LATEST EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATE NOVEMBER 2024
This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through November 30, 2024. The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.
See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and
persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.
REGULATORY UPDATES
President
President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Iran
November 1, 2024: On November 14, 1979, by Executive Order 12170, the President declared a national emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and took related steps to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the situation in Iran.
U.S. relations with Iran have not yet normalized, and the process of implementing the agreements with Iran, dated January 19, 1981, is ongoing. For this reason, the national emergency declared on November 14, 1979, and the measures adopted on that date to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 2024. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency with respect to Iran declared in Executive Order 12170.
and
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/page/2/
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President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to the Threat from Securities Investments That Finance Certain Companies of the People’s Republic of China
November 7, 2024: On November 12, 2020, by Executive Order 13959, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the threat from securities investments that finance certain companies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The President found that the PRC is exploiting United States capital to resource and enable the development and modernization of its military, intelligence, and other security apparatuses, which continues to allow the PRC to directly threaten the United States homeland and United States forces overseas. Through the national strategy of Military‑Civil Fusion, the PRC increases the size of the country’s military-industrial complex by compelling civilian Chinese companies to support its military and intelligence activities. Those companies, though remaining ostensibly private and civilian, directly support the PRC’s military, intelligence, and security apparatuses and aid in their development and modernization. At the same time, those companies raise capital by selling securities to United States investors that trade on public exchanges both here and abroad, lobbying United States index providers and funds to include these securities in market offerings, and engaging in other acts to ensure access to United States capital.
The President further found that the PRC’s military-industrial complex, by directly supporting the efforts of the PRC’s military, intelligence, and other security apparatuses, constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.
On January 13, 2021, the President signed Executive Order 13974 amending Executive Order 13959.
On June 3, 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order 14032, which expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13959. President Biden found that additional steps are necessary to address that national emergency, including the threat posed by the military-industrial complex of the PRC and its involvement in military, intelligence, and security research and development programs, and weapons and related equipment production under the PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy. In addition, President Biden found that the use of Chinese surveillance technology outside the PRC and the development or use of Chinese surveillance technology to facilitate repression or serious human rights abuse constituted unusual and extraordinary threats to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and President Biden expanded the national emergency to address these threats. Executive Order 14032 amended Executive Order 13959 and revoked Executive Order 13974 in its entirety.
The threat from securities investments that finance certain companies of the PRC and certain uses, and development of Chinese surveillance technology continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.
For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13959 of November 12, 2020, expanded in scope by Executive Order 14032 of June 3, 2021, must continue in effect beyond November 12, 2024. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13959 with respect to the threat from securities investments that finance certain companies of the PRC and expanded in Executive Order 14032.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/
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President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
November 7, 2024: On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, the President declared a national emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons. On July 28, 1998, by Executive Order 13094, the President amended Executive Order 12938 to respond more effectively to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation activities. On June 28, 2005, by Executive Order 13382, the President, among other things, further amended Executive Order 12938 to improve our ability to combat proliferation. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994, with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering such weapons must continue beyond November 14, 2024. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden Continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938, as amended.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/
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President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Nicaragua
November 22, 2024: On November 27, 2018, by Executive Order 13851, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in Nicaragua. On October 24, 2022, President Biden issued Executive Order 14088 to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13851.
The situation in Nicaragua, including the violent response by the Government of Nicaragua to the protests that began on April 18, 2018, and the Ortega-Murillo regime’s continued systematic dismantling and undermining of democratic institutions and the rule of law, its use of indiscriminate violence and repressive tactics against civilians, as well as its corruption leading to the destabilization of Nicaragua’s economy, continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared on November 27, 2018, must continue in effect beyond November 27, 2024. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden is continuing for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13851 with respect to the situation in Nicaragua.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/
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Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)
Extension of Comment Period for the Rule Proposing Changes to U.S. Munitions List Categories IV and XV
November 15, 2024: The Department of State is extending the comment period for the proposed rule “International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR): U.S. Munitions List Categories IV and XV” (89 FR 84482, Oct. 23, 2024). The original comment period required submission of comments on or before November 22, 2024. In response to requests from the public, the Department extends the comment period through December 23, 2024.
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events and
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2024-27059
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International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Extension of an Existing Temporary Modification of Category VIII of the U.S. Munitions List
November 26, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 93170: The Department of State, pursuant to its regulations and in the interest of the national security and foreign policy of the United States, extended a previous temporary modification of the United States Munitions List (USML) Category VIII.
On December 4, 2023, the Department of State published a final rule in the Federal Register at 88 FR 84072 temporarily modifying the note to USML Category VIII(h)(1), such that parts, components, accessories, and attachments specially designed for aircraft identified in paragraph (h)(1) are not released from that paragraph due to their use in the KF-21 aircraft.
The Department of State previously determined it is in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States to allow manufacturers to apply for export authorizations to participate in development of the KF-21 aircraft by using certain defense articles described in paragraph (h)(1) without removing those defense articles from the USML simply because they are used in the KF-21.
Now, the Department of State again determined it is in the security and foreign policy interests of the United States to extend the validity period of this temporary modification. Accordingly, pursuant to International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) § 126.2, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs hereby extends the previous temporary modification of the Note to paragraph (h)(1) of USML Category VIII.
Section 126.2 of the ITAR provides that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade Controls may order the temporary suspension or modification of any or all provisions of the ITAR when in the interest of the security and foreign policy of the United States. Section 120.1(b) of the ITAR authorizes the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs to exercise this authority for the Department of State.
This temporary modification, already effective and currently reflected in the USML at ITAR § 121.1, is hereby extended until December 1, 2026, or when terminated by the Department of State, whichever occurs first.
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Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Poland
November 1, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government Poland of has requested to buy mobile Ground Control Approach (GCA-2000) systems, which consist of ultra-high frequency radios; AN/UPX interrogators; radio navigation equipment; test equipment; precision navigation; spare and repair parts; consumables; accessories; warranties; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $105 million. The principal contractor will be L3Harris, located in Melbourne, FL. There is no known offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Repubic of Korea
November 4, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Republic of Korea (ROK) has requested to buy four (4) E-7 Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft; ten (10) CFM56 jet engines (8 installed, 2 spares); seven (7) Guardian Laser Transmitter Assemblies (GLTA) (4 installed, 3 spares); eight (8) AN/AAR-57 AN/AAQ 24(V)N Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) System Processor Replacements (LSPR) (4 installed, 4 spares); ten (10) Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) (EGI) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) – or M-Code receiver (8 installed, 2 spares); and six (6) Multifunctional Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio Systems with Tactical Targeting Network Technology (MIDS JTRS TTNT) (4 installed, 2 spares). The following non-MDE items will also be included: AN/ARC-210 radios; digital radar warning receivers; AN/ALE-47 electronic countermeasure dispensers; LAIRCM control interface units; missile warning sensors; AN/APX-119 identification friend or foe (IFF) transponders; KY100M narrowband/wideband terminals; KIV-77 Mode 4/5 IFF cryptographic appliqué; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; KG-175 Link encryptors; communications security (COMSEC) cables and other COMSEC devices and equipment; communications equipment; precision navigation; Computer Program Identification Numbers (CPINS); user data module cards; testing and test equipment; major and minor modifications and maintenance support; aircraft components, parts, and accessories; training aids and devices, and spare parts; instruments and lab equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; aircraft ferry and transportation support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $4.92 billion. The principal contractor will be The Boeing Company, located in Renton, WA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/archive-date/202411
DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Czech Republic
November 5, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of the Czech Republic has requested to buy a two-sector fixed satellite communications turnkey system, based on a Large Enterprise Terminals (LET) system, consisting of the following non-MDE items: communications equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $184 million. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the Czech Republic.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/czech-republic-large-enterprise-terminals-system and
https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/archive-date/202411
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Greece
November 14, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Greece has requested to buy equipment and services for follow-on support of its F-16 engines. The following non-MDE items will be included: engine components, parts, and accessories; aircraft engine and ground handling equipment; major and minor modifications; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $160 million. The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region. The principal contractor will be General Electric Aerospace, located in Evendale, OH. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Greece. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/greece-f-16-engine-follow-support
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the United Kingdom
November 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government the United Kingdom has requested to buy forty-six (46) Tactical Combat Training System Increment II (TCTS II) air combat training systems. The following non-MDE items will also be included: containers; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $70 million. The principal contractors will be Collins Aerospace, located in Cedar Rapids, IA, and Leonardo DRS Systems, located in Fort Walton Beach, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Republic of Korea
November 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Republic of Korea has requested to buy equipment and services to upgrade its F-15K aircraft fleet, including ninety-six (96) Advanced Display Core Processor II (ADCP II) mission system computers; seventy (70) AN/APG-82(v)1 Active Electronically Scanned Arrays (AESA) radars; seventy (70) AN/ALQ-250 Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS) electronic warfare (EW) suites; and seventy (70) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS). The following non-MDE items will also be included: Joint Mission Planning Systems (JMPS) with unique planning components; Computer Program Identification Numbers (CPINs); Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems; major modifications and maintenance support; aircraft components, parts, and accessories; spare parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support; training aids and devices; weapons software and software support; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; aerial refueling support; aircraft ferry and transportation support; facilities and construction support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $6.2 billion. The primary contractors will be Boeing Company, based in Arlington, VA; Raytheon Technologies, located in Forest, MS; and BAE Systems, situated in Falls Church, VA. The U. S. Government is not aware of any offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/republic-korea-f-15k-aircraft-upgrade
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Ukraine
November 19, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of Ukraine has requested to buy equipment and services for refurbishment of vehicles; technical assistance; training; publications; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $100 million. The principal contractor(s) will be determined from approved vendors. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the United Kingdom
November 27, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of the United Kingdom has requested to buy a High Gain Measurement System (HGMS) with off-aspect mid frequency line arrays (MFLAs), HGMS components that include acoustic sensors, cables, test hardware and software; containers; anchoring equipment; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $125 million. The principal contractor will be Leidos, Inc., located in Reston, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO)
November 29, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy critical spare and repair parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support for F-16 aircraft; Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar spare parts and support; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $320 million. Deliveries are estimated to begin in 2025. This equipment will be transferred from U.S. Government stock. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO)
November 29, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy extended services provided under a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at $41.6 million ($0 in MDE), included services related to follow-on support for the Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment (IMSE) and Experimental Force (EXFOR) system, including repair and return of equipment; management, replacement, and repair services; U.S. Government liaison support as required; contract engineering and technical support; logistics; contractor operation and management of the OCONUS depot, including repair and replacement; and other related elements of logistics and program support. This notification is for an extension of those same services for an additional two years. The estimated total cost is $65 million. The principal contractor will be General Dynamics Mission Systems, located in Fairfax, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
BIS Releases New Edition of “Don’t Let This Happen to You!”
November 12, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Export Enforcement published an updated version of “Don’t Let This Happen to You!”, a compendium of case examples highlighting BIS criminal and administrative enforcement efforts. The publication was last updated in July 2024.
The updated version includes new enforcement cases involving: the first Disruptive Technology Strike Force case to result in a stand-alone administrative penalty; a criminal case against an illicit Russian procurement network; a criminal case where export-controlled items were smuggled outside of the United States and used in an assassination plot; an administrative case against a semiconductor wafer manufacturing company for unauthorized shipments to a party on the Entity List; and violations of the antiboycott regulations. Exporters are encouraged to review the publication, which provides useful illustrations of the type of conduct that gets companies and universities in trouble.
BIS Export Enforcement protects and promotes U.S. national security by aggressively investigating violations of export control and antiboycott regulations and by partnering with industry and academia to facilitate compliance with those regulation.
https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-releases-new-edition-dont-let-happen-you-0
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Export Administration Regulation: Revisions to Space-Related Export Controls; Extension of Comment Period
November 18, 2024: On October 23, 2024, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published in the Federal Register the interim final rule, “Export Administration Regulations: Revisions to Space Related Export Controls” with comments originally due November 22, 2024. This notification extends the deadline for written comments to December 23, 2024. This extension is being made to allow commenters to have additional time to review the interim final rule and to be informed by the public outreach that BIS is conducting on the rule in preparing their comments. Extending the public comment period will not in any way undermine the rule or national security of the United States.
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Export Administration Regulations: Revisions to Space-Related Controls, including Addition of License Exception Commercial Space Activities (CSA); Extension of Comment Period
November 18, 2024: On October 23, 2024, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published in the Federal Register the proposed rule, “Export Administration Regulations: Revisions to Space Related Export Controls, Including Addition of License Exception Commercial Space Activities (CSA)” with comments originally due November 22, 2024. This notification extends the deadline for written comments to December 23, 2024. This extension is being made to allow commenters to have additional time to review the proposed rule and to be informed by the public outreach that BIS is conducting on the rule in preparing their comments. Extending the public comment period will not in any way undermine the rule or national security of the United States.
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Department of Commerce Strengthens Restrictions on Exports to Pakistan to Address Diversion Concerns
November 25, 2024: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule imposing new controls on exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) involving six key categories of items – some of which were previously controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons – to Pakistan to address diversion concerns. BIS has determined that these items have been sought by entities on the Entity List, as well as front companies acting on their behalf. Controlling such items on a countrywide basis will allow the U.S. Government to review proposed transactions to mitigate the risk of diversion to an end use or end user of concern, while facilitating trade for legitimate commercial and civil end uses.
The items controlled in this rule are listed on the Commerce Control List under Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) 1B999, 2A992, 2B999,1 3A992, 3A999, and 6A996. Items that fall within the scope of these ECCNs include the following:
- Particle accelerators;
- Certain stainless or alloy pipes and valves;
- Certain pumps and welders;
- Oscilloscopes;
- Chromatographs and spectrometers; and
A BIS license will now be required for regional stability reasons to export, reexport, or transfer items (in-country) under these six ECCNs to or within Pakistan. Applications for such transactions will be denied if the U.S. Government determines that there is an unacceptable risk of use in an end use of concern or diversion to an end user of concern. The availability of license exceptions is limited.
https://www.federalregister.gov/ and
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U.S. Census Bureau
Implementation of SPD 15 in the American Community Survey
November 5, 2024: Earlier this year, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published the results of its review of Statistical Policy Directive No. 15 (SPD 15) and issued updated standards for maintaining, collecting and presenting race and ethnicity data across federal agencies. The updated 2024 SPD 15 requires the use of a combined race and ethnicity question, the addition of a new “Middle Eastern or North African” minimum reporting category, and the collection of detailed race and ethnicity responses.
Since then, programs across the U.S. Census Bureau have been assessing how and when to implement the updated race and ethnicity standards set by OMB in the 2024 SPD 15. We expect race and ethnicity data that align with the revised standards will enhance the entire range of Census Bureau data products that describe the demographic makeup and socioeconomic characteristics of our country and our diverse communities.
The U.S. Census Bureau recognizes the importance of implementing the updated standards as quickly as possible, while maintaining the high-quality American Community Survey (ACS) data that are relied upon by so many both inside and outside of government. We have given careful consideration regarding the implementation of the updated race and ethnicity standards, including an assessment of cost, risk, and benefit. Based on these assessments, we decided to implement the finalized 2024 SPD 15 published by OMB on March 28, 2024, in the 2027 ACS data collection cycle. This means:
- The first ACS 1-year estimates produced using the updated standards will be the 2027 ACS 1-year data, planned for release in September 2028.
- The first 5-year estimates produced solely using the data collected under the 2024 SPD 15 will be available in the 2027-2031 ACS 5-year data, scheduled for release in December 2032.
- Until the ACS has 5 years of data collected using the updated standards, the Census Bureau will produce ACS 5-year estimates using a bridging technique, starting with the 2023-2027 ACS 5-year release scheduled for December 2028. Providing data products at low levels of geography following the 2024 SPD 15 will allow data users to gain new insights into the demographic makeup and socioeconomic characteristics of our diverse communities.
In making a final decision about the timing, the Census Bureau weighed the need for producing data under the updated standards as quickly as possible against the need for accurate data. The ACS program conducted an assessment of what would be necessary to implement the updated 2024 SPD 15 in the ACS in either the 2026 ACS or the 2027 ACS. This assessment considered multiple factors including the amount of time and resources needed to implement the change accurately and how the implementation of the 2024 SPD 15 could be accomplished alongside work on critical projects to modernize operations at the Census Bureau.
The Census Bureau also considered federal and nonfederal stakeholder feedback in its assessment. The Census Bureau solicited public feedback on the timing of the implementation of the updated 2024 SPD 15 through a Federal Register notice published on July 12, 2024. The ACS program and OMB also solicited comments about the timing of implementation from federal agencies that use ACS data. We appreciate those who responded with their thoughtful comments.
Related to this effort, the Census Bureau is participating in OMB’s Federal Committee on SPD 15, which will provide statistical tools such as bridging programs to crosswalk data collected under the 1997 SPD 15 and the revised 2024 SPD 15, and best practices for coding detailed racial and ethnic groups and write-in responses.
As we continue the work of implementing the updated standards in the ACS, we will keep the public, stakeholders, and data users informed. We look forward to implementing the updated race/ethnicity standards to improve and produce race/ethnicity statistics for our country.
Port of Unlading Codes Updated in the Automated Export System (AES)
November 18, 2024: Please note the following Port of Unlading Code Name has been UPDATED in the AES effective immediately.
Port Name Port Code Country
Whonnock, BC 12488 Canada
The following Port of Unlading Code Country has been UPDATED in the AES effective immediately.
Port Name Port Code Country
Tolu 30111 Colombia
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Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages
November 19, 2024: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected. If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation. Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN. However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.
To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.
Response Code: 512
Narrative: ECCN Missing
Severity: Fatal
Reason: The License Code/License Exemption Code requires an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN), but it was not reported.
Resolution: The License Code/License Exemption Code requires the reporting of an ECCN. See ‘Appendix F – License and License Exemption Type Codes’ and reporting guidelines.
Verify the License Code/License Exemption Code requirements, correct the shipment and resubmit.
Response Code: 626
Narrative: 1st UOM Code Missing
Severity: Fatal
Reason: The Schedule B/HTS Number reported requires a Unit of Measure (1) and Unit of Measure (1) is missing.
Resolution: The Schedule B/HTS Number reported requires the Units for 1st Quantity to be reported.
Verify the Unit of Measure for the 1st Quantity, correct the shipment and resubmit.
LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES |
This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.
Fines and Penalties
November 1, 2024: As part of a settlement agreement, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed a civil penalty of $500,000 against GlobalFoundries U.S. Inc., a semiconductor wafer manufacturing company headquartered in Malta, New York, and its subsidiary, GlobalFoundries U.S. 2 LLC (collectively, “GlobalFoundries”).
The penalty relates to GlobalFoundries’ shipments of semiconductor wafers valued at approximately $17.1 million to SJ Semiconductor (SJS), a company on the BIS Entity List, without the requisite license or other authorization from BIS. GlobalFoundries voluntarily disclosed the conduct to BIS, cooperated with the investigation by BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement (OEE), and took remedial measures after discovering the conduct at issue, which resulted in a significant reduction in the penalty.
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November 1, 2024: Vadim Yermolenko, 43, a dual U.S.-Russian national and resident of New Jersey, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Export Control Reform Act, conspiracy to commit bank fraud, and conspiracy to defraud the United States for his role in a transnational procurement and money laundering network that sought to acquire sensitive dual-use electronics for Russian military and intelligence services.
The defendant and his co-conspirators unlawfully purchased and exported highly sensitive, export controlled electronic components, some of which can be used in the development of nuclear and hypersonic weapons, quantum computing and other military applications.
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November 13, 2024: Stanislav Romanyuk, 39, a citizen of Ukraine last residing in Estonia, was sentenced to 33 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, for his role in a scheme to violate U.S. export laws and regulations by attempting to smuggle a dual-use export-controlled item to Russia.
According to court documents and statements made in court, beginning in 2018, Romanyuk, who operated Estonia-based BY Trade OÜ, conspired with Vadims Ananics and Eriks Mamonovs, both citizens of Latvia who operated the Latvia-based corporation CNC Weld. Romanyuk, Ananics, and Mamonovs violated U.S. export laws and regulations with individuals in Russia and a Russian company to smuggle to Russia a 500 Series CPWZ Precision Jig Grinder that was manufactured in Connecticut.
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November 14, 2024: George Semerene Quintero (Semerene), 61, of Venezuela, was sentenced to 30 months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release for conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and for his role in a scheme to evade U.S. sanctions imposed on Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA), a Venezuelan state-owned oil company.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/venezuelan-national-sentenced-sanctions-evasion-scheme and
November 14, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $178,421 settlement with American Life Insurance Company (ALICO), a subsidiary of MetLife, Inc. ALICO agreed to settle its potential civil liability for 2,331 apparent violations of OFAC sanctions on Iran. The apparent violations related to insurance policies provided to entities in the United Arab Emirates that were owned or controlled by the Government of Iran. The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that the apparent violations were voluntarily self-disclosed and were not egregious.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241114_33
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November 15, 2024: The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) has notified Moheed Latif, Hamza Latif, and Abdu Latif Chaudhry, and their company M&M Wireless Communications, Inc. (“M&M), of its intention to initiate an administrative proceeding against the individuals and M&M pursuant to Section 766.3 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”). The individuals and M&M jointly committed 94 Violations of the EAR, including 4 acts of Misrepresentation and Concealment of Facts (15 C.F.R 764.2(g)) and 90 acts of Failure to Comply with Recordkeeping requirements (15 C.F.R. 764.2(i)).
Misrepresentation and Concealment of Facts
On four occasions between November 24, 2020 and November 17, 2021, M&M made false and misleading statements and falsified material facts a to U.S. based freight forwarding company in preparing and submitting “export control documents” as defined in Section 772.1 of the EAR. M&M provided false information to file Electronic Export Information (“EEI”) on four separate occasions where BIS inspected and detained the shipment.
Failure to Comply with Recordkeeping Requirements
On May 10, 2022, the Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”) served M&M with a BIS Administrative Subpoena requesting the records, including but not limited to, invoices, correspondence with foreign purchasers, air waybills, and bills of lading, in connection with 90 exports. On June 10, 2022, OEE received a response from M&M stating that no such records existed.
Settlement
U.S. Customs and Border Protection has imposed a $5.4 million penalty and $462,669 civil forfeiture action against M&M.
BIS and M&M have entered into a Settlement Agreement:
- For a period of three (3) years, M&M shall be made subject to a three-year denial of its export privileges under the EAR.
- M&M shall complete export compliance training on the EAR within twelve (12) months of date of order.
- Verification of attendance of an export compliance training are made conditions to the granting, restoration, or continuing validity of any export license, license exception, permission, privilege granted, or to be granted to M&M.
https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/docman/?task=doc_download&gid=1648emid=
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November 26, 2024: Richard Shih, 77, the founder and former chief executive officer of a California-based international logistics and freight forwarding company with offices in Grapevine, Texas, pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate export laws by shipping goods to Chinese companies on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List.
Shih pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the Export Control Reform Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, which carries a maximum sentence of up to five years in federal prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.
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November 26, 2024: On Nov. 20 in the District of Oregon, Sanjay Kaushik, 57, of India, was indicted for conspiring to export controlled aviation components with dual civilian and military applications to end users in Russia, in violation of the Export Control Reform Act. Kaushik was also charged with attempting to illegally export a navigation and flight control system from Oregon to Russia through India, and with making false statements in connection with an export. He was arrested in Miami, Florida, on Oct. 17, pursuant to a criminal complaint and arrest warrant issued by the District of Oregon.
If convicted, Kaushik faces maximum penalties of 20 years in prison and up to a $1 million for each count in the indictment. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.
Sanctions
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
November 1, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 87279: In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) makes changes to the export controls against Russia and Belarus under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). This final rule expands the scope of the Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions by imposing controls on nine key precursors for riot control agents and a chemical weapon that Russia has deployed against Ukraine in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This final rule also makes adjustments to exclusions, exceptions, and licensing policy for exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) to certain components of the governments of Country Group A:5 and A:6 destinations that are in Russia and Belarus. Lastly, this final rule clarifies that the Russia/Belarus-Military End User and Procurement Foreign-Direct Product (FDP) rule and the EAR’s other Entity List FDP rules’ license requirements extend to or within any destination or to any end user or party that otherwise meets the criteria. This final rule is being published concurrently with a BIS final rule, “Additions and Revisions of Entities to the Entity List” (RIN 0694-AJ94), which includes additional changes related to export controls related to Russia and Belarus.
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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
November 6, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated one individual and one entity who support a corrupt patronage network in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) that attempted to evade U.S. sanctions. This network is directly linked to U.S.-designated Igor Dodik (Igor), the son of Milorad Dodik (Dodik), the U.S.-designated President of BiH’s Republika Srpska (RS), one of two entities that make up BiH. For years, Dodik has used his official position to accumulate personal wealth through companies linked to himself and Igor. This corruption has contributed to an undermining of public confidence in BiH state institutions and the rule of law.
The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) also issued Balkans-related General License (No. 5A), “Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Pumps Manufactured or Distributed by Kaldera Company EL PGP d.o.o. or Elpring d.o.o. Laktasi for the Treatment or Distribution of Drinking Water.”
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 5A: Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Pumps Manufactured or Distributed by Kaldera Company EL PGP d.o.o. or Elpring d.o.o. Laktasi for the Treatment or Distribution of Drinking Water
- All transactions prohibited by the Western Balkans Stabilization Regulations, 31 CFR part 588 (WBSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the manufacture, distribution, operation, installation, or maintenance and repair of pumps manufactured or distributed by Kaldera Company EL PGP d.o.o. (Kaldera), Elpring d.o.o. Laktasi (Elpring), or any entity in which Kaldera or Elpring owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are currently or are intended solely for use in the treatment or distribution of drinking water, are authorized.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Perisic, Vladimir of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Elpring D.O.O. Laktasi, XVI of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241106 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2709 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933566/download?inline
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November 7, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Venezuela General License 5Q, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 2020 8.5 Percent Bond on or After March 7, 2025,” and Venezuela General License 8O, “Authorizing Transactions Involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) Necessary for the Limited Maintenance of Essential Operations in Venezuela or the Wind Down of Operations in Venezuela for Certain Entities.”
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 5Q Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 2020 8.5 Percent Bond on or After March 7, 2025
- On or after March 7, 2025, all transactions related to, the provision of financing for, and other dealings in the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 2020 8.5 Percent Bond that would be prohibited by subsection l(a)(iii) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13835 of May 21, 2018, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019, and incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 😯 Authorizing Transactions Involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) Necessary for the Limited Maintenance of Essential Operations in Venezuela or the Wind Down of Operations in Venezuela for Certain Entities
- All transactions and activities prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13850 of November 1, 2018, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019, or E.O. 13884 of August 5, 2019, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the limited maintenance of essential operations, contracts, or other agreements, that: (i) are for safety or the preservation of assets in Venezuela; (ii) involve PdVSA or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest; and (iii) were in effect prior to July 26, 2019, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, May 9, 2025, for the following entities and their subsidiaries (collectively, the “Covered Entities”):
- Halliburton
- Schlumberger Limited
- Baker Hughes Holdings LLC
- Weatherford International, Public Limited Company
Note to paragraph (a). Transactions and activities necessary for safety or the preservation of assets in Venezuela that are authorized by paragraph (a) of this general license include: transactions and activities necessary to ensure the safety of personnel, or the integrity of operations and assets in Venezuela; participation in shareholder and board of directors meetings; making payments on third-party invoices for transactions and activities authorized by paragraph (a) of this general license, or incurred prior to April 21, 2020, provided such activity was authorized at the time it occurred; payment of local taxes and purchase of utility services in Venezuela; and payment of salaries for employees and contractors in Venezuela.
(b) All transactions and activities prohibited by E.O. 13850, as amended, or E.O. 13884, each as incorporated into the VSR, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of operations, contracts, or other agreements in Venezuela involving PdVSA or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, and that were in effect prior to July 26, 2019, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, May 9, 2025, for the Covered Entities.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241107 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933576/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933581/download?inline
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November 12, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Abdel Rahman Joma’a Barakallah (Barakallah) for his leadership role in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a primary party responsible for the ongoing violence against civilians in Sudan since April 2023. Barakallah led the RSF’s campaign in West Darfur, which was marked by credible claims of serious human rights abuses, including targeting of civilians, conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), and ethnically motivated violence. This action is in furtherance of the United Nations Security Council’s November 8 designation of Barakallah and fellow RSF commander Osman Mohamed Hamid Mohamed, who was previously designated by the Department of the Treasury in May 2024.
The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended the Burma Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 525, to further implement E.O. 14014 and reissued them in their entirety. This regulatory amendment is currently available for public inspection with the Federal Register and will take effect upon publication in the Federal Register on November 13, 2024.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Barkallah, Abdel Rahman Joma’a of Sudan.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2710 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933591/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241112
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November 13, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published two new insurance-related FAQs (FAQ 1199 and FAQ 1200).
FAQ 1199:
Q: Can a claim be paid under a policy issued to a blocked individual or entity if the payment is to an innocent third-party (for example, the injured party in an automobile accident)?
A: The insurance company should contact OFAC for additional guidance. OFAC will work with you on the specifics of the case. Although authorizing payments to blocked persons is rarely aligned with the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives of OFAC sanctions, circumstances may weigh in favor of authorizing payments to innocent third parties. Ultimately, the insurance policy itself is a blocked contract, so all otherwise prohibited dealings related to the policy would require OFAC authorization.
FAQ 1200:
Q: If a non-sanctioned person files a claim with their insurance company for a loss caused by a blocked person, such as a designated terrorist organization, is the insurance company permitted to pay the claim?
A: OFAC is aware that insurers at times receive claims from non-sanctioned persons in non-comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions for losses caused by individuals or entities on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List). For example, a U.S. insurance company may receive a claim request for death, injury, or property damage caused by a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Under this scenario, the mere fact that a blocked person has caused the loss does not in and of itself create a blocked interest in the policy or any claim or payment under the policy, nor does it constitute a dealing involving the blocked person. Therefore, U.S. insurers may pay such claims to non-sanctioned recipients, provided the payment is not prohibited by other OFAC sanctions regulations (e.g., the recipient resides in a sanctioned jurisdiction and no other authorization applies). This guidance does not apply to scenarios in which a person is seeking reimbursement for payments that were made or will be made to a blocked person.
OFAC encourages insurers who receive claims for losses caused by a blocked person to conduct necessary due diligence to ensure there are no other potential sanctions risks associated with making or facilitating related claim payments (e.g., the involvement of a blocked financial institution).
OFAC is aware that some insurance policies may include subrogation rights, which provide a legal right for the insurer to pursue reimbursement from the liable third-party for payment of the claim. The mere existence of such rights in a situation involving a loss caused by a blocked person does not create an interest of the blocked person in the policy or claims made under the policy. However, claims paid as described above and all other obligations of the insurer on behalf of the insured (or their non-sanctioned beneficiaries) under a given policy must not be contingent on the successful pursuit of a subrogated claim by the insurer against a blocked person.
OFAC does not require U.S. persons to obtain a specific license to initiate legal proceedings against a blocked person. For example, a U.S. attorney, insurer, or other service provider initiating arbitral proceedings against a Specially Designated Global Terrorist does not require a specific license. In most OFAC programs, however, a license would generally be required to enter a settlement agreement with a blocked person, to accept payment from a blocked person, or to enforce an order or award transferring blocked property. Please see the relevant OFAC implementing regulations and the Sanctions Programs and Country Information page on OFAC’s website for further program-specific information. For guidance on how to request and apply for a specific license, please see 31 CFR § 501.801 and the License Application page on OFAC’s website.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241113 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1199 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1200
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November 14, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 26 companies, individuals, and vessels associated with the Al-Qatirji Company, a Syrian conglomerate responsible for generating hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and the Houthis through the sale of Iranian oil to Syria and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Previously designated for its role in facilitating the sale of fuel between the Syrian regime and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Al-Qatirji Company has morphed into one of the main channels through which the IRGC-QF generates revenue and funds its regional proxy groups. OFAC is expanding its targeting of Al-Qatirji’s network and its fleet of vessels to inhibit the IRGC-QF from benefiting from this relationship.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Katerji, Abbas of Syria; and
- Qatirji, Muhammad Agha Ahmed Rashdi of Syria.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Amitis Jazireh Ship Management Co LLC of Iran;
- Bluespectrum Shipping S.A. of Panama;
- Elias Shipping & trading Group SA of Panama;
- Moshtaq Tejarat Sanat Co JSC of Iran;
- Nativa Management Ltd of the Marshall Islands;
- Pearl Shipping & Trading Ltd of Lebanon;
- Salina Ship Management PVT Ltd of India;
- Softwater Naviagtion Holding Ltd of the Marshall Islands; and
- Veline Shiptrade Incorporated of Seychelles.
The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Baron (8RCB2) Chemical/Products Tanker Guyana flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9080493; MMSI 667001798 (vessel);
- Celine 3E2126) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9305609; MMSI 352001369 (vessel);
- Chloe (8RAX1) Crude Oil Tanker Guyana flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9173745; MMSI 750656000 (vessel);
- Eline (8PAA5) Crude Oil Tanker Barbados flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9292486; MMSI 314856000 (vessel);
- Joel (T8A4642) Crude Oil Tanker Palau flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9198094; MMSI 511101321 (vessel);
- Lelia (8PAB1) Crude Oil Tanker Barbados flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9258870; MMSI 314861000 (vessel);
- Lotus (EPNF3) Crude Oil Tanker Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9203784; MMSI 422300300 (vessel);
- Ramona (8RPE6) Crude Oil Tanker Guyana flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9233222; MMSI 750925000 (vessel);
- Rex 1 (3EUU2) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9219056; MMSI 372979000 (vessel);
- Romina (EPMH6) Crude Oil Tanker Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9114608; MMSI 422278900 (vessel); and
- Star 5 (EPPV7) Crude Oil Tanker Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9150377; MMSI 422362100 (vessel).
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2712 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241114
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November 18, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Amana the Settlement Movement of Gush Emunim Central Cooperative Association Ltd (Amana), a settlement development organization that is involved with U.S.-sanctioned individuals and outposts that perpetrate violence in the West Bank, and its subsidiary Binyanei Bar Amana Ltd. This action, taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14115, is part of an ongoing multilateral approach by the United States and its partners to hold accountable those who are threatening the peace, security, and stability of the West Bank. Amana has also been sanctioned by the United Kingdom and Canada.Top of Form
The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issued West Bank-related General License 1, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Entities Blocked on November 18, 2024.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 1: Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Entities Blocked on November 18, 2024
(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14115 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving Amana The Settlement Movement Of Gush Emunim Central Cooperative Association Ltd (Amana), Binyanei Bar Amana Ltd (BBA), or any entity in which Amana or BBA owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 10, 2025, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked interest-bearing account and reported to the Office of Foreign Assets Control consistent with § 501.603 of the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations, 31 CFR part 501.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Koshlevsky, Shabtai of Israel;
- Levi, Itamar Yehuda of Israel; and
- Sabah, Zohar of Israel.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Amana The Settlment Movement of Gush Emunium Central Cooperative Association LTD of Israel;
- Binyanei Bar Amana Ltd of Israel; and
- Eyal Yehuda Company Ltd of Israel.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241118 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2715 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933616/download?inline
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November 19, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned a network of nine Mexican nationals involved in fentanyl, heroin, and other deadly drug trafficking and money laundering. Individuals designated in this network also engage in human smuggling in furtherance of their drug trafficking activities. Additionally, as members of the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG), some of the individuals sanctioned played a prominent role in the early stages of the U.S. opioid crisis, a leading factor driving the United States’ modern fentanyl crisis. CJNG is a violent Mexico-based drug trafficking organization responsible for a significant proportion of fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Arias Ponce, Erandiny Jazim of Mexico;
- Castaneda Meza, Giovanni of Mexico;
- Castaneda Meza, Ivan Atzayacatl of Mexico;
- Castaneda Meza, Juan Carlos of Mexico;
- Catellanos Meza, Roberto of Mexico;
- Catillo Lopez, Jose Adrian of Mexico;
- Castillo Peinado, Araceli of Mexico;
- Castro Alvarez, Jose Sinue of Mexico; and
- Navarro Quezada, Luis Alonso of Mexico.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241119
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November 19, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated six senior Hamas officials, including the terrorist group’s representatives abroad, a senior member of the Hamas military wing, the Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, as well as individuals involved in supporting the terrorist group’s fundraising efforts and weapons smuggling into Gaza.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Akari, Musa Daud Muhammad of Turkey;
- Ghanimat, Abd Al-Rahman Ismail Abd Al-Rahman of Turkey;
- Hamad, Gazi of Saudi Arabia;
- Mari, Salama Aziz Muhammad of Turkey;
- Naim, Basem of Palestine; and
- Nazzal, Mohammad of Syria.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241119
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November 21, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took another major step in implementing commitments made by G7 leaders to curtail Russia’s use of the international financial system to further its war against Ukraine. OFAC’s action includes the designation of Gazprombank, more than 50 internationally connected Russian banks, more than 40 Russian securities registrars, and 15 Russian finance officials. OFAC also issued an alert describing sanctions risks related to Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS), which the Kremlin created and uses to evade sanctions.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related GL 53A, “Authorizing Transactions for Diplomatic Missions of the Russian Federation Involving Gazprombank Joint Stock Company or Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024,” Russia-related GL 55C, “Authorizing Certain Services Related to Sakhalin-2,” Russia-related GL 113, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Financial Institutions Blocked on November 21, 2024,” and Russia-related GL 114, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Certain Entities Blocked on November 21, 2024.”
Additionally, OFAC issued two new Russia-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ 1201, FAQ 1202).
OFAC is also publishing a new, Russia-related Alert, “Sanctions Risk for Foreign Financial Institutions that Join Russian Financial Messaging System, System for Transfer of Financial Messages.”
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 53A: Authorizing Transactions for Diplomatic Missions of the Russian Federation Involving Gazprombank Joint Stock Company or Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024
(a) U.S. persons are authorized to engage in all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the official business of diplomatic or consular missions of the Government of the Russian Federation (“Russian missions”) that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 and involve Gazprombank Joint Stock Company (Gazprombank), or any entity in which Gazprombank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, or are prohibited by Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 55C: Authorizing Certain Services Related to Sakhalin-2
(a) All transactions prohibited by the determination of November 21, 2022 made pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 (“Prohibitions on Certain Services as They Relate to the Maritime Transport of Crude Oil of Russian Federation Origin”) related to the maritime transport of crude oil originating from the Sakhalin-2 project (“Sakhalin-2 byproduct”) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 28, 2025, provided that the Sakalin-2 byproduct is solely for importation into Japan.
(b) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 involving Gazprombank Joint Stock Company (Gazprombank) or any entity in which Gazprombank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are related to the Sakhalin-2 project, including such transactions involving Sakhalin Energy LLC, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 28, 2025.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 113: Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Financial Institutions Blocked on November 21, 2024
(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions involving the blocked persons listed in the Annex to this general license, and any entity in which those blocked persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 20, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 114: Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Certain Entities Blocked on November 21, 2024
(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or the facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity issued or guaranteed by the following blocked entities (“Covered Debt or Equity”) to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 20, 2024:
(1) Gazprombank Joint Stock Company;
(2) Interstate Bank; or
(3) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.
(b) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of Covered Debt or Equity that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, November 21, 2024 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 20, 2024.
(c) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, November 21, 2024 that (i) include a blocked person described in paragraph (a) of this general license as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to Covered Debt or Equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 20, 2024, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).
FAQ 1201:
Q: What authorizations exist for diplomatic or consular missions operating in Russia and Russian diplomatic or consular missions operating abroad?
A: The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued several authorizations related to U.S. and third-country diplomatic or consular missions operating in Russia and Russian diplomatic or consular missions operating abroad.
FAQ 1202:
Q: Following the November 21, 2024 designation of Russian financial institutions, Treasury has now designated a significant number of financial institutions in Russia. Will this negatively impact the processing of personal, non-commercial remittances to or from Russia?
A: No. Treasury’s sanctions target Russian financial institutions that have continued to help Russia gain access to the critical goods it needs to prosecute its war in Ukraine. As a general matter, personal, non-commercial remittances are not the target of sanctions imposed by the United States on Russia.
There remain a number of non-sanctioned Russian banks, subsidiaries of foreign banks, and money service businesses that can continue to process legitimate transactions, including non-commercial, personal remittances.
U.S. and foreign financial institutions may continue to process transactions for activities, such as the facilitation of personal non-commercial remittances, that do not involve blocked persons and are not otherwise prohibited by OFAC. In addition, OFAC maintains various authorizations related to legitimate humanitarian activity and agricultural and medical trade, which include authorizations for dealings with certain sanctioned Russian financial institutions, such as General License (GL) 6D (authorizing transactions related to certain agricultural and medical activities); U.S. and foreign financial institutions may continue to process transactions for such authorized activities as well.
Please see link below for full list of sanctioned entities and individuals.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241121 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2725 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933626/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933621/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933631/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933636/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1201 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1197 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933656/download?inline
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November 26, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned five Mexican individuals associated with the Gulf Cartel, one of Mexico’s most dangerous criminal organizations. Those designated are tied to the Gulf Cartel’s involvement in criminal activities associated with illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, human smuggling, and narcotics trafficking in the Gulf of Mexico. IUU fishing often involves criminal activity, forced labor, and human rights abuses, and is often a revenue stream for criminal organizations. IUU fishing is also a threat to U.S. maritime security, as criminal organizations may use the same vessels for smuggling narcotics and humans across borders.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Carrillo Sapien, Ildelfonso of Mexico;
- Decuir Garcia, Raul of Mexico;
- Guerra Salinas, Ismael of Mexico;
- Guerra Salinas, Omar of Mexico; and
- Sierra Angulo, Franscisco Javier of Mexico.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241126 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2729
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November 27, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 21 security and cabinet-level officials aligned with Nicolas Maduro. These individuals are sanctioned pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, as amended, for being current or former officials of the Government of Venezuela. They have supported and carried out Maduro’s orders to repress civil society in his efforts to fraudulently declare himself the winner of Venezuela’s July 28 presidential election, thus ignoring the will of the overwhelming majority of Venezuelan voters who elected Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia as their next president.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Aigster Villamizar, Carlos Eduardo of Venezuela;
- Balestrini Jaramillo, Angel Daniel of Venezuela;
- Cabello Contreras, Daniella Desiree of Venezuela;
- Castillo Bolle, William Alfredo of Venezuela;
- Coronado Millan, Anibal Eduardo of Venezuela;
- Fernandez Alayon, Jesus Ramon of Venezuela;
- Garcia Zerpa, Julio Jose of Venezuela;
- Herrera Duarte, Jose Yunior of Venezuela;
- Lizano Colmenter, Pablo Ernesto of Venezuela;
- Marcano Tabata, Javier Jose of Venezuela;
- Matheus Melendez, Alberto Alexander of Venezuela;
- Menendez Prieto, Ricardo Jose of Venezuela;
- Nazaret Nanez Contreras, Freddy Alfred of Venezuela;
- Perez Davila, America Valentina of Venezuela;
- Reyes Rivero, Luis Gerardo of Venezuela;
- Rivera Bastardo, Jose Alfredo of Venezuela;
- Rodriguez Cabello, Alexis Jose of Venezuela;
- Rodriguez Dias, Dilio Guilermo of Venezuela;
- Romero Bolivar, Orlando Ramon of Venezuela;
- Santiago Servigna, Ruben of Venezuela; and
- Villamizar Gomez, Jesus Rafael of Venezuela.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2730 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241127
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