrial Components Weirich.

Oman

  • International Smart Digital Interface Company (ISDIC);
  • Moaz Ahmed Mohammed al-Haifi.

Pakistan

  • AHD International;
  • Genesis Technical Consultancy;
  • Indus Tooling Solution;
  • Longford Engineering (Pvt) Ltd.;
  • Polymaster Engineering.

Russia

  • Device Consulting;
  • Grant Instrument;
  • SMT-iLogic;
  • Streloy;
  • VSMPO–AVISMA Corporation PJSC.

United Arab Emirates

  • New Era Enterprises FZE.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3335-2023-09-25-bis-release-28-entity-list-additions/file

*******

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

September 6, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo (Abdelrahim) for his leadership of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an entity whose members have engaged in acts of violence and human rights abuses, including the massacre of civilians, ethnic killings, and use of sexual violence. Since the beginning of conflict between the RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on April 15, 2023, both sides have failed to implement a ceasefire, and the RSF and allied militias have been credibly accused of extensive human rights abuses in Darfur and elsewhere.

Abdelrahim is a high-ranking leader in the RSF and the brother of RSF Commander Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Abdelrahim is being designated pursuant to Executive Order 14098 for being a foreign person who is or has been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the RSF, an entity that has, or whose members have, engaged in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Sudan relating to the tenure of such leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors. Abdelrahim is also being designated for being a foreign person who is or has been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the RSF, an entity that has, or whose members have, engaged in the targeting of women, children, or any other civilians through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence), abduction, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge, or through conduct that would constitute a serious abuse or violation of human rights or a violation of international humanitarian law relating to the tenure of such leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors.

Treasury Sanctions Sudanese Paramilitary Leader | U.S. Department of the Treasury

*******

September 7, 2023: The United States, in coordination with the United Kingdom, sanctioned eleven individuals who are part of the Russia-based Trickbot cybercrime group. Russia has long been a safe haven for cybercriminals, including the Trickbot group. This action was taken by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is concurrently unsealing indictments against nine individuals in connection with the Trickbot malware and Conti ransomware schemes, including seven of the individuals designated here.

The sanctions target key actors involved in management and procurement for the Trickbot group, which has ties to Russian intelligence services and has targeted the U.S. Government and U.S. companies, including hospitals. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Trickbot group targeted many critical infrastructure and health care providers in the United States.

Trickbot, first identified in 2016 by security researchers, was a trojan virus that evolved from the Dyre trojan. Dyre was an online banking trojan operated by Moscow-based individuals who began targeting non-Russian businesses and entities in mid-2014. Dyre and Trickbot were developed and operated by a group of cybercriminals to steal financial data from targets outside of Russia. The Trickbot trojan infected millions of victim computers worldwide, including those of U.S. businesses and individuals. It has since evolved into a highly modular malware suite that provides the Trickbot group the ability to conduct a variety of malicious cyber activities, including ransomware. During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the Trickbot group launched a wave of ransomware disruptions against hospitals and other healthcare centers across the United States. In one instance, the Trickbot group deployed ransomware against three Minnesota medical facilities, disrupting their computer networks and telephones, and causing a diversion of ambulances. Members of the Trickbot group publicly gloated over the ease of targeting the medical facilities and the speed with which ransoms had been paid to the group. Members of the Trickbot group are associated with Russian intelligence services. The Trickbot group’s preparations in 2020 aligned them to Russian state objectives and actions taken by the Russian intelligence services. This included targeting the U.S. Government and U.S. companies. The following individuals have been named:

  • Andrey Zhuykov
  • Maksim Galochkin
  • Maksim Rudenskiy
  • Mikhail Tsarev. Tsarev is also known by the monikers Mango, Alexander Grachev, Super Misha, Ivanov Mixail, Misha Krutysha, and Nikita Andreevich Tsarev.
  • Dmitry Putilin. Putilin is also known by the online monikers Grad and Staff.
  • Maksim Khaliullin. Khaliullin is also known by the online moniker Kagas.
  • Sergey Loguntsov
  • Vadym Valiakhmetov. Valiakhmetov is known by the online monikers Weldon, Mentos, and Vasm.
  • Artem Kurov. Artem Kurov is also known by the online moniker Naned.
  • Mikhail Chernov. Chernov is also known by the online moniker Bullet.
  • Alexander Mozhaev. Mozhaev is known by the online monikers Green and Rocco.

OFAC designated each of these individuals pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13694, as amended by E.O. 13757, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an activity described in subsection (a)(ii) of section 1 of E.O. 13694, as amended.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1714

*******

September 12, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in coordination with the Drug Enforcement Administration, designated key Hizballah operatives and financial facilitators in South America and Lebanon. This action includes Amer Mohamed Akil Rada (Amer), who in addition to his role as a senior Hizballah operative, was one of the operational members of Hizballah who carried out the terrorist attack against the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) in Argentina in 1994 that killed 85 people. Amer and his associates manage a commercial enterprise for Hizballah, including charcoal exports to Lebanon. This action targets seven key individuals and entities in this network that generates revenue for Hizballah’s terrorist activities and enables the terrorist group’s presence and nefarious activities in Latin America. Since its inception, Hizballah has established an extensive global infrastructure that includes commercial activities that allow Hizballah operatives to travel freely, strategically case targets, and transfer materials and funds.

  • Amer Mohamed Akil Rada.
  • Samer Akil Rada (Samer)
  • Mahdy Akil Helbawi (Helbawi).
  • Zanga S.A.S.
  • Ali Ismail Ajrouch
  • Black Diamond SARL
  • A.S.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1726

*******

September 14, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is imposing nearly 100 individual sanctions on Russian elites and Russia’s industrial base, financial institutions, and technology suppliers as the United States continues to leverage sanctions and economic restrictions to undermine Russia’s capacity to wage its war against Ukraine, as described below. The following individuals have been named:

  • Andrei Removich Bokarev (Bokarev)
  • Olga Vladimirovna Syrovatskaya (Syrovatskaya)
  • Transmashholding JSC (Transmash)
  • Iskandar Kakhramonovich Makhmudov (Makhmudov)
  • Dzhakhangir Iskandarovich Makhmudov (Dzhakhangir).
  • Open Joint Stock Company Aero Engine Scientific and Technical Complex Soyuz (Soyuz)
  • Open Joint Stock Company Balashikhinskiy Liteyno Mekhanicheskiy Zavod (Balashikha)
  • Mkrtich Okroevich Okroyan (Mkrtich)
  • Aleksei Yurievich Krivoruchko (Krivoruchko)
  • Joint Stock Company Gavrilov Yam Machine Building Plant Agat (Agat)
  • Joint Stock Company Star (JSC Star)
  • Joint Stock Company Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (NIMI)
  • Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Ulyanovskii Patronnyi Zavod (Ulyanovsk Cartridge Works)

OFAC is also designating a Finland-based network that specializes in shipping foreign electronics to Russia-based end-users. Finland-based logistics firms Siberica Oy (Siberica) and Luminor Oy (Luminor) have sent a wide variety of electronics into Russia, including UAV cameras, high-performance optical filters, and lithium batteries. French national Gabriel Temin is Siberica’s owner, managing director, and a member of Siberica’s board of directors and Estonian national Catherine Esther Temin is a deputy board member of Siberica.

  • Gabriel Temin
  • Catherine Esther Temin

The following Russia-based entities were importing directly from Luminor:

  • Flytechgroup Limited Liability Company (Flytechgroup)
  • OOO NPK Fotonika Limited Liability Company (NPK Fotonika)
  • Globaltrans Limited (Globaltrans)
  • Limited Liability Company Aservice (Aservice)
  • OOO Mayak (Mayak)

OFAC is also targeting two entities based in Turkey. Russia continues to rely on third-country entities to keep importing much-needed dual-use goods to enable its unprovoked war of aggression on Ukraine. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has repeatedly raised the issue of the shipment or transshipment of dual-use goods to Russia with the Government of Turkey and the Turkish private sector. They are:

  • Margiana Insaat Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Margiana)
  • Demirci Bilisim Ticaret Sanayi Limited Sirketi (Demirci)

OFAC also designated the owner and director of previously designated Russia-based entity Limited Liability Company AK Microtech (AKM), Russian national Andrei Rostislavovich Khokhlun (Khokhlun), as well as two companies owned by Khokhlun: Russia-based Limited Liability Company Keko R (Keko R) and Slovenia-based Arktec Tehnologije na Podrocju Elektronike doo (Arktec).

OFAC also designated the following Russia-based entities were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the electronics, technology, manufacturing, construction, and/or financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy:

  • OOO Enkor Grupp
  • Nauchno Proizvodstvennoe Predpiyatie Itelma
  • OOO Makro Grupp
  • Limited Liability Company Streloi
  • Vertikal Limited (Vertikal)
  • OOO VMK (VMK)
  • OOO Aiti Tsentr
  • Limited Liability Company Baltinfokom
  • OOO Bitteriya
  • Eastern Trade Limited Liability Company
  • Joint Stock Company Echelon Union for Science and Development
  • Limited Liability Company Inforion
  • Obshchestvos Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu Inforser Inzhiniring
  • Intech Engineering LTD
  • Joint Stock Company Kraftway Corporation PLS (Kraftway)
  • Limited Liability Company Kvarta VK
  • OOO Lanprint
  • OOO Novyi Ai Ti Proekt
  • Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Pluton
  • Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rostov on Don Research Institute of Radio Communications’s (RNIIRS)
  • Joint Stock Company Signaltek
  • Silkway Limited Liability Company
  • OOO Solar Sekyuriti (Solar Security)
  • Limited Liability Company Status Complains
  • Svetlana Rost Joint Stock Company (Svetlana Rost)
  • Joint Stock Company Special Economic Zone Technopolis Moscow (Technopolis Moscow)
  • OOO Trialkom
  • Limited Liability Company Tribit
  • OOO Vneshekostil
  • Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Taskom
  • Joint Stock Company Avtovaz
  • Gaz Group
  • Joint Stock Company HMS Group
  • Kirovsky Zavod Public Joint Stock Company
  • Kriogenmash OAO (Kriogenmash)
  • Joint Stock Company Moscow Automotive Factory Moskvich
  • JSC Power Machines (Power Machines)
  • Publichnoe Aktsionernoe Obschestvo Sollers
  • Limited Liability Company Machine Building Plant Tonar
  • Joint Stock Company United Metallurgical Company (OMK)
  • Open Joint Stock Company Tikhoretsk Machine Construction Plant V.V. Vorovsky
  • Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo BashVzryvTekhnologii (BVT)
  • Limited Liability Company Gazprom Nedra (Gazprom Nedra)
  • Joint Stock Company Gazstroyprom (Gazstroyprom)
  • Velesstroi Limited Liability Company (Velesstroi)
  • JSC AGD Diamonds (AGD Diamonds)
  • Vitalij Victorovich Perfilev (Perfilev)
  • Joint Stock Commercial Bank Ak Bars Public Joint Stock Company (Ak Bars Bank)
  • Obshchestvo s Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu Kommercheski Bank Sinko Bank (Sinko Bank)
  • Katarzyna Ewa Pawlowska Hanafin (Pawlowska)
  • Obshchestvo S Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu A1 (A1)
  • KSK Group (KSK)

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1731

*******

September 14, 2023: OFAC issued Russia-Related General License 55A: “Authorizing Certain Services Related to Sakhalin-2”

All transactions prohibited by the determination of November 21, 2022 made pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of Executive Order 14071 (“Prohibitions on Certain Services as They Relate to the Maritime Transport of Crude Oil of Russian Federation Origin”) related to the maritime transport of crude oil originating from the Sakhalin-2 project (“Sakhalin-2 byproduct”) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 28, 2024, provided that the Sakhalin-2 byproduct is solely for importation into Japan.

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized.

Effective September 14, 2023, General License No. 55, dated November 22, 2022, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License No. 55A.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932136/download?inline

*******

September 14, 2023: OFAC issued Russia-Related General License 72: “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on September 14, 2023”

All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked persons (collectively, the “Blocked Entities”) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 13, 2023, provided that any payment to a Blocked Entity is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):

  • Joint Stock Company Russian Copper Company;
  • Joint Stock Company United Metallurgical Company;
  • Transmashholding JSC;
  • Joint Stock Company Avtovaz;
  • Joint Stock Company Moscow Automotive Factory Moskvich;
  • Limited Liability Company Machine Building Plant Tonar;
  • Publichnoe Aktsionernoe Obschestvo Sollers;
  • Arctic Transshipment Limited Liability Company; or
  • Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

This general license does not authorize:

Any transactions prohibited by Directive 2 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions;

Any transactions prohibited by Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or

Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the RuHSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR other than the Blocked Entities described in this general license, unless separately authorized.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932131/download?inline

*******

September 15, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 29 individuals and entities in connection with the Iranian regime’s violent suppression of nationwide protests following the death of Mahsa “Zhina” Amini in custody of its ‘Morality Police,’ and the regime’s continued efforts to detain dissenting voices and restrict access to a free and open internet. OFAC’s action targets: 18 key members of the regime’s security forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF); the head of Iran’s Prisons Organization; three individuals and one company in connection with the regime’s systematic censorship and blocking of access to the internet; and three IRGC and regime-controlled media outlets––Fars News, Tasnim News and Press TV––and three senior officials.

Concurrently, the Department of State is imposing visa restrictions on 13 Iranian officials and other individuals for their involvement in the detention or killing of peaceful protestors or inhibiting their rights to freedom of expression or assembly, including through censorship via a country-wide internet shutdown in Iran. Since Mahsa Amini’s death and the protests that followed, the Department of State has imposed visa restrictions on 40 Iranian officials and other individuals for their involvement in acts targeting peaceful protestors.

  • Saeed Montazerolmehdi (Montazerolmehdi)
  • Hossein Amjadian (Amjadian)
  • Alaaddin Aykut (Aykut)
  • Abbasali Mohammadian (Mohammadian)
  • Hassan Shahrestani (Shahrestani)
  • Ahmad Taheri (Taheri)
  • Ahmad Naderian (Naderian)
  • Seyyed Khalil Safavi (Safavi)
  • Delavar Alghasi-Mehr (Alghasi-Mehr)
  • Mohammad Mozzami Goudarzi (Goudarzi)
  • Roham Bakhsh Habibi (Habibi)
  • Khodarahm Sarani (Sarani)
  • Mazaher Majidi (Majidi)
  • Bahman Reyhani (Reyhani)
  • Jamal Shakarami (Shakarami)
  • Mohammad Abdollahpour (Abdollahpour)
  • Gholamhossein Gheib-Parvar (Gheib-Parvar)
  • Ali Akbar Pourjamshidian (Pourjamshidian)
  • Abdolreza Abedzadeh (Abedzadeh)
  • Gholamali Mohammadi (Mohammadi)
  • Alireza Abedinejad
  • Yaftar Pazhohan Pishtaz Rayanesh (Yaftar)
  • Press TV
  • Tasnim News Agency (Tasnim)
  • Fars News Agency

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1733

*******

September 18, 2023: The U.S. government announced the establishment of a humanitarian channel in Qatar (HC) to further facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance to the people of Iran consistent with the U.S. government’s longstanding support for humanitarian trade.  Similar to humanitarian channels established under previous administrations, the HC is designed to support the Iranian people’s access to food, agricultural goods, medicine, and medical devices under stringent due diligence measures that guard against money laundering, misuse, and evasion of U.S. sanctions.  The HC does not lift any U.S. sanctions on Iran, and the U.S. government continues to impose sanctions on Iran’s malign activity, including in response to Iran’s weapons proliferation and its support for international terrorism.  To that end, OFAC added secondary sanctions on the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

The following individual has been added to the OFAC SDN List:

  • Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230918

*******

September 19, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned seven individuals and four entities based in Iran, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and Turkey in connection with Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and military aircraft development. This network has facilitated shipments and financial transactions in support of the U.S.-designated Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company’s (HESA’s) UAV and military aircraft production, procurement, and maintenance activities. This action builds on OFAC’s March 9, 2023 designation of five PRC-based companies and one individual responsible for the sale and shipment of thousands of aerospace components, including those with UAV applications, to HESA.

 

Iran

  • HESA
  • Mehdi Gogerdchian (Gogerdchian)

China

  • Shenzhen Jiasibo Technology Co., Ltd. (Shenzhen Jiasibo)
  • Dong Wenbo (Dong)

Russia

  • Delta-Aero Technical Service Center LLC (Delta-Aero)

Turkey

  • Mehmet Tokdemir (Tokdemir)
  • Alaaddin Aykut (Aykut)

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1745

*******

September 26, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 10 individuals, including several Sinaloa Cartel affiliates and fugitives, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059. Those sanctioned operate under the Los Chapitos faction of Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel. Responsible for a significant portion of the illicit fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States, the Sinaloa Cartel is one of the world’s most damaging transnational criminal organizations. Additionally, OFAC sanctioned the leader of the Clan del Golfo, one of Colombia’s largest criminal enterprises that controls most of the country’s cocaine cultivation, production, and transportation routes.

  • Jorge Humberto Figueroa Benitez
  • Leobardo Garcia Corrales
  • Martin Garcia Corrales
  • Liborio Nunez Aguirre
  • Samuel Leon Alvarado
  • Carlos Mario Limon Vazquez
  • Mario Alberto Jimenez Castro (Jimenez Castro)
  • Julio Cesar Dominguez Hernandez (Dominguez Hernandez)
  • Jesus Miguel Vibanco Garcia (Vibanco Garcia)
  • Jobanis de Jesus Avila Villadiego (Avila Villadiego)

*******

September 27, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned five entities and two individuals based in Iran, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) involved in the procurement of sensitive parts for Iran’s one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program. This network has facilitated shipments and financial transactions in support of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization’s (IRGC ASF SSJO) procurement of servomotors, a critical component used in Iran’s Shahed-series UAVs. Iran has been supplying Russia with Shahed-136 UAVs to support Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. One of the servomotors procured by the network designated was recovered in the remnants of a Russia-operated Shahed-136 that was recently shot down in Ukraine.

Iran

  • Pishgam Electronic Safeh Company (PESC)
  • Hamid Reza Janghorbani (Janghorbani)

Hong Kong

  • Hongkong Himark Electron Model Limited (Hongkong Himark)

People’s Republic of China

  • Fan Yang (Fan)

Turkey

  • Dal Enerji Madencilik Turizm Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi (Dal Enerji)
  • Anka Port Ic Ve Dis Ticaret INSAAT Lojistik Sanayi Limited Sirketi (Anka Port)

United Arab Emirates

  • Farhad Ghaedi Goods Wholesalers LLC (Farhad Ghaedi)

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1766

*******

September 28, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted two entities and one individual for their role in undermining the peace, security, and stability of Sudan. Since the Sudanese people peacefully ousted Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, various actors, including the individual being designated, have taken steps to undermine Sudan’s efforts to establish civilian, democratic governance. His actions have obstructed efforts to reach a ceasefire to end the current conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and opposed Sudanese civilian efforts to resume Sudan’s stalled democratic transition. The two entities designated in this action are RSF-affiliated companies generating revenue from, and contributing to, the conflict in Sudan.

  • Ali Karti (Karti)
  • GSK Advance Company Ltd (GSK)
  • Aviatrade LLC

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1769

*******

Fines and Penalties

BIS Imposes Penalty Against Pratt & Whitney Component Solutions to Resolve 13 Alleged Violations of the Antiboycott Regulations

September 7, 2023: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed a civil penalty of $48,750 against Pratt & Whitney Component Solutions, Inc (PWCS), located in Muskegon, Michigan, to resolve 13 violations of the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (antiboycott regulations), as alleged in BIS’s Proposed Charging Letter. PWCS voluntarily disclosed the conduct to BIS, cooperated with the investigation by BIS’s Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC), and took remedial measures after discovering the conduct at issue, all of which resulted in a significant reduction in penalty.

As part of the settlement with BIS, PWCS admitted to the conduct set forth in the Proposed Charging Letter, which alleged 13 violations of Section 760.5 of the EAR (Failing to Report the Receipt of a Request to Engage in a Restrictive Trade Practice or Foreign Boycott Against a Country Friendly to the United States). Specifically, between May 2019 and March 2020, on thirteen occasions, PWCS received a request from Qatar Airways, a customer in Qatar, to refrain from importing Israeli-origin goods into Qatar in fulfillment of purchase orders from Qatar Airways. PWCS failed to report to BIS the receipt of these requests, as required by Section 760.5 of the Regulations.

These BIS actions were taken under the authority of the Anti-Boycott Act of 2018, a subpart of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, and its implementing regulations, the EAR. The antiboycott provisions set forth in Part 760 of the EAR discourage, and in certain circumstances prohibit, U.S. persons from taking certain actions in furtherance or support of a boycott maintained by a foreign country against a country friendly to the United States (an unsanctioned foreign boycott). In addition, U.S. persons must report to OAC their receipt of certain boycott-related requests. Reports may be filed electronically or by mail on form BIS 621-P for single transactions or on form BIS 6051P for multiple transactions involving boycott requests received in the same calendar quarter. U.S. persons located in the U.S. must postmark or electronically date stamp their reports by the last day of the month following the calendar quarter in which the underlying request was received. For U.S. persons located outside the U.S., the postmark or date stamp deadline is the last day of the second month following the calendar quarter in which the request was received.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3330-09-07-antiboycott-penalty-pr-final/file

*******

Justice Department Announces First Criminal Resolution Involving the Illicit Sale and Transport of Iranian Oil in Violation of U.S. Sanctions

September 8, 2023: The Justice Department announced the successful disruption of a multimillion-dollar shipment of crude oil by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a designated foreign terrorist organization, that was bound for another country. This is the first-ever criminal resolution involving a company that violated sanctions by facilitating the illicit sale and transport of Iranian oil and comes in concert with a successful seizure of over 980,000 barrels of contraband crude oil.

The contraband cargo is now the subject of a civil forfeiture action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The United States’ forfeiture complaint alleges that the oil aboard the vessel is subject to forfeiture based on U.S. terrorism and money laundering statutes.

The complaint alleges a scheme involving multiple entities affiliated with Iran’s IRGC and the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to covertly sell and transport Iranian oil to a customer abroad. Participants in the scheme attempted to disguise the origin of the oil using ship-to-ship transfers, false automatic identification system reporting, falsified documents and other means. The complaint further alleges that the charterer of the vessel used the U.S. financial system to facilitate the transportation of Iranian oil.

The complaint further alleges that the oil constitutes the property of, or provided a “source of influence” over, the IRGC and the IRGC-QF, both of which have been designated by the United States as foreign terrorist organizations, and that the oil facilitated money laundering. The documents allege that profits from oil sales support the IRGC’s full range of malign activities, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, support for terrorism and both domestic and international human rights abuses.

Funds successfully forfeited with a connection to a state sponsor of terrorism may in whole or in part be directed to the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-first-criminal-resolution-involving-illicit-sale-and-transport

*******

September 12, 2023: 88 FR 62534: Ruben Beltran Pedroza (“Pedroza”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a) on November 3, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Specifically, Pedroza was convicted of smuggling a Smith & Wesson M&P Shield .40 pistol from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Pedroza to 34 months of confinement, with credit for time served, three years of supervised release and a $100 assessment. BIS received notice of Pedroza’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 554. As provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations, BIS provided notice and opportunity for Pedroza to make a written submission to BIS. BIS has not received a written submission from Pedroza. The Bureau of Industry and Security has decided to deny Pedroza’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of five years from the date of Pedroza’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Pedroza had an interest at the time of his conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-19678

*******

September 12, 2023: 88 FR 62535: Jonathan Santiago (“Santiago”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a) on October 25, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Specifically, Santiago was convicted of smuggling a Smith & Wesson M&P Shield .40 pistol from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Santiago to 42 months of confinement, with credit for time served and three years of supervised release. BIS received notice of Santiago’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 554. As provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations, BIS provided notice and opportunity for Santiago to make a written submission to BIS. BIS has not received a written submission from Santiago. The Bureau of Industry and Security has decided to deny Santiago’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of seven years from the date of Santiago’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Santiago had an interest at the time of his conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-19679

*******

September 12, 2023: 88 FR 62536: Nicholas Ayala (“Ayala”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371 and 18 U.S.C. 554 on November 16, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Specifically, Ayala was convicted of conspiring to smuggle various handguns and firearms from the United States to Ecuador. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 36 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $400 special assessment.  BIS received notice of Ayala’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 371 and 18 U.S.C. 554. As provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations, BIS provided notice and opportunity for Ayala to make a written submission to BIS. BIS has not received a written submission from Ayala. The Bureau of Industry and Security has decided to deny Ayala’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Ayala’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Ayala had an interest at the time of his conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-19680

*******

September 12, 2023: 88 FR 62533: Peter Sotis (“Sotis”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C 1701, et seq.) (“IEEPA”) and 18 U.S.C. 554 on January 12, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Specifically, Sotis was convicted of conspiring to export, exported and attempted to export and smuggling four (4) rEvo III rebreathers from the United States to Libya without the required license or written approval. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 57 months in prison, three years of supervised release and a $300 special assessment. BIS received notice of Sotis conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 371, IEEPA and 18 U.S.C 554. As provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations, BIS provided notice and opportunity for Sotis to make a written submission to BIS. BIS received and considered a written submission from Sotis. The Bureau of Industry and Security has decided to deny Sotis’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Sotis’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Sotis had an interest at the time of his conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-19681

*******

September 14, 2023: A federal jury has convicted Jalal Hajavi of conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (“ITSR”), smuggling goods from the United States, unlawfully exporting and reexporting goods from the U.S. to Iran without a license, and unlawfully engaging in transactions and dealings based on his participation in a scheme to unlawfully export heavy equipment from the U.S. to Iran by routing the shipments though the United Arab Emirates.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/virginia-man-convicted-exporting-heavy-equipment-iran-violation-us-sanctions-laws

*******

September 15, 2023: 88 FR 63550: Katie Ellen O’Brien (“O’Brien”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a) and 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) on January 17, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. Specifically, O’Brien was convicted of making false statements or misrepresentations to the U.S. Government during the course of an investigation and smuggling and attempting to smuggle firearms from the United States to Mexico. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced O’Brien to 60 months confinement with credit for time served, three years supervised release, and a $600 special assessment.

Following issuance of the April 12, 2023 Order, BIS received notification that the last known address listed on the Order was incorrect. Specifically, BIS has since learned that another individual named Katie O’Brien, who is not the intended subject of the Denial Order, resides at the address listed on the April 12, 2023 Order. BIS has subsequently obtained updated information that indicates that the last known address for the individual who is the intended subject of the Denial Order is 1026 East Spence Avenue, Unit 103, Tempe, AZ 85281. Therefore, BIS is amending the April 12, 2023, Order to reflect the last known address of the individual convicted of the listed offenses for purposes of the denial of this individual’s export privileges.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-20049

*******

September 21, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $9,618,477 settlement with 3M Company (“3M”).  3M has agreed to settle its potential civil liability for 54 apparent violations of OFAC sanctions on Iran that arose from its subsidiary’s sale of reflective license plate sheeting to an Iranian entity controlled by the Iranian Law Enforcement Forces.  Between September 2016 and September 2018, 3M East AG sold 43 orders of this product to a reseller with knowledge that it was destined for a customer in Iran.  Additionally, one U.S.-person employee of another 3M subsidiary was substantively involved in these sales.  OFAC determined that these apparent violations were egregious and were voluntarily self-disclosed.

Separately, OFAC also announced a settlement with Emigrant Bank (Emigrant).  Emigrant agreed to remit $31,867.90 to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of sanctions against Iran.  For approximately 26 years, Emigrant maintained a Certificate of Deposit account on behalf of two individuals ordinarily resident and located in Iran, for which it processed 30 transactions between June 2017 and March 2021 totaling $91,051.13.  Emigrant had actual knowledge of the Iranian address and apparent location of the accountholders during this period.  The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that Emigrant’s conduct was non-egregious and voluntarily self-disclosed.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230921

*******

September 28, 2023: 88 FR 66807: The Bureau of Industry and Security renewed an order denying PJSC Aeroflot’s (“Aeroflot”) export privileges for a period of 180 days on the ground that Aeroflot has engaged in a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR. Therefore, Aeroflot, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:

  1. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control document;
  2. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
  3. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.

Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:

  1. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of Aeroflot any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  2. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by Aeroflot of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby Aeroflot acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  3. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from Aeroflot of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  4. Obtain from Aeroflot in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
  5. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by Aeroflot, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by Aeroflot if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.

Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to Aeroflot by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21173

*******

September 28, 2023: 88 FR 66805: The Bureau of Industry and Security renewed an order denying Azur Air’s (“Azur”) export privileges for a period of 180 days on the grounds that Azur has engaged in a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR. Therefore, Azur, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:

  1. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control document;
  2. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
  3. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.

Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:

  1. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of Azur any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  2. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by Azur of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby Azur acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  3. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from Azur of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  4. Obtain from Azur in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
  5. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by Azur, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by Azur if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.

Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to Azur by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21172

*******

September 28, 2023: 88 FR 66802: The Bureau of Industry and Security renewed an order denying UTair Aviation JSC’s (“UTair”) export privileges for a period of 180 days on the grounds that UTair has engaged in a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR. Therefore, UTair, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:

  1. Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control document;
  2. Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
  3. Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.

Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:

  1. Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of UTair any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  2. Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by UTair of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby UTair acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  3. Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from UTair of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
  4. Obtain from UTair in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
  5. Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by UTair, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by UTair if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.

Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to UTair by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21171

SEPTEMBER 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES Read More »

AUGUST 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through August 31, 2023.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

REGULATORY UPDATES

President

President Biden signed H.R. 4004, the “United States-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade First Agreement Implementation Act”

August 7, 2023: President Biden signed H.R. 4004, the “United States-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade First Agreement Implementation Act” (the “Act”).  Among other things, the Act would impose requirements on the negotiations of certain further trade agreements between the United States and Taiwan.

Section 7 of the Act includes requirements for the negotiation of certain further trade agreements with Taiwan that raise constitutional concerns.  Section 7(b) of the Act would require the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to provide negotiating texts to congressional committees in the midst of negotiations with a foreign partner, and section 7(c) of the Act would preclude the USTR from transmitting United States-proposed texts to Taiwan while the Congress is reviewing them.  Section 7(c) of the Act would further, in violation of INS v. Chadha, afford 2 members of the Congress the power to increase the required waiting period before the USTR may provide texts to Taiwan.  Section 7(d) of the Act would require the inclusion of members of the Congress as accredited members of the United States delegation who would be entitled to daily briefings, including of tentative agreements.  In cases where the requirements of section 7 of the Act would impermissibly infringe upon the President’s constitutional authority to negotiate with a foreign partner, the Biden Administration will treat them as non-binding.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/07/statement-from-president-joe-biden-on-h-r-4004-the-united-states-taiwan-initiative-on-21st-century-trade-first-agreement-implementation-act/

*******

President Biden Published Fact Sheet On Progress Under CHIPS and Science Act

August 9, 2023: One year ago, President Biden signed into law the CHIPS and Science Act (CHIPS), which makes a nearly $53 billion investment in U.S. semiconductor manufacturing, research and development, and workforce. The law also creates a 25 percent tax credit for capital investments in semiconductor manufacturing and is helping to keep America at the forefront of innovation and technological development. Semiconductors were invented in the United States, but the U.S. only produces about 10 percent of  the global supply—and none of the most advanced chips. Similarly, investments in research and development have fallen to less than 1 percent of GDP from 2 percent in the mid-1960s at the peak of the space race. The CHIPS and Science Act aims to change this by driving American competitiveness, making American supply chains more resilient, and supporting national security and access to key technologies.

In the one year since CHIPS was signed into law, companies have announced over $166 billion in manufacturing in semiconductors and electronics, and at least 50 community colleges in 19 states have announced new or expanded programming to help American workers access good-paying jobs in the semiconductor industry. In total, since the beginning of the Biden-Harris Administration, companies have announced over $231 billion in commitments in semiconductor and electronics investments in the United States. In August, the Department of Commerce announced the first round of grants under CHIPS to support the development of open and interoperable wireless networks, and the National Science Foundation and Departments of Energy, Commerce, and Defense announced progress toward establishing the National Semiconductor Technology Center, which will help advance America’s leadership in semiconductor research and development.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/09/fact-sheet-one-year-after-the-chips-and-science-act-biden-harris-administration-marks-historic-progress-in-bringing-semiconductor-supply-chains-home-supporting-innovation-and-protecting-national-s/ and

*******

President Biden Issues Executive Order “Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern.

August 9, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 54867: On August 9, 2023, President Biden issued the Executive Order declaring a national emergency to address the threat to the United States posed by certain countries of concern, which seek to develop and exploit sensitive or advanced technologies or products critical for military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled capabilities.  The Order directs the Secretary of the Treasury to establish a program to prohibit or require notification of certain types of outbound investments by United States persons into certain entities located in or subject to the jurisdiction of a country of concern, and certain other entities owned by persons of a country of concern, involved in specific categories of advanced technologies and products.  The Order identifies three categories of national security technologies and products for the program: semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum information technologies, and artificial intelligence.  In an Annex to the Order, the President identified the People’s Republic of China, along with the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau, as a country of concern.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-17449

*******

Biden-⁠Harris Administration Launches Artificial Intelligence Cyber Challenge to Protect America’s Critical Software

August 9, 2023: The Biden-Harris Administration launched a major two-year competition that will use artificial intelligence (AI) to protect the United States’ most important software, such as code that helps run the internet and our critical infrastructure.  The “AI Cyber Challenge” (AIxCC) will challenge competitors across the United States, to identify and fix software vulnerabilities using AI. Led by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), this competition will include collaboration with several top AI companies – Anthropic, Google, Microsoft, and OpenAI – who are lending their expertise and making their cutting-edge technology available for this challenge. This competition, which will feature almost $20 million in prizes, will drive the creation of new technologies to rapidly improve the security of computer code, one of cybersecurity’s most pressing challenges. It marks the latest step by the Biden-Harris Administration to ensure the responsible advancement of emerging technologies and protect Americans.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/09/biden-harris-administration-launches-artificial-intelligence-cyber-challenge-to-protect-americas-critical-software/

*******

The White House’s Office of the National Cyber Director Issues RFI Regarding Open-Source Software Security

August 10, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 54315: The Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD), the Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) invite public comments on areas of long-term focus and prioritization on open-source software security.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/10/2023-17239/request-for-information-on-open-source-software-security-areas-of-long-term-focus-and-prioritization

*******

President Biden Signs Continuation of Export Administration Act of 1979

August 17, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 55549: On August 17, 2001, the President issued Executive Order 13222 pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. In that order, the President declared a national emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States related to the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979.  Because the implementation of certain sanctions authorities is to be carried out under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the President has determined the national emergency declared on August 17, 2001 must continue in effect beyond August 17, 2023.  Therefore, the President issued an Executive Order continuing for one year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13222, as amended by Executive Order 13637 of March 8, 2013.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-17743

*******

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

August 1 through 29, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Change in Address for General Dynamics Mission Systems – Italy s.r.l. from Viale Egeo 100-106, 00144, Rome, Italy to Via Carlo Veneziani 58, 00148, Rome, Italy.
  • Change in Name for Meggitt PLC to Meggitt Limited due to acquisition.
  • Change in Name and Address for Nitec (UK) Ltd, Hardwick House, Hardwick View Road, Chesterfield, Derbyshire, S42 5SA, UK to CBE Plus Ltd, Enterprise Drive, Holmewood Industrial Estate, Chesterfield, Derbyshire, S42 5UZ, UK due to merger.
  • Change in Name for General Electric International, Inc. – Aviation (Dubai) to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC Branch due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in Name and Address for General Electric International, Inc. filial av utenlandsk foretak, Kjerrbergtunet 40, Sola 11, Norway to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC Norwegian Branch, Drammensveien 165, Oslo, 0277, Norway due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in Name and Address for Filial af General Electric International, Inc., Park Alle 295, Brondby 2605, Denmark to filial af GE Aviation Systems North America LLC, Jupitervej 6, Kolding 6000, Denmark due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in Name and Address for General Electric International, Inc., Wilmington, Delaware, Baden Branch, Brown Boveri Strasse 8, Baden 5400, Switzerland to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC, Wilmington, succursale de Vaud, Eysins, Nyon Business Park Office 0005 Regus, Route de Crassier 7, Eysins 1262, Switzerland due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in Name for Philotech Iberica Sistemas y Logistica S.L. to Bertrandt Technology Spain S.L. as a result of a rebranding effort.
  • Change in Name and Addresses from General Electric International, Inc., Via Galeno 36, Milano 20126, Italy and Viale Tiziano 19, Rome 00196, Italy to GE Avio S.r.l., Via I Maggio 99, Rivalta di Torino (TO) 10040, Italy due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in Address for CAE France SAS from Rue St Georges, 75009 Paris, France to Batiment 1, 26 Avenue Ariane Airial Parc, 33700 Mérignac, France.
  • Change in Name and Address for AGIS Group Pty Ltd, 116/24 Lonsdale Street, Braddon ACT 2612, Australia, to Downer Professional Services Pty Ltd at Suite 3.01, Level 3, 68 Northbourne Avenue, Canberra ACT 2600, Australia, due to acquisition.
  • Change in Name for Zangold Pty Ltd to EPE Oceania Pty Ltd, due to acquisition.

*******

Secretary of State Certification of Statutory Requirements: Lifting of Defense Trade Restrictions on the Republic of Cyprus for Fiscal Year 2024

August 18, 2023: Secretary Blinken determined and certified to Congress that the Republic of Cyprus has met the necessary conditions under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year and the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 to allow the Department to approve exports, reexports, and transfers of defense articles to the Republic of Cyprus for FY 2024. Secretary Blinken’s actions continue the Department’s current policy, which first suspended the status of the Republic of Cyprus as a proscribed destination under § 126.1 of the ITAR on October 1, 2022.

Therefore, the Department will be publishing a Federal Register notice amending the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) § 126.1(r) to specify that the policy of denial as described in § 126.1(r) shall not apply with respect to exports, reexports, and transfers to the Republic of Cyprus for FY 2024 and that the Republic of Cyprus’ status as a proscribed destination is suspended for FY 2024 with respect to exports, reexports, and transfers of defense articles.  The Federal Register notice will also amend the ITAR to suspend the policy of denial for retransfers and temporary imports destined for or originating in the Republic of Cyprus and brokering activities involving the Republic of Cyprus for FY 2024.

https://www.state.gov/lifting-of-defense-trade-restrictions-on-the-republic-of-cyprus-for-fiscal-year-2024/

*******

DSCA Notification Of Potential Foreign Military Sale To Finland

August 1, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Finland of a M270A2 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) upgrade and related equipment for an estimated cost of $395 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.

The Government of Finland has requested to buy the M270A2 upgrade for its M270A1 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). The upgrade will include: intercom systems; radio communication mounts; machine gun mounts; battle management system vehicle integration kit; publications for MLRS; spares; services; support equipment; and other related elements of program and logistics support. The estimated total cost is $395 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by improving the security of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Ally that is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe.

The proposed sale will improve Finland’s capability to meet current and future threats, and will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and other allied forces. Finland will have no difficulty absorbing this upgrade into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractors will be Lockheed Martin Inc., Grand Prairie, TX; Chelton Inc., Marlow, United Kingdom; Leonardo DRS, Arlington, VA; and Loc Performance Products, Inc., Plymouth, MI. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.

Finland – M270A2 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Upgrade | Defense Security Cooperation Agency (dsca.mil)

*******

DSCA Notification of Potential Foreign Military Sale To Australia

August 18, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Australia of M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $975 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.

The Government of Australia has requested to buy up to twenty-two (22) M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS); sixty (60) M30A1 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Alternative Warhead (AW) Pods with Insensitive Munitions Propulsion System (IMPS); forty (40) M31A1 GMLRS Unitary (GMLRS-U) High Explosive (HE) Pods with IMPS; sixty-six (66) M30A2 Extended Range (ER)-GMLRS AW Pods; and twenty-four (24) M31A2 ER GMLRS Unitary (HE) Pods. Also included are Reduced Range Practice Rocket (RRPR) Pods; intercom systems to support the HIMARS Launcher; M1084A2 HIMARS Re-Supply Vehicles (RSV); trailers; 9300-SL60TN Forklift, Side Loader; radio/communication mounts; machine gun mounts; wheel guards; ruggedized laptops; training; training equipment; publications for HIMARS and its munitions, and spares; services; other support equipment; and other related elements of program and logistic support. The estimated total program cost is $975 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States. Australia is one of our most important allies in the Western Pacific. The strategic location of this political and economic power contributes significantly to ensuring peace and economic stability in the region. It is vital to the U.S. national interest to assist our ally in developing and maintaining a strong and ready self-defense capability.

The proposed sale will improve Australia’s capability to meet current and future threats, and will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and other allied forces. Australia will use the capability to strengthen its homeland defense and provide greater security for its critical infrastructure. Australia will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractors will be Lockheed Martin, Grand Prairie, TX; L3Harris Corporation, Melbourne, FL; Leonardo DRS, Arlington, VA; and Oshkosh Corporation, Stafford, VA. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.

Australia – M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) | Defense Security Cooperation Agency (dsca.mil)

*******

DSCA Notification Of Potential Foreign Military Sale To Poland

August 21, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Poland of AH-64E Apache Helicopters and related equipment for an estimated cost of $12.0 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.

The Government of Poland has requested to buy ninety-six (96) AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters; two hundred ten (210) T700-GE 701D engines (192 installed, 18 spares); ninety-seven (97) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (M-TADS/PNVS) (96 installed, 1 spare); thirty-seven (37) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) Mast Mounted Assembly (MMA) (36 installed, 1 spare); thirty-seven (37) Longbow Fire Control Radar (FCR) Radar Electronic Units (REU), (36 installed, 1 spare); ninety-six (96) AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency Interferometers (MRFI); one hundred two (102) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (96 installed, 6 spares); two hundred four (204) AN/ARC-231A, with RT-1987 Receiver Transmitters, Very High Frequency/Ultra High Frequency (VHF/UHF) radios (192 installed, 12 spares); one thousand eight hundred forty-four (1,844) AGM-114R2 Hellfire Missiles; ninety-six (96) M36E8 Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM); four hundred sixty (460) AGM-179A Joint Air-to-Ground Missiles (JAGM); five hundred eight (508) Stinger 92K Block I Missiles; and seven thousand six hundred fifty (7,650) WGU-59/B Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS-II) Guidance Sections (GS). Also included are Radar Signal Detecting Sets; Laser Detecting Sets; Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders; Improved Data Modems; Small Tactical Terminals; Improved Countermeasure Dispensing Systems (ICMD); Automatic Direction Finders; Doppler Radar Velocity Sensors; Radar Altimeter Common Cores (RACC); Tactical Air Navigation Set (TACAN); Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers; Simple Key Loader; Advanced Weapon System Automatic Machine Guns; rocket launchers; missile launchers; rockets; ammunition; Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUMT) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Receiver; MUMT Air-Air-Ground kits; training devices; communication systems; helmets; simulators; generators; aircrew survivability equipment; transportation and organization equipment; spare and repair parts; support equipment; tools and test equipment; technical data and publications; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance; technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of program and logistical support. The estimated total cost is $12.0 billion.

Poland – AH-64E Apache Helicopters | Defense Security Cooperation Agency (dsca.mil)

*******

DSCA Notification of Potential Foreign Military Sale To Taiwan

August 23, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States of F-16 Infrared Search and Track (IRST) systems and related equipment for an estimated cost of $500 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.

The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy Infrared Search and Track (IRST) systems; integration and test support and equipment; aircraft and munitions support and support equipment; software delivery and support; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support. There is no Major Defense Equipment (MDE). The estimated total cost is $500 million.

Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) – F-16 Infrared Search and Track (IRST) systems | Defense Security Cooperation Agency (dsca.mil)

*******

DSCA Notification of Potential Foreign Military Sale To Japan

August 28, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Japan of Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles with Extended Range (JASSM-ER) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $104 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.

The Government of Japan has requested to buy up to fifty (50) AGM-158B/B-2 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles with Extended Range (JASSM-ER). Also included are JASSM Anti-jam Global Positioning System Receivers (JAGR), training missiles, and missile containers; munitions support and support equipment; spare parts, consumables, accessories, and repair/return support; integration and test support and equipment; personnel training and equipment; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; transportation support; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $104 million.

Japan – Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles with Extended Range (JASSM-ER) | Defense Security Cooperation Agency (dsca.mil)

*******

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry & Security

Expansion of Nuclear Nonproliferation Controls on the People’s Republic of China and Macau

August 14, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 54875: In response to the People’s Republic of China’s (China) military modernization efforts, military-civil fusion strategy, and expansion of its nuclear forces, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding additional nuclear nonproliferation controls on China and Macau. This change specifically applies to items controlled for Nuclear Nonproliferation (NP) column 2 reasons for control. These controls enhance U.S. Government efforts to monitor the export of these items and to ensure they are only being used in peaceful activities such as commercial nuclear power generation, medical developments, production of or use in medicine, and non-military industries.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/federal-register-notices-1/3312-88-fr-54875-china-np2-published/file

*******

Commerce Control List: Updates Based on the Latest Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Plenary Meetings

August 18, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 56462: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule to amend the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to reflect changes reached by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in its June 2019 plenary meeting in Nur-Sultan (now Astana), Kazakhstan and its plenary meeting of June 2022 in Warsaw, Poland. Consistent with U.S. commitments as a participating country in the NSG, this rule revises five existing Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) under the Commerce Control List (CCL). These changes protect U.S. nuclear nonproliferation interests, while aligning the EAR with the control text agreed to by participating governments (PGs).

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-16750

*******

Commerce Secretary Raimondo Meets with Minister of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China Wang Wentao

August 28, 2023: U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo met with Minister of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China Wang Wentao to advance U.S. commercial and strategic interests. The meeting was part of ongoing efforts to deliver on President Biden’s directive following his meeting with President Xi in November 2022 to deepen bilateral discussions.

Secretary Raimondo emphasized the importance of ensuring open lines of communication between the United States and China and took concrete steps to deliver on that goal. Secretary Raimondo and Minister Wang agreed to:  Establish a new commercial issues working group, a consultation mechanism involving U.S. and PRC government officials and private sector representatives to seek solutions on trade and investment issues and to advance U.S. commercial interests in China. They agreed that the working group will meet twice annually at the Vice Minister level, with the U.S. hosting the first meeting in early 2024. Launch the export control enforcement information exchange, which will serve as a platform to reduce misunderstanding of U.S. national security policies. The first in-person meeting occurred at the Assistant Secretary level at the Ministry of Commerce in Beijing on Tuesday, August 29. Convene subject matter experts from both sides to hold technical discussions regarding strengthening the protection of trade secrets and confidential business information during administrative licensing proceedings.  Communicate regularly at the Secretary and Minister level about commercial and economic issues and to meet in-person at least once annually.

https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2023/08/readout-secretary-raimondos-meeting-minister-commerce-peoples-republic

*******

Bureau of Industry and Security Continues to Update Section 232 Exclusions For Steel and Aluminum Tariffs

August 28, 2023: The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a proposed rule that continues the Department’s efforts to improve the exclusion process for steel and aluminum tariffs and obtain public feedback. The proposed rule responds to public comments received since BIS’s February 2022 notice, proposes four additional changes to the Section 232 exclusions process, and requests additional public comment on a series of issues. This proposed rule (and subsequent final rule(s) that will follow) will build on the existing five interim final rules (IFRs) issued since 2018, and which remain in effect. BIS has administered the Section 232 exclusions process since the imposition of duties on imports of aluminum and steel in 2018 following investigations into the national security impacts of imports of aluminum and steel to the United States. Since 2018, BIS has published five IFRs that established and made various revisions to the Section 232 exclusions process.

The rule proposes four primary changes intended to create a more transparent, fair, and efficient exclusions process:

  • Proposes a more efficient General Approved Exclusions (GAE) process by changing the criteria generally used for determining GAEs by focusing on the substance of objections submitted rather than whether any objection has been submitted or not;
  • Introducing a “General Denied Exclusions” (GDE) process to limit further exclusions on products which have consistently been found to be manufactured in the United States. Similar to General Approved Exclusions, GDEs would be identified on the volume and substance of Objections submitted to such products in the 232 Exclusions Process;
  • Modifying the existing certification language and introducing new certification requirements for exclusion requests, including by making changes to the Exclusion Request Form so that requestors can demonstrate that they made reasonable efforts to source their product from the United States or from countries which the United States has arrived at a satisfactory alternative means to address U.S. national security concerns, which currently are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and the United Kingdom; and
  • Proposing similar certification language on the objection form to further ensure objectors can supply comparable quality and quantity steel or aluminum and make it “immediately available” to requestors in line with the standards described in the previous Section 232 IFRs.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3320-2023-08-28-bis-press-release-232-exclusions-proposed-rule/file

*******

BIS Creates Option For Longer Renewal Periods For TDOs

August 29, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 59791: In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to create an additional option for the renewal of temporary denial orders (TDOs) by allowing BIS, under certain circumstances, to request that the Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement renew an existing TDO for a period of no more than one year, rather than the current renewal period of no more than 180 days.  This final rule also makes some conforming changes to remove references to the ‘EAA,’ the Export Administration Act (EAA), and add in their place references to ‘ECRA,’ the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), to reflect the EAR’s current statutory authority.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/regulations-docs/federal-register-notices/federal-register-2023/3323-88-fr-59791-tdo-final-rule-effective-8-29-23-published-8-30-23-1/file

*******

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

OFAC Posts Sanctions Compliance Guidance on the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to Syria

August 8, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued an OFAC Compliance Communique: Guidance for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to Syria in response to questions from the NGO community and the general public on how to provide humanitarian assistance to Syria while complying with OFAC sanctions.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931236/download?inline

*******

OFAC To Retire PIP, DEL, And SDALL.ZIP File Formats Of The Sanctions List On Or About The Week Of September 18, 2023

August 15, 2023: OFAC retires the PIP, DEL, and SDALL.ZIP sanctions list file formats on or about, the week of September 18, 2023. OFAC will continue to offer for public download, the XML, CSV, and FF file formats, the ZIP files SDN_XML and SDN_Advanced, and PDF versions for OFAC’s sanctions list(s). OFAC’s Sanctions List Search tool will not be affected by these changes, and users of the search tool will not experience any loss of service.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230815_33

*******

OFAC Releases Video – Fundamentals of Sanctions Program

August 28, 2023: OFAC released the second episode of its “Introduction to OFAC” web series, a series of short videos created to provide viewers with a high-level introduction on the fundamentals of OFAC and sanctions implementation.  The episode introduces viewers to OFAC sanctions programs and provides an explanation of blocking and non-blocking sanctions.

Introduction to OFAC – Episode 2 | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov)

*******

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Census Bureau Updates Its Foreign Trade Regulations On ITAR Filing Requirements

August 10, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 54234: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Census Bureau (Census) has issued a final rule amending its regulations to reflect new export reporting requirements related to the U.S. Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) U.S. Munitions List (USML) Category XXI determination number. Specifically, the Census Bureau is adding a conditional data element, DDTC Category XXI Determination Number, when “21” is selected in the DDTC USML Category Code field in the Automated Export System (AES) to represent USML Category XXI. In addition, this rule makes remedial changes to Census’ Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR) to update International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) references in existing data elements: DDTC Significant Military Equipment Indicator and DDTC Eligible Party Certification Indicator. This rule also makes other remedial changes to the FTR. This final rule is effective November 8, 2023.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-16970

*******

CBP’s Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee to Meet Sept. 20

August 31, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 59933: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has announced that its Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee ((COAC) will hold its quarterly meeting on Wednesday, September 20, 2023, from 1:00 PM to 5:00 PM ET. The meeting will be open to the public via webinar only. There is no on-site, in-person option for the public to attend this quarterly meeting. The webinar link and conference number will be posted by 5:00 p.m. EDT on September 19, 2023, at https://www.cbp.gov/trade/stakeholder-engagement/coac/coac-public-meetings.  The COAC will hear from the current subcommittees on the topics listed below:

The Intelligent Enforcement Subcommittee will provide updates on the work completed and topics discussed in its working groups. The Antidumping/Countervailing Duty (AD/CVD) Working Group will provide updates regarding its work and discussions on importer compliance with AD/CVD requirements. The Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Process Modernization Working Group will report on, and anticipates providing recommendations for the committee’s consideration relating to, the development of a portal on the CBP IPR web page and other enhancements in communications between CBP, rights holders, and the trade community regarding enforcement actions. The Bond Working Group will report on the ongoing discussions and status updates for eBond requirements. The Forced Labor Working Group (FLWG) has been working on the implementation of recommendations and updates, as well as revisions to its statement of work. The FLWG will also provide updates and anticipates making recommendations for the committee’s consideration at the September public meeting.
The Next Generation Facilitation Subcommittee will provide updates on its working groups. There will be an update and potential recommendations for the committee’s consideration from the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) 2.0 Working Group regarding progress on the ACE 2.0 initiative resulting from the working group’s recent in-person sessions held to review the CBP ACE 2.0 Concept of Operations processes. The Customs Interagency Industry Working Group (CII) (formerly the One U.S. Government Working Group) will provide an update on the work accomplished this quarter, which includes discussions with Partner Government Agencies and an update on ACE 2.0. The Passenger Air Operations (PAO) Working Group has been focusing its discussions on CBP security seal processing and access to international aircraft and passengers, landing rights, and elimination of outdated or obsolete forms, and will provide an update on those discussions.
The Rapid Response Subcommittee will provide updates from the Broker Modernization Working Group and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) Chapter 7 Working Group. The Broker Modernization Working Group currently meets monthly and continues to focus on the 19 CFR Part 111 final rules relating to Modernization of the Customs Broker Regulations and Continuing Education for Licensed Customs Brokers, as well as Customs Broker Licensing Exams matters. The subcommittee anticipates the Broker Modernization Working Group will provide one recommendation for the committee’s consideration. The USMCA Chapter 7 Working Group meets bi-weekly with the expectation that recommendations will be developed and submitted for consideration at an upcoming COAC public meeting. The current focus of this working group is to review the Chapter 7 articles of the USMCA and identify gaps in implementation between the United States, Mexico, and Canada.

The Secure Trade Lanes Subcommittee will provide updates on its five active working groups: the Export Modernization Working Group, the In-Bond Working Group, the Trade Partnership and Engagement Working Group, the Pipeline Working Group, and the Cross-Border Recognition Working Group. The Export Modernization Working Group has continued its work on the electronic export manifest pilot program. The In-Bond Working Group has continued its focus on the implementation of previously submitted recommendations. The Trade Partnership and Engagement Working Group has focused its work on implementing previous recommendations for Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (CTPAT) Trade Compliance partners and is working to update its statement of work to include CTPAT security. The Pipeline Working Group expects to submit a recommendation for the committee’s consideration that CBP develop a pilot to use Distributed Ledger Technology to enhance transparency in supply chains for pipeline-borne goods. Although the Cross-Border Recognition Working Group did not meet this quarter, it remains an active working group within the subcommittee and will resume meetings next quarter.

COAC Public Meetings | U.S. Customs and Border Protection (cbp.gov)

*******

Department of Justice

The DOJ Sued SpaceX For Discriminating Against Asylees And Refugees In Hiring

August 24, 2023: The Justice Department filed a lawsuit against Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (SpaceX) for discriminating against asylees and refugees in hiring. The lawsuit alleges that, from at least September 2018 to May 2022, SpaceX routinely discouraged asylees and refugees from applying and refused to hire or consider them, because of their citizenship status, in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

In job postings and public statements over several years, SpaceX wrongly claimed that under federal regulations known as “export control laws,” SpaceX could hire only U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, sometimes referred to as “green card holders.” Export control laws impose no such hiring restrictions. Moreover, asylees’ and refugees’ permission to live and work in the United States does not expire, and they stand on equal footing with U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents under export control laws. Under these laws, companies like SpaceX can hire asylees and refugees for the same positions they would hire U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. And once hired, asylees and refugees can access export-controlled information and materials without additional government approval, just like U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-spacex-discriminating-against-asylees-and-refugees-hiring

*******

The Department of State, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Commerce

The Department of State, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Commerce Issued Advisory On Doing Business In South Sudan

August 14, 2023: The Department of State, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Commerce issued an advisory to highlight risks for U.S. businesses, individuals, and other persons, including academic institutions, research service providers, and investors (hereafter “businesses and individuals”) conducting or contemplating business in South Sudan.  These risks continue to grow as a result of South Sudan’s transitional government’s failure to implement political and economic reforms, improve transparency and public financial management, and address pervasive, endemic corruption and human rights violations.

https://www.state.gov/south-sudan-business-advisory/

*******

Department Of The Treasury

Department Of The Treasury Published List Of Countries That Require Participation Or Cooperation With An International Boycott

August 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 57178: In accordance with section 999(a)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, the Department of the Treasury is publishing a current list of countries which require or may require participation in, or cooperation with, an international boycott (within the meaning of section 999(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986).

On the basis of the best information currently available to the Department of the Treasury, the following countries require or may require participation in, or cooperation with, an international boycott (within the meaning of section 999(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986):

Iraq;

Kuwait;

Lebanon;

Libya;

Qatar;

Saudi Arabia;

Syria; and

Yemen.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/22/2023-18015/list-of-countries-requiring-cooperation-with-an-international-boycott

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

Sanctions

Department of State

August 8, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 53574: The U.S. Department of State has determined that the following individual and entities have engaged in activities that warrant the imposition of measures pursuant to Section 3 of the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act:

  • Sinobright Import and Export Company (PRC) (People’s Republic of China); and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
  • Wisdom Import & Export (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. (PRC) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
  • Seyed Taba (Turkish individual); EuroAsia (Turkiye) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof;
  • Mirel Makina Elektronik Teks (Turkiye) and any successor, sub-unit, or subsidiary thereof.

The Act provides for sanctions on foreign entities and individuals for the transfer to or acquisition from Iran since January 1, 1999; the transfer to or acquisition from Syria since January 1, 2005; or the transfer to or acquisition from North Korea since January 1, 2006, of goods, services, or technology controlled under multilateral control lists (Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement) or otherwise having the potential to make a material contribution to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or cruise or ballistic missile systems. The latter category includes items of the same kind as those on multilateral lists but falling below the control list parameters when it is determined that such items have the potential of making a material contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems; items on U.S. national control lists for WMD/missile reasons that are not on multilateral lists; and other items with the potential of making such a material contribution when added through case-by-case decisions. The measures became effective on July 19, 2023.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-16891

*******

August 24, 2023: The Department of State designated the below individuals and entity that have reportedly played a role in forcibly deporting Ukrainian children from Russia-occupied areas of Ukraine to Russia, and/or transferring Ukrainian children within Russia-occupied areas of Ukraine:

  • Galina Anatolevna Pyatykh is the advisor to the Governor of Belgorod and Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Belgorod region and has been involved in facilitation of the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and their adoption by Russian families;
  • Irina Anatolyevna Ageeva is the Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Kaluga region and has been involved in facilitation of the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and their adoption by Russian families;
  • Irina Aleksandrovna Cherkasova is the Commissioner for Children’s Rights in Rostov region and has been involved in facilitation of the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and their adoption by Russian families;
  • Mansur Mussaevich Soltaev (Soltaev) is the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Chechen Republic and is reportedly associated with human rights violations and abuses and the suppression of protests against the Russian mobilization of troops. Additionally, Soltaev has been involved in facilitation of the transfer of civilians of the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the so-called “Luhansk People’s Republic”, to include the deportation of Ukrainian children to camps in the Chechen Republic;
  • Muslim Magomedovich Khuchiev is the Chairman of the government of the Chechen Republic and has been involved in facilitation of the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia and their adoption by Russian families;
  • Federal State Budgetary Educational Institute International Children Center Artek (Artek) is a Government of Russia-owned “summer camp” located in Russia-occupied Crimea that has received Ukrainian children who are subsequently placed in extensive “patriotic” re-education programs and are prevented from returning to their families;
  • Konstantin Albertovich Fedorenko is the director of Artek;
  • Zamid Alievich Chalaev is a special police battalion commander in the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs who took part in the storming of the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works during the siege of Mariupol and was involved in the transfer of Ukrainian children to camps in the Chechen Republic;
  • Olena Oleksandrivna Shapurova is the Russia-appointed, so-called “Minister of Education and Science” in Russia-controlled portions of the Zaporizhzhia region in Ukraine and has implemented pro-Russia educational curriculums in schools in these areas threatening to remove children from Ukrainian families if they do not attend pro-Russia schools;
  • Aymani Nesievna Kadyrova is a member of the board of directors of AKF. Aymani Kadyrova is the mother of U.S.-designated Ramzan Kadyrov and the president of AKF, who is involved in efforts to transfer children from Ukraine to military camps outside of Grozny in Chechnya;
  • Vladimir Vladislavovich Kovalenko is a member of the board of directors of the All Russian Children and Youth Patriotic Public Movement Youth Army, an entity designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 in April 2023. Youth Army is an initiative created by Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu responsible for militarizing, propagandizing, and Russifying schoolchildren in Russia-controlled areas of Ukraine. Kovalenko is the Chief of Staff of the Sevastopol Branch of Youth Army, which is responsible for organizing Russian military and patriotic camps for Ukrainian children in Crimea; and
  • Vladimir Dmitrievich Nechaev is the Russia-appointed head of Sevastopol State University in Crimea, overseeing a Russian cultural, historical, and patriotic reeducation program for Ukrainian children transported from the Luhansk region to Crimea.

https://www.state.gov/imposing-sanctions-and-visa-restrictions-on-individuals-and-entities-to-promote-accountability-for-forced-transfer-and-deportation-of-children-during-russias-illegal-war-against-ukraine/

*******

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

August 31, 2023: The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a Temporary Denial Order (TDO) suspending the export privileges of three individuals – Arthur Petrov, Zhanna Soldatenkova, and Ruslan Almetov – and four companies – Astrafteros Technokosmos LTD, Ultra Trade Service LLC, Juzhoi Electronic LLC, and LLC Electrocom VPK – all of which are part of a Russia-based illicit procurement network that supplies the Russian military. This action, coordinated through the Disruptive Technology Strike Force co-led by the U.S. Departments of Justice and Commerce, also involve the unsealing of a criminal complaint in the Southern District of New York against Petrov. Petrov was arrested on August 26, 2023 and remains in custody. The Commerce Department’s actions build on the criminal complaint by denying his company, Astrafteros Technokosmos LTD, as well as Electrocom VPK, Ultra Trade Service LLC, and Juzhoi Electronic LLC, access to U.S. exports.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3324-2023-08-31-bis-press-release-petrov-tdo/file

*******

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

August 8, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 52026: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has adopted a final rule amending and replacing the Mali Sanctions Regulations, published in abbreviated form at 85 Fed. Reg. 7223 (Feb. 7, 2020), to further implement a July 26, 2019, Mali-related Executive Order and provide a more comprehensive set of regulations, including additional interpretive and definitional guidance, general licenses, and other regulatory provisions. This rule is effective August 7, 2023.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/08/07/2023-16860/mali-sanctions-regulations and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932051/download?inline

*******

August 8, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing an OFAC Compliance Communique: Guidance for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to Syria in response to questions from the NGO community and the general public on how to provide humanitarian assistance to Syria while complying with OFAC sanctions. OFAC is additionally amending one Syria Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 937).

Question 937: What does the general license (GL) at § 542.516 of the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR), as amended on November 26, 2021, authorize with respect to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)? 

Answer: The GL at § 542.516 of the SySR continues to authorize, subject to certain limitations, NGOs to engage in certain transactions and activities that would otherwise be prohibited in support of the following not-for-profit activities in Syria:

  • Humanitarian projects that meet basic human needs;
  • Democracy-building;
  • Education;
  • Non-commercial development projects directly benefitting the Syrian people; and
  • The preservation and protection of cultural heritage sites.

The transactions and activities that NGOs are authorized to engage in include:

  • Transactions with persons who meet the definition of the term Government of Syria, as defined in § 542.305(a) (i.e., the state and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including the Central Bank of Syria), that would otherwise be prohibited by § 542.201(a)(1);
  • New investment (i.e., a transaction that constitutes a commitment or contribution of funds or other assets, or a loan or other extension of credit) in Syria that would otherwise be prohibited by § 542.206;
  • Exportation or reexportation of services that would otherwise be prohibited by § 542.207; and
  • Purchase of refined petroleum products of Syrian origin for use in Syria that would otherwise be prohibited by § 542.209.

Early-recovery-related transactions and activities that fall within the categories of transactions and activities listed above are authorized.  For transactions and activities not otherwise authorized or exempt from sanctions, OFAC considers license requests on a case-by-case basis.

Additionally, this GL authorizes U.S. financial institutions to process transfers of funds in support of the authorized transactions and activities outlined above. U.S. depository institutions, U.S. registered brokers or dealers in securities, and U.S. registered money transmitters may rely on the statements of their customers that such transactions are authorized unless they know or have reason to know a transaction is not authorized. U.S. depository institutions, U.S. registered brokers or dealers in securities, and U.S. registered money transmitters are expected to conduct a level of due diligence commensurate with its overall risk profile and internal compliance policies and procedures with respect to a transaction involving Syria.

Separately, non-U.S. persons, including NGOs and foreign financial institutions, do not risk exposure to U.S. secondary sanctions pursuant to the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 for engaging in or facilitating transactions and activities that are otherwise authorized or exempt for U.S. persons under the SySR.  Please see FAQ 884 for additional information.

Please note that this guidance does not apply to transactions and activities that may be subject to sanctions under other sanctions programs administered by OFAC (e.g., transactions with persons blocked under OFAC’s counterterrorism authority (E.O. 13224, as amended) or OFAC’s Syria-related authority (E.O. 13894)), unless exempt or otherwise authorized by OFAC.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931236/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/937

*******

August 9, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated three Sinaloa Cartel members involved in the illicit trafficking of fentanyl and other deadly drugs. This action was coordinated closely with the Government of Mexico, including La Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit), and is the result of ongoing collaboration with the Drug Enforcement Administration’s San Diego Field Division, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s San Diego Field Office – Major Mexican Traffickers Strike Force, the San Diego County District Attorney’s Office, and the San Diego Sheriff’s Department.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Alfonso Arzate Garcia of Mexico;
  • Rene Arzate Garcia of Mexico; and
  • Rafael Guadalupe Felix Nunez of Mexico.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1680

*******

August 9, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Belarus General License 8 “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Joint Stock Company Byelorussian Steel Works Management Company of Holding Byelorussian Metallurgical Company” and Belarus General License 9 “Authorizing Transactions Related to Civil Aviation Safety or the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Open Joint Stock Company Belavia Belarusian Airlines”.

Belarus General License 8: All transactions prohibited by the Belarus Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 548 (BSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving Joint Stock Company Byelorussian Steel Works Management Company of Holding Byelorussian Metallurgical Company (BSW) or any entity in which BSW owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, including Bel-Kap-Steel LLC (collectively, “BSW Entities”), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 9, 2023, provided that any payment to a BSW Entity must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the BSR. Note: The authorization above includes authorization for U.S. persons to process and pay salaries, severance, and expenses, and to pay vendors and landlords, to the extent such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of Bel-Kap-Steel LLC and do not involve a debit to a blocked account.

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the BSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the BSR other than the BSW Entities, unless separately authorized.

Belarus General License 9: All transactions prohibited by the Belarus Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 548 (BSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the provision, exportation, or reexportation of goods, technology, or services to ensure the safety of civil aviation involving Open Joint Stock Company Belavia Belarusian Airlines, or any entity in which Open Joint Stock Company Belavia Belarusian Airlines owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest (collectively, the “Belavia Entities”), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, September 8, 2023, provided that the goods, technology, or services that are provided, exported, or reexported are for use on aircraft operated solely for civil aviation purposes.

All transactions prohibited by the BSR that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving the Belavia Entities, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, September 8, 2023, provided that any payment to a Belavia Entity must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the BSR.

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the BSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the BSR other than the Belavia Entities, unless separately authorized.

OFAC also designated eight individuals and five entities identifying one aircraft as blocked property on the three-year anniversary of the Belarusian authorities’ falsification of the August 2020 presidential election and their callous crackdown on the Belarusian protest movement demanding fundamental freedoms. This action targets several entities involved in the Belarusian regime’s continued civil society repression, complicity in the Russian Federation’s unjustified war in Ukraine, and enrichment of repressive Belarusian regime leader Alyaksandr Lukashenka. This action is taken alongside other recent actions of U.S. partners and Allies, further highlighting the unified view that Belarus’s prolonged subjugation of its people and its continued support of Russia’s war against Ukraine remain a global concern.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Aleksin, Dzmitry Aliakseevich of Belarus;
  • Aleksin, Vital Aliakseevich of Belarus;
  • Aleksina, Ina Vladimirovna of Belarus;
  • Dunko, Artem Konstantinovich of Belarus;
  • Franskevich, Viktor Ivanovich of Belarus;
  • Korchik, Dmitry Aleksandrovich of Belarus;
  • Marshalov, Igor Anatolievich of Belarus;  and
  • Selitskiy, Victor Frantsevich of Belarus.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Bel-Kap-Steel LLC of the U.S.;
  • Department Of Financial Investigations Of The State Control Committee Of The Republic Of Belarus;
  • Open Joint Stock Company Belavia Belarusian Airlines (A.K.A. Belavia Belarusian Airlines;
  • Open Joint Stock Company Byelorussian Steel Works Management Company Of Holding Byelorussian Metallurgical Company; and
  • Open Joint Stock Company Minsk Civil Aviation Plant 407.

The following aircraft has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • EW-301PJ; Aircraft Model CRJ-200ER; Aircraft Manufacturer’s Serial Number (MSN) 8057; Aircraft Tail Number EW-301PJ.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932071/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932076/download?inline and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1682 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230809

*******

August 10, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has designated the former governor of Lebanon’s central bank, Riad Salameh (Salameh), whose corrupt and unlawful actions have contributed to the breakdown of the rule of law in Lebanon. Salameh abused his position of power, likely in violation of Lebanese law, to enrich himself and his associates by funneling hundreds of millions of dollars through layered shell companies to invest in European real estate. OFAC has also designatied four close associates of Salameh, including members of Salameh’s family and his primary assistant, who helped to conceal and facilitate this corrupt activity. The United States is taking this action alongside United Kingdom and Canada, partners who share the United States’ vision of a Lebanon that is governed for the benefit of the Lebanese people and not for the personal wealth and ambition of Lebanon’s elite.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Riad bin Tawfiq Salameh of Lebanon and France;
  • Nadi Riad Salame of Lebanon and France;
  • Raja Salameh of Lebanon;
  • Marianne Alexandros Andrianopoulos of Lebanon; and
  • Anna Kosakova of Ukraine.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230810 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1687

*******

August 10, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issued Russia-related General License 13F, “Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024”.

Russia-Related General License 13F: U.S. persons, or entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person, are authorized to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, or certifications, to the extent such transactions are prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to the day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation of such U.S. persons or entities, through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, November 8, 2023.

This general license does not authorize:

(1) Any debit to an account on the books of a U.S. financial institution of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or

(2) Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932081/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230810

*******

August 11, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a new round of sanctions targeting prominent members of Russia’s financial elite, as well as a Russian business association. The four individuals have served on the supervisory board of the Alfa Group Consortium (“Alfa Group”), one of the largest financial and investment conglomerates in Russia. These individuals were previously sanctioned by Australia, Canada, the European Union, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is publishing one Russia-related Frequently Asked Question (1131).

Frequently Asked Question 1131: Is Letterone Holdings S.A. (LetterOne) blocked as a result of the designation of Petr Olegovich Aven, Mikhail Maratovich Fridman, German Borisovich Khan, and Alexey Viktorovich Kuzmichev?

 

Answer: No.  OFAC has not designated LetterOne and, based on information available to OFAC, LetterOne is not owned 50 percent or more by blocked persons or otherwise considered the blocked property or interest in property of blocked persons, including Petr Olegovich Aven, Mikhail Maratovich Fridman, German Borisovich Khan, and Alexey Viktorovich Kuzmichev.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Aven, Petr Olegovich of the United Kingdom, Lavia, Luxembourg and Russia;
  • Fridman, Mikhail Maratovich of Russia;
  • Khan, German Borisovich of the Ukraine, Israel and Russia;
  • Kuzmichev, Alexey Viktorovich of France and Russsia.

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Russian Association Of Employers The Russian Union Of Industrialists And Entrepreneurs.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1690 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1131

*******

August 16, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Lebanon-based Green Without Borders and its leader. Green Without Borders is a Lebanon-based organization that has provided support to and cover for Hizballah’s operations in southern Lebanon along the “Blue Line” between Lebanon and Israel over the last decade while publicly operating under the guise of environmental activism.

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • NAHLA, Zuhair Subhi of Lebanon.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Green Without Borders.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230816 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1698

*******

August 16, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on three entities tied to a sanctions evasion network attempting to support arms deals between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The entities are Limited Liability Company Verus (Verus), Defense Engineering Limited Liability Partnership (Defense Engineering), and Versor S.R.O. (Versor).

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Defense Engineering Limited Liability Partnership of Kazakhstan;
  • Limited Liability Company Verus of Russia; and
  • Versor S.R.O., of Slovakia.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1697 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230816

*******

August 17, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two Syria-based armed militias and three members of the groups’ leadership structures in connection with serious human rights abuses against those residing in the Afrin region of northern Syria. An auto sales company owned by the leader of one of the armed groups is also being designated. The Suleiman Shah Brigade is a prominent element of the armed opposition to the Syrian government and a component of the Syrian National Army, a coalition of Syrian armed opposition groups. The Suleiman Shah Brigade operates in the Afrin region of northern Syria, where it exerts significant control over the civilian population. The brigade subjects the populace of this area to abductions and extortion. The brigade has targeted Afrin’s Kurdish residents, many of whom are subjected to harassment, abduction, and other abuses until they are forced to abandon their homes or pay large ransoms for return of their property or family members. The Hamza Division, another armed opposition group operating in northern Syria, has been involved in abductions, theft of property, and torture. The division also operates detention facilities in which it houses those it has abducted for extended periods of time. During their imprisonment, victims are held for ransom, often suffering sexual abuse at the hands of Hamza Division fighters.

The following individuals has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Mohammad Hussein al-Jasim (Abu Amsha) is the leader of the Suleiman Shah Brigade;
  • Walid Hussein al-Jasim is a younger brother of Abu Amsha who also holds a leadership role in the Suleiman Shah Brigade, including serving as the head of the brigade when Abu Amsha left Syria to fight in Libya; and
  • Sayf Boulad Abu Bakr is the leader of the Hamza Division and its public face, appearing in numerous propaganda videos produced by the Hamza Division.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Al-Safir Oto Of Turkey (a car dealership owned by Abu Amsha that provides an outlet for Abu Amsha to invest his income);
  • Hamza Division Of Syria; and
  • Suleiman Shah Brigade Of Syria.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230817 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1699

*******

August 17, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is once again taking action to hold the Government of Russia accountable for its poisoning of Russian opposition politician Aleksey Navalny three years ago on August 20, 2020. Russian authorities imprisoned Navalny upon his return to Russia in January 2021, and on August 4, 2023, a Russian court sentenced Navalny to an additional 19 years in prison on unfounded charges of so-called “extremism.” Navalny came to prominence as a leading Russian anti-corruption activist more than a decade ago. Exposés published by Navalny and his organization, the Anti-Corruption Foundation, have revealed the ill-gained wealth of Russia’s elite politicians and their families, including, among others, President Vladimir Putin, former Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, and Kremlin spokesperson Dmitriy Peskov. As a vocal anti-corruption politician, Navalny has continued his fight against Russia’s kleptocracy despite the Kremlin’s attempts to silence him. On August 20, 2020, approximately 30 minutes into a flight back to Moscow after campaigning in Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Navalny fell gravely ill, prompting an emergency landing in Omsk where Navalny was treated by local hospital staff. The U.S. government assesses that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers used the nerve agent Novichok to poison Navalny. Novichok nerve agents were created by the Soviet Union, and Russia is the only known country to have used these chemical weapons. Russia previously used a Novichok nerve agent in the March 2018 attempted assassination of former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, United Kingdom. The Russian operation against Navalny reportedly involved multiple individuals who were on the ground in both Tomsk and Omsk, as well as operatives coordinating the situation from afar. These individuals collaborated to surveil Navalny ahead of the attack, break into his hotel room and apply the chemical weapon to his personal belongings, and they attempted to erase any evidence of their operation following the attack.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1700 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230817

*******

August 23, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Roman Semenov, one of three co-founders of the sanctioned virtual currency mixer Tornado Cash, for his role in providing material support to Tornado Cash and to the Lazarus Group, a state-sponsored hacking group that is an instrumentality of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea). Tornado Cash has been used to launder funds for criminal actors since its creation in 2019, including to obfuscate hundreds of millions of dollars in virtual currency stolen by Lazarus Group hackers.

  • Roman Semenov, a citizen of Russia, co-founded Tornado Cash as a mixing service to increase the anonymity of users’ transactions. Semenov was actively involved in promoting Tornado Cash in media and on online platforms, where he provided Tornado Cash users with advice to anonymize their transactions. After Semenov was alerted that Tornado Cash was being used to launder large volumes of stolen virtual currency for the Lazarus Group, he and his fellow co-founders continued to pay for infrastructure supporting the Tornado Cash service and took steps to increase the anonymity of the Tornado Cash service without appropriate measures to address the known illicit use by the DPRK.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1702

*******

August 23, 2023: Taking note of the Burmese military regime’s violent airstrikes against the people of Burma, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a determination that allows sanctions to be imposed on any foreign individual or entity that operates in the jet fuel sector of the Burmese economy. Concurrently, OFAC designated two individuals and one entity that are involved in the procurement and distribution of jet fuel to Burma’s military regime, and two entities for being owned or controlled by such persons. After overthrowing Burma’s democratically elected civilian government in a coup on February 1, 2021, the military regime has increasingly relied on violent airstrikes to repress the people of Burma. Most recently, fighter jet and helicopter attacks killed up to 10 civilians near Nyaung Kone village and up to 80 civilians, including women and schoolchildren, in a village in the Sagaing region of central Burma in April and June 2023, respectively. The Sagaing region attack was one of many deadly air strikes since the military seized control of the country. Since the coup, over 3,900 civilians are estimated to have been killed by the regime.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Tun, Zaw Min of Burma; and
  • Win, Khin Phyu of Burma;

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • E.I Energy PTE. LTD. of Singapore;
  • PEIA PTE. LTD. of Singapore; and
  • Shoon Energy PTE. LTD. of Singapore.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1701 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230823

*******

August 24, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned six individuals for contributing to the most recent escalation of conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). These sanctions reflect the United States’ commitment to advancing efforts toward resolution of the crisis, promoting accountability for human rights abuses including conflict-related sexual violence, and addressing the dire humanitarian situation.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Byamungu, Bernard of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
  • Hakizimana, Apollinaire of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
  • Nyamvumba, Andrew of Rwanda;
  • Protogene, Ruvugayimikore of Rwanda;
  • Tokolonga, Salomon of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and
  • Uwimbabazi, Sebastien of Rwanda.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1703 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230824

*******

August 24, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published the following Russia related designations.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Ageeva, Irina Anatolyevna of Russia;
  • Chalaev, Zamid Alievich of Russia;
  • Cherkasova, Irina Aleksandrovna of Russia;
  • Fedorenko, Konstantin Albertovich of Russia;
  • Kadyrova, Aymani Nesievna of Kazakhstan and Russia;
  • Khuchiev, Muslim Magomedovich of Russia;
  • Kovalenko, Vladimir Vladislavovich of Ukraine;
  • Nechaev, Vladimir Dmitrievich of Russia;
  • Pyatykh, Galina Anatolevna of Russia;
  • Shapurova, Olena Oleksandrivna of the Ukraine; and
  • Soltaev, Mansur Mussaevich of Russia.

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Federal State Budgetary Educational Institute International Children Center Artek.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230824

*******

August 31, 2023:  In coordination with the Republic of Korea and Japan, the United States sanctioned two individuals and one entity—Jon Jin Yong, Sergey Mikhaylovich Kozlov, and Intellekt LLC—involved in generating revenue for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) unlawful development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles. This action by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is being taken in response to the DPRK’s August 23 attempted launch of a reconnaissance satellite into orbit, marking its second failed attempt to do so in three months.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Jin Yong Jon of North Korea; and
  • Sergey Mikhaylovich Kozlov of Russia.

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • INTELLEKT LLC of Russia.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230831 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1710

Fines and Penalties

August 2, 2023: Robert Alcantara pled guilty in Manhattan federal court to conspiracy to traffic firearms and conspiracy to launder money from his firearms trafficking.  Alcantara conspired to sell more than 100 “ghost guns” to individuals in the Dominican Republic. On November 20, 2021, Alcantara was stopped in his vehicle in possession of kits to build approximately 45 ghost guns.  Alcantara was interviewed by law enforcement agents and stated that he was planning to turn the 45 kits into working firearms and that he had 50 additional similar ghost guns at his home.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/rhode-island-man-pleads-guilty-conspiring-traffic-ghost-guns-and-laundering-money

******

August 3, 2023: In two separate cases, two U.S. Navy servicemembers were arrested for transmitting sensitive military information to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). A U.S. Navy sailor, Jinchao Wei, aka Patrick Wei, was arrested on espionage charges as he arrived for work at Naval Base San Diego, the homeport of the Pacific Fleet. He was indicted for conspiracy to send national defense information to an intelligence officer working for the People’s Republic of China. A U.S. Navy servicemember, Petty Officer Wenheng Zhao, aka Thomas Zhao, 26, of Monterey Park, California, was arrested following an indictment by a federal grand jury, charging him with receiving bribes in exchange for transmitting sensitive U.S. military information to an individual posing as a maritime economic researcher, but who was actually an intelligence officer from the PRC.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-us-navy-servicemembers-arrested-transmitting-military-information-peoples-republic-china

*******

August 8, 2023: In federal court, Dairo Antonio Úsuga David was sentenced to 45 years in prison for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise as a leader of the multibillion-dollar paramilitary and drug trafficking organization known as the “Clan del Golfo” (CDG). According to court documents, Úsuga David was also sentenced to 45 years in prison for engaging in a maritime narcotics conspiracy. The sentences will run concurrently. As part of the sentence, the court ordered Úsuga David to pay $216 million in forfeiture. The defendant pleaded guilty to all three charges in January 2023.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-leader-clan-del-golfo-drug-trafficking-organization-sentenced-45-years-prison

*******

August 10, 2023: Corporación Financiera Colombiana S.A. (Corficolombiana), a Colombian financial services institution, has agreed to pay over $80 million to resolve parallel bribery investigations by criminal, civil, and administrative authorities in the United States and Colombia stemming from the company’s involvement in a scheme to pay millions of dollars in bribes to high-ranking government officials in Colombia.

The U.S. Department of Justice’s resolution is coordinated with authorities in Colombia, as well as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

According to court documents, Corficolombiana entered into a three-year deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the Department in connection with a criminal information filed in the District of Maryland charging the company with conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery provision of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Corficolombiana was majority-owned and controlled by Grupo Aval Acciones y Valores S.A., a Colombian holding company and issuer in the United States.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/corficolombiana-pay-80m-resolve-foreign-bribery-investigations

*******

August 15, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 55437: On March 31, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Guiliano Pecci (“Pecci”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Pecci was convicted of smuggling firearm kits from the United States to Paraguay. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Pecci to 18 months of confinement, three years of supervised release and a $200 assessment. The Office of Export Enforcement subsequently denied Pecci’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of seven years from the date of Pecci’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Pecci had an interest at the time of his conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-17503

*******

August 15, 2023: Former Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the FBI Counterintelligence Division in New York, Charles McGonigal, 54, of New York City, pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and to commit money laundering in connection with his 2021 agreement to provide services to Oleg Deripaska, a sanctioned Russian oligarch.

According to court documents, on April 6, 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska for having acted or purported to act on behalf of a senior official of the Government of the Russian Federation and for operating in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia affirmed the sanctions against Deripaska, finding, among other things, that OFAC’s determination that Deripaska had acted as an agent of Russian President Vladimir Putin was supported by the evidence.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-special-agent-charge-new-york-fbi-counterintelligence-division-pleads-guilty

*******

August 16, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 55665: On January 12, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Emilie Voissem (“Voissem”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371 the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq.) (“IEEPA”) and 18 U.S.C. 554. Specifically, Voissem was convicted of conspiracy to violate IEEPA, exporting and attempting to export, and smuggling four (4) rEvo III rebreathers from the United States to Libya without the required license or written approval. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced her to five months in prison, three years of supervised release and a $300 special assessment. The Office of Export Enforcement subsequently denied Voissem’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of seven years from the date of Voissem’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Voissem had an interest at the time of her conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-17543

*******

August 16, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 55664: On August 4, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Vladimir Volgaev (“Volgaev”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Volgaev was convicted of smuggling and attempting to smuggle firearm parts from the United States to Ukraine without having obtained a license or other approval from the U.S. Department of State. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Volgaev to 33 months of confinement, one year of supervised release, $200 assessment and $6,835 in restitution. The Office of Export Enforcement subsequently denied Volgaev’s export privileges for a period of 10 years from the date of his conviction. The Office of Exporter Services also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Volgaev had an interest at the time of his conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-17541

*******

August 16, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 55663: On November 12, 2021, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa, Bradley Jon Matheny (“Matheny”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Matheny was convicted of smuggling from the United States to Arad, Israel, .117 caliber hunting pellets and smuggling from the United States to Sderot, Israel and Scottsville, South Africa, a Winchester 42-piece firearm brush cleaning kit. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Matheny to 36 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, $1,000 assessment, $10,000 criminal fine and $256,441.78 in restitution. The Office of Export Enforcement subsequently denied Matheny’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of seven years from the date of Matheny’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Matheny had an interest at the time of his conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-17542

*******

August 16, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 55662: On December 3, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Omran Ismail (“Ismail”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371. Specifically, Ismail was convicted of conspiring to straw purchase several handguns on behalf of co-defendant Ola Sayed, who allegedly tried to smuggle the firearms into Egypt, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Ismail to 18 months in prison, one year of supervised release, and an assessment of $200. The Office of Export Enforcement subsequently denied Ismail’s export privileges for a period of seven years from the date of Ismail’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Ismail had an interest at the time of his conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-17540

*******

August 16, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $660,594 settlement with Construction Specialties Inc. (“CS”).  CS has agreed to settle its potential civil liability for three apparent violations of OFAC sanctions on Iran that arose from its United Arab Emirates subsidiary’s, Construction Specialties, Middle East L.L.C. (“CSME”), exportation of U.S. origin goods to Iran.  Specifically, between December 4, 2016 and August 3, 2017, CSME senior leadership oversaw the purchase and re-exportation of commercial building products, valued at approximately $1,100,991, from suppliers in the United States with the knowledge that these goods were ultimately destined for a customer in Iran.  OFAC determined that these apparent violations were egregious and were voluntarily self-disclosed.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230816_33

*******

August 21, 2023: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security extended the temporary denial orders for Ilya Balakaev and Radiotester OOO a/k/a Radiotester LLC, for an additional 180 days.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1548-e2884/file

*******

August 22, 2023: Victor Coronado Jr., was sentenced Aug. 15 to 60 months in federal prison followed by three years of supervised release for smuggling weapons from the United States into Mexico following an investigation by Homeland Security Investigations (HSI); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Coronado was the leader of a conspiracy to smuggle firearms from the United States into Mexico between October 2019 and July 2020. Coronado and his co-conspirators purchased firearms, made false statements to firearms dealers in the acquisition of firearms, provided funds to others for the purchase of firearms, and assisted in smuggling 49 assault rifles and high-capacity semiautomatic pistols into Mexico.

The firearms that Coronado conspired to smuggle are prohibited from being exported from the United States into Mexico without a valid license. Neither Coronado nor any of his co-conspirators had a valid license or any other lawful authority to export the firearms into Mexico.

https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/hsi-tucson-multiagency-investigation-sends-firearms-smuggler-prison-60-months

*******

August 23, 2023: A Russian national and a Washington man were charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit sanctions violations, and conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business. According to the indictment, Roman Storm, 34, of Auburn, Washington, and Roman Semenov, 49, of Russia, created, operated, and promoted Tornado Cash, a cryptocurrency mixer that facilitated more than $1 billion in money laundering transactions, and laundered hundreds of millions of dollars for the Lazarus Group, the sanctioned North Korean cybercrime organization. Storm was arrested in the state of Washington.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/tornado-cash-founders-charged-money-laundering-and-sanctions-violations

*******

August 28, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 58544: On March 8, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Esteban Andres Alexander (“Alexander”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371. Specifically, Alexander was convicted of conspiring to export firearms and firearms parts from the United States to Mexico without first having obtained the required export license and authorization from the U.S. Department of State or U.S. Department of Commerce. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Alexander to 46 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, a $10,000 criminal fine and a $100 assessment. The Office of Export Enforcement subsequently denied Alexander’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Alexander’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Alexander had an interest at the time of his conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-18442

*******

August 28, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 58545: On March 30, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Tuqiang Xie (“Xie”) was convicted of violating section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) (“AECA”). Specifically, Xie was convicted of knowingly and willfully engaging in brokering activities involving the People’s Republic of China in negotiating and arranging purchases, sales, transfers, export, and import of a defense article, namely an eyepiece assembly, National Stock Number 1240-01-063-1352, without first registering with, and obtaining a license or written approval from the U.S. Department of State. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Xie to one year and one day in prison, one year of supervised release, an assessment of $200 and a preliminary order of forfeiture in the amount of $200,027. The Office of Export Enforcement subsequently denied Xie’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Xie’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS issued licenses in which Xie had an interest at the time of his conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-18439

*******

August 28, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 58547: On January 11, 2021, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Naomi Natal Haynes (“Haynes”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371. Specifically, Haynes was convicted of conspiring to fraudulently and knowingly export and send firearms from the United States to Canada without the required license. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced her to 84 months in prison, three years of supervised release, a $200 assessment and $18,240.18 Restitution. The Office of Export Enforcement subsequently denied Haynes’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Haynes’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Haynes had an interest at the time of her conviction.

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-18437

*******

August 29, 2023: Island Pyrochemical Industries Corp. settled allegations that it violated the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in connection with unauthorized brokering involving defense articles from the People’s Republic of China, a proscribed country and making false statements on license applications.

The 3 year administrative settlement concluded pursuant to ITAR § 128.11, addresses the misrepresentation of material facts on export license applications and engagement in unauthorized brokering activities involving ITAR-controlled ammonium perchlorate, which is controlled under U.S. Munitions List Category V(d)(2), from the People’s Republic of China, a proscribed country for exports and temporary imports of defense articles and defense services under ITAR § 126.1 at the time of the violations. Island Pyrochemical Industries Corporation reported in response to a directed disclosure to have made numerous unreported and unauthorized brokering activities.

Among the measures the Consent Agreement mandates are:

  • An $850,000 civil penalty, half of which is payable in four installments and the other half for Consent Agreement-authorized remedial compliance costs;
  • Designation of a Special Compliance Officer or Internal Special Compliance Office for the entire term of the Consent Agreement to oversee compliance with the Consent Agreement;
  • Implementation of an automated export compliance system;
  • A classification review; and
  • At a minimum, one external audit.

DDTC chose not to impose an administrative debarment on IPI, but it reserved the right to do so in the future if the company does not fulfill the provisions of the Consent Agreement or is responsible for other compliance or law enforcement issues under the AECA or under other statutes enumerated in ITAR 120.27. The Consent Agreement and related documents are available for public inspection in the Public Reading Room of the Department of State and on the Penalties and Oversights Agreements section of DDTC’s website.

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/$viewer.do?sysparm_stack=no&sysparm_sys_id=2221427b1bfcf5502b6ca932f54bcbf4

*******

August 31, 2023: A New York man was sentenced in federal court in Concord, NY, for operating an unlicensed money transmitting business that was used to export weapons to Pakistan. Muhammad Mohsin Raja, 27, was sentenced by U.S. District Court Judge Paul J. Barbadoro to 24 months in prison and 1 year of supervised release.  On May 25, 2022, Raja pleaded guilty to conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business.

For several years, Raja operated a “hawala” based out of New York and worked with individuals in Pakistan to coordinate the transfer of money between parties in the United States and Pakistan.  A hawala is a type of informal money transfer system that uses a network of agents to transfer money across international borders without using the banking system, typically to circumvent banking laws and regulations.

The defendant transmitted approximately $4.7 million to Pakistan in 2021 alone.  As part of the hawala, he made multiple payments for products intended for an organization on the Commerce Department’s Entity List, Pakistan’s Advanced Engineering Research Organization (AERO). AERO was added to the Entity List, which imposes export restrictions for organizations whose activities threaten U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, for procuring items for use in Pakistan’s cruise missile and strategic UAV programs. For example, the defendant made payments for a blade antenna manufactured by a New Hampshire defense contractor.  Those antennas are typically used in UAVs, tactical missiles, helicopters, and aircraft.  The defendant also made payments to a Florida defense contractor for rotary pumps and a solenoid valve.  The rotary pumps were designed for use in M110 self-propelled howitzers, and the solenoid valve was designed for use in an AIM-9 Sidewinder missile or an AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile.

The defendant also made payments to a Florida firearms manufacturer on behalf of a Pakistani company called Al-Akbar Arms.  The payments were for two shipments of assault weapons.  The defendant messaged another individual suggesting they disguise the purpose of the payments as “purchasing watches as sports equipment.”  However, law enforcement successfully intercepted the assault weapons.

In operating the hawala, the defendant used multiple cell phones to coordinate with other individuals, used multiple bank accounts, and enlisted the assistance of at least 10 friends and family members to visit banks and check cashing businesses to help cash checks, place money orders, and deposit funds.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-nh/pr/new-york-man-sentenced-connection-illegal-export-weapons

*******

August 31, 2023: Arthur Petrov, 33, a dual Russian-German citizen who has resided in Russia and Cyprus, is charged by criminal complaint with export control violations, smuggling, wire fraud, and money laundering offenses based on his alleged participation in an ongoing scheme to procure U.S.-sourced microelectronics subject to U.S. export controls on behalf of a Russia-based supplier of critical electronics components for manufacturers supplying weaponry and other equipment to the Russian military. Petrov was arrested on Aug. 26 in the Republic of Cyprus at the request of the United States.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-german-national-arrested-illegally-exporting-russia-sensitive-us-sourced

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

AUGUST 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES Read More »

JULY 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through July 31, 2023.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

 

The President

 

President Biden Delegates Authority to Secretary of State to Direct Drawdown of $500 Million in Defense Articles to Support Ukraine

 

July 6, 2023: 88 FR 43049: President Biden, under section 621 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), delegated to the Secretary of State the authority under section 506(a)(1) of the FAA to direct the drawdown of up to $500 million in defense articles and services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training, to provide assistance to Ukraine and to make the determinations required under such section to direct such a drawdown.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/07/06/2023-14435/delegation-of-authority-under-section-506a1-of-the-foreign-assistance-act-of-1961

 

*******

 

President Biden Continues the National Emergency with Respect to Hong Kong

 

July 12, 2023: 88 FR 44669: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for one year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13936 of July 14, 2020, which declared a national emergency with respect to Hong Kong.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/07/12/2023-14973/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-hong-kong

 

*******

President Biden Delegates Authority to Secretary of State to Direct Drawdown of $922 Million in Defense Articles to Support Ukraine

July 13, 2023: 88 FR 44671: President Biden, under section 621 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), delegated to the Secretary of State:

(1) the authority under section 506(a)(1) of the FAA to direct the drawdown of up to $800 million in defense articles and services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training, to provide assistance to Ukraine and to make the determinations required under such section to direct such a drawdown; and

(2) the authority under section 614(a)(1) of the FAA to determine whether it is important to the security interests of the United States to furnish up to $122 million in assistance to Ukraine without regard to any provision of law within the purview of section 614(a)(1) of the FAA.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/07/13/2023-15010/delegation-of-authority-under-section-506a1-and-section-614a1-of-the-foreign-assistance-act-of-1961

*******

 

President Biden Continues the National Emergency with Respect to Hostage-Taking and Wrongful Detention

July 14, 2023: 88 FR 45327: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14078, of July 19, 2022, with respect to hostage-taking and the wrongful detention of United States nationals abroad.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/07/14/2023-15138/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-hostage-taking-and-the-wrongful-detention-of

*******

President Biden Continues the National Emergency with Respect to Mali

 

July 21, 2023: 88 FR 48027: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for one year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 139882 of July 26, 2019, which declared a national emergency with respect to Mali.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/07/25/2023-15896/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-mali

 

*******

President Biden Continues the National Emergency with Respect to Lebanon

 

July 25, 2023: 88 FR 48025: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for one year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13441 of August 1, 2007, which declared a national emergency with respect to Lebanon.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/07/25/2023-15889/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-lebanon

 

*******

 

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

 

July 18 through 26, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Change in Name and Address from General Electric International, Inc. (Malaysia), MAS Eng Ops Cntr, Complex A, AERO Bldg, Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah, Subang 47200, Malaysia, to GE On Wing Support (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd at Cmplx A-AA MAS Engineering Ops Ctr, Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah Apt, Subang Jaya, Malaysia, and all locations in Malaysia, due to reorganization.
  • Change in Name from L3 Technologies Australia Group Pty Ltd. to L3Harris Technologies Australia Pty Ltd. due to merger.
  • Change in Name for Philotech Systementwicklung und Software GmbH to Bertrandt Technology Germany GmbH, and all locations in Germany due to corporate rebranding.
  • Change in Name and Address from General Electric International, Inc. (Germany), Maria-Theresia, Strasse 35, Muenchen, 85232, Germany, to GE Aviation Deutschland GmbH at Bleichstrasse 64-66, Frankfurt Am Main, Germany, and all locations in Germany, due to reorganization.
  • Change in Name and Address from General Electric International, Inc. (South Korea), 13F, GE Tower, 71-3 Cheongdam, Gangnamgu, Seoul, Republic of Korea, and from POBA Gangnam Tower, 343 Hakdongro, Gangnam-gu, Seoul 135-820, Republic of Korea, to GE Aviation Korea, Ltd. at 25/F, Gangnam Finance Center Building, 152, Teheran-ro, Gangnam-gu, Seoul, 06236, Republic of Korea, and all locations in the Republic of Korea, due to reorganization.
  • Change in Name and Address from General Elektrik Ticaret ve Servis A.S. (Turkey), Dumlupinar Bulvari 164 501, Kentpark Ofis Bloklari, Cankaya Ankara, Turkey, to GE Marmara Technology Center Muhendislik Hizmetleri Limited Sirketi, at Esentepe Mah. Harman1 Sk.Nida Kule, Sisli, Istanbul, Turkey, and all locations in Turkey, due to reorganization.
  • Change in Name from Philotech Iberica S.L. (Spain), to Bertrandt Technology Spain S.L, due to corporate rebranding.
  • Change in Name and Address from General Electric International, Inc. (UK), 31 Coull Gardens, Aberdeen AB15 8TQ, United Kingdom, and from 635 Sipson Road, London UB70JE, United Kingdom, to GE Aviation Systems Limited at Cheltenham Rd, Bishops Cleeve, Cheltenham, Gloucestershire GL52 8SF, United Kingdom, and all locations in the United Kingdom, due to reorganization.
  • Change in Name and Address from General Electric International, Inc. (Singapore), 11 North Buona Vista Drive #09-07, The Metropolis, Singapore 138589, Singapore, and from 240 Tanjong Pagar Road, GE Tower #04-00, Singapore 088540, Singapore, to GE Aviation International Services Pte. Ltd. at 11 North Buona Vista Drive #09-07, The Metropolis, Singapore 138489, Singapore, and all locations in Singapore, due to reorganization.
  • Change in Address for NTK International Corporation from NTK Building, 2-5- 11, Nishi-Shinbashi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105-0003 Japan, to Higashi-Nihonbashi 1-chome Bldg, 3F 1-4-6 HigashiNihonbashi, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 103-0004 Japan.
  • Change in Name from General Electric International, Inc. (Japan) to GE Aviation Distribution Japan Co., Ltd. due to reorganization.
  • Change in Name from Stelia Aerospace Composites SAS to Airbus Atlantic Composites SAS due to acquisition.
  • Change in Address from Ametrine Technologies Ltd., Ein-Hahoresh M.P., Hefer 38980, Israel to Kibbutz Maabarot, M.P Hefer, 4023000, Israel.
  • Change in Name and Address from General Electric International, Inc. (Romania), Strada Barbu Vacarescu, nr. 301-311, Cladirea Lakeview, Etaj 3, Sectorul 2, Bucuresti, Romania, to Unison Engine Components – Bucharest S.A. at 244 C luliu Maniu Boulevard, 6th District, Bucuresti 77826, Romania, due to reorganization.
  • Change in Name from Leonardo US Aircraft, Inc. to Leonardo US Aircraft, LLC due to reorganization as a Limited Liability Company.
  • Change in Name from Philotech France SAS (France) to Bertrandt Technology France SAS due to corporate rebranding.
  • Change in Name from Raytheon Technologies Corporation to RTX Corporation due to corporate rebranding.
  • Change in Name from Fenice Poland Sp. z.o.o. to Edison Next Poland sp. z.o.o. due to acquisition.
  • Change in Name from Mitsubishi Electric TOKKI Systems Corporation to Mitsubishi Electric Defense and Space Technologies Corporation due to corporate rebranding.
  • Change in Address from DRS Signal Solutions, One Milestone Center Court, Germantown, Maryland 20876 to 4910 Executive Court South, Frederick, Maryland, 21703.

 

*******

 

The U.S. Department of State Outlined AUKUS Trade Authorization Mechanism

 

July 10, 2023: The U.S. Department of State has posted a Fact Sheet outlining the AUKUS Trade Authorization Mechanism (ATAM). According to the Fact Sheet, the mechanism is designed to facilitate trade of U.S. defense articles and defense services between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia in support of AUKUS programs for both Pillar I (providing Australia with a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability) and Pillar II (advanced capabilities). This is an interim measure to streamline defense trade of U.S. origin items while the Biden Administration pursues more comprehensive legislative changes. This approach was adopted to address concerns regarding how the speed and efficiency of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) processes would be inadequate for the expected increase in the volume of AUKUS-related defense trade. The implementation of the ATAM involves the following steps:

  • Identify the scope of AUKUS programs. This will optimize operations and compliance, as both government and industry will have a clear understanding of which uses/programs are authorized under this Mechanism.
  • Identify what technologies are not eligible under this Mechanism.
  • Identify which communities in each country would be approved for access to the technology, which includes an obligation to record what is transferred and to secure and protect the technology. This will help reduce the likelihood of unauthorized diversion of sensitive defense technologies and, if necessary, help to investigate any potential diversion.

Next, the utilization of ATAM will proceed as follows:

  • The exporter must check proposed transfers under AUKUS against these three basic and transparent criteria (programs, technologies, and authorized communities) that Defense and State would develop, and review with partners.
  • Transfers beyond the United Kingdom or Australia, or transfer to a non-AUKUS program or a community not eligible to receive it, would require standard non-ATAM authorization.
  • Based on legislation, the U.S. government would need to notify shipments under this authorization exceeding $100 million at least 15 days prior to the shipment. Existing systems will be utilized to conduct congressional notification.

The ATAM will allow DCS transfers of some items typically transferred only under FMS. According to the Fact Sheet, ATAM offers an immediate solution to expedite and secure defense transfers of U.S. defense items for AUKUS projects, leveraging existing authorities (ITAR § 126.4 of the ITAR) to allow seamless and speedy defense trade.

Ensuring swift and secure defense trade under AUKUS - United States Department of State

 

*******

 

The U.S. Department of State Posted Myths and Facts About U.S. Defense Export Controls

 

July 10, 2023: The U.S. Department of State has posted a Fact Sheet entitled Myths and Facts About U.S. Defense Export Controls. This posting refutes such "myths" as whether obtaining an export license for Direct Commercial Sales takes too long under the ITAR and whether the ITAR unnecessarily prevents U.S. companies from building munitions production facilities abroad.

Myths and Facts about U.S. Defense Export Controls - United States Department of State

 

*******

 

Department of Defense

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To France

 

July 7, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of France of AGM-114R2 Hellfire Missiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $203 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The Government of France has requested to buy up to one thousand five hundred fifteen (1,515) AGM-114R2 Hellfire Missiles. Also included are technical assistance; non-standard books; publications; other Hellfire publications; integration support; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost is $203 million.

 

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of a NATO Ally that is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. The proposed sale will improve France’s capability to meet current and future threats by building its long-term defense capacity to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity in order to meet its national defense requirements. France will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces. The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

 

The prime contractor will be Lockheed Martin Corporation, Orlando, FL. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of U.S. Government or contractor representatives to France. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/Press%20Release%20-%20France%2023-43%20CN.pdf

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Sweden

 

July 7, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Sweden of Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $605 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.

 

The Government of Sweden has requested to buy up to two hundred fifty (250) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); and up to six (6) AMRAAM C-8 Guidance Sections. Also included are spare AIM-120 control sections and containers; AMRAAM Test Set (ATS) telemetry kits; encryption devices; munitions support and support equipment; classified software delivery and support; spare parts, consumables, and accessories; repair and return support; transportation support; classified publications and technical documentation; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost is $605 million.

 

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a partner country that is a force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. The proposed sale will improve Sweden’s capability to meet and deter current and future threats in the region by ensuring Sweden has modern, capable air-to-air munitions. This sale will further advance the already high level of Swedish Air Force interoperability with U.S. joint forces and other regional and NATO forces. Sweden will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.

 

The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The principal contractor will be Raytheon Missiles and Defense, Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Sweden. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

 

Sweden – AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) | Defense Security Cooperation Agency (dsca.mil)

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Germany

 

July 19, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Germany of AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $2.90 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.

The Government of Germany has requested to buy up to nine hundred sixty-nine (969) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); and up to twelve (12) AMRAAM C8 Guidance Sections. Also included are AIM-120 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM); telemetry kit and control section spares and containers; KGV-135A Communications Security (COMSEC) devices; Common Munitions Built-in-Test Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); ADU 891 Computer Test Set Adapter Groups; munitions support and support equipment; classified software delivery and support; spare parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support; transportation support; classified publications and technical documentation; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost is $2.90 billion.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/germany-aim-120c-8-advanced-medium-range-air-air-missiles-amraam

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Romania

 

July 27, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Romania of sixteen (16) Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $120.5 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.

 

The Government of Romania has requested to buy sixteen (16) Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs), Personnel Variant (AAVP-7A1); three (3) Assault Amphibious Vehicles, Command Variant (AAVC-7Al); two (2) Assault Amphibious Vehicles, Recovery Variant (AAVR-7Al); sixteen (16) 50 Cal Machine Guns (Heavy Barrel); and five (5) 7.62 mm M240B Machine Guns. Also included are MK-19 Grenade Launchers; M36E T1 Thermal Sighting Systems (TSS); supply support (spare parts); support equipment (including special mission kits/Enhanced Applique Kits (EAAK)); training, unclassified technical manuals, technical data package, engineering and technical support and assistance (including Contractor Engineering Technical Services (CETS)); and other related elements of program and logistics support. The total estimated program cost is $120.5 million.

 

Romania – Assault Amphibious Vehicles | Defense Security Cooperation Agency (dsca.mil)

 

*******

 

DOD/DSCA Updates Security Assistance Management Manual and Policy Memos

 

July 12, 2023: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has made the following updates to its Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) and Policy Memorandums:

Program code "GK" is assigned to track Fiscal Year (FY) 2021/2022 funds for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) appropriated under the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Program Appropriations Act (Division K, P.L. 116-260). INCLE activities are authorized under section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), as amended (22 U.S.C. Section 2291).

This memo adds code GK to:

 

Effective immediately, this memorandum updates an initial tranche of terms and definitions in the DSCA Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) glossary for an effective understanding of security cooperation language throughout the community.

https://samm.dsca.mil/policy-memoranda/dsca-23-31 and https://samm.dsca.mil/policy-memoranda/dsca-23-47

 

*******

 

U.S. Department of Defense Enters Agreement to Expand Capabilities for Domestic Graphite Mining and Processing for Large-Capacity Batteries

 

July 17, 2023: The U.S. Department of Defense's Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, through its Manufacturing Capability Expansion and Investment Prioritization office, has entered an agreement with Graphite One (Alaska) to secure a reliable, sustainable supply of graphite materials within the U.S. to be used in the production of large-capacity batteries. The $37.5 million agreement, entered into under Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III authorities and using funds appropriated by the Inflation Reduction Act, will aid Graphite One (Alaska) in developing a domestic advanced graphite supply chain solution anchored by the Company's Graphite Creek resource. Graphite One's supply chain strategy includes mining from Graphite Creek and processing the graphite ore through an advanced material and battery anode manufacturing plant expected to be sited in Washington State. Graphite One's strategy also includes plans for a recycling facility to reclaim graphite and other battery materials, to be co-located at the advanced materials manufacturing site; the third link in Graphite One's circular economy strategy. DPA Title III funding will allow Graphite One to fast-track their feasibility study by a full year, informing and expediting decisions to move the project further through its plans for a complete U.S.-based graphite anode supply chain.

DOD Enters Agreement to Expand Capabilities for Domestic Graphite Mining and Processing for Large-Capacity Batteries > U.S. Department of Defense > Release

 

*******

 

U.S. Department of Commerce

 

U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Amended the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations

 

July 3, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 42615: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR) (15 CFR Part 713) to reduce the concentration threshold level above which mixtures containing a Schedule 2A chemical are subject to the declaration requirements that apply to Schedule 2A chemical production, processing, and consumption under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This final rule also amends the CWCR to reduce the concentration threshold level above which mixtures containing a Schedule 2A chemical are subject to the declaration and reporting requirements that apply to exports and imports of Schedule 2A chemicals under the CWC. These regulatory amendments bring the CWCR into further alignment with guidelines adopted by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Conference of the States Parties (CSP), which established a low concentration limit for Schedule 2A chemicals.

 

Federal Register :: Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations: Reducing the Concentration Level Above Which Mixtures Containing Schedule 2A Chemicals Are Subject to Declaration and Reporting Requirements

 

*******

 

U.S. Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration Seeks Public Comments on the Modernization of Its Export Promotion Services and Assistance

 

July 7, 2023: 88 FR 43286: The U.S. Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration (ITA) includes the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service (CS), which assists and advocates for U.S. businesses in international markets to foster U.S. economic prosperity. Utilizing its network of trade promotion and policy professionals located in 79 countries and 106 U.S. locations, CS promotes U.S. exports, especially among small and medium-sized enterprises; advances and protects U.S. commercial interests overseas; and attracts inward investment into the United States.

 

CS is seeking feedback from the general public – including businesses that are new to exporting or not currently exporting - on ways to modernize services for the 21st century. CS is reviewing its services to assess their effectiveness in meeting the needs of U.S. exporters and identify opportunities to innovate and enhance services offered, with the objective of driving U.S. innovation and global competitiveness by increasing U.S. exports and ensuring more U.S. regions benefit, as well as workers and businesses from underserved communities. Interested persons have until 5:00 PM ET on August 7, 2023, to submit their comments.

 

Federal Register :: Opportunity To Comment on the Modernization of the Export Promotion Services and Assistance Delivered by the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service

 

*******

 

U.S. Department Of Commerce's Data Privacy Framework Program Launches New Website Enabling U.S. Companies to Participate in Cross-Border Data Transfers

 

July 20, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce has launched the Data Privacy Framework (DPF) program's website, enabling eligible U.S. companies to self-certify their participation in the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework (EU-U.S. DPF), facilitating cross-border transfers of personal data in compliance with EU law. The DPF program is particularly valuable for small- and medium-sized enterprises that can now access an affordable and streamlined mechanism for personal data transfers from the European Economic Area (comprised of EU countries along with Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway). Data flows between the United States and Europe more than anywhere else in the world, enabling the $7.1 trillion U.S.-EU economic relationship. To participate, companies must self-certify and publicly commit to comply with the EU-U.S. DPF Principles, which are enforceable under U.S. law. They can also self-certify their compliance with the UK Extension to the EU-U.S. DPF and/or the Swiss-U.S. DPF Principles, which will enable personal data transfers from those jurisdictions after they complete their legal processes and deem such transfers to have adequate protection. Eligible companies can now sign up for the EU-U.S. DPF at www.dataprivacyframework.gov. Companies that participate in the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield may begin relying immediately on the EU-U.S. DPF to receive personal data transfers from the European Union/European Economic Area but will need to self-certify to the EU-U.S. DPF by October 10.  Companies can now sign up for mechanisms to receive personal data from the United Kingdom and Switzerland.  However, they may not rely on these mechanisms to receive personal data until the anticipated recognition by the UK Government and the Swiss Government of the adequacy of those mechanisms enter into force. Organizations interested in self-certifying should review the DPF program requirements, which are available, along with other guidance materials, on the DPF program website.

https://cts.lmsslsecure.com/t/6340695/113404557/95192/31/

 

*******

 

U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security Posted Best Practices for License Applications for Medical-Related Items Destined for Russia, Belarus, and Occupied/Covered Regions of Ukraine

 

July 24, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has posted on its website "Best Practices" guidance for license applications for medical-related items destined for Russia, Belarus, and occupied/covered regions of Ukraine. Consistent with licensing policies set forth in Sections 746.5, 746.6, 746.8, and 746.10 of the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR Parts 730-774, “EAR”), license applications for health and safety, medical, and humanitarian applications are generally reviewed on a case-by-case basis. This review policy reflects the U.S. Government’s position that the Russian and Belarusian people are not the target of export controls imposed on Russia in response to its invasion and continuing aggression in Ukraine, as well as on Belarus, which has substantially enabled Russia’s actions. However, the U.S. Government reviews all export license applications to evaluate whether approving the application would benefit the Russian or Belarusian government or defense sector, particularly with regard to the usefulness of the items for the treatment of battlefield casualties or the production of chemical and biological weapons and biotechnological (including biopharmaceutical) products. The guidance has sections on:

  • End-Use/User Statements
  • License Scope
  • Export Item Grouping
  • Direct Patient Care
  • HS Codes
  • Best Practices Checklist

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/product-guidance/3300-russia-medical-related-license-application-guidance-fpd-final-incorp-occ-and-3f-cmts-clean-071323/file

*******

 

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

Reminder to file the 2023 Annual Report of Blocked Property

July 3, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) reminds industry that 31 C.F.R. § 501.603 of the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations (RPPR) requires holders of blocked property to provide OFAC with a comprehensive list of all blocked property held as of June 30 of the current year by September 30. Persons that do not hold blocked property as of June 30 do not need to file an Annual Report of Blocked Property (ARBP). Please note that the term blocked property only applies to property that is blocked pursuant to OFAC regulations. Property that was unblocked by an OFAC general or specific license or was previously blocked pursuant to a sanctions program that was terminated on or before June 30, 2023, is not considered blocked property and should not be reported in the ARBP. Similarly, a restricted account of a person ordinarily resident in Iran is not blocked and should not be reported to OFAC in the ARBP, unless there is an interest in the account of a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to an applicable sanctions authority.

Persons filing the 2023 ARBP are required to utilize spreadsheet form TD-F 90-22.50. Completed forms should be filed through the OFAC Reporting System (ORS) or sent to OFACreport@treasury.gov. Failure to submit a required ARBP by September 30 constitutes a violation of the RPPR.

For Additional guidance visit this link: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/16451/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230703

*******

 

OFAC to retire PIP, DEL, and SDALL.ZIP file formats of the sanctions list on or about August 15, 2023

 

July 6, 2023: OFAC announced it will retire the PIP, DEL, and SDALL.ZIP sanctions list file formats on or about August 15, 2023. OFAC will continue to offer for public download the XML, CSV, and FF file formats, the ZIP files SDN_XML and SDN_ Advanced, and PDF versions for OFAC’s sanctions list(s).

OFAC’s Sanctions List Search tool will not be affected by these changes, and users of the search tool will not experience any loss of service.

Members of the public can contact OFAC at OFAC@treasury.gov for questions or to provide feedback on the impact related to the removal of these file formats.

The full list of files to be retired are as follows:

  • SDALL.ZIP
  • SDN.DEL
  • ADD.DEL
  • ALT.DEL
  • SDN_COMMENTS.DEL
  • SDN.PIP
  • ADD.PIP
  • ALT.PIP
  • SDN_COMMENTS.PIP
  • CONS_PRIM.DEL
  • CONS_ADD.DEL
  • CONS_ALT.DEL
  • CONS_COMMENTS.DEL
  • CONS_PRIM.PIP
  • CONS_ADD.PIP
  • CONS_ALT.PIP
  • CONS_COMMENTS.PIP

Users may continue to access OFAC's sanctions list data formats - via the URLs provided below.  However, on or about August 15, 2023, the PIP, DEL, and SDALL.ZIP files listed above will be removed from the below pages and will no longer be available for download.

OFAC to retire PIP, DEL, and SDALL.ZIP file formats of the sanctions list on or about August 15, 2023 | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov)

 

*******

 

OFAC Sanctions Impede Russian Access to Battlefield Supplies and Target Revenue Generators

 

July 20, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has sanctioned nearly 120 individuals and entities in Russia, Kyrgyz Republic, and the United Arab Emirates pursuant to Executive Order 14024 to further implement the commitments that G7 Leaders made on February 24, 2023 and May 19, 2023. The designations announced by OFAC and the Department of State take measures to inhibit Russia’s access to products that support its military and war efforts; reduce Russia’s revenue from the metals and mining sector; undermine its future energy capabilities; degrade Russia’s access to the international financial system; and starve Russia of G7-produced technology needed for its technology, aerospace, and defense sectors. In a May 19, 2023, Supplemental Alert, the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) identified certain high-priority items, primarily based on the Harmonized System (HS) code classification of components from Russian weapons systems recovered on the battlefield in Ukraine, to assist financial institutions in identifying suspicious transactions relating to possible export control evasion. Items described by these HS codes have been found in multiple Russian weapons systems used against Ukraine, including the Kalibr cruise missile, the Kh-101 cruise missile, and the Orlan-10 UAV.

Many of the entities designated by OFAC have transferred certain of these high-priority items to Russia-based end-users. As a result of these designations, all property and interests in property of the persons above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.

 

In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or blocked persons are prohibited unless exempt or authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

 

Treasury Sanctions Impede Russian Access to Battlefield Supplies and Target Revenue Generators | U.S. Department of the Treasury

 

*******

Announcement of OFAC's New Video Series: "Introduction to OFAC"

 

July 28, 2023: OFAC released the first episode of its “Introduction to OFAC” web series, a series of short videos created to provide viewers with a high-level introduction on the fundamentals of OFAC and sanctions implementation. The first episode introduces viewers to OFAC and its place within the U.S. government, as well as its history, mission, and relationship with the public.

 

Introduction to OFAC Video Series | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov)

 

*******

 

U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Treasury Department

 

The Departments of Justice, Commerce, And Treasury Issued A Joint Compliance Note On Voluntary Self-Disclosure Of Potential Violations

 

July 26, 2023: The Department of Justice, Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a joint compliance note focusing on the voluntary self-disclosure policies that apply to U.S. sanctions, export controls, and other national security laws, including recent updates to certain of those policies. This note marks the second collective effort by the three agencies to inform the private sector about enforcement trends and provide guidance to the business community on compliance with U.S. sanctions and export laws.

 

The note underscores the importance of an effective and robust compliance program. If a company discovers a potential violation, whether it is an administrative or criminal violation, that company must promptly disclose and remediate. Not only does such reporting make the disclosing company potentially eligible for significant mitigation, but it also alerts national security agencies to activities that may pose a threat to the national security and foreign policy objectives of the U.S. Government.

 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/policy-guidance/3302-vsd-tri-seal-compliance-note-7-26-23/file

 

*******

 

The U.K. Government

 

July 3, 2023: The U.K. Government's Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) has issued Notice to Exporters 2023/11 on its issuance of a revised General Trade License (Syria Sanctions - Earthquake Relief Efforts in Syria).  The revised General Trade License replaces the license issued on 15 February 2023, which was due to expire on 31 August 2023.  The revised license is identical to the previous license, with the exception that it will remain in force until it is revoked.

The ECJU has also posted on its website updated guidance on complying with professional and business services sanctions related to Russia. This document contains information on services sanctions in the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (‘the Russia Regulations’). It also sets out guidance on applying for licenses and considers what information to include in the cover letter of license applications related to the prohibitions in regulations 54C and 54D of the Russia Regulations.

NTE 2023/11: General Trade Licence Syria Sanctions revised - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

*******

U.S. Census Bureau

 

Schedule B and Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) Updated in the Automated Export System (AES)

 

July 3, 2023: Effective July 3, 2023, the Schedule B, Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), and HTS Codes That Are Not Valid for AES tables have been updated to accept the changes to the July 1, 2023 codes.

AES will accept shipments with outdated codes during a grace period for 30 days beyond the expiration date of June 30, 2023Reporting an outdated code after the 30-day grace period will result in a fatal error.

The ACE AESDirect program has been updated with the 2023 codes and will accept shipments with outdated codes during the grace period as well.

The 2023 Schedule B and HTS tables are available for downloading at:

AES Concordance (census.gov)

*******

 

Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages

July 19, 2023: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected.  If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation.  Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN.  However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.

To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

Fatal Error Response Code:  068

Narrative:     SRN Not on File; Action Not Allowed

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        The Shipment is not on file in AES. Therefore, the requested action is not allowed.

Resolution:  When the Shipment Filing Action Request Indicator is a Change, Replace, or Cancel, the Shipment Reference Number must exist on a previous filing in AES for the filer.                       

Verify the Shipment Filing Action Request Indicator and the Shipment Reference Number, correct the shipment and resubmit.

Response Code:  850

Narrative:     Improbable Foreign/Domestic Origin

Severity:       Verify

Reason:        For the reported Schedule B/HTS Number, the Domestic/Foreign Origin Indicator is improbable for this commodity.

Resolution: Certain products are highly unlikely to be either of domestic origin or of foreign origin.  This might indicate either a keying error or misclassification of the product.   

Verify the Domestic/Foreign Origin Indicator and the Schedule B/HTS Number, correct the shipment, and resubmit (if necessary).  If the information is verified correct as reported, no action is necessary.

For a complete list of AES Response Codes, their reasons, and resolutions, see Appendix A – Commodity Filing Response Messages.

It is important that AES filers correct Fatal Errors as soon as they are received in order to comply with Foreign Trade Regulations.  These errors must be corrected prior to export for shipments filed pre-departure and as soon as possible for shipments filed post-departure but not later than five calendar days after departure.

For further information or questions, contact the U.S. Census Bureau’s Trade Data Collection Branch.

Telephone: (800) 549-0595; select option 1 for AES

Email: askaes@census.gov

Online: www.census.gov/trade

Blog: blogs.census.gov/globalreach

*******

 

Port of Unlading Code Deleted in the Automated Export System (AES) 

 

July 31, 2023: The U.S. Census Bureau announced the following Port of Unlading Code has been DELETED in the AES effective immediately.

Port Name           Port Code              Country

Liezen                  60217                   Australia

For further information or questions, contact the U.S. Census Bureau’s Trade Data Collection Branch.

Telephone: (800) 549-0595, select option 1 for AES

 

Email: askaes@census.gov

 

Online: www.census.gov/trade

 

Blog: blogs.census.gov/globalreach

*******

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

 

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Sanctions

July 10, 2023: OFAC issued Venezuela-Related General License 40B, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving the Exportation or Reexportation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas to Venezuela:"

Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving the Exportation or Reexportation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas to Venezuela

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this general license, all transactions related to the exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, of liquefied petroleum gas to Venezuela, involving the Government of Venezuela, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by E.O. 13850 of November 1, 2018, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019, or E.O. 13884 of August 5, 2019, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, July 10, 2024.

(b) This general license does not authorize:

(1) Any payment-in-kind of petroleum or petroleum products; or

(2) Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the VSR, including transactions involving any blocked persons other than PdVSA, any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, or any Government of Venezuela person that is blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13884.

(c) Effective July 10, 2023, General License No. 40A, dated July 7, 2022, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License No. 40B.

Note to General License No. 40B: Nothing in this general license relieves any persons from compliance with the requirements of other Federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security.

Additionally, OFAC is adding regulations to implement Executive Order (E.O.) 14078 of July 19, 2022, “Bolstering Efforts To Bring Hostages and Wrongfully Detained United States Nationals Home.”  These regulations are currently available for public inspection with the Federal Register and will take effect upon publication in the Federal Register on Tuesday, July 11, 2023.

Issuance of Venezuela-Related General License 40B; Publication of Hostages and Wrongful Detention Sanctions Regulations | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov)

 

*******

 

July 11, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)  sanctioned an individual in Serbia, Aleksandar Vulin, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14033. OFAC has designated Vulin pursuant to E.O. 14033 for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged in, corruption related to the Western Balkans, including corruption by, on behalf of, or otherwise related to a government in the Western Balkans, or a current or former government official at any level of government in the Western Balkans, such as the misappropriation of public assets, expropriation of private assets for personal gain or political purposes, or bribery. Vulin has been implicated in transnational organized crime, illegal narcotics operations, and misuse of public office. Vulin has maintained a mutually beneficial relationship with U.S.-designated Serbian arms dealer Slobodan Tesic, helping ensure that Tesic’s illegal arms shipments can move freely across Serbia’s borders. As a result of this designation, all property and interests in property of Vulin that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.

 

In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. All transactions by U.S. persons within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. In addition, financial institutions and other persons that engage in certain transactions or activities with the sanctioned individual may expose themselves to sanctions or be subject to an enforcement action.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • Aleksandar Vulin, of Serbia

 

Treasury Sanctions Official Linked to Corruption in Serbia | U.S. Department of the Treasury

 

*******

 

July 11, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three Belgian nationals and one Mexican national for international drug trafficking, including cocaine and fentanyl. Those designated are involved in the importation and distribution of narcotics destined for U.S. and European markets.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • Youssef Ben Azza, of United Arab Emirates
  • Othman El Ballouti, of United Arab Emirates
  • Younes El Ballouti, of United Arab Emirates
  • Franco Tabarez Martinez, of Mexico.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230719

 

*******

 

July 12, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 10 individuals, including several Sinaloa Cartel members and fugitives, as well as one Mexico-based entity, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059. Those sanctioned are associated with Sinaloa, Mexico-based precursor chemical suppliers and brothers Ludim and Luis Alfonso Zamudio Lerma and ultimately operate under the Los Chapitos faction of the Sinaloa Cartel. Responsible for a significant portion of the illicit fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States, the Sinaloa Cartel is one of the most powerful and pervasive drug trafficking organizations in the world.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • Eliseo De Leon Becerra, of Mexico
  • Jeuri Limon Elenes. of Mexico
  • Noel Lopez Perez, of Mexico
  • Oscar Noe Medina Gonzalez (a.k.a. "El Panu"; a.k.a. "Pan"; a.k.a. "Panu"), of Mexico
  • Ricardo Paez Lopez, of Mexico
  • Nestor Isidro Perez Salas (a.k.a. "Chicken Little"; a.k.a. "GARCIA, Nestor Isidro"; a.k.a. "Nini"), of Mexico
  • Dora Vanessa Valdez Fernandez, of Mexico
  • Angel Guillermo Zamudio Lerma, of Mexico
  • Daniel Zamudio Lerma, of Mexico
  • Jorge Alberto Zamudio Lerma, of Mexico

The following entity has been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • Rei Compania Internacional, S.A. DE C.V. (a.k.a. Rei Compania International, S.A. DE C.V.), of Mexico.

Counter Narcotics Designations; Counter Narcotics Designations Removals | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov)

*******

July 18, 2023: 88 FR 45816: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has published one general license (GL) issued pursuant to the Burma Sanctions Regulations: GL 5, which was previously made available on OFAC’s website. On June 21, 2023, OFAC issued GL 5 to authorize certain transactions otherwise prohibited by the Burma Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 525. The GL was made available on OFAC’s website when it was issued. The GL has an expiration date of August 5, 2023.

 

Additionally, The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has published three web general licenses (GLs) issued in the Syria Sanctions Regulations, Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, and Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, and Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, respectively: Syria GL 21B, Iran GL N-2, and Venezuela GL 39B, each of which was previously made available on OFAC’s website. On June 14, 2023, OFAC issued Syria GL 21B, Iran GL N-2, and Venezuela GL 39B to extend the authorization for certain transactions otherwise prohibited by, respectively: the Syria Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 542; the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 560, and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 594; and the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 591. At the time of issuance, OFAC made all three GLs, each of which has an expiration date of June 14, 2024.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 21B: Authorizing Certain Activities To Respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19)

(a) Authorizing certain COVID–19-related transactions prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this general license, the following transactions and activities that are prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 542 (SySR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024:

(1) Exportation of services related to COVID–19. All transactions and activities related to the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of services to Syria that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID–19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID–19); and

(2) COVID–19-related transactions involving certain blocked persons. All transactions and activities involving the Government of Syria, Polymedics LLC, Letia Company, or any entity in which Polymedics LLC or Letia Company owns, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID–19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID–19), provided that any exportation or reexportation of items to Syria must be licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce.

(b) This general license does not authorize:

(1) The exportation or reexportation of any goods, technology, or services to military, intelligence, or law enforcement purchasers or importers;

(2) The unblocking of any property blocked pursuant to any part of 31 CFR chapter V; or

(3) Any transactions or activities otherwise prohibited by the SySR, or prohibited by any other part of 31 CFR chapter V, statute, or Executive order, or involving any blocked person other than the blocked persons identified in paragraph (a) of this general license.

(c) Effective June 14, 2023, General License 21A, dated June 10, 2022, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License 21B.

Note 1 to General License 21B: Nothing in this general license relieves any person from compliance with the requirements of other Federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security or the Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.

GENERAL LICENSE N–2: Authorizing Certain Activities To Respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19)

(a) Authorizing certain COVID–19-related transactions prohibited by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. Except as provided in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this general license, the following transactions and activities that are prohibited by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 (ITSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024:

(1) Exportation of goods or technology. All transactions and activities related to the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of goods or technology for use in connection with the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID–19 (including research or clinical studies related to COVID–19) to Iran or the Government of Iran, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to Iran or the Government of Iran;

(2) Importation of or dealings in certain COVID–19-related goods. All transactions and activities related to the importation into the United States of, or dealings in or related to, goods that previously were exported or reexported to Iran or the Government of Iran pursuant to this general license and that are broken, defective, or non-operational, or are connected to product recalls, adverse events, or other safety concerns, or for routine maintenance or the permanent return of such items to the United States or a third country; and

(3) Exportation or importation of services. All transactions and activities related to the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of services to Iran or the Government of Iran, or the importation into the United States of, or dealings in or related to, Iranian-origin services, in each case that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID–19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID–19).

(b) Authorizing certain transactions involving the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) or the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this general license, all transactions and activities described in paragraph (a) of this general license involving CBI, NIOC, or any entity in which NIOC owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by the ITSR or the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024.

(c) Authorizing certain financial transactions. Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this general license, the processing of funds transfers or trade finance transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to give effect to the transactions and activities authorized in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this general license that are prohibited by the ITSR or the GTSR are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024.

(d) Any exportation or reexportation of goods or technology pursuant to paragraph (a) of this general license is subject to the following conditions:

(1) Any goods or technology exported or reexported must:

(i) Be designated as EAR99 under the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (EAR); or

(ii) In the case of goods or technology that are not subject to the EAR, not be listed on any multilateral export control regime; and

(2) All exports or reexports made pursuant to this general license must be concluded prior to the expiration date of this general license.

(e) This general license does not authorize:

(1) The exportation or reexportation of goods or technology to CBI, NIOC, or any entity in which NIOC owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest;

(2) The exportation or reexportation of any goods, technology, or services to military, intelligence, or law enforcement purchasers or importers;

(3) The exportation or reexportation of any goods, technology, or services used to facilitate the development or production of a chemical or biological weapon or weapon of mass destruction;

(4) The unblocking of any property blocked pursuant to any part of 31 CFR chapter V; or

(5) Any transactions or activities otherwise prohibited by the ITSR or the GTSR, or prohibited by any other part of 31 CFR chapter V, involving any person blocked pursuant to the GTSR except as identified in paragraph (b) of this general license.

(f) Effective June 14, 2023, General License N–1, dated June 10, 2022, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License N–2.

Note 1 to General License N–2: The export or reexport to Iran of certain food, medicine, medical devices, and agricultural commodities, as well as certain related transactions such as payments and brokering, are broadly authorized under sections 560.530, 560.532, and 560.533 of the ITSR, subject to certain conditions. In addition, transactions or activities authorized under those provisions that involve CBI, NIOC, or any entity in which NIOC owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are also authorized pursuant to Counter Terrorism- and Iran-related General License No. 8A. Those authorizations remain in effect, including with respect to exports or reexports of food, medicine, medical devices, and agricultural commodities intended to respond to COVID–19 that satisfy the applicable criteria of those authorizations.

Note 2 to General License N–2: Nothing in this general license relieves any person from compliance with the requirements of other Federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security or the Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 39B: Authorizing Certain Activities To Respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19)

(a) Authorizing certain COVID–19-related transactions involving the Government of Venezuela. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this general license, all transactions and activities involving the Government of Venezuela that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID–19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID–19), that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13808 of August 27, 2017, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019, or E.O. 13884 of August 5, 2019, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024.

(b) Authorizing certain COVID–19-related transactions involving certain banks. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this general license, all transactions and activities described in paragraph (a) of this general license involving Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV), Banco de Venezuela, S.A. Banco Universal (Banco de Venezuela), Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo, de la Clase Obrera, Mujer y Comunas, Banco Universal C.A. (Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo), or any entity in which BCV, Banco de Venezuela, or Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo owns, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by E.O. 13850 of November 1, 2018, as amended by E.O. 13857, each as incorporated into the VSR, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024.

(c) This general license does not authorize:

(1) The exportation or reexportation of any goods, technology, or services to military, intelligence, or law enforcement purchasers or importers;

(2) Any transactions or activities involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), Banco de Desarrollo Economico y Social de Venezuela (BANDES), or Banco Bandes Uruguay S.A. (Bandes Uruguay), or any entity in which PdVSA, BANDES, or Bandes Uruguay owns, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest;

(3) The unblocking of any property blocked pursuant to any part of 31 CFR chapter V; or

(4) Any transactions or activities otherwise prohibited by the VSR, or prohibited by any other part of 31 CFR chapter V, statute, or E.O., or involving any blocked persons other than Government of Venezuela persons blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13884 or the blocked persons identified in paragraph (b) of this general license.

(d) Effective June 14, 2023, General License 39A, dated June 10, 2022, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License 39B.

Note 1 to General License 39B: Nothing in this general license relieves any person from compliance with the requirements of other Federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security or the Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.

Federal Register :: Publication of Covid-Related Web General Licenses Related to Syria Sanctions Regulations, Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, and Venezuela Sanctions Regulations.

 

*******

 

July 20, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is taking action to further implement the commitments that G7 Leaders made on February 24, 2023 and May 19, 2023. The designations announced by OFAC and the Department of State take measures to inhibit Russia’s access to products that support its military and war efforts; reduce Russia’s revenue from the metals and mining sector; undermine its future energy capabilities; degrade Russia’s access to the international financial system; and starve Russia of G7-produced technology needed for its technology, aerospace, and defense sectors.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • Vasiliy Nikolaevich Anokhin, of Russia
  • Valeriy Yevgenyevich Chekalov, of Russia
  • Ivan Cvetic, of Russia
  • Leonid Vladimirovich Gornin, of Russia
  • Tatyana Grigoryevna Ivanova, of Russia
  • Aleksey Igorevich Khersontsev of Russia
  • Sergey Borisovich Korolev, of Russia
  • Aleksey Leonidovich Kudrin, of Russia
  • Vladimir Nikolaevich Lepin, of Russia
  • Pavel Alekseevich Marinychev, of Russia
  • Vasiliy Sergeevich Osmakov, of Russia
  • Yong Hyok Rim, of North Korea
  • Anatoliy Anatolyevich Smolin, of Russia
  • Pavel Nikolaevich Snikkars, of Russia
  • Maksim Valeriovych Soldatov, of Ukraine
  • Pavel Yurevich Sorokin, of Russia
  • Igor Mikhailovich Stramilov, of Russia
  • Ilya Eduardovich Torosov, of Russia

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • M. Prokhorov General Physics Institute Russian Academy Of Sciences (a.k.a. Federalnoe Gosudarstvennoe Byudzhetnoe Uchrezhdennie Nauki Federalny Issledovatelski Tsentr Institut Obshchei Fiziki Im. A.M. Prokhorova Rossiskoi Akademii Nauk; a.k.a. Prokhorov General Physics Institute Of Ras; a.k.a. Prokhorov General Physics Institute Of The Russian Academy Of Sciences; a.k.a. Russian Academy Of Sciences - Alexandr Mikhailovich Prokhorov General Physics Institute; a.k.a. "GPI RAS"; a.k.a. "IOF RAN"; a.k.a. "IOF RAN FGBU", of Russia.
  • Aem Propulsion, of Russia
  • Ak Systems (a.k.a. Ak Sistems), of Russia
  • Aleksinskii Khimicheskii Kombinat (a.k.a. Aleksinsky Chemical Combine; a.k.a. Aleksinsky Chemical Plant; a.k.a. "AKHK"), of Russia
  • Amegino FZE, of Russia
  • AO NPO Kurganpribor, of Russia
  • AO Vostok Treid Invest, of Russia
  • Arsenal Machine Building Plant Open Joint Stock Company (a.k.a. Arsenal Machine Building Plant OJSC; a.k.a. Mz Arsenal OAO; a.k.a. Mz Arsenal PAO; a.k.a. Otkrytoe Aktsionernoe Obschestvo Mashinostroitelnyi Zavod Arsenal, of Russia
  • Basis Trade Prosoft LLC (a.k.a. Bazis Treid Prosoft; a.k.a. "Btptrade", of Russia
  • Budker Institute Of Nuclear Physics Of Siberian Branch Russian Academy Of Sciences (a.k.a. Budker Institute Of Nuclear Physics Of SB RAS; a.k.a. Federalnoe Gosudarstvennoe Byudzhetnoe Uchrezhdenie Nauki Institut Yadernol Fiziki IM. G.I. Budkera Sibirskogo Otdeleniya Rossiskoi Akademii Nauk; f.k.a. Institute Of Nuclear Physics Of The Siberian Branch Of The Ussr Academy Of Science; a.k.a. Iyaf So Ran Fgbu; a.k.a. "Binp Sb Ras", of Russia
  • Burovaya Kompaniya Eurasia LLC, of Russia
  • Central Research Institute Of The Russian Air And Space Forces (a.k.a. Federalnoe Gosudarstvennoe Bjudzhetnoe Uchrezhdenie Tsentralnyj Nauchno-Issledovatelskij Institut Vojsk Vosdushno-Kosmicheskoj Oborony Minoborony Rossii; a.k.a. Fgbu Tsnii Vvko Minoborony Rossii; a.k.a. "Tsnii Vvko"), of Russia.
  • Closed Joint Stock Company Klimovskiy Specialized Ammunition Plant, of Russia
  • Closed Joint Stock Company Superconducting Nanotechnology (a.k.a. Limited Liability Company Superconducting Nanotechnology; a.k.a. Obshchestvo S Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu Sverkhprovodnikovye Nanotekhnologii; a.k.a. Scontel; a.k.a. Skontel AO; a.k.a. Skontel OOO, of Russia
  • Federal State Budgetary Institution Of Science Federal Research Center Kazan Scientific Center Of The Russian Academy Of Sciences, of Russia
  • Federal State Enterprise Ya M Sverdlov Plant, of Russia
  • Federal State Unitary Enterprise Center For Operation Of Space Ground Based Infrastructure, of Russia
  • Fund For Development Of Energy Complex Energy, of Russia
  • Institute Of Laser Physics Of The Siberian Branch Of The Russian Academy Of Sciences, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Astrophysika National Centre Of Laser Systems And Complexes, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Aviation Electronics And Communication Systems, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Commercial Bank Solidarnost, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Compel, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Experimental Design Bureau Fakel, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Gazprom Avtomatizatsiya, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Locko Bank, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Neftegazavtomatika, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Petersburg Social Commercial Bank, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Research And Production Corporation Precision Systems And Instruments, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Science Research Institute For Precise Instruments, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Scientific And Production Association Critical Information Systems, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Scientific Production Enterprise Research And Design Institute Of Well Logging, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Special Research Bureau Of Moscow Power Engineering Institute, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Tula Cartridge Works, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Ural Mining And Metallurgical Company, of Russia
  • Joint Stock Company Uralelektromed, of Russia
  • JSC Siberian Service Company, of Russia
  • JSC Tinkoff Bank, of Russia
  • Kazanskii Gosudarstvennyi Kazennyi Porokhovoi Zavod, of Russia
  • Komponenta AO, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company AB Optiks, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company AK Microtech, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Fifth Element Trading, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Fivel, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Forepost Trading, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Fortap, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Imex Expert, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Irbis Sky Tech
  • Limited Liability Company Ishimbay Specialized Chemical Plant Of Catalyst, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Knt Kat, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Kosmosavia, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Legion, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Oktanta, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Perm Oil Machine Company, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Private Security Organization Gazpromneft Okhrana, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Private Security Organization Legat, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Proizvostvennaya Kommercheskaya Firma Gazneftemash, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Rn Kat, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Rustmash, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Siaisi, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Sterlitamak Catalyst Plant, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Tyumen Petroleum Research Center, of Russia
  • Limited Liability Company Vega Strategic Services
  • LLC Altrabeta, of Russia
  • LLC IQ Components, of Russia
  • LLC Onelek, of Russia
  • LLC RM Design And Development, of Russia
  • LLC Spetselservis, of Russia
  • V. Frunze Arsenal Design Bureau Joint Stock Company, of Russia
  • MCI Trading Doo Beograd Palilula
  • Nauchno Issledovatelskii I Proektnyi Institut Po Pererabotke Gaza AO, of Russia
  • NPF-Radiotekhkomplekt AO, of Russia
  • Obshestvo S Ogranichennoj Otvetstvennostyu Nipigaz Aktiv, of Russia
  • Obshestvo S Ogranichennoj Otvetstvennostyu Nipigaz IT, of Russia
  • OOO Morskie Paromnye Linii Vanino Sakhalin, of Russia
  • OOO Radiotekhsnab, of Russia
  • Open Joint Stock Company Russian Institute Of Radionavigation And Time, of Russia
  • Osipyan Institute Of Solid State Physics Of The Russian Academy Of Sciences, of Russia
  • OSOO Kargolayn, of Russia
  • OSOO Progress Lider, of Russia
  • L. Kapitza Institute For Physical Problems, Russian Academy Of Sciences, of Russia
  • Public Joint Stock Company Sakhalin Shipping Company, of Russia
  • Radiant EK AO, of Russia
  • Region-Prof LLC, of Russia
  • Saturn EK OOO, of Russia
  • Scientific Production Company Optolink, of Russia
  • Space Research Institute Russian Academy Of Sciences, of Russia
  • State Unitary Enterprise Of The Donetsk People's Republic Republican Center Trading House Vtormet, of Ukraine
  • Staut Company Limited, of Russia
  • Tambovskii Porokhovoi Zavod, of Russia
  • Technologies Systems And Complexes Limited, of Russia
  • UMMC Nonferrous Metals Processing Limited Liability Company, of Russia
  • Unistream Commercial Bank JSC, of Russia
  • Vityaz Machine Building Company Joint Stock Company, of Russia
  • ZAO GTME Tekhnologii, of Russia

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230720

*******

 

July 24, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three Malian transition government and military officials for facilitating the deployment and expansion of the Private Military Company ‘Wagner’s (Wagner Group) activities in Mali. The United States took this step based on evidence showing that these Malian officials have contributed to the Wagner Group’s malicious activities in Mali.

These sanctions respond to the actions of three specific individuals and are not directed against the people of Mali.  As the largest bilateral donor of development and humanitarian assistance to Mali, the United States continues to support the Malian people in their pursuit of peace, prosperity, and democracy.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • Adama Bagayoko of Mali
  • Sadio Camara of Mali
  • Alou Boi Diarra of Mali

Russia-related Designations | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov)

*******

 

July 27, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf, the head of the finance office of the Somalia-based affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), designating him as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf has played a key role in the delivery of foreign fighters, supplies, and ammunition on behalf of ISIS-Somalia, which serves as a hub for disbursing funds and guidance to ISIS branches and networks across the continent. ISIS-Somalia generates much of its revenue through extortion, specifically targeting local communities for money and recruits, often under the threat of violence.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf of Somalia

Counter Terrorism Designation | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov)

*******

July 31, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated key leaders and financial facilitators of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qa’ida in Maldives, including 20 ISIS, ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), and al-Qa’ida operatives. OFAC also designated 29 companies associated with the individuals sanctioned, who include leaders of Maldives-based terrorist-affiliated criminal gangs and associates of key ISIS-K recruiter Mohamad Ameen who was designated by OFAC in 2019. Several of the individuals being designated have also planned or carried out attacks that targeted journalists and local authorities.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • Ahmed Afraah of The Maldives
  • Ahmed Agleel of The Maldives
  • Ameen Ahmed of The Maldives
  • Milos Bukejlovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
  • Zeljka Cvijanovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
  • Faris Mohamed Didi of The Maldives
  • Moosa Inas of The Maldives
  • Abdulla Ali Manik of The Maldives
  • Ahmed Mubeen of The Maldives
  • Jinaau Naseem of The Maldives
  • Mohamed Naushad Shareef of The Maldives
  • Ali Nihadh of The Maldives
  • Ahmed Alif Rauf of The Maldives
  • Ibrahim Aleef Rauf of The Maldives
  • Mohamed Inthif Rauf of The Maldives
  • Mohamed Maathiu Abdul Razzaq of The Maldives
  • Ali Shafiu of Afghanistan
  • Yoosuf Shaheed of The Maldives
  • Hussain Shamil of The Maldives
  • Abdulla Shareef of The Maldives
  • Ali Shiyam of The Maldives
  • Nenad Stevandic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
  • Mohamed Thasleem of The Maldives
  • Radovan Viskovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • 3ZED Investment of The Maldives
  • Al Athmaar of The Maldives
  • Baum Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • Code A Partnership of The Maldives
  • Designer Garage of The Maldives
  • Dhawi Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • Eriyadhu Investments Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • Fruit Plus Maldives Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • Furaha Construction Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • Golden Warriors Investment Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • Green Birds of The Maldives
  • Inma Maldives of The Maldives
  • Jazeera Properties Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • Jazeerat Almaldifi of The Maldives
  • Larosa of The Maldives
  • Maroc International Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • Multi Construction Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • New Sun Investments Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • Panda Maldives Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • X Investments Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • Sias Investment Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • Sky Nova Investment of The Maldives
  • Southern Stallions Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • Street Investments Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • Street Motor Services of The Maldives
  • Syskon Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • Vaaly Brothers Pvt Ltd, of The Maldives
  • Visions Maldives Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
  • White Beach Watersports Pvt Ltd of The Maldives.

Counter Terrorism Designations and Designation Update; Balkans-related Designations | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov)

*******

 

U.S. Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

July 18, 2023: 88 FR 46071: In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding four entities to the Entity List under the destinations of Greece, Hungary, Ireland, and North Macedonia.  These four entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.

 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/federal-register-notices-1/3299-0694-aj28-published-7-19-2023/file

*******

 

Fines and Penalties

 

July 6, 2023: The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the filing of a forfeiture complaint against over 9,000 rifles, 284 machine guns, approximately 194 rocket launchers, over 70 anti-tank guided missiles, and over 700,000 rounds of ammunition that the U.S. Navy seized in transit from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to militant groups in Yemen. According to court documents, the noted weapons came from four interdictions of stateless DHOW vessels: two from 2021 and two from 2023.

These interdictions led to the discovery and seizure of four large caches of conventional weapons, including long arms and anti-tank missiles, and related munitions – all of which were determined to be primarily of either Iranian, Chinese, or Russian origin. This action follows the government’s March 2023 forfeiture action against over one million rounds of ammunition in route from Iran to Yemen. The network for both actions was involved in the illicit trafficking of advanced conventional weapons systems and components by sanctioned Iranian entities that directly support military action by the Houthi movement in Yemen and the Iranian regime’s campaign of terrorist activities throughout the region. The forfeiture complaint alleges a sophisticated scheme by the IRGC to clandestinely ship weapons to entities that pose grave threats to U.S. national security. This forfeiture action is a product of the U.S. government’s coordinated effort to enforce U.S. sanctions against the IRGC and the Iranian regime and are merely allegations.

Office of Public Affairs | United States Files Forfeiture Action Against Over Nine Thousand Rifles and Over 700,000 Rounds of Ammunition Enroute from Iran to Yemen | United States Department of Justice

 

*******

 

July 7, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced that Jaeyoun Jung of Puyallup, Washington, has agreed to a denial of his export privileges for two years, with such denial suspended during a two-year probationary period and thereafter waived, and to attend export compliance training within twelve months, to settle charges that he committed one violation of EAR § 764.2(a) - Engaging in Prohibited Conduct.

 

Specifically, on one occasion on or about October 3, 2018, Jung exported from the United States to South Korea optical magnifiers (the "items") without the BIS license required by EAR § 742.7. At all times pertinent to the transaction at issue, these items were subject to the EAR, classified on the Commerce Control List (the "CCL") under Export Control Classification Number ("ECCN") 0A987.e, and controlled for Crime Control ("CC") reasons. The items were valued in total at approximately $10,947. Jung ordered the items from a supplier located in Auburn, Washington. U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers seized the items.

 

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1537-e2875/file

 

*******

 

July 10, 2023: The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the unsealing of an eight-count Indictment charging Gal Luft with offenses related to willfully failing to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”), arms trafficking, Iranian sanctions violations, and making false statements to federal agents. Luft, a dual U.S.-Israeli citizen, was indicted on November 1, 2022, and arrested on February 17, 2023, in the Republic of Cyprus based on the charges in the Indictment. Luft subsequently fled after being released on bail while extradition proceedings were pending and remains a fugitive.

According to the allegations contained in the Indictment, other filings, public information, and statements made during court proceedings; Luft conspired with others in an effort to act within the United States to advance the interests of the People’s Republic of China (“China”) as agents of China-based principals, without registering as foreign agents as required under U.S. law. As part of this scheme, while serving as the co-director of a Maryland-based non-profit think tank, Luft agreed to covertly recruit and pay, on behalf of principals based in China, a former high-ranking U.S. Government official (“Individual-1”), including in 2016 while the former official was an adviser to the then-President-elect, to publicly support certain policies with respect to China without Luft or Individual-1 filing a registration statement as an agent of a foreign principal with the Attorney General of the United States, in violation of FARA.

Additionally, Luft conspired with others and attempted to broker illicit arms transactions with, among others, certain Chinese individuals and entities. In his role as a broker or middleman, Luft worked to find both buyers and sellers of certain weapons and other materials, without a license to do so as required under U.S. law, in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. Among other things, Luft worked to broker a deal for Chinese companies to sell certain weapons to Libya, including anti-tank launchers, grenade launchers, and mortar rounds. Luft also worked to broker deals for certain weapons to be sold to the United Arab Emirates, including aerial bombs and rockets. Luft further worked to broker deals for certain weapons to be sold by a Chinese company to Kenya, including unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs”) – and specifically “strike” UAVs.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/us-attorney-announces-charges-against-co-director-think-tank-acting-unregistered

 

*******

 

July 11, 2023: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Investigations (ICE) announced that Cesar Ignacio Perez-Barrios, 48, of Mexico, who is a former law enforcement officer, has been sentenced to 46 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release for his involvement in firearms smuggling as a result of an HSI investigation. Perez-Barrios was also ordered to pay a $100 special assessment. Perez-Barrios pleaded guilty to smuggling goods from the United States. On April 28, 2019, Perez-Barrios knowingly attempted to smuggle from the United States into Mexico: five AR-style upper receivers; five AR-style lower receivers; five AR-style barrels; five AR-style buffer tubes; five trigger kits; and five AR-style pistol grips. Perez-Barrios concealed these items in a vehicle a co-conspirator drove while attempting to exit the United States into Mexico. Perez-Barrios expected to be paid for his role in the operation intended to illegally smuggle the firearm parts into Mexico from the United States. Perez-Barrios arranged the transportation of the firearm parts, which are prohibited to export from the United States into Mexico without a valid license. Neither Perez-Barrios nor any of his associates had a valid license or any other lawful authority to export the items to Mexico.

HSI Nogales case results in a man sentenced for conspiracy to smuggle firearms from the US | ICE

 

*******

 

July 14, 2023: The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) arraigned defendant Vadim Konoshchenok, who allegedly smuggled dual-use technologies and ammunition from U.S. companies for Russia’s defense sector. The indictment chared him with conspiracy and other charges related to a global procurement and money laundering network on behalf of the Russian government.  Konoshchenok, a Russian citizen with alleged ties to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), was arrested in Estonia on a provisional arrest warrant issued from the Eastern District of New York and extradited from Estonia to the United States on July 13, 2023.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/suspected-russian-intelligence-operative-extradited-estonia-face-charges-related

*******

 

*******

 

July 14, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced that Profense LLC (Profense), a manufacturer of defense weapon systems located in Phoenix, AZ, has agreed to pay a civil penalty of $48,500 and B.E. Meyers & Co., Inc. (Meyers), a defense contractor in Redmond, Washington, has agreed to pay a civil penalty of $44,750 to resolve violations of the anti-boycott regulations set forth at EAR Part 760. As part of the settlements with BIS, both Profense and Meyers admitted to the conduct set forth in the Proposed Charging Letters, which alleged violations involving the furnishing of information by U.S. persons about their business relationships with boycotted countries or blacklisted persons and the failure to report the receipt of requests to take action in support of a foreign boycott of a country friendly to the United States. Specifically, both Profense and Meyers participated in a trade show in Bahrain in 2019. In connection with the shipment of products (goods) for display at the trade show, each company furnished to its freight forwarder a commercial invoice/packing list certifying that the goods were not of Israeli origin and not manufactured by a company on the “Israeli Boycott Blacklist.” A “blacklist” in this context is a boycott-based list of persons with whom a boycotting country requires U.S. Persons to refuse to do business (see Section 760.2(a)(4) of the EAR). Furnishing such information is prohibited by Section 760.2(d) of the EAR. In addition, both companies failed to report to BIS the receipt of the request to furnish such information as required by Section 760.5 of the EAR. The antiboycott provisions set forth in Part 760 of the EAR discourage, and in certain circumstances prohibit, U.S. persons from taking certain actions in furtherance or support of a boycott maintained by a foreign country against a country friendly to the United States (i.e., an unsanctioned foreign boycott). In addition, U.S. persons must report to OAC their receipt of certain boycott-related requests, whether or not they intend to comply with them. Reports may be filed electronically or by mail on form BIS-621P for single transactions or on form BIS-6051P for multiple transactions involving boycott requests received in the same calendar quarter.

 

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3296-2023-07-13-antiboycott-penalties/file

 

*******

 

July 14, 2023: The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that Vadim Konoshchenok, 48, of Tallinn, Estonia, with alleged ties to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) has been charged with conspiracy and other charges related to a global procurement and money laundering network on behalf of the Russian government. Konoshchenok was arrested in Estonia on a provisional arrest warrant issued from the Eastern District of New York and extradited from Estonia to the United States on July 13. According to the indictment and court filings, Konoshchenok and his co-defendants were affiliated with Serniya Engineering and Sertal LLC (the Serniya Network), Moscow-based companies that operate under the direction of Russian intelligence services to procure advanced electronics and sophisticated testing equipment for Russia’s military-industrial complex and research and development sector, some of which can be used in the development of nuclear and hypersonic weapons, quantum computing and other military applications.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Department of Commerce (DOC) Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) levied sanctions against Serniya, Sertal, and several individuals and companies engaged in the scheme, calling them “instrumental to the Russian Federation’s war machine.” As alleged in the indictment, the Serniya Network was licensed to conduct highly sensitive and classified procurement activities by Russia’s FSB, Russia’s principal security agency and the main successor agency to the Soviet Union’s KGB. According to court documents, in electronic communications, Konoshchenok explicitly identified himself as an FSB “Colonel” and enclosed a photograph of himself wearing his FSB uniform. Additionally, a review of electronic communications equipment recovered from Konoshchenok revealed saved contacts beginning with the prefix “FSB” and email addresses from “FSB[.]ru” domains. One of Konoshchenok’s calendar entries referenced an “FSB order.”

As described in the indictment, Estonia was a popular transshipment point, where Konoshchenok would smuggle U.S.-origin items across the border into Russia. On Oct. 27, 2022, Konoshchenok was detained by Estonian authorities while attempting to cross into Russia from Estonia with approximately 35 different types of semiconductors and electronic components, including several U.S.-origin and export-controlled items. Konoshchenok has also been repeatedly stopped by Estonian border officials attempting to smuggle hundreds of thousands of American-made and export-controlled rounds into Russia, including 6.5 mm, 7 mm, .338, and .308 magnum rounds, which are commonly used by snipers, as well as military-grade .223 rounds. Konoshchenok used an Estonian front company called Stonebridge Resources and communicated frequently with other co-conspirators about sourcing, transporting, and paying for controlled items. In electronic communications, Konoshchenok is clear that his fee is “10%” because he “can’t do less. Sanctions . . . Sanction item for 10%.” To date, over half a ton of military-grade ammunition linked to Konoshchenok has been recovered or interdicted before being smuggled into Russia. DOJ's Task Force KleptoCapture, an interagency law enforcement task force dedicated to enforcing the sweeping sanctions, export restrictions, and economic countermeasures that the United States has imposed, along with its allies and partners, in response to Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine, coordinated this case.

Office of Public Affairs | Suspected Russian Intelligence Operative Extradited from Estonia to Face Charges Related to Providing American-Made Electronics and Ammunition to Russian Military | United States Department of Justice

 

*******

 

July 17, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued Orders denying export privileges to the following two individuals:

  • Tyler James Sumlin - Until September 11. 2026 - On September 11, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Florida, Tyler James Sumlin (“Sumlin”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a). Specifically, Sumlin was convicted of attempting to smuggle from the United States. to Mexico firearms, namely silencers, a short-barreled rifle, and a destructive device. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Sumlin to five years of probation, a $100 assessment, and a $150 criminal fine.
  • Victor Thomas Diaz, III - Until April 18, 2032 - On April 18, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Victor Thomas Diaz, III (“Diaz”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371. Specifically, Diaz was convicted of conspiring to knowingly, intentionally, and willfully engage in the business of dealing firearms without a license. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Diaz to 24 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, and a $200 assessment.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1540-e2876/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1541-e2877/file

 

 

*******

July 21, 2023: Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation has agreed to pay the United States $377,453,150 to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by improperly billing commercial and international costs to its government contracts. Booz Allen, which is headquartered in McLean, Virginia, provides a range of management, consulting, and engineering services to the government, as well as commercial and international customers.

Under government contracting rules, there must be a nexus between the costs charged to a government contract and the objective of the contract. Thus, a contractor may charge to a government contract costs directly related to that contract, as well as indirect costs that benefit multiple contracts including the government contract. A contractor may not charge costs to a government contract, however, that have no relationship to that contract. This prohibition prevents government contractors from using taxpayer funds to subsidize non-government related work.

The settlement resolves allegations that from approximately 2011 to 2021, Booz Allen improperly charged costs to its government contracts and subcontracts that instead should have been billed to its commercial and international contracts. In particular, the government alleged that Booz Allen improperly allocated indirect costs associated with its commercial and international business to its government contracts and subcontracts that either had no relationship to those contracts and subcontracts or were allocated to those contracts and subcontracts in disproportionate amounts. The government further alleged that Booz Allen failed to disclose to the government the methods by which it accounted for costs supporting its commercial and international businesses. As a result, Booz Allen obtained reimbursement from the government for the costs of commercial activities that provided no benefit to the United States.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/booz-allen-agrees-pay-37745-million-settle-false-claims-act-allegations

*******

 

July 25, 2023: The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that Behrouz Mokhtari, 72, of McLean, Virginia, has been sentenced to 41 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release for violating U.S. sanctions against Iran by conspiring to engage in prohibited business activities on behalf of persons and entities in Iran. In addition, Mokhtari was ordered to forfeit approximately $2,862,598 in proceeds derived from his criminal activity as well as a residence he purchased in Campbell, California, for over $1.5 million using such proceeds. Mokhtari pleaded guilty earlier this year in the District of Maryland to two counts of conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economics Power ACT (IEEPA). According to court documents, Mokhtari engaged in a conspiracy lasting from at least March 2018 until at least September 2020, in which he conducted numerous business activities on behalf of Iranian entities without first obtaining the required licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

In a separate conspiracy lasting from about February 2013 until at least June 2017, Mokhtari and a number of Iranian nationals agreed to conduct illicit shipments of petrochemical products to and from Iran­, utilizing his front company, East & West Shipping Inc., in Panama to do so. Mokhtari held management positions and/or maintained ownership control of numerous businesses in Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), collectively referred to as “the FSR Network.” Using the FSR Network, he and his co-conspirators illegally provided services to Iranian entities, such as the refinement and transport of petrochemical products. Mokhtari and his co-conspirators used FSR Network bank accounts in the UAE, including Bitubiz FZE, to process these U.S. dollar transactions. Mokhtari admitted that he knew that, as a U.S. citizen, engaging in business with Iranian entities without first obtaining a license or permission from OFAC is prohibited. He further knew that it was illegal to engage in transactions intended to evade Iranian sanctions or to engage in transactions related to goods and services of Iranian origin or export.

Office of Public Affairs | Virginia Man Sentenced to Federal Prison for Conspiring to Violate Iranian Sanctions | United States Department of Justice

 

*******

 

July 26, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an Order renewing the temporary denial of export privileges of Empresa de Transporte Aéreocargo del Sur, S.A. ) a/k/a Aerocargo del Sur Transportation Company ) a/k/a EMTRASUR in Caracas, Venezuela. The initial TDO, issued on August 2, 2022, was based on evidence that EMTRASUR engaged in conduct prohibited by a TDO that had been previously issued against Iranian airline Mahan Air a/k/a Mahan Airlines a/k/a Mahan Airways (“Mahan Air”) and the Regulations when EMTRASUR, through its parent company, acquired custody and/or control from Mahan Air of a U.S-origin Boeing 747 aircraft bearing manufacturer’s serial number 23413 (“MSN 23413”), an item subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991, in or around October 2021.6 Moreover, the initial TDO, issued on August 2, 2022, was also based on evidence that EMTRASUR had continued to use MSN 23413 on flights into Iran and Russia in violation of General Prohibition 10, which (among other restrictions) prohibits the continued use of an item that was known to have been exported or reexported in violation of the EAR. As also noted in OEE’s initial request, MSN 23413 was detained by Argentinian authorities on or about June 8, 2022, where it presently remains. On or about August 2, 2022, the United States Department of Justice transmitted a request to Argentinian authorities for the seizure of MSN 23413 following the unsealing of a seizure warrant in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1542-e2878/file

 

New FD Associates, Inc. Workshops Announced:

Upcoming workshops 2023:

 

September 18-21, 2023 ITAR FUNdamentals
October 17, 2023 ITAR for the Empowered Official
November 16, 2023 ITAR for the Empowered Official
December 12-13, 2023 ITAR Compliance Programs

 

See our website or contact FD @ info@fdassociates.net or 703-847-5801.

 

JULY 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES Read More »

JUNE 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES

The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

REGULATORY UPDATES

The President

President Biden Continues The National Emergency With Respect To Belarus

June 14, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 39109: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for one year the national emergency with respect to Belarus declared in Executive Order 13405 of June 16, 2006, as expanded in scope by Executive Order No. 14038 of August 9, 2021.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/06/14/2023-12873/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-belarus

President Biden Continues The National Emergency With Respect To The Western Balkans

June 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 40683: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for one year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13219 of June 26, 2001, which was expanded in scope in Executive Order 14033, with respect to the Western Balkans.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/06/22/2023-13424/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-the-western-balkans

*******

President Biden Continues The National Emergency With Respect To North Korea

June 22, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 40681: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for one year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13466 of June 26, 2008, expanded in scope in Executive Order 13551 of August 30, 2010, addressed further in Executive Order 13570 of April 18, 2021, further expanded in scope in Executive Order 13687 of January 2, 2015, and under which additional steps were taken in Executive Order 13722 of March 15, 2016, and Executive Order 13810 of September 20, 2017, with respect to North Korea.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/06/22/2023-13420/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-north-korea

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

June 2 through 28, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at  

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Change in address for umlaut Consulting Engineering, S.L., Vía de los poblados 1, Parque Empresarial Alvento, 28033 Madrid, Spain to calle Dulce Chacón 55, 7a Planta, 28050 Madrid, Spain.
  • Change in name for Toshiba Electronics Engineering Corporation, Toshiba Electronic Systems Corporation, and Toshiba Electro-Wave Components Co., Ltd. to Toshiba Electronic Technologies Corporation due to merger.
  • Change in name and address for General Electric International, Inc., Explora Business Centre Stodulky, Praha 5, 158 00, Czech Republic to GE Aviation Czech s.r.o., Beranovych 65, Praha 9, 199 02, Czech Republic, and all locations in the Czech Republic due to reorganization.
  • Change in name and address for General Electric International, Inc., Rond Point Schuman 204, Brussels 1040, Belgium, to GE Europe NV, Rond Point Schuman 2-4, Brussels 1040, Belgium, and all locations in Belgium due to reorganization.
  • Change in name for Altran Deutschland S.A.S. & Co. KG to Capgemini Engineering Deutschland S.A.S. & Co. KG due to acquisition.
  • Change in name and address for Pennine Tools Aerospace Ltd., Unit 1, Ravenscroft Business Park, Jackdaw Road, Barnoldswick, Lancashire BB18 6DX, United Kingdom to Buoyancy Aerospace V1 Ltd. (dba Buoyancy Aerospace), Jackdaw Road, Barnoldswick, Lancashire BB18 6DX, United Kingdom due to merger.
  • Change in name and address for General Electric International, Inc., 204 Rond-Point du Pont de Sevres, Citylights, Boulogne-Billancourt 92100, France to GE Aviation Systems France SARL, 17 Avenue Didier Daurat Immeuble Socrate, Blagnac 31700, France, and all locations in France, due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in name for General Electric International, Inc. (Netherlands Operations) to GE Aviation Netherlands B.V. due to reorganization.
  • Change in name for General Electric International, Inc. (Ireland Operations) to GE Management Services Ireland Limited due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in Name for General Electric Company Polska Sp. z.o.o. to GE Aerospace Poland Sp. z.o.o. due to corporate reorganization.
  • Change in Address for Agile Space Industries, Inc., from 1334 Airport Rd., Durango, CO 81303, to 1514 Main Ave., Durango, CO 81301.
  • Change in Name for SPX Corporation to SPX Technologies, Inc.

*******

The Directorate Of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Updates Two Open General Licenses Issued in July 2022, Extending the Validity by Three Years

June 1, 2023: 33 FR 35992: The Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) published a notice in the Federal Register to inform the public that it published two updated open general licenses, which extend the validity period by two years. The update also addresses ITAR citations changed by the rewrite of Part 120 in the Fall of 2020.

Federal Register:: International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Reissuance and Update of Open General Licenses 1 and 2

*******

The Department of State Deploys New Renewal Fee Details Function In DECCS

June 26, 2023:  The Department of State’s IT Modernization Team will deploy the new “Renewal Fee Details” functionality to the DECCS Registration application. This feature will be visible to Registration application users who fulfill the following criteria:

  • 90 days or fewer remaining prior to the Registration expiration date;
  • Organization is subject to a Tier 2 or Tier 3 registration renewal fee**; and
  • Organization has at minimum one or more licenses “Approved” or “Approved with Provisos” in the twelve-month window ending 90 days before Registration expiration.

Registration tiers are based on the number of license applications submitted by the registrant. Tier 1 registrants are those submitting an initial registration application, registrants who have not submitted any license applications during the preceding 12 months, and non-profit registrants. The set fee for Tier 1 registrants is $2,250. Tier 2 registrants are those renewing their registration who have submitted 1-10 license applications during the preceding 12 months. The set fee for Tier 2 registrants is $2,750. Tier 3 registrants are those renewing their registration who have submitted more than ten license applications during the preceding 12 months. The fee for Tier 3 registrations is based at $2,750 and increases by $250 for every license application after the 10th application.

Provided the above criteria are met, users will see a new “Renewal Fee Details” button in their Registration dashboard when there are 90 days or less before the expiration date. Selecting this button will display a pop-up window featuring additional details and information on how the renewal fee was calculated. Users will now be able to see the following information consolidated into the new Renewal Fee Details window:

  • Registration expiration date;
  • License Period “Start” and “End” dates;
    • Any licenses which were either “Approved” or “Approved with Provisos” within this date range were incorporated in the calculation of renewal fees;
  • Number of Licenses;
    • Any licenses which were “Returned Without Action” (RWA) will not be included in the calculation of renewal fees;
    • DS-4294 & DS-6004 licenses are not included in the calculation of renewal fees;
  • Total License Value;
  • 3% of Total License Value Reduced Fee (Tier 3 Renewals Only)**;
    • The 3% of Total License Value Reduced Fee field is provided only for calculation purposes and will not be applicable to all organizations. Please see the “Payment of Registration” website page to determine your organization’s renewal fee tier and discount fee eligibility; and
  • Renewal Fee Charged By DDTC.

Within this pop-up window, users will be presented with a “Download Licenses” button which generates a .csv file of all licenses considered when calculating the renewal fee charged by DDTC. This .csv file will include the case number, license type, approval date, and license value of all licenses “Approved” or “Approved with Provisos” within the license period date range that were used in the calculation of the renewal fee.

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events

*******

Department of Defense

The Netherlands – MK 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS)

June 2, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the Netherlands of MK 41 Vertical Launching Systems (VLS) Baseline (B/L) VII Strike Length Launcher Modules (either system or standalone) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $110 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Government of the Netherlands has requested a possible purchase of eight (8) eight-cell MK 41 Vertical Launching Systems (VLS) Baseline (B/L) VII Strike Length Launcher Modules (either system or standalone). Also included are spare parts; handling equipment; transportation test and support equipment; software; engineering/technical assistance; personnel training and training equipment; documentation, publications, and technical data; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated program cost is $110 million.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a NATO ally that is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. It is vital to the U.S. national interest to assist the Netherlands in developing and maintaining a strong and ready self-defense capability.

The proposed sale will provide a defensive capability for the Netherlands while enhancing interoperability with the U.S. and other allied forces. The Royal Netherlands Navy intends to use the MK 41 VLS Baseline (B/L) VII strike-length launcher modules for their new ship class. These modules are intended for ESSM BLK1 and SM-2 capabilities in support of ongoing and emergent operational needs. The Netherlands has previously purchased MK 41 VLS capability and actively uses it on their current ship classes. The Netherlands will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and support into its armed forces. The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractor will be Lockheed Martin Corporation, Bethesda, MD. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of the proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the Netherlands. However, U.S. Government or contractor personnel in-country visits will be required on a temporary basis in conjunction with program technical oversight and support requirements. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

The Netherlands – MK 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS) | Defense Security Cooperation Agency (dsca.mil)

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To The Netherlands

June 2, 2023: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has notified Congress that the Government of the Netherlands has requested a possible purchase of eight (8) eight-cell MK 41 Vertical Launching Systems (VLS) Baseline (B/L) VII Strike Length Launcher Modules (either system or standalone). Also included are spare parts; handling equipment; transportation test and support equipment; software; engineering/technical assistance; personnel training and training equipment; documentation, publications, and technical data; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated program cost is $110 million. The prime contractor will be Lockheed Martin Corporation, Bethesda, MD. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/netherlands-mk-41-vertical-launching-system-vls

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To France

June 13, 2023: The Government of France has requested to buy additional non-MDE E-2C Hawkeye sustainment items and services that will be added to a previously implemented case. The original FMS case, valued at $99.6 million, included E-2C Hawkeye sustainment support. Therefore, this notification is for E-2C Hawkeye sustainment support to include an Engine Component Improvement Program (CIP); software updates; technical publications; U.S. Government and contractor technical/product support/assistance; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $160 million. The principal U.S. contractor will be Northrop Grumman, Melbourne, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/france-e-2c-hawkeye-sustainment-support

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Kuwait

June 13, 2023: The Government of Kuwait has requested the continuation of contractor-provided engineering technical services; contractor maintenance services; Hush House (an enclosed, noise-suppressed aircraft jet engine testing facility) support services; and Liaison Office Support for the Government of Kuwait’s F/A-18 C/D/E/F program, to include: F/A-18 avionics software upgrades; engine component improvements; ground support equipment; engine and aircraft spares and repair parts; publications and technical documentation; Engineering Change Proposals (ECP); U.S. Government and contractor programmatic, financial, and logistics support; maintenance and engineering support; F404/F414 engine and engine test cell support; and other related elements of logistical and program support. This proposed sale will provide follow-on sustainment support to Kuwait’s F/A-18C/D/E/F aircraft. The estimated cost is $1.8 billion. The principal contractors will be Sigmatech, Inc., Huntsville, AL; Kay and Associates, Inc., Buffalo Grove, IL; Kellogg, Brown, and Root, Houston, TX; L3 Technologies, Melbourne, FL; The Boeing Company, St. Louis, MO; General Electric, Lynn, MA; Industrial Financial Services, Ottawa, ON; and Lockheed Martin, Orlando, FL. Additional principal contractors will be determined by a competitive contractual award process. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kuwait-follow-technical-support

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Spain

June 14, 2023: The Government of Spain has requested to buy an additional one hundred fifty-three (153) M982A1 Excalibur tactical projectiles that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original FMS case, valued at $21.87 million, included one hundred eighteen (118) M982A1 Excalibur tactical projectiles. This notification is for a combined total of two hundred seventy-one (271) M982A1 Excalibur tactical projectiles. Also included is a portable electronic Fire Control System (FCS); Improved Platform Integration Kit; Propelling Charge Modular Artillery Charge System; Simple Key Loaders (SKL); crypto cable; training aids; technical data; U.S. Government technical assistance; transportation; Excalibur spare parts; artillery cleaning sections; new equipment training; repair and return support equipment; support related to collateral damage estimation tables; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated cost is $48.2 million. The principal contractor will be Raytheon Company Missile Systems, McAlester, OK. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this sale will not require the assignment of any U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Spain.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/spain-excalibur-projectiles

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To The Netherlands

June 16, 2023: The Government of the Netherlands has requested to buy up to four (4) MQ-9A Block 5 aircraft; up to three (3) UAV MQ-9 Mobile Ground Control Systems (MGCS); up to thirty (30) Embedded Global Positioning Systems/Internal Navigation Systems (EGI) devices, Airborne, with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) or M-Code; up to eight (8) AN/DAS-4 Multi-Spectral Targeting Systems; and up to twenty (20) Lynx AN/APY-8 Synthetic Aperture Radars. Also included are Reaper Engines; Selex Seaspray Synthetic Aperture Radars; SeaVue Maritime Radars; M299 Hellfire Longbow missile launchers; AN/ARC-210 radios; Line-of-Site (LOS) Ground Data Terminals; Ruggedized Aircraft Maintenance Test Stations (RAMTS); AN/APX-119 and other Identification Friend or Foe transponders; KIV-77 Cryptographic Appliques; KY-100M narrowband/wideband terminals; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; satellite communications earth terminal subsystems (SETSS); spare parts, consumables, and accessories and repair and return support; secure communication equipment and cryptographic devices; major/minor modifications, maintenance, and maintenance support; munitions support and support equipment; unclassified software delivery and support; transportation support; unclassified publications and technical documentation; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistic and program support. The estimated total cost is $611 million. The principal contractor will be General Atomics-Aeronautical Systems, Poway, CA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/netherlands-mq-9a-block-5-aircraft

*******

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Canada

June 27, 2023: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has notified Congress that the Government of Canada has requested to buy up to sixteen (16) P-8A Patrol Aircraft; up to twenty-six (26) Multifunctional Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio System 5 (MIDS JTRS 5); up to thirty-eight (38) Embedded Global Positioning Systems (GPS)/Inertial Navigation Systems (EGIs) for the LN-251; up to twenty-five (25) System Processor Replacements for AN/AAQ-24(V)N Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) System Processor Replacement (LSPR) with Exelis Embedded GPS Receiver (EGR) integrated with SAASM; and up to twenty-two (22) Guardian Laser Transmitter Assemblies (GLTA) for the AN/AAQ-24(V)N. Also included are commercial engines; Tactical Open Mission Software (TOMS); Electro-Optical (EO) and Infrared (IR) MX-20HD; AN/AAQ-2 Acoustic System; AN/APY-10 Radar; AN/ALQ-240 Electronic Support Measures; NexGen Missile Warning Sensors; AN/ARC-210 RT-2036(C) Radios; AN/PRC-117G Manpack Radios including MPE-S type II with SAASM 3.7; AN/ALQ-213 Electronic Countermeasures; AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispenser Systems; AN/UPX-43 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Interrogators; AN/APX-123A(V) IFF Digital Transponders; KIV-78 IFF Mode 4/5 Cryptographic Appliques; KIV-701A Cryptographic Core Modules; KY-100M, KY-58, KYV-5 for HF-121C radios; KG-175 Encryptor Network Convergence System; AN/PYQ-10 V3 Simple Key Loaders (SKL) with KOV-21 Cryptographic Appliques; Radiant Mercury Hardware and Software with ENTR(V)4 Receiver with Embedded Crypto for the Integrated Broadcast System (IBS); software; publications; Dual KIV-7M with Power Supply HFIP Channel Link Encryptor; Advanced Digital Antenna Production (ADAP) Antenna Electronics (AE); Advanced Digital Antenna Production (ADAP) Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPA); Control Interface Units (CIU) for AN/AAQ-24(V)N LAIRCM; aircraft spares; spare engines; support equipment; operational support systems; training; training devices; maintenance trainer/classrooms; engineering technical assistance (ETA); logistics technical assistance (LTA); Country Liaison Officer (CLO) support; Contractor Engineering Technical Services (CETS); Contractor Logistics Support (CLS); repair and return; transportation; aircraft ferry; other associated training and support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $5.9 billion. The prime contractor will be The Boeing Company, Seattle, WA. There are a significant number of other companies under contract with the U.S. Navy that will provide components, systems, and engineering services during the execution of this effort. While the purchaser typically requests offsets, any offset agreement will be defined in future negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor(s).

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/canada-p-8a-aircraft

*******

The Department of Defense (DoD) Makes Recommendations To Improve And Accelerate To FMS Process

June 13, 2023: The Department of Defense (DoD) approved a tasking memo from the DoD Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Tiger Team that highlights six key FMS pressure points and directs the implementation of recommendations to improve and accelerate the Department’s institutional processes to execute FMS cases. The efforts of the Tiger Team and the Department’s commitment to improving the FMS system advance the direction of the 2022 National Defense Strategy to break down barriers to working with allies and partners.

The Tiger Team analyzed representative case studies at all phases of the FMS process, illuminated best practices to benchmark, and identified systemic challenges endemic in DoD’s FMS ecosystem. The team reviewed the findings of historical reform efforts and also solicited and incorporated feedback from allies and partner nations, and the U.S. industry on ways to improve the efficiency of DoD’s implementation of the FMS process.

The FMS-implementing agencies were instructed to:

  • Improve the Department’s understanding of ally and partner requirements. To accelerate discussions with allies and partner nations about FMS requirements and reduce delays during the FMS case lifecycle, the Department will change the way it organizes, trains, and equips for security cooperation, including by establishing a Defense Security Cooperation Service on par with the Defense Attaché Service;
  • Enable efficient reviews for the release of technology. To reduce barriers to the export of key capabilities, the Department will review and update relevant policies and empower accountable officials to improve the efficiency of the review and release of technology to allies and partner nations. The Department will also continue to support interagency efforts focused on technology review and release;
  • Provide allies and partner nations with relevant priority capabilities. To better enable allies and partner nations to support their own national security needs, the Department of Defense will develop a methodology to facilitate Non-Programs of Record;
  • Accelerate acquisition and contracting support. To advance FMS acquisition prioritization and award timelines for allies and partner nations, the Department will establish contract award standards and metrics as well as develop associated process maps to monitor the FMS prioritization and award process;
  • Expand Defense Industrial Base (DIB) capacity. To reduce production timelines, the Department will incorporate ally and partner requirements into ongoing efforts to expand DIB production capacity. This will include developing a comprehensive study to incentivize DIB investment in production capacity and building surge capability for high-demand, low-supply platforms, systems, and services. The strategy will include the use of multi-year contracts; enhanced use of the Special Defense Acquisition Fund; five-year predictive analyses of partner demand; and sustained engagement with the DIB; and
  • Ensure broad U.S. Government support. Recognizing that DoD is part of the broader U.S. Government FMS ecosystem, the Department will work with the Department of State and other stakeholders, including Congress, to identify opportunities to improve the FMS process.

To implement these recommendations and ensure the elevation of emergent FMS issues to senior leadership, the Department established an FMS Continuous Process Improvement Board (CPIB), which will act as an enduring governance structure within the Department. The Board, which reports to the Secretary of Defense, will provide accountability in implementing the recommendations, measuring impact, and continually pursuing areas to improve the overall process.

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3425963/department-of-defense-unveils-comprehensive-recommendations-to-strengthen-forei/

*******

U.S. Census Bureau

Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages

June 21, 2023: To help the industry take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, below are two tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

Response Code:  303

Narrative:      Sold En Route Indicator Must be Y or N

Severity:        Fatal

Reason: The Party Type is identified as Ultimate Consignee, and the Sold En Route Indicator is not reported as Yes or No.

Resolution:  The Ultimate Consignee information must be reported on an EEI, including a valid Sold En Route Indicator. If the Ultimate Consignee is known and reported, set the Sold En Route Indicator to No. If the cargo is to be Sold En Route and the ultimate consignee is not known at the time of export, then set the Sold En Route Indicator to Yes.

Verify the Ultimate Consignee and the Sold En Route Indicator, correct the shipment, and resubmit.

Response Code:  331

Narrative:      Ultimate Consignee Country Unknown

Severity:        Fatal

Reason:         The Ultimate Consignee Country code reported is not valid in AES.

Resolution:  The Ultimate Consignee Country code must be a valid ISO Country code found in Appendix C – ISO Country Codes.

Verify the Ultimate Consignee Country code, correct the shipment, and resubmit.

*******

The Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury

The Department Of Commerce, The Department Of Justice, The Department Of State, And The Department Of The Treasury Issued Guidance To Industry On Iran’s UAV-Related Activities

June 9, 2023: The Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury issued guidance to industry on Iran’s UAV-Related activities. Iran’s procurement, development, and proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) is an increasing threat to international peace and security. The Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury are issuing this advisory to alert persons and businesses globally to the threat of Iran’s UAV-related activities and the need to take appropriate steps to avoid or prevent any activities that would support the further development of Iran’s UAV program.    The United States is committed to countering Iran’s UAV programs, including by preventing abuse of the U.S. financial system and disrupting the procurement of foreign-sourced components. It is critical that private industry be aware of its legal obligations vis-à-vis entities and items involved in such procurement efforts, given the potential applicability of U.S. export controls and sanctions. The intent of the advisory is to highlight effective due diligence policies, compliance structures, and internal controls relevant specifically to Iran’s UAV-related activities to ensure compliance with applicable legal requirements across the entire supply chain. The advisory is also designed to help prevent companies from contributing to Iran’s UAV programs, including via direct and indirect transfers to third-country suppliers, which may threaten the broader national and international security interests of the United States and its allies and partners.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931876/download?inline

*******

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

OFAC To Retire Its Public-Facing File Transfer Protocol (FTP) Server

June 9, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) will retire its public-facing file transfer protocol (FTP) server (ofacftp.treas.gov) on or about June 10, 2024. In order to comply with updated Treasury security policies, OFAC will retire the FTP capability associated with the file transfer protocol. OFAC is aware that many users utilize ofacftp.treas.gov to automate their sanctions list data downloads. OFAC will maintain this server for one additional calendar year to allow users sufficient time to develop automation that utilizes the list content hosted on the agency’s website at the following URLs listed below. Members of the public may contact OFAC at O_F_A_C@treasury.gov for technical support related to this decision.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230609_33

*******

The U.S. OFAC And UK’s OFSI Published A Joint Humanitarian Assistance And Food Security Fact Sheet 

June 28, 2023: In furtherance of the recent commitments by the United States and the United Kingdom to protect humanitarian activity from the unintended impacts of sanctions and in support of the enhanced partnership between the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and His Majesty’s Treasury’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI), OFAC and OFSI are publishing a joint Humanitarian Assistance and Food Security Fact Sheet to provide additional clarity on U.S. and UK Russia-related sanctions and the relevant authorizations, exceptions, and public guidance.

OFAC and OFSI continue to work together and with foreign partners to reduce the impacts of Russia’s war on global food supplies and prices and to address humanitarian concerns associated with sanctions.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230628 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931946/download?inline

*******

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines, and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

Sanctions

The U.S. Department of State:

June 12, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 38118: The U.S. Department of State has determined that the persons known as Maxamed Siidow (also known as Maxamed Siidow Sheikh Ibrahim), Cali Yare (also known as Ali Yare), Maxamed Dauud Gabaane (also known as Maxamed Daud Qaawane, Maxamed Daud, Mahamud Daud), Suleiman Cabdi Daoud (also known as Suleiman Daoud Goobe, Saleban Goobe, Saleeban Goobe), Mohamed Omar Mohamed (also known as Mohamed Omar Ma’alin, Maxamed Cumar Maxamed, Ma’d Umurow, Mohamed Omar Haji, Mohamed Haji Omar Mo’alin, Mohamed Omarow, Ibnu-Omar) are leaders of al-Shabaab, a group whose property and interests in property are currently blocked pursuant to a determination by the Secretary of State pursuant to E.O. 13224 and are designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/06/12/2023-12419/designation-of-maxamed-siidow-cali-yare-maxamed-dauud-gaabane-suleiman-cabdi-daoud-mohamed-omar

*******

June 15, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 39323: The U.S. Department of State published a notice of ten persons statutorily debarred for having been convicted of violating, or conspiring to violate, the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751, et seq.). This action, pursuant to section 127.7(b) of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) (22 CFR parts 120-130), highlights the Department’s responsibility to protect the integrity of U.S. defense trade. Pursuant to section 38(g)(4) of the AECA and section 127.7(b) and (c)(1) of the ITAR, the following persons, having been convicted in a U.S. District Court, are denied export privileges and are statutorily debarred as of the date of this notice (Name; Date of Judgment; Judicial District; Case No.; Month/Year of Birth):

  • Almendarez, Maria Guadalupe; May 10, 2022; Eastern District of Arkansas; 4:19–cr–00116; December 1980.
  • Bukey, Murat; a.k.a. Bukey, Murat; a.k.a. Murat, Recep; March 22, 2023; District of Columbia; 1:18–cr–00129; January 1971.
  • Cassidy, Kevin Jerome; September 13, 2022; District of Arizona; 2:18–cr– 01236; December 1959.
  • Hamade, Usama Darwich; a.k.a. Hamade, Prince Sam; July 22, 2020; District of Minnesota; 0:15–cr–00237; December 1964.
  • Pierson, Andrew Scott; April 29, 2022; Eastern District of Arkansas; 4:19– cr–00116; May 1975.
  • Radionov, Ihor; August 27, 2021; Middle District of Florida; 8:20–cr– 00308; January 1969.
  • Sery, Joe; September 19, 2022; Southern District of California; 3:21–cr– 02898; June 1944.
  • Ugur, Arif; December 16, 2022; District of Massachusetts; 1:21–cr– 10221; January 1969.
  • Veletanlic, Hany; January 27, 2020; Western District of Washington; 2:18– cr–00162; December 1983.
  • Wu, Tian Min; a.k.a. Wu, Bob; a.k.a. Wu, David; a.k.a. Sones, Graham; a.k.a. Wang, Edward; June 9, 2021; Central District of California; 2:17–cr–00081; April 1965.

At the end of the three-year period following the date of this notice, the above-named persons remain debarred unless a request for reinstatement from statutory debarment is approved by the Department of State.

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sysparm_referring_url=tear_off&view=true&sys_id=440cf1841befed50d1f1ea02f54bcbcf and https://www.state.gov/u-s-department-of-state-debars-ten-persons-for-violating-or-conspiring-to-violate-the-arms-export-control-act-2/

*******

June 28, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 41997: Acting under the authority of and in accordance with section 1(a)(ii)(B) of E.O. 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended by E.O. 13268 of July 2, 2002, E.O. 13284 of January 23, 2003, and E.O. 13886 of September 9, 2019, the Department of State determined that the persons known as Arkan Ahmad `Abbas al-Matuti (also known as Arkan Ahmad Abbas Albu-Mazida Albu-Miteuti, Arkan Ahmad `Abbas al-Mitiwiti, and Abu Sarhan) and Nawaf Ahmad Alwan al-Rashidi (also known as Qahtan Nawaf Ahmad Alwan Sada, Nawaf Ahmed Alwan, and Abu Faris) are leaders of ISIS, a group whose property and interests in property are currently blocked pursuant to a determination by the Secretary of State pursuant to E.O. 13224. Arkan Ahmad `Abbas al-Matuti and Nawaf Ahmad Alwan al-Rashidi are designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/06/28/2023-13703/designation-of-arkan-ahmad-abbas-al-matuti-and-nawaf-ahmad-alwan-al-rashidi-as-specially-designated

*******

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

June 6, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 37007: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has renewed the Order temporarily denying the export privileges of Quicksilver Manufacturing, Inc., Rapid Cut LLC, and U.S. Prototype, Inc., for an additional 180 days. OEE’s request for renewal is based upon the facts underlying the issuance of the initial TDO, as well as evidence developed over the continuing course of this investigation. The initial TDO, issued on June 7, 2022, was based on evidence that Respondents engaged in conduct prohibited by the Regulations by exporting or causing the export from the United States of technology controlled on national security and/or missile technology grounds to China for 3D printing without the required U.S. government authorization. In its November 10, 2022, request for renewal of the TDO, BIS submitted evidence that Respondents’ export compliance failures were broader in scope than the investigation initially revealed, as well as evidence related to new concerns raised by actions taken after the issuance of the June 7, 2022, TDO. Specifically, BIS’s evidence and further investigation identified additional U.S. companies that engaged in business with Respondents involving the unlicensed export of technical specifications to China related to firearm components (ECCN 0E501.a) and space-rated items (ECCN 9E515.a), both of which are controlled on national security and regional stability grounds, as well as numerous additional suspected export control-related violations between 2017 and 2022. BIS’s renewal request was also based upon concerns related to Respondents’ initial attempts at compliance following the issuance of the June 7, 2022, TDO, including the provision of potentially inaccurate information to customers about the scope of items subject to the Regulations. In its November 10, 2022, BIS also submitted evidence that a China-based individual, known to operate an @rapidcut.com email address to facilitate Rapid Cut’s business operations, may have violated the TDO shortly after its issuance by providing customer information on how to complete and fulfill pending orders, despite the issuance of the TDO. Such information included instructions to cancel existing Rapid Cut orders and reissue purchase orders to China Company No. 1 in an apparent attempt to avoid the restrictions of the TDO. The May 10, 2023, request for renewal of the December 5, 2022, TDO is also based on evidence related to the nature and scope of BIS’ continuing investigation. This includes the circumstances surrounding the access by China-based employees to Respondents’ email accounts, as detailed above, which remain under investigation. The renewal request is also based on evidence provided by additional U.S. companies that engaged in business with Respondents involving the unlicensed export of technical specifications to China, including information received as recently as April 2023. In sum, and as detailed in the renewal request, BIS’ investigation is ongoing, the entirety of Respondent’s misconduct remains unknown, and a final written disclosure of prior violations has not yet been submitted.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/06/06/2023-12067/quicksilver-manufacturing-inc-8209-market-st-a173-wilmington-nc-28411-rapid-cut-llc-8209-market-st

*******

June 7, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has renewed the Order temporarily denying the export privileges of Belavia Belarusian Airlines for an additional 180 days.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1523-e2861/file

*******

June 9, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an Order denying the export privileges of Thomas Harris on March 1, 2022, for ten years until March 1, 2032. Harris was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) for smuggling and attempting to smuggle 14 firearms from the United States to Saint Lucia. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Harris to 46 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, and a $1,500 assessment.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1525-e2863/file

*******

June 12, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 38739: The Department of Commerce amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 43 entities under 50 entries to the Entity List. These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States. These entries are listed on the Entity List under the destinations of China (31), Kenya (1), Laos (1), Malaysia (1), Pakistan (4), Singapore (1), South Africa (3), Thailand (1), the United Arab Emirates (5), and the United Kingdom (2). This rule also removes one entity from the Entity List under the destination of Latvia.

China:

  • Aviation Industry Corporation of China 612 Institute;
  • Aviation International Corporation of China International Simulation Technology Service Co., Ltd.;
  • Beijing China Aviation Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Beijing Iwintall Technology Co. Ltd.;
  • Beijing Luo Luo Technology Development Co., Ltd.;
  • Beijing Ryan Wende Science and Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Beijing Transemic Information Technology Ltd.;
  • Beijing Transemic Technology Ltd.;
  • Belt Consulting Co., Ltd.;
  • Changzhou Utek Composite Co., Ltd.;
  • Chengdu Poyotencon Technology;
  • China Taly Aviation Technologies Corporation;
  • Chinese Flight Test Establishment;
  • Enhance International Trade Limited;
  • Frontier Services Group Limited;
  • General Technology Limited;
  • Luoyang Institute of Science and Technology;
  • New Faith Enterprise Investment Limited;
  • Opturn Co., Ltd.;
  • Pera Global;
  • Qianpu Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Shanghai Aerospace Science and Technology Development Co., Ltd.;
  • Shanghai Breeze Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Shanghai Breeze Technology Jiangsu Co., Ltd.;
  • Shanghai Shark Sprite Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Shanghai Supercomputing Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • The Test Flying Academy of South Africa;
  • Tiger Force Electronics Limited;
  • United Vision Limited;
  • Universal Enterprise Limited; and
  • Xinjiang Kehua Hechang Biological Science and Technology Co., Ltd.

Kenya:

  • Frontier Services Group Limited.

Laos:

  • Frontier Services Group Limited.

Malaysia:

  • International Aerospace Asia.

Pakistan:

  • Affiliates International;
  • Akhtar and Sons Private Limited;
  • Imminent Engineering Co., Ltd.; and
  • Quantum Logix (Private) Limited.

Singapore:

  • International Aerospace Asia.

South Africa:

  • AVIC International Flight Training Academy;
  • Pearl Coral 1173 CC; and
  • The Test Flying Academy of South Africa.

Thailand:

  • International Aerospace Asia.

United Arab Emirates:

  • Frontier Services Group Limited;
  • TFASA Group FZCO;
  • TFASA Group Training;
  • TFASA Services FZCO; and
  • TFASA Training Limited.

United Kingdom

  • TFASA Group Limited; and
  • International Aerospace Asia.

Removal From the Entity List

The End-User Review Committee determined to remove Fiber Optic Solutions from the Entity List. This is based on information that BIS received pursuant to § 744.16(e) of the EAR and the review that the ERC conducted in accordance with procedures described in supplement no. 5 to part 744 of the EAR. Prior to removal from the Entity List by this rule, Fiber Optic Solutions was listed under Latvia.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/06/14/2023-12726/additions-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-removal-of-entity-from-the-entity-list

*******

June 15, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has renewed for 180 days Temporary Denial Orders (TDOs) against the following three Russian airlines for violations of license requirements it imposed in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine effective March 2, 2022, on any U.S.-origin aircraft or foreign aircraft that includes more than 25% controlled U.S.-origin content, and that is registered in, owned, or controlled by, or under charter or lease by Russia or a national of Russia, before such aircraft can travel to Russia:

  • Pobeda Airlines;
  • Nordwind Airlines and Pegas Touristik, a/k/a Pegas Touristik OOO;
  • Siberian Airlines d/b/a S7 Airlines.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1533-e2871/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1534-e2872/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1535-e2873/file

*******

June 21, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 40084: The Department of Commerce is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding an inadvertently omitted entity to the Entity List. This correcting amendment is effective June 16, 2023.

China:

  • China Aviation Development Harbin Bearing Co., Ltd.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/06/21/2023-13196/additions-of-entities-to-the-entity-list-and-removal-of-entity-from-the-entity-list-correction

*******

Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

BIS Removed Pegas Touristik from the Temporary Denial Order

June 28, 2023: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security removed Pegas Touristik from the Temporary Denial Order of Nordwin.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1536-e2874/file

*******

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

June 1, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Sudan General License Number 1, “Official Business of Certain International Organizations and Entities;” Sudan General License Number 2, “Certain Transactions in Support of Nongovernmental Organizations’ Activities;” Sudan General License Number 3 “Transactions Related to the Provision of Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, Medical Devices, Replacement Parts and Components, or Software Updates, and the Extraction, Processing, Transport, Sale, or Distribution of Water in Sudan;” and Sudan General License Number 4 “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Defense Industries System or Al Junaid Multi Activities Co Ltd.”

Sudan General License Number 1: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14098 that are for the conduct of the official business of the following entities by employees, grantees, or contractors thereof are authorized:   

(1) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA);

(2) The African Development Bank Group, the Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB Group), including any fund entity administered or established by any of the foregoing;

(3) The International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies;   

(4) The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance;   

(5) The African Union, including the African Union Commission and other subsidiary bodies and organs; and

(6) The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

This general license does not authorize funds transfers initiated or processed with knowledge or reason to know that the intended beneficiary of such transfers is a person blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098 other than for the purpose of effecting the payment of taxes, fees, or import duties, or the purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, or public utility services.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931821/download?inline

Sudan General License Number 2: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14098 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the activities described below by nongovernmental organizations are authorized, provided that the nongovernmental organization is not a person whose property or interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098.

The activities referenced above are non-commercial activities designed to directly benefit the civilian population that fall into one of the following categories:

(1) Activities to support humanitarian projects to meet basic human needs, including disaster, drought, and flood relief; food, nutrition, or medicine distribution; the provision of health services; assistance for vulnerable or displaced populations, including individuals with disabilities and the elderly; and environmental programs;

(2) Activities to support democracy building, including activities to support the rule of law, citizen participation, government accountability and transparency, human rights, and fundamental freedoms, access to information, and civil society development projects;

(3) Activities to support education, including combating illiteracy, increasing access to education, international exchanges, and assisting education reform projects;

(4) Activities to support non-commercial development projects directly benefitting civilians, including those related to health, food security, and water and sanitation;

(5) Activities to support environmental and natural resource protection, including the preservation and protection of threatened or endangered species, responsible and transparent management of natural resources, and the remediation of pollution or other environmental damage; and

(6) Activities to support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs and peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution programs.    

This general license does not authorize funds transfers initiated or processed with knowledge or reason to know that the intended beneficiary of such transfers is a person blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098 other than for the purpose of effecting the payment of taxes, fees, or import duties, or the purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, or public utility services.

Specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis to authorize nongovernmental or other entities to engage in other activities designed to directly benefit the civilian population, including support for the removal of landmines and economic development projects directly benefiting the civilian population.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931826/download?inline

Sudan General License Number 3: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14098 of May 4, 2023, that are related to the provision of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components for medical devices, or software updates for medical devices to Sudan or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to Sudan, are authorized.

All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14098 that are related to the extraction, processing, transport, sale, or distribution of water, including the maintenance or repair of water pipelines, are authorized.   

For the purposes of this general license, agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices are defined as follows:   

(1) Agricultural commodities. Agricultural commodities are products:   

(i) That fall within the term “agricultural commodity” as defined in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602); and    

(ii) That are intended for ultimate use in Sudan as (A) Food for humans (including raw, processed, and packaged foods; live animals; vitamins and minerals; food additives or supplements; and bottled drinking water) or animals (including animal feeds);   (B) Seeds for food crops; (C) Fertilizers or organic fertilizers; or (D) Reproductive materials (such as live animals, fertilized eggs, embryos, and semen) for the production of food animals.    

(2) Medicine. Medicine is an item that falls within the definition of the term “drug” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).   

(3) Medical devices. A medical device is an item that falls within the definition of “device” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931831/download?inline

Sudan General License Number 4: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14098 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of any transaction involving Defense Industries System, Al Junaid Multi Activities Co Ltd, or any entity in which Defense Industries System or Al Junaid Multi Activities Co Ltd owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, July 31, 2023, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account and reported to the Office of Foreign Assets Control consistent with § 501.603 of the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations, 31 CFR part 501.

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by E.O. 14098, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098 other than the blocked persons described in paragraph (a) of this general license, unless separately authorized.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931836/download?inline

OFAC also designated members and affiliates of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its external operations arm, the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), who have participated in a series of terrorist plots including assassination plots targeting former United States government officials, dual U.S. and Iranian nationals, and Iranian dissidents. This action targets three Iran- and Türkiye-based individuals and a company affiliated with the IRGC-QF, along with two senior officials of the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO), who have been involved in plotting external lethal operations against civilians, including journalists and activists.

OFAC also designated four companies generating revenue from, and contributing to, the conflict in Sudan. The entities designated are affiliated with the two embattled forces that are fueling the ongoing conflict in Sudan: two companies affiliated with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and two companies affiliated with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

In addition, the following changes have been made to OFAC’s list of Specially Designated Nationals:

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Hossein Hafez Amini of Iran
  • Mohammad Reza Ansari of Iran
  • Rouhollah Bazghandi of Iran
  • Shahram Poursafi of Syria
  • Reza Seraj of Iran

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Al Junaid Multi Activities Co Ltd of Sudan
  • Defense Industries System of Sudan
  • Rey Havacilik Ithalat Ihracat Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi, of Turkey
  • Sudan Master Technology of Sudan
  • Tradive General Trading L.L.C of The U.A.E.

The following deletions have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Alfa Nero (ZCTL4) Yacht 2,159GRT Cayman Islands flag of Russia

Counter Terrorism Designations; Sudan Designations; Russia-related Designation Removal; Issuance of Sudan General Licenses | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov) 

*******

June 2, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Iran-related General License P “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Navyan Abr Arvan Private Limited Company or Arvancloud Global Technologies L.L.C.”

In addition, the following changes have been made to OFAC’s list of Specially Designated Nationals:

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Farhad Fatemi of Iran.
  • Pouya Pirhosseinloo of Iran

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Arvancloud Global Technologies L.L.C. of The United Arab Emirates
  • Navyan Abr Arvan Private Limited Company of Iran

Iran-related Designations; Issuance of Iran-related General License | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov)

*******

June 5, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published four general licenses (GLs) issued pursuant to the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations: GLs 13E, 66, 67, and 68, each of which was previously made available on OFAC’s website.

Federal Register:: Publication of Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations Web General Licenses 13E, 66, 67, and 68

June 5, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published one Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions directive in the Federal Register. The directive, issued pursuant to an April 15, 2021, Executive Order, was previously made available on OFAC’s website.

Federal Register:: Publication of Directive 4 (as Amended) Under Executive Order 14024 of April 15, 2021

June 5, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated seven leading members of a Russian intelligence-linked malign influence group for their role in the government of the Russian Federation’s destabilization campaign and continued malign influence campaigns in Moldova. An entity owned or controlled by one of these individuals has also been designated.

These designations are part of an ongoing effort to combat Russia’s malign influence in Moldova. The U.S. government has previously exposed Russia’s attempts to use covert operatives to subvert democracy in Moldova. On October 26, 2022, OFAC sanctioned Yuriy Igorevich Gudilin, Olga Yurievna Grak, and Leonid Mikhailovich Gonin for their coordinated efforts in 2020 and 2021 to influence the outcome of Moldova’s elections. Additionally, on May 30, 2023, the EU sanctioned several Russian and Moldovan individuals for engaging in destabilizing activities against the government of Moldova. The U.S. government will continue to support the Moldovan government and people in their efforts to combat coercive activities that undermine democracy in Moldova.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Boyko, Svetlana Andreyevna of Russia;
  • Gromovikov, Vasiliy Viktorovich of Russia;
  • Khloponin, Gleb Maksimovich of Russia;
  • Losev, Aleksey Vyacheslavovich of Russia;
  • Makolov, Yury Yuryevich of Russia;
  • Sapozhnikov, Konstantin Prokopyevich of Russia; and
  • Travnikova, Anna of Russia.

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Perko Julleuchter of Russia.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1522 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230605

*******

June 6, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two senior members of the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) engaged in trafficking high-caliber firearms from the United States and fuel theft in Mexico. Additionally, OFAC designated another individual and one Mexican entity that provide support to CJNG by laundering illicit narcotics proceeds. CJNG is a violent Mexico-based drug trafficking organization responsible for a significant proportion of fentanyl, and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States.

OFAC also sanctioned a network of seven individuals and six entities in Iran, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Hong Kong in connection with Iran’s ballistic missile program. This network has conducted financial transactions and facilitated procurement of sensitive and critical parts and technology for key actors in Iran’s ballistic missile development, including Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and its affiliated organizations, Parchin Chemicals Industries (PCI), Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), Iran Electronics Industries (IEI), and P.B. Sadr, which is PCI’s key intermediary for the procurement of parts to develop missile propellant. PCI, the main beneficiary of this network, is a subsidiary of MODAFL’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and produces ammunition, explosives, and solid propellants for rockets and missiles. OFAC is also designating Iran’s Defense Attaché in Beijing, which has coordinated military-related procurements from the PRC for Iranian end-users, including MODAFL subsidiaries.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Damghani, Davoud of China and Iran;
  • Gong, Jiao of China;
  • Guerrero Covarrubias, Alonso of Mexico;
  • Guerrero Covarrubias, Javier of Mexico;
  • Haghighat, Ghasem of China and Iran;
  • Li, Zeming, Zhejiang of China;
  • Qin, Xutong, Ji Lin of China;
  • Rodriguez Aguirre, Mary Cruz of Mexico;
  • Shen, Weisheng, Zhejiang of China; and
  • Wei, Zunyi of China.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Beijing Shiny Nights Technology Development CO., LTD, of China;
  • Blue Calm Marine Services Company of Iran;
  • Hong Kong Ke.Do International Trade CO., LIMITED of China;
  • Lingoe Process Engineering Limited of China;
  • Nacer Agencia Panamericana De Divisas Y Centro Cambiario, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Qingdao Zhongrongtong Trade Development CO., LTD. of China; and
  • Zhejiang Qingji Ind. CO., LTD of China.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1523 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1524 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230606

*******

June 8, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Counter Terrorism Designations, Iran-related Designations Updates, and a Non-Proliferation Designation Update.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Al-Mainuki, Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn ‘Ali of Nigeria; and
  • Al-Rufay’i, Abdallah Makki Muslih of Iraq.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230608

*******

June 14, 2023: The United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is publishing a Fact Sheet on the “Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Trade to Combat COVID-19.”  OFAC is also issuing Iran-related General License N-2Venezuela-related GL 39BSyria GL 21B, and amending several FAQs.

The United States is committed to ensuring that humanitarian assistance continues to reach at-risk populations through legitimate and transparent channels as countries across the globe fight the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). The sanctions programs administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) generally allow for legitimate humanitarian-related trade, assistance, or activity under existing laws and regulations. OFAC encourages those interested in providing such COVID-19-related assistance to avail themselves of longstanding exemptions, exceptions, and authorizations pertaining to humanitarian assistance and trade available in many U.S. sanctions programs. In the event that individuals, governments, or entities facing sanctions-related challenges have questions related to the provision of humanitarian assistance to sanctioned countries, or believe additional authorizations are needed, OFAC stands ready to provide guidance and respond to applications for specific licenses. This Fact Sheet provides consolidated guidance highlighting the most relevant exemptions, exceptions, and authorizations for humanitarian assistance and trade under the OFAC-administered Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, Syria, Cuba, and Russia-related sanctions programs.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931896/download?inline

Iran-related General License N-2: Authorized certain COVID-19-related transactions prohibited by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. The following transactions and activities that are prohibited by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 (ITSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024:

(1) Exportation of goods or technology. All transactions and activities related to the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of goods or technology for use in connection with the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19 (including research or clinical studies related to COVID-19) to Iran or the Government of Iran, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to Iran or the Government of Iran;

(2) Importation of or dealings in certain COVID-19-related goods. All transactions and activities related to the importation into the United States of, or dealings in or related to, goods that previously were exported or reexported to Iran or the Government of Iran pursuant to this general license and that are broken, defective, or non-operational, or are connected to product recalls, adverse events, or other safety concerns, or for routine maintenance or the permanent return of such items to the United States or a third country; and

(3) Exportation or importation of services. All transactions and activities related to the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of services to Iran or the Government of Iran, or the importation into the United States of, or dealings in or related to Iranian-origin services, in each case that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID-19).

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931881/download?inline

Venezuela-related General License 39B: All transactions and activities involving the Government of Venezuela that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID-19) that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13808 of August 27, 2017, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019, or E.O. 13884 of August 5, 2019, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024.

Authorized certain COVID-19-related transactions involving certain banks. All transactions and activities described above involving Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV), Banco de Venezuela, S.A. Banco Universal (Banco de Venezuela), Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo, de la Clase Obrera, Mujer y Comunas, Banco Universal C.A. (Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo), or any entity in which BCV, Banco de Venezuela or Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo owns, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by E.O. 13850 of November 1, 2018, as amended by E.O. 13857, each as incorporated into the VSR, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931886/download?inline

Syria General license 21B:  Authorized certain COVID-19-related transactions prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations. The following transactions and activities that are prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 542 (SySR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. Eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024:

(1) Exportation of services related to COVID-19. All transactions and activities related to the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of services to Syria that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID-19); and

(2) COVID-19-related transactions involving certain blocked persons. All transactions and activities involving the Government of Syria, Polymedics LLC, Letia Company, or any entity in which Polymedics LLC or Letia Company owns, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID-19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID-19), provided that any exportation or reexportation of items to Syria must be licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931891/download?inline

*******

June 15, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) nationals involved in the procurement of equipment and materials that support the DPRK ballistic missile program. The DPRK continues to utilize a network of representatives in foreign countries, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Iran, to illicitly import restricted components necessary to conduct research and development of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs, in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Choe, Chol Min of North Korea; and
  • Choe, Un Jong of North Korea.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1539 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230615

*******

June 16, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on the Hernandez Salas transnational criminal organization (TCO), a human smuggling organization based in Mexicali, Mexico, as well as several members and entities in its support network. The practice of human smuggling and the facilitation of fraudulent documentation undermines the U.S. asylum system, damaging public confidence in the vetting process and jeopardizing access to protection for vulnerable persons fleeing conflict, famine, and persecution. Often, migrants encounter violence in each territory they cross on their journey toward the United States and may even end up victims of human trafficking. This action continues the Biden-Harris administration’s whole-of-government effort to confront human smuggling on the southern border of the United States.

According to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, TCOs earn billions of dollars from human smuggling. Most individuals attempting to enter the United States covertly seek assistance organizing transport across the border; smuggling organizations, often associated with other TCOs, take advantage of those individuals by providing services at a significant cost.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Chavez Tamayo, Jesus Gerardo of Mexico;
  • Hernandez Salas, Ofelia of Mexico;
  • Hernandez Sanchez, Federico of Mexico;
  • Maldonado Lopez, Fatima del Rocio of Mexico; and
  • Saucedo Huipio, Raul of Mexico.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Hernandez Salas Transnational Criminal Organization of Mexico;
  • Hotel Plaza of Mexico; and
  • Hotelera Lopez Mateos S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1545 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230616

*******

June 21, 2023:  the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Burma’s Ministry of Defense and two regime-controlled financial institutions that facilitate much of the foreign currency exchange within Burma and enable transactions between the military regime and foreign markets, including for the purchase and import of arms and related materiel.

OFAC also issued the Burma-related General License 5, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank or Myanma Foreign Trade Bank.”

Burma-related General License 5: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order 14014 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind-down of transactions involving Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank (MICB), Myanma Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB), or any entity in which MICB or MFTB owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, August 5, 2023, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Burma Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 525 (BuSR).

This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the BuSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the BuSR other than the blocked persons described in paragraph (a) of this general license, unless separately authorized.   

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Ministry Of Defense Of Burma;
  • Myanma Foreign Trade Bank; and
  • Myanma Investment And Commercial Bank.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1555 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931936/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230621

*******

June 23, 2023:  The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) officers recently indicted by the Department of Justice who played a significant role in the Kremlin’s attempts to conduct global malign influence operations, including efforts to influence a local election in the United States.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Popov, Yegor Sergeyevich of Russia; and
  • Sukhodolov, Aleksei Borisovich of Russia.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1572 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230623

*******

June 27, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned four companies and one individual connected to the violent Russian military group PMC Wagner (Wagner Group) and its founder and owner Yevgeniy Prigozhin, previously sanctioned by the United States, the European Union (EU), Canada, and the United Kingdom (U.K.). The Wagner Group exploits insecurity around the world, committing atrocities and criminal acts that threaten the safety, good governance, prosperity, and human rights of nations, as well as exploiting their natural resources. The targeted entities in the Central African Republic (CAR), United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Russia have engaged in illicit gold dealings to fund the Wagner Group to sustain and expand its armed forces, including in Ukraine and Africa, while the targeted individual has been central to activities of Wagner Group units in Mali.

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Ivanov, Nikolayevich Andrey of Russia.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List: 

  • Diamville SAU of the Central African Republic;
  • Industrial Resources General Trading of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Limited Liability Company DM of Russia; and
  • Midas Ressources SARLU of the Central African Republic.

OFAC also published an Africa Gold Advisory.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1581 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230627_33 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931956/download?inline

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

June 12, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 38080:  The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as the Chair of the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force (FLETF), announces the publication and availability of the updated Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) Entity List, a consolidated register of the four lists required to be developed and maintained pursuant to the UFLPA, on the DHS UFLPA website. The updated UFLPA Entity List is also published as an appendix to this notice. This update adds two entities and eight subsidiaries to the UFLPA Entity List for working with the government of Xinjiang to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, or receive forced labor or Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or members of other persecuted groups out of Xinjiang.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/06/12/2023-12481/notice-regarding-the-uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act-entity-list

*******

Fines and Penalties

June 3, 2023: The U.S. Department of State has concluded an administrative settlement with VTA Telecom Corporation to resolve six violations of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2751 et seq., and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 C.F.R. Parts 120-130. The Department of State and VTA Telecom Corporation reached this settlement following an extensive compliance review by the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance in the Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

The administrative settlement between the Department of State and VTA Telecom Corporation, concluded pursuant to ITAR § 128.11, addresses unauthorized exports and attempted exports of ITAR-controlled defense articles, including hobby rocket motors, video trackers, including related technical data, and a gas turbine engine controlled under U.S. Munitions List Categories IV(d)(7), IV(h), IV(h)(11), XII(a), and XIX(c) to Vietnam, a proscribed country for exports and temporary imports of defense articles and defense services, by 22 CFR § 126.1 at the time of the violations.

The settlement demonstrates the Department’s role in furthering world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States by controlling the export of defense articles. The settlement also highlights the importance of exporting defense articles only pursuant to appropriate authorization from the Department.

Under the terms of the Consent Agreement, VTA Telecom Corporation will be administratively debarred and thereby prohibited from participating directly or indirectly in any activities subject to the ITAR for three years.

https://www.state.gov/u-s-department-of-state-concludes-settlement-resolving-export-violations-by-vta-telecom-corporation/ and https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sysparm_referring_url=tear_off&view=true&sys_id=99e327b21b4ba990d1f1ea02f54bcb8d and https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sysparm_referring_url=tear_off&view=true&sys_id=15e363b21b4ba990d1f1ea02f54bcb09 and https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sysparm_referring_url=tear_off&view=true&sys_id=99e327b21b4ba990d1f1ea02f54bcb8b

*******

June 7, 2023: A federal judge sentenced Miguel Armando Castro, of Phoenix, to 51 months in prison, followed by supervised release for attempting to smuggle firearms and ammunition into Mexico. The judge also ordered him to pay a $100 special assessment. Castro pleaded guilty to smuggling goods from the United States following a Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) probe. On Jan. 19, 2022, Castro attempted to exit the United States into Mexico in a vehicle lane at the Mariposa Port of Entry in Nogales. Castro was the driver and sole occupant of a Chevrolet Silverado pickup truck. U.S. Customs and Border Protection officials had received alerts on the Silverado and Castro related to a prior ammunition smuggling incident. Upon initial inspection of the Silverado, officers found a bag on the front seat containing a loaded .22-caliber revolver. While inspecting the vehicle, they found two high-capacity Glock firearm magazines, four regular-capacity Glock firearm magazines, and one .22-caliber Walther firearm magazine. The firearm, ammunition, and magazines Castro intended to export to Mexico are designated on the U.S. Commerce Control List as prohibited for export from the United States into Mexico without a valid license. Castro did not have a license or any other lawful authority to export any of the items from the United States into Mexico.

https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/hsi-nogales-investigation-sends-firearms-and-ammunition-smuggler-prison-51-months

*******

June 8, 2023: Eric Nana Kofi Ampong Coker, age 41, of Columbia, Maryland, pleaded guilty to the illegal export of firearms to Ghana. According to his guilty plea, since 2017, Ampong Coker has purchased at least 81 firearms from three separate Maryland Federal Firearms Licensees (“FFLs”) and, in 2019, received Regulated Firearms Collector status through the Maryland State Police, which waived the restriction on the number of firearms he could purchase during a 30-day period.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/columbia-man-pleads-guilty-illegally-exporting-firearms-ghana

*******

June 9, 2023: the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), issued a Temporary Denial Order (TDO) suspending the export privileges of the Aratos Group, a network of defense-related companies in the Netherlands and Greece, and its president, Nikolaos Bogonikolos. These actions are related to a May 22, 2023, criminal indictment issued in the Eastern District of New York and are the result of coordination by the Disruptive Technology Strike Force co-led by the Departments of Justice and Commerce. While Bogonikolos remains in custody, this action builds on the indictment by severing his company, Aratos Group, from access to U.S.-origin items and technologies. The TDO also renews the denial of export privileges against three persons – Boris Livshits, Svetlana Skvortsova, and Aleksey Ippolitov – and two companies – Advanced Web Services and Strandway, LLC – for the unauthorized export of sensitive items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to Russia.

https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3285-2023-06-09-bis-press-release-aratos-tdo-final/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1524-e2862/file

*******

June 10, 2023: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Samet Doyduk for seven years until July 12, 2029. On July 12, 2022, Doyduk was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring to export firearm parts purchased in the United States to be shipped to Turkey and the Republic of Georgia. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Doyduk to 15 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1526-e2864/file

*******

June 10, 2023: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Shaohua “Eric” Wang for ten years until February 2, 2030. On February 3, 2020, Wang was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring to willfully export from the United States to China, controlled military equipment and supplies for profit without the required licenses. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Wang to 46 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, a $200 special assessment, and a $25,000 criminal fine.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1527-e2865/file

*******

June 10, 2023: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Jorge Jesus Sigala for five years until April 22, 2026. On April 22, 2021, Sigala was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) for smuggling from the United States to Mexico various pistols. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Sigala to 12 months and one day of confinement, three years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1528-e2866/file

*******

June 10, 2023: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Eli Espinoza for ten years until December 14, 2030. On December 14, 2020, Espinoza was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) for smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico firearms components to include, front trunnion, AK bolt body, upper hand guard and gad tube, rear sight block, recoil spring rear guide, dust cover, trigger for semi-automatic rifle, bolt carrier assembly, and bolt catch, without a license or written approval from the US Department of Commerce. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Espinoza to 63 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1530-e2868/file

*******

June 10, 2023: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Khalid Jarrah for ten years until August 11, 2031. On August 11, 2021, Jarrah was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring to knowingly, intentionally, and willfully engage in the business of dealing firearms without a license. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Jarrah to 15 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1531-e2869/file

*******

June 10, 2023: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry (BIS) denied the export privileges of Patrick Lee Sousa for ten years until October 29, 2031. On October 29, 2021, Sousa was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring to knowingly, intentionally, and willfully engage in the business of dealing firearms without a license. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Sousa to 57 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, and a $300 assessment.

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1532-e2870/file

*******

June 20, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a settlement with Swedbank AS (Latvia) (“Swedbank Latvia”), a subsidiary of Swedbank AB (publ), headquartered in Stockholm, Sweden. Swedbank Latvia has agreed to remit $3,430,900 to settle its potential civil liability for 386 apparent violations of OFAC’s Crimea sanctions. Throughout 2015 and 2016, a customer of Swedbank Latvia used Swedbank Latvia’s e-banking platform from an internet protocol address in Crimea to send payments to persons in Crimea through U.S. correspondent banks. The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that Swedbank Latvia’s apparent violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and were non-egregious.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230620_33 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931911/download?inline 

*******

June 20, 2023: Following the International Day for the Elimination of Sexual Violence in Conflict, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two South Sudanese individuals involved in conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) in South Sudan. The two individuals designated have abused their positions of political and military authority to carry out acts of sexual violence against citizens of South Sudan. These designations, along with sanctions on ISIS leaders by the U.S. Department of State, represent the first time that a dedicated focus on conflict-related sexual violence —consistent with the Presidential Memorandum signed by President Biden in November 2022 —has led to the imposition of U.S. sanctions.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Al-Matuti, Arkan Ahmad ‘Abbas of Iraq and Syria;
  • Al-Rashidi, Nawaf Ahmad Alwan of Syria, Turkey, and Iraq;
  • Futuyo, Alfred of South Sudan; and
  • Nando, James of South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1552 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230620

*******

June 23, 2023: A former member of the United States military was sentenced to 27 months in federal prison for conspiring to unlawfully export to Russia defense articles – including thermal imaging riflescopes and night vision goggles – without a license in violation of the Arms Export Control Act.

Igor Panchernikov, 41, a former Corona, California resident who once served in the United States Air Force Reserves. Panchernikov pleaded guilty on March 24 to one count of conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act. He has been in federal custody since July 2022 after Israel extradited him to the United States. From December 2016 to May 2018, Panchernikov conspired with other individuals to knowingly export from the United States to Russia defense articles without obtaining from the State Department a valid license or other approval for such exports. Panchernikov’s accomplices purchased defense articles – including thermal riflescopes, weapons sights, monoculars, and night vision googles – from various online sellers located in the United States and directed the sellers to mail those items to Panchernikov’s residence in Corona.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/former-us-serviceman-sentenced-27-months-prison-illegally-exporting-night-vision

*******

JUNE 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES Read More »

MAY 2023 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through May 31, 2023.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities.  It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

 

The President

 

President Biden Continues National Emergencies With Respect To Sudan

 

May 4, 2023: President Biden issued Executive Order 14098 that expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997 (Blocking Sudanese Government Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Sudan), and expanded by Executive Order 13400 of April 26, 2006 (Blocking Property of Persons in Connection With the Conflict in Sudan’s Darfur Region), finding that the situation in Sudan, including the military’s seizure of power in October 2021 and the outbreak of inter-service fighting in April 2023, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. The Executive Order imposed sanctions on certain persons destabilizing Sudan and undermining the goal of a democratic transition.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/931716/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230504

 

*******

 

President Biden Continues National Emergencies With Respect To The Central African Republic

 

May 11, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 30637:  On May 12, 2014, by Executive Order 13667, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1706) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in and in relation to the Central African Republic, which has been marked by a breakdown of law and order; intersectarian tension; the pervasive, often forced recruitment and use of child soldiers; and widespread violence and atrocities, including those committed by Kremlin-linked and Yevgeniy Prigozhin-affiliated entities such as the Wagner Group, and which threatens the peace, security, or stability of the Central African Republic and neighboring states.

 

The situation in and in relation to the Central African Republic continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13667 on May 12, 2014, to deal with that threat must continue in effect beyond May 12, 2023. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for one year the national emergency declared with respect to the Central African Republic.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/05/11/2023-10315/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-the-central-african-republic

 

*******

 

President Biden Continues National Emergencies With Respect To The Unrestricted Acquisition And Use Of Certain Information And Communications Technology And Services Transactions

 

May 11, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 30635: On May 15, 2019, by Executive Order 13873, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the unrestricted acquisition and use of certain information and communications technology and services transactions.

 

The unrestricted acquisition or use in the United States of information and communications technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of foreign adversaries augments the ability of these foreign adversaries to create and exploit vulnerabilities in information and communications technology or services, with potentially catastrophic effects. This threat continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared on May 15, 2019, must continue in effect beyond May 15, 2023. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for one year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13873 with respect to securing the information and communications technology and services supply chain.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/05/11/2023-10314/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-securing-the-information-and-communications

 

*******

 

President Biden Continues National Emergencies With Respect To Yemen

 

May 15, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 31141: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for one year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13611 of May 16, 2012, with respect to Yemen.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/05/15/2023-10487/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-yemen

 

*******

 

President Biden Continued The National Emergency With Respect To The Stabilization Of Iraq

 

May 17, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 31601: President Biden Continued The National Emergency With Respect to the Stabilization of Iraq for one (1) year.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/05/17/2023-10756/continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-the-stabilization-of-iraq

 

*******

 

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

 

May 3 through 31, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Change in Name from Hawker Pacific (Malaysia) SDN. BHD. to Jet Aviation (Malaysia) MRO SDN. BHD. due to company reorganization;
  • Change in Address from Sabena Technics ATP, formerly at 350, avenue Jean René Guillibert Gautier de la Lauzière, ZAC de Pichaury II, Parc du Golf Bâtiment 7, 13290 Aix-enProvence, France to Sabena technics ATP at Hangar Boussiron, Route de la Plage, 13700 Marignane, France;
  • Change in Address from Leonardo Electronics US Inc., 2345 Crystal Drive, Suite 901, Arlington, Virginia 22202, U.S. to 1650 Tysons Boulevard, Suite 700, McLean, Virginia, 22102;
  • Change in Name from Meta Mission Data Ltd to Metrea Mission Data Ltd. due to corporate reorganization;
  • Changes in Names and Ownership for Raytheon Anschutz GmbH due to acquisition by DMB Dr. Dieter Murmann Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH:

 

Old Name New Name
Raytheon Anschuetz GmbH Portsmouth Office Raytheon Technologies Anschuetz UK Ltd.
Raytheon Anschütz GmbH Anschuetz GmbH
Raytheon Anschuetz do Brasil Sistemas Marítimos Ltda. Anschuetz do Brasil Sistemas Maritimos Ltda.
Raytheon Anschuetz Singapore Pte. Ltd. Anschuetz Singapore Pte Ltd.

 

  • Changes in Names and Ownership for Cobham Aviation Services Australia’s Special Mission business due to acquisition by Leidos:

 

Old Name New Name
Cobham Aviation Services Pty Ltd Leidos Airborne Solutions Australia Pty Ltd
Cobham SAR Services Pty Ltd Leidos SAR Services Pty Ltd
Cobham NAS Pty Ltd Leidos NAS Pty Ltd

 

  • Change in Name and Ownership from Apsys Risk Engineering GmbH to Airbus Protect GmbH due to merger;
  • Change in Name of Leonardo DRS, Inc.’s Israeli subsidiary company, from RADA Electronic Industries Ltd to DRS RADA Technologies Ltd. due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name and Address from General Electric do Brasil Ltda. formerly at Av. Magalhaes de Castro, 4800 Continental Tower, Sao Paulo, Brazil to GE Celma LTDA at Rua Alice Herve 356, Bingen, Petropolis, RJ 25669-900 Brazil due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name from Thales Programas De Electrónica Y Comunicaciones SAU to Thales España Sistemas SAU due to corporate rebranding; and
  • Change in Name from SPX Corporation to SPX Technologies, Inc. due to corporate rebranding.

 

*******

 

The Directorate Of Defense Trade Controls Posted Five Additional FAQs Regarding The Use Of USML Category XXI In The Automated Export System

 

May 3, 2023: Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted five additional Frequently Asked Questions regarding the use of USML Category XXI in the Automated Export System (AES).

 

  • When can I use USML Category XXI to export my commodity?
  • Can I use a USML Category XXI determination number that has been assigned to a different commodity?
  • If an item is not described in any USML category, may I then self-classify it as USML Category XXI on the license?
  • Who do I contact if the Automated Export System (AES) is not accepting my DDTC Determination Number for USML Category XXI?
  • Who has the authority to determine that an item or service is included in USML Category XXI?

 

See the information below regarding the U.S. Census Bureau’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) for the collection of a new data element – USML Category XXI.

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_faq_cat&topic=840e3f6cdb3bc30044f9ff621f9619c0&subtopic=e0b1d163db0ddb00d0a370131f961988#e0b1d163db0ddb00d0a370131f961988

 

*******

 

The Directorate Of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) Released An Update To The “Guidance For USPAB Authorization Requests”

 

May 23, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) has released an update to the “Guidance for USPAB Authorization Requests” document. The update (v. 1.1) includes several clarifications, with the most significant being the following:

  • Support documents are to be submitted in PDF format;
  • Clarification on how to identify USML defense service categories and related USML commodity categories in the submission letter;
  • Updated guidance on preparing the DS-6004 (Part 4 of the guidance document), particularly the sections on commodity information (blocks 5-6) and blocks 8-10; and
  • Reiterates that applicants are to address periods of U.S. residency even if they have never lived in the U.S.
  • Reorganizes the instructions in Section II.A to highlight that defense services are to be listed in BOLD and that the scope of defense services is limited to the specific defense articles identified in the submission.

 

Additionally, the USPAB submission letter template and the sample ITAR §126.13 certification letter for USPAB requests have been added as appendices to the guidance document. They will no longer be found separately on the DDTC website.

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=f72d111c1b43a550d1f1ea02f54bcbdc

 

*******

 

The Department Of State Certified To Congress Certain Countries Are Not Cooperating Fully With United States Antiterrorism Efforts

 

May 23, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 33184: Pursuant to section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781), and Executive Order 13637, as amended, Secretary of State Antony Blinken has determined and certified to the Congress that the following countries are not cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts: Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea), Iran, Syria, and Venezuela.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/05/23/2023-10903/determination-and-certification-of-countries-not-cooperating-fully-with-antiterrorism-efforts

 

*******

 

The Directorate Of Defense Trade Controls Released New FAQs Regarding The Open General License Pilot Program

 

May 26, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) has released new frequently asked questions (FAQs) regarding the Open General License (OGL) Pilot Program. In addition, DDTC has released updated versions of previously published OGL FAQs and related factsheets.

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sysparm_referring_url=tear_off&view=true&sys_id=f8d90a611bc3e990c6c3866ae54bcbd7

 

*******

 

U.S. Department of Defense

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Latvia

 

May 2, 2023: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that the Government of Latvia has requested to buy a Naval Strike Missile Coastal Defense System (NSM CDS), including tactical, telemetered, and training missiles; containers; mobile operational platforms; integration equipment; ordnance handling equipment (OHE); training equipment and aids; technical publications and data; training; spares; U.S. Government and contractor technical and product support or assistance; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost is $110 million. The principal contractor is to be determined. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/latvia-naval-strike-missile-coastal-defense-system

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To The Czech Republic

 

May 3, 2023: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that the Government of the Czech Republic has requested to buy equipment and services to refurbish six (6) AH-1Z and two (2) UH-1Y Excess Defense Article (EDA) helicopters. This equipment and services will include twenty-two (22) T-700 GE 401C engines (16 installed, six spares); fourteen (14) Honeywell Embedded Global Positioning System Inertial Navigation Systems (EGIs) w/Precise Positioning Service (PPS) (8 installed, 6 spares); four (4) M240 machine guns; and twenty-four (24) ARC-210 COMSEC radios. Also included is communication equipment; electronic warfare systems; support equipment; spare engine containers; flight training devices; Composite Maintenance trainer; spare and repair parts; tools and test equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total value is $650 million. The principal contractors will be Bell Helicopter, Textron, Fort Worth, TX, and General Electric Company, Lynn, MA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/czech-republic-ah-1z-and-uh-1y-refurbishmentmodernization

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Australia

 

May 4, 2023: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that the Government of Australia has requested to buy Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System Expeditionary (SURTASS-E) mission systems for Vessels of Opportunity (VOO); a shore processing mission system, a spare SURTASS passive acoustic array; containers; communications parts and support equipment (Classified and Unclassified); software (Classified and Unclassified); publications (Classified and Unclassified); training; U.S. Government and contractor engineering support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $207 million. The principal contractors will be Lockheed Martin-Syracuse, Syracuse, NY, and Lockheed Martin-Manassas, Manassas, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-surveillance-towed-array-sensor-system-expeditionary-surtass

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Poland

 

May 9, 2023: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that the Government of Poland has requested to buy thirty-four (34) AN/AAQ-33 Sniper Advanced Targeting Pods (ATP) with Shipping Containers.  Also included are system support and support equipment; spare parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support; integration and test equipment and support; unclassified software delivery and support; unclassified Computer Program Identification Number (CPIN) systems; unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support.  The estimated total cost is $124.7 million.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-sniper-advanced-targeting-pods

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Slovakia

 

May 11, 2023: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that the Government of Slovakia has requested to buy one hundred ninety-two (192) M1278A1/A2 Heavy Gun Carriers Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTVs) as well as M153 Common Remote Weapons Stations (CROWS) with Display and Control Panels (DCP); M2 Quick Change Barrels (QCB) .50 caliber machine guns; MK19 40mm grenade launchers; M2A1 machine guns; M4A1 Joint Chemical Agent Detectors; AN/VAS-5B(V)2 Driver’s Vision Enhancers (DVE); JLTV kits; special tools to support the JLTV; JLTV spare parts; M205 gun mounts; basic issue items for CROWS; CROWS DCP retrofit kits; AN/VRC-104 radio kits; 16 port network switch kits; Silent Watch energy storage kits; DVE installation kits; M4A1 detector kits; M1114 turret rings and hatches; Maintenance Support Devices (MSD) with wireless at-platform test sets; Driver’s Vision Enhancer (DVE) sensor modules; display control modules; bracket assembly; electronics components assembly; CROWS appended trainers; CROWS diagnostic kits; CROWS maintenance tool sets; M2 Small Arms Tool Kits; Small Arms MK19 Tool Kits; M2 spare parts; MK93 weapon mounts; Toughbook laptops with interactive electronic technical manuals (IETM) and cables; JLTV contractor spare parts support; CROW Systems spare parts support; Maintenance Support Items (MSI) in support of MK19; MK19 Mod III spare parts support; CROWS spare parts; CROWS Basic Issue Items (BII) boresight kit components; Total Package Fielding; Field Service Representative support; U.S. government technical assistance; training; technical publications/manuals; and other related elements of logistics and program support.  The estimated cost is $250 million.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/slovakia-m1278a1a2-heavy-gun-carriers-joint-light-tactical-vehicles

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Germany

 

May 11, 2023: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that the Government of Germany has requested to buy sixty (60) CH-47F Block II Cargo Helicopters with customer-unique modifications; one hundred forty (140) T-55-GA-714A engines (120 installed, 20 spares); seventy-two (72) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (60 installed, 12 spares); and two hundred eighty-four (284) AN/ARC-231A Communications Security (COMSEC) radios (240 installed, 44 spares). Also included are AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Sets; AN/APR-39C(V)1 Radar Detecting Sets; AN/ARC-220 High Frequency (HF) radios with electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM); military Precise Positioning Service (PPS) (to include SAASM or M-Code); Digital Advanced Flight Control Systems (DAFCS); AN/APX-123A Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponder; AN/ARN-147 very high frequency (VHS) omnidirectional range and instrument landing system (VOR/ILS); AN/ARN-153 Tactical Air Navigation Systems (TACAN); air data computers; AN/APN-209 radar altimeter systems; AN/PYQ-10 simple key loaders; KIV-77 Mode 4/5 IFF Applique; KY-100M narrowband/wideband terminal COMSEC devices; AN/AVS-6 Night Vision Devices (NVD); IDM-401 Improved Data Modem; air-to-air refueling probes; M134 gun mounts; Infrared Suppression System (IRSS); Engine Air Particle Separator (EAPS); Ballistic Protection System (BPS) with Cockpit; cabin sides; Midas Underfloor COOLS; Extended Range Fuel System (ERFS)