MARCH 2024 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES
This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through March 31, 2024. The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.
See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and
persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.
REGULATORY UPDATES
President
President Biden Terminated The National Emergency with Respect to Zimbabwe
March 4, 2024: President Biden found that the declaration of a national emergency in Executive Order 13288 of March 6, 2003, with respect to the actions and policies of certain members of the Government of Zimbabwe and other persons to undermine Zimbabwe’s democratic processes or institutions, as relied upon for additional steps taken in Executive Order 13391 of November 22, 2005, and as expanded by Executive Order 13469 of July 25, 2008, should no longer be in effect. Although President Biden continues to be concerned with the situation in Zimbabwe, particularly with respect to acts of violence and other human rights abuses against political opponents and with respect to public corruption, including misuse of public authority, the declaration of a national emergency in Executive Order 13288 is no longer needed. Accordingly, President Biden terminated the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13288, and revoke that order, Executive Order 13391, and Executive Order 13469.
Editors note: The declaration of termination of the national emergency may result in revisions to the ITAR and EAR for an arms embargo on Zimbabwe. Follow our monthly newsletter for updates.
President Biden Continued The National Emergency with Respect to Ukraine
March 4, 2024: On March 6, 2014, by Executive Order 13660, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in relation to Ukraine. The situation in and in relation to Ukraine undermine democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine; threaten its peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; and contribute to the misappropriation of its assets, as well as the actions and policies of the Government of the Russian Federation, including its purported annexation of Crimea and its use of force in Ukraine, continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States
Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13660.
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President Biden Continued The National Emergency with Respect to Venezuela
March 5, 2024: On March 8, 2015, the President issued Executive Order 13692, declaring a national emergency with respect to the situation in Venezuela, including the Government of Venezuela’s erosion of human rights guarantees, persecution of political opponents, curtailment of press freedoms, use of violence and human rights violations and abuses in response to antigovernment protests, and arbitrary arrest and detention of antigovernment protesters, as well as the exacerbating presence of significant government corruption.
The situation in and in relation to Venezuela, continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13692.
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President Biden Continued The National Emergency with Respect to Iran
March 12, 2024: On March 15, 1995, by Executive Order 12957, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701‑1706) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the actions and policies of the Government of Iran. The actions and policies of the Government of Iran — including its proliferation and development of missiles and other asymmetric and conventional weapons capabilities, its network and campaign of regional aggression, its support for terrorist groups, and the malign activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its surrogates — continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.
The situation in and relation to Iran continue to pose threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency with respect to Iran declared in Executive Order 12957.
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President Biden Continued The National Emergency with Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities
March 26, 2024: On April 1, 2015, by Executive Order 13694, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the increasing prevalence and severity of malicious cyber-enabled activities originating from, or directed by persons located, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States. On December 28, 2016, the President issued Executive Order 13757 to take additional steps to address the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13694.
These significant malicious cyber-enabled activities continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared on April 1, 2015, must continue in effect beyond April 1, 2024. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13694.
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President Biden Continued The National Emergency with Respect to South Sudan
March 26, 2024: On April 3, 2014, by Executive Order 13664, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in and in relation to South Sudan, which has been marked by activities that threaten the peace, security, or stability of South Sudan and the surrounding region, including widespread violence and atrocities, human rights abuses, recruitment and use of child soldiers, attacks on peacekeepers, and obstruction of humanitarian operations.
The situation in and in relation to South Sudan continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared on April 3, 2014, must continue in effect beyond April 3, 2024. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13664.
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The U.S. Department of State
Change in Policy on Exports of Defense Articles and Defense Services to Nicaragua
March 15, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 18796: In response to growing concerns regarding Nicaragua’s continuing dismantling of democratic institutions, attacks on civil society, and increased security cooperation with Russia, to include support of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Department of State amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to add Nicaragua to the 22 CFR § 126.1 list of countries for which it is the policy of the United States to deny licenses or other approvals for exports and imports of defense services and defense articles, except as otherwise provided.
The policy of denial toward Nicaragua applies to licenses or other approvals for exports and imports of defense articles or defense services, except that a license or other approval may be issued on a case-by-case basis for non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian assistance, to include natural disaster relief.
Editors note: The EAR also takes a corresponding action for items with a 600 series ECCN by adding Nicaragua to the list of D:5 countries.
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State/DDTC Publishes FAQ re Value of Paragraph (x) Items
March 18, 2024: The Department of State published a new Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) on its website regarding the values of Paragraph (x) items:
Question:
“Will the value of the paragraph (x) items be used to decrement the authorization or count toward congressional notification threshold?”
Answer:
“No, however applicants must include the appropriate value of the paragraph (x) articles on the license applications. When adjudicating a license request, although the value of the paragraph (x) items is included in the total license value, DDTC will exclude the paragraph (x) value from threshold determinations such as congressional notifications. When the license is approved and the exporter files via Automated Export System (AES) for a shipment against the license, the exporter must include the declared value of the paragraph (x) items and that value will be decremented in AES against the total value of the license.”
Editor’s note: Paragraph (x) items are items subject to the EAR that have been licensed on an ITAR license.
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International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Removal of Certain Capacitors from Category XI(c)(5) of the U.S. Munitions List
March 25, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 20546: The Department of State published a final rule in the Federal Register that amends, effective April 24, 2024, U.S. Munitions List Category XI(c)(5), which describes certain high-energy storage capacitors.
The Department of State published an interim final rule on April 27, 2023, effective May 21, 2023, amending the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to remove from U.S. Munitions List (USML) Category XI certain high-energy storage capacitors and to clearly identify the high-energy storage capacitors that remain in USML Category XI. After reviewing the comments received in response to that interim final rule, the Department is now further amending USML Category XI to remove additional high-energy storage capacitors and to more clearly identify those that remain in USML Category XI.
The Department received four comments from the public, all of which recommended that the Department define the voltage criterion according to “voltage rating” or “rated voltage,” rather than “capable of operating.” The Department accepts these comments and will implement the term “rated voltage” to specify the voltage criterion in place of the phrase “capable of operating,” which does not have a broadly accepted definition. The Department notes that rated voltage is commonly provided in manufacturers’ product literature worldwide, thereby giving persons other than the manufacturer valuable information in assessing the capabilities of the capacitors. Accordingly, the Department has decided to specify the voltage criterion in paragraph (c)(5)(i) of USML Category XI in terms of “rated voltage.”
USML Category XI(c)(5) includes the following changes:
Category XI—Military Electronics
(c)
(5) High-energy storage capacitors that:
(i) Have a rated voltage of greater than five hundred volts (500 V);
(ii) Have a repetition rate greater than or equal to six (6) discharges per minute;
(iii) Have a full energy life greater than or equal to 10,000 discharges at greater than 0.2 Amps per Joule peak current; and
(iv) Have any of the following:
(A) Volumetric energy density greater than or equal to 1.5 J/cc; or
(B) Mass energy density greater than or equal to 1.3 kJ/kg;
Note to paragraph (c)(5):
Volumetric energy density is Energy per unit Volume. Mass energy density is Energy per unit Mass, sometimes referred to as Gravimetric energy density or Specific energy. Energy (E = 1/2 CV2 , where C is Capacitance and V is the rated voltage) in these calculations must not be confused with useful energy or extractable energy. Rated voltage is the value, based on the capacitor’s design, testing, and evaluation, that describes the maximum amount of continuous voltage, at an operating temperature less than or equal to 85 degrees Celsius (85 °C), that will not damage the capacitor. Rated voltage does not include short-term transient or surge operating conditions.
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events and
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The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls Released New Joint Venture FAQs
March 25, 2024: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls has released new Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) regarding when and how joint ventures (JV) must be added to Block 8 (Affiliate/Subsidiary Information) of an DDTC registrant’s Statement of Registration (DS-2032 form). DDTC views JVs as separate legal entities which are established by two or more parties and are governed by a Joint Venture Agreement.
Question:
How do I register a foreign-incorporated joint venture (JV) in Defense Export Control and Compliance System (DECCS)?
Answer:
If a Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) registrant owns more than 50% of the outstanding voting securities of the foreign JV then the registrant must add the JV to Block 8 of its DS-2032 form as a subsidiary. If a DDTC registrant does not own more than 50% of the outstanding voting securities of the foreign JV, but otherwise manages the day-to-day operations of the foreign-incorporated JV, then such DDTC registrant must add the JV to Block 8 of its DS-2032 form as a controlled affiliate. Otherwise, without U.S. persons managing the day-to-day operations of the foreign-incorporated JV then such JV is not able to be DDTC registered. Alternatively, if the DDTC registrant is a foreign broker and they own more than 50% of the outstanding voting securities of the foreign JV then they must add the foreign JV to Block 8 of its DS-2032 form as a subsidiary and the JV would only be registered as a foreign broker. If the foreign broker manages the day-to-day operations of the foreign JV then they must add the foreign JV to Block 8 of its DS-2032 form as a controlled affiliate and the JV would only be registered as a foreign broker.
DDTC registrants participating in a JV engaged in ITAR-related activities with foreign-persons are reminded that foreign-person employees who will receive ITAR-controlled technical data must first obtain appropriate licenses or other approvals. Special protocols may be appropriate to address the day-to-day involvement of foreign-person personnel including officers and senior managers. Export compliance briefings should be prepared for foreign-person personnel to ensure they understand ITAR-related restrictions as well as protocols/procedures to request access to ITAR-controlled activities (including defense articles, including technical data, and defense services). Furthermore, it is prohibited to perform defense services or export or temporary import ITAR-controlled defense articles to subsidiaries/affiliates located in proscribed countries under ITAR Section 126.1 (for example, the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, Syria, etc.) without first obtaining a license or other approval from DDTC. DDTC registrants should counsel their employees not to discuss the substance of ITAR-controlled technical data with foreign-person employees without a license or other approval. Also, DDTC registrants should ensure all employees are appropriately briefed on their ITAR compliance responsibilities.
Question:
Which Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)-registered U.S. joint venture (JV) member holds responsibility for listing the JV on its Statement of Registration (DS-2032 form) in Defense Export Control and Compliance System (DECCS)?
Answer:
The answer will depend on several factors. If a DDTC registrant owns more than 50% of the outstanding voting securities of the JV, then such DDTC registrant must add the JV to Block 8 of its DS-2032 form in DECCS Registration as a subsidiary, so long as the JV is separately incorporated as its own legal entity (i.e., not an unincorporated collection of property and/or assets). Alternatively, if an DDTC registrant does not own more than 50% of the outstanding voting securities of the JV, but otherwise manages the day-to-day operations of the JV, then such DDTC registrant must add the JV to Block 8 of its DS-2032 form in DECCS Registration as a controlled affiliate, so long as the JV is separately incorporated as its own legal entity (i.e., not an unincorporated collection of property and/or assets).
If a DDTC registrant does not own or have ability to manage the day-to-day operations of the JV, the JV must send a registration submission using a DS-2032 form in DECCS Registration to receive its own, separate registration.
To confirm management control by the DDTC registrant, the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance may consider (including but not limited to): ownership distribution of the JV, whether the JV has an independent board of directors, terms of the JV agreement, and/or staffing and resources of the JV.
Question:
My joint venture (JV) is incorporated in the United States, but management and control are split 50/50 between two foreign persons—can I have my JV register on its own?
Answer:
If an U.S.-incorporated JV is engaged in ITAR activities, but both of its managing members are foreign persons as defined in ITAR 120.63, then the JV must send a registration submission, signed by a U.S. person senior officer, in Defense Export Control and Compliance System (DECCS) Registration to receive its own, separate registration and code. If an U.S.-incorporated JV does not have a U.S. person senior officer, then the JV will either not be able to register with DDTC or it must hire a U.S. person senior officer who has authority to manage the day-to-day operations of the JV. The U.S. person senior officer must sign and submit the DS-2032 form in DECCS Registration to receive a registration and code. Directorate of Defense Trade Controls Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance (DDTC) registrants participating in a JV engaged in ITAR-related activities with foreign-persons are reminded that foreign-person employees who will receive ITAR-controlled technical data must first obtain appropriate licenses or other approvals.
Question:
What type of legal entities can be added to Block 8 of a Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) registrant’s DS-2032 form?
Answer:
Entities listed as subsidiaries or controlled affiliates in Block 8 of the DS-2032 form must be separate and distinct legal entities from the registrant in the DS-2032 form. Such legal entities will have their own articles of incorporation and/or formation separate and distinct from their parent company.
However, office and factory locations owned by a DDTC registrant, but not separately incorporated from such registrant must not be added to Block 8 of the DS-2032 form as subsidiaries or controlled affiliates. Similarly, a joint venture consisting of certain resources (e.g., joint money, property, effort, and knowledge) must not be added to the DS-2032 form if such joint venture is not separately incorporated as a distinct legal entity.
If a DDTC registrant operates under a trade name distinct from its legal name, it must not separately list its trade name in Block 8 of the DS-2032 form. Instead, Block 5 of the DS-2032 form affords the registrant the opportunity to distinguish their “doing business as name” from the legal name reflected in their articles of incorporation or formation.
Question:
My Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) U.S. registered company and another DDTC U.S. registered company each own 50% of an ITAR related legal entity. Which DDTC registrant must add the company to its DS-2032 form?
Answer:
Generally, the DDTC registrant that manages the day-to-day operations of the joint venture (JV), must add the JV to Block 8 of its DS-2032 form as a controlled affiliate. If both DDTC registered parties have equal management control of the JV, the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance may consider other factors which may be determinative of control (including but not limited to): responsibilities related to specific ITAR related activities enumerated in the JV agreement, specifically stipulated tie-breakers, arbitration agreements, etc. If the JV has a 50/50 ownership split and is independently managed, then the JV must send a registration submission using a DS-2032 form in Defense Export Control and Compliance System (DECCS) Registration to receive its own, separate registration and code.
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events
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DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website
March 11 through 26, 2024: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at
- Change in Address from Pilatus Training Solutions Australia Pty Ltd formerly at 249 Somerton Park Road, Sale, Victoria 3850, Australia to Pilatus Training Solutions Australia Pty Ltd at 81 Pearson Street, Sale, Victoria 3850, Australia;
- Change in Address from D3O, LLC formerly at 2270 Kraft Drive, Suite 1260, Blacksburg, VA 24060 to D3O, LLC at 1750 Kraft Drive, Suite 1275, Blacksburg, VA 24060;
- Change in Address from GEC Aviation Inc. formerly at 1919 Minnesota Court, Suite 100, Mississauga, Ontario L5N 0C9, Canada to GEC Aviation Inc. at 60 Queen Street, Suite 601, Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5YZ, Canada; and
- Change in Name from Ayesa Air Control GmbH to Alten GmbH due to merger.
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U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Canada
March 7, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that The Government of Canada has requested to buy telecommunications services providing Tactical Narrowband Satellite Communications (SATCOM) access to Canadian armed forces users over the Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) service; communication technical assistance to provide operational support, lifecycle management support, and engineering technical assistance and services; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering; technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $138 million. The principal contractor will be General Dynamics, Reston, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/canada-mobile-user-objective-system-access
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale to South Korea
March 7, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that The Republic of Korea (ROK) has requested to buy five (5) BQM-177A Subsonic Sea-Skimming Aerial Targets (SSAT) for KDX-III Batch-II AEGIS Class Destroyers. Also included are GQM-163 target drones; classified books and other publications (technical and non-technical); test support; technical documentation; personnel training; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $170.6 million. The principal contractor for the BQM-177A SSAT will be Kratos Defense, Sacramento, CA, and Fort Walton Beach, FL. The principal contractor for the GQM-163A target drones will be Northrop Grumman, Chandler, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale to South Korea
March 8, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that The Republic of Korea (ROK) has requested to buy six (6) T-700 GE 401C or 401D engines. Also included are spare engine containers; spare and repair parts; ferry support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $350 million. The principal contractor will be the General Electric Company, located in Lynn, MA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale to North Macedonia
March 8, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that The Government of North Macedonia has requested to buy an additional eighteen (18) M1278A1/A2 Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Heavy Gun Carriers (HGC); and seven (7) M1280A1/A2 Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) General Purpose (GP) that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at $78.54 million ($23.16 million in MDE), included a total of seventy-one (71) JLTVs, consisting of forty-eight (48) M1278A1/A2 JLTVs HGC; seventeen (17) M1280A1/A2 JLTVs GP; and six (6) M1281A1/A2 JLTVs Close Combat Weapons Carrier (CCWC). This notification is for a combined total of sixty-six (66) M1278A1/A2 JLTV HGC; twenty-four (24) M1280A1/A2 JLTV GP; and six (6) M1281A1/A2 JLTV CCWC. Also included are Common Remotely Operated Weapon Stations (CROWS); CROWS spare parts; CROWS Basic Issue Items (BII) – Boresight Kit Components; CROWS packaging and handling; CROWS installation and training; M2A1 machine guns with support equipment; MK19 Mod III with support equipment; M240B machine guns with support equipment; MK93 weapon mount; Driver’s Visor Enhancer (DVE); Maintenance Tool Set Toughbook Laptops; high frequency radios; communications equipment; Defense Advanced Global Positioning System Receivers (DAGR) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Modules (SAASM) and support equipment; JLTV kits; Vehicle Integration kits; LCD 4.0; spare and repair parts; Supplemental Common Tool Kit (SCTK); Special Tools and Test Equipment (STTE); Objective Gunner Protection Kit (OGPK); Javelin Integration Bracket Kit; turret rings and hatches; technical manuals and publications; New Equipment Training (NET); U.S. Government and contractor technical engineering, logistics, and personnel services; JLTV Field Service Representative support; JLTV integration support, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $111 million. The principal contractors will be Oshkosh Defense, Oshkosh, WI; AM General, Auburn Hills, MI; Leonardo DRS, West Plains, MO, and L3Harris, Melbourne, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/north-macedonia-joint-light-tactical-vehicles
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale to Poland
March 12, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that The Government of Poland has requested to buy two hundred thirty-two (232) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II Tactical Missiles and sixteen (16) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II Tactical Missile Guidance Units. Also included are missile containers; training aids; active optical target detectors; spares; support equipment; missile support; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $219.1 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-aim-9x-block-ii-sidewinder-missiles
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale to Poland
March 12, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that The Government of Poland has requested to buy up to seven hundred forty-five (745) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM), up to sixteen (16) AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM guidance sections, and fifty (50) LAU-129 Guided Missile Launchers. Also included are AIM-120 Captive Air Training Missiles, missile containers, and control section spares; Common Munitions Built-in-Test Reprogramming Equipment; ADU-891 Adapter Group Test Sets; munitions support and support equipment; spare and repair parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support; contract logistics support; classified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training support; transportation support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $1.69 billion. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale to Poland
March 12, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that The Government of Poland has requested to buy up to eight hundred twenty-one (821) AGM-158B-2 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles with Extended Range (JASSM-ER) All-Up-Rounds. Also included are AGM-158 JASSM classified test equipment; weapon system support; integration and test support and equipment; classified software delivery and support; unclassified publications and technical documentation; transportation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $1.77 billion. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin, Orlando, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale to Italy
March 15, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that The Government of Italy has requested to buy twenty-eight (28) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II+ Tactical Missiles; four (4) AIM-9X Block II+ Tactical Guidance Units; eight (8) AIM-9X Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM); and two (2) AIM-9X CATM Guidance Units that will be added to previously implemented cases whose values were under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales cases, valued at $34.1 million ($24.1 million in MDE) and $17.6 million ($9.7 million in MDE), respectively, included a total of thirty-eight (38) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II+ Tactical Missiles; three (3) AIM-9X Block II+ Tactical Guidance Units; sixteen (16) AIM-9X CATM; and two (2) AIM-9X CATM Guidance Units. This notification is for a combined total of sixty-six (66) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II+ Tactical Missiles; seven (7) AIM-9X Block II+ Tactical Guidance Units; twenty-four (24) AIM-9X CATM; and four (4) AIM-9X CATM Guidance Units. Also included are active optical target detectors; containers; personnel training and training equipment; classified and unclassified publications and technical documents; warranties; U.S. Government engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $90.6 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Arlington, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/italy-aim-9x-sidewinder-missiles
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale to Bahrain
March 19, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that The Government of Bahrain has requested to buy fifty (50) M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams Main Battle Tanks; four (4) M88A2 HERCULES Combat Recovery Vehicles; eight (8) M1110 Joint Assault Bridges; eight (8) M1150 Assault Breacher Vehicles; eight (8) Heavy Assault Scissor Bridge (HASB); one hundred (100) M240 Coaxial 7.62mm machine guns; three (3) AGT1500 Gas Turbine engines; six thousand (6,000) 120mm M1002 Target Practice Multipurpose Tracer (TPMP-T) projectiles; and five thousand seven hundred sixty (5,760) 120mm M1147 High Explosive Multipurpose Tracers. Also included are M2A1 .50 caliber machine guns; Common Remote Operated Weapons Station Low Profile (CROWS-LP); Forward Repair System; M250 smoke grenade launchers; service and training ammunition; M1300/M1302 Enhanced Heavy Equipment Transporter System (EHETS); M978A4 Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT) tanker and Load Handling System (LHS); M074A1 Palletized Load Systems and trailers and flat racks; support and test equipment; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; Special Tools and Test Equipment (STTE); communications equipment; Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM)-based Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers; software delivery and support; Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment; publications and technical manuals; maintenance trainers; training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; Next Generation Automatic Test System (NGATS); and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $2.2 billion. The principal contractors will be General Dynamics Land Systems, Sterling Heights, MI; BAE Systems, York, PA; Leonardo DRS, Arlington, VA; Honeywell Aerospace, Phoenix, AZ; RTX Corporation, McKinney, TX; and Lockheed Martin, Orlando, FL. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/bahrain-m1a2-abrams-main-battle-tanks
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale to Morocco
March 19, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DCSA) has notified Congress that The Government of Morocco has requested to buy six hundred twelve (612) Javelin FGM-148F missiles (includes twelve (12) fly-to-buy missiles) and two hundred (200) Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Units (LWCLUs). Also included are missile simulation rounds; Javelin support equipment; hand and measuring tools; books and publications; power plus distribution equipment; component parts and support equipment; life cycle support and other technical assistance; gunner training; ammunition officer’s training; System Integration and Checkout (SICO); maintenance training; Tactical Aviation and Ground Munitions (TAGM); and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated cost is $260 million. The prime contractors will be the Javelin Joint Venture between Lockheed Martin in Orlando, FL, and RTX Corporation in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/morocco-javelin-missiles
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U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
Clarification of Controls on Radiation Hardened Integrated Circuits and Expansion of License Exception GOV
March 13, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 18353: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to clarify controls on radiation hardened integrated circuits, including controls on computer and telecommunications equipment incorporating such radiation hardened integrated circuits. This rule also addresses certain scenarios that apply to certain integrated circuits acquired, tested, or otherwise used by or for the United States Government and affirms the availability of License Exception GOV for such items when pursuant to an official written request or directive from the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy. Lastly, this rule expands the availability of License Exception GOV for microelectronics items being exported, reexported, or transferred (in-country) in furtherance of a contract between the exporter, reexporter, or transferor and a department or agency of the U.S. Government when the contract provides for the export, reexport, transfer (in-country) of the item by the exporter, reexporter, or transferor in order to remove export control obstacles for official business of the U.S. Government, including the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense.
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Commerce Updates Rules To Further Restrict Exports To Nicaragua Due To Foreign Policy Concerns
March 15, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 18780: U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published revisions to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to apply more restrictive treatment to exports and reexports to Nicaragua of items subject to the EAR. This action is consistent with the State Department’s recent addition of Nicaragua to the list of proscribed countries under Section 126.1 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. BIS’s amendments also address concerns regarding the Nicaraguan Government’s human rights abuses against citizens and civil society groups, as well as the government’s continuing military and security cooperation with Russia. Specifically, BIS is moving Nicaragua from Country Group B to Country Group D:5, a more restrictive country grouping, applying a stricter licensing policy for items controlled for national security reasons, and making the country subject to ‘military end use’ and ‘military end user’ restrictions.
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases and
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/docman/?task=doc_download&gid=3463
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BIS Imposes Stricter End-User Controls: Ensuring Consistency with OFAC Programs
March 20, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 20107: The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released a final rule to impose additional restrictions under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on persons identified under fourteen sanctions programs, on the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List) maintained by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). This action builds on long-standing end-user restrictions under the EAR.
While the EAR has for many years restricted the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) transactions involving certain persons and entities identified on the SDN List or pursuant to certain statutory authorities, this rule ensures that persons and entities blocked under fourteen OFAC sanctions programs will also automatically be subject to stringent export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) controls under the EAR. The fourteen OFAC sanctions programs consist of:
- Seven Executive Orders related to Russia’s harmful foreign activities, including its aggression in Ukraine dating back to its 2014 annexation of Crimea as well as the recent further invasion in 2022 and the undermining of democratic processes or institutions in Belarus (EOs 13405, 13660, 13661, 13662, 13685, 14024, and 14038);
- Two programs related to terrorism (Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations and Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations);
- The Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations; and Four programs related to narcotics trafficking and other criminal networks (EOs 13581 and 1 14059, the Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions Regulations, and the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations)
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/docman/?task=doc_download&gid=3466 and
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases and
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BIS Updated Website
March 20, 2024: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has moved websites. You can now find it at https://www.bis.gov/
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BIS ANNUAL Update – Assistant Secretary Speech Highlights
March 28, 2024: Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod gave BIS’s 2024 update on export controls and policy. He highlighted 4 key actions taken by BIS as follows:
- Updated guidance for freight forwarders (including antiboycott guidance) is on the BIS website.
- A new “Don’t Let This Happen to You” (enforcement action summary document) packet is available on the BIS website. This captures many new actions since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
- A list of parties requiring engagement with a foreign boycott is now available on the BIS website. This list was created from data provided in response to a new field on the OAC antiboycott reporting form (the field was added to the form last year).
- U.S. companies identified as having certain risky counterparties by BIS (based on, it seems, AES data) are being sent “red flag letters.” These letters now demonstrate how those counterparties are risky by providing “commercially available datasets” identifying those counterparties (over 600 foreign companies) as continuing to export to Russia. Contacted exporters are being encouraged not to export to these potentially diversionary parties. 20 companies have received these notices so far.
Additional Facts:
- Russia and China prohibited diversion of US goods to these countries continue to be a primary focus for BIS.
- In 2023, BIS received over 1,100 license application for exports to Russia, the majority for EAR99 medical products. The agency is now working on developing a License Exception to simplify the process for exporters.
- BIS could soon consider controls on exports of EAR99 software to Russia to align with international counterparts.
- Publication of a new Advanced Computing Semiconductor clarifications and conforming changes rule is imminent.
- BIS is now sending letters to U.S. companies that identify their foreign customers that have been determined to be exporting high-priority items to Russia.
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/enforcement/1005-don-t-let-this-happen-to-you-1/file
See below for more expanded articles on some of the update.
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BIS Updates Freight Forwarder Guidance And Best Practices
March 28, 2024: the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a document containing updated guidance and best practices for freight forwarders and exporters who use freight forwarders to help them ensure compliance with U.S. export controls and regulatory requirements.
The freight forwarding community has a key role and obligation in securing the global supply chain and stemming the flow of illegal exports. Fulfilling this role helps to prevent activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, destabilizing military activities, and the enabling of human rights abuses. The guidance and best practices document contains discussions on: freight forwarder roles and responsibilities; responsibilities with respect to routed and non-routed exports; expectations of the exporter or U.S. principal party in interest (USPPI); considerations in selecting a freight forwarder; how the antiboycott regulations apply to freight forwarders; and red flags specific to freight forwarders and USPPIs.
https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-updates-freight-forwarder-guidance-and-best-practices and
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BIS Issues New Resources To Facilitate Antiboycott Compliance
March 28, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a new resource for companies, financial institutions, freight forwarders, and others to help them identify boycott-related requests they may receive during the regular course of business. The resource is a public list of entities who have been identified as having made a boycott-related request in reports received by BIS. The list is posted on the Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC) webpage with the objective of helping U.S. persons comply with the antiboycott regulations set forth in Part 760 of the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR Parts 730-774 (EAR).
Each entity on this list has been recently reported to BIS on a boycott request report form, as required by Section 760.5 of the EAR, as having made a boycott-related request in connection with a transaction in the interstate or foreign commerce of the United States. The list is not exhaustive and will be updated quarterly. If you believe that you have been listed in error or would like to discuss the listing, please contact the OAC.
U.S. persons are encouraged to diligently review transaction documents from all sources, but especially transaction documents with or involving these listed parties – given that they’ve been identified by others as a source of boycott requests – to identify possible boycott-related language and to determine whether U.S. persons have a reporting requirement to BIS pursuant to Part 760 of the EAR. The boycott request reporting form can be found here.
https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-issues-new-resource-facilitate-antiboycott-compliance and
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/docman/?task=doc_download&gid=3485 and
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/enforcement/oac?id=300
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U.S. Census Bureau
Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages
March 18, 2024: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected. If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation. Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN. However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.
To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.
Response Code: 118
Narrative: Carrier Code Missing
Severity: Fatal
Reason: The Carrier ID (SCAC/ IATA) is missing.
Resolution: The Carrier ID identifies the carrier that transports the goods out of the United States. The Standard Carrier Alpha Code (SCAC) is valid for vessel, rail, and truck shipments. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) code is valid for air shipments.
Verify the Carrier ID and Mode of Transport, correct the shipment and resubmit.
Response Code: 649
Narrative: Quantity 1 Cannot Exceed Shipping Weight
Severity: Fatal
Reason: The Unit of Measure 1 for the reported Schedule B/HTS requires kilograms and Quantity 1 exceeds the Shipping Weight.
Resolution: For the Schedule B/HTS reported, Quantity 1 must be reported in kilograms. Quantity 1 in kilograms cannot exceed the Shipping Weight.
Verify the Quantity 1 and Shipping Weight, correct the shipment and resubmit.
For a complete list of AES Response Codes, their reasons, and resolutions, see Appendix A – Commodity Filing Response Messages.
Appendix A – Commodity Filing Response Messages
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NOTICE: Expansion of Data Elements in the AES 203 Report
March 20, 2024: There are three different export reports provided in the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) system: the Automated Export System (AES) 201 Filer Report, the AES 202 USPPI Report and the AES 203 USPPI Routed Report. At the request of the trade community, the U.S. Census Bureau along with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection has expanded the AES 203 Report to include ten additional data elements. The Census Bureau authorizes that the additional data elements do not compromise the competitiveness between the USPPI and the FPPI, and the expanded report provides a greater visibility to users to measure compliance with routed export transactions. The following data elements will be added to AES 203 Report effective March 22, 2024:
- USPPI Contact Name
- USPPI Contact Phone
- Forwarder Company Name
- Forwarder Contact Name
- Forwarder Contact Phone
- Unit of Measure (Quantity 1)
- Unit of Measure (Quantity 2)
- Late File Indicator
- License Type Code
- License Number
For more information or questions regarding AES Export Reports, please contact the U.S. Census Bureau’s Data User and Trade Outreach Branch at 1-800-549-0595, Option 5 or through email at exportreports@census.gov.
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New BIS License Types C67 ((NAC) Notification Required)) and C68 (NAC) (No Notification Required) – for exports authorized under License Exception Notified Advanced Computing (NAC)
March 22, 2024: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule with an effective date of October 17, 2023 for most provisions. Among other actions, this interim final rule established a new License Exception Notified Advanced Computing (NAC) in § 740.8 of the Export Administrations Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. parts 730 – 774. This license exception as specified under the paragraph (a) (Eligibility requirements) authorizes the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of any item classified in ECCNs 3A090, 4A090, 3A001.z, 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 5A002.z, 5A004.z, 5A992.z, 5D002.z, or 5D992.z, except for items designed or marketed for use in a datacenter and meeting the parameters of 3A090.a.
New License Code C67 (NAC) (Notification required)
An update has been made to AES to create License Type Code C67 “Notified Advanced Computing Authorized” (NAC) (Notification required).
An update has been made to AES to create new License Code C67 “Notified Advanced Computing” (NAC), which authorizes certain exports and reexports of any item classified in ECCNs 3A090, 4A090, 3A001.z, 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 5A002.z, 5A004.z, 5A992.z, 5D002.z, or 5D992.z, except for items designed or marketed for use in a datacenter and meeting the parameters of 3A090.a. The notification requirements under NAC are limited to exports and reexports to Macau or any destination specified in Country Group D:5, or to an entity headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5, wherever located. Transactions under NAC must meet all of the applicable criteria identified under paragraph § 740.8(a) and must comply with the restrictions set forth in paragraph § 740.8(b).
The full terms of License Exception NAC are described in § 740.8.
AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C67 (NAC) (Notification required) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:
- Report License Code: C67 Notified Advanced Computing (NAC) (Notification required), if advanced notification was required.
- Report License Number: Report the NAC confirmation number “(A######)” received from BIS in the license number block.
- Allowable ECCNs: 3A090, 4A090, 3A001, 4A003, 4A004, 4A005, 5A002, 5A004, 5A992, 5D002, or 5D992.
- Allowable countries: All destinations.
- “.z” must be entered as the first characters to appear in the Commodity Description block for 3A001.z, 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 5A002.z, 5A004.z, 5A992.z, 5D002.z, or 5D992.z.
- Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
- Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)
New License Code C68 (NAC) (NO notification required)
An update has been made to AES to create License Type Code C68 “Notified Advanced Computing Authorized” (NAC) (NO notification required)
An update has been made to AES to create new License Code C68 “Notified Advanced Computing” (NAC) (NO notification required), which authorizes certain exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of any item classified in ECCNs 3A090, 4A090, 3A001z, 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 5A002.z, 5A004.z, 5A992.z, 5D002.z, or 5D992.z to destinations specified in Country Group D:1 and D:4, and transfers (in-country) to Macau and destinations in Country Group D:5, for which no notification is required. Transactions under NAC must meet all of the applicable criteria identified under paragraph § 740.8(a) and must comply with the restrictions set forth in paragraph § 740.8(b).
The full terms of License Exception NAC are described in § 740.8.
AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C68 (NAC) (No notification required) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:
- Report License Code: C68 Notified Advanced Computing (NAC) (No notification required), if no advanced notification was required.
- Report License Number: Report “NAC” in the license number block.
- Allowable ECCNs: 3A090, 4A090, 3A001, 4A003, 4A004, 4A005, 5A002, 5A004, 5A992, 5D002, or 5D992.
- Allowable countries: Destinations specified in Country Groups D:1, D:4, and D:5.
- “.z” must be entered as the first characters to appear in the Commodity Description block for 3A001.z, 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 5A002.z, 5A004.z, 5A992.z, 5D002.z, or 5D992.z.
- Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
- Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)
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The U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
Publication of Tri-Seal Compliance Note
March 6, 2024: The U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, have issued a Tri-Seal Compliance Note: Obligations of foreign-based persons to comply with U.S. sanctions and export control laws.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240306_33 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932746/download?inline
| LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES |
This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.
Fines and Penalties
March 1, 2024: Maxim Marchenko, a Russian citizen who has resided in Hong Kong, pleaded guilty to charges of money laundering and smuggling goods from the United States. Marchenko was arrested in September 2023.
Marchenko and two co-conspirators operated an illicit procurement network in Russia, Hong Kong, and elsewhere overseas. This procurement network has fraudulently obtained from U.S. distributors large quantities of dual-use, military grade microelectronics, on behalf of Russia-based end users. To carry out this scheme, Marchenko and his co-conspirators used shell companies based in Hong Kong and other deceptive means to conceal from U.S. Government agencies and U.S. distributors that the OLED micro-displays were destined for Russia.
The technology that Marchenko and his co-conspirators fraudulently procured have significant military applications, such as in rifle scopes, night-vision googles, thermal optics and other weapon systems.
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March 5, 2024: A federal criminal complaint was unsealed in the District of Arizona charging Abraham Chol Keech, 44, of Utah, and Peter Biar Ajak, 40, of Maryland, with conspiring to purchase and illegally export millions of dollars’ worth of fully automatic rifles, grenade launchers, Stinger missile systems, hand grenades, sniper rifles, ammunition, and other export-controlled items from the United States to South Sudan, in violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA).
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March 7, 2024: A federal grand jury indicted Leon Ding, charging him with four counts of theft of trade secrets in connection with an alleged plan to steal from Google LLC (Google) proprietary information related to artificial intelligence (AI) technology. Ding, 38, a national of the People’s Republic of China and resident of Newark, California, transferred sensitive Google trade secrets and other confidential information from Google’s network to his personal account while secretly affiliating himself with PRC-based companies in the AI industry.
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March 7, 2024: Korbein Schultz, a U.S. Army soldier and intelligence analyst, was arrested at Fort Campbell following an indictment by a federal grand jury charging him with conspiracy to obtain and disclose national defense information, exporting technical data related to defense articles without a license, conspiracy to export defense articles without a license, and bribery of a public official.
During the course of the conspiracy, Schultz also sent Conspirator A three documents that violated the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The three documents included an Air Force Tactics Techniques and Procedures manual for the HH-60W helicopter, an Air Force Tactics Techniques and Procedures manual for the F22-A fighter aircraft, and an Air Force Tactics Techniques and Procedures manual for intercontinental ballistic missiles.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1341561/dl?inline
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March 14, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a settlement with EFG International AG, a Switzerland-based global private banking group. EFG has agreed to pay $3,740,442 to settle its potential civil liability for processing 873 securities transactions in apparent violation of the Cuban Asset Control Regulations, the Kingpin Act, and Executive Order 14024. The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that EFG’s apparent violations were voluntarily self-disclosed and were non-egregious.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932766/download?inline
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March 20, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 19799: On May 12, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Thomas Allen Glomski (“Glomski”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371 and 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Glomski was convicted of conspiring to smuggle and smuggling ammunition from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Glomski to time served, 36 months of supervised release, and a $200 special assessment.
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March 20, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 19801: On January 17, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Oziel Zuniga (“Zuniga”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Zuniga was convicted of smuggling a Romarm/Cugir, Model Draco, 7.62×39 mm caliber pistol from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Zuniga to 51 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.
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March 20, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 19805: On February 14, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Alejandro Valles (“Valles”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Valles was convicted of smuggling a M203 40mm grenade launcher barrel from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Valles to 15 months of imprisonment with credit for time served, three years of supervised release, and a special $100 assessment.
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March 20, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 19805: On June 26, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Igor Panchernikov (“Panchernikov”) was convicted of violating Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C 2778) (“AECA”). Specifically, Panchernikov was convicted of conspiring to knowingly and willfully export from the United States to Russia defense articles, including thermal imaging riflescopes and night vision goggles, that were covered by the United States Munitions List without first obtaining the required license or written approval from United States Department of State. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Panchernikov to 27 months in prison, one year of supervised release and a $100 special assessment.
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March 20, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 19800: On January 19, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Miami, Hendel Laurent (“Laurent”) was convicted of violating 50 U.S.C. 4819. Specifically, Laurent was convicted of knowingly and willfully attempting to export and attempting to cause the export of firearms and related commodities, specifically, non-automatic and semi-automatic firearms equal to .50 caliber (12.7 mm) or less, and detachable magazines with a capacity of greater than 16 rounds specially designed for those firearms, from the United States to Haiti, without first having obtained the required licenses from the U.S. Department of Commerce. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Laurent to 46 months of imprisonment, two years of supervised release and a $100 assessment.
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March 20, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 19802: On June 21, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, Victor Avalos-Tavera (“Avalos-Tavera”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Avalos-Tavera was convicted of smuggling from the United States to Mexico several firearms. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Avalos-Tavera to 57 months of imprisonment and a $200 assessment.
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March 20, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 19803: On September 24, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, Ron Rockwell Hansen (“Hansen”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 794. Specifically, Hansen was convicted of attempting espionage by knowingly and unlawfully attempting to communicate, deliver, and transmit directly and indirectly to the People’s Republic of China, documents and information relating to the national defense of the United States including documents marked as SECRET//NOFORN that related to military readiness in a particular region, with intent and reason to believe that such documents and information would be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of any foreign nation. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Hansen to 10 years of imprisonment, 60 months of supervised release and a $100 assessment.
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March 20, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 19804: On April 13, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Noe De Hoyos (“Hoyos”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Hoyos was convicted of smuggling from the United States to Mexico various firearms, various firearms accessories and various ammunition without the required license or written approval from the Department. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Hoyos to 51 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment.
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March 20, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 19806: On December 19, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, Martin Najera (“Najera”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371 and 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Najera was convicted of conspiring to smuggle firearms from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Najera to 37 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, restitution of $7,513.70 and a $100 special assessment.
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March 20, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 19807: On July 19, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Jonathan Guadalupe Almanza (“Almanza”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Almanza was convicted of smuggling one Glock 17 GEN5 pistol with three magazines, one Stoeger 9mm STR–9 pistol with one magazine, and one Springfield 9mm Hellcat pistol with two magazines without a license or written approval from the United States Department of Commerce. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Almanza to 38 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and $100 assessment.
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March 26, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 20942: On November 29, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Michael David Mummert (“Mummert”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371 and 18 U.S.C. 554. Specifically, Mummert was convicted of conspiring to smuggle firearms and firearms parts from the United States to Mexico without first having obtained the required export license and authorization from the United States Department of State or United States Department of Commerce. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 36 months in prison, three years of supervised release, a $100 assessment and a $10,000 fine.
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March 26, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 20943: On April 7, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Niloufar Bahadorifar (“Bahadorifar”), was convicted of violating the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C 1701, et seq.) (“IEEPA”). Specifically, Bahadorifar was convicted of conspiring to provide services to Iran and the Government of Iran from the United States without first obtaining the required approval from U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced Bahadorifar to 48 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $200 assessment.
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March 26, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 20943: On August 29, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Juan Jose Roque (“Roque”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554. Specifically, Roque was convicted of smuggling from the United States to Mexico, 12,800 rounds of 7.62 x 39mm ammunition, 150 rounds of 38 Special ammunition 60 rounds of .223 caliber ammunition and one Stoeger Cougar 9mm pistol, without a license or written approval from the U.S. Department of Commerce. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 46 months in prison, and a $100 special assessment.
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March 28, 2024: In a superseding indictment returned by a grand jury, a citizen of the Republic of Latvia was charged with crimes related to a years-long conspiracy to sell sophisticated avionics equipment to Russian companies, in violation of U.S. export laws. The defendant is the third to be arrested and charged in connection with the conspiracy led by a Kansas company and two U.S. nationals.
According to the superseding indictment, Oleg Chistyakov, also known as Olegs Čitsjakovs, 55, conspired with U.S. citizens Cyril Gregory Buyanovsky and Douglas Edward Robertson, of Kansas, to facilitate the sale, repair, and shipment of U.S. avionics equipment to customers in Russia and in other countries that operate Russian-built aircraft, including the Federal Security Service of Russia (FSB). Chistyakov was arrested on March 19 near Riga, Latvia, and remains detained pending extradition proceedings. In December 2023, Buyanovsky pleaded guilty to conspiracy and conspiracy to commit money laundering and consented to the forfeiture of over $450,000 worth of avionics equipment and a $50,000 personal forfeiture judgment.
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March 29, 2024: Fares Abdo Al Eyani, 41, of Oakland, California, was sentenced to 12 months and a day in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, for conspiring to export defense articles and attempting to export defense articles.
Court documents establish that the items Al Eyani attempted to export — four firearms, magazines, ammunition, and night-vision rifle scopes — were defense articles prohibited from export without a license by the AECA and the ITAR. Al Eyani did not have a license to export the defense articles.
In a separate sentencing, Al Eyani’s wife, Saba Mohsen Dhaifallah, 42, also of Oakland, was sentenced to three years of probation for making false statements to FBI special agents during the investigation of this matter.
Sanctions
Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
March 1, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 15744: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended the “Darfur Sanctions Regulations”. The newly updated “Sudan Stabilization Sanctions Regulations,” still found at 31 CFR part 546, implement Executive Order 14098 of May 4, 2023, as well as additional administrative updates.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932691/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240301
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March 1, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 15740: OFAC published a final rule to update terms across several sanctions programs’ regulations, to reflect current office names and email addresses, as well as to update grammatical terminology.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932696/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240301
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March 1, 2024: OFAC has published Frequently Asked Question (1167).
Question 1167: How does Venezuela General License (GL) 45B differ from Venezuela GL 45A?
Answer: On February 29, 2024, OFAC issued Venezuela GL 45B, “Authorizing Certain Repatriation Transactions Involving Consorcio Venezolano de Industrias Aeronáuticas y Servicios Aéreos, S.A.,” which narrowed the scope of transactions previously authorized by GL 45A. GL 45B no longer authorizes transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to non-commercial flights between non-U.S. jurisdictions in the Western Hemisphere and Venezuela that are not exclusively for the purposes of repatriation.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1167 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240301
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March 4, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 11 individuals, including Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa, and three entities for their involvement in corruption or serious human rights abuse pursuant to E.O. 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Mnangagwa, Auxillia, of Zimbabwe; and
- Tapfumaneyi, Asher Walter of Zimbabwe.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2154 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932741/download?inline and
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Treasury-2021-sanctions-review.pdf
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March 5, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two individuals and five entities associated with the Intellexa Consortium for their role in developing, operating, and distributing commercial spyware technology used to target Americans, including U.S. government officials, journalists, and policy experts. The proliferation of commercial spyware poses distinct and growing security risks to the United States and has been misused by foreign actors to enable human rights abuses and the targeting of dissidents around the world for repression and reprisal.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Dillan, Tal Jonathan of Israel; and
- Hamous, Sara Aleksandra Fayssal of Poland.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Cytrox Ad of Macedonia;
- Cytrox Holdings Zartkoruen Mukodo Reszvenytarsasag of Hungary;
- Intellexa Limited of Ireland;
- Iyellexa S.A. of Greece; and
- Thalestris Limited of Ireland.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240306 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2155
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March 6, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took additional action to target shipments of Iranian commodities undertaken by the network of Iran-based, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)-backed Houthi financial facilitator Sa’id al-Jamal. This action targeted two Hong Kong- and Marshall Islands-based ship owners and two vessels for their role in shipping commodities on behalf of al-Jamal, and follows a February 27 action targeting a related vessel, the ARTURA. The revenue generated through al-Jamal’s network continues to enable Houthi militant efforts, including ongoing and unprecedented attacks on international maritime commerce in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Hongkong Unitop Group Ltd of China; and
- Reneez Shipping of the Marshall Islands.
The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Eternal Fortune (3E5962) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9230907; MMSI 352003073 (vessel); and
- Reneez (T8A3663) Crude Oil Tanker Palau flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9232450; MMSI 511100508 (vessel).
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240306 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2159
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March 8, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two companies – one in Russia and one in the Central African Republic (CAR) – for their efforts in advancing Russia’s malign activities in CAR. These targets have played an important role enabling the Private Military Company ‘Wagner’ (Wagner Group) and, by extension, the activities of the Russian Federation. Those designated sought monetary gain from illicit natural resource extraction and provided material and financial support to the Wagner Group and other organizations associated with the enterprise of Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the former Wagner Group owner who died in August 2023 in a plane explosion in Russia.
The following changes have been made to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Bois Rogue Sarlu of Central African Republic; and
- Limited Liability Company Broker Expert of Russia
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240308 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2164
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March 11, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on 16 entities and individuals who compose an expansive business network spanning the Horn of Africa, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Cyprus that raises and launders funds for al-Shabaab, a terrorist group affiliated with al-Qa’ida. Individuals within this network include influential businesspeople in the region that lend financial backing to al-Shabaab, a terrorist group responsible for some of the worst terrorist attacks in East Africa’s modern history. These attacks have claimed the lives of thousands of innocent civilians. These individuals and entities are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, which targets terrorist groups and their enablers.
OFAC is also issuing Counter Terrorism General License 29, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Haleel Commodities LLC”.
General License 29: All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving Haleel Commodities LLC (Haleel Commodities), or any entity in which Haleel Commodities owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 10, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the GTSR.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Abdullahi, Abdulkadir Omar of Kenya;
- Awale, Mohamed Jumale Ali of Kenya;
- Dini, Faysal Yusuf of Kenya;
- Abdulaziz Yusuf of Somalia;
- Haydar, Farhan Hussein of Somalia;
- Hilowle, Omar Sheikh Ali of Somalia;
- Mahmad, Hassan Abdirahman of Somalia;
- Momahed, Abdikarin Farah of Somalia; and
- Robel, Mohammed Artan of Sweden.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Crown Bus Services Limited of Kenya;
- Haleel commodities L. L C. of the United Arab Emirates;
- Haleel commodities limited of Kenya;
- Haleel commodities ltd. Of Uganda;
- Haleel finance ltd of Cyprus;
- Haleel holdings ltd of Cyprus;
- Haleel ltd of Cyprus; and
- Qemat Al Najah General Trading L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates .
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240311 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2168 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932761/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932756/download?inline
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March 12, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action in coordination with the Kingdom of Bahrain against key Iran-based operatives and a financial facilitator for designated terrorist group Al-Ashtar Brigades. The Department of State designated Al-Ashtar Brigades as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2018.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Al-Dammami, Hussein Ahmad ‘Abdallah Ahmad Hussein of Bahrain;
- Alshofa, Ali Abdulnabi Ahmed Ebrahim M of Bahrain;
- Salman, Isa Saleh Isa Mohamed of Bahrain; and
- Sarhan, Hasan Ahmed Radhi Husain of Bahrain.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2171 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240312
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March 13, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated three individuals who have contributed to Specially Designated National (SDN) and Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik’s (Dodik) efforts to undermine the peace and stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) by organizing and executing the commemoration of “Republika Srpska Day” (RS Day) on January 9, 2024, an activity determined to be unconstitutional in BiH. These individuals facilitated Dodik’s efforts to undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) and the authority of the BiH Constitutional Court and the High Representative.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Golic, Srebrenka of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Okuka, Branislav of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
- Pajic Basinac, Jelena Banja Luka of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240313 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2175
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March 15, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is taking action against Marshall Islands-registered shipping company Vishnu Inc., whose vessel, the LADY SOFIA, is involved in illicit shipments to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in support of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Houthi financial facilitator Sa’id al-Jamal, who is sanctioned under U.S. counterterrorism authorities.
The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Vishnu Inc of Marshall Islands.
The following vessel has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Lady Sofia (3ESB9) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Executive Order 13886; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9212759; MMSI 371698000 (vessel).
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240315 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions
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March 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted three procurement networks –– based in Iran, Türkiye, Oman, and Germany –– that have supported Iran’s ballistic missile, nuclear, and defense programs. These networks have procured carbon fiber, epoxy resins, and other missile-applicable goods for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC ASF SSJO), Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), other U.S.-designated entities in Iran’s defense industrial base, and Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA), which is linked to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).
OFAC designated two individuals and two entities for services they provided the Government of the Russian Federation (GoR) in connection with a foreign malign influence campaign, including attempting to impersonate legitimate media outlets.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Gambashidze, Ilya Andreevich of Russia;
- Gok, Mahmut, Istanbul of Turkey;
- Inanlu, Mitra of Iran;
- Kanoglu, Hidayet, Rize, of Turkey;
- Karimi, Maziar of Iran;
- Shahmari Ghojeh Biklo, Rostam of Iran; and
- Tupikin, Nikolai Aleksandrovich of Russia.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Alborz Organic Material Engineering Company of Iran;
- Company Group Structura LLC of Russia;
- DM Gold Kiymelti Madenler Anonim Sirketi of Turkey;
- Gokler Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi of Tukey;
- Klas Kimyasal Urunler Ticaret Limited Sirketi of Turkey;
- Mahmut Gok Skies Petroleum Dis Ticaret of Turkey;
- Mazya Alardh Aldhabia LLC of Oman;
- Mazixon Gmbh and Co KG of Germany;
- Mazixon Verwaltungs GMBH of Germany;
- Pishro Mobtaker Peyvand of Iran;
- Social Design Agency of Russia; and
- Tit Uluslararasi Nakliyat Deri Tekstil Gida Sanayi Ve Ticaret Limited Sikreti of Turkey.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240320 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-rleases/jy2194 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-rleases/jy2195
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March 21, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Wendy Carolina Morales Urbina, Nicaragua’s Attorney General, for being complicit in the Ortega-Murillo regime’s oppression. This action, taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13851, as amended, targets a key actor in the Nicaraguan regime’s unjust persecution of political prisoners and civil society within the country.
In 2018, anti-government protests erupted in Nicaragua, prompting ongoing violent repression by the Ortega-Murillo regime. President Ortega and the Vice President, Rosario Murillo, Ortega’s wife, have consolidated power, suppressed popular protests, incarcerated political opponents, and silenced critical voices in the media or forced them into exile. President Ortega governs with a tight-knit group of trusted figures in the police, the military, and parliament. On February 9, 2023, President Ortega expelled 222 political prisoners and put them on a flight to Washington, D.C. According to the Nicaraguan government, the deportation of the prisoners was intended to protect peace and national security and those freed have been declared traitors who can never serve in Nicaraguan public office. As a result, Nicaragua stripped the 222 former political prisoners of their Nicaraguan citizenship.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Morales Urbina, Wendy Carolina of Nicaragua.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240321 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2200
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March 22, 2024: Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo announced, alongside local leaders and law enforcement in Arizona, that the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned operatives in a Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE) scheme to launder millions in illicit fentanyl proceeds for the Sinaloa Cartel. OFAC designated 15 Sinaloa Cartel members—several of whom are fugitives—and six Mexico-based businesses pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059. The Sinaloa Cartel, which is one of the most notorious and pervasive drug trafficking organizations in the world, is responsible for a significant portion of the illicit fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Garcia Velazco, Jorge Alejandro, of Mexico
- Gonzalez Cordero, Mayra Gisel, of Mexico
- Larranaga Herrera, Jesus Norberto of Mexico
- Leon Valdez, Jesus Manuel of Mexico
- Lizarraga Martinez, Victor of Mexico
- Lizarrage Sanchez, Karla Gabriela of Mexico
- Marin Gonzalez, Arturo D’Artagnan of Mexico
- Marin Gonzalez, Porthos, of Mexico
- Nunez Herrera, Alan Gabriel of Mexico
- Robledo Arredondo, Adilene Mayre of Mexico
- Robledo Arredondo, Ivan Yarethof Mexico
- Tirado Andrade, Jesus of Mexico
- Verduzco Castro, Rolando of Mexico
- Vergara Meza, Alexis of Mexico
- Vergara Meza, Edy of Mexico
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Bufaluss of Mexico
- Celulandia Taller & Store SLRC of Mexico
- Dulce Vulcan of Mexico
- Royal Room Dress of Mexico
- Smart Depot of Mexico
- Total Look of Mexico
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240322 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2201 and
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March 25, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Wuhan Xiaoruizhi Science and Technology Company, Limited (Wuhan XRZ), a Wuhan, China-based Ministry of State Security (MSS) front company that has served as cover for multiple malicious cyber operations. OFAC is also designating Zhao Guangzong and Ni Gaobin, two Chinese nationals affiliated with Wuhan XRZ, for their roles in malicious cyber operations targeting U.S. entities that operate within U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, directly endangering U.S. national security. This action is part of a collaborative effort with the U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of State, and the United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO).
People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored malicious cyber actors continue to be one of the greatest and most persistent threats to U.S. national security, as highlighted in the most recent Office of the Director of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Ni, Gaobin of China; and
- Zhao, Guangzong of China
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Wuhan Xiaoruizhi Science And Technology Company, Limited of China.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2205 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240325
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March 25, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned thirteen entities and two individuals for operating in the financial services and technology sectors of the Russian Federation economy including persons developing or offering services in virtual assets that enable the evasion of U.S. sanctions. Five entities were designated for being owned or controlled by OFAC-designated persons.
Many of the individuals and entities designated facilitated transactions or offered other services that helped OFAC-designated entities evade sanctions. These designations build upon OFAC’s February 23, 2024 action to target companies servicing Russia’s core financial infrastructure and curtail Russia’s use of the international financial system to further its war against Ukraine.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Bukanov, Timur Evgenyevich of Russia;
- Kaigorodov, Igor Veniaminovich of Russia;
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Autonomous Non-Profit Organization of Additional Professional Education Echelon Training Center of Russia;
- Bitfingroup OU of Estonia;
- Bitpapa IC FZC LLC of United Arab Emirates;
- Crypto Explorer DMCC of Russia;
- Joint-Stock Company Echelon Technologies of Russia;
- Joint-Stock Company B-Crypto of Russia;
- Limited Liability Company Cybersecurity Laboratory of Russia;
- Limited Liability Company Echelon Innovations of Russia;
- Limited Liability Company Key Information Systems of Russia;
- Limited Liability Company Project Consulting Bureau of Russia;
- Obschestvo S Organichennoy Osvetstvennostyu Atomaiz of Russia;
- Obschestvo S Organichennoy Osvetstvennostyu Kripto Eksplorer of Russia;
- Obschestvo S Organichennoy Osvetstvennostyu Laitkhaus of Russia;
- Obschestvo S Organichennoy Osvetstvennostyu Sistemy Raspredelennogog Reyestra
- of Russia;
- Obschestvo S Organichennoy Osvetstvennostyu Tsentr Obrabotki Elektronnykh Platezhy of Russia ;
- Obschestvo S Organichennoy Osvetstvennostyu Veb3 Integrator of Russia;
- Obschestvo S Organichennoy Osvetstvennostyu Veb3 Teknologii of Russia
- Tokentrust Holdings Limited of Russia; and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2204 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240325
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March 26, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is sanctioning six entities, one individual and two tankers that are based or registered in Liberia, India, Vietnam, Lebanon, and Kuwait that have engaged in facilitating commodity shipments and financial transactions for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), the Houthis, and Hizballah. This action, the sixth round of sanctions targeting the network of Iran-based, IRGC-QF-backed Houthi financial facilitator Sa’id al-Jamal since December 2023, represents yet another step in a concerted campaign to disrupt IRGC-QF finances and its support to terrorist proxies such as the Houthis.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Makarov, Aleksey of Russia.
The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Abyss Palau flag Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9157765; MMSI 511101287 (vessel); and
- Dawn II Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9185530; MMSI 374100000 (vessel).
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2209 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240326
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March 26, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 11 individuals and entities supporting the regime of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad through the facilitation of illicit financial transfers and trafficking of illegal drugs, as well as the extraction and export of Syrian commodities. Syria has become the leading producer and exporter of Captagon, a highly addictive amphetamine-type stimulant trafficked illegally throughout the Middle East and Europe.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Al-Dj, Mahmoud Abdulilah of Syria;
- Al-Kayali, Taher of Syria;
- Al-law, Tawfiq Muhammad Sa’id of Syria;
- Al-Minala, Muhammad ‘Ali, of Syria; and
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Al-Ta’ir Company of Syria;
- Freebird Travel and tourism of Syria;
- Grains Middle East Trading DWC-LLC of United Arab Emirates;
- Hassaleh International Company of Liberia;
- KNH Shipping Private Limited of India;
- Limited Liability Company STG Logistic of Russia;
- Mass Com Group General Trading and Contracting Company of Kuwait;
- Maya Exchange Company of Syria;
- Melody Shipment Pvt Ltd of India;
- Neptunus LLC of Syria;
- Orchida Regional For General Trading and Contracting Company of Kuwait; and
- Quoc Viet Marine Transport JSC of Vietnam.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2210 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240326
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March 27, 2024: In coordination with the Republic of Korea (ROK), the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned six individuals and two entities based in Russia, China, and the United Arab Emirates, that generate revenue and facilitate financial transactions for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Funds generated through these actors are ultimately funneled to support the DPRK’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. The ROK is jointly designating six of the same individuals and entities for their involvement in illicit financing and revenue generation through overseas DPRK information technology (IT) workers. This action also accompanies the 6th U.S.-ROK Working Group on DPRK Cyber Threats.
This action targets agents of designated DPRK banks along with companies that employ DPRK IT workers abroad. DPRK banking representatives, IT workers, and the companies that employ them generate revenue and gain access to foreign currencies vital to the Kim regime. These actors, operating primarily through networks located in Russia and China, orchestrate schemes, set up front or shell companies, and manage surreptitious bank accounts to move and disguise illicit funds, evade sanctions, and finance the DPRK’s unlawful WMD and ballistic missile programs.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Han, Chol Man of North Korea;
- Jon, Yun Gun of North Korea;
- Jong, Song Ho of North Korea;
- O, In Chun of North Korea;
- Ri, Tong Hyok of North Korea; and
- Yu, Pu Ung of North Korea.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Limited Liability Company Alis of Russia; and
- Pioneer Bencot Star Real Estate of United Arab Emirates.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240327_33 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2215
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March 27, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two individuals and three entities as key financial facilitators involved in fundraising for Hamas. In the wake of the October 7, 2023 terrorist attack perpetrated by Hamas against Israel, Gaza Now engaged in fundraising efforts to support Hamas. Gaza Now and its founder Mustafa Ayash, as well Al-Qureshi Executives and Aakhirah Limited, and their director Aozma Sultana, partnered on multiple fundraising efforts. This action is being taken as part of a collaborative effort with the United Kingdom’s Office of Foreign Sanctions Implementation, which is implementing sanctions on these same targets.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Ayash, Mustafa of Austria; and
- Sultana, Aozma of United Kingdom.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Aakhiran Limited of United Kingdom;
- Al-Quereshi Executives of United Kingdom; and
- Gaza Now.
MARCH 2024 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES Read More »