MAY 2025 EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through May 31, 2025.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and

persons denied export privileges by the United States Government. 

 

In this newsletter, we have added a specific DDTC FAQs section, we think this will be of interest to our readers.

 

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

 

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls: Notifications to the Congress of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses

 

May 2, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 17863: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and the Department of State give notice that the attached Notifications of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses were submitted to the Congress on the dates indicated.

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=a69b87859759e21067b1791ad053af95 and

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events

 

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Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls: Notifications to the Congress of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses

 

May 2, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 17869: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and the Department of State give notice that the attached Notifications of Proposed Commercial Export Licenses were submitted to the Congress on the dates indicated.

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=6e9b87859759e21067b1791ad053af91 and

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events

 

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DDTC Final Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations Posted to Website

 

May 5, 2025: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following Final CJ Determinations for CJ’s adjudicated between September 12, 2024 through May 5, 2025, on its website at:

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=6ea6afdcdbc36300529d368d7c96194b

 

 

Readers may find these determinations helpful when performing self-classification work.

 

Model Name Manufacturer Description Final

Determination

Final Determination Date
Dominate Virtual Anticipation Network, BUILD.2024.03.05.001 BigBear.ai, LLC Software that uses automated machine learning to provide anticipatory intelligence and decision support across a multi-domain environment USML Category XI(b) 9/17/2024
ML-9600, ML-9600W, and ML-9600X Wideband High Frequency (HF) Transceivers; software versions 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 Bronze Bear Communications, Inc., doing business as FlexRadio Systems Software-defined radios Seek a CCATS 9/17/2024
Marine Security Design Consulting Services Ultrasea, Inc Engineering design and analysis services for surface and subsurface security applications Scenarios 1-3: Seek a CCATS

Scenario 4:
Defense service
corresponding to the USML category of the related defense articles

Scenario 5: Defense service
corresponding to the USML category of the related defense articles; USML Category IX(e)(3); and USML Category XVII(a) if using classified technical data not elsewhere described

9/17/2024
AVRA Suite Arctos, LLC Software suite that supports the lifecycle of flight safety analysis for airborne vehicles Seek a CCATS 9/17/2024
64 Megabit (8 M x 8-Bit) CMOS 3.0 Volt-only Uniform Sector Flash Memory, P/N Am29LV065DU90REI Spansion, LLC An unprogrammed flash memory device Seek a CCATS 9/29/2024
Shock Tube,
Model
Number C4-
25658-050,
Part
Number C4-
25658-050
ITT Inc. Inner tube
for a shock
absorber
Seek a CCATS 10/1/2024
VT977
Integrated
Processor/F
PGA
System,
Model A,
Part
Number
VT977-000-
000-000
Vadatech
Inc.
A system that integrates
an Advanced RISC
Machine (ARM)
processor with an
unprogrammed fieldprogrammable
gate
array (FPGA) module
Seek a CCATS 10/1/2024
Rocky Linux, Model Number: Rocky Linux v8.5 and v8.9, Part Number: Rocky Linux Kernel v8.x Hoonify Technologies Inc. Open-source software operating system used to deliver the parallel computing software platform called TurbOSTM Seek a CCATS 10/4/2024
Vulcan Basic Kit, Part Number VU0001, and Vulcan Projectile Combo Kit, Part Number VU0093 Alford Technologies Ltd. A versatile, modular, shaped charge designed for use in a variety of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) operations, that is inert until filled by the user, and projectiles for the shaped charge Split: USML Category IV(c), Seek a CCATS 10/4/2024
Lenco BearCat Elevated Ramp Armored Vehicle Lenco Industries, Inc. Armored vehicle that transports 10-12 occupants and incorporates articulating rapid entry system USML Category VII(e) 10/22/2024
RECU (Ruggedized Environmental Control Unit) Mainstream Engineering Corporation A portable heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system for temporary structures such as tents EAR99 10/22/2024
Panoramic Night Vision Goggle NVG-105 (without the image intensifier tubes), Model NVG-105 Rev B, Part Number 10011100-1 Aether Optics LLC NVG system consisting of the full mechanical, electrical, and optical systems (excluding the IITs), battery pack, and helmet mount EAR99 10/22/2024
ASM 509 Filled Shell Body, part number 01217926 SAAB North America, Inc. A projectile shell filled with PAX-47 explosives, but doesn’t include the fuze, fin, assembly, or nose cap USML Category III(d)(4) 10/22/2024
MERLIN-I (Mounted Enhanced RADIAC Long-Range Imaging Networkable - Imager) H3D, Inc. An integrable detector and imaging module that is designed for high-resolution spectroscopy and isotope-specific imaging USML Category XI(a)(4)(i) 10/22/2024
Aluminum Alloy Extrusion for Missile Container, Blueprint for Extrusion Universal Alloy Corporation Extrusion that will become a part for a missile storage container/launch tube, and a blueprint for this extrusion CCL ECCN 9A604.x, CCL ECCN 9E604.a 10/22/2024
Metallic Hose Assembly, part numbers AE1002867H and AE100120H v.A Danfoss Power Solutions II, LLC Metallic, pneumatic hose assemblies USML Category XX(c) 10/25/2024
Bullfrog, Part Number: BF001 Allen Control Systems Inc. Remote-controlled weapons station USML Category XII(a)(1) 10/25/2024
GenesisRL, Model 0.1.4 EpiSys Science, Inc. Software used in video games to produce a top performing automated artificial intelligence (AI) agent by having different AI agents compete against each other Seek CCATS 10/27/2024
Single Mode Laser Diode Bar Specification Model Number: 05082024/Rev. 1, Part Number 05082024 Forward Photonics Technical specification for a laser diode bar USML Category XVIII(g) 10/27/2024
Distributed Spectrum Software Suite, Version Number 0.1 Distributed Spectrum Inc. Software capable of real-time RF signal detection, classification, and localization Seek a CCATS 10/27/2024
Thrust Vector Controller Automated Test Equipment (ATE) Mk2, part number 24P-A75-100-001 BAE Systems Australia Limited Test Equipment for Missile Thrust Vector Controllers USML Category IV(i) (software), USML Category XI(a)(7) (system prior to production), ECCN 9B604.d (system when in production) 10/27/2024
Model 86, ver. 1.7 Oehler Research, Inc. Acoustic Scoring System USML Category IX(a)(1)(ii),
USML Category IX(e)(1) (software), and CCL ECCN 0A614.a (sensors)
11/16/2024
Gulfstream model G700 aircraft with J-MUSIC SPS installed and used solely for Very Important Person or Head of State transport, and certain related information and services General Dynamics Corporation Aircraft modified to incorporate a Self-Protection Suite (SPS) without the SPS installed;
Aircraft incorporating a SPS;
Technical data and services necessary for the SPS installation and maintenance;
Maintenance, repair, and other services to support continued safe operation of the modified aircraft;
Information common to the unmodified G700 and the modified aircraft.
Split Determination:
Modified aircraft: USML Category VIII(a)(8)
Aircraft with SPS: USML Category VIII(a)(8)
Technical data and services directly related to the modifications: USML Category VIII(i);
Technical data and services directly related to the installed SPS: USML Category XI(d);
Services for the modified aircraft: USML Category VIII(i) for an (a)(8) aircraft;
Information common to the civil G700 and the modified aircraft: Seek a CCATS
3/12/2025
RJ45 8-Channel A/B Port Switcher with RS232 ASCII
Remote Control and Pushbutton Local Control, Model 7236, Part Number 306236
Electro Standards Laboratory, Inc. A unit that enables the sharing of two RJ45 (A&B) ports for each of its eight channels, which allows switching for up to eight devices or networks. EAR99 10/29/2024
Knowledge Service Engine, Model Number: 4.1.2, Part Number: DMI-KSEC-1 Discovery Machine Inc. Execution framework for AI behavior models EAR99 11/3/2024
Two-day Simulated Experimentation Course and “Simulation Experimentation,” PowerPoint Presentation, version 5 CogniPlay Dynamics, Inc. A course that uses simulation for experimentation to advance armed force capabilities in future operational environments, as well as identify new synergies and opportunities Service: USML Category IX(e)(3)
Information: EAR99
11/16/2024
Spectral Beam Combining Grating Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) An optical diffraction grating used in a directed energy weapon system USML Category XVIII(e) 11/16/2024
EZRAM Raman Spectrometer, Model and Version Number EZRAM Plus Rev A, Part Number
12010
SSI LLC A spectrometer used to identify unknown molecules through their vibration modes Seek a CCATS 11/16/2024
Model 86, ver. 1.7 Oehler Research, Inc. Acoustic Scoring System USML Category IX(a)(1)(ii) 11/16/2024
MAGCOMM Precision Targeting, LLC Wireless communication module - very low power, very short range (1 meter) for replacement of
wired connections between electronic components
USML Category XI(c)(2) (part number 52000125)

Seek a CCATS (part numbers 52000115 and 52000148)

11/21/2024
Vanguard, U.S. Navy Unmanned Surface Vessel, Model Number: Unmanned, USV-3, Part Number: USV - Vessel Austal USA, LLC A mid-size autonomous surface vessel USML Category VI(c) 11/21/2024
Solidtron, part number SP205-01 Excelitas Technologies Corp Solid-state pulsed power switching thyristor device USML Category IV(h)(9) 11/28/2024
Filter Electrical Connector, 38999 Series III, part number 21-50D015-35P Amphenol Corporation D38999 circular connector with added filter planar array component USML Category VIII(f) 11/28/2024
MDS-10, Part Number 3130-0002 and MDS-10T, Part Number 3130-0005 WM Industries Inc. Handheld dual sensor detectors that combine metal detection and ground penetrating radar technologies for the purpose of detecting improvised explosive devices USML Category XXI(a) 12/19/2024
Markes TT24-7NRT CUBRC, Inc. Test data from a commercial product that is a near real-time vapor sampling system for chemicals Seek a CCATS 11/29/2024
Digital Acquisition Toolset V1.0 Ricardo, Inc. Software tools designed to establish an enterprise framework for lifecycle digital engineering. CCL ECCN 5D002.c.1 11/29/2024
Titanium Fire Pump, Part Number: 5773203, Schematic Number: 803-5773203, Technical Manual: S6255-W6-MMA-010 Carver Pump Company A titanium centrifugal fire pump and its schematic and technical manual Pump: CCL ECCN 8A609.x
Manual: CCL ECCN 8E609.a
Schematic: Seek a CCATS
11/29/2024
HALIA, Model Number: Alpha Prototype, Part Number: v2; Hoverfoil Wings LeVanta Tech Inc. Sea-launched aerial drone and its Hoverfoil wings EAR99 11/29/2024
Embedded Field Programmable Gate Array Intellectual Property (eFPGA), Part Number K6N10 QuickLogic Family of unprogrammed eFPGA IP architecture Seek a CCATS 11/29/2024
AgileAir-78, Model Number: 78 Oshkosh Corporation A portable diesel-powered unit designed to provide ground services to military aircraft CCL ECCN 9B610.a 11/29/2024
BuildOS, Version: 1 Dirac, Inc. An automated work instruction platform that drafts instructions for hardware assembly EAR99 11/29/2024
Spherical Bearing, Part Number MLAM4016 NMB (USA) Inc. A component of the TP400 aircraft propeller used for blade pitch adjustment and feathering CCL ECCN 9A610.x 12/8/2024
Spherical Bearing, Part Number KNDB22-12/287600 Sargent Aerospace and Defense, LLC Spherical bearing for an aircraft landing gear USML Category VIII(h)(1) 12/8/2024
3X3 LSD, Version 1, Part Number HMCS-MK6X-LSD-3X3, and 6X3 LSD, Version 1, Part Number HMCS-MK6X-LSD-6X3 Haivision MCS LLC Multi-display video walls created by joining multiple display screens together in harsh environments CCL ECCN 8A609.x 12/8/2024
Arcas Maritime Domain Awareness System BigBear.ai, LLC Data analytics software for maritime domain awareness USML Category XI(b) 12/8/2024
Encore Flight Software, initial release Odyssey Space Research, LLC Flight software framework designed for safety critical components in spacecraft and satellites, providing essential functionality for communication, navigation, control, data processing, and other space-related applications Seek a CCATS 12/8/2024
Composition A-5 Explosive, Model Composition A-5 US Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) An explosive compound containing RDX USML Category V(a)(23) 12/8/2024
M2E Acoustic Modem, Part Number M2E-S115 OceanComm Incorporated Device that provides high-speed wireless connectivity underwater CCL ECCN 5A001.b.1.a 12/8/2024
Voxaverse, Part Number 1001 10x National Security Software that provides chat, voice, video, and file sharing in a fully encrypted multi-user environment CCL ECCN 5D002.c.1 12/8/2024
Aluminum Mirror, Part Number: C1735 Inrad Optics, Inc. A component of the Scanner Module of the Electro-Optical Observation System (EOOS) for Military Vehicles USML Category XII(e)(18) 12/11/2024
SignalQ Event Detection, Part Number GEOL-0020 NVRN, LLC d/b/a A software-only signal intelligence platform that provides
event-detection capability that leverages freely associated mobile phones as sensors
USML Category XI(d) 12/11/2024
Integrated Unique Identification (IUID) Intrinsic Marks International MIL-STD-130 compliant identification name plates with a range of thicknesses from .003” to .032” and used on the F-35 Seek a CCATS 12/13/2024
DDM4/DD5 Armorers Manual M. C. Daniel Group Inc. A manual for armorer certification for the Daniel Defense (DD) DDM4 and DD5 rifle lines. USML Category I(i) 12/13/2024
1) Technical data for the design of the H225M Flight Simulator, Iteration: January 1, 2018 through December 31, 2020
2) Technical data for the design of the of H225M Flight Simulator, Iteration: January 1, 2021 the present
FlightSafety International, Inc. Information related to the Design of the H225M Flight Simulator USML Category IX(e)(1) 12/13/2024
Nitronic 60 High Strength Stainless Bar, Model Number: UNS S21800, ultra high strength, Part Number: A06200050004 (sample PN) High Performance Alloys Inc. Material used to make bushings for an aircraft Seek a CCATS 12/13/2024
Positive Displacement External Gear Coolant Pump, Model GB-P34-DC30B Micropump, Inc. Submarine component USML Category XX(c) 12/13/2024
Air Conditioner, Model A/M32C-10C, Part Number 100502-2 American Turbo Systems Used with a ground start cart to provide conditioned air to aircraft Seek a CCATS 12/13/2024
NATO Resilience and Crisis Management Consulting Service, Model Number: CBI-Resilience-Consulting-01 v1.0 Capacity Building International Consulting services focused on NATO resilience, emergency management, and crisis response. Seek a CCATS 12/13/2024
High-Temperature Material Characterization System, Model Number: HTMC150-150, Part Number: DSC1547 Delta Sigma, LLC 8-40 HGz free-space material characterization system for temperatures up to 1,500 °C. EAR99 12/13/2024
Microcircuit, Pulse Width Modulation (PWM), Current Mode with J-Leads, Model: 561R911 revision E, Part Number: 561R911H03 Corfin Holdings Inc. A current mode, pulse-width modulation, controller chip with solder coated leads modified to add J-Leads. Seek a CCATS 12/13/2024
HI-TAK Conductive Gasket with Knitted Aluminum Mesh, Model: Revision A, P/N: PG339000-73 Aviation Devices and Electronic Components LLC Gasket used to seal and moisture proof between overlapping surfaces, providing environmental protection and electrical conductivity. EAR99 12/19/2024
1. MAN-PC software, Version 5.0.1.5; 2. MAN-PC Software Activation License; and 3. Silvus StreamCaster radios with MAN-PC software included Silvus Technologies, Inc. An activation license and software option for StreamCaster radios. 1, 2: USML Category XI(d) 3: USML Category XI(a)(5)(iii) 12/19/2024
Pressure Gauges, Part Numbers 97200003533 and 97200003534 WIKA Holding, LP Pressure gauges used in an air-toair refueling system. Seek a CCATS 12/20/2024
OwlEye Omitron, Inc A service for satellites that helps assess and mitigate the risk of collisions with other space objects. Seek a CCATS 12/20/2024
Neros Valkyrie UAV, Block 1 Neros Technologies First-person view drone carrying a 3 kg payload. USML Category VIII(a)(16) 12/20/2024
Image Signals Processing Board Sheltered Wings, Inc. d/b/a Vortex Optics Printed circuit board assembly for processing images. USML Category XII(e)(19) 12/20/2024
SPX-500 and SPX-800, Part Numbers 950058, 950061, 950062, and 950064 Senspex, Inc. Visible and MWIR Camera Systems Seek a CCATS 12/29/2024
Services that Include the Loading of Production Parts and Alignment of Production Tooling for Blisks Manufacturing Technology, Inc. Assistance in the setup and use of production equipment and tooling for the purpose of producing Blisks For Blisks described in USML Category XIX(f): USML Category XIX(g) For Blisks not described on the USML: Not a defense service 12/29/2024
FEKO 2019 (Standard), Certain FEKO 2019 Enhancements, and FEKO Enhanced 2019 Altair Engineering, Inc. Software to evaluate the emissions of electromagnetic energy Foreign defense articles described in USML Category XIII(i)(4) 12/29/2024
CF-104 Starfighter Display Aircraft, Model F-104, Serial #: 683A-1031 Canadair Demilitarized and mutilated fighter aircraft with all articles described on the U.S. Munitions List removed and cuts to the airframe to prevent it from being made airworthy. CCL ECCN 9A610.x 12/30/2024
Performance Requirements, Testing Services, and a Fuel Cell, Version V1.0 Piasecki Aircraft Corporation High Temperature Proton Exchange Membrane (HTPEM) Hydrogen Fuel Cell for Aviation Fuel Cell: USML Category XI(a)(7);
Services and Information: USML Category XI(d)
12/30/2024
CF-116 Freedom Fighter Display Aircraft, Model CF-5D, Tail Number 116809 Canadair Demilitarized and mutilated fighter aircraft with all articles described on the U.S. Munitions List removed and cuts to the airframe to prevent it from being made airworthy. CCL ECCN 9A610.x 12/30/2024
Ballistic Performance Testing and Test Results Avient Protective Materials LLC Testing of composite armor panels to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Standard 0101.07 RF1 and RF2 levels, including performing the testing and providing test results USML Category XIII(I) 12/30/2024
WR112 Circulator, Part Number XC3-73 Microwave Techniques, LLC A circulator used in a radar subsequently used in the Thales Goalkeeper Close-in Weapon System (CIWS). USML Category VI(f)(7) 12/30/2024
Pistolet-Pulemyot Sudayeva "PPS43" 7.62mm x 25mm Submachine Gun Minutemen Defense LLC Fully Automatic Submachine Gun USML Category I(b) 12/30/2024
Schematic ES-5000 for Cable assembly CX2384 Elbit Systems UK Limited Schematic depicting a data transfer cable assembly Seek a CCATS 12/30/2024
EnQuanta Base Suite of products (Vault, Storage, Transfer, and Comms), Model Number: Base V1.0.1 VoiceIt Technologies, Inc.
(dba EnQuanta, A VoiceIt Technology Company)
Quantum resilience hybrid cryptographic object code used to provide “incryption” (sic) of digital assets CCL ECCN 5D002.c.1 12/30/2024
Plain Encased Seal, Part Number 3233429‐2 Quality Industrial Products, Inc. A component to a thrust reverser actuation system (TRAS) used in the Rolls Royce RB211 turbofan engine CCL ECCN 9A991.d 12/30/2024
GCA 2000/2020 Radar, Model GCA 2000, (Multiple Part Numbers); MPN-25 Radar, Model MPN-25 BUILD, (Multiple Part Numbers); and AN/MPN-25 Radar, Part Number 276000-1 L3 Harris Technologies, Inc., d. b. a. Space and Airborne Systems Surveillance radars with Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) and Moving Target Detector (MTD) features USML Category XI(a)(5)(ii) 12/30/2024
RATTLER UAS, Model Number RATTLER.UAS.V1 Actualized Business Solutions, Inc Unmanned aerial system (UAS) target drone used to support test and evaluation and training of counter UAS systems USML Category VIII(a)(10) 1/30/2025
Related to Wire Rope Isolator, Model Number: WR28, Part Number: WR2880004BM ITT Inc. Advice regarding installation of the product on a fire control system component USML Category XII(f) 1/30/2025
Monofilament Vaporization Propulsion (MVP) System CU Aerospace, LLC Thruster for small satellites Seek a CCATS 1/30/2025
Cubesat High Impulse Propulsion System (CHIPS) CU Aerospace, LLC Propulsion System for Small Satellites Seek a CCATS 1/30/2025
Rayon Based Carbon Fabric, CCA-10 Tex-Tech Industries, Inc. Rayon Based Carbon Fabric Seek a CCATS 2/9/2025
Periscope Prism Drawing Numbers: 12548771 and 12548772, and Process Specifications: 1247300 Global Photonics, Inc. Drawings and process specifications for the manufacture of glass prisms for a periscope USML Category XII(f) 2/9/2025
QuickShot v8.0.2, Part Number QS-XX-XX_CVI4B SpaceWorks Enterprises, Inc. Trajectory Optimization Software EAR99 2/10/2025
Antenna, Part Number S67-1575-714 Sensor Systems, Inc. M-Code capable antenna USML Category VIII(f) 2/10/2025
SeaFLIR / TacFLIR 230, SeaFLIR / TacFLIR 240, and SeaFLIR / TacFLIR 280-HD Teledyne FLIR, LLC Electro-optical imaging systems with gimbal stabilized 9” turrets USML Category XII(c)(3) 2/10/2025
Veronte Autopilot, Model 1x, Version 4.8, Part Number P008726 Embention Sistemas Inteligentes SA User-programable controller for the operation of autonomous devices such as drones, ground vehicles, robots, and surface vehicles Seek a CCATS 2/10/2025
Automated Portable Raman Microscope (Pendar XM); Pendar XM with Chemical Warfare Agent (CWA) Library; Pendar XM Software; Pendar XM Source Code and Technical Drawings; and Pendar XM Non-CWA Spectral Library Pendar Technologies LLC Portable system designed for testing items to detect explosive or drug residues, and, when equipped with the CWA library, certain chemical warfare agents, without contact or damage to the item under test, and related technology Seek a CCATS 2/10/2025
Spherical Bearing Assembly, Part Number KSC255619B Kaman Corporation Component of the tail hook actuator of a fighter aircraft USML Category VIII(h)(5) 2/13/2025
X-Wall MX+ XN SATA Gen 3 Crypto Module Solution, Part Number X-Wall MX+ xN / x/I with Firmware version 3.8 Enova Technology Corp. An application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) engineered for encryption and decryption of standard SATA (Serial Advanced Technology Attachment) storage devices, with a maximum data transfer rate of 6 Gbps Seek CCATS 2/13/2025
Electric Motor Resolver, Part Number: 433283 Parker-Hannifin Corporation A rotational position measurement device for use in a hydraulic pump electric motor USML Category VIII(h)(1) 2/13/2025
Mine Eraser Ensign-Bickford Aerospace & Defense Company An energetic line charge containing plastic bonded explosive blocks connected by detonating cord USML Category IV(c) 2/13/2025
N5193A UXG Firmware and Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) (Version A.01.90) and N5194A UXG Firmware and FPGAs (Versions A.02.00 and A.12.00) Keysight Technologies, Inc. Firmware and FPGAs for N5193A and N5194A UXG signal generators UXG Firmware: USML Category XI(d)

FPGAs when programmed with FPGA images loaded: USML Category XI(c)(1)

Unprogrammed FPGAs: Seek a CCATS

Preprogrammed CPLDs: Depends on the export classification of Keysight MXG signal generators

2/13/2025
LED cable assembly, part number P567847 Axon' Cable Wiring harness with 16 AWG and 24 AWG insulated wire USML Category VIII(h)(1) 2/13/2025
Diced and Undiced Integrated Circuit Wafers Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP Cut and uncut unpackaged integrated circuits programmed for defense articles USML Category XI(c)(1) 2/13/2025
5 cm x 5 cm Sapphire Substrate and related information Luxium Solutions, LLC A transparent, single crystal aluminum oxide substrate that does not exceed the dimensions in USML Category XIII(e)(3) for transparent ceramic plate EAR99 2/18/2025
Artificial Intelligence Security Platform (AISec Platform) Software, Version 24.10.0 HiddenLayer, Inc. Security solution to protect AI systems from threats throughout their lifecycle by detecting and responding to risks like malicious inputs and weaknesses in the AI’s underlying components, data sources and development tools Seek a CCATS 2/18/2025
TrueView R40i Radars, Part Numbers TV-R40iSC, TV-
R40iSC+1YSUP, TVR40iSC+SWL+3YS, TV-R40iMC,
TV-R40iMC+1YSUP, TVR40iEC+SWL+1YS, TVR40iEC+
SWL+3YS, TV-R40iEC-2.0+1YSUP, and TV-R40iEC, TVR40iMC+
SWL+1YS, TVR40iMC+SWL+3YS
Fortem Technologies, Inc. Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars designed for drone detection and airspace security and operating in the KU-Band (15.4-16.6 GHz) with between 16-22 W of power CCL ECCN 6A008.e 2/18/2025
Power Supply HV/LV, Version Number: REV D, Part Number: 580470 Shigamo Development, Inc.
dba: American High Voltage
Power supply for a heads-up display CCL ECCN 9A610.x 2/18/2025
G‐Loc and GD-Loc Geolocation and Object Positioning Software for Gimbals Trillium Engineering, LLC Software tools that provide improved geolocation accuracy and precise object positioning Seek a CCATS 2/18/2025
GeoDLSR, Version Number: 1.0 and XEN-HUB, Version Number: 1.0 OnOff Block Inc./Xenesis A space-based network routing software and a Dual Aperture Optical Head Assembly ECCN 9A515.x/ ECCN 9D515.a 2/18/2025
Soft Telepresence System software, STS Phase 0, Version v.0 Kansas State University Software that uses augmented reality (AR) to enable a "share what you see" telepresence experience to enhance collaboration by transferring audio and visual input from a remote operator to another person Seek a CCATS 3/1/2025
S9-Type Laser Diode Array, Model: S9 Leonardo Electronics US, Inc. Laser diode array that has a thermally conductive base that can incorporate up to 10 high power edge-emitting laser diode bars USML Category XII(e)(2) 3/1/2025
LEUSI Fiber Amplifier, Model Number: A-40, Part Number: 01-1111 Leonardo Electronics US Inc. A 2.5 kW continuous wave operation fiber amplifier with narrow linewidth and single output USML Category XVIII(e) 3/5/2025
Merlin-Handheld-SM and Sidemate, Model 114401-1-4-0, PN 114401-1-4-0 Iris Technology Company Interfaces between a PRC-163 radio system, a PRC-163 battery, an external power source, and auxiliary equipment to power those items CCL ECCN 3A611.x 3/10/2025
ARES Lenco BearCat, Model ARES Lenco BearCat 2024 Lenco Industries, Inc. Off-road capable armored personnel carrier USML Category VII(e) 3/6/2025
Rechargeable, Nickel Cadmium Battery, model BB-287 ENERSYS Provides power for the target acquisition and fire control system of a missile system USML Category XII(e)(1) 3/6/2025
ConductorOS BigBear.ai, LLC A software system that enables rapid decision-making and distributed computing by orchestrating data and AI in near real-time, allowing interoperability across diverse environments and easy integration of legacy systems with modern applications Seek a CCATS 3/6/2025
Project Pantheon Resilience Government Services, Inc. Technical information relating to monoclonal antibodies (mAb) or prophylaxis of exposure to aerosolized botulinum neurotoxin A and B serotypes Not subject to the ITAR or the EAR 3/6/2025
Common Aperture Laser Illuminator Laser Diode Module (LDM) and Common Aperture Laser Pointer LDM Teledyne Technologies Incorporated Modules for a laser illuminator and a laser pointer, each used in gimbaled electro-optical surveillance systems USML Category XII(e)(8) 3/12/2025
High Voltage Power Supply, Model Number: dB-2560 dB Control A high voltage power supply designed and adapted from the commercial Ka-band and high-power amplifier to work with the Leonardo ET9900 TWT. USML Category XII(e)(1) 3/12/2025
Uniform Crystals Test Sensors (UCTS) Testing Service and Resulting Test Information LG Tech-Link Global, LLC Testing and analysis of material sensors to determine the maximum temperatures the sensors were exposed to Split based on the application.

Defense service and technical data (see definitions)

EAR99 when not a defense service or technical data

3/12/2025
M3A1 Pull Wire Fuse Lighter, Model Number: M3A1, Part Number: 1050 Martin & Shaft LLC Fuse lighter (igniter) for activating ground burst simulators and grenade simulators Seek a CCATS 3/12/2025
RoadBlock, Vehicle Interdiction Cartridge, MOD 0 Matsys Inc Shotgun shell containing reactive metals that release thermal
energy
USML Category III(a)(3) 3/12/2025
Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Exhaust, part 461-30001 Senior Operations, LLC An auxiliary power unit exhaust duct that is designed for an aircraft in development USML Category VIII(f) 3/12/2025
PowerLight System PowerLight Technologies System that uses a laser to transmit power between a transmitter device and receiver device USML Category XI(a)(7) 3/16/2025
Multi-Shot Robotic EOD Disruptor (MRED) Version 5.1 Vadum, Inc. Electronically controlled disruptor capable of firing existing
12-gauge disrupter cartridges and water shots
Seek a CCATS 3/16/2025
ARTIV, Model Number: 1.x DEFCON AI, INC Modeling, simulation, and analysis simulation software to support mobility and logistics USML Category IX(b)(4)(iii) 3/16/2025
Aloft X-band Radars, Model: AXR-112-UL-E, SDRT v1; AXR-122-UL-E, SDRT v2; AXR-112-Max-E, SDRT v1; and AXR-122-Max-E, SDRT v2 Thomsen and Burke LLP Miniature X-band Synthetic Aperture Radars (SAR) used for mid-sized drones, aircraft, and stratospheric vehicles USML Category XI(a)(3)(ii) 3/16/2025
Mini DDL Transceiver Aerovironment, Inc. Communications Transceiver USML Category XI(a)(5)(i) 3/16/2025
OmniBlast Air, Part Number 01, Model Number OBA;
OmniBlast Air+, Part Number 00, Model Number OBA+;
OmniBlast Air and OmniBlast Air+ Consulting Services
Advanced Materials and Devices Wearable blast sensors and associated consulting services USML Category X(a)(8) until sensors are in production

USML Category X(e) for services while sensors are in development

USML Category IX(e)(3) for services when not directly related to a defense article

3/16/2025
Schematic of Receiver Integration Fixture (RIF), Part Number TYPII_BREAKOUT_REVB Navigation Technology Associates, Inc Schematic showing a device used to test GPS receivers Seek a CCATS 3/21/2025
RAID Plate Chassis AeroVironment, Inc. A chassis, or "spine," that is worn on the back of a UAV operator, holds four modular radios, and provides AI-enhanced common control, open architecture, and advanced networking supporting a complex multi-radio layout. Seek a CCATS 3/21/2025
Fortem DragonFly, Model DragonFly X100 Fortem Technologies, Inc. Multi-copter with an onboard radar and customizable user module. CCL ECCN 6A008.e 3/23/2025
MRAM Radiation hardened memory device Western Digital
Technologies, Inc.
Non-volatile device that stores data in magnetic domains. Seek a CCATS 3/31/2025
Non-destructive Testing Consulting Services (NDT) TB3 NDT Consulting LLC Training and subsequent certifications on NAS-410, SNT-TC 1A, and ANSI/ASNT CP-189 standards. Seek a CCATS 3/31/2025
Audio Routing Circuit Card with Transit Firmware Installed, Model 6-Channel, Part Number 874-2040-002 (Firmware Version 874-9F01-001) TTM Technologies, Inc. Circuit card assembly that performs analog-to-digital and digital-to-analog conversions USML Category XI(c)(2) 3/31/2025
TAMP Austere, version: 01 GAMS Inc. Advanced tactical medical training that includes training to return fire to neutralize the enemy while performing initial life-saving interventions, using firearms to establish and maintain a secure cordon around a medical team, and training on the use of certain of defense articles USML Category IX(e)(3) 3/31/2025
Test Stand, Model 1, Part Number 0001 JINXIN INC Test Stand Seek a CCATS 4/7/2025
TF50A Gas Turbine Engine with SPG Power Turbine, Part Number 0-001-010-76; SPG Power Turbine, Model SPG4PT-SN, Part Number SPG4PT-SN-001;
Inconel Spacer, Part Number SPG-141-55;
Inconel Exhaust Diffuser, Part Number SPG-051-02
Signal Power Group Operating LLC Marine gas turbine engine with power turbine derived from Honeywell T55-GA-714A kit and two custom components Engine: CCL ECCN 9A619.a;
Power Turbine and Spacer: 9A619.x;
Exhaust diffuser: 8A609.x
4/9/2025
Harness, Protected-Side, Left Main A, Model D, Part Number 51586-0101 Collins Aerospace Wire harness for in-tank fuel quantity indicating system USML Category VIII(h)(11) 4/14/2025
Photothermal Common-path Interferometer, Model and Part Number PCI-003; and Testing Service Island Interferometry A machine that measures thermal absorption in optical materials using a laser, and related services Interferometer: Seek a CCATS;
Testing service: Split; defense service when testing a defense article
4/14/2025
M107 Simulated 155 Artillery Round; M9 Charge bag; and M582 Simulated Fuze Van Halteren Technologies Simulated ammunitions that replicate the weight and balance of artillery rounds, charge bags, and fuzes ECCN 0A614.x 4/14/2025

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=6ea6afdcdbc36300529d368d7c96194b

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DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

 

May 2 through May 30, 2025: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Change in Address of Curtiss-Wright Controls Integrated Sensing Inc. from 1150 North Fiesta Boulevard, Gilbert, AZ 85233 to 1100 W Gove Pkwy, Ste. 102, Tempe, AZ 85283;
  • Change in Address of GTDS America, LLC from 8 Morgan Avenue, Newbury, MA 01951 to 10 Trailside Way, Norfolk, MA 02056;
  • Change in Name of Airbus GmbH sites in Ausburg and Varel due to corporate restructuring;

 

From: To:
Airbus GmbH Airbus Aerostructures GmbH
Airbus GmbH Plant Ausburg Airbus Aerostructures GmbH Plant Ausburg
Airbus GmbH Plant Varel Airbus Aerostructures GmbH Plant Varel
  • Change in Address of GE Aviation Czech s.r.o from Beranovych 65, 199 02, Letnany, Prague 19902, Czech Republic to Berabovych 65, Praha 9, Praha 199 02, Czech Republic;
  • Change in Address of a branch of GE Aviation Systems North America LLC from Building Number 7546, Qurtubah District, Unit 1110, Riyadh 13244, Saudia Arabia to Building Number 7546, Qurtubah District, Unit 1110, P.O. Box 2284, Riyadh 13244, Saudi Arabia;
  • Change in Address of GE India Industrial Pvt. Ltd. from A-18 First Floor, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase II, New Delhi, India 110 020 to Unit 9, First Floor, Hyatt Delhi Residences, Aerocity, New Delhi, India 110 037; and
  • Change in Address of GE Aviation Systems North America LLC from 21 Leonardo Da Vinci St., Tel Aviv 6473319, Israel to 8 Shaul Hamelech Blvd., Tel Aviv 6473307, Israel.

 

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DDTC Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

 

Q: I am exporting software source code. Are there any additional requirements I need to be aware of?

 

A: Yes. Any export of U.S software source code, operating algorithms, signal processing algorithms, and/or program maintenance documentation must be compliant with DoD Guidelines for International Transfers of Software Documentation (including source code), dated 8 April 1997.  The request MUST include a full description and explanation of all relevant software modules. Be sure to identify the modules proposed for release, as well as those that will NOT be released.  Contact DTSA for a copy of the guidelines or answers to any questions you may have.

 

Q: Why is a transmittal letter required if information is already stated in application?

 

A: While the transmittal letter may re-state information already provided in the application, it will allow the applicant to provide further insight into the transaction as well as provide information not specifically required in the license application, i.e., related voluntary disclosure (VD), customs seizure. More importantly, DDTC is moving away from the “stand-alone” license application where no supporting documentation is provided. The inclusion of a transmittal letter re-stating the application information or providing further clarification of the transaction allows for a more robust license file.

 

Q: My company is entering into an agreement to grant a non-US person authorization to manufacture defense articles abroad. The agreement requires the transfer of ITAR-controlled technical data, defense articles, or the performance of defense services, but we are not transferring manufacturing know-how. Is an MLA still required?

 

A: Yes. ITAR § 120.57(d) provides that an MLA is an agreement “whereby a U.S. person grants a foreign person an authorization to manufacture defense articles abroad” and involves either (1) exports of defense articles, including technical data, or the performance of a defense service, or (2) the use by the foreign person of technical data or defense articles previously exported by the U.S. person. Thus, an MLA would be appropriate even if no manufacturing know-how is transferred. DDTC may authorize a manufacturing activity under a TAA when it meets all the conditions of ITAR § 124.13 and only limited defense services are furnished (e.g., quality control). Alternatively, if no defense services will be furnished and all the conditions of ITAR § 124.13 are met, an offshore procurement license may be appropriate.

 

Q: How is a purchase order issued to a subsidiary handled in the license application?

 

A: The parent company who is the holder of the registration code must be identified in the applicant section of the license application. If the supporting documentation is issued to or identifies a subsidiary of the parent, the subsidiary’s information must be provided in the subsidiary section of the applicant block.

 

Q: Is an export license required in order to send defense articles to Puerto Rico?

 

A: No. As ITAR § 120.60 makes clear, Puerto Rico is part of the United States, as are other locations including American Samoa, Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands. No export occurs when a defense article is shipped to Puerto Rico. Therefore, no export license or other approval from DDTC is required.

 

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Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Saudi Arabia  

 

May 2, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested to buy one thousand (1,000) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and fifty (50) AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM guidance sections. The following non-MDE items will also be included: AMRAAM control section spares, missile containers, and support equipment; spare parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support; weapon system support; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $3.50 billion. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4173146/kingdom-of-saudi-arabia-aim-120c-8-advanced-medium-range-air-to-air-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Ukraine

 

May 2, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Ukraine requests to buy equipment and services in support of its F-16 aircraft. The following non-MDE items will be included: aircraft modifications and upgrades; personnel training related to operation, maintenance, and sustainment support; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; ground handling equipment; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $310.5 million. The principal contractors will be Valiant Integrated Services, located in Herndon, VA; Top Aces Corporation, located in Mesa, AZ; Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, located in Fort Worth, TX; Pratt and Whitney, located in East Hartford, CT; Snap-on, Inc., located in Kenosha, WI; BAE Systems, Inc., located in Falls Church, VA; AAR Corporation, located in Wood Dale, IL; and Comsetra, LLC, located in Grove, OK. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4173182/ukraine-f-16-training-and-sustainment

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Norway  

 

May 2, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Norway has requested to buy three hundred (300) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder tactical missiles; two (2) AIM 9X Block II special air training missiles (NATM); twenty-four (24) AIM 9X Block II captive air training missiles (CATM); twenty (20) AIM 9X Block II Tactical Guidance Units; and twenty (20) AIM 9X Block II CATM Guidance Units. The following non-MDE items will also be included: dummy air training missiles; missile containers; software; training; support equipment; spare and repair parts; publications and technical documentation; transportation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $370.9 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4173194/norway-aim-9x-block-ii-tactical-missiles

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Czech Republic  

 

May 5, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of the Czech Republic has requested to buy AN/PYQ-10A(C) simple key loaders; AN/PRC-160, AN/PRC-163, and AN/PRC-167 radios; RF-300M-DL(C) small secure data links and support equipment; spare parts; U.S. Government and contractor technical engineering, logistics, and personnel services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $181 million. The principal contractor will be L3Harris Global Communications, Inc., located in Rochester, NY. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4174285/czech-republic-communications-equipment

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the United Arab Emirates

 

May 12, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested to buy six (6) CH-47F Block II Chinook helicopters with air-to-air refuel probe capability and extended range fuel tanks; sixteen (16) T-55-GA-714A engines, (12 installed, 4 spares); fourteen (14) Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS)/Inertial Navigation System (INS) (EGI) devices with M-Code (12 installed, 2 spares); eight (8) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (6 installed, 2 spares); twenty (20) AN/ARC-231A communications security (COMSEC) radios (18 installed, 2 spares); and twenty (20) M-240 machine guns (18 installed, 2 spares). The following non-MDE items will also be included: Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) classified software; AN/APR-39A radar warning receivers; AN/AVR-2B Laser Detecting Sets (LDS); AN/ARC-220 high frequency (HF) radios; KY-100M COMSEC terminals; aircraft survivability equipment (including impulse cartridges for cable cutters and aircraft cartridges); AN/ARN-147 Very High Frequency (VHF) Omni Directional Radio Range/Instrument Landing System (VOR/ILS) receivers; WESCAM MX-15HDi electro-optical/infrared imaging systems; AN/ARN-153 Tactical Airborne Navigation System (TACAN) radios; AN/APN-209 radar altimeters; AN/APX-123A identification friend or foe (IFF) transponders; KIV-77 COMSEC IFF cryptographic appliqués; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; services to support the mission equipment; hardware and services required to implement partner-unique modifications; Fast Rope Insertion/Extraction Systems (FRIES); Internal Extended Range Fuel Systems (ERFS); in-flight refueling capability; firefighting equipment; ballistic armor protection systems; air worthiness support; spare and repair parts; communications equipment; personnel training and training equipment; site surveys; tool and test equipment; ground support equipment; repair and return; publications and technical documentation; Quality Assurance Team (QAT); U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $1.32 billion. The principal contractors will be Boeing Helicopter Aircraft Company, located in Ridley Park, PA; and Honeywell Engine Company, located in Phoenix, AZ. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4182033/united-arab-emirates-ch-47f-chinook-helicopters

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the United Arab Emirates

 

May 12, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested to buy additional F-16 aircraft components, spares, and accessories; and other related elements of logistics and program support that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was below the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at $40.9 million ($0 in MDE), included Common Munitions Built-in-Test Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); munitions support equipment; night vision device (NVD) support and spare equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories; repair and return support; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; site surveys; studies and surveys; transportation support; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services. The estimated total cost is $130 million. There are no principal contractors associated with this potential sale. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4182037/united-arab-emirates-f-16-sustainment

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Türkiye

 

May 14, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Republic of Türkiye has requested to buy sixty (60) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II All Up Round (AUR) missiles and eleven (11) AIM-9X Block II Tactical guidance units. The following non-MDE items will be included: missile containers and support equipment; spare parts, and missile support, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $79.1 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article/4186475/trkiye-aim-9x-sidewinder-block-ii-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Türkiye

 

May 14, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Republic of Türkiye has requested to buy fifty-three (53) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); and six (6) AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM guidance sections. The following non-MDE items will be included: AMRAAM containers and support equipment; Common Munitions Built-in-Test (BIT) Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); spare parts, consumables and accessories, repair and return support; weapons system support and software; classified software delivery and support; classified publications and technical documentation; transportation support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $225 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article/4186456/trkiye-aim-120c-8-advanced-medium-range-air-to-air-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Bosnia and Herzegovina

 

May 20, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that Bosnia and Herzegovina has requested to buy AW-119Kx helicopters; qualification and transition training of pilots and maintainers; in-country contractor field service representative support; program management reviews; technical assistance; product support; associated aviation ground support equipment; platform-peculiar ground support equipment; hardware; special tools; test equipment and basic issue items; quality assurance team inspections; inventories; ground run and flight test validation and verification testing; air freight transportation delivery; initial spares, repair and consumable parts; operator maintenance; and technical manuals; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $100 million. The principal contractor will be Leonardo Helicopters U.S., AgustaWestland Philadelphia Corporation, located in Philadelphia, PA. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article/4192556/bosnia-and-herzegovina-aw-119kx-helicopters

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Poland

 

May 21, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of Poland has requested to buy one thousand four hundred (1,400) GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs (SDB-I); and four (4) GBU-39 (T-1)/B inert practice bombs with fuzes. The following non-MDE items are also included: GBU-39 tactical training rounds; practice bombs; bomb components; containers; weapons system support; support and test equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical data; personnel training and training equipment; warranties; transportation support; site surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $180 million. The principal contractor will be The Boeing Corporation, located in St. Louis, MO. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article/4194147/poland-gbu-39b-small-diameter-bombs

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Estonia

 

May 22, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of Estonia has requested to buy eight hundred (800) FGM-148F Javelin missiles (including 8 fly-to-buy missiles) and an additional seventy-two (72) Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Units (LwCLUs) that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at $10.18 million ($3.1 million in MDE), included twelve (12) LwCLUs; LwCLU Basic Skills Trainers; Javelin missile simulation rounds; Battery Coolant Units; spare parts; tool kits and support equipment; equipment training; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance and services; engineering services; and related elements of logistics and program support. This notification is for a combined eight hundred (800) FGM-148F Javelin missiles (including 8 fly-to-buy missiles) and eighty-four (84) LwCLUs. The following non-MDE items will also be included: LwCLU Basic Skills Trainers; Javelin missile simulation rounds; Battery Coolant Units; spare parts; tool kits and support equipment; equipment training; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance and services; engineering services; and related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $296 million. The principal contractors will be the Javelin Joint Venture between RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ, and Lockheed Martin, located in Orlando, FL. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article/4195631/estonia-javelin-missiles

 

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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

Department of Commerce Launches Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Inclusions Process

 

May 1, 2025: On April 30, 2025, the Department of Commerce issued an interim final rule establishing a new tariff inclusion process for derivative aluminum and steel articles.

This action follows the issuance of Presidential Proclamations 10895 and 10896, collectively known as the “Inclusion Proclamations,” which direct the Secretary of Commerce to establish a mechanism for expanding the scope of steel and aluminum tariffs to cover “derivative” articles that contain steel or aluminum.
The Section 232 inclusions process allows U.S. manufacturers and trade associations to request the inclusion of new derivative articles under Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs. Inclusions may be submitted during any of three defined periods each year. The first submission period opens May 1, 2025. The public will have an opportunity to comment on inclusion requests, and decisions will be issued within 60 days. BIS will publicly post its determinations on Regulations.gov.
Today’s rule also eliminates the Section 232 aluminum and steel exclusions process. In accordance with the Inclusion Proclamations, no new applications for product exclusions have been accepted after February 10,2025.
Jeffrey Kessler, Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, said:
“The new steel and aluminum inclusions process will extend the reach of the steel and aluminum tariff program and shut down avenues for circumvention – bringing industry and jobs back to the United States.”
Beyond the establishment of the steel and aluminum inclusions process, Commerce is currently conducting six Section 232 investigations in support of the President’s America First Agenda, including inquiries into the national security impact of imports of copper, timber, lumber, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, critical minerals, and medium- and heavy-duty trucks into the United States. In addition, Commerce recently imposed tariffs on autos and auto parts under Section 232.

 

https://media.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-launches-section-232-steel-aluminum-inclusions-process

 

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Department of Commerce Rescinds Biden-Era Artificial Intelligence Diffusion Rule, Strengthens Chip-Related Export Controls

May 13, 2025: The Department of Commerce initiated a rescission of the Biden Administration’s AI Diffusion Rule, while announcing additional steps to strengthen export controls on semiconductors worldwide.

The AI Diffusion Rule was issued on January 15, 2025, with compliance requirements that were set to come into effect on May 15, 2025.  These new requirements would have stifled American innovation and saddled companies with burdensome new regulatory requirements.  The AI Diffusion Rule also would have undermined U.S. diplomatic relations with dozens of countries by downgrading them to second-tier status.

BIS plans to publish a Federal Register notice formalizing the rescission and will issue a replacement rule in the future.

Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Jeffery Kessler has instructed BIS enforcement officials not to enforce the Biden Administration’s AI Diffusion Rule, stating:

“The Trump Administration will pursue a bold, inclusive strategy to American AI technology with trusted foreign countries around the world, while keeping the technology out of the hands of our adversaries.  At the same time, we reject the Biden Administration’s attempt to impose its own ill-conceived and counterproductive AI policies on the American people.”

In addition, BIS announced actions to strengthen export controls for overseas AI chips, including:

  • Issuing guidance alerting industry to the risks of using PRC advanced computing ICs, including specific Huawei Ascend chips.
  • Issuing guidance warning the public about the potential consequences of allowing U.S. AI chips to be used for training and inference of Chinese AI models.
  • Issuing guidance to U.S. companies on how to protect supply chains against diversion tactics.

These actions ensure that the United States will remain at the forefront of AI innovation and maintain global AI dominance.

https://media.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-rescinds-biden-era-artificial-intelligence-diffusion-rule-strengthens-chip-related

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Reporting for Calendar Year 2024 on Offsets Agreements Related to Sales of Defense Articles or Defense Services to Foreign Countries or Foreign Firms

 

May 21, 2025: 90. Fed. Reg. 21738: This notice is to remind the public that U.S. firms are required to report annually to the Department of Commerce (Commerce) information on contracts for the sale of defense articles or defense services to foreign countries or foreign firms that are subject to offsets agreements exceeding $5,000,000 in value. U.S. firms are also required to report annually to Commerce information on offsets transactions completed in performance of existing offsets commitments for which an offsets credit of $250,000 or more has been claimed from the foreign representative. This year, such reports must include relevant information from calendar year 2024 and must be submitted to Commerce no later than June 15, 2025.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/21/2025-09139/reporting-for-calendar-year-2024-on-offsets-agreements-related-to-sales-of-defense-articles-or

 

U.S. Census Bureau

Update to Automated Export System (AES) Appendix F – Update to C65 and C75 License Type Codes

May 6, 2025:

CSMS # 64956194 - Update to Automated Export System (AES) Appendix F – Update to C65 and C75 License Type Codes

Update to the Automated Export System Trade Interface Requirements – Appendix F has been posted to CBP.gov.

The following license type codes have been updated:

License Code: C65

  • Removed 3A991 ECCN
  • Added 3B991 ECCN

License Code: C75

  • Added 5A002.z

Documentation is available under the ACE AESTIR Appendix F - License and License Exemption Type Codes webpage which can be located at: https://www.cbp.gov/document/guidance/aestir-appendix-f-license-and-license-exemption-type-codes

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Update to AESDirect – Displaying Participating Government Agency (PGA) Records

 

May 15, 2025:

 

Note: This update is specific to filers who use AESDirect as their connection method.

AESDirect will be updated on Tuesday, May 20, 2025, to allow all AESDirect participants to see the PGA requirements that have been integrated in AESDirect. Prior to this change, some PGA requirements were based on Pilot participation and were only available to those participants.

When a Schedule B/ HTS number is found on Appendix X, the appropriate PGA record will now be available to all filers in AESDirect based on each agency’s requirements. Shipments subject to PGA data requirements must submit a PGA record in the Automated Export System (AES).

When reporting for PGA data, filers will need to indicate ‘Yes’ in Step 3 to the question: Does this filing require Participating Government agency data? The additional PGA data will then display for you to enter the appropriate data elements.

 

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How to Resolve Common AES Response Messages


May 19, 2025

 

Note: This message is sent to all AES Updates subscribers and is for educational purposes only.

 

When submitting your Electronic Export Information (EEI) to the Automated Export System (AES), you can receive different response messages: Fatal, Compliance, Verify, Informational and Warning.  It is important that AES filers address and/or correct Response Messages as soon as they are received to comply with the Foreign Trade Regulations.

To help you take the appropriate action, here is guidance on how to address one of the most frequent Response Messages that were generated in the AES for the previous month.

 

Response Code: 136

 

Narrative:     PR to US Requires PR Port of Export

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        The Country of Destination is reported as the Unites States and the Port of Export Code is not a Puerto Rican port.

 

 

Resolution:  A Port of Export Code must be reported on shipments from Puerto Rico to the United States and it must be a Puerto Rican port.

 

See Appendix D, Export Port Codes for a list of acceptable Port of Export Codes.

Verify the Country of Ultimate Destination and Port of Export Code, correct the shipment and resubmit.

For a complete list of the AES Response Codes, their reasons and resolutions, see Appendix A – Commodity Filing Response Messages.

As a reminder, filers have multiple resources that they can use when filing EEI to the AES.  You can access User Guides, Walk-through videos and other resources at our website.

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

 

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Fines and Penalties

 

May 22, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 21886:  On April 17, 2024, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Sergey Karpushkin (“Karpushkin”), was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371. Specifically, Karpushkin conspired with others to purchase and receive over $139 million in metal products from companies owned by a sanctioned oligarch. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Karpushkin to 21 months of imprisonment, with credit for time served, and three years of supervised release.

 

Pursuant to Section 1760(e) of the Export Control Reform Act (“ECRA”), the export privileges of any person who has been convicted of certain offenses, including, but not limited to, 18 U.S.C. 371, may be denied for a period of up to ten (10) years from the date of his/her conviction. 50 U.S.C. 4819(e). In addition, any Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) licenses or other authorizations issued under ECRA, in which the person had an interest at the time of the conviction, may be revoked. Id.

 

BIS received notice of Karpushkin's conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 371. As provided in Section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or the “Regulations”), BIS provided notice and opportunity for Karpushkin to make a written submission to BIS. 15 CFR 766.25.  BIS has not received a written submission from Karpushkin.

 

Based upon the Office of Export Enforcement’s review of the record and consultations with BIS' Office of Exporter Services, including its Director, and the facts available to BIS, they have decided to deny Karpushkin's export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Karpushkin's conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Karpushkin had an interest at the time of his conviction.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/22/2025-09174/in-the-matter-of-sergey-karpushkin-3740-ne-207th-terrace-miami-fl-33180-order-denying-export

 

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May 22, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 21887: On March 1, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Arlando Torres (“Torres”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Torres was convicted of smuggling and attempting to smuggle from the United States to Mexico, 1,680 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition, 1,000 rounds of 10mm ammunition, 3,200 rounds of 7.62x39mm ammunition, and 50 rounds of 7.62x25mm ammunition. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Torres to 41 months of imprisonment with credit for time served, and three years of supervised release.

 

Pursuant to Section 1760(e) of the Export Control Reform Act (“ECRA”), the export privileges of any person who has been convicted of certain offenses, including, but not limited to, 18 U.S.C. 554, may be denied for a period of up to ten (10) years from the date of his/her conviction. 50 U.S.C. 4819(e). In addition, any Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) licenses or other authorizations issued under ECRA, in which the person had an interest at the time of the conviction, may be revoked. Id.

 

BIS received notice of Torres's conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 554. As provided in Section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or the “Regulations”), BIS provided notice and opportunity for Torres to make a written submission to BIS. 15 CFR 766.25. BIS has not received a written submission from Torres.

 

Based upon the Office of Export Enforcement’s review of the record and consultations with BIS's Office of Exporter Services, including its Director, and the facts available to BIS, the have decided to deny Torres's export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Torres's conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Torres had an interest at the time of his conviction.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/22/2025-09170/order-denying-export-privileges-arlando-torres-304-7th-street-hico-tx-76457

 

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May 22, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 21889; On May 19, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Osmani Valdivia Perez (“Perez”), was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371. Specifically, Perez pled guilty to conspiring with others to export from the United States to Mexico stolen vessel parts, specifically outboard engines. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Perez to 60 months in prison and three years of supervised release.

 

Pursuant to Section 1760(e) of the Export Control Reform Act (“ECRA”), the export privileges of any person who has been convicted of certain offenses, including, but not limited to, 18 U.S.C. 371, may be denied for a period of up to ten (10) years from the date of his/her conviction. 50 U.S.C. 4819(e). In addition, any Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) licenses or other authorizations issued under ECRA, in which the person had an interest at the time of the conviction, may be revoked. Id.

 

BIS received notice of Perez's conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 371. As provided in Section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or the “Regulations”), BIS provided notice and opportunity for Perez to make a written submission to BIS. 15 CFR 766.25. BIS has not received a written submission from Perez.

 

Based upon the Office of Export Enforcement’s review of the record and consultations with BIS's Office of Exporter Services, including its Director, and the facts available to BIS, they have decided to deny Perez's export privileges under the Regulations for a period of seven (7) years from the date of Perez's conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Perez had an interest at the time of his conviction.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/22/2025-09172/in-the-matter-of-osmani-valdivia-perez-inmate-number-33469-018-fci-coleman-low-federal-correctional

 

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May 22, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 21890: On December 19, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, Steve Trevino (“Trevino”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a) (Smuggling Goods from the United States). Specifically, Trevino was convicted of smuggling firearms from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Trevino to 57 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.

 

Pursuant to Section 1760(e) of the Export Control Reform Act (“ECRA”), the export privileges of any person who has been convicted of certain offenses, including, but not limited to, 18 U.S.C. 554, may be denied for a period of up to ten (10) years from the date of his/her conviction. 50 U.S.C. 4819(e). In addition, any Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) licenses or other authorizations issued under ECRA, in which the person had an interest at the time of the conviction, may be revoked. Id.

 

BIS received notice of Trevino's conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 554. As provided in Section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or the “Regulations”), BIS provided notice and opportunity for Trevino to make a written submission to BIS. 15 CFR 766.25. BIS has not received a written submission from Trevino.

 

Based upon the Office of Export Enforcement’s review of the record and consultations with BIS's Office of Exporter Services, including its Director, and the facts available to BIS, they have decided to deny Trevino's export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Trevino's conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Trevino had an interest at the time of his conviction.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/22/2025-09175/in-the-matter-of-steve-trevino-7014-palacios-cv-san-antonio-tx-78242-2327-order-denying-export

 

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May 22, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 2188: On May 19, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Roberto Marrero-Cisneros (“Marrero-Cisneros”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371 (conspiracy to export stolen vessel parts and to smuggle goods from the United States). Specifically, Marrero-Cisneros conspired with others to export from the United States to Mexico boat engines and parts that were stolen, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 553(a)(1), and to export boat engines and parts contrary to law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 554(a). As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Marrero-Cisneros to 60 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.

 

Pursuant to Section 1760(e) of the Export Control Reform Act (“ECRA”), the export privileges of any person who has been convicted of certain offenses, including, but not limited to, 18 U.S.C. 371, may be denied for a period of up to ten (10) years from the date of his/her conviction. 50 U.S.C. 4819(e). In addition, any Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) licenses or other authorizations issued under ECRA, in which the person had an interest at the time of the conviction, may be revoked. Id.

 

BIS received notice of Marrero-Cisneros's conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 371. As provided in Section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or the “Regulations”), BIS provided notice and opportunity for Marrero-Cisneros to make a written submission to BIS. 15 CFR 766.25.[2] BIS has not received a written submission from Marrero-Cisneros.

 

Based upon the Office of Export Enforcement’s review of the record and consultations with BIS's Office of Exporter Services, including its Director, and the facts available to BIS, they have decided to deny Marrero-Cisneros's export privileges under the Regulations for a period of seven (7) years from the date of Marrero-Cisneros's conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Marrero-Cisneros had an interest at the time of his conviction.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/22/2025-09173/in-the-matter-of-roberto-marrero-cisneros-inmate-number-24458-018-fci-jesup-federal-correctional

 

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May 22, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 21887: On May 23, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Carlos Orlando Ledesma (“Ledesma”), was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371 (conspiracy to export stolen vessel parts and to smuggle goods from the United States). Specifically, Ledesma conspired with others to export from the United States to Mexico boat engines and parts that were stolen, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 553(a)(1), and to export boat engines and parts contrary to law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 554(a). As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Ledesma to 36 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.

 

Pursuant to Section 1760(e) of the Export Control Reform Act (“ECRA”), the export privileges of any person who has been convicted of certain offenses, including, but not limited to, 18 U.S.C. 371, may be denied for a period of up to ten (10) years from the date of his/her conviction. 50 U.S.C. 4819(e). In addition, any Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) licenses or other authorizations issued under ECRA, in which the person had an interest at the time of the conviction, may be revoked. Id.

 

BIS received notice of Ledesma's conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 371. As provided in Section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or the “Regulations”), BIS provided notice and opportunity for Ledesma to make a written submission to BIS. 15 CFR 766.25. BIS has not received a written submission from Ledesma.

 

Based upon the Office of Export Enforcement’s review of the record and consultations with BIS's Office of Exporter Services, including its Director, and the facts available to BIS, they have decided to deny Ledesma's export privileges under the Regulations for a period of seven (7) years from the date of Ledesma's conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Ledesma had an interest at the time of his conviction.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/22/2025-09171/in-the-matter-of-carlos-orlando-ledesma-980-nw-127th-ave-miami-fl-33182-order-denying-export

 

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Sanctions

 

 

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

May 1, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three Mexican nationals, and two Mexico-based entities involved in a drug trafficking and fuel theft network linked to the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG). This network generates hundreds of millions of dollars annually, benefitting CJNG, through a slew of criminal activities, including fentanyl trafficking, fuel theft, and smuggling stolen crude oil from Mexico across the southwest border. Concurrently, Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued an Alert that provides financial typologies and red flags indicative of crude oil smuggling schemes on the U.S. southwest border associated with CJNG and other Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Morfin Morfin, Alvao Noe of Mexico;
  • Morfin Morfin, Cesar of Mexico; and
  • Morfin Morfin, Remigio of Mexico.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Grupo Jala Logistica, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico; and
  • Servicios Logisticos Ambientales, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250501 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934256/download?inline=

 

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May 2, 2025: The United States remains committed to protecting our national security interests and dismantling violent criminal gangs terrorizing the Haitian people.

 

The Department of State announced the designation of Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).

 

  • Viv Ansanm is a group formed in September 2023 as a coalition of gangs through an alliance between the two main gang factions operating in Port-au-Prince, G-9 and G-Pép.
  • The groups provide a unified platform for criminal groups to use violence to destabilize Haiti and quash actions aimed at restoring state control. Viv Ansanm has launched coordinated attacks on critical infrastructure in Haiti, including prisons, government buildings, and Haiti’s main airport in Port-au-Prince as part of a campaign that, among other things, forced the resignation of former Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry.
  • Gran Grif is the largest gang in Haiti’s Artibonite department, a region that is home to much of the country’s rice fields. Since 2022, Gran Grif has been responsible for 80 percent of civilian death reports in Artibonite. Gran Grif has attacked Haitian National Police and the UN-authorized Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, including in the February 2025 attack that killed a Kenyan MSS mission officer.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Gran Grif of Haiti; and
  • Viv Ansanm of Haiti.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250502 and

https://www.state.gov/designation-of-viv-ansanm-and-gran-grif/

 

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May 5, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Karen National Army (KNA), a militia group in Burma, as a transnational criminal organization, along with the group’s leader Saw Chit Thu, and his two sons, Saw Htoo Eh Moo and Saw Chit Chit, for their role in facilitating cyber scams that harm U.S. citizens, human trafficking, and cross-border smuggling.  The KNA-controlled region, located on the Thai-Burmese border, is home to multiple cyber scam syndicates, and the KNA has benefitted from its connection to Burma’s military in its criminal operations.  Although statistics vary, American victims of cyber scams like the ones emanating from Burma have collectively lost billions of dollars over the last three years.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Chit, Saw Chit of Burma;
  • Eh Moo, Saw Htoo of Burma; and
  • Thu, Saw Chit of Burma.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Karen National Army of Burma.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250505 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0129

 

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May 8, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) increased pressure on Iran’s export of oil, designating the “teapot” refinery Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd. and three port terminal operators in Shandong Province for their role in purchasing or facilitating the delivery of hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil.  These teapot refineries, most of which are located in Shandong Province, purchase the majority of Iranian crude oil exports.  OFAC also imposed sanctions on several companies, vessels, and captains responsible for facilitating Iranian oil shipments as part of Iran’s “shadow fleet.”  This is OFAC’s third action against a teapot refinery and its first targeting terminal operators in Shandong Province.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Agarwal, Ketan of India; and
  • Viegas, Lincoln Francisco of India.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Baogang Dongying Donggang Logistics and Warehousing Co., Ltd. of China;
  • Embrace Que Limited of China;
  • Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd. of China;
  • Hong Kong Prime Trading Co., Limited of China;
  • Nissho Lines Incorporated of the Marshall Islands;
  • Propitous Forever Trading Co Ltd of the United Kingdom;
  • Shandong Baogang International Port Co., Ltd. of China;
  • Shandong Jingang Port Co., Ltd. of China;
  • Skadi Limited of the Marshall Islands;
  • Star Twinkle Shipping Limited of China; and
  • Xing AO Energy Pte. Ltd. of Singapore.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Big Mag (HORS) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 356336000 (vessel);
  • Impalas (S9Z4) Crude Oil Tanker Sao Tome & Principe flag; MMSI 668116257 (vessel);
  • Lamd (a.k.a. TAI HE) (3E6106) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352003859 (vessel);
  • Skadi (HPPN) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352421000 (vessel);
  • Star Twinkle 6 (3E5173) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352003519 (vessel); and
  • Thane (T7BR8) Crude Oil Tanker San Marino flag; MMSI 268246702 (vessel).

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250508

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0135

 

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May 12, 2025: Sayyed Mohammad Reza Seddighi Saber is the head of Iran’s Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research’s (also known by its Persian acronym, SPND) Shahid Karimi Group, a group that works on explosives-related projects. Seddighi Saber is linked to projects including research and testing applicable to the development of nuclear explosive devices.

 

Ahmad Haghighat Talab is an SPND senior official and a nuclear scientist who was previously involved in Iran’s pre-2004 weapons program: the Amad Project. Talab continues to use his scientific expertise to advance Iran’s nuclear-related research and development efforts that have potential military applications.  As an SPND senior official, Talab also coordinates with Iranian researchers who work on nuclear research with dual-use purposes.

 

Mohammed Reza Mehdipur is a longtime SPND-affiliated official who has been involved in explosion and shock research on behalf of SPND. Mehdipur was appointed as head of SPND’s Shahid Chamran Group, which has conducted nuclear-related research.  As a longtime explosives and nuclear researcher, Mehdipur has supported SPND’s nuclear and explosives research and development efforts, including those with potential military applications.

 

Fuya Pars Prospective Technologists, also known as Ideal Vacuum, is an SPND-affiliated company that has attempted to procure from foreign suppliers, as well as indigenously fabricate, equipment that could be applicable in nuclear weapons research and development.

 

The Department of State is designating Fuya Pars Prospective Technologists (Ideal Vacuum), Sayyed Mohammad Reza Seddighi Saber, Ahmad Haghighat Talab, and Mohammed Reza Mehdipur for sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13382 for engaging or attempting to engage in activities or transactions that materially contribute to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport or transfer such items, by Iran, a foreign country of proliferation concern.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Saber, Sayyed Mohammed Reza Seddighi of Iran; and
  • Talab, Ahmad Haghighat of Iran.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Fuya Pars Prospective Technologists of Iran.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250512

https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/05/imposition-of-new-u-s-sanctions-related-to-iranian-nuclear-related-research-with-potential-military-applications/

 

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May 13, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned nearly two dozen firms operating in multiple jurisdictions in virtually every aspect of Iran’s illicit international oil trade.  The Iranian government allocates billions of dollars’ worth of oil annually to its armed forces to supplement their budget allocations, underwriting the development of ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as financing regional terrorist groups.  Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) and its main commercial affiliate, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company (Sepehr Energy), continue to establish front companies and rely on buyers and facilitators to enable their sanctioned oil trade.  Since the start of this administration, Treasury has rapidly moved to implement President Trump’s maximum pressure campaign on Iran and have taken 19 actions, sanctioning 253 individuals, entities, and vessels related to Tehran and its proxies.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Khorasani Niasari, Mohammad of Iran.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • CCIC Singapore Pte. Ltd. of Singapore;
  • Continental Sinoil Group Limited of China;
  • Fine Sanmata Shipping Co., Limited of China;
  • Forsal Chartering Corporation of Seychelles;
  • Huangdao Inspection and Certification Co., Ltd of China;
  • Metaone Trading Limited of China;
  • Milen Trading Co., Limited of China;
  • Nanhai Limited of China;
  • Oriental Apple Company Pte Ltd of Singapore;
  • Qingdao Fushen Petrochemical Co., Ltd of China;
  • Qingdao Linkrich International Shipping Agency Co., Ltd of China;
  • South Sea Energy Limited of China;
  • Star Energy International Limited of China;
  • Winso Trading Limited of China; and
  • Xin Rui Ji Trad Co., Limited of China.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Balu (TJM0133) Floating Storage Tanker Cameroon flag;  MMSI 613469620 (vessel); and
  • Roc (3E6750) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352004455 (vessel).

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250513

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0139

 

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May 14, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated six individuals and 12 entities for their involvement in efforts to help the Iranian regime domestically source the manufacturing of critical materials needed for Tehran’s ballistic missile program.  Those sanctioned support the various Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) sub-organizations that oversee the effort to help Iran domestically develop carbon fiber materials needed to manufacture intercontinental ballistic missiles.  This action is being taken in furtherance of National Security Presidential Memorandum-2, which directs that Iran be denied intercontinental ballistic missiles and that the IRGC and its surrogates be disrupted, degraded, or denied access to the resources that sustain their destabilizing activities.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Qin, Dehui of China;
  • Qin, Jinhua of China;
  • Rezai, Mohammad of Iran;
  • Wang, Chao of China; and
  • Wang, Piao of China.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Advanced Fiber Development Company of Iran;
  • Nantong Tanchen High Performance Material Co Ltd of China;
  • Nantong Yihong New Materials Co Ltd of China;
  • Qingdao Premier Technology Co Ltd of China;
  • Reso Trading Shanghai Co Ltd of China;
  • Sarmand Sazeh Sazan Saroush of Iran;
  • Shanghai Ninestex New Material Technology Co Ltd of China;
  • Shanghai Tanchain New Material Technology Co Ltd of China;
  • Sharif Hamrah Science and Technology Researchers of Iran; and
  • Super Sources Industrial Co Limited.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0142

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250514

 

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May 15, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted two senior Hizballah officials and two financial facilitators for their roles in coordinating financial transfers for Hizballah.  These individuals, based in Lebanon and Iran, work closely with Hizballah leadership to send money to the group from overseas donors.  These donations are a significant portion of the terrorist group’s overall budget.  In addition to managing and processing funding for Hizballah within Lebanon, one of these individuals is responsible for overseeing financial activity for Hizballah-aligned groups around the world.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Alami, Jihad of Lebanon;
  • Al-‘Amili, Mu’in Daqiq of Lebanon;
  • Nehme, Fadi of Lebanon; and
  • Ni’Mah, Hasan Abdallah of Lebanon.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250515

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0143

 

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May 15, 2025: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued Russia-related General License 124, "Authorizing Petroleum Services Related to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and Tengizchevroil."

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 124: “Authorizing Petroleum Services Related to  the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and Tengizchevroil Projects”

 

  • All transactions prohibited by the determination of January 10, 2025 made pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of Executive Order 14071 (“Prohibition on Petroleum Services”) that are related to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium or Tengizchevroil projects are authorized.

 

Additionally, OFAC has published an updated Russia-related Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1216).

 

FAQ 1216:

 

Q: What action has Treasury taken with regard to the provision of petroleum services to Russia?

 

A: In line with G7 efforts to reduce Russian revenues from energy, on January 10, 2025, Treasury issued a determination pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 prohibiting petroleum services to Russia. See The Determination Pursuant to Sections 1(a)(ii), 1(b), and 5 of E.O. 14071, Prohibition on Petroleum Services ("the Petroleum Services Determination"). This determination prohibits the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, to any person located in the Russian Federation of petroleum services. The Petroleum Services Determination took effect at 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on February 27, 2025. See FAQ 1217 for additional information.

 

OFAC expects to issue regulations defining petroleum services to include services related to the exploration, drilling, well completion, production, refining, processing, storage, maintenance, transportation, purchase, acquisition, testing, inspection, transfer, sale, trade, distribution, or marketing of petroleum, including crude oil and petroleum products, as well as any activities that contribute to Russia's ability to develop its domestic petroleum resources, or the maintenance or expansion of Russia's domestic production and refining. This would include services related to natural gas as a byproduct of oil production in Russia.

 

OFAC issued General License 121 to authorize any petroleum services that would otherwise be prohibited by the Petroleum Services Determination related to the operations of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), Tengizchevroil, and Sakhalin II. GL 121 expires on June 28, 2025. On May 15, 2025, OFAC issued GL 124, which extends without time limitation authorizations related to the CPC and Tengizchevroil.

 

The Petroleum Services Determination does not apply to (1) any petroleum services related to isotopes derived from petroleum manufacturing that are used for medical, agricultural, or environmental purposes, such as Carbon-13; (2) certain covered services related to the maritime transport of crude oil and petroleum products of Russian Federation origin purchased at or below the relevant price cap; and (3) any service in connection with the wind down or divestiture of an entity located in the Russian Federation that is not owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a Russian person. See FAQ 1217 for additional information related to price cap related exclusions of the Petroleum Services Determination.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934251/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1216

 

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May 20, 2025: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Iran-related General License Q, "Authorizing Limited Safety, Environmental, and Sale Transactions Involving the Blocked Vessel M.V. Tinos I While Located in the United States."

 

GENERAL LICENSE Q: “Authorizing Limited Safety, Environmental, and Sale Transactions Involving the Blocked Vessel M.V. Tinos I While Located in the United States”

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13902 involving the vessel M.V. Tinos I (IMO: 9969821) (Tinos I), Meisam Emamjomeh, or Pearl Petrochemical FZE, or any entity in which any of the foregoing owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one or more of the following activities are authorized, provided that any payments to a blocked person must be made into a blocked interest-bearing account at a U.S. financial institution:

 

(1) The safe docking and anchoring of the Tinos I in port;

(2) The preservation of the health and safety of the crew of the Tinos I;

(3) Emergency repairs and environmental mitigation or protection activities related to the Tinos I;

(4) The provision of vessel management, bunkering, pilotage, towing, insurance, classification, flagging, registration, crewing, or port agency services for the Tinos I, as well as other services necessary to maintain normal vessel standards for the Tinos I; or

(5) The sale of the Tinos I provided the net proceeds of the sale be placed into a blocked interest-bearing account at a U.S. financial institution.

 

Note to paragraph (a)(5).  Transactions authorized by paragraph (a)(5) include: bidding on the purchase of the vessel; paying deposits; providing financing, insurance, or funding in connection with the purchase; and, in furtherance of the sale of the vessel, repairing or modifying the vessel for commercial use and hiring surveyors to inspect the vessel.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934291/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250520

 

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May 21, 2025:  The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two high-ranking members of the Mexico-based Cartel del Noreste (CDN), formerly known as Los Zetas.  CDN, one of the most violent drug trafficking organizations in Mexico and a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), exerts significant influence over the border region, especially near the Laredo/Nuevo Laredo point of entry. These sanctions underscore the commitment to target CDN and other violent cartels involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms trafficking, and other heinous crimes that are endangering the American people.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • De Anda Ledezma, Miguel Angel of Mexico; and
  • Gonzalez Sauceda, Ricardo of Mexico.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250521

 

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May 23, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Syria General License (GL) 25 to provide immediate sanctions relief for Syria in line with the President’s announcement for the cessation of all sanctions on Syria.  GL 25 authorizes transactions prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, effectively lifting sanctions on Syria.  GL 25 will enable new investment and private sector activity consistent with the President’s America First strategy.  The U.S. Department of State concurrently issued a waiver under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act (Caesar Act) that will enable our foreign partners, allies, and the region to further unlock Syria’s potential.  This is just one part of a broader U.S. government effort to remove the full architecture of sanctions imposed on Syria due to the abuses of the Bashar al-Assad regime.

 

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued Syria General License 25, "Authorizing Transactions Prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations or Involving Certain Blocked Persons."

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 25: “Authorizing Transactions Prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations or Involving Certain Blocked Persons”

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 542 (SySR), other than transactions involving blocked persons, are authorized.

 

(b) All transactions that are prohibited by the SySR, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 544, the Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 561, the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594, the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597, or Executive Order 13574 involving the following blocked persons are authorized:

 

(1) the Government of Syria, as defined by 31 CFR § 542.308, as in existence on or after May 13, 2025;  (2) any blocked person listed in the Annex to this general license; or

(3) any entity in which one or more of the blocked persons listed in the Annex own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

Note to paragraph (b)(1). The Government of Syria includes Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and his government.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250523_33

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0148

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934306/download?inline

 

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May 29, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Funnull Technology Inc., a Philippines-based company that provides computer infrastructure for hundreds of thousands of websites involved in virtual currency investment scams, commonly known as “pig butchering,” along with its administrator, Liu Lizhi.  Americans lose billions of dollars annually to these cyber scams, with revenues generated from these crimes rising to record levels in 2024.  Funnull has directly facilitated several of these schemes, resulting in over $200 million in U.S. victim-reported losses.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Liu, Lizhi of China.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Funnull Technology Inc of China.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0149

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250529

MAY 2025 EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATES Read More »

APRIL 2025 EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through April 30, 2025.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and

persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 

In this newsletter, we have added a specific DDTC FAQs section, we think this will be of interest to our readers.

 

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

President

 

The President Announces Executive Order to Reform Foreign Defense Sales To Improve Speed and Accountability

 

April 9, 2025: To serve the interests of the American people, the United States must maintain the world’s strongest and most technologically advanced military through a dynamic defense industrial base, coupled with a robust network of capable partners and allies.  A rapid and transparent foreign defense sales system that enables effective defense cooperation between the United States and our chosen partners is foundational to these objectives.  Reforming this system would simultaneously strengthen the security capabilities of our allies and invigorate our own defense industrial base.  This mutually reinforcing approach would enhance United States warfighting capabilities by fostering healthy American supply chains, domestic production levels, and technological development.

Sec2.  Policy.  It is the policy of the President’s Administration to:

(a) Improve accountability and transparency throughout the foreign defense sales system to ensure predictable and reliable delivery of American products to foreign partners in support of United States foreign policy objectives.

(b) Consolidate parallel decision-making when determining which military capabilities the United States will choose to provide, and to which countries.

(c) Reduce rules and regulations involved in the development, execution, and monitoring of foreign defense sales and of transfer cases to ensure alignment with United States foreign policy objectives.

(d) Increase government-industry collaboration to achieve cost and schedule efficiencies in the execution of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

(e) Advance United States competitiveness abroad, revitalize the defense industrial base, and lower unit costs for the United States and our allies and partners by integrating exportability features in the design phase, improving financing options for partners, and increasing contract flexibility overall.

 

Sec3.  Phased Implementation.

 

(a)  The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall promptly:

 

(i)    Implement National Security Presidential Memorandum 10 of April 19, 2018 (United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy), or any successor policy directive.

(ii)   Reevaluate restrictions imposed by the Missile Technology Control Regime on Category I items and consider supplying certain partners with specific Category I items, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce.

(iii)  Submit a joint letter to the Congress proposing an update to statutory congressional certification (also known as congressional notification) thresholds of proposed sales under the FMS and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) programs in the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).  The Secretary of State shall also work with the Congress to review congressional notification processes to ensure the timely adjudication of notified FMS and DCS cases.

 

(b)  Within 60 days of the date of this order:

 

(i)   The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall develop a list of priority partners for conventional arms transfers and issue updated guidance to Chiefs of the United States Diplomatic Missions regarding this list.

 

(ii)  The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall:

 

(A)  develop a list of priority end-items for potential transfer to priority partners identified by the Secretary of State in the list required by this subsection;

(B)  ensure the transfer of priority end-items to priority partners would not cause significant harm to United States force readiness; and

(C)  ensure the transfer of priority end-items to priority partners would advance my Administration’s goal of strengthening allied burden-sharing, both by sharing the cost of end-item production and by increasing our allies’ capacity to meet capability targets independently, without sustained support from the United States.

(c)(i) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall review, update, and reissue the lists of priority partners and military end-items on an annual basis. The United States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. part 121, to focus protections solely on our most sensitive and sophisticated technologies and shall establish clear criteria for including an item on the FMS-Only List.

(c)(ii) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall review and update the list of defense items that can only be purchased through the FMS process (the FMS-Only List) and the United States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. part 121, to focus protections solely on our most sensitive and sophisticated technologies, and shall establish clear criteria for including an item on the FMS-Only List.

 

(d)  Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a plan to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), to:  improve the transparency of United States defense sales to foreign partners by developing metrics for accountability; secure exportability as a requirement in the early stages of the acquisition process; and consolidate technology security and foreign disclosure approvals.

(e) Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense, with the assistance of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a plan to the APNSA to develop a single electronic system to track all DCS export license requests and ongoing FMS efforts throughout the case life-cycle.

 

Sec4.  Definitions.  For purposes of this order:

 

(a) “Parallel decision-making” refers to the granting of simultaneous certifications and approvals during the FMS process, as opposed to sequential decision-making where agencies wait for other agencies to make decisions before taking action.

(b) “Exportability” means the process to identify, develop, and integrate technology protection features into United States defense systems early in the acquisition process to protect critical technologies, capabilities, and program information and thus enable export to partners.

(c) “FMS-only” means defense articles that are exclusively available through the FMS process as opposed to the DCS process, as authorized in the Arms Export Control Act and described in the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Chapter 4.

(d) “End-item” means the final product when assembled and ready for issue or deployment.

(e) “Foreign defense sales system” means the enterprise devoted to the transfer of defense articles, services, and training by the United States Government and United States companies to international partners and organizations.

(f) All other terms related to FMS cases shall have the meanings given to them by the SAMM, DSCA 5105.38M.

Sec. 5.  General Provisions.

 

(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

 

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/reforming-foreign-defense-sales-to-improve-speed-and-accountability/

 

 

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Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

Annual Report to Congress on Direct Commercial Sales Authorizations to Foreign Countries and International Organizations for Fiscal Year 2024 as required by Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended

 

April 25, 2025: This report documents defense articles and defense services licensed for permanent export under Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. 2778, to each foreign country and international organization during fiscal year (FY) 2024, in response to the requirements in Section 655(b)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended. The Department of Defense will report International Military Education and Training activities separately.

 

The report specifies the aggregate dollar value and quantity of defense articles, and defense services, authorized to each foreign country and international organization during the fiscal year, as well as data on the actual shipments of those licensed transactions. The actual-shipment data shows the total dollar value of all shipments that were authorized and on Page 2 of 4 that exported during the fiscal year to each destination. Authorizations in this report are categorized based on the destination country.

 

Authorizations applicable to multiple countries in the appendix are included under the designation “Various.” Documentation for shipping purposes requires a definitive destination be declared. Accordingly, actual shipments for those articles approved under the designation “Various” are attributed to the country listed on the shipping documentation.

 

The reported value of authorizations for defense articles and defense services does not correlate precisely to the value of articles actually transferred during the reporting period. The reasons for this are as follows: Most licenses issued for defense articles are valid for four years and may be used throughout the four years to execute authorized transactions. Similarly, manufacturing license and technical assistance agreements cover a wide range of programmatic activities for multi-year periods (generally exceeding the four-year validity period of defense-article export licenses). Export authorizations furnished in FY 2024 also include certain activities occurring in prior years, because the scope of the Department’s regulatory authority over such agreements continues for as long as these multi-year agreements remain in effect

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=ef6ae6324785aa107ddc0c03e16d43ef

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events

 

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DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

 

April 1, 2025, through April 30, 2025: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Change in Name of Churyo Engineering Co., Ltd. to MHI Aero Technologies Co., Ltd. due to acquisition;
  • Change in Name of Compro Computer Services, Inc. to Aechelon Technology, Inc. due to acquisition;
  • Change in Name of Toshiba Infrastructure Systems & Solutions Corporation to Toshiba Corporation due to corporate restructuring;
  • Change in Name of Bollore Logistics SE to CEVA Logistics SA due to acquisition;
  • Change in Address of Mikuni Aerospace Corporation, Nagoya Sales Office from 1-17-26 Nishiki, Naka-ku, Nagoya, Aichi, Japan to 3-20- 27 Nishiki, Naka-ku, Nagoya, Aichi Prefecture 460-003, Japan;
  • Change in Name and Address of General Electric International Inc., Kungsgatan 15, Stockholm, Sweden to Arcam AB, Designvagen 2, Molnlycke 435 33, Sweden due to acquisition;
  • Change in Name of Daher Aerospace SA to Daher Logistics SAS and Daher Business Support SAS due to company spin-off;
  • Change in Address of OHB Sweden AB, Vidarugatan 6, 164 40 Kista, Sweden to Torshamnsgatan 24, 164 40 Kista, Sweden;
  • Change in Address of General Dynamics Mission Systems, Inc. and General Dynamics Mission Systems Overseas Company, LLC, from 12450 Fair Lakes Circle, Suite 800, Fairfax, Virginia 22033 to 15036 Conference Center Drive, Suite 400, Chantilly, Virginia 20151;
  • Change in Address of filal af GE Aviation System North America LLC (“GE Denmark”) from Frederiksborggade 15,3, Kobenhavn 1358, Denmark to Frederiksborggade 15,3, Kobenhavn 1360, Denmark;
  • Change in Name of Blue Origin, LLC to Blue Origin Manufacturing, LLC due to corporate restructuring;
  • Change in Name of Multiwerkplaats B.V. to MWP Works due to acquisition;
  • Change in Name of General Dynamics Mission Systems - Italy S.r.l., General Dynamics Mission Systems Gulf LLC, and General Dynamics Mission Systems Asia-Pacific SDN BHD to Page Europa S.r.l., Page Middle East LLC, and Page Asia Pacific SDN BHD due to acquisition; and
  • Change in Name of Jacobs Australia Pty Limited to Amentum Australia Proprietary Limited due to acquisition.

 

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DDTC Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

 

Q: What does it mean to be on one of DDTC's lists of debarred parties?

 

A: Persons subject to statutory or administrative debarment are generally prohibited from participating directly or indirectly in ITAR-controlled activities, such as the export of technical data and other defense articles and the furnishing of defense services for which a license or other approval is required.  Also, pursuant to ITAR § 127.1(d), it is a violation for a person with knowledge that another person is ineligible under ITAR § 120.16(c), which includes debarred parties, to, among other things, apply for, obtain, or use an export control document on behalf of a debarred party, or participate in a transaction subject to the ITAR that will benefit a debarred party, without first obtaining DDTC’s approval.

 

DDTC has specified the consequences of debarment in the ITAR, and the Federal Register Notices announcing the debarment provide further detail regarding the debarment.  DDTC does not impose any restrictions on a debarred party’s eligibility to obtain banking services, engage in real estate transactions, purchase automobiles, or participate in any other activity not controlled under the ITAR.

 

Q: Why does the purchase documentation have to be issued within one year?

 

A: This requirement ensures the current validity of the export request. To comply with this requirement it is recommended all purchase documentation must be dated. A letter of explanation must be provided for any purchase documentation not meeting this requirement.

 

Q: How is a purchase order issued to a subsidiary handled in the license application?

 

A: The parent company who is the holder of the registration code must be identified in the applicant section of the license application. If the supporting documentation is issued to or identifies a subsidiary of the parent, the subsidiary’s information must be provided in the subsidiary section of the applicant block.

 

Q: Can I get an agreement in lieu of a brokering authorization?

 

A: No. In most cases, an agreement does not provide the full authorization for brokering activities.  Parties must ensure broker registration and any required approval of brokering activities is obtained prior to brokering activities occurring.

 

Q: My company is entering into an agreement to grant a non-US person authorization to manufacture defense articles abroad. The agreement requires the transfer of ITAR-controlled technical data, defense articles, or the performance of defense services, but we are not transferring manufacturing know-how. Is an MLA still required?

 

A: Yes. ITAR § 120.57(d) provides that an MLA is an agreement “whereby a U.S. person grants a foreign person an authorization to manufacture defense articles abroad” and involves either (1) exports of defense articles, including technical data, or the performance of a defense service, or (2) the use by the foreign person of technical data or defense articles previously exported by the U.S. person. Thus, an MLA would be appropriate even if no manufacturing know-how is transferred. DDTC may authorize a manufacturing activity under a TAA when it meets all the conditions of ITAR § 124.13 and only limited defense services are furnished (e.g., quality control). Alternatively, if no defense services will be furnished and all the conditions of ITAR § 124.13 are met, an offshore procurement license may be appropriate.

 

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Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Ecuador

 

April 1, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Ecuador has requested to buy M4A1 rifles. The following non-MDE items will also be included: Magpul PMAG M4 magazines; technical manuals; training and support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $64 million. The principal contractor will be determined after case implementation. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/ecuador-m4a1-rifles-and-support

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Philippines

 

April 1, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of the Philippines has requested to buy sixteen (16) F-16 C Block 70/72 aircraft; four (4) F-16 D Block 70/72 aircraft; twenty-four (24) F110-GE-129D or F100-PW-229 Engines (20 installed, 4 spares); twenty-two (22) Improved Programmable Display Generators (iPDG) (20 installed, 2 spares); twenty-two (22) AN/APG-83 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Scalable Agile Beam Radars (SABR) (20 installed, 2 spares); twenty-two (22) Modular Mission Computers 7000AH (or available mission computer) (20 installed, 2 spares); twenty-two (22) Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS) Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) (EGI) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) or M-Code capability and Precise Positioning Service (PPS) (20 installed, 2 spares); eighty-eight (88) LAU-129 guided missile launchers; twenty-two (22) M61A1 anti-aircraft guns (20 installed, 2 spares); twelve (12) AN/AAQ-33 Sniper Advanced Targeting Pods (ATP); twenty-four (24) Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Joint Tactical Radio Systems (MIDS-JTRS); one hundred twelve (112) Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) Air Intercept Missile (AIM)-120C-8 or equivalent missiles; four (4) AMRAAM guidance sections; thirty-six (36) Guided Bomb Unit (GBU)-39/B Small Diameter Bombs Increment 1 (SDB-1); two (2) GBU-39(T-1)/B SDB-1 Guided Test Vehicles; forty (40) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder missiles; thirty-two (32) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder Captive Air Training Missiles (CATMs); four (4) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder guidance units; three (3) AIM-9X Block II Captive Air Training Missile (CATM) guidance units; sixty (60) MK-82 500-lb general purpose bombs; sixty (60) MK-84 2,000-lb general purpose bombs; thirty (30) Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) KMU-572 tail kits for GBU-38 or Laser JDAM GBU-54; sixty (60) FMU-152 fuze systems; thirty (30) MAU-210 enhanced computer control groups (ECCG) for GBU-50 Enhanced Paveway II (EP II); and thirty-two (32) MXU-651 air foil groups (AFG) for GBU-50 EP II. The following non-MDE items will also be included: AN/ALQ-254 Viper Shield (VS) electronic warfare (EW) or equivalent systems; AMRAAM CATMs; AIM-9X Sidewinder training missiles and active optical target detectors (AOTD); Infrared Search and Track (IRST) systems; Air Combat Maneuvering Instrument (ACMI) range systems; FMU-139 Joint Programmable Fuzes (JPFs); missile containers; AN/ARC-238 radios; AN/APX-127 or equivalent Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIFF) Combined Interrogator Transponders (CIT) with Mode 5; KY-58 and KIV-78 cryptographic devices; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKLs); KGV-250X cryptographic devices; Scorpion Hybrid Optical-based Inertial Trackers (HObIT) or Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems II (JHMCS II) helmet mounted displays; night vision devices (NVDs); spare image intensifier tubes; AN/ALE-47 Airborne Countermeasures Dispenser Systems (CMDS); AN/ALE-47 countermeasure processors; AN/ALE-47 sequencer switching units; AN/ALE-47 Control Display Units (CDUs); precision navigation; Joint Mission Planning Systems (JMPS); GPS Antenna System (GAS-1) antenna electronics; Sniper pod pylons; ADU-890 and
ADU-891 adapter units, LAU-117 and LAU-88 Maverick launchers, impulse cartridges, chaff, flares, ammunition, and other bomb components; BRU-57 bomb racks; BRU-61 munitions carriage assemblies; MAU-12 bomb racks and TER-9A triple ejection racks; Common Munitions Built-in-Test (BIT) Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); Rackmount Improved Avionics Intermediate Shop (RIAIS); Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD); targeting systems; aircraft refurbishment after maintenance training; spare and repair parts, consumables and accessories; repair and return support; aircraft, engine, ground, and pilot life support equipment; classified and unclassified computer program identification number (CPIN) systems; pylons, launcher adapters, weapon interfaces, and bomb and ejection racks; fuel tanks; Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory (PMEL) and calibration support; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) maps and mapping data; ferry and fuel support; classified and unclassified software and software support; classified and unclassified publications, manuals, and technical documentation; facilities and construction support; simulators and training devices; personnel training and training equipment; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $5.58 billion. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin, located in Greenville, SC. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/philippines-f-16-aircraft

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Kuwait

 

April 3, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Kuwait has requested to buy equipment and services required to upgrade and recertify PATRIOT PAC-2 Guidance Enhancement Missiles (GEM) and recertify PATRIOT Guidance Enhancement Missiles-Tactical (GEM-T). The following non-MDE items will be included: sustainment maintenance; special tools, support, and test equipment; repair parts; modification kits; common tools; shop equipment and fixtures; material handling equipment; test support; stockpile reliability testing and inspection; repair and return support; spare parts; training; replacement materials; support from field service representatives, technicians, mechanics, and other support personnel; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $400 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Letterkenny, PA. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kuwait-upgrade-and-recertification-patriot-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Australia

 

April 9, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Australia has requested to buy up to two hundred (200) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); and up to two hundred (200) AIM-120D-3 AMRAAMs. The following non-MDE items will be included: AMRAAM containers and support equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, repair and return support; weapons system support and software; classified software delivery and support; classified publications and technical documentation; transportation support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $1.04 billion. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4150603/australia-aim-120c-and-aim-120d-advanced-medium-range-air-to-air-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Israel  

 

April 14, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Israel has requested to buy additional Eitan 8V199TE21-D powerpack engines and engine components that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at $85.5 million ($0 in MDE), included Eitan 8V199TE21-D powerpack engines and engine components; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance; contractor non-recurring engineering; and other related elements of logistics and program support. This notification is for a combined notification of non-MDE Eitan 8V199TE21-D powerpack engines and engine components; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance; contractor non-recurring engineering; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $180 million. The principal contractor will be Rolls-Royce Solutions America, Inc., located in Novi, MI. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4154118/israel-eitan-powerpack-engines

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Philippines  

 

April 15, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of the Philippines has requested to buy the following defense articles and services: TH-73A training helicopters; aircraft simulator; spare engines; pack up kits; fuel tanks; aircraft hoists and lifts; commercial avionics; commercial flight management systems; commercial Global Positioning Systems; shipping containers; support and test equipment; consumables and accessories; integration and test support; repair and return support; spare and repair parts; unclassified software delivery and support; unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and commercial training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, logistics, and transportation support services, including in-country representative support; studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $120 million. The principal contractor will be AgustaWestland Philadelphia Corporation (Leonardo), located in Philadelphia, PA. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4155316/philippines-th-73a-training-helicopters-and-support

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Morocco

 

April 15, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Kingdom of Morocco has requested to buy up to six hundred (600) FIM-92K Stinger Block I missiles. The following non-MDE items will also be included: U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $825 million. The principal contractors will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ; and Lockheed Martin, located in Syracuse, NY. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4155284/kingdom-of-morocco-fim-92k-stinger-block-i-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Ireland

 

April 23, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of Ireland has requested to buy thirty-six (36) Lightweight Command Launch Units (LwCLUs) that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at $8.7 million ($7.9 million in MDE), included forty-four (44) FGM-148 Javelin missiles. This notification is for a combined total of forty-four (44) FGM-148 Javelin missiles and thirty-six (36) Lightweight Command Launch Units (LwCLUs). The following non-MDE items will also be included: missile containers; U.S. Government technical assistance; Enhanced Producibility Basic Skills Trainers (EPBST); training; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $46 million. The prime contractors will be the Javelin Joint Venture between Lockheed Martin, located in Orlando, FL, and RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4164095/ireland-fgm-148-javelin-missiles-and-lightweight-command-launch-units

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To The Netherlands

 

April 25, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of the Netherlands has requested to buy up to one hundred sixty-three (163) Tomahawk Block V All Up Rounds (AURs); twelve (12) Tomahawk Block IV AURs; up to ten (10) Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Control Systems (TTWCS); and up to two (2) Tomahawk Block IV telemetry missiles. The following non-MDE items will also be included: satellite data link terminals (KIV-18A); integrated secure broadcast systems (KSX-5); communications security devices (KGV-135A); technical, programmatic, engineering, and logistical support for the Tomahawk AUR missiles, TTWCS, and Mission Distribution Software; missile containers; software; hardware; training; training devices; unscheduled missile maintenance; spares; in-service support; communication equipment; operational flight test; publications; engineering and technical expertise to maintain the capability; non-recurring engineering; transportation; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $2.19 billion. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are known offset requirements associated with this sale. See the attached annex for further details.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4166632/the-netherlands-tomahawk-land-attack-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Romania

 

April 28, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of Romania has requested to buy one (1) AN/MPQ-65 Configuration 3+ Increment 3 radar set; one (1) AN/MSQ-132 Engagement Control Station; two (2) M903 launching stations; and one (1) Electrical Power Plant (EPP) III. The following non-MDE items will also be included: launching station modification kits; PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement launcher conversion kit; generators; generator spare parts; prime movers; spare parts for prime movers; KG-250X encryptor; AN/TPX-57v1 identification friend or foe (IFF); KIV-77 encryptor; personnel communication equipment training; Defense Advanced Global Positioning Systems Receivers (DAGRs); U.S. Government and contractor representative technical assistance; engineering and logistics support services; publications and technical documentation; classified software; classified books and publications; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $280 million. The principal contractors will be RTX Corporation, located in Andover, MA, and Lockheed Martin, located in Bethesda, MD. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4167631/romania-patriot-air-defense-system

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Poland

 

April 29, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of Poland has requested to buy four hundred (400) AIM-120D3 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); sixteen (16) AIM-120D3 AMRAAM guidance sections, including either Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Modules or M-Code; and one (1) AIM-120 AMRAAM Instrumented Test Vehicle. The following non-MDE items will also be included: AMRAAM control sections, missile containers, and support equipment; Common Munitions Built-in-Test Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); ADU-891 adapter group test sets; KGV-135A encryption devices; Computer Program Identification Numbers (CPINs); spares and repair parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; weapons system support and software; classified software delivery and support; classified publications and technical documentation; transportation support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $1.33 billion. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4168673/poland-aim-120d-advanced-medium-range-air-to-air-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Kuwait

 

April 30, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of Kuwait has requested to buy services, including delivery, installation, and upgrade, for PATRIOT Post-Deployment Build (PDB) 8.1. The following non-MDE items will be included: software development; delivery and support; sustainment maintenance; spare and repair parts; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; integration and test support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $425 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Waltham, MA. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4170479/kuwait-patriot-post-deployment-build-81

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To India

 

April 30, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of India has requested to buy SeaVision software (including requested software enhancements); Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT) training; remote software and analytic support; access to SeaVision documentation; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $131 million. The principal contractor will be Hawkeye 360, located in Herndon, VA. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/Congressional-Notification-Archive/Article/4170460/india-indo-pacific-maritime-domain-awareness

 

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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

BIS Nominee Suggests 50% Rule for Entity List

 

April 11, 2025: Landon Heid, the President’s nominee to be assistant secretary of commerce for export administration, said April 10 that he wants the Bureau of Industry and Security to wage a “continuous battle every single day” to prevent China from obtaining restricted U.S. technology. He suggested that he wants to make subsidiaries automatically subject to Entity List restrictions, similar to OFAC’s 50% rule.

 

https://exportcompliancedaily.com/article/2025/04/11/bis-nominee-suggests-50-rule-for-entity-list-2504100036?BC=bc_680120417547a

 

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Commerce Launches Section 232 Investigation on Imports of Medium-Duty and Heavy-Duty Trucks and their parts

 

April 23, 2025: The Department of Commerce initiated an investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 1862) (“Section 232”), to determine the effects on the national security of the imports of medium-duty trucks, heavy-duty trucks, and medium- and heavy-duty truck parts.

 

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) examined the current quantities and circumstances of these imports to determine if it threatens to impair U.S. national security and whether action is needed to address any such threat. Protection of U.S. national security and economic interests remains the President’s first priority, and this investigation will ensure American truck manufacturing remains protected.

 

Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Jeffrey Kessler released the following statement:

“A strong and resilient automotive and truck industry is vital to our national security. Under President Trump’s leadership, the Commerce Department will work to support this vital sector and carefully assess the risks posed by external threats and supply chain vulnerabilities.”

 

Interested parties are invited to submit written comments, data, analyses, or other information pertinent to the investigation to the Department of Commerce’s (Department) Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-launches-section-232-investigation-imports-medium-duty-heavy-duty-trucks-their-parts

 

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Commerce Launches Section 232 Investigation on Imports of Processed Critical Minerals and Derivative Products

 

April 23, 2025: The Department of Commerce initiated an investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 1862) (“Section 232”), to evaluate the effects of processed critical minerals and their derivative products on U.S. national security.

 

Critical minerals, including rare earth elements, are important production inputs required for both civilian and defense-related applications. However, China currently dominates the global market for processing critical minerals and is the leading producer of 30 out of 44 critical minerals. In addition, China is expanding its influence by acquiring mining concessions and operations around the world.

 

Through this Section 232 investigation, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is evaluating the foreign sources of processed critical minerals and their derivative products and assessing the associated risks. BIS is also analyzing current and potential U.S. capabilities to process critical minerals and their derivative products. This is an important step in securing America’s mineral future and prioritizing national security.

 

U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Jeffrey Kessler released the following statement:

 

“The United States should not allow foreign adversaries to have a chokehold on critical inputs for our economy and defense industrial base.  Under President Trump’s leadership, the Commerce Department will carefully assess the risks posed by external threats and supply chain vulnerabilities.”

 

Interested parties are invited to submit written comments, data, analyses, or other information pertinent to the investigation to BIS’s Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-launches-section-232-investigation-imports-processed-critical-minerals-derivative-products

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U.S. Census Bureau

Update to the Automated Export System Trade Interface Requirements – Appendix U – HTS/Schedule B Classifications Requiring Used Vehicle Reporting


April 7, 2025:

CSMS # 64646715 - Update to the Automated Export System Trade Interface Requirements – Appendix U – HTS/Schedule B Classifications Requiring Used Vehicle Reporting.

Update to the Automated Export System Trade Interface Requirements (AESTIR) – Appendix U – HTS/Schedule B Classifications Requiring Used Vehicle Reporting has been posted to CBP.gov.

The following HTS/Schedule B code numbers have been added: 8432.80.0010.

The following HTS/Schedule B code numbers have been removed: 8708.30.0050.

Documentation is available under the ACE AESTIR, Appendix U in the AES webpage which can be located at: https://www.cbp.gov/document/guidance/appendix-u-htsschedule-b-classifications-requiring-used-vehicle-reporting.

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How to Resolve Common AES Response Messages

 

April 21, 2025:

 

When submitting your Electronic Export Information (EEI) to the Automated Export System (AES), you can receive different response messages: Fatal, Compliance, Verify, Informational and Warning.  It is important that AES filers address and/or correct Response Messages as soon as they are received to comply with the Foreign Trade Regulations.

 

To help you take the appropriate action, here is guidance on how to address one of the most frequent Response Messages that were generated in the AES for the previous month.

 

Response Code: 649

 

Narrative: Quantity 1 Cannot Exceed Shipping Weight

 

Severity: Fatal

 

Reason: The Unit of Measure 1 for the reported Schedule B/HTS requires kilograms and Quantity 1 exceeds the Shipping Weight.

 

Resolution: For the Schedule B/HTS reported, Quantity 1 must be reported in kilograms.  Quantity 1 in kilograms cannot exceed the Shipping Weight.

 

Verify the Quantity 1 and Shipping Weight, correct the shipment and resubmit.

 

For a complete list of the AES Response Codes, their reasons and resolutions, see Appendix A – Commodity Filing Response Messages.

 

As a reminder, filers have multiple resources that they can use when filing EEI to the AES.

 

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

 

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Fines and Penalties

 

Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

April 2, 2025: A seven-count indictment was unsealed in federal court in Brooklyn charging José Adolfo Macías Villamar, also known as “Fito,” with international cocaine distribution conspiracy; international cocaine distribution; using firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking; smuggling firearms from the United States; and straw purchasing of firearms conspiracy.  Since at least 2020, he has been the leader of Los Choneros, one of Ecuador’s most violent drug trafficking and transnational criminal organizations.  The defendant is not in U.S. custody.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/jose-adolfo-fito-macias-villamar-leader-los-choneros-transnational-criminal and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates

 

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April 2, 2025: An indictment was unsealed charging Mohammad Jawaid Aziz, also known as Jawaid Aziz Siddiqui and Jay Siddiqui, 67, of Pakistan and Canada, with conspiracy to violate U.S. export laws and violating U.S. export laws. Siddiqui was arrested on March 21 in the Western District of Washington while attempting to cross into the United States from Canada. He remains detained, pending transfer to the District of Minnesota.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/dual-pakistani-canadian-national-arrested-years-long-scheme-circumvent-us-export-control and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates

 

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April 2, 2025: Oleg Sergeyevhich Patsulya, a Russian national, was sentenced to 70 months, or nearly six years, in prison for his role in a conspiracy to export controlled aviation technology to Russia and to launder money in connection with the illegal export scheme. In December 2024, Patsulya’s co-conspirator, Russian national Vasilii Sergeyevich Besedin, was sentenced to two years in prison for his role in the scheme.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/leader-export-control-evasion-scheme-sentenced-70-months-prison

 

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April 4, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 14783: Pursuant to section 766.24 of the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730-774, the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”), U.S. Department of Commerce, through its Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”), has requested the issuance of an Order temporarily denying, for a period of 180 days, the export privileges under the Regulations of: ExHigh Air Space Ltd. (“ExHigh”), Geoffrey Chune Omariba (“Chune”), and Nader Ali Saboori Haghighi (“Haghighi”), (collectively, the “Respondents”). OEE's request and related information indicate that these parties are located in Nairobi, Kenya, and Belgrade, Serbia, at the respective addresses listed on the caption page of this order. OEE's request and related information further indicates that the Respondents have obtained, and continue to engage in attempts to obtain, controlled aircraft parts from the United States in order to divert those items to Russia contrary to the requirements of the Regulations.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/04/2025-05803/order-temporarily-denying-export-privileges

 

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April 30, 2025: The Justice Department announced that it has declined the prosecution of Universities Space Research Association (USRA) after it self-disclosed to the Department’s National Security Division (NSD) criminal violations of U.S. export control laws committed by its former employee, Jonathan Soong. Soong pleaded guilty to willfully violating the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by exporting U.S. Army-developed aviation software to a university in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that had been placed on the Commerce Department’s Entity List and was sentenced to 20 months in prison.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-declines-prosecution-company-self-disclosed-export-control-offenses

 

Sanctions

 

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

April 3, 2025: the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an updated list of foreign companies that have made boycott-related requests, including requests to comply with the Arab League boycott of Israel. BIS added 30 parties, in addition to removing 18 entities who certified that they have stopped making boycott-related requests in transactions with U.S. persons. BIS maintains anti-boycott regulations that discourage and, in certain circumstances, prohibit U.S. persons or businesses from participating in unsanctioned foreign boycotts, focusing on the Arab League boycott of Israel.

 

Parties Added to the Requester List:

 

REQUESTER LOCATION
ATEL TEKNOLOJI VE SAVUNMA SANAYI TURKEY
B.M. NAGANO INDUSTRIES MALAYSIA
BASHUNDHARA READYMIX AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES LTD BANGLADESH
BENCHMARK ELECTRONICS (M) SDN BHD MALAYSIA
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO BANGLADESH COMPANY LTD BANGLADESH
DHL Global Forwarding Qatar W.L.L. QATAR
EOLANE MALAYSIA SDN BHD MALAYSIA
INTEC DISTRIBUTIONS LTD., BANGLADESH
INTERSCIENCE TECHNOLOGIES BANGLADESH
ITG ELECTRONICS MALAYSIA
J.K. SPINNING MILLS LTD BANGLADESH
KUEHNE-NAGEL TURKEY
KUWAIT INVESTMENT AUTHORITY KUWAIT
KUWAIT PETROLEUM COMPANY KUWAIT
LEADER SPORT LLC UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
LOTTE CHEMICAL PAKISTAN LIMITED PAKISTAN
MASHREQ BANK KUWAIT BRANCH KUWAIT
MOH / THE STATE COMP. FOR MARKETING DRUGS MEDICAL APPLIANCES IRAQ
NATIONAL HEART FOUNDATION OF BANGLADESH BANGLADESH
PENTAMASTER EQUIPMENT MFG MALAYSIA
PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRIES COMPANY (K.S.C.) KUWAIT
PETROFAC INTERNATIONAL (UAE) LLC ALGERIA
SANMINA-SCI SYSTEMS MALAYSIA
SAUDIA TECHNIC SAUDI ARABIA
SMART INDUSTRIES MALAYSIA
SPECIALIZED SECURITY SYSTEMS CO. WII KUWAIT
SPM OIL AND GAS PAKISTAN
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK PAKISTAN
UNITED BANK LIMITED PAKISTAN
WATER & ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANY, LLC SAUDI ARABIA

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-updates-boycott-requester-list-8 and

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-updates-boycott-requester-list-8

 

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April 25, 2025: 90. Fed. Reg. 17339; The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 18 persons to the Unverified List (UVL). Of the 18 persons being added: five are under the destination of China, People's Republic of (China); six are under the destination of Finland; three are under the destination of Türkiye; two are under the destination of Kazakhstan; one is under the destination of Italy; and one is under the destination of the United Kingdom. BIS is also amending the EAR by removing five persons from the UVL. Of the five persons being removed, three are under the destination of China and two are under the destination of the United Arab Emirates.

 

Pursuant to § 744.15(c) of the EAR, this rule adds 18 persons to the UVL by amending supplement no. 6 to part 744 of the EAR to include their names and addresses. This final rule implements the decision to add the following 18 persons located in the following destinations to the UVL:

 

  • Arctic Star Co., Ltd.; Henixio Aviation Co., Ltd.; Shusum Construction Ltd.; Sino-World International Co., Ltd.; and Vauxhall International Co., Ltd., under the destination of China;
  • Buran TMI; Finland Multi Center FMC OY; Finnalliance OY; Inmargo OY; Karjalan Puutyo; and MM Cargo OY, under the destination of Finland;
  • Euro Servizi Elettromeccanici Industriali SEI., under the destination of Italy;
  • EltexAlatau and Inter-Traid Electro, under the destination of Kazakhstan;
  • Bagil Havacilik, Basak Traktor, and Ozkanlar Grup Makine AS, under the destination of Türkiye; and
  • Identiparts Ltd., under the destination of the United Kingdom.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/25/2025-07185/revisions-to-the-unverified-list

 

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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

April 1, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in coordination with the U.S. Department of Justice, targeted a network of six entities and two individuals based in Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) responsible for the procurement of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components on behalf of Iran-based Qods Aviation Industries (QAI)—a leading manufacturer for Iran’s UAV program.  This network has also facilitated procurement for other entities in Iran’s military-industrial complex, to include Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA) and Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group (SBIG).  This action marks the second round of sanctions targeting Iranian weapons proliferators since the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 on February 4, 2025, ordering a campaign of maximum pressure on Iran.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Akbari, Hossein of Iran; and
  • Yousefnejad, Abbas of Iran.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Diamond Castle Elctronics Trading LLC of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Future Trends Goods Wholesalers LLC of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Infracom Communications Network FZE of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Phenomena International General Trading LLC of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Rah Roshd International Trade Exchanges Development of Iran; and
  • Zibo Shenbo Machinelectronics Co LTD of China.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250401 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0066

 

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April 2, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against a network of Houthi financial facilitators and procurement operatives working in coordination with Sa’id al-Jamal, a senior Houthi financial official backed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). This network has procured tens of millions of dollars’ worth of commodities from Russia, including weapons and sensitive goods, as well as stolen Ukrainian grain, for onward shipment to Houthi-controlled Yemen.  Additionally, OFAC has identified eight digital asset wallets used by the Houthis to transfer funds associated with their activities.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Beliyakov, Yuri Vladimirovich of Russia;
  • Ghairat, Hushang of Afghanistan;
  • Ghairat, Sohrab of Afghanistan;
  • Jafari, Hassan of Iran; and
  • Vidanov, Vyacheslov Vladimirovich of Russia.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • AM ASIA M6 LTD of China;
  • LLC Edison of Russia;
  • LLC Kolibri Group Russia; and
  • LLC Sky Frame of Russia.

 

The following vessel has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • AM Theseus (UBKZ6) Bulk Carrier Russia flag; MMSI 273254900 (vessel).

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250402

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0068

 

*******

 

April 2, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has released Quarterly Reports of Licensing Activities pursuant to Section 906(b) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), covering activities undertaken by OFAC under Section 906(a)(1) of the TSRA from October through December 2024. Under the procedures established in its TSRA-related regulations, OFAC processes license applications requesting authorization to export agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran under the specific licensing regime set forth in Section 906 of the TSRA.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/ofac-license-application-page/trade-sanctions-reform-and-export-enhancement-act-of-2000-tsra-program/trade-sanctions-reform-and-export-enhancement-act-of-2000-tsra-reports-to-congress and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934191/download?inline

 

*******

 

April 7, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued Russia-related General License 13M, “Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024.”

 

Additionally, OFAC has updated two Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ 999, FAQ 1118).

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 13M: “Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024”

 

  • S. persons, or entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person, are authorized to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, certifications, or tax refunds to the extent such transactions are prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to the day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation of such U.S. persons or entities, through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, July 9, 2025.

 

FAQ 999:

 

Q: What authorizations exist for entities subject to Directive 4 under Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,” as amended (Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive)?

 

A: OFAC issued Russia-related General Licenses (GLs) 8L and 115A to authorize the wind-down of certain energy-related transactions and civil nuclear energy-related transactions, including those involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, that would be prohibited by the Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive (see FAQs 976 and 977).

 

OFAC issued GL 13M to authorize U.S. persons to pay taxes, fees, or import duties and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, or certifications, to the extent such transactions are prohibited by the Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to such persons’ day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation. For further information on the types of transactions authorized by GL 13M, see FAQ 1118.

 

OFAC also issued GL 14, authorizing certain transactions involving any Directive 4 entity where the Directive 4 entity’s sole function in the transaction is to act as an operator of a clearing and settlement system. GL 14 does not authorize any transfer of assets to or from any Directive 4 entity, or any transaction where a Directive 4 entity is either a counterparty or beneficiary to the transaction. In addition, GL 14 does not authorize any debit to an account on the books of a U.S. financial institution of any Directive 4 entity. See FAQ 1003.

 

Note that GL 8L, GL 13M, GL 14, and GL 115A continue to authorize against the Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive.

 

FAQ 1118:

 

Q: As of December 2022, the Government of the Russian Federation may require a so-called “exit tax” payment prior to the divestment of assets located in the Russian Federation, potentially requiring transactions involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. Do U.S. sanctions prohibit the payment of this so-called “exit tax”? Does Russia-related General License (GL) 13M authorize transactions that involve the payment of this exit tax?

 

A: The Directive 4 under Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, “Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation,” as amended (Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive), prohibits the following activities by U.S. persons:  any transaction involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, including any transfer of assets to such entities or any foreign exchange transaction for or on behalf of such entities (collectively, “Directive 4 entities”).  As noted in FAQ 1002, this includes both direct and indirect transactions.

 

OFAC issued the Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive with the explicit aim of preventing the Government of the Russian Federation from leveraging these institutions and their holdings of international reserves in ways that would undermine the impact of U.S. sanctions.  Information currently available to OFAC suggests so-called “exit taxes” imposed by the Government of the Russian Federation involve payments to Directive 4 entities.  Consequently, U.S. persons whose divestment from the Russian Federation will involve the payment of such an exit tax require a specific license from OFAC prior to the payment of such tax, unless otherwise authorized by OFAC.

 

GL 13M authorizes U.S. persons, or entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person, to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, or certifications involving Directive 4 entities that would otherwise be prohibited by the Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to such persons’ day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation.  Payment of exit taxes is not considered ordinarily incident and necessary to day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation and, thus, is not authorized under GL 13M.

 

Therefore, U.S. persons whose divestment of assets in the Russian Federation will involve a payment of such an “exit tax” should seek a specific license from OFAC.  Such persons may submit a request for a specific license with OFAC’s Licensing Division online at https://ofac.treasury.gov/ofac-license-application-page.  License applications related to these payments should include information regarding the amount of the exit tax, the amount of ongoing taxes that would otherwise be paid to the Government of the Russian Federation should divestment not occur, the impact of a failure to pay the tax on the employees of the exiting company, the specific economic activity in Russia of the exiting company, and the impact on the Russian Federation of the divestment.  OFAC will expedite its review of such requests, which will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

 

While OFAC is aware that the Commission established by the Russian Federation to review such divestments may include individuals from entities subject to the Russia-related Sovereign Transactions Directive or individuals listed on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, U.S. persons do not need to seek authorization from OFAC for their Russian buyers to submit an application to the Commission regarding a divestment transaction.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1118 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250407

 

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April 9, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated five entities, and one individual based in Iran for their support to key entities that manage and oversee Iran’s nuclear program, including the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the AEOI-subordinate Iran Centrifuge Technology Company (TESA).  This action, which targets entities procuring, or manufacturing, critical technologies for TESA and AEOI, is taken in furtherance of U.S. policy that Iran be denied a nuclear weapon, as stated in National Security Presidential Memorandum 2.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Mosallat, Majid of Iran.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Atbin Ista Technical And Engineering Company of Iran;
  • Azarab Industries Co. of Iran;
  • Pars Reactors Construction and Development Company of Iran;
  • Pegah Aluminum Arak Company of Iran; and
  • Thorium Power Company of Iran.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250409

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions

 

*******

 

April 9, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Mexican national Jesus Alfredo Beltran Guzman, a key leader of the Beltran Leyva Organization (BLO), for playing a significant role in the trafficking of illicit drugs, including fentanyl, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine, into the United States. One of the most powerful drug trafficking organizations in the world, the BLO is heavily involved in the transportation and distribution of deadly drugs, including fentanyl, to the United States, and has been one of the largest suppliers of cocaine to the U.S. market for over two decades. OFAC carried out this investigation in coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Beltran Guzman of Mexico.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250409

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0076

 

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April 10, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based Indian national Jugwinder Singh Brar (Brar), who owns multiple shipping companies that boast a fleet of nearly 30 vessels, many of which operate as part of Iran’s “shadow fleet.” OFAC also designated two UAE- and two India-based entities that own and operate Brar’s vessels that have transported Iranian oil on behalf of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the Iranian military.  Brar’s vessels engage in high-risk ship-to-ship (STS) transfers of Iranian petroleum in waters off Iraq, Iran, the UAE, and the Gulf of Oman.  These cargoes then reach other facilitators who blend the oil or fuel with products from other countries and falsify shipping documents to conceal links to Iran, allowing these cargoes to reach the international market.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SND List:

 

  • Brar, Jugwinder Singh of the United Arab Emirates.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • B And P Solutions Private Limited of India;
  • Global Tankers Private Limited of India;
  • Glory International FZ-LLC of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Guangsha Zhoushan Energy Group Co., Ltd of China;
  • Marziya Shipping OPC Pvt Ltd of India;
  • Prime Tankers LLC of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Rising Phoenix Provider NV of Suriname; and
  • Valiant Marine Ventures FZE of the United Arab Emirates.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Amor (TJMC800) Crude Oil Tanker Cameroon flag; MMSI 613884000 (vessel);
  • Chil 1(C5J280) Chemical/Oil Tanker Gambia flag; MMSI 629009268 (vessel);
  • Global Ace (3FJW3) Chemical/Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 374808000 (vessel);
  • Global Angel (3FVC9) Oil Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 353283000 (vessel);
  • Global Asphalt (3FZQ3) Oil Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 354816424 (vessel);
  • Global Beauty (3E6819) Chemical/Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352004530 (vessel);
  • Global Crest (3FHI8) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 372463000 (vessel);
  • Global Dignity (3E2062) Chemical/Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352898795 (vessel);
  • Global Dominance (V2YZ5) Bunkering Tanker Antigua & Barbuda flag; MMSI 305290000 (vessel);
  • Global Eagle (D6A3537) Chemical/Products Tanker Comoros flag; MMSI 620999538 (vessel);
  • Global Elegance (E5U4389) Chemical/Oil Tanker; Former Vessel Flag Cook Islands; MMSI 518998409 (vessel);
  • Global Emerald (3E2462) Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352001105 (vessel);
  • Global Everest (3EUO4) Oil Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352995000 (vessel);
  • Global Falcon (T8A4956) Chemical/Oil Tanker Palau flag; MMSI 511101536 (vessel);
  • Global Genesis (E5U3771) Oil Products Tanker; Former Vessel Flag Cook Islands; MMSI 518100860 (vessel);
  • Global Hawk (E5U3877) Chemical/Oil Tanker; Former Vessel Flag Cook Islands; MMSI 518100966 (vessel);
  • Global Maharani (8P2426) Oil Products Tanker Barbados flag; MMSI 314932000 (vessel);
  • Global Peace (E5U3881) Oil Products Tanker Cook Islands flag; MMSI 518100969 (vessel);
  • Global Peak (3FBM7) Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 354117000 (vessel);
  • Global Rani (T8A4955) Chemical/Oil Tanker Palau flag; MMSI 511101535 (vessel);
  • Global Star (3FYM8) Chemical/Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 354068000 (vessel);
  • Global Star I (3E4656) Oil Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002878 (vessel);
  • Harmony (8PVO9) Oil Products Tanker Barbados flag; MMSI 314825000 (vessel);
  • Luanda 1(3FWF5) Anchor Handling Vessel Panama flag; MMSI 357029000 (vessel);
  • Mirage (8P2465) Chemical/Oil Tanker Barbados flag; MMSI 314963000 (vessel);
  • Nadiya (3E3423) Oil Products Tanker Panama flag;  MMSI 352001151 (vessel);
  • Ocean Princess 1 (3EVR9) Oil Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 373094000 (vessel);
  • Purna (C5J300) Oil Products Tanker Gambia flag; MMSI 629000928 (vessel);
  • Simran (HO4539) Oil Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 356762000 (vessel); and
  • Virgo (C5J448) Crude Oil Tanker Gambia flag; MMSI 629009436 (vessel).

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250410

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0082

 

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April 15, 2025: The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned four individuals affiliated with La Nueva Familia Michoacana (LNFM), a Mexican cartel designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, that has poisoned Americans by trafficking fentanyl and other illicit drugs into the United States. LNFM’s crimes also include the smuggling of illegal aliens into the United States and violence against its rivals and Mexican security forces, utilizing drones and bombs in addition to conventional firearms.  Those sanctioned, all of whom are siblings, include the group’s notorious co-leaders: Johnny Hurtado Olascoaga and Jose Alfredo Hurtado Olascoaga.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Hurtado Olascoga, Adita of Mexico; and
  • Hurtado Olascoga, Ubaldo of Mexico.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250415 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934231/download?inline=

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0087

 

*******

 

April 16, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated a China-based independent “teapot” refinery Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd. for its role in purchasing more than a billion dollars’ worth of Iranian crude oil, including from a front company for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF).  OFAC also imposed additional sanctions on several companies and vessels responsible for facilitating Iranian oil shipments to China as part of Iran’s “shadow fleet.”

 

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued an Advisory for Shipping and Maritime Stakeholders on Detecting and Mitigating Iranian Oil Sanctions Evasion.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Bestla Company Limited of the Marshall Islands;
  • Civic Capital Shipping Inc. of Panama;
  • Dexiang Shipping Co., Limited of China;
  • Oceanic Orbit Incorporated of Panama;
  • Pro Mission SDN BHD of Malaysia;
  • Shadong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd. of China; and
  • Starboard Shipping Inc. of Panama City.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Bestla (3E6593) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352003044 (vessel);
  • Egret (3E2524) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352001512 (vessel);
  • Nyantara (3E2243) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002259 (vessel);
  • Rani (3EED4) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 354907000 (vessel); and
  • Reston (TJ4HG) Crude Oil Tanker Cameroon flag; MMSI 613464706 (vessel).

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250416

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0090

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934236/download?inline

 

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April 17, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Yemen-based International Bank of Yemen Y.S.C. (IBY) for its financial support to Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis, which is part of the Iran threat network.  As part of this designation, OFAC sanctioned key leaders or officials of IBY, Kamal Hussain Al Jebry, Ahmed Thabit Noman Al-Absi, and Abdulkader Ali Bazara. The designation of IBY complements the whole-of-government effort to stop Iran-backed Houthi attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

 

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued Counter Terrorism General License 33, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving International Bank of Yemen (IBY)."

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 33: “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving International Bank of Yemen (IBY)”

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving International Bank of Yemen (IBY), or any entity in which IBY owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, May 17, 2025, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the GTSR.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Al Jerby, Kamal Hussein of Yemen;
  • Al-Absi, Ahmed Thabit Noman of Yemen; and
  • Bazra, Abdulkader, Ali of Yemen.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • International Bank of Yemen Y.S.C. of Yemen.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250417 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250416

 

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April 22, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Iranian national and liquified petroleum gas (LPG) magnate Seyed Asadoollah Emamjomeh and his corporate network, which is collectively responsible for shipping hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian LPG and crude oil to foreign markets. Emamjomeh’s expansive network includes a vessel, the TINOS I, which intended but failed to load cargo in 2024 off the coast of Houston, Texas.  In addition to crude oil, LPG continues to be a major source of revenue for the Iranian regime, the proceeds of which fund Iran’s nuclear and advanced conventional weapons programs, as well as regional proxy groups and partners such as Hizballah, the Houthis, and Hamas.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Emamjomeh, Meisam of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • Emamjomeh, Seyed Asadoollah of the United Arab Emirates.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Arsa Gas Company of Iran;
  • Caspian Petrochemical Fze of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Nilgon Parsa Caspian Shipping Company of Iran;
  • Parsa Fidar Paydar Engineering and Technology Company of Iran;
  • Parsa Salakh Qeshm Idustrial Complex of Iran;
  • Parsa Trabar Caspian International Transportation Company of Iran;
  • Parsa Trabar Persia International Transportation Company of Iran;
  • Pasar Gas Company of Iran;
  • Pasar Gas Novin Trading Company of Iran;
  • Pearl Petrochemical Fze of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Petro Parsa Caspian Iranian Company of Iran; and
  • Worldwide LPG Limited of the United Kingdom.

 

The following vessel has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Tinos I (3E5261) LPG Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352003638 (vessel).

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250422

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0093

 

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April 28, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted three vessels and their owners for providing support to Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis, which is part of the Iranian regime’s network of terrorist proxies and partners.  The group has deployed missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and naval mines to attack commercial shipping interests in the Red Sea, threatening global freedom of navigation and the integrity of international commerce.  The Houthis also profit significantly from the shipment of goods through ports they control, profiting, in particular, from the discharge of refined petroleum products.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Bagsak Shipping Inc of Mauritius;
  • Great Success Shipping Co of Lebanon; and
  • Zaas Shipping & Trading Co of Lebanon.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Maisan (3E4995) Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002675 (vessel);
  • Tulip Bz (T7AV5) LPG Tanker San Marino flag; MMSI 268249300 (vessel); and
  • White Whale (H9HR) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 374932000 (vessel).

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250428

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0113

 

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April 29, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated six entities and six individuals based in Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for their role in a network procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).  This network has facilitated the procurement of sodium perchlorate and dioctyl sebacate from the PRC to Iran.  Sodium perchlorate is used to produce ammonium perchlorate, which is controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a multilateral political understanding among states that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology.  Both ammonium perchlorate and dioctyl sebacate are chemicals usable in solid propellant rocket motors, which are commonly used for ballistic missiles.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Asgari, Mohammed of Iran;
  • Modarres Fathi, Forough of Iran;
  • Pour Kazemi, Abbas of Iran;
  • Zargar Bab Aldashti, Abed of Iran;
  • Zagar Bab Aldashti, Hamed of Iran; and
  • Zagar Bab Aldashti, Zahra of Iran.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • China Chlorate Tech Co Limited of China;
  • Dongying Weiaien Chemical Co Ltd of China;
  • Saman Tejarat Barman Trading Company of Iran;
  • Shenzhen Amor Logistics Co Ltd of China;
  • Yanling Chuanxing Chemical Plant General Partnership of China; and
  • Yanling Lingfeng Chlorate Co Ltd of China.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250429

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0116

APRIL 2025 EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATES Read More »

MARCH 2025 EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through March 31, 2025.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and

persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 

In this newsletter, we have added a specific DDTC FAQs section, we think this will be of interest to our readers.

 

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

 

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

30-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Application/License for Permanent/Temporary Export or Temporary Import of Classified Defense Articles and Related Classified Technical Data

 

March 14, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 11640: The Department of State has submitted the information collection described below to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval. In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the Department of State requested comments on this collection from all interested individuals and organizations. The purpose of this Notice is to allow 30 days for public comment.

 

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DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

 

March 3 through March 21, 2025: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Change in Address of PVP Advanced EO Systems, Inc. from 14312 Franklin Avenue, Suite 100, Tustin, CA 92780 to 26776 Simpatica Circle, Lake Forest, CA 92680;
  • Change in Address of Capgemini UK Plc from No 1 Forge End, Woking, Surrey, GU21 6DB, United Kingdom to 95 Queen Victoria Street, London, EC4V 4HN, United Kingdom;
  • Change in Name of Airholding S.A. to Embraer Portugal, S.A due to acquisition;
  • Change in Name of Mitsubishi Electric Logistics Corporation to MD Logis Corporation due to acquisition.
  • Change in Name of subsidiaries of Curtiss-Wright Corporation due to corporate restructuring;
Dy4, Inc.  

 

Curtiss-Wright DS, Inc.

Curtiss-Wright Controls Electronic Systems, Inc,
Pacific Star Communications, Inc.
Tactical Communications Group, LLC
Teletronics Technology Corporation
Acra Control Inc.
  • Change in Name of ELEB Equipamentos Ltda. to Embraer, Brazil due to acquisition;
  • Change in Name and Address of Econocom Infogerance System, 21, avenue Descarter – Immeuble Astrale, Le Plessis-Robinson, France 92350 to Econocom Workplace Infra Innovation, 40, quai de Dion Bouton, Puteaux, France 92800 due to corporate restructuring;
  • Change in Name of Compro Computer Services, Inc. to Aechelon Technology, Inc. due to acquisition;
  • Change in Address of ALTEN S.A. from 40, Avenue Andre Morizet, 92100 Boulogne-Billancourt, FRANCE to ALTEN S.A., 221 Bis, Boulevard Jean Jaures, 92100 Boulogne-Billancourt, FRANCE.
  • Change in Address of Mikuni Aerospace Corporation, Nagoya Sales Office address from 1-17-26 Nishki, Naka-ku, Nagoya, Aichi, Japan to 3-20- 27 Niskiki, Naka-ku, Nagoya, Aichi Prefecture 460-003, Japan.
  • Change in Name of CPI International, Inc. to CPI Electron Device Business, Inc. due to corporate restructuring.

 

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DDTC Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

 

Q: What are the License Status Definitions?

 

A:

  1. Draft
  • License request that has not been signed and submitted for a company.
  1. Awaiting Signature
  • The license request is waiting for the Empowered Official’s review and signature.
  1. Submitted
  1. In Review
  • DDTC has received and is reviewing the license request.
  • The license request status can be found in the Track Status page and the user must be part of an access group containing that license request, in order to see it.
  1. Final
  • The license request has been fully processed and will be displayed in Track Status.
  1. Rejected
  • The license request has been rejected by DDTC.

 

Q: If I am exporting an aircraft that is controlled under Category VIII(a), regardless of whether it is a bomber, fighter, or attack helicopter, must I individually itemize all of the inclusive systems (e.g., electronics, folding wings, batteries, weapons, etc.) in Blocks 9 through 12 as separate items on the DSP 5 license?

 

A: No for items physically (mechanically, electronically, etc.) incorporated into the aircraft. This does not include spare parts, components, etc. that are to accompany the aircraft during shipment, as these items must be accounted for separately as their own unique line item(s).

 

Q: What is "DECCS"?

 

A: “DECCS” stands for Defense Export Control and Compliance System. It is DDTC’s cloud-based modernization replacement of the DTRADE and EFS systems.

 

Q: How does the § 126.7 exemption work?

 

A: The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) § 126.7 exemption simplifies the transfer of ITAR-controlled defense articles, including technical data, the performance of defense services, and engaging in brokering activities between and among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States within an approved Authorized User group of government, private sector, and research and academic entities.  When all requirements are met, parties may engage in such activities without the need for additional Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) authorization.  More information on who is an Authorized User is available in a corresponding FAQ.

 

Q: Do I need to amend my DDTC authorizations if they only contain items moving from on USML category to another?

 

A: No. Both agreements and licenses are valid until their expiration. However, if a license is to be amended for reasons unrelated to Export Control Reform, then the category designations must be updated as well. For agreements, if a major amendment to an agreement is submitted, category designations must be updated; but if a minor amendment is submitted, category designations do not necessarily need to be updated. Furthermore, during the transition period, when information on an In Furtherance Of license does not match that which was presented in its parent agreement, the applicant should note the disparities on the cover letter (15.1) for that license. For example: “Gas turbine engines formerly designated USML Category VIII(b) here designated as Cat XIX(a).”

 

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REMINDER: ITS TIME FOR ANNUAL SALES REPORT FILINGS TO BE MADE WITH DDTC FOR MANUFACTURING LICENSE AGREEMENTS AND WAREHOUSING DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS FOR SALES AND TRANSFERS THAT OCCURRED IN 2024

 

 

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Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

 

March 10, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Japan has requested to buy equipment and services in support of its indigenous Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectiles (HVGP) capability, including test preparation, test, and transportation support; coordination meetings in the United States and Japan; etc. The estimated total cost is $200 million. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Japan.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-hyper-velocity-gliding-projectiles-capability-support

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Australia  

 

March 10, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Australia has requested to buy fifty-four (54) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System-Alternate Warhead (GMLRS-AW) rounds. The following non-MDE items will also be included: telemetry kits; engineering services; technical assistance; and other related logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $91.2 million. The principal contractors will be Lockheed Martin, located in Grand Prairie, TX; and Lockheed Martin, Australia. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-guided-multiple-launch-rocket-system-alternate-warhead

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Australia 

 

March 18, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Australia has requested to buy MJU-61 decoy flares; MJU-64 decoy flares; MJU-66 flare countermeasures; MJU-76 flare countermeasures; RR-198A/L chaff cartridges; CCU-145/A impulse cartridges; other support equipment (MK-3 pallet); U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $165 million. The principal contractors will be Kilgore Flares Company, LLC, located in Toone, TN; Armtec Countermeasures Company, located in Coachella, CA; Alloy Surface Company, Inc, located in Aston, PA; and CCI Capco LLC, located in Grand Junction, CO. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-countermeasures-chaff-and-impulse-cartridges

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Saudi Arabia

 

March 18, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested to buy two thousand (2,000) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS). The following non-MDE items will be included: APKWS spare parts; support equipment; missile software; training; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $100 million. The principal contractor will be BAE Systems, Inc., located in Falls Church, VA. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kingdom-saudi-arabia-advanced-precision-kill-weapon-systems

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Qatar

 

March 26, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of Qatar has requested to buy eight (8) MQ-9B Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA); two hundred (200) KMU-572 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) tail kits for Guided Bomb Unit (GBU)-38 or Laser JDAM GBU-54; three hundred (300) BLU-111 500-lb general purpose bombs; one hundred (100) MXU-650 air foil groups (AFG) for Paveway II GBU-12; one hundred (100) MAU-169 computer control groups (CCG) for Paveway II GBU-12; twenty-eight (28) Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS)/Inertial Navigation System (INS) (EGI) security devices with M-Code; twelve (12) EGI security devices with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Modules (SAASM); ten (10) Lynx AN/APY-8 Synthetic Aperture Radars (SAR); ten (10) L3 Rio Grande communications intelligence (COMINT) sensor suites; one hundred ten (110) AGM-114R2 Hellfire II missiles; and eight (8) M36E9 Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM). The following non-MDE items will also be included: Honeywell TPE-331 turboprop engines; Certifiable Ground Control Stations (CGCS); FMU-139D/B fuze systems; DSU-38 laser illuminated target detectors for GBU-54; KY-100M narrowband/wideband terminals; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKLs); Keying Identification Verification (KIV)-77 Mode 5 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) cryptographic appliques; Intrusion Prevention System (IPS)-250X High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE) Type 1 cryptographic communications security (COMSEC) devices; Cryptographic Core Modernization (CCM)-700A Type 1 COMSEC chips; AN/DPX-7 IFF transponders; Link-16 KOR-24A Small Tactical Terminals (STTs); Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) Electronic Surveillance Measure systems; AE-4500 Electronic Support Measure; Compact Multi-band Data Link (CMDL); Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) 6Si compatible systems; Common Munitions Built-in-Test Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE) Plus Block II; Mayflower Multi-Platform Anti-Jam GPS Navigation Antennas (MAGNA)-I, AS-4841; imaging systems; Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) Multi-Spectrum Targeting System (MTS); Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars (SeaSpray 7500 maritime radars); Due Regard Radar (DRR); Automatic Information System (AIS) transponders; Rohde & Schwartz Ultra High Frequency (UHF)/Very High Frequency (VHF) radios; satellite communications (SATCOM) ground station antennas, modems, and terminals with Unifi Security Gateway (USG) encryption; Ku-Band SATCOM GA-ASI Transportable Earth Stations (GATES); secure SATCOM systems; DSU-33D/B bomb components; M299 Longbow Hellfire launchers; weapons loading equipment; spare and repair parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; weapons integration; support and test equipment; facilities and construction support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; transportation and airlift support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $1.96 billion. The principal contractors will be General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, located in Poway, CA; Lockheed Martin, located in Bethesda, MD; RTX Corporation, located in Waltham, MA; L3Harris, Inc., located in Melbourne, FL; Boeing Corporation, located in Arlington, VA; and Leonardo SpA, located in Rome, Italy. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/qatar-mq-9b-remotely-piloted-aircraft

 

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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

SNAP-R has migrated to a new database.  To access, you need to first migrate your old SNAP-R account.

 

Go to https://www.bis.gov/ and click on the Licensing subheading.  Then click “Apply for licenses (SNAP-R).”

 

Then click “Migrate Legacy Account” and enter your SNAP-R login information.

 

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U.S. Census Bureau

Update to Automated Export System (AES)

March 5, 2025:

This message is a follow-up to the broadcast released on May 11, 2022, titled Expansion of Foreign Trade Zone Identifier to 9-characters (Effective May 17, 2022). The severity of Response Message 15A is being upgraded to “Compliance Alert” from “Informational” for a minimum of 120 days, and then will be upgraded to a severity of “Fatal” at a later date. This is to ensure further compliance with the changes outlined in Federal Register Notice 85 FR 60479 that requires the expansion of the Foreign Trade Zone Identifier from 7 to 9-characters.

Response Code: 15A

Narrative Text: FTZ MUST BE 9 CHARACTERS ALPHANUMERIC

Severity: COMPLIANCE ALERT

Reason: The Foreign Trade Zone Indicator reported on the SC2 record does not have the required format of 3 numeric characters which is a valid zone followed by 6 alphanumeric characters.

Resolution: The Foreign Trade Zone Indicator must be specified in the required format. The first 3 positions must be numeric and represent the general-purpose zone. The next 3 positions are alphanumeric and represent the subzone. The last 3 positions are alphanumeric and represent the site. The Foreign Trade Zone Indicator must be left justified with no trailing spaces. Insert zeros when there is no sub zone or site. Report leading zero(s) when the general-purpose zone is less than 3 numerics, and when the subzone or site is 1 alphanumeric. Verify the Foreign Trade Zone Indicator, correct the SC2 record and retransmit.

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Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages

 

March 24, 2025:

 

When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected.  If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation.  Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN.  However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.

 

To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

 

Response Code:  119

 

Narrative:     Carrier Code Not Allowed for MOT

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        A Carrier ID (SCAC/IATA) is reported but the Mode of Transportation Code indicates a carrier code is not allowed.

Resolution: A Carrier ID (SCAC/IATA) must be reported for Modes of Transportation vessel, air, rail and truck.  A Carrier ID (SCAC/IATA) is not allowed to be reported for Modes of Transportation other than vessel, air, rail or truck (i.e., mail, fixed, etc.).

Verify the Mode of Transportation and the Carrier ID (SCAC/IATA), correct the shipment and resubmit.

 

Response Code:  331

 

Narrative:     Ultimate Consignee Country Unknown

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        The Ultimate Consignee Country code reported is not valid in AES.

Resolution: The Ultimate Consignee Country code must be a valid ISO Country code found in Appendix C – ISO Country Codes.

Verify the Ultimate Consignee Country code, correct the shipment and resubmit.

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Port of Unlading Codes Added in the Automated Export System (AES) 

 

March 25, 2025:

 

Please note the following Port of Unlading Codes have been ADDED to the AES effective immediately.

Port Name                    Port Code                    Country

Fort Frances   09602             Canada
Puerto Madero   20192             Mexico
Alvarado   20196             Mexico

 

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

 

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Fines and Penalties

 

 

Department of Commerce - Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

March 18, 2025:  The United States filed a civil forfeiture complaint in the Southern District of Florida against a Dassault Falcon 900 EX aircraft, bearing tail number T7-ESPRT, which was smuggled from the United States under false pretenses and operated for the benefit of Nicolás Maduro Moros (Maduro) and his representatives in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (the Maduro Regime) in violation of U.S. sanctions and export control laws. The aircraft was seized last year in the Dominican Republic at the request of the United States.

 

This filing alleges that the Dassault Falcon 900 EX aircraft was purchased and maintained in violation of U.S. sanctions against Maduro and the Maduro Regime. According to the complaint, the aircraft is forfeitable based on violations of U.S. law, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and money laundering violations.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-files-civil-forfeiture-complaint-against-aircraft-used-nicolas-maduro-moros-violation-us

 

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March 26, 2025: An indictment was unsealed charging Mohammad Jawaid Aziz, also known as Jawaid Aziz Siddiqui and Jay Siddiqui, 67, of Pakistan and Canada, with conspiracy to violate U.S. export laws and violating U.S. export laws. Siddiqui was arrested on March 21 in the Western District of Washington while attempting to cross into the United States from Canada. He remains detained, pending transfer to the District of Minnesota.

 

As alleged, from as early as 2003 through approximately March 2019, Siddiqui operated an illicit procurement network through his Canada-based company Diversified Technology Services. The purpose of the network was to obtain U.S.-origin goods on behalf of prohibited entities in Pakistan that were associated with the country’s nuclear, missile, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) programs.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/dual-pakistani-canadian-national-arrested-years-long-scheme-circumvent-us-export-control

 

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Sanctions

 

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

March 25, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 14046 and 90 Fed. Reg. 14032: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 80 entities to the Entity List from China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), South Africa, Iran, Taiwan, and others for activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy. As part of these measures, BIS is working toward the following objectives:

 

  • Restrict the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ability to acquire and develop high-performance and exascale computing capabilities, as well as quantum technologies, for military applications;
  • Impede China’s development of its hypersonic weapons program;
  • Prevent entities associated with the Test Flying Academy of South Africa (TFASA) from using U.S. items to train Chinese military forces;
  • Disrupt Iran’s procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related defense items; and
  • Impair the development of unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic missile program.

Specifically, these revisions to the Entity List include:

  • 12 entities—11 under the destination of China and one under the destination of Taiwan—are added for engaging in the development of advanced AI, supercomputers, and high-performance AI chips for China-based end-users with close ties to the country’s military-industrial complex.
  • 13 entities, including under the destinations of China, are added for their contributions to unsafeguarded nuclear activities.
  • 7 entities are added for contributions to ballistic missile programs.
  • 27 Chinese entities are added for acquiring or attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of China’s military modernization. These entities have demonstrable ties to activities of concern, including the development of hypersonic weapons and the design and modeling of vehicles in hypersonic flight.
  • 7 entities located in China are added for acquiring or attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of advancing the CCP’s quantum technology capabilities, presenting serious ramifications for U.S. national security given the military applications of quantum technologies.
  • 2 Chinese entities are being added for selling products to parties on the Entity List, including Huawei and affiliated entity HiSilicon.
  • 2 entities in Iran and China are added for attempting to procure U.S.-origin items for Iran’s defense industry and unmanned aerial vehicle programs.
  • 10 entities under the destinations of China, South Africa, and the UAE are added due to their links to the Test Flying Academy of South Africa (TFASA) —a party added to the Entity List on June 12, 2023—and the training of Chinese military forces using Western and NATO sources.

 

BIS also modified one existing entity, Dart Aviation, under four entries on the Entity List under the destinations of France, Iran, Senegal, and the United Kingdom. This entry is modified by adding two additional aliases and one additional address. Dart Aviation was added to the Entity List in 2019 for transshipping U.S.-origin items to sanctioned destinations.

 

These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States:

 

China

 

  • Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence;
  • Beijing Innovation Wisdom Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Henan Dingxin Information Industry Co., Ltd.;
  • Inspur (Beijing) Electronic Information Industry Co., Ltd.;
  • Inspur Electronic Information Industry Co., Ltd.;
  • Inspur Electronic Information (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd.;
  • Inspur (HK) Electronics Co., Ltd.;
  • Inspur Software Co., Ltd.;
  • Nettrix Information Industry Co., Ltd.;
  • Suma Techology Co., Ltd.;
  • Suma-USI Electronics Co., Ltd;
  • Aeronautics Computing Technique Research Institute;
  • Aerospace Star Technology Application Co., Ltd.;
  • Air Force Engineering University;
  • Anhui Kehua Sci-Tech Trading Co., Ltd.;
  • Associated Opto-electronics (Chongqing) Co., Ltd.;
  • Beijing Foundfresh Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Beijing Graphene Institute Co., Ltd;
  • Beijing Guoke Tianxun Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Chengdu Aircraft Design and Research Institute;
  • China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology Beijing Institute of Precision Mechatronics Control Equipment;
  • China Aeronautical Radio Electronics Research Institute;
  • Chinese Academy of Sciences Technology and Engineering Center for Space Utilization;
  • Chongqing Southwest Integrated Circuit Design Co., Ltd.;
  • Gyro Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Harbin Aerospace Star Data System Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Jiangxi Hongdu Aviation Industry Group Co., Ltd.;
  • Mohammad Reza Rajabi;
  • Nanjing Chunhui Technology Industry Co., Ltd.;
  • Nanjing Fiberglass Research and Design Institute;
  • Nanjing Panda Handa Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • National Inspection and Testing Holding Group Nanjing National Materials Testing Co., Ltd.;
  • Ningbo Institute of Materials Technology and Engineering;
  • ORICAS Import and Export (Beijing) Corporation;
  • Physike Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Scikro (Hong Kong) Instruments Limited;
  • Scikro (Shanghai) Instrument Co., Ltd.;
  • Shaanxi Aerospace Science and Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Shanghai Aviation Electronic Co., Ltd.;
  • Silk Road Trading Company Ltd.;
  • Singleton (Suzhou) Electronics Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Space Star Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Stratum FT Limited;
  • Suzhou Changfeng Avionics Co., Ltd.;
  • Suzhou SIP Hi-Tech Precision Electronics Co., Ltd.;
  • Tianjin Aerospace Zhongwei Data System Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Xi'an Aerospace Automation Co., Ltd.;
  • Xi'an Aerospace Tianhui Data Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Xi'an Sunward Aeromat Co., Ltd.;
  • Xi'an Xiangteng Microelectronics Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Xi'an Xiangxun Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Zhejiang Aerospace Hengjia Data Technology Co., Ltd.; and
  • Zibo Topred International Trading Company Limited.

 

Taiwan

 

  • Inspur Taiwan.

 

Iran

 

  • Mohammad Reza Rajabi; and
  • Silk Road Trading Company Ltd.

 

Pakistan

 

  • Allied Business Concerns (Pvt) Ltd;
  • Ariston Trade Links;
  • Britlite Engineering Company;
  • Global Traders;
  • Indentech International;
  • IntraLink Incorporated;
  • Linkers Automation (Pvt) Ltd;
  • NA Enterprises;
  • Otto Manufacturing;
  • Potohar Industrial & Trading Concern;
  • Proc-Master;
  • Professional Systems (Pvt) Ltd.;
  • Rachna Supplies (Pvt) Ltd;
  • RASTEK Technologies;
  • Rehman Engineering and Services;
  • Resource Enterprises;
  • Sine Technologies;
  • Supply Source Co.; and
  • The Sadidians.

 

South Africa

 

  • Ascenso Aviation;
  • Blue Sky Aviation (Pty) Ltd.; and
  • Wingman Concept (Pty) Ltd.

 

United Arab Emirates

 

  • Astec Astronomy FZCO;
  • Roche Consulting Limited;
  • TFASA Helicopter International; and
  • TG Training 2023 FZCO.

 

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-further-restricts-chinas-artificial-intelligence-advanced-computing-capabilities

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/28/2025-05427/additions-to-the-entity-list and

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/28/2025-05426/additions-and-modifications-to-the-entity-list

 

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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

March 2, 2025: OFAC has published a frequently asked question (FAQ 1218) regarding the President's February 26 announcement on energy-related authorizations in Venezuela.

 

FAQ 1218:

 

Q: How is Treasury planning to implement the President’s February 26 announcement on energy-related authorizations in Venezuela?

 

A: Treasury is preparing to take action to wind-down General License 41 and other specific licenses as appropriate. We will issue additional guidance to assist implementation concurrent with any changes to the authorization(s).

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1218 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250302

 

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March 4, 2025:  The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Iran-based Behrouz Parsarad (Parsarad), the sole administrator of Nemesis, an online darknet marketplace, which was subject of an international law enforcement operation and was taken down in 2024. Prior to its takedown by law enforcement, narcotics traffickers and cybercriminals openly traded in illegal drugs and services on Nemesis, which was designed with built-in money laundering features. Nemesis had over 30,000 active users and 1,000 vendors and facilitated the sale of nearly $30 million worth of drugs around the world between 2021 and 2024, including to the United States. These sanctions designation is OFAC’s first action as a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-led interagency Joint Criminal Opioid and Darknet Enforcement (JCODE) Team.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Parsarad, Behrouz of Iran.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0040

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934026/download?inline

 

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March 4, 2025: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued Venezuela General License 41A, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Certain Transactions Related to Chevron Corporation's Joint Ventures in Venezuela."

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 41A: “Authorizing the Wind Down of Certain Transactions Related to Chevron Corporation’s Joint Ventures in Venezuela”

 

(a) All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions previously authorized by Venezuela General License 41 related to the operation and management by Chevron Corporation or its subsidiaries (“Chevron”) of Chevron’s joint ventures in Venezuela (collectively, the “Chevron JVs”) involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13850, as amended by E.O. 13857, or E.O. 13884, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 3, 2025.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250304

 

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March 5, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against seven high-ranking members of Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis. These individuals have smuggled military-grade items and weapon systems into Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and also negotiated Houthi weapons procurements from Russia. OFAC also designated one Houthi-affiliated operative and his company that have recruited Yemeni civilians to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine and generated revenue to support the Houthis’ militant operations.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Abdulsalam, Mohammad of Yemen;
  • Alagri, Abdulmalek Abdullah Mohammed of Yemen;
  • Al-Hadi, Ali Muhammad Muhsin Salih of Yemen;
  • Al-Houthi, Mohamed Ali of Yemen;
  • Al-Jabri, Abdulwali Abdoh Hasan of Yemen;
  • Almarwani, Eshaq Abdulmalek Abdullah of Yemen;
  • Al-Mashat, Mahdi Mohammed Hussein of Yemen; and
  • Gaber, Khaled Hussein Saleh of Yemen.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Al-Jabri General Trading and Investment Co

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250305 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0041

 

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March 5, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)  designated Zhou Shuai, a Shanghai-based malicious cyber actor and data broker, and his company, Shanghai Heiying Information Technology Company, Limited (Shanghai Heiying). In collaboration with another malicious cyber actor, U.S.-sanctioned Yin Kecheng, Zhou Shuai illegally acquired, brokered, and sold data from highly sensitive U.S. critical infrastructure networks. Malicious cyber actors, particularly those operating in China, continue to be one of the greatest and most persistent threats to U.S. national security, as highlighted in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s most recent Annual Threat Assessment.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Zhou, Shuai of China.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SND List:

 

  • Shanghai Heiying Information Technology Company Limited of China.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250305 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0042

 

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March 5, 2025: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued Counter Terrorism General License 22A, "Transactions Related to the Provision of Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, Medical Devices, Replacement Parts and Components, or Software Updates Involving Ansarallah"; Counter Terrorism General License 23A, "Authorizing Transactions Related to Telecommunications, Mail, and Certain Internet-Based Communications Involving Ansarallah"; Counter Terrorism General License 24A, "Authorizing Noncommercial, Personal Remittances Involving Ansarallah"; Counter Terrorism General License 25A, "Authorizing the Offloading of Refined Petroleum Products in Yemen Involving Ansarallah"; Counter Terrorism General License 26A, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Necessary to Port and Airport Operations Involving Ansarallah"; and Counter Terrorism General License 28A, "Authorizing Transactions for Third-Country Diplomatic and Consular Missions Involving Ansarallah".

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 22A: “Transactions Related to the Provision of Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, Medical Devices, Replacement Parts and Components, or Software Updates Involving Ansarallah”

 

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this general license, all transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the provision (including sale) of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components for medical devices, or software updates for medical devices to Yemen, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for provision to Yemen, are authorized.

 

(b) For the purposes of this general license, agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices are defined as follows:

 

(1) Agricultural commodities.  Agricultural commodities are products that:

(i) Fall within the term “agricultural commodity” as defined in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602); and

(ii) Are intended for ultimate use in Yemen as:

 

(A) Food for humans (including raw, processed, and packaged foods; live animals; vitamins and minerals; food additives or supplements; and bottled drinking water) or animals (including animal feeds);

(B) Seeds for food crops;

(C) Fertilizers or organic fertilizers; or

(D) Reproductive materials (such as live animals, fertilized eggs, embryos, and semen) for the production of food animals.

 

(2) Medicine.  Medicine is an item that falls within the definition of the term “drug” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

 

(3) Medical devices.  A medical device is an item that falls within the definition of “device” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 23A: “Authorizing Transactions Related to Telecommunications, Mail, and Certain Internet Based Communications Involving Ansarallah”

 

(a)(1) All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, with respect to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications within Yemen are authorized.

 

(b) The exportation, reexportation, or provision, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to Yemen, of services, software, hardware, or technology incident to the exchange of communications over the internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, blogging, social media platforms, collaboration platforms, video conferencing, voice over internet protocol (VOIP), e-gaming, elearning platforms, automated translation, web maps, and user authentication services, as well as cloud-based services in support of the foregoing, and domain name registration services, involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that is prohibited by the GTSR or FTOSR, is authorized, provided the exportation, reexportation, or provision is not to a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the GTSR or FTOSR.

 

(c) All transactions of common carriers incident to the receipt or transmission of mail and packages between the United States and Yemen, or within Yemen, involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by the GTSR or the FTOSR are authorized, provided that the importation or exportation of such mail and packages is not to or from any person blocked pursuant to the GTSR or the FTOSR.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 24A: “Authorizing Noncommercial, Personal Remittances Involving Ansarallah”

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the transfer of noncommercial, personal remittances to or from an individual in Yemen, are authorized, provided the individual is not a person whose property or interests in property are blocked pursuant to the GTSR or the FTOSR.

 

Note to paragraph (a).  Noncommercial, personal remittances do not include charitable donations of funds to or for the benefit of an entity or funds transfers for use in supporting or operating a business, including a family-owned business.

 

(b) Transferring institutions may rely on the originator of a funds transfer with regard to compliance with paragraph (a) of this general license, provided that the transferring institution does not know or have reason to know that the funds transfer is not in compliance with paragraph (a).

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 25A: “Authorizing the Offloading of Refined Petroleum Products  in Yemen Involving Ansarallah”

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the delivery and offloading of refined petroleum products for personal, commercial, or humanitarian use in Yemen are authorized, through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 4, 2025, provided the refined petroleum products were loaded on a vessel prior to March 5, 2025

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 26A: “Authorizing Certain Transactions Necessary to Port and Airport Operations Involving Ansarallah”

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the operation of, or import or export of goods or transit of passengers through, ports and airports in Yemen are authorized.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 28A: “Authorizing Transactions for Third-Country Diplomatic and Consular Missions Involving Ansarallah”

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the official business of third-country diplomatic or consular missions to Yemen are authorized.

 

Additionally, OFAC has issued a new Counter Terrorism Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1219).

 

FAQ 1219:

 

Q: On March 4, 2025, the Department of State (State) designated Ansarallah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). What actions did OFAC take related to this announcement?

 

A: OFAC implemented State's designation of Ansarallah ("the Houthis") as an FTO by updating the existing Ansarallah entry on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List). Ansarallah was already listed on the SDN List as a result of State's February 16, 2024 designation of the group as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).

 

OFAC also updated three Ansarallah-related general licenses (GLs) to authorize certain transactions under the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (FTOSR) (31 C.F.R. part 597): agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices (GL 22A); noncommercial, personal remittances (GL 24A); and third-country diplomatic missions (GL 28A).

 

OFAC also amended three additional Ansarallah-related GLs. Specifically, OFAC issued GL 25A, which winds down the previously issued GL by authorizing the delivery and offloading of refined petroleum products in Yemen through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time April 4, 2025, provided such products were loaded on a vessel prior to March 5, 2025. Authorizations in GL 25A replace and supersede previous authorization for transactions related to the provision of refined petroleum products in GL 25. Additionally, OFAC issued GL 26A to exclude refined petroleum products from goods that can be imported or exported through ports and airports in Yemen. OFAC also issued GL 23A, which eliminates the previous authorization of transactions for the receipt or transmission of telecommunications to or from Yemen and now only authorizes transactions within Yemen for the receipt or transmission of telecommunications involving Ansarallah.

 

The above GLs supplement broad preexisting humanitarian GLs in the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR) and FTOSR covering the United States government, certain international organizations and entities, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and for the provision of food, other agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices for personal, non-commercial use. For more information on these baseline humanitarian general licenses, please consult OFAC's Supplemental Guidance for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance, and FAQs 1105, 1106, 1107, and 1108. Other humanitarian-related guidance documents are available in the NGO section of OFAC's Information for Industry Groups webpage. Note that activities authorized by GLs issued by OFAC do not relieve persons from compliance with any other laws or requirements of other federal agencies.

As a result of OFAC's amendments to Ansarallah-related GLs in conjunction with the FTO designation, OFAC has also removed OFAC's Compliance Communiqué: Guidance for the Provision of Humanitarian-Related Assistance and Critical Commodities to the Yemeni People.

Non-U.S. persons may engage in or facilitate transactions for which a U.S. person would not require a specific license pursuant to the GTSR or FTOSR without exposure to sanctions under the GTSR or FTOSR.

 

OFAC prioritizes specific license applications and requests for guidance related to humanitarian activity. OFAC encourages anyone with questions to reach out to the OFAC Compliance Hotline.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250305

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934031/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934036/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934041/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934046/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934051/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934056/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1219

 

*******

 

March 13, 2025: The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Foxtrot Network, a transnational criminal organization (TCO) primarily based in Sweden that has trafficked illicit drugs and that carried out attacks on Israelis and Jews in Europe, along with its fugitive leader Rawa Majid. In January 2024, the Foxtrot Network orchestrated an attack on the Israeli Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, on behalf of the Government of Iran.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Majid, Rawa of Iran.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Foxtrot Network of Sweden.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250312

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0047

 

*******

 

March 13, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Iran’s Minister of Petroleum, Mohsen Paknejad, who oversees the export of tens of billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil and has allocated billions of dollars’ worth of oil to Iran’s armed forces for export. OFAC also designated several entities in multiple jurisdictions, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India, for their ownership or operation of vessels that have delivered Iranian oil to the PRC, or lifted Iranian oil from storage in Dalian, PRC. These sanctions apply further pressure on the “shadow fleet” and other vessels upon which Iran depends to deliver its oil to the PRC, advancing United States’ commitment to reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Pankejad, Mohsen of Iran.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Aren Ship Management of Bangladesh;
  • Celestite Maritime Inc of the Marshall Islands;
  • Fallon Shipping Company Limited of Seychelles;
  • Hong Kong Heshun Transportation Trading Limited of China;
  • Huaxia Trading Ltd of China;
  • Itaugua Services Inc of Liberia;
  • Lake View Ship Management Private Limited of India;
  • Marine Solution PVT Ltd of Sri Lanka;
  • Neptune Marine Ltd of the Marshall Islands;
  • Bintang Samudra Utama of Indonesia;
  • Gianira Adhinusa Senatama of Indonesia;
  • Sea Services Providers NV of Suriname;
  • Seasky Marine Co., Limited of China;
  • Shipload Maritime PTE. LTD of Singapore;
  • Sun Science International Co., Limited of China;
  • Turquoise Sea Marine Limited of Seychelles; and
  • United Tankers LTD of the Marshall Islands.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Blue Gulf (T8A4799) Crude Oil Tanker Palau flag; MMSI 511101436 (vessel);
  • Celebes (YDA3301) Tug Indonesia flag; MMSI 525018077 (vessel);
  • Corona Fun (3E5355) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352003958 (vessel);
  • Itaugua (D6A3529) Crude Oil Tanker Comoros flag; MMSI 620999528 (vessel);
  • Lexi (TJ04M) Crude Oil Tanker Cameroon flag; MMSI 613806561 (vessel);
  • Lyda N (T8A4077) Crude Oil Tanker Palau flag; MMSI 511100863 (vessel);
  • Malili (YBEN) Tug Indonesia flag; MMSI 525018442 (vessel);
  • Marina Vision (YDA3415) Tug Indonesia flag; MMSI 525010379 (vessel);
  • Neso (3E5143) Crude Oil Tanker PANAMA flag; MMSI 352003483 (vessel);
  • Peace Hill (VRGO9) Crude Oil Tanker Hong Kong flag; MMSI 477738400 (vessel);
  • Polaris 1(EPXT5) Chemical/Oil Tanker Iran flag; MMSI 422546600 (vessel);
  • Seasky (T7BN2) Crude Oil Tanker San Marino flag; MMSI 268242902 (vessel); and
  • SHANNON II (8P2369) Crude Oil Tanker Barbados flag; MMSI 314903000 (vessel).

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0049

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250313

 

*******

 

March 18, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Jumilca Sandivel Hernandez Perez (Hernandez Perez), a key leader of the Lopez Human Smuggling Organization (HSO), a Guatemala-based Transnational Criminal Organization responsible for the smuggling of thousands of illegal aliens from Guatemala, through Mexico, and into the United States. Additionally, Hernandez Perez has coordinated her illegal activity with members of the violent U.S.-sanctioned drug trafficking organization, La Linea, which among other heinous acts is responsible for the November 2019 murders of nine American citizens, including six children, in the Mexican state of Sonora.

 

OFAC published a new Counter Terrorism-related OFAC Alert, "International Cartels Designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists."

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Hernandez, Perez of Mexico.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0051 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934096/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250318

 

*******

March 20, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated a “teapot” oil refinery and its chief executive officer for purchasing and refining hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian crude oil, including from vessels linked to the Foreign Terrorist Organization, Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis, and the Iranian Ministry of Defense of Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).

 

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published the Final Rule to Extend Recordkeeping Requirements from Five to 10 Years, consistent with the extension of the statute of limitations for violations of certain sanctions administered by OFAC.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Wang, Xueqing of China.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Astrid Menks Limited of China;
  • Britney Ryder Limited of China;
  • Canes Ventici Limited of China;
  • Citywallship Management Co Ltd of China;
  • Huaying Huizhou Daya Vay Petrochemical Terminal Storage Co. Ltd of China;
  • Jetee Co., Limited of China;
  • Lyrari Group Ltd of Virgin Islands;
  • Placencia Services Incorporation of Liberia;
  • Sea Breeze Shipping Inc of Panama;
  • Seapalm Shipping Limited of Seychelles;
  • Setasean Ship Management Limited of China;
  • Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co., Ltd. of China; and
  • Zenith Bridge Inc of Panama.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Aurora Riley (HPKT) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 356024000 (vessel);
  • Brava Lake (8P2225) Crude Oil Tanker Barbados flag; MMSI 314867000 (vessel);
  • Catalina 7 (3E4129) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352001485 (vessel);
  • Montrose (T7BJ4) Crude Oil Tanker San Marino flag; MMSI 268240502 (vessel);
  • Natalina 7 D6A3622) Crude Oil Tanker Comoros flag; MMSI 620999608 (vessel);
  • Titan (TJ03M) Crude Oil Tanker Unknown flag; IMO 9293741 (vessel);
  • Viola (3EHD8) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 354951000 (vessel); and
  • Volans (8PDO3) Crude Oil Tanker Barbados flag; MMSI 314679000 (vessel).

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250320

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0056

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934131/download?inline

 

*******

 

March 24, 2025: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)  issued Venezuela General License 41B, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Certain Transactions Related to Chevron Corporation's Joint Ventures in Venezuela."

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 41B: “Authorizing the Wind Down of Certain Transactions Related to Chevron Corporation’s Joint Ventures in Venezuela”

 

(a) All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions previously authorized by Venezuela General License 41, issued on November 26, 2022, related to the operation and management by Chevron Corporation or its subsidiaries (“Chevron”) of Chevron’s joint ventures in Venezuela (collectively, the “Chevron JVs”) involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13850, as amended by E.O. 13857, or E.O. 13884, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, May 27, 2025.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934071/download?inline

 

*******

 

March 25, 2025:  The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), imposed sanctions on three Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) officials who were involved in the abduction, detention, and probable death of former FBI Special Agent Robert A. “Bob” Levinson.  The individuals designated, Reza Amiri Moghadam, Gholamhossein Mohammadnia, and Taqi Daneshvar, all played a role in Mr. Levinson’s abduction, probable death, and Iran’s efforts to cover up or obfuscate their responsibility.  This action follows the December 2020 OFAC designations of two Iranian MOIS officers, Mohammad Baseri and Ahmad Khazai, who acted in their capacity as MOIS officers in Mr. Levinson’s abduction, detention, and probable death.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Daneshvar, Taqi of Iran;
  • Moghadam, Reza Amiri of Iran; and
  • Mohammadnia, Gholamhossein of Iran.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0059 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250325

 

*******

 

March 28, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated five individuals, and three associated companies involved in a Lebanon-based sanctions evasion network supporting the Hizballah finance team.  The Hizballah finance team manages a variety of lucrative commercial projects and oil smuggling networks, often in conjunction with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF), to generate and transfer revenue for Hizballah.  The Hizballah finance team uses front companies to generate millions of dollars in revenue for Hizballah and support the group’s terrorist activities, while also allowing key associates and family members, like those designated, to enrich themselves through these commercial enterprises.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Al-Bazzal, Rashid Qasim of Lebanon;
  • Ayyub, Fatimah ‘Abdallah of Lebanon;
  • Ayyub, Hawra’ ‘Abdallah of Turkey;
  • Khafaja, Jamil Mohamad of Lebanon; and
  • Murtada, Mahasin Mahmud of Turkey.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Lebanese United Group SAL of Lebanon;
  • Ravee Sarl of Lebanon; and
  • Securol Glass Curtains of Lebanon.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250328 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0063

 

*******

 

March 31, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated six individuals and seven entities involved in a money laundering network supporting the Sinaloa Cartel, one of the most notorious and violent drug trafficking organizations in the world, and a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).  The Sinaloa Cartel is responsible for a significant portion of the illicit fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States and has exploited multiple ports of entry along the southern border for its criminal activities.  This action is the culmination of a coordinated investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigations, Homeland Security Investigations, and the Government of Mexico, including the Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera, Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Amador Valenzuela, Christian Noe of Mexico;
  • Benguiat Jimenez, Alberto David of Mexico City;
  • Diaz Rodriguez, Salvador of Mexico;
  • Esparragoza Rosas, Enrique Dann of Mexico;
  • Paez Vargas, Israel Daniel of Mexico; and
  • Viramontes Sesteaga, Alan of Mexico.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Grupo Unter Empresarial S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
  • Grupo Vindende S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
  • Grupo Zipfel De Mexico S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
  • Personas Unidas Hoas, S.A.P.I DE C.V. of Mexico;
  • Productions Pipos S. DE. R.L. DE C.V. of Mexico;
  • Scatman and Hatman Corp, S.A.P.I. DE C.V. of Mexico; and
  • Tapagas Mexico S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250331 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250331

MARCH 2025 EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATES Read More »

JANUARY 2025 EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATES

LATEST EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATE

January 2025

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through January 31, 2025.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and

persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 

In this newsletter, we have added a specific DDTC FAQs section, we think this will be of interest to our readers.

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

President

President Trump Announces America First Trade Policy

January 20, 2025: In 2017, President Trump’s Administration pursued trade and economic policies that put the American economy, the American worker, and our national security first.  President Trump will established a robust and reinvigorated trade policy that promotes investment and productivity, enhances the Nation’s industrial and technological advantages, defends the economic and national security, and — above all — benefits American workers, manufacturers, farmers, ranchers, entrepreneurs, and businesses.

Addressing Unfair and Unbalanced Trade.  The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the United States Trade Representative, shall investigate the causes of the country’s large and persistent annual trade deficits in goods, as well as the economic and national security implications and risks resulting from such deficits, and recommend appropriate measures, such as a global supplemental tariff or other policies, to remedy such deficits.

The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall investigate the feasibility of establishing and recommend the best methods for designing, building, and implementing an External Revenue Service (ERS) to collect tariffs, duties, and other foreign trade-related revenues.

The United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, shall undertake a review of, and identify, any unfair trade practices by other countries and recommend appropriate actions to remedy such practices under applicable authorities, including, but not limited to, the Constitution of the United States; sections 71 through 75 of title 15, United States Code; sections 1337, 1338, 2252, 2253, and 2411 of title 19, United States Code; section 1701 of title 50, United States Code; and trade agreement implementing acts.

The United States Trade Representative shall commence the public consultation process set out in section 4611(b) of title 19, United States Code, with respect to the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in preparation for the July 2026 review of the USMCA.  Additionally, the United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall assess the impact of the USMCA on American workers, farmers, ranchers, service providers, and other businesses and make recommendations regarding the United States’ participation in the agreement.  The United States Trade Representative shall also report to appropriate congressional committees on the operation of the USMCA and related matters consistent with section 4611(b) of title 19, United States Code.

The Secretary of the Treasury shall review and assess the policies and practices of major United States trading partners with respect to the rate of exchange between their currencies and the United States dollar pursuant to section 4421 of title 19, United States Code, and section 5305 of title 22, United States Code.  The Secretary of the Treasury shall recommend appropriate measures to counter currency manipulation or misalignment that prevents effective balance of payments adjustments or that provides trading partners with an unfair competitive advantage in international trade, and shall identify any countries that he believes should be designated as currency manipulators.

The United States Trade Representative shall review existing United States trade agreements and sectoral trade agreements and recommend any revisions that may be necessary or appropriate to achieve or maintain the general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions with respect to free trade agreement partner countries.

The United States Trade Representative shall identify countries with which the United States can negotiate agreements on a bilateral or sector-specific basis to obtain export market access for American workers, farmers, ranchers, service providers, and other businesses and shall make recommendations regarding such potential agreements.

The Secretary of Commerce shall review policies and regulations regarding the application of antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) laws, including with regard to transnational subsidies, cost adjustments, affiliations, and “zeroing.”  Further, the Secretary of Commerce shall review procedures for conducting verifications pursuant to section 1677 of title 19, United States Code, and assess whether these procedures sufficiently induce compliance by foreign respondents and governments involved in AD/CVD proceedings.  The Secretary of Commerce shall consider modifications to these procedures, as appropriate.

The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, in consultation with the United States Trade Representative, shall assess the loss of tariff revenues and the risks from importing counterfeit products and contraband drugs, e.g., fentanyl, that each result from the current implementation of the $800 or less, duty-free de minimis exemption under section 1321 of title 19, United States Code, and shall recommend modifications as warranted to protect both the revenue of the United States and the public health by preventing unlawful importations.

The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, shall investigate whether any foreign country subjects United States citizens or corporations to discriminatory or extraterritorial taxes pursuant to section 891 of title 26, United States Code.

The United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, shall review the impact of all trade agreements — including the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement — on the volume of Federal procurement covered by Executive Order 13788 of April 18, 2017 (Buy American and Hire American), and shall make recommendations to ensure that such agreements are being implemented in a manner that favors domestic workers and manufacturers, not foreign nations.

Economic and Trade Relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  The United States Trade Representative shall review the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China to determine whether the PRC is acting in accordance with this agreement, and shall recommend appropriate actions to be taken based upon the findings of this review, up to and including the imposition of tariffs or other measures as needed.

The United States Trade Representative shall assess the May 14, 2024, report entitled “Four-Year Review of Actions Taken in the Section 301 Investigation:  China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation” and consider potential additional tariff modifications as needed under section 2411 of title 19, United States Code — particularly with respect to industrial supply chains and circumvention through third countries, including an updated estimate of the costs imposed by any unfair trade practices identified in such review — and he shall recommend such actions as are necessary to remediate any issues identified in connection with this process.

The United States Trade Representative shall investigate other acts, policies, and practices by the PRC that may be unreasonable or discriminatory and that may burden or restrict United States commerce, and shall make recommendations regarding appropriate responsive actions, including, but not limited to, actions authorized by section 2411 of title 19, United States Code.

The Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative shall assess legislative proposals regarding Permanent Normal Trade Relations with the PRC and make recommendations regarding any proposed changes to such legislative proposals.

The Secretary of Commerce shall assess the status of United States intellectual property rights such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks conferred upon PRC persons, and shall make recommendations to ensure reciprocal and balanced treatment of intellectual property rights with the PRC.

Additional Economic Security Matters.  The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of any other relevant agencies, shall conduct a full economic and security review of the United States’ industrial and manufacturing base to assess whether it is necessary to initiate investigations to adjust imports that threaten the national security of the United States under section 1862 of title 19, United States Code.

The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, shall review and assess the effectiveness of the exclusions, exemptions, and other import adjustment measures on steel and aluminum under section 1862 of title 19, United States Code, in responding to threats to the national security of the United States, and shall make recommendations based upon the findings of this review.

The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce, in cooperation with the heads of other agencies with export control authorities, shall review the United States export control system and advise on modifications in light of developments involving strategic adversaries or geopolitical rivals as well as all other relevant national security and global considerations.  Specifically, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall assess and make recommendations regarding how to maintain, obtain, and enhance our Nation’s technological edge and how to identify and eliminate loopholes in existing export controls -– especially those that enable the transfer of strategic goods, software, services, and technology to countries to strategic rivals and their proxies.  In addition, they shall assess and make recommendations regarding export control enforcement policies and practices, and enforcement mechanisms to incentivize compliance by foreign countries, including appropriate trade and national security measures.

The Secretary of Commerce shall review and recommend appropriate action with respect to the rulemaking by the Office of Information and Communication Technology and Services (ICTS) on connected vehicles, and shall consider whether controls on ICTS transactions should be expanded to account for additional connected products.

The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and, as appropriate, the heads of any other relevant agencies, shall review whether Executive Order 14105 of August 9, 2023 (Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern) should be modified or rescinded and replaced, and assess whether the final rule entitled “Provisions Pertaining to U.S. Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern,” 89 Fed. Reg. 90398 (November 15, 2024), which implements Executive Order 14105, includes sufficient controls to address national security threats.  The Secretary of the Treasury shall make recommendations based upon the findings of this review, including potential modifications to the Outbound Investment Security Program.

The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall assess any distorting impact of foreign government financial contributions or subsidies on United States Federal procurement programs and propose guidance, regulations, or legislation to combat such distortion.

The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall assess the unlawful migration and fentanyl flows from Canada, Mexico, the PRC, and any other relevant jurisdictions and recommend appropriate trade and national security measures to resolve that emergency.

 

Reports.  The results of the reviews and investigations, findings, identifications, and recommendations identified above.

 

Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/america-first-trade-policy/

 

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Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

Department of State 2025 Civil Monetary Penalties Inflationary Adjustment and New Maximum Penalty for Violation of Section 38 of the AECA

 

January 10, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 1866: On January 10, 2025, the Department of State published a final rule to adjust the civil monetary penalties at section 127.10 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) as part of a larger rule amending penalties for all regulatory provisions maintained and enforced by the Department of State.  ITAR section 127.10(a)(1)(i) through (iii) providing maximum penalties under sections 38 (22 U.S.C. 2778), 39A (22 U.S.C. 2779a), and 40 (22 U.S.C. 2780) of the AECA, respectively, are adjusted for inflation in accordance with the December 2024 guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB M-25-02). The revised amounts for violations of those sections will apply to those penalties assessed on or after January 10, 2025, regardless of the date on which the underlying facts or violations occurred.

 

The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs is authorized to impose a civil penalty, as follows:

 

(i)   For each violation of 22 U.S.C. 2778, an amount not to exceed the greater of $1,271,078 (from $1,238,892) or the amount that is twice the value of the transaction that is the basis of the violation with respect to which the penalty is imposed;

 

(ii)   For each violation of 22 U.S.C. 2779a, an amount not to exceed $1,055,721 (from $1,028,988), or five times the amount of the prohibited incentive payment, whichever is greater; and

 

(iii)   For each violation of 22 U.S.C. 2780, an amount not to exceed $1,256,607 (from $1,224,787).

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/10/2025-00361/department-of-state-2025-civil-monetary-penalties-inflationary-adjustment

 

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Interim Final Rule: Targeted Revisions To Certain Parts Of USML Categories II, IV, V, VII Through XIV And XIX Through XXI.

 

January 17, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 5594: The Department of State published an interim final rule in the Federal Register that, after a 240-day delayed effective date, will amend §§ 121.0 and 121.1 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) by revising certain U.S. Munitions List (USML) definitions, adding new definitions, and revising certain parts of USML Categories II, IV, V, VII through XIV, and XIX through XXI.

 

USML Category II

In USML Category II, Note 2 to paragraph (a)(5) is revised to correct a typographical error.

 

USML Category IV

USML Category IV paragraph (c) is revised and paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) are added to more clearly describe the equipment controlled therein, and to differentiate between equipment specially designed for commodities enumerated in paragraphs (a) or (b) of Category IV under the new paragraph (c)(1), and equipment specially designed for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) under the new paragraph (c)(2), similar to how they are differentiated in paragraph 4.b of the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List. This amendment also replaces the undefined term “apparatus and devices” with the § 120.40 defined term “equipment.”

 

USML Category V

USML Category V paragraph (c)(2) is revised to add the CAS Registry Number for pentaborane and to replace the comma after “pentaborane” with a semicolon, in order to clarify this paragraph describes derivatives of carboranes, decaboranes, and pentaborane. Paragraph (f)(4)(x) is revised to correct the CAS Registry Number. Paragraphs (e)(10), (f)(19), and (g)(4) are revised to correct typographical errors.

 

USML Category VII

Note 3 to USML Category VII is revised to further clarify the universe of ground vehicles described, with no change to the scope of controls. Specifically, the types of vehicular control and locomotion employed are irrelevant when evaluating a vehicle against the control criteria. The Department affirms that although some unmanned ground vehicles, based on their method of control or locomotion, may be referred to by the public colloquially as “robots,” they must still be evaluated against the criteria in USML Category VII.

 

USML Category VIII

USML Category VIII(h)(1) is revised to clarify which commodities are described therein by incorporating relevant portions of the existing note to paragraph (h)(1). This revision also serves to facilitate reference to the included list of aircraft by other USML paragraphs, and to better align controls with the Department's intent around U.S. Government technology demonstrators. Additionally, it precludes release of commodities from paragraph (h)(1) based solely on their subsequent use in aircraft included in USML Category XXI (pursuant to the procedures therein) or in foreign advanced military aircraft. Foreign advanced military aircraft, as newly defined in § 121.0, include non-U.S. origin aircraft and foreign derivatives of U.S. origin aircraft, either in development or entering production after 2023, with one or more of the following advanced military capabilities: Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) fire control radar, integrated signature management, electronic warfare systems, or the ability to engage targets beyond visual range (BVR). The Department further highlights the use of the term “AESA fire control radar” to ensure that AESA weather radars commonly used in civil aviation are clearly excluded from this list of advanced military capabilities. The year 2023 was chosen as the production year in this definition to ensure alignment with the temporary modification to the USML issued on December 4, 2023 (88 FR 84072), and extended on November 26, 2024 (89 FR 93170), which states that parts used in or with the KF-21 continue to be described on the USML.

 

As practitioners have confused the F-15SE (Silent Eagle) with the F-15E (Strike Eagle), the F-15SE nomenclature is also clarified. Further, the “B1B” is replaced by “B-1.” As the B-1A never entered into production, this change does not change the export classification of existing items. The Department makes this change consistent with the majority of aircraft listed in the paragraph and its intent to include future variants of those aircraft. The Department notes the only aircraft listed with series letters (F-15SE, F/A-18E/F, and EA-18G) in this paragraph intentionally exclude earlier variants (for example, the control does not include the F-15A, which is an F-15 variant developed before the F-15SE). Additionally, the Department adds the MQ-25 and the RQ-170 to the list of aircraft in paragraph (h)(1)(i). The MQ-25 provides a critical military advantage in its ability to support the future Navy carrier air wing and is central to the Navy's strategic Unmanned Campaign Framework. The RQ-170 is a high-altitude, long-endurance, low-observable unmanned aerial vehicle that provides a critical military and intelligence advantage in its ability to perform key intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, and electronic warfare functions. Paragraph (h)(1) describes articles used in some of the most advanced U.S. military aircraft. The changes to paragraph (h)(1) ensure those specially designed articles are not released from this entry based on their subsequent use in USML Category XXI aircraft, foreign advanced military aircraft, or U.S. Government (USG) technology demonstrator aircraft.

 

Ensuring those elements are not released from paragraph (h)(1) based on subsequent use in foreign advanced military aircraft is consistent with the language of § 120.3(a)(2). With this change, the Department treats use of these commodities in foreign advanced military aircraft as it has in their use in advanced U.S. military aircraft. This addition facilitates opportunities for reuse and commonality with partner aircraft by enabling U.S. content to be utilized in those platforms without unnecessary redesigns or unmerited removal from the USML.

 

The Department further considered amending the language to remove commodities designed exclusively for non-Department of Defense (DoD) USG technology demonstrators from paragraph (h)(1). The Department declines to do so, as such commodities are generally not currently described in paragraph (h)(1). Specifically, USG technology demonstrators are unique among the aircraft listed in paragraph (h)(1), as some technology demonstrators are described on the USML, while others are not. The Department notes commodities used in technology demonstrators are often developed exclusively for those demonstrators or repurposed from other USML or CCL platforms for time and cost savings; those commodities must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis for proper export classification. Specifically, for USG technology demonstrators that are themselves not described on the USML (“these aircraft”), it is generally the case that:

 

  • Articles designed for and used only in other aircraft listed in paragraph (h)(1) before and during subsequent unmodified use in these aircraft generally remain described in paragraph (h)(1), as explained by the following analysis:
  • In the context of paragraph (h)(1), such articles meet the criteria in, and thus are caught by, § 120.41(a)(1) as having properties peculiarly responsible for the controlled characteristic ( e., their use in the listed aircraft), and (a)(2) for their use in or with the other listed aircraft.
  • In the context of paragraph (h)(1), such articles are not released by § 120.41(b)(3), (4), or (5), as they were originally developed for aircraft described in either USML Category VIII or XXI, and the USG technology demonstrator does not enter production as defined in § 120.43.
  • Articles designed for, and used in, aircraft subject to the EAR prior to unmodified use in these aircraft are not described in paragraph (h)(1) but may be described elsewhere on the USML, as explained by the following analysis:
  • In the context of paragraph (h)(1), there are circumstances wherein such articles would be released by § 120.41(b)(3), regardless of meeting the criteria in § 120.41(a).
  • With contemporaneous documentation, there are circumstances in which the articles would also be released by paragraph (b)(4) or (5).
  • Articles designed for, and only used in, these aircraft are not described in paragraph (h)(1), but may be described elsewhere on the USML, as explained by the following analysis:
  • In the context of paragraph (h)(1), such articles meet the criteria in § 120.41(a)(1) as having properties peculiarly responsible for the controlled characteristic ( e., their use in the listed aircraft), but not (a)(2) unless they are used in or with a defense article.
  • In the context of paragraph (h)(1), such articles are not released by § 120.41(b)(3), as the USG technology demonstrator does not enter production. However, they could be released by paragraph (b)(4), as they were developed with the knowledge they would be used in these aircraft, often in a system that is subject to the EAR.
  • In contrast, articles designed for, and only used in, USG technology demonstrators described on the USML are described in paragraph (h)(1), as explained in the following analysis:
  • In the context of paragraph (h)(1), such articles meet the criteria in § 120.41(a)(1) as having properties peculiarly responsible for the controlled characteristic ( e., their use in the listed aircraft), and (a)(2) for their use in or with aircraft described in USML Category VIII.
  • In the context of paragraph (h)(1), such articles are not released by § 120.41(b)(3), (4), or (5), as they were originally developed for an aircraft described in USML Category VIII. The Department is also amending the text of the current “Note to paragraph (h)(1),” redesignating it as “Note 1 to paragraph to (h)(1),” and adding “Note 2 to paragraph (h)(1).” The addition of “Note 2 to paragraph (h)(1)” outlines an example of the scope of paragraph (h)(1) for articles used in USG technology demonstrators.
  • With these revisions to paragraph (h)(1) and the notes to paragraph (h)(1), the Department also terminates the temporary modification to Category VIII of the USML that was issued on December 4, 2023 (88 FR 84072) and extended on November 26, 2024 (89 FR 93170).

 

The Department notes certain commodities designed exclusively for DoD-funded developmental aircraft, including aircraft jointly funded by DoD and another agency, remain defense articles described in paragraph (f) of USML Category VIII.

 

Paragraph (h)(29) of USML Category VIII is revised to clarify the commodities described therein include both those designed for the aircraft listed and the defense articles described in paragraph (h)(1), with a change in control via the removal of commodities specially designed for USG technology demonstrators.

The note located at the end of USML Category VIII is moved to follow USML Category VIII paragraph (h), renamed “Note 1 to paragraph (h),” and revised for clarity, with no change in scope.

 

USML Category IX

USML Category IX(e)(2) is placed in reserve to eliminate redundancy. Technical data directly related to the software and databases enumerated in paragraph (b)(4) is already described in paragraph (e)(1).

 

USML Category X

Developmental exoskeletons have been identified as a technology warranting ITAR control due to the critical military advantage they provide. Thus, Category X is amended by removing paragraph (b) from reserve and adding a new paragraph (b) to describe exoskeletons under development for DoD, along with standard exclusions applied to other developmental articles to provide advance notice to industry and to avoid controlling those that do not provide a critical military advantage.

 

The Department also amends Category X to align body armor protection levels with the most recent NIJ standard, 0123.00, “Specification for NIJ Ballistic Protection Levels and Associated Test Threats.” All references to “NIJ Type IV” have been updated to NIJ RF3. “Note 1 to paragraph (a)(1)” and “Note to paragraphs (a) and (d)” have also been updated to reference the new standard. “Note to paragraphs (a) and (d)” is redesignated as “Note 1 to paragraphs (a) and (d).”

 

USML Category XI

 

USML Category XI paragraphs (c)(10)(i) and (ii) are revised to reflect that certain anti-jam antennas no longer provide a critical military advantage, with increasing commercial utilization applicable to civil GPS resiliency. Following consultations with DoD, the beam switching speed criterion in paragraph (c)(10)(i) is revised from 50 milliseconds down to one millisecond, and the convergence time criterion in paragraph (c)(10)(ii) is revised from one second down to one millisecond, as the Department seeks to control only the most sensitive and effective anti-jam antennas in USML Category XI(c)(10)(i) and (ii). The Department further intends to exclude Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPAs) for Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) from paragraph (c)(10). To implement this, the Department is removing all CRPAs from paragraphs (c)(10)(i) and (ii) and adding paragraphs (c)(10)(v) and (vi) to describe the CRPAs for non-PNT applications that meet the updated criteria used in paragraphs (c)(10)(i) and (ii) the CRPA antennas were moved from. In removing CRPAs for PNT, the Department intends to facilitate civil global navigation system resiliency. CRPAs use multiple elements and advanced signal processing techniques to dynamically control their reception pattern, thereby enhancing signal reception from desired directions and suppressing interference from undesired directions. Generally, in comparing CRPAs to the antennas that remain described in paragraphs (c)(10)(i) and (ii), CRPAs are more optimized to control the reception pattern instead of the transmission beam steering or switching. This is in line with the Position, Navigation, and Timing, Advisory Board's (PNTAB) recommendation to remove CRPAs from the USML. The antennas removed from the USML by these changes are neither subject to multilateral controls nor controlled as munitions in other countries that produce them. Once removed from the USML, these anti-jam antennas will become subject to the EAR under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce.

 

USML Category XII

USML Category XII paragraph (d)(2)(ii) is revised to update the language to reflect the current description of Positioning Service from Precise Positioning Service to Protected Positioning Service (PPS). In the 2021 Federal Radionavigation Plan published by the Departments of Defense, Transportation, and Homeland Security (available at https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/​view/​dot/​63024), PPS has been updated to “Protected” Positioning Service from the former “Precise” Positioning Service. This change accurately reflects the technology's ability to operate in degraded environments as opposed to legacy encryption abilities that facilitate greater position precision and no longer provide a critical military advantage.

 

USML Category XIII

USML Category XIII paragraph (b)(4) is revised to update the name of the Unified Cross Domain Management Office (UCDMO) to the National Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office (NCDSMO).

 

The Department further amends Category XIII to align armor protection levels with the most recent NIJ standard, 0123.00, “Specification for NIJ Ballistic Protection Levels and Associated Test Threats.” All references to “NIJ Level III” are updated to NIJ RF1. As the new RF1 standard corresponds to the previous Type III standard, this is not a significant change in control. The reference in paragraph (m)(10) is also updated to reference the new standard.

 

Additionally, paragraph (e)(2) is revised for clarification and to add paragraphs (e)(2)(i) and (ii). Category XIII is further revised to add specific fluids to the USML in paragraph (j)(3). Each of these fluids was developed for one or more critical military applications for which existing fluids were unsuitable; by including a specially designed criterion, general-purpose fluids subsequently selected for use in a military application are not described by this control. Lastly, paragraph (m)(9) is amended to clarify the definitions of variables in the equation for Em.

 

USML Category XIV

Additional nerve agents and a defoliant are added to USML Category XIV in paragraphs (a)(1)(iv) through (viii) and (j), and controls on Chemical Agent Resistive Coatings (CARC) are clarified in paragraph (f)(7). The nerve agent additions are made pursuant to changes to Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention, while the defoliant addition is a constituent of Agent Orange, for which the Department is unaware of current commercial applications.

 

The clarification of CARC controls in paragraph (f)(7) is made consistent with longstanding policy published on DDTC's website. As CARC is controlled only through the point of application and curing, export applications for CARC must specify the proposed end-users and end-uses, and export licenses for CARC impose limitations on the same. Of note, the control release for CARC that has been applied and cured only applies to USML Category XIV(f)(7); this release does not apply to coatings or materials described elsewhere on the USML. For example, when a USML Category XIII(j)(2) coating is applied to an item subject to the EAR, a DDTC license or other approval continues to be required for the coating, when the item to which the coating was applied is exported, reexported, or retransferred.

 

USML Category XIX

USML Category XIX paragraphs (d) and (f)(1) are amended to add specific DoD-funded aircraft engines in development that provide a critical military or intelligence advantage, as well as their specially designed parts, components, accessories, and attachments. Specifically, paragraph (d) is split into two parts, paragraphs (d)(1) and (2), and amended to include the XT900, which is a developmental engine resulting from the enumerated HPW3000 technology demonstrator.

 

The note to paragraph (d) is redesignated as the note to paragraph (d)(1), to continue its applicability to the engines in former paragraph (d) following their movement to paragraph (d)(1), with no change in scope. Paragraph (f)(1) is amended to include specially designed parts, components, accessories, and attachments for the engine now described in paragraph (d)(2), and to incorporate a portion of the note to paragraph (f)(1). The remainder of the note to paragraph (f)(1) is redesignated as “Note 1 to paragraph (f)(1)” and revised for clarity. Paragraph (f)(1) is further amended to clarify that parts, components, accessories, and attachments are not released if common only to a listed engine and an engine designated in USML Category XXI(a), and to add a catch-all control for XA100, XA101, XA102, XA103, and T901 engine hardware. The XA-series engines represent a substantial leap in propulsion capability. Items specially designed for these engines provides a critical military or intelligence advantage in enabling the engines to provide improved thrust-to-weight capability while addressing fuel efficiency, affordability, and sustainment for warfighter operational readiness. The T901 powers the Future Vertical Lift platform and provides 33% more thrust than, but retains the same size as, its predecessor.

 

Paragraph (f)(2) is amended to clarify the items described in paragraph (f)(2) by replacing a term of art (“hot section components”) with defined regulatory terms (hot section “parts” and “components”), with no change in scope, and to add related cooled structures for combustion chambers and liners. Punctuation is also updated with no change in scope.

 

USML Category XX

USML Category XX is amended to add paragraphs (a)(9) and (10) to control two new classes of uncrewed, untethered vessels and vehicles that provide a critical military advantage: specifically, those equipped with anti-recovery features, and larger systems with significant range or endurance. Paragraph (a)(10) includes criteria to avoid control of systems below certain weight and performance thresholds the Department assesses are best suited for scientific research or commercial applications. Tethered systems are similarly excluded from both paragraphs (a)(9) and (10).

 

USML Category XX(b)(2) is revised for clarity, with no change to the scope of the control.

 

USML Category XXI

USML Category XXI is amended to move the second sentence of paragraph (a) into a new note, and to further clarify the considerations when designating an article in USML Category XXI.

 

These amendments will take effect 240 days after publication, on September 15, 2025.

 

In addition to accepting public comment on these USML revisions, the Department is also asking specific questions in the Request for Comments section of the rule’s preamble.  The comment period will be open for 60 days after publication.  Interested parties may submit comments by March 18, 2025, using one of the methods described in the interim final rule.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/17/2025-01313/international-traffic-in-arms-regulations-us-munitions-list-targeted-revisions

 

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DDTC Final Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations Posted to Website

 

January 6, 2025: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following Final CJ Determinations for CJ’s that resulted in a final determination that the subject product was controlled within USML Category XXI.

 

Readers may find these determinations helpful when performing self-classification work.

 

Model Name Manufacturer Description Final Determination Final Determination Date
METSS 2190-S K&L Gates LLP Submarine synthetic hydraulic and lubricating fluid for submarines USML Category XXI(a), and USML Category XXI(b) for directly related technical data and defense services 5/28/2021
Echo Voyager, P/Ns 1717200-1000-1 and 1717401-2000 The Boeing Company Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV) USML Category XXI(a) (and in the second CJ, the same classification for its specially designed parts, components, accessories, and attachments) 8/2/2019 8/2/2023
Slocum Glider, Model LBS-G, P/N ASSY G-1408-DS Teledyne Webb Research Underwater automnomous gliding vehicle USML Category XXI(a) 9/27/2017
Krytox XHT 500AF The Chemours Company Perfluorinated grease USML Category XXI(a), and USML Category XXI(b) for directly related technical data and defense services 5/20/2021
TenCate ABDS TenCate Advanced Composites, acquired by Toray Composites Materials America Active blast mitigation system that suppresses vehicle flight caused by IED and mine blasts and significantly increases the protection of occupants. USML Category XXI(a) 6/17/2014
Liner, Combustion Chamber, Turbine Engine Transition, Part Number LH50905-02 Honeywell International Transition element between the combustion chamber and the power turbine of an aircraft gas turbine engine USML Category XXI(a), and USML Category XXI(b) for directly related technical data and defense services 8/19/2021
Gila Strike Multi-Threat Small Arms Ammunition Reliant Defense, Inc. Proprietary enhanced penetration round USML Category XXI(a), and USML Category XXI(b) for directly related technical data and defense services 10/2/2024
MDS-10, Part Number 3130-0002 and MDS-10T, Part Number 3130-0005 WM Industries Inc. Handheld dual sensor detectors that combine metal detection and ground penetrating radar technologies for the purpose of detecting improvised explosive devices USML Category XXI(a), and USML Category XXI(b) for directly related technical data and defense services 12/19/2024

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=6ea6afdcdbc36300529d368d7c96194b

 

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Compliance Reminder

 

Annual sales / transfer reports for ITAR MLAs and WDAs are due now if your company files annually for the calendar year.

 

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DDTC Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Related To Registrations With The Department Of State

 

Q: Can I renew and amend my registration at the same time?

 

A: Yes, but only if an applicant includes administrative, material, and Mergers, Acquisitions and Divestitures (MAD) changes within the annual renewal submission. However, if the amendment is executed more than 60 days prior to the registration expiration date, then an applicant must submit a standalone amendment via the ‘Amend’ option in DECCS Registration Dashboard.

 

Q: How were the new fees calculated?

 

A: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) conducted a multi-year assessment to calculate the new registration fees. The new registration fees are based on several factors, including the last 15 years of inflation, technological advancements, and advancements in support services.

 

Q: Are there any special circumstances which the Department will consider to delay full payment of the registration fee?

 

A: Registrants whose fees are greater than $4000 may appeal to the Department for consideration of an alternate payment schedule. To be considered, registrants must provide proof that the registration fee is greater than 1 percent of the total sales in the given year. "Total sales" includes domestic and international sales and is not limited to sales of items controlled on the USML. Applicants must submit a request for special consideration to DDTC not less than 30 days prior to registration expiration. Any request received within the 30-day window will be automatically disapproved.

 

Q: When it comes to registration fee calculations, what is a "favorable determination"?

 

A: A favorable determination is an approval, an approval with provisos (sometimes also referred to as an approval with conditions), or written authorization from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) to conduct an activity regulated by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). An application that is returned without action or denied is not a type of favorable determination.

 

Q: How will a new registrant know their fee?

 

A: The fee for first time registrants is set at $3,000 (manufacturers/exporters and brokers). However, persons registering as a manufacturer/exporter may also simultaneously register as a broker with a consolidated DS-2032 Statement of Registration and not be charged a separate broker registration fee.

 

 

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Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

 

January 2, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Japan has requested to buy up to one thousand two hundred (1,200) AIM-120 (D-3/C-8) Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); up to twenty (20) AIM-120D-3 guidance sections, including precise positioning provided by either Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module or M-Code; and up to four (4) AIM-120C-8 guidance sections. The following non-MDE items will be included: AMRAAM propulsion sections, warheads, AIM-120 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM), missile containers, and control section spares; Common Munitions Built-in Test (BIT) Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); ADU-891 Adaptor Group Test Sets; munitions support and support equipment; spare and repair parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support; classified software delivery and support; classified publications and technical documentation; transportation support; studies and surveys; warranties; US Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $3.64 billion. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-aim-120d-3-and-aim-120c-8-advanced-medium-range-air-air-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Saudi Arabia  

 

January 2, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as requested to buy twenty (20) MK 54 MOD 0 Lightweight Torpedo (LWT) all up rounds. The following non-MDE items will also be included: MK 54 MOD 0 LWT spare parts; MK 54 Recoverable Exercise Torpedoes (REXTORP); handling shapes and containers; training; publications; support and test equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $78.5 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Integrated Defense Systems, located in Portsmouth, RI. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kingdom-saudi-arabia-mk-54-mod-0-lightweight-torpedoes

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Zambia

 

January 13, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Republic of Zambia has requested to buy Bell 412 Enhanced Performance exportable medium-lift transport helicopters; radio communication and navigation systems; weather radar and transponder capabilities; qualification and transition training for pilots and maintainers; in-country Contractor Field Service Representatives support; Program Management Reviews; technical assistance and product support; associated aviation ground support equipment; peculiar ground support equipment; hardware; special tools; test equipment; basic issue items; Quality Assurance Team inspections, inventories, validations, and ground run and flight test verification testing; air freight transportation delivery; initial spare, repair, and consumable parts; operator, maintenance, and technical manuals; technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $100 million, to be funded by a combination of Foreign Military Financing and Zambian national funds. The principal contractor will be Bell Textron, located in Fort Worth, TX. The purchaser typically requires offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/republic-zambia-bell-412-enhanced-performance-exportable-medium-lift

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

 

January 15, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of Japan has requested to buy up to sixteen (16) AGM-158B/B-2 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles with Extended Range (JASSM-ER). The following non-MDE items will also be included: AGM-158 JASSM Dummy Air Training Missiles (DATM) and containers; JASSM Anti-jam Global Positioning System Receivers (JAGR); munitions support and support equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; integration and test support and equipment; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and equipment; airlift and transportation support; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $39 million. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Japan.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-joint-air-surface-standoff-missiles-extended-range

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

 

January 15, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of Japan has requested to buy up to one hundred fifty (150) Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) Block I missiles. The following non-MDE items will also be included: MK 21 Mod 3 Vertical Launch System (VLS) canisters; component parts and support equipment; continued Engineering, Integration and Test (EI&T) materiel and support required to produce the SM-6 Block I missiles; special test and handling equipment; training and training equipment and aids; technical publications and data; U.S. Government and contractor engineering and technical assistance, including related studies and analysis support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $900 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Camden, AR. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-standard-missile-6-sm-6-block-i-missiles

 

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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

Commerce Issues Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Secure Unmanned Aircraft Systems

 

January 2, 2025: the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) seeking public comment to inform the potential development of a rule to secure and safeguard the information and communication technology and services (ICTS) supply chain for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or drones.

 

With the rapid development of advanced technology, commercial drones are now commonplace across the United States. This ANPRM explains how foreign adversary involvement in UAS ICTS supply chains – including acute threats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia – may offer our adversaries the ability to remotely access and manipulate these devices, exposing sensitive U.S. data.

 

BIS seeks public feedback on several matters outlined in the ANPRM, including: definitions of UAS and components, assessments of how potential classes of ICTS transactions integral to UAS may present undue or unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, evaluations of risk posed by different foreign adversaries, potential processes for the public to request approval to engage in an otherwise prohibited transaction, the economic impact such regulation could have on certain entities, and, where feasible, potential mitigation measures.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-issues-advance-notice-proposed-rulemaking-secure-unmanned-aircraft-systems and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?content_type=All&created=1&field_countries=All&field_learn_support_topics=All&field_news_updates_topic=All&news_search_query=&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

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Export Enforcement Releases 2024 Year in Review

January 2, 2025: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Export Enforcement published its annual Year in Review, a compilation of highlights reflecting Export Enforcement’s accomplishments over the past year.

The Year in Review includes numerous initiatives from 2024, including the expansion of the Disruptive Technology Strike Force, which, to date, has brought 26 criminal cases charging sanctions and export control violations, smuggling conspiracies, and other offenses related to the transfer of sensitive information, goods, and military-grade technology to the People’s Republic of China, Russia, and Iran.

The Year in Review also highlights significant criminal and administrative enforcement actions from the past year, including several related to Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean illicit procurement networks. In addition, the Year in Review describes key partnerships with the interagency, industry, academia, and foreign governments, and it describes updates to the antiboycott enforcement program.

BIS Export Enforcement protects and promotes U.S. national security by aggressively investigating violations of export control and antiboycott regulations and by partnering with industry and academia to facilitate compliance with those regulations.

https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/bis-export-enforcement-year-review-2024 and https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?content_type=All&created=1&field_countries=All&field_learn_support_topics=All&field_news_updates_topic=All&news_search_query=&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

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Biden-Harris Administration Announces Regulatory Framework for the Responsible Diffusion of Advanced Artificial Intelligence Technology

January 13, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 4544: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced controls on advanced computing chips and certain closed artificial intelligence (AI) model weights, alongside new license exceptions and updates to the Data Center Validated End User (VEU) authorization. This new regulation serves key U.S. national security and foreign policy interests and supports the Biden-Harris Administration’s broader strategy to cultivate a secure and trusted technology ecosystem for the responsible use and diffusion of AI.

The framework adopts a three-pronged strategy.

First, the rule updates controls for advanced computing chips by requiring authorizations for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) involving a broad set of additional countries. However, the rule also includes the following license exceptions and authorizations, which will ensure that commercial transactions that don’t pose national security risks can proceed and the benefits of AI can be broadly shared:

  • Exceptions for certain allies and partners: New License Exception Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA) allows for the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of advanced computing chips, without an authorization, to a set of allies and partners. Those destinations, which are listed in paragraph (a) to Supplement No. 5 to Part 740, are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
  • Exceptions for supply chains:New License Exception Advanced Compute Manufacturing (ACM) allows for the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of advanced computing chips, without an authorization, for the purposes of development, production, and storage of these chips, except to arms-embargoed countries. This license exception builds on the Temporary General License from October 2023 rule to prevent disruption of supply chains.
  • Low volume exception: New License Exception Low Processing Performance (LPP) allows limited amounts of compute to flow globally, except to arms-embargoed countries.
  • Update to Data Center Validated End User (VEU) Program:The rule further bifurcates Data Center VEUs into:
    • Universal VEUs (UVEU):Provides U.S. and certain allied and partner country entities with the opportunity to obtain a single authorization that will allow the company to build data centers around the world without additional authorizations, except in arms-embargoed countries.
    • National VEUs (NVEU):Provides entities headquartered outside arms-embargoed countries the opportunity to obtain an authorization that will allow the company to build data centers in specified locations without additional authorizations, except in arms-embargoed countries.

When a license is required to export or reexport chips to a certain destination, license applications will be reviewed under a presumption of approval until the total quantity of controlled chips exported or reexported to that country exceeds a specified allocation. After a country reaches its allocation, applications will be reviewed under a policy of denial. Consistent with previously established policy, a presumption of denial remains in place for arms-embargoed countries, regardless of quantity.

Authorized NVEUs will be able to build data centers up to a specified scale in each country. This allocation is separate from, and not impacted by, the host country’s specified country allocation. Likewise, the low-volume orders are not affected by and do not count against country-level allocations. Authorized UVEUs will be required to keep at least 75% of their controlled advanced chips within the United States and certain allied and partner countries and will be prohibited from installing more than 7% of their controlled chips in any single other country. U.S.-headquartered UVEUs will be required to keep at least 50% of their controlled advanced chips in the United States.

Second, the rule institutes new controls on the model weights of the most advanced closed-weight AI models. These controls will initially apply to the weights of models trained with 10^26 computational operations or more, and authorizations will be required to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) such weights to a broad set of countries. Additionally, the rule creates a new foreign direct product rule that applies these controls to certain model weights produced abroad using advanced computing chips made with U.S. technology or equipment. As with advanced computing chips, however, this rule includes several license exceptions for model weights:

  • Exception for deployments by U.S., ally and partner-headquartered entities: New License Exception Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA) allows for the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of otherwise controlled closed AI model weights, without an authorization, by companies headquartered in the United States and certain allies and partners (see list above), except to an arms-embargoed country.
  • Exception for open models:Models with widely available model weights (i.e., open-weight models) are not subject to controls. Additionally, the model weights of closed models that are less powerful than the most advanced open-weight models, even if they exceed the 10^26 threshold, are not controlled.

Third, BIS will impose security conditions to safeguard the storage of the most advanced models in destinations to protect U.S. national security and to mitigate the risk of diversion for advanced computing chips.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/biden-harris-administration-announces-regulatory-framework-responsible-diffusion and https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion

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Commerce Finalizes Rule to Secure Connected Vehicle Supply Chains from Foreign Adversary Threats

January 14, 2025: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced a final rule prohibiting certain transactions involving the sale or import of connected vehicles integrating specific pieces of hardware and software, or those components sold separately, with a sufficient nexus to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or Russia.

BIS and its Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services (OICTS) have found that certain technologies originating from the PRC or Russia present an undue and unacceptable risk to U.S. national security. This action represents the culmination of a months-long regulatory process to design, seek public input on, and ultimately finalize a measure to protect drivers and passengers on American roads.

The final rule establishes that hardware and software integrated into the Vehicle Connectivity System (VCS) and software integrated into the Automated Driving System (ADS), the systems in vehicles that allow for external connectivity and autonomous driving capabilities, present an undue and unacceptable risk to national security when designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons with a sufficient nexus to the PRC or Russia. Malicious access to these critical supply chains could allow our foreign adversaries to extract sensitive data, including personal information about vehicle drivers or owners, and remotely manipulate vehicles.

At this time, given the complexity of the commercial vehicle supply chain, the final rule applies only to passenger vehicles (defined as those under 10,001 pounds). BIS recognizes the acute national security threat presented by foreign adversary involvement in the commercial vehicle supply chain and intends to issue a separate rulemaking addressing the technologies present in connected commercial vehicles – including in trucks and buses – in the near future.

This final rule prohibits the import of VCS hardware or connected vehicles containing such hardware, and the import and sale of vehicles containing VCS or ADS software, with a sufficient nexus to the PRC or Russia. VCS is defined as the set of systems that allow the vehicle to communicate externally, including telematics control units, Bluetooth, cellular, satellite, and Wi-Fi modules. ADS includes the components that collectively allow a highly autonomous vehicle to operate without a driver.

The rule also prohibits manufacturers with a sufficient nexus to the PRC or Russia from selling new connected vehicles that incorporate VCS hardware or software or ADS software in the United States, even if the vehicle was made in the United States.

The software-related prohibitions will take effect for Model Year 2027. The hardware-related prohibitions will take effect for Model Year 2030, or January 1, 2029, for units without a model year. Prohibitions on the sale of connected vehicles by manufacturers with a sufficient nexus to the PRC or Russia, even if manufactured in the United States, take effect for Model Year 2027.

The rule requires certain importers and manufacturers to submit annual Declarations of Conformity to certify their compliance with the prohibitions. The final rule allows Commerce to issue General Authorizations for certain types of transactions posing lower risk. It also allows regulated parties to seek Specific Authorizations permitting them to engage in otherwise prohibited transactions, as well as advisory opinions to ask BIS for a determination if a prospective transaction may fall within the scope of the rule.

The final rule follows a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) published by BIS on September 26, 2024, and an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) published by BIS on March 1, 2024.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-finalizes-rule-secure-connected-vehicle-supply-chains-foreign-adversary

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Commerce Strengthens Restrictions on Advanced Computing Semiconductors to Enhance Foundry Due Diligence and Prevent Diversion to PRC

January 15, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 5298: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released two rules: one that updates export controls on advanced computing semiconductors, and another that places additional entities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Singapore on the Entity List.

These rule’s reinforce and build on the October 7, 2022, October 17, 2023, and December 2, 2024, controls to restrict the PRC’s ability to obtain certain high-end chips critical for military advantage. These updates are necessary to maintain the effectiveness of these controls, close loopholes, and ensure they remain durable.

Among other changes, the rules:

  • Impose a broader license requirement for foundries and packaging companies seeking to export certain advanced chips, unless one of three conditions is met:
    • The export is to a trusted “Approved” or “Authorized” integrated circuit (IC) designer, who attests that the chips fall below the relevant performance threshold;
    • The chip is packaged by a front-end fabricator in a location outside of Macau or a destination in Country Group D:5 and the fabricator verifies the transistor count of the final chip; or
    • The chip is packaged by an “Approved” outsourced semiconductor assembly and test services (OSAT) company that verifies the transistor count of the final chip.
  • Create a process for new companies to be added to the list of Approved IC designers and OSATs.
  • Improve reporting for transactions involving newer customers who may pose a heightened risk of diversion.
  • Update other parts of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), including the recent AI Diffusion rule, to ensure that license exceptions are only available for transactions involving approved or authorized IC designers.
  • Make technical corrections to the December 2 export controls, including to update the definition of “advanced-node integrated circuit” in § 772.1 for Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM) chips.
  • Add 16 entities to the Entity List, including AI companies like Sophgo Technologies Ltd., that are acting at the behest of Beijing to further the PRC’s goals of indigenous advanced chip production, which poses a risk to U.S. and allied national security.

These controls were crafted to mitigate the PRC’s efforts to obtain high-end advanced computing semiconductors necessary to enable the development and production of technologies such as AI used in military applications. Advanced AI capabilities – facilitated by supercomputing, built on advanced semiconductors – present U.S. national security concerns because they can be used to improve the speed and accuracy of military decision making, planning, and logistics. These capabilities may also be used for cognitive electronic warfare, radar, signals intelligence, jamming, and to support facial recognition surveillance systems for human rights violations and abuses.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-restrictions-advanced-computing-semiconductors-enhance-foundry

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Commerce Implements New Controls to Address National Security Risks Related to Biotechnology

January 15, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 4612: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released an Interim Final Rule (IFR) implementing targeted export controls on certain laboratory instruments. The United States recognizes that ensuring the responsible use of biotechnology, particularly when combined with advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and data science, is essential to safeguard public health, agriculture and food production, and the environment. At the same time, the United States needs to address the benefits and risks of biotechnology given the potential that its use, particularly when coupled with AI and biological design tools, could strengthen the military capabilities of countries of concern and pose threats to U.S. national security.

This IFR controls the following instruments:

  1. High-parameter and spectral flow cytometers and cell sorters, which are used to simultaneously measure multiple features of individual cells or particles, allowing scientists to rapidly produce large, high-information biological datasets.
  2. Certain liquid chromatography mass spectrometers (LC/MS) specially designed for proteomics, the study of all or a significant portion of proteins produced and/or modified by an organism to elucidate the interactions, function, composition, and structures of proteins and their cellular activities.

While this IFR imposes new license requirements for these instruments, license exceptions will be available for certain destinations. Exporters will also be required to file Electronic Export Information in the Automated Export System for certain exports.

This IFR, which takes immediate effect, is the latest step in the Biden administration’s ongoing efforts to address national security and foreign policy concerns related to critical technologies. BIS invites public comments on this IFR, which must be submitted no later than 60 days after the rule’s publication in the Federal Register. Information on submitting comments can be found in the “addresses” portion of the rule’s preamble.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-implements-new-controls-address-national-security-risks-related

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U.S. Census Bureau

Happy New Year 2025

January 1, 2025: This is a friendly reminder to ensure the Estimated Date of Export is reported with the correct year. To avoid the Automated Export System (AES) generating the Compliance Alert - Shipment Reported Late, please report the year 2025 for the current AES shipments.

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Schedule B and Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) Updated in the Automated Export System (AES)

 

January 2, 2025: Effective immediately, the Schedule B, Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), and HTS Codes That Are Not Valid for AES tables have been updated to accept the changes to the January 1, 2025 codes.

 

AES will accept shipments with outdated codes during a grace period for 30 days beyond the expiration date of December 31, 2024Reporting an outdated code after the 30-day grace period will result in a fatal error.

 

The ACE AESDirect program has been updated with the 2025 codes and will accept shipments with outdated codes during the grace period as well.

 

The 2025 Schedule B and HTS tables are available for downloading at:

https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aes/concordance.html

 

The current list of HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available at:

https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aes/documentlibrary/concordance/hts-not-for-aes.txt

Editor’s note: It is best practice to validate your schedule B codes each January.

 

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Updates to the AES Commodity Filing Response Messages – Appendix A: Response Code 5C2/5C3


January 7, 2025:  CSMS # 63644218 - Updates to the AES Commodity Filing Response Messages – Appendix A: Response Code 5C2/5C3

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) recently published the following updates to the Automated Export System Trade Interface Requirements – Appendix A:

Response Code: 5C2

Narrative Text: CAT XXI DETERMINATION NBR UNKNOWN
Severity: FATAL
Proprietary Record ID/Data Elements: Input ODT Record/DDTC Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) Number
X.12 Segment ID/Data Elements: X117
Reason: The License Code/USML Category XXI Code declared is one that requires a DDTC Category XXI determination number on the ODT record either reported empty, unknown or the Date of Export is greater than the superseded date in AES.
Resolution: The DDTC Category XXI determination number reported on the ODT record must be a known value in AES.  Verify, correct, and retransmit.  If DDTC has advised your commodity export is classified in Category XXI, but you do not have a unique case number, you may contact the DDTC Response Team for assistance at ddtccustomerservice@state.gov or (202) 663-1282.

 

Response Code: 5C3

Narrative Text: DDTC USML CATEG 55 NOT ELIG FOR LIC TYPE
Severity: FATAL
Proprietary Record ID/Data Elements: Input CL1 Record/License Code/License Exemption Code; Input ODT Record/DDTC USML Category Code
X.12 Segment ID/Data Elements: X105; X107
Reason: The DDTC USML Category Code 55 (Articles Not Listed in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)), may not be used with License Code/License Exemption Code entered.
Resolution: When the DDTC USML Category Code 55 (Articles Not Listed in the International Traffic in Arms (ITAR)) is reported but is not available for use with the License Code/License Exemption Code entered. See ‘Appendix L- DDTC USML Category Codes’ to determine the category code to report.
For further assistance, contact the licensing agency. The Response Team at the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls can be reached for this purpose at 202-663-1282 or ddtccustomerservice@state.gov.

 

Editor’s note: In December, we advised that Census reported updates to the AES system for reporting items classified as USML XXI via a Commodity Jurisdiction determination issued by the Department of State, the only avenue for declaration of USML XXI on EEI filings. In order to use Category XXI, you must also list the CJ case number in the EEI record.

 

 

 

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Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages

 

January 21, 2025: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected.  If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation.  Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN.  However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.

 

To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

 

Response Code:  303

Narrative:     To Be Sold En Route Indicator Must be Y or N

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        The Party Type is identified as Ultimate Consignee and the To Be Sold En Route Indicator is not reported as Yes or No.

Resolution:  The Ultimate Consignee information must be declared on an EEI including a valid To Be Sold En Route Indicator. If the Ultimate Consignee is known and reported, set the To Be Sold En Route Indicator to No. If the cargo is to be sold en route and the Ultimate Consignee is not known at the time of export, then set the To Be Sold En Route Indicator to Yes.

Verify the Ultimate Consignee and the To Be Sold En Route Indicator, correct the shipment and resubmit.

Response Code: 505

Narrative:     Value of Goods Contains Non-Numerics

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        The Value of Goods reported contains non-numerics or spaces.

Resolution: The Value of Goods must be reported as numerics on the EEI.

Verify the Value of Goods, correct the shipment and resubmit.

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NEW BIS LICENSE TYPES C73 – License Exceptions Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA) and C74 Advanced Compute Manufacturing (ACM)

 

January 28, 2025: On Monday, January 13, 2025, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) put on public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register an interim final rule with an effective date of Monday, January 13, 2025 and a compliance date of May 15 for most provisions.  The IFR was published in the Federal Register on Thursday, January 16 2024 (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion).

 

Among other actions, this interim final rule established new controls on advanced AI chips exceeding the technical thresholds in ECCN 3A090.a and also creates License Exceptions Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA) and Advanced Compute Manufacturing (ACM).

New License Code C73 (AIA)

An update has been made to AES to create new License Code C73 Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA) which authorizes the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of eligible advanced computing chips and associated software and technology to entities located in a destination listed in paragraph (a) of supplement no. 5 to part 740 as long as they certify compliance with specific requirements provided in EAR 740.27.

The full terms of License Exception AIA are described in § 740.27.

AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C73 (AIA) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:

  • Report License Code: C73 Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA)
  • Allowable ECCNs: 3A001.z, 3A090.a, 3A090.z, 3D001, 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 4A090.a, 4A090.z, 4D001, 4D090, 4E001, 4E091, 5A002.z, 5A004.z, 5A992.z, 5D002.z, 5D992.z, 5E002, and 5E992
  • Allowable countries: All Countries listed in Supplement 5 to part 740 (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States)
  • Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
  • Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)

New License Code C74 (ACM)

An update has been made to AES to create new License Code C74 Advanced Compute Manufacturing (ACM) which authorizes the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of eligible items to a ‘private sector end user’ that is located in a destination not listed in Country Group D:5 or Macau, for the purposes of development, production, and storage of these chips, except for or in arms embargoed countries (D:5 and Macau).

The full terms of License Exception ACM are described in § 740.28.

AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C74 (ACM) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:

  • Report License Code: C74 Advanced Compute Manufacturing (ACM)
  • Allowable ECCNs: 3A001.z, 3A090, 3D001, 3E001, 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 4A090, 4D001, 4D090, 4E001, 5A002.z, 5A004.z, 5A992.z, 5D002.z, 5D992.z, 5E002, and 5E992
  • Allowable countries: All Countries except Macau and destinations listed in Country Group D:5
  • Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
  • Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)

 

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NEW BIS LICENSE TYPE C75 – (LPP) License Exception Low Processing Performance (LPP)

 

January 29, 2025: On Monday, January 13, 2025, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) put on public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register an interim final rule with an effective date of Monday, January 13, 2025 and a compliance date of May 15 for most provisions.  The IFR was published in the Federal Register on Thursday, January 16, 2024 (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion ).

 

Among other actions, this interim final rule established new License Exception Low Processing Performance (LPP).

New License Code C75 (LPP)

An update has been made to AES to create new License Codes C75 “Low Processing Performance” (LPP), which authorizes certain export and reexport (no transfer (in-country) of specified items in § 740.29(b) of the EAR. Allows limited quantities of advanced ICs (i.e., quantities well below the amount necessary to train the most advanced AI models) to flow globally to ultimate consignees in destinations other than those of Country Group D:5 or Macau. The threshold for LLP exception has been set at 26,900,000 Total Processing Performance (TPPs) of ECCN 3A090.a, 4A090.a, and corresponding .z items per end user, per calendar year. This license exception is not available for exports or reexports made through distributors or for in country transfers. Ultimate consignees must notify BIS when they have reached the annual TPP allocation limit.

The full terms of License Exception LPP are described in § 740.29.

AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C75 (LPP) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:

  • Report License Code: C75 Low Processing Performance (LPP)
  • Allowable ECCNs: 3A001.z.1.a, z.2.a, z.3.a, z.4.a; 3A090.a; 4A003.z.1.a, z.2.a; 4A004.z.1; 4A005.z.1; 4A090.a; 5A004.z.1.a, z.2.a; and 5A992.z.1
  • Allowable countries: All Countries except Macau and destinations listed in Country Group D:5 Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG

Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)

 

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NEW BIS LICENSE TYPES C76 – Universal Validated End User (UVEU) and C77 National Validated End User (NVEU)

 

January 29, 2025: On Monday, January 13, 2025, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) put on public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register an interim final rule with an effective date of Monday, January 13, 2025 and a compliance date of May 16 for most provisions.  The IFR is expected to publish in the Federal Register on Thursday, January 16, 2024 (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion).  Among other actions, this interim final rule established new License Exceptions C76 Universal Validated End User (UVEU) and C77 National Validated End User (NVEU).

New License Code C76 (UVEU)

An update has been made to AES to create new License Codes C76 Universal Validated End User (UVEU) which provides the data centers that own their advanced computing capacity with a single authorization that will allow a UVEU to build DCs around the world, except in Macau or destinations specified in Country Group D:5, provided that the UVEU maintains its status by following the guidelines in supplement no. 10 to part 748. The UVEU is responsible for ensuring it complies with the applicable AI TPP geographic allocations. To receive UVEU status, a DC that owns its advanced computing capacity must certify that it will follow the guidelines outlined in supplement no. 10 to part 748 and go through an intensive application process. As previously noted, if the owner of the advanced compute cannot directly certify to all of the application information requested in § 748.15, it must include in its VEU application to BIS the identities of other entities involved in the DC operations.

The full terms of License Exception UVEU are described in § 748.15.

AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C76 (UVEU) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:

  • Report License Code: C76 Universal Validated End User (UVEU)
  • Allowable ECCNs: See Supplement 7 to part 748 for specific end users and ECCNs.
  • Allowable countries: All Countries except D:5 and Macau
  • Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
  • Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)

New License Code C77 (NVEU)

An update has been made to AES to create new License Codes C77 National Validated End User (NVEU)   which  is available to all entities headquartered in or located in a destination in Country Groups A, B, or D:1-D:4, except Macau or destinations specified in Country Group D:5, as described in revised § 748.15(b)(2). New paragraph (a)(2)(iii) of § 748.15 describes the requirements to obtain an NVEU. In order to receive NVEU Authorization, a data center operator that owns its advanced computing capacity must apply to BIS and go through an intensive application process that will be subject to interagency review. Information required to be submitted to become a VEU is described in supplement no. 8 to part 748, some provisions of which are revised by this rule, including an update to paragraph (B)(2) of the supplement to require information about business activities and corporate relationships with government or military organizations in Macau and destinations specified Country Group D:5, e.g., direct sales to or contracts with such entities.

Approved applicants for the NVEU Authorization will be listed in the EAR as NVEUs in supplement no. 7 to part 748. This listing will serve to notify exporters and reexporters that the NVEU location can receive exports and reexports under this authorization. The NVEU may choose whether to list a corporate address or a physical address of the new data center location. NVEUs will be subject to the cumulative TPP allocations identified above.

The full terms of License Exception UVEU are described in § 748.15.

AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C77 (NVEU) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:

  • Report License Code: C77 National Validated End User (NVEU)
  • Allowable ECCNs: All EXCEPT 600 series and ECCNs with a reason for control: Missile Technology and/or Crime Control
  • Allowable countries: All Countries except D:5 and Macau
  • Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG

Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)

 

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Implementation of the Census Bureau Voluntary Self-Disclosure (VSD) Form

 

January 30, 2025: In an effort to improve the Voluntary Self Disclosure (VSD) process, the Census Bureau’s Trade Regulations Branch (TRB) has piloted the use of a fillable VSD form since August 2024. TRB’s evaluation of the pilot has shown that the data received is more timely and complete, and allows for more efficient processing of VSDs. The feedback received from VSD submitters has been positive and TRB is implementing the use of the VSD Form on March 3, 2025.

The fillable VSD form will collect the following data required under Section 30.74 of the Foreign Trade Regulations:

  • The kind of violation involved, for example, failure to file EEI, failure to correct fatal errors, failure to file timely corrections;
  • Describe all data that was either not reported or reported incorrectly;
  • An explanation of when and how the violations occurred;
  • The complete identities and addresses of all individuals and entities, whether foreign or domestic, involved in the activities giving rise to the violations;
  • If the party in violation was notified of the violation by any federal agency(ies);
  • Were the exports subject to any export controls from federal agency(ies)?;
  • A description of any mitigating factors;
  • Corrective measures taken; and
  • ITNs of the missed and/or corrected shipments.

The implementation of this fillable VSD form will allow companies to submit the necessary VSD information in a uniform format.

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

 

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Fines and Penalties

 

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

January 6, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 599: On May 30, 2024, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, Derby Clerfe (“Clerfe”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371. Specifically, Clerfe pled guilty to conspiring with others to export from the United States to Haiti nine handguns without the required licenses and without filing Electronic Export Information in the Automated Export System. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Clerfe to one year of probation. The Director of the Office of Export Enforcement has decided to deny Clerfe's export privileges under the Regulations for a period of two years from the date of Clerfe's conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Clerfe had an interest at the time of his conviction.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-31656/in-the-matter-of-derby-clerfe-9-garden-terrace-pittsburgh-pa-15521-order-denying-export-privileges

 

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January 6, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 597: On February 16, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Joel Alejandro Garza-Corona (“Garza-Corona”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Garza-Corona was convicted of smuggling 2,399 rounds of assorted ammunition from the United States to Mexico without the required authorization from the U.S. Department of Commerce. As a result of his conviction, the court sentenced him to 40 months in prison. The Director of the Office of Export Enforcement decided to deny Garza-Corona's export privileges under the Regulations for a period of eight years from the date of Garza-Corona's conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Garza-Corona had an interest at the time of his conviction.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-31669/in-the-matter-of-joel-alejandro-garza-corona-inmate-number-26658-510-fci-ashland-po-box-6001-ashland

 

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January 6, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 597: On September 6, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Eric Nana Kofi Ampong-Coker (“Ampong-Coker”) was convicted of violating 50 U.S.C. 4819. Specifically, Ampong-Coker was convicted of knowingly and willfully attempting to export one (1) SCCY Industries LL.C., Model CPX-2 9mm handgun; one (1) Mossberg 9mm handgun; one (1) Smith & Wesson 9mm handgun; one (1) FIS Product, Model XD-9 9mm handgun; and one (1) Sarsilmaz (Sar Arms), 9mm handgun, which weapons were designated under ECCN 0A501 from the United States to Ghana without the required licenses. As a result of his conviction, the court sentenced Among-Coker to 30 months in prison and two years of supervised release. The Director of the Office of Export Enforcement decided to deny Ampong-Coker's export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Ampong-Coker's conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Ampong-Coker had an interest at the time of his conviction.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-31667/in-the-matter-of-eric-nana-kofi-ampong-coker-inmate-number-16722-510-fci-cumberland-po-box-1000

 

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January 6, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 599: On June 11, 2024, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Daniel Ray Lane (“Lane”), was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371 and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C 1701, et seq.) (“IEEPA”). Specifically, Lane was convicted of conspiring to sell sanctioned Iranian petroleum/crude oil to a refinery in China. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Lane to 45 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.

The Director of the Office of Export Enforcement decided to deny Lane's export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Lane's conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Lane had an interest at the time of his conviction.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-31654/in-the-matter-of-daniel-ray-lane-inmate-number-60019-177-fci-texarkana-federal-correctional

 

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January 8, 2025: Nikolay Goltsev, 38, of Montreal, Canada, was sentenced to 40 months in prison for conspiring to commit export control violations. Goltsev masterminded a global procurement scheme on behalf of sanctioned Russian companies, including Russian military companies. Some of the electronic components shipped by Goltsev were later found in seized Russian weapons platforms and signals intelligence equipment in Ukraine.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/canadian-national-sentenced-40-months-multimillion-dollar-export-control-scheme

 

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January 17, 2025: As part of a coordinated enforcement effort, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed approximately $2.5 million in combined civil penalties against Haas Automation, Inc. (Haas) for alleged and apparent violations of U.S. export controls and sanctions laws, including illegal shipments of Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machine parts to Entity-Listed parties in Russia and China. The transactions charged by BIS involved parties that were added to the Entity List for supporting the defense sectors of China or Russia.

 

As part of a settlement agreement with Haas, BIS issued an order imposing an administrative penalty of $1.5 million, as well as an ongoing audit and reporting requirement. In addition to the BIS penalty, Haas entered a corresponding settlement with OFAC whereby Haas agreed to a $1,044,781 civil penalty to resolve apparent violations of OFAC’s sanctions regulations involving Russia and Ukraine.

 

Headquartered in Oxnard, California, Haas is a privately held manufacturer of machine tools and related parts, including CNC vertical and horizontal machining centers and CNC lathes. CNC machines and parts have a wide range of potential applications, including uses across the electronics, transportation, oil and gas, aerospace, marine, and military and defense industries.

 

On 32 occasions between April 2019 and March 2024, Haas violated the EAR by selling CNC machine parts designated as EAR99, through Haas’s authorized distributors, for export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to defense sector parties that were on the BIS Entity List in China,  including Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (also known as Beihang University), Shandong Institute of Space Electronic Technology, and China Electronics Technology Group Corporation 14th Research Institute (CETC 14). Additionally, Haas violated the EAR by making nine sales to two defense sector parties on the Entity List in Russia—DJSC Factory Krasnoe Znamya and JSC LEMZ R&P Corporation—between January 2020 and November 2021.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/haas-automation-pay-over-25-million-combined-civil-penalties-bis-and-ofac-prohibited

 

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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

January 16, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $1,076,923 settlement with a Miami, Florida-based natural U.S. person and their real estate company Family International Realty LLC regarding their potential civil liability for apparent violations of OFAC's Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions. Between 2018 and 2023, Family International Realty and its owner engaged in a willful scheme to evade OFAC sanctions by concealing the property interest of two sanctioned Russian oligarchs in luxury condominiums and profiting from the rental and sale of the properties, thereby committing 73 apparent violations of Executive Order 13685. The settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that the conduct at issue was egregious and was not voluntarily self-disclosed.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933941/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250116

 

Sanctions

 

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

January 6, 2025: 90. Fed. Reg. 559: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 entities under 13 entries to the Entity List. These entries are listed on the Entity List under the destinations of Burma (1), China, People's Republic of (China) (11), and Pakistan (1). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security and/or foreign policy interests of the United States. This rule also amends the EAR by making certain editorial corrections and clarifications. BIS is making the corrections and clarifications in order to minimize confusion and not impede the free flow of commerce.

 

The following Entities have been added:

 

Burma:

  • Telecom International Myanmar Company Limited.

 

China:

  • Chengdu RML Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Chengdu Yaguang Electronics Co., Ltd.;
  • Chinese Academy of Sciences Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics, and Physics;
  • Hefei Starwave Communication Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Ji Hua Laboratory;
  • Nanjing Simite Optical Instruments Co., Ltd.;
  • Peng Cheng Laboratory;
  • Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics;
  • Suzhou Ultranano Precision Optoelectronics Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Wuhu Kewei Zhaofu Electronics Co., Ltd.; and
  • Yaguang Technology Group Co., Ltd.

 

Pakistan:

  • Emerging Future Solutions Private Limited.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-31468/revisions-to-the-entity-list and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?content_type=All&created=1&field_countries=All&field_learn_support_topics=All&field_news_updates_topic=All&news_search_query=&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

 

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January 16, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 4617: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 11 entities under 11 entries to the Entity List. These entries are listed on the Entity List under the destination of China, People's Republic of (China) (11). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security and/or foreign policy interests of the United States. This rule also revises one existing entry on the Entity List under the destination of India.

 

China:

 

  • Beijing Keyi Hongyuan Optoelectronics Co., Ltd.;
  • Beijing Lingxin Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Beijing Yuanyin Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Beijing Zhipu Future Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Beijing Zhipu Huazhang Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Beijing Zhipu Linghang Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Beijing Zhipu Qingyan Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Hangzhou Zhipu Huazhang Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Nanjing Zhihu Information Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Shanghai Zhipu Huanyu Technology Co., Ltd.; and
  • Shenzhen Zhipu Future Technology Co., Ltd.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/16/2025-00704/addition-of-entities-to-and-revision-of-entry-on-the-entity-list

 

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January 16, 2024: 90. Fed. Reg. 4621: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 16 entities to the Entity List, under the destinations of China, People's Republic of (China) (14) and Singapore (2). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.

China:

  • Chengdu Suanze Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Fujian Sophon Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Fujian Suanxin Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Jiangsu Suanxin Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Qingdao Sophgo Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Quliang Electronics Co., Ltd.;
  • Shanghai Suanhu Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Sophgo Technologies Ltd.;
  • Sophon Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd.;
  • Suanli (Fujian) Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Tianjin Shunhua Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Wuhan Suanneng Technology Co., Ltd.;
  • Wuxi Suanneng Technology Co., Ltd.; and
  • Xiamen Sophgo Technologies Limited.

Singapore:

  • Sophgo Technologies Pte.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/16/2025-00480/additions-to-the-entity-list

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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

January 3, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Integrity Technology Group, Incorporated (Integrity Tech), a Beijing-based cybersecurity company, for its role in multiple computer intrusion incidents against U.S. victims. These incidents have been publicly attributed to Flax Typhoon, a Chinese malicious state-sponsored cyber group that has been active since at least 2021, often targeting organizations within U.S. critical infrastructure sectors.

 

Chinese malicious cyber actors continue to be one of the most active and most persistent threats to U.S. national security, as highlighted in the most recent Office of the Director of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment. These actors continue to target U.S. government systems as part of their efforts, including the recent targeting of Treasury’s own IT infrastructure.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Integrity Technology Group, Incorporated of China.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2769 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250103

 

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January 6, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Syria General License (GL) 24 to expand authorizations for activities and transactions in Syria following December 8, 2024. This action underscores the United States’ commitment to ensuring that U.S. sanctions do not impede activities to meet basic human needs, including the provision of public services or humanitarian assistance. This authorization is for six months, as the U.S. government continues to monitor the evolving situation on the ground.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 24: “Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances”

 

(a) The following transactions that are prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 542 (SySR), the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, July 7, 2025:

 

(1) transactions with governing institutions in Syria following December 8, 2024;

(2) transactions in support of the sale, supply, storage, or donation of energy, including petroleum, petroleum products, natural gas, and electricity, to or within Syria; and

(3) transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to processing the transfer of noncommercial, personal remittances to Syria, including through the Central Bank of Syria.

 

Additionally, OFAC has also issued eight new Syria Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 1205 - 1212).

 

Syria FAQ 1205:

 

Q: What is the purpose of Syria General License (GL) 24 ("Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances") and what does it authorize?

 

A: GL 24 is intended to ensure that sanctions do not impede essential governance-related services in Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad on December 8, 2024, including for the provision of public services or certain transactions related to energy or personal remittances.  GL 24 complements OFAC's existing humanitarian-related authorizations by authorizing the following transactions, with some conditions and exceptions, through July 7, 2025:

 

  • transactions with governing institutions in Syria following December 8, 2024;
  • transactions in support of the sale, supply, storage, or donation of energy, including petroleum, petroleum products, natural gas, and electricity, to or within Syria; and
  • transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to processing the transfer of noncommercial, personal remittances to Syria, including through the Central Bank of Syria.

 

GL 24 authorizes the foregoing under the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR), the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR), and the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (FTOSR).  It does not relieve any person from compliance with other Federal laws or regulations, including the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) or the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) administered by the Department of Commerce.

 

Syria FAQ 1206:

 

Q: What Syrian entities are included in the scope of "governing institutions" for the purposes of Syria General License (GL) 24 ("Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances")?

 

A: Syrian governing institutions include departments, agencies, and government-run public service providers (including public hospitals, schools, and utilities) at the federal, regional, or local level in Syria following December 8, 2024, including entities involved with Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) across all geographic areas of Syria.

 

GL 24 does not authorize transactions involving military or intelligence entities, or any persons acting on behalf of such entities.

 

Syria FAQ 1207:

 

Q: What types of transactions are included in the authorization related to Syrian governing institutions in Syria General License (GL) 24 ("Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances")?

 

A: GL 24 authorizes transactions under the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR), the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR), and the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (FTOSR).

GL 24 generally authorizes the following transactions, with the exclusion of military or intelligence entities or those acting for or on their behalf:

 

  • providing services to, or paying for services received from, Syrian governing institutions, such as the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, or the Ministry of Water Resources, even if the ministry or leadership of the institution is blocked;
  • payment of taxes, fees, or import duties to Syrian governing institutions, even if the ministry or leadership is blocked;
  • purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, public utility services, or other public services;
  • payment of salaries or wages to employees of governing institutions in Syria, provided such employees are not designated on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List); and
  • negotiating contracts or other agreements with Syrian governing institutions.

 

Syria FAQ 1208:

 

Q: Does Syria General License (GL) 24 ("Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances") authorize activities and transactions with a governing institution in Syria run by or led by a designated person?

 

A: Yes. GL 24 authorizes transactions with governing institutions in Syria, with some conditions and exceptions, through July 7, 2025, even if a designated individual has a leadership role in that governing institution.

For example, if a company engaging in otherwise authorized activity needs to make a customs payment to a governing institution led by a blocked individual following December 8, 2024, that payment is authorized.

 

Syria FAQ 1209:

 

Q: Even after the issuance of Syria General License (GL) 24 ("Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances"), may I still rely on existing sanctions authorizations for the provision of humanitarian aid?

 

A: Yes.  The authorization in GL 24 may overlap with the authorizations in existing GLs issued under the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR), the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR), and the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (FTOSR), including:

  • transactions in support of certain nongovernmental organizations' activities (31 CFR §§ 594.520; 597.516; 542.516);
  • official business of the U.S. Government (31 CFR §§ 594.518; 597.514; 542.522);
  • official business of certain international organizations (31 CFR §§ 594.519; 597.515; 542.513); and
  • activities in certain economic sectors in specified areas of northeast and northwest Syria (31 CFR § 542.533).

 

OFAC general licenses are "self-executing," meaning that persons who determine that certain activities are authorized under a GL may proceed without further assurance from OFAC.  Where multiple authorizations may apply, U.S. persons may rely on the broadest applicable authorization.

 

With respect to transactions in support of certain nongovernmental organizations’ activities, U.S. depository institutions, U.S. registered brokers or dealers in securities, and U.S. registered money transmitters can process such transactions and may rely on the statements of their customers that such transactions are authorized unless they know or have reason to know a transaction is not authorized.  For more information, including an overview of authorized humanitarian activities in addition to GL 24, please review FAQs 231 and 938, and the OFAC Syria Compliance Communique.

 

Syria FAQ 1210:

 

Q: Does Syria General License (GL) 24 ("Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances") remove the restrictions placed on Syria under the State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) designation?

 

A: No.  SST restrictions on Syria remain in place.

 

Syria FAQ 1211:

 

Q: Can foreign governments or companies donate or provide subsidized fuel to Syria without facing exposure to U.S. sanctions?

 

A: Yes.  Syria General License (GL) 24 authorizes transactions in support of the sale, supply, storage, or donation of energy, including petroleum, petroleum products, natural gas, and electricity, to or within Syria.  This may include, for example, the donation of gasoline to Syrian refineries, and power plants.

 

However, authorizations for this activity under the general license do not relieve persons from compliance with any other laws or requirements of other federal agencies or international organizations.  For example, the export or reexport of petroleum, petroleum products, natural gas, and other commodities to Syria may require additional authorization from the Department of Commerce if such items are U.S.-origin or otherwise subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).

 

Syria FAQ 1212:

 

Q: Are international organizations and nongovernmental organizations authorized to conduct transitional justice activities in Syria?

 

A: Yes. Activities to support the rule of law, accountability, and transparency are broadly authorized under the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR), the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR), and the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (FTOSR), including transactions in support of certain nongovernmental (NGO) activities (31 CFR §§ 594.520; 597.516; 542.516), official business of the U.S. Government (31 CFR §§ 594.518; 597.514; 542.522), and official business of certain international organizations (31 CFR §§ 594.519; 597.515; 542.513) by employees, grantees, or contractors thereof.

 

For example, the NGO activities general licenses authorize transactions in support of activities to support democracy building, including activities to support rule of law, citizen participation, government accountability and transparency, human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to information, and civil society development projects; and activities to support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs and peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution programs.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2770 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933861/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/added/2025-01-06

 

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January 7, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Mohammad Hamdan Daglo Mousa (Hemedti), the leader of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), under Executive Order (E.O.) 14098, “Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons Destabilizing Sudan and Undermining the Goal of a Democratic Transition.” For nearly two years, Hemedti’s RSF has engaged in a brutal armed conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces for control of Sudan, killing tens of thousands, displacing 12 million Sudanese, and triggering widespread starvation.

 

In addition, OFAC sanctioned seven companies, and one individual linked to the RSF. The RSF's ability to acquire military equipment and generate finances continue to fuel the conflict in Sudan. Capital Tap Holding L.L.C. (Capital Tap Holding), based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has provided money and weapons to the RSF.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Ahmmed, Abu Dharr Abdul Nabi Habiballa of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • Mousa, Mohammed Hamdan Daglo of Sudan.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Al Jil Alqadem General Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Al Zumoroud And Al Yaqoot Gold and Jewellers Trading of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Capital Tap General Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Capital Tap Holding L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Capital Tap Management and Consultancies L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Creative Python L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • Horizon Advanced Solutions General Trading – Sole Proprietorship L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250107 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions

 

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January 7, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Antal Rogan, a senior Hungarian government official, for his involvement in corruption in Hungary. He is being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world.

 

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued Russia-related General License 13L, "Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024."

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 13L: “Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024”

 

(a) U.S. persons, or entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person, are authorized to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, certifications, or tax refunds to the extent such transactions are prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to the day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation of such U.S. persons or entities, through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 9, 2025.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Rogan, Antal of Hungary.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250107 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2773 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933871/download?inline

 

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January 10, 2025:  The U.S. Department of the Treasury took sweeping action to fulfill the G7 commitment to reduce Russian revenues from energy, including blocking two major Russian oil producers. This action also imposes sanctions on an unprecedented number of oil-carrying vessels, many of which are part of the “shadow fleet,” opaque traders of Russian oil, Russia-based oilfield service providers, and Russian energy officials. This action is underpinned by the issuance of a new determination that authorizes sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 against persons operating or having operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy. These actions substantially increase the sanctions risks associated with the Russian oil trade.

 

Please see full list of sanctioned individuals, entities, and vessels at the link below.

 

OFAC has also issued Russia-related General License 8L, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Related to Energy;" Russia-related General License 115A, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Civil Nuclear Energy;" Russia-related General License 117, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegas, and Certain Additional Entities Blocked on January 10, 2025;" Russia-related General License 118, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegas, and Certain Additional Entities Blocked on January 10, 2025;" Russia-related General License 119, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Public Joint Stock Company Gazprom Neft Related to Diplomatic and Consular Mission Operations Outside of the Russian Federation;" Russia-related General License 120, "Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions and the Unloading of Cargo Involving Certain Persons or Vessels Blocked on January 10, 2025;" Russia-related General License 121, "Authorizing Petroleum Services Related to Certain Projects;" and Russia-/Ukraine-related General License 26, "Transactions Authorized Pursuant to the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations."

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 8L: Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Related to Energy

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 involving one or more of the following entities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction related to energy are authorized, through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 12, 2025:

 

(1) State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs Vnesheconombank;

(2) Public Joint Stock Company Bank Financial Corporation Otkritie;

(3) Sovcombank Open Joint Stock Company;

(4) Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia;

(5) VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company;

(6) Joint Stock Company Alfa-Bank;

(7) Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank;

(8) Bank Zenit Public Joint Stock Company;

(9) Bank Saint-Petersburg Public Joint Stock Company;

(10) National Clearing Center (NCC);

(11) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest; or

(12) the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

 

(b) For the purposes of this general license, the term “related to energy” means the extraction, production, refinement, liquefaction, gasification, regasification, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, transport, or purchase of petroleum, including crude oil, lease condensates, unfinished oils, natural gas liquids, petroleum products, natural gas, or other products capable of producing energy, such as coal, wood, or agricultural products used to manufacture biofuels, or uranium in any form, as well as the development, production, generation, transmission, or exchange of power, through any means, including nuclear, thermal, and renewable energy sources.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 115A: Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Civil Nuclear Energy

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 involving one or more of the following entities that are related to civil nuclear energy are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 30, 2025:

 

(1) Gazpombank Joint Stock Company;

(2) State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs Vnesheconombank;

(3) Public Joint Stock Company Bank Financial Corporation Otkritie;

(4) Sovcombank Open Joint Stock Company;

(5) Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia;

(6) VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company;

(7) Joint Stock Company Alfa-Bank;

(8) Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank;

(9) Bank Zenit Public Joint Stock Company;

(10) Bank Saint-Petersburg Public Joint Stock Company;

(11) National Clearing Center (NCC);

(12) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest; or

(13) the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

 

(b) For the purposes of this general license, the term “related to civil nuclear energy” means transactions undertaken solely to maintain or support civil nuclear projects initiated before November 21, 2024.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 117: Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegas, and Certain Additional Entities Blocked on January 10, 2025

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving one or more of the blocked entities listed in the Annex to this general license, or any entity in which those blocked entities own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 27, 2025, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 118: Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegas, and Certain Additional Entities Blocked on January 10, 2025

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or the facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity issued or guaranteed by the following blocked entities (“Covered Debt or Equity”) to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 27, 2025:

 

(1) Ingosstrakh Insurance Company;

(2) Limited Liability Company Plant for the Production of Propeller Steering Columns Sapphire;

(3) Open Joint Stock Company Volzhsky Abrasive;

(4) Public Joint Stock Company Gazprom Neft;

(5) Surgutneftegas; or

(6) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

(b) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of Covered Debt or Equity that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, January 10, 2025 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 27, 2025.

 

(c) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, January 10, 2025 that (i) include a blocked person described in paragraph (a) of this general license as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to Covered Debt or Equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 27, 2025, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 119: Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Public Joint Stock Company Gazprom Neft Related to Diplomatic and Consular Mission Operations Outside of the Russian Federation

 

(a) all transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the official business of diplomatic or consular missions located outside of the Russian Federation and involving Public Joint Stock Company Gazprom Neft (Gazprom Neft), or any entity in which Gazprom Neft owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time February 27, 2025.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 120: Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions and the Unloading of Cargo Involving Certain Persons or Vessels Blocked on January 10, 2025

 

(a) all transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one or more of the following activities involving the blocked persons listed in the Annex to this general license, and any entity in which those blocked persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 27, 2025, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):

 

(1) The safe docking and anchoring in port of any vessels in which any person listed in the Annex to this general license has a property interest (the “blocked vessels”);

(2) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; or  (

3) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.

 

(b) all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the delivery and offloading of cargo involving the blocked persons listed in the Annex to this general license are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 27, 2025, provided that the cargo was loaded prior to January 10, 2025.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 121: Authorizing Petroleum Services Related to Certain Projects

(a) all transactions prohibited by the determination of January 10, 2025 made pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of Executive Order 14071 (“Prohibition on Petroleum Services”) that are related to the projects listed below are authorized until 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time June 28, 2025:

 

(1) Caspian Pipeline Consortium;

(2) Tengizchevroil; or

(3) Sakhalin-2.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 26: Transactions Authorized Pursuant to the  Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations

 

(a) all transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13662 involving one or more blocked persons listed in the Annex to this general license, or any entity in which those blocked persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are authorized or exempt under the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions authorized by a general or specific license, are authorized.

 

Furthermore, OFAC has issued five new, Russia-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 1213 - 1217)

 

FAQ 1213:

 

Q: For the purposes of the determination of January 10, 2025 made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 (the "January 2025 Energy Sector Determination"), what is meant by the term "energy sector of the Russian Federation economy"?

 

A: On January 10, 2025, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, issued a determination pursuant to E.O. 14024 that authorizes the imposition of economic sanctions on any person determined to operate or have operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy. For purposes of the January 2025 Energy Sector Determination, OFAC anticipates publishing regulations defining the term "energy sector of the Russian Federation economy" to include activities such as the procurement, exploration, extraction, drilling, mining, harvesting, production, refinement, liquefaction, gasification, regasification, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, manufacturing, testing, financing, distribution, purchase or transport to, from, or involving the Russian Federation, of petroleum, including crude oil, lease condensates, unfinished oils, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, natural gas liquids, or petroleum products, or other products capable of producing energy, such as coal, wood, or agricultural products used to manufacture biofuels; the development, production, testing, generation, transmission, financing, or exchange of power, through any means, including nuclear, electrical, thermal, and renewable, to, from, or involving the Russian Federation; and any related activities, including the provision or receipt of goods, services, or technology to, from, or involving the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy.

 

This definition is similar to the energy sector definition set forth under the Ukraine-/Russia-Related sanctions in 31 CFR 589.311 but includes additional language identifying specific activities and petroleum products, reflecting developments since the Department of the Treasury issued a determination pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 13662 on July 16, 2014. OFAC intends to update the SDN List to reflect whether persons have been designated pursuant to E.O. 14024, E.O. 13662, or both.

 

FAQ 1214:

 

Q: Does the determination of January 10, 2025, made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 (the "January 2025 Energy Sector Determination") mean that all persons that operate or have operated in this sector of the Russian Federation economy are sanctioned by OFAC?

 

A: No. On January 10, 2025, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, issued a determination pursuant to E.O. 14024 that authorizes the imposition of economic sanctions on any person determined to operate or have operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy.

 

A sector determination pursuant to E.O. 14024 exposes persons that operate or have operated in an identified sector to sanctions risk; however, a sector determination does not automatically impose sanctions on all persons who operate or have operated in the sector.

 

FAQ 1215:

 

Q: Why did OFAC issue General License (GL) 26 ("Transactions Authorized Pursuant to the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations") in the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 589 (URSR)?

 

A: GL 26 applies to transactions involving specified persons identified in the Annex to GL 26, who are designated under both the URSR and the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR). The purpose of GL 26 is to ensure that transactions authorized or exempt under the RuHSR, including transactions authorized by a general or specific license, that involve those specified persons are also authorized under the URSR, to the extent such transactions are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13662. However, GL 26 does not authorize any transaction prohibited by a directive issued pursuant to E.O. 13662, as incorporated into sections 589.202 through 589.205 of the URSR, or any transaction involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR or the URSR other than the specified persons, unless separately authorized.

 

FAQ 1216:

 

Q: What action did Treasury take on January 10, 2025 with regard to the provision of petroleum services to Russia?

 

A: In line with G7 efforts to reduce Russian revenues from energy, on January 10, 2025, Treasury issued a determination pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 prohibiting petroleum services to Russia. See The Determination Pursuant to Sections 1(a)(ii), 1(b), and 5 of E.O. 14071, Prohibition on Petroleum Services ("the Petroleum Services Determination"). This determination prohibits the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, to any person located in the Russian Federation of petroleum services. The Petroleum Services Determination will take effect at 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on February 27, 2025.  See FAQ 1217 for additional information.

 

OFAC expects to issue regulations defining petroleum services to include services related to the exploration, drilling, well completion, production, refining, processing, storage, maintenance, transportation, purchase, acquisition, testing, inspection, transfer, sale, trade, distribution, or marketing of petroleum, including crude oil and petroleum products, as well as any activities that contribute to Russia’s ability to develop its domestic petroleum resources, or the maintenance or expansion of Russia’s domestic production and refining. This would include services related to natural gas as a byproduct of oil production in Russia.

 

Concurrently, OFAC issued GL 121 to authorize any petroleum services that would otherwise be prohibited by the Petroleum Services Determination related to the operations of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Sakhalin II, or Tengizchevroil, (2) any petroleum services related to isotopes derived from petroleum manufacturing that are used for medical, agricultural, or environmental purposes, such as Carbon-13; (3) certain covered services related to the maritime transport of crude oil and petroleum products of Russian Federation origin purchased at or below the relevant price cap; and (4) any service in connection with the wind down or divestiture of an entity located in the Russian Federation that is not owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a Russian person. See FAQ 1217 for additional information related to price cap related exclusions of the Petroleum Services Determination.

 

FAQ 1217:

 

Q: I am a U.S. service provider. Following the January 10, 2025 determinations under Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 and E.O. 14071 (the Energy Sector Determination and Petroleum Services Determination, respectively), am I still authorized to provide certain services relating to the maritime transport of Russian crude oil and Russian petroleum products to a non-sanctioned person operating in the energy sector of the Russian economy, so long as the crude oil or petroleum products are purchased at or below the price cap?

 

A: Yes, as long as the provision of services does not involve an entity blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024 and is not otherwise prohibited by OFAC sanctions. The price cap policy does not authorize transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized. For more information on the price cap policy, please see OFAC's price cap policy guidance.

 

See FAQ 1216 for more information on The Determination Pursuant to Sections 1(a)(ii), 1(b), and 5 of E.O. 14071, Prohibition on Petroleum Services. See FAQs 1213 and 1214 for more information on the January 2025 Energy Sector Determination, issued pursuant to E.O. 14024.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933926/download?inline

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2777

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933791/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933881/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933771/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933776/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933781/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933786/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933886/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933891/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/added/2025-01-10

 

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January 10, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned eight Venezuelan officials who lead key economic and security agencies enabling Nicolas Maduro’s repression and subversion of democracy in Venezuela. The individuals sanctioned, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, as amended, include the president of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., (PdVSA), Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, and Maduro’s Minister of Transportation and president of the Venezuelan Consortium of Aeronautical Industries and Air Services (CONVIASA), the state-owned airline. In addition, OFAC sanctioned high-level Venezuelan officials in the military and police who lead entities with roles in carrying out Maduro’s repression and human rights abuses against democratic actors.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Castillo Rengifo, Manuel Enrique of Venezuela;
  • Ferrer Sandrea, Danny Ramon of Venezuela;
  • Figuera Valdez, Jose Ramon of Venezuela;
  • Obregon Perez, Hector Andres of Venezuela;
  • Osorio Guzman, Felix Ramon of Venezuela;
  • Rico Gonzalez, Douglas Arnoldo of Venezuela;
  • Salazar Bello, Jhonny Rafael of Venezuela; and
  • Velasquez Araguayan, Ramon Celestino of Venezuela.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2778 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250110

 

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January 15, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury moved against Russian efforts to evade U.S. sanctions. This action targets a sanctions evasion scheme established between actors in Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to facilitate cross-border payments for sensitive goods. In addition, Treasury designated a Kyrgyz Republic-based financial institution that coordinated with Russian officials and a U.S.-designated bank to implement a sanctions evasion scheme.

 

Treasury also reinforced the grave risks foreign persons face in continuing to work with Russia’s military-industrial complex by re-designating pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13662 almost 100 entities already designated pursuant to E.O. 14024. As a result of these entities’ designation pursuant to E.O. 13662, foreign persons, including foreign financial institutions, that knowingly facilitate significant transactions for or on behalf of any of these entities could be subject to mandatory secondary sanctions under the Ukraine-/Russia-related sanctions program.

 

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has amended its regulations to implement for 2025 the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as amended by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015. This regulatory amendment adjusts for inflation the maximum amount of the civil monetary penalties that may be assessed under relevant OFAC regulations. The regulatory amendment is published in the Federal Register and is effective as of January 15, 2025.

 

OFAC also has issued Russia-related General License 122, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on January 15, 2025;" Russia-related General License 123, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Wafangdian Bearing Company Limited;" and Russia-/Ukraine-related General License 26A, "Transactions Authorized Pursuant to the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations."

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 122: “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities  Blocked on January 15, 2025”

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked entities are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 1, 2025, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):

 

(1) Haucore Ltd;

(2) Limited Liability Company Management Metallurgical Company Steel;

(3) Mining And Chemical Complex Federal State Unitary Enterprise;

(4) OJSC Keremet Bank;

(5) Oke Precision Cutting Tools Co Ltd;

(6) Public Joint Stock Company Nadezhdinskiy Metallurgicheskiy Zavod;

(7) Star Rapid Manufacturing Co Ltd;

(8) Wafangdian Bearing Company Limited; or

(9) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 123: “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Wafangdian Bearing Company Limited”

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or the facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity issued or guaranteed by Wafangdian Bearing Company Limited (Wafangdian), or any entity in which Wafangdian owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, (“Covered Debt or Equity”) to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 1, 2025.

 

(b) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of Covered Debt or Equity that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, January 15, 2025 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 1, 2025.

 

(c) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, January 15, 2025 that (i) include a blocked person described in paragraph (a) of this general license as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to Covered Debt or Equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 1, 2025, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 26A: “Transactions Authorized Pursuant to the  Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations”

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13662 involving one or more blocked persons listed in the Annex to this general license, or any entity in which those blocked persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are authorized or exempt under the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions authorized by a general or specific license, are authorized.

 

Please see link below for full list of sanctioned entities and individuals,

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2785 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933936/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933916/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933921/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933911/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250115

 

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January 16, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan (Burhan), the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), under Executive Order (E.O.) 14098, “Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons Destabilizing Sudan and Undermining the Goal of a Democratic Transition.” This action follows the designation of the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Mohammad Hamdan Daglo Mousa (Hemedti), on January 7, 2025. In addition, OFAC is  one company and one individual involved in weapons procurement on behalf of the Defense Industries System (DIS), a procurement arm of the SAF that OFAC sanctioned in June 2023.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Abdalla, Ahmed of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • Al-burhan, Abdel Fattah of Sudan.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Portex Trade Limited of China.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2789

 

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January 16, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two individuals and four entities for generating illicit revenue for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) government.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Jong, In Chol of Laos; and
  • Son, Syong Sik of China.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Chonsurim Trading Corporation of North Korea;
  • Department 53 of the Ministry of The Peoples Armed Forces of North Korea;
  • Korea Osong Shipping Corporation; and
  • Liaoning China Trade Industry Co., Ltd.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2790

 

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January 16, 2025: The President signed a new Executive Order (E.O.), "Taking Additional Steps with Respect to the Situation in Syria." The President also signed another new E.O., "Strengthening and Promoting Innovation in the Nation's Cybersecurity."

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933951/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933946/download?inline

 

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January 17, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)  designated five individuals and one entity that facilitate Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik (Dodik) and his family’s efforts to enrich themselves at the public’s expense. This action also targets eight individuals who, at Dodik’s direction, organized and executed the commemoration of “Republika Srpska Day” (RS Day) in January 2024, in contravention to the principles of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) and which the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Constitutional Court (CC) ruled unconstitutional.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Bojanic, Radmila of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
  • Corovic, Pavle of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
  • Dodik, Sinsia of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
  • Gujanicic, Marko of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
  • Reljin, Nemanja of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • SEE MEDIA RESEARCH LTD of Cyprus.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250117 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2793

 

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January 17, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Yin Kecheng, a Shanghai-based cyber actor who was involved with the recent Department of the Treasury network compromise. Additionally, OFAC sanctioned Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Co., LTD., a Sichuan-based cybersecurity company with direct involvement in the Salt Typhoon cyber group, which recently compromised the network infrastructure of multiple major U.S. telecommunication and internet service provider companies. People’s Republic of China-linked (PRC) malicious cyber actors continue to target U.S. government systems, including the recent targeting of Treasury’s information technology (IT) systems, as well as sensitive U.S. critical infrastructure. As highlighted in the most recent Office of the Director of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment, Chinese state-backed cyber actors continue to present some of the greatest and most persistent threats to U.S. national security.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Yin, Kecheng of China.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Co., Ltd. of China.

 

OFAC has issued Counter Terrorism General License 32, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Yemen Kuwait Bank for Trade and Investment Y.S.C."

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 32: Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Yemen Kuwait Bank for Trade and Investment Y.S.C

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving Yemen Kuwait Bank for Trade and Investment Y.S.C (Yemen Kuwait Bank), or any entity in which Yemen Kuwait Bank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 16, 2025, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the GTSR.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2792 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933961/download?inline

 

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January 24, 2025: On January 20, 2025, the President signed a new Executive Order (E.O.), "Initial Rescissions Of Harmful Executive Orders And Actions," which, among other actions, revoked E.O. 14115, "Imposing Certain Sanctions on Persons Undermining Peace, Security, and Stability in the West Bank." To implement the President's revocation of E.O. 14115, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) removed the West Bank-Related Sanctions program from its website and removed all persons designated under E.O. 14115 from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List). All property and interests in property blocked under E.O. 14115 are unblocked.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933976/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932576/download?inline

JANUARY 2025 EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATES Read More »

DECEMBER 2024 EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through December 31, 2024.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and

persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

President

 

President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to the Global Illicit Drug Trade

 

December 11, 2024: On December 15, 2021, by Executive Order 14059, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by global illicit drug trafficking.

 

The trafficking into the United States of illicit drugs, including fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, is causing the deaths of tens of thousands of Americans annually, as well as countless more non-fatal overdoses with their own tragic human toll.  Drug cartels, transnational criminal organizations, and their facilitators are the primary sources of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals that fuel the current opioid epidemic, as well as drug-related violence that harms our communities.  International drug trafficking — including the illicit production, global sale, and widespread distribution of illegal drugs; the rise of extremely potent drugs such as fentanyl and other synthetic opioids; as well as the growing role of Internet-based drug sales — continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14059 of December 15, 2021, must continue in effect beyond December 15, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14059 with respect to global illicit drug trafficking.

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/12/11/press-release-notice-to-the-congress-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-the-global-illicit-drug-trade/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/

 

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President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Serious Human Rights Abuse and Corruption

 

December 11, 2024:  On December 20, 2017, by Executive Order 13818, the President declared a national emergency with respect to serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world and, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), took related steps to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.

 

The prevalence and severity of human rights abuse and corruption that have their source, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States, continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared on December 20, 2017, must continue in effect beyond December 20, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13818 with respect to serious human rights abuse and corruption.

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/12/11/notice-to-the-congress-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-serious-human-rights-abuse-and-corruption/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/

 

*******

 

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

Pay.gov To No Longer Accept Amazon Pay Payments

 

December 5, 2024: After February 22, 2025, Pay.gov will no longer accept Amazon Pay as a valid payment option.  Please be sure to have a different form of payment available when paying for a new or renewed Registration.

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events

 

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Public Notice: 12542 - Final Rule: DDTC Registration Fees

 

December 6, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 99081: On December 10, 2024, the Department of State published a final rule, regarding changes to the three tiers of Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) registration fees. The new regulation will go into effect on January 9, 2025.

 

New Registrants

Effective January 9, 2025, first-time registrants will pay the $3000 Tier 1 fee to register with DDTC.

 

Registration Renewals                   

For registrations scheduled for renewal, DDTC will continue to send the standard e-mail reminder notifications (90 and 30 days prior to expiration) requesting registrants to log into the Defense Export Control and Compliance System (DECCS) to view the renewal fee and begin the renewal application.

 

Current registrations expiring on or after March 31, 2025, will be issued standard reminder notifications under the new fee structure included in the final rule.

 

Registrants issued 90-day reminder notifications with the fee structure under the prior regulation may pay the amount listed in DECCS under DDTC’s prior fee structure.

 

The final rule’s revised registration fees are as follows.

 

(1) Tier 1: The first tier is a set registration fee of $3,000 per year. This new registration fee amount applies to first time registrants. It also applies to those renewing registrations and for whom the Department did not issue a favorable determination on a license application or other request for authorization during the 12-month period ending 90 days prior to the expiration of the current registration.

 

The Tier 1 registration fee also applies to registrants who are wholly exempt from income tax pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3), such as non-profit organizations. Such registrants must attach proof of tax-exempt status (for example, an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) certification form) for the registration fee to be reduced to a Tier 1 amount. The IRS certification must apply to all entities, subsidiaries, and affiliates listed in the registration submission.

 

(2) Tier 2: The second tier is a set registration fee of $4,000 for registrants renewing their registrations who have submitted license applications or other requests for authorization and received five or fewer favorable determinations during the 12-month period ending 90 days prior to the expiration of their current registration.

 

(3) Tier 3: The third tier is a calculated registration fee for registrants who have submitted license applications or other requests for authorization and received more than five favorable determinations during the 12-month period ending 90 days prior to the expiration of their current registration. For these registrants, the registration fee calculation is $4,000 plus $1,100 times the total number of favorable determinations over five.

 

For potential discounts for Tier 1 or Tier 3 registrants, see below.

 

All registration payments must be completed electronically, through the DECCS Registration application. Once DDTC reviews and issues the registration submission, a “Make Payment” button will appear on your DECCS Registration dashboard.

 

DDTC recommends all registrants frequently check their DECCS Registration payment portal and email regarding their registration’s payment status. For more guidance on how to make a registration payment, accepted payment methods, and payment status, review the Registration User Guides.

 

Tier 1 Discount

 

DDTC is instituting a one-year initiative for qualifying Tier 1 registrants who may petition DDTC for a $500 discount, for a total registration fee of $2,500.

 

To qualify, Tier 1 registrants must provide some form of proof that $3,000 constitutes 1 percent or more of their total revenue for the last calendar year.  DDTC does not prescribe a certain set of documents for this purpose. Examples may include relevant documentation, or a signed attestation (subject to penalties under law for submitting a false statement) by a senior officer empowered by the registrant stating that $3000 constitutes 1 percent or more of their total revenue for the registrant’s last calendar year. Registrants who do not provide sufficient proof in the form of documentation or attestation may not receive the discount. DDTC will make efforts to contact those who have requested the discount, but who did not provide sufficient proof.

 

For purposes of this discount, “total revenue” is the total amount of income and is not limited to sales of ITAR controlled defense articles. Applicants must submit a discount request at least 30 calendar days prior to expiration of their current registration term. Such requests are encouraged to be made well in advance of 30 days to allow DDTC to review the request, and to contact the requestor if necessary or if sufficient proof was not provided.

 

At the end of the one-year pilot period the Department will assess the impact of the initiative and consider an extension of the special consideration initiative.

 

Tier 3 Discount

 

The Department is maintaining its 3% Total License Value discount for Tier 3 registrants.  If the registration fee calculated using the Tier 3 formula listed is greater than 3 percent of the total value of all approvals, the registration fee will be revised to either 3 percent of the total value of all applications or $4,000, whichever is greater.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/10/2024-29032/international-traffic-in-arms-regulations-registration-fees and

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events

 

*******

 

DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

 

December 16, 2024: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Address change of Raytheon Systems France S.A.R.L. from 175 Rue Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Issy-les-Moulineaux, 92130, France to 8 Rue Rouget de L’Isle, Issy-les-Moulineaux, 92130, France; and
  • Address Change of Pilatus Training Solutions Australia Pty Ltd from 81 Pearson Street, Sale, Victoria 3850 to 26-28 Wellington Park Way, Sale, Victoria 3850, Australia.

 

*******

 

Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To India

 

December 2, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of India has requested to buy thirty (30) Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Joint Tactical Radio Systems (MIDS-JTRS). The following non-MDE items will also be included: advanced data transfer systems; external fuel tanks; AN/AAS 44C(V) forward looking infrared (FLIR) systems; an operator machine interface assistant; spare containers; facilities study, design, construction and support; support and test equipment; munitions; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; intermediate and depot-level repair capabilities and associated spares; communications equipment; software development, delivery and support, including Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS); Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, including Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) repair capabilities and Performance Based Logistics (PBL); studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $1.17 billion. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems, located in Owego, NY. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/india-mh-60r-multi-mission-helicopter-equipment-and-follow-support

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Tunisia  

 

December 3, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Tunisia has requested to buy one hundred eighty-four (184) Javelin FGM-148F missiles (includes four (4) fly-to-buy missiles); and thirty (30) Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Units (LWCLU). Also included is missile simulation round System Integration and Check out (SICO); Javelin Restricted Interactive Electronic Technical Manual (IETM); Javelin operator manual and Technical Assistance (TAGM); tools; spare parts; indoor/outdoor trainers; Javelin gunner training; Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO) training; Javelin maintenance training; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated cost is $107.7 million. The prime contractors will be the Javelin Joint Venture between Lockheed Martin, located in Orlando, FL, and RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/tunisia-javelin-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To The Netherlands

 

December 6, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of the Netherlands has requested to buy up to two hundred twenty-six (226) AIM-120D3 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); up to five (5) AIM-120D3 AMRAAM guidance sections, to include precise position provided by either Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module or M-Code; and one (1) AIM-120 AMRAAM Integrated Test Vehicle (ITV). The following non-MDE items will also be included: AMRAAM control sections, missile containers and support equipment; KGV-135A encryption devices; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; weapons system support and software; classified software delivery and support; classified publications and technical documentation; transportation support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is up to $807 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/netherlands-aim-120d3-advanced-medium-range-air-air-missiles

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Kuwait

 

December 10, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Kuwait has requested to buy equipment and services required to refurbish existing maintenance facilities in Kuwait, including sustainment maintenance; special tools; repair parts; common tools; shop equipment and fixtures; materiel handling equipment; two-years of initial repair parts; bench stock; mandatory replacement materials; capability to repair small/medium arms of up to 100 mm; cables; wiring harnesses (including wiring harness manufacturing); hydraulics; fuel oil pumps; starters; generators; AGT1500 hang-on parts; functionality testing and limited repairs authorized in the technical manuals for communications equipment, fire control, night vision, and laser devices; capability to perform enhanced repairs on AGT1500 engines consistent with the TIGER Process; five years of facility operation and maintenance; field service representatives, technicians, mechanics, and other support personnel; on-the-job training; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $300 million. The principal contractors will be BAE Systems, located in York, PA; U.S. Ordnance, located in McCarran, NV; DRS Technologies, located in Arlington, VA; L3Harris Corporation, located in Tysons Corner, VA; Northrop Grumman, located in West Falls Church, VA; and RTX Corporation, located in McKinney, TX. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kuwait-maintenance-repair-sustainment-capability

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Ukraine

 

December 10, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Ukraine has requested to buy the Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS); AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKL); minor modifications and maintenance support; engine Component Improvement Program (CIP); spare and repair parts, consumables, and accessories; repair and return support; weapons software, weapons software support equipment, and classified and unclassified software and delivery support; classified and unclassified publications and documentation; personnel training and training equipment; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $266.4 million. The principal contractors will be Sabena, located in Charleroi, Belgium; Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, located in Fort Worth, TX; and Pratt and Whitney, located in East Hartford, CT. The U.S. Government is not aware of any proposed offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/ukraine-f-16-sustainment-services

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To The Republic of Korea

 

December 16, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Republic of Korea (ROK) has requested to buy modified MK 99 fire control system (FCS) cabinets; updated Weapon Direct System (WDS) software modification, integration, and installation; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $300 million. The principal contractors will include BAE Systems, Inc., Integrated Defense Solutions, located in Rockville, MD. Additional contractors will be determined by competition to select approved vendors. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/republic-korea-kdx-ii-class-destroyers-product-improvement-program

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Norway

 

December 17, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Norway has requested to buy eight thousand one (8,001) M1156A1 Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) multi-option fuzes that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at $2.79 million, included PGK cutaway models; fuze wrenches; enhanced portable inductive artillery fuze setters; GPS antennae and cables; improved Platform Integration Kits; PGK-associated hardware for testing; labor support; training aids; technical data and reports; U.S. Government technical assistance; incidental travel; transportation; PGK spare parts; equipment training; and related elements of logistics and program support. This notification is for eight thousand one (8,001) M1156A1 PGK multi-option fuzes. The following non-MDE items will also be included: PGK cutaway models; fuze wrenches; enhanced portable inductive artillery fuze setters; GPS antennae and cables; improved Platform Integration Kits; PGK-associated hardware for testing; labor support; training aids; technical data and reports; U.S. Government technical assistance; incidental travel; transportation; PGK spare parts; equipment training; and related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $130 million. The principal contractor will be Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, located in Dulles, VA. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/norway-m1156a1-precision-guidance-kits-fuzes

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Greece

 

December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Greece has requested to buy Aerosonde Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) with Lycoming heavy-fuel engines; Global Positioning System (GPS) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM); TASE400 Electro Optical (EO)/Medium Wave Infrared (MWIR)/Long-Range Spotter-High Definition (LRS-HD) payloads; avionics; video and telemetry datalink subsystems, and secondary payload bays; Ground Control Stations; ground data terminals; launch and recovery trailers; ground support equipment; “fly as you drive” M1117 ASV interface kits and integration; initial spares package; initial spares replenishment; new equipment training; program management support; contractor logistics support and Field Service Representative support; technical data and publications; quality assurance services; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support, that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The principal contractor will be Textron Systems, located in Hunt Valley, MD. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/greece-aerosonde-uncrewed-aircraft-systems-and-armored-security

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in The United States

 

December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy sixteen (16) MK 75 76 mm gun mounts. The following non-MDE items will be included: shipping containers; technical assistance to overhaul guns to be ready for use; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $30 million. The equipment will be purchased from U.S. stock and then overhauled to be ready for use condition by the U.S. Coast Guard. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this sale.

Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the recipient.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-mk-75

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in The United States

 

December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy three hundred nine (309) Multifunctional Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio Systems (MIDS JTRS) Variant 5 (V5). The following non-MDE items will also be included: non-recurring engineering; testing, certification, and other activities necessary to integrate the MIDS JTRS V5 Block Upgrade Three on the recipient’s Patriot, HE-2K, P-3, and F-16 Block 20 platforms; communications equipment and services needed to accelerate the modernization of the recipient’s Advanced Tactical Datalink System; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $265 million. The principal contractor(s) will be selected through competitive procurements conducted by the U.S. Government in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-38

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Egypt

 

December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Egypt has requested a possible sale to refurbish and upgrade five hundred fifty-five (555) M1A1 Abrams tanks into M1A1SA configuration tanks. Included are five hundred fifty-five (555) AN/VAS- 5B Driver Vision Enhancer (DVE-A) Kits; five hundred fifty-five (555) Thermal Imaging System (TIS) Gunner's Sights; M250 Smoke Grenade Launchers; AGT-1500 tank engines; X-1100 tank transmissions; spare parts; support equipment; depot level support; Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE); repair parts; repair and return program; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $4.69 billion. The M1A1SA tank contractor will be General Dynamics Land Systems, Sterling Heights, MI. Refurbishment and upgrade will take place at the Egyptian Tank Plant, Cairo, Egypt. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/egypt-abrams-tank-refurbishment-support-and-equipment

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Egypt

 

December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Egypt has requested to buy an additional five hundred forty-three (543) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS) that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at $8 million ($5.2 million in MDE), included two hundred sixteen (216) APKWS. This notification is for a combined total of seven hundred fifty-nine (759) APKWS. The following non-MDE items will also be included: test support equipment; spare and repair parts; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; transportation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $30 million. The principal contractor will be BAE Systems, located in Nashua, NH. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/egypt-advanced-precision-kill-weapon-system-apkws

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Egypt

 

December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Egypt has requested to buy two thousand one hundred eighty-three (2,183) Hellfire Air-to- Ground Missiles, AGM-114R. The following non MDE items will also be included: spare and repair parts; U.S. Government technical assistance; integrated logistics support; hardware equipment; technical publications; repair and return services; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The total estimated cost is $630 million. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin, located in Orlando, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/egypt-hellfire-agm-114r-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Morocco

 

December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Kingdom of Morocco has requested to buy up to thirty (30) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and one (1) AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM guidance section. Also included are AMRAAM telemetry kits, control section spares, and containers; Common Munitions Built-in-Test Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); ADU-891 Computer Test Set Adapter Groups; munitions support and support equipment; classified software delivery and support; spare parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support; transportation support; classified publications and technical documentation; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $88.37 million. The prime contractor will be RTX Corporation located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kingdom-morocco-advanced-medium-range-air-air-missiles

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Morocco

 

December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Kingdom of Morocco has requested to buy five hundred (500) GBU-39B Small Diameter Bombs I (SDBI); and two (2) GBU-39 (T-1)/B inert practice bombs with fuze. The following non-MDE items will also be included: GBU-39 tactical training rounds; containers, weapons system support, and support and test equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; publications and technical data; personnel training and training equipment; warranties; transportation support; site surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $86 million. The principal contractor will be Boeing Corporation, located in St. Louis, MO. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kingdom-morocco-gbu-39b-small-diameter-bombs-sdb-i

 

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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

Commerce Strengthens Export Controls to Restrict China’s Capability to Produce Advanced Semiconductors for Military Applications

 

December 2, 2024: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced a package of rules designed to further impair the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) capability to produce advanced-node semiconductors that can be used in the next generation of advanced weapon systems and in artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced computing, which have significant military applications. This action is a proactive measure enhancing the Department of Commerce’s work to impede the PRC’s ability to procure and produce the technologies necessary for its military modernization.

 

The rules include new controls on 24 types of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and 3 types of software tools for developing or producing semiconductors; new controls on high-bandwidth memory (HBM); new red flag guidance to address compliance and diversion concerns; 140 Entity List additions and 14 modifications spanning PRC tool manufacturers, semiconductor fabs, and investment companies involved in advancing the PRC government’s military modernization; and several critical regulatory changes to enhance the effectiveness of our previous controls.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-export-controls-restrict-chinas-capability-produce-advanced

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Public Briefing on Changes to Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items

December 4, 2024: 89 Fed Reg. 96095: On December 2, 2024, the Office of the Federal Register posted for public inspection two related Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) rules: an interim final rule, “Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items,” (RIN 0694-AJ74) and a final rule, “Additions and Modifications to the Entity List; Removals from the Validated End-User (VEU) Program” (RIN 0694-AJ77).

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/04/2024-28423/public-briefing-on-changes-to-advanced-computing-and-semiconductor-manufacturing-items and

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/04/2024-28423/public-briefing-on-changes-to-advanced-computing-and-semiconductor-manufacturing-items

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Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items

December 5, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 96790: In this interim final rule (IFR), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) made changes to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) controls for certain advanced computing items, supercomputers, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, which includes adding new controls for certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment and related items, creating new Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules for certain commodities to impair the capability to produce “advanced-node integrated circuits” (“advanced-node ICs”) by certain destinations or entities of concern, adding new controls for certain high bandwidth memory important for advanced computing, and clarifying controls on certain software keys that allow for the use of items such as software tools. This IFR publishes concurrently with another BIS final rule entitled, “Additions and Modifications to the Entity List; and Removals from the Validated End-User (VEU) Program” (Entity List rule) that adds to and modifies the Entity List to ensure appropriate EAR controls are in place for certain critical technologies and to minimize the risk of diversion to entities of concern.

In this IFR, BIS made changes to EAR controls for advanced computing items, supercomputers, and SME. The five categories of changes implemented by this IFR are described in section III as follows:

  1. Addition of two new FDP rules in § 734.9 of the EAR for certain types of advanced SME and for entities on the Entity List involved in the production of “advanced-node ICs”;
  2. Additional revisions related to the production of semiconductors and other conforming changes, including revisions to de minimis provisions that correlate to the new FDP rules, establishment of new License Exception Restricted Fabrication “Facility” (RFF), addition of eight new Red Flags, clarifications to § 744.23, and revisions and conforming changes to other parts of the EAR;
  3. Addition of HBM controls, including addition of new ECCN 3A090.c and License Exceptions HBM;
  4. Clarification to software keys to address when authorization is required; and
  5. Revisions to the CCL in supplement no. 1 to part 774, including revisions to eight existing ECCNs and addition of eight new ECCNs.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/05/2024-28270/foreign-produced-direct-product-rule-additions-and-refinements-to-controls-for-advanced-computing and

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/05/2024-28270/foreign-produced-direct-product-rule-additions-and-refinements-to-controls-for-advanced-computing

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Commerce Issues Final Rule to Formalize Information and Communications Technology and Services ICTS Program

December 5, 2024: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule cementing the procedures it will follow in investigating foreign adversary threats to information and communications technology and services (ICTS) transactions that may harm U.S. national security, pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13873: Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain.

This final rule demonstrates the Biden-Harris Administration’s proactive efforts to address the potential national security risks associated with the ICTS supply chain and the abuse of U.S. critical infrastructure by foreign adversaries. It is a significant step in formalizing the operations of the Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services (OICTS), which was established within BIS in March 2022 to implement EO 13873 and related executive orders.

Since its formation, OICTS has completed or undertaken several key investigations and rulemakings. In June 2024, OICTS announced a first-of-its-kind final determination prohibiting Kaspersky Lab, Inc., the U.S. subsidiary of a Russia-based anti-virus software and cybersecurity company, from selling its software within the United States or providing updates to software already in use, amongst other activities.

Additionally, in September 2024, OICTS issued a proposed rule that would prohibit the sale or import of connected vehicles integrating specific pieces of hardware and software, or those components sold separately, with a sufficient nexus to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or Russia. These actions underscore the critical role of OICTS in protecting American technologies and services from potentially malicious foreign adversary intervention or interference.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-issues-final-rule-formalize-icts-program

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BIS Publishes Assessment on the Use of Mature-Node Chips

December 6, 2024: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released a report on the use of mature-node semiconductor chips, or legacy chips, in supply chains that directly or indirectly support U.S. critical infrastructure. The report includes key findings related to U.S. companies’ use of legacy chips manufactured by entities based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The report, based on data BIS collected pursuant to an authority under the Defense Production Act (DPA), shows:

  • Companies that sell products containing legacy chips continue to lack visibility into their semiconductor supply chains. About half of surveyed companies were unable to determine whether their products contained any chips manufactured by PRC-based foundries.
  • Based on the information respondents provided, U.S. companies’ use of chips made in PRC-based foundries is pervasive. More than 2/3 of their products contain PRC-origin chips. However, these legacy chips represent a limited share of the total number of chips used in those products.
  • Capacity expansion in China has already begun to cause pricing pressure that may weaken U.S. chip suppliers’ competitive positions.

https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/public-report-use-mature-node-semiconductors-december-2024 and

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-publishes-assessment-use-mature-node-chips

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Implementation of Certain Australia Group Decisions

December 23, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 104408: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement changes agreed to by Australia Group (AG) member countries at recent meetings. These include controlling: instruments for the automated chemical synthesis of peptides (automated peptide synthesizers), dipropylamine, and neosaxitoxin; and revising the controls for botulinum toxins, toxic gas monitors, and centrifugal separators. This rule also makes minor conforming changes for the new controls and revisions to existing controls.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/23/2024-30425/implementation-of-certain-australia-group-decisions

 

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U.S. Census Bureau

REVISION BIS LICENSE TYPE C65 – (TGL) Temporary General License

December 5, 2024

On Monday, December 2, 2024, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) put on public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register an interim final rule (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-12-05/pdf/2024-28270.pdf) with an effective date of Monday, December 2, 2024 for most provisions. The IFR is expected to publish in the Federal Register on Thursday, December 5, 2024.

Among other actions, this interim final rule amended the existing Temporary General License (TGL) in supplement number 1 to part 736, paragraph (d), General Order number 4 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). General Order number 4 is amended to add newly added semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) ECCNs to this authorization in paragraph (d)(1)(i) and add 3A090.c under certain conditions to this authorization in paragraph (d)(2)(ii).

Revised License Code C65 (TGL)

An update has been made to AES to revise License Code C65 “Temporary General License” (TGL), which authorizes certain exports, reexports, in-country transfers, and exports from abroad destined to or within China or Macau by companies not headquartered in Country Groups D:1 or D:5 or E (see supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) to continue or engage in integration, assembly (mounting), inspection, testing, quality assurance, and distribution of items covered by ECCN 3A090.a or .b, 4A090, and associated software and technology in ECCN 3D001 (for 3A090.a or .b), 3E001 (for 3A090.a or .b), 4D090, or 4E001; or any item that is a computer, integrated circuit, “electronic assembly” or “component” and associated software and technology, specified elsewhere on Commerce Control List (supplement no. 1 to part 774), which meets or exceeds the performance parameters of ECCN 3A090.a or .b or 4A090.

Under the new interim final rule, ECCNs added to the “Less Restricted SME “parts,” “components”, or “equipment” paragraph (d)(1)(i) include 3B001.c.4, 3B993.b.1, c.2, c.3, d.4, f.2, f.3, o.2, q.1, q.2, 3B994, 3D993.a (for commodities specified in paragraph (d)(1)(i)(B)),  3D993.b through .d, 3D994, 3E993.a (for commodities specified in paragraph (d)(1)(i)(B)), 3E993.b, and 3E994.

Additionally, paragraph (d)(2)(ii) pertaining to advanced computing items is revised by adding 3A090.c when destined to or within Macau or a destination in Country Group D:5. A new paragraph, (d)(2)(ii)(B), is added to add an additional ultimate end use for 3A090.c, 3D001 (for 3A090.c), 3E001 (for 3A090.c).

The full terms of this Temporary General License are described in General Order No. 4 of in paragraph (d) in supplement no. 1 to part 736 of the EAR. See paragraph (d)(3) for item-based changes to validity dates.

AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C65 (TGL) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:

  • AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C65 (TGL) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES.
  • Report License Code: C65 Temporary General License (TGL)
  • Allowable ECCNs until December 31, 2025 under General Order #4 (d)(1)(i)(A): ECCNs 3A001.z; 3A090.a and 3A090.b; 3D001 (for “software” for commodities controlled by 3A001.z, 3A090.a and 3A090.b); 3E001 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 3A001.z, 3A090.a and .b); 4A003.z; 4A004.z; 4A005.z; 4A090; 4D001 (for “software” for commodities controlled by 4A003.z, 4A004.z, and 4A005.z); 4D090; 4E001 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 4A090 or “software” specified by 4D001 (for 4A003.z, 4A004.z, and 4A005.z); 4D090; 5A002.z; 5A004.z; 5A992.z; 5D002.z; 5D992.z; 5E002 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 5A002.z or 5A004.z or “software” specified by 5D002 (for 5A002.z or 5A004.z commodities)); or 5E992 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 5A992.z or “software” controlled by 5D992.z) of the Commerce Control List (CCL).
  • Allowable ECCNs until December 31, 2026 under General order #4 (d)(1): ECCN 3A991, 3B001.c.4, 3B992, 3B993.b.1, c.2, c.3, d.4, f.2, f.3, o.2, q.1, q.2, 3B994, 3D991, a (for commodities specified in this paragraph), 3D993.b through d, 3D994, 3E993.a (for commodities specified in this paragraph), 3E991, 3E993.b, or 3E994.
  • Allowable ECCNs until December 31, 2026 under General Order #4 (d)(2)(i)(B): 3A090.c, 3D001 (for 3A090.c), and 3E001 (for 3A090.c)

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NEW BIS LICENSE TYPE C71 – (HBM) High Bandwidth Memory

 

December 5, 2024:

 

On Monday, December 2, 2024, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) put on public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register an interim final rule (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-12-05/pdf/2024-28270.pdf) with an effective date of Monday, December 2, 2024 and a compliance date of December 31 for most provisions.  The IFR is expected to publish in the Federal Register on Thursday, December 5, 2024.  Among other actions, this interim final rule established new controls on high-bandwidth memory units under ECCN 3A090.c, and also creates a License Exception High Bandwidth Memory (HBM) in § 740.25 of the Export Administrations Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. parts 730 – 774, which can be used for certain less advanced HBM units.  This license exception, as specified under § 740.25, authorizes the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of items specified in ECCN 3A090.c on the Commerce Control List if all terms and conditions within paragraphs (a) through (e) are met.

(in-country) If the 3A090.c items are destined for packaging at any packaging site either (i) headquartered outside of Country Group A:5 or A:6 of supplement no. 1 to part 740, or (ii) having an ultimate parent headquartered in Macau or a location specified in Country Group D:5 of supplement no. 1 to part 740, then the finished, co-packaged products must be sent back to the exporter, reexporter, or transferor for export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to the purchaser. This allows the exporter, reexporter, or transferor to confirm that no diversion to unauthorized end-users has occurred.

For other packaging sites that face lower diversion risk, it is possible to claim License Exception HBM without needing to send the co-packaged products back to the exporter, reexporter, or transferor, if certain conditions are met (for example, the co-packaged products must not exceed the technical thresholds in ECCN3A090.

License Exception HBM under paragraph (b) specifies that the exporter, reexporter, or transferor must be headquartered in the United States or a destination specified in Country Group A:5 of supplement no. 1 to part 740, without an ultimate parent headquartered in Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5 of supplement no. 1 to part 740.  No other exporter, reexporter, or transferor may use License Exception HBM.

3A090.c items exported, reexported, or transferred to or within Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5 of supplement no. 1 to part 740 must be directly purchased by the end user.  3A090.c items must be shipped directly to the packaging site, which is included to prevent diversion.

New License Code C71 (HBM)

An update has been made to AES to create new License Codes C71 “High Bandwidth Memory” (HBM) which authorizes certain export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of items specified in ECCN 3A090.c.  (in-country)

AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C71 (HBM) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:

  • Report License Code: C71 Restricted Fabrication Facility (HBM)
  • Allowable ECCNs: 3A090.c
  • Allowable countries: All Countries
  • Allowable Export Information Codes:

 

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LICENSE TYPE C72 – (RFF) Restricted Fabrication Facility

 

December 5, 2024:

 

On Monday, December 2, 2024, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) put on public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register an interim final rule (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-12-05/pdf/2024-28270.pdf) with an effective date of Monday, December 2, 2024 for most provisions.  The IFR is expected to publish in the Federal Register on Thursday, December 5, 2024. Among other actions, this interim final rule established a new License Exception Restricted Fabrication Facility (RFF) in § 740.26 of the Export Administrations Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. parts 730 - 774.  This license exception as specified under the paragraph (a) (Eligibility requirements) authorizes the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of items not specified in ECCNs 3B001, 3B002, 3B993, 3B994, 3D992, 3D993, 3D994, 3E992, 3E993, or 3E994 to specific entities on the Entity List when § 740.26 is referenced in the Entity List “License requirement” entry.

The new License Exception RFF will allow certain items, including specified semiconductor manufacturing equipment, to be exported, reexported, exported from abroad, or transferred (in-country) to certain fabrication facilities that are subject to end user-based license requirements but that are not currently producing “advanced node ICs”.

License Exception RFF overcomes license requirements in the license requirements column of a specific entity when § 740.26 is referenced in that Entity List entry (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administrations Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. parts 730 – 774).  This license exception does not overcome destination-based license requirements, end-use based license requirements in other sections of part 744, or license requirements that apply to other entities on the Entity List if other listed entities are a party to the transaction.

License Exception RFF may not be used for the operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, or refurbishing of commodities specified in ECCNs 3B001.a.4, c, d, f.1, f.5, k to n, p.2, p.4, r, or 3B002.c, or 3B993, or 3B994.  Also, any item exported, exported from abroad, reexported, or transferred under License Exception RFF may not be used to produce “advanced-node ICs.”  A notification that must be sent to BIS 45 days prior to exporting, reexporting, exporting from abroad, or transferring (in-country) that includes the end-user’s name and address, description of item(s), purchase price, and anticipated shipping date of export, reexport, or transfer (in-country).

In addition, a notification must be sent to BIS within one business day of learning that the end use has changed to “advance-node integrated circuit” “production.”  There is also a reporting requirement for installation of SME that must be sent to BIS within 30 days of installation.  An annual end-use confirmation report that must be sent to BIS by the exporter, reexporter, or transferor that confirms that the installed equipment is not being used in the productions of “advanced-node ICs.”

New License Code C72 (RFF)

An update has been made to AES to create new License Codes C72 “Restricted Fabrication Facility” (RFF), which authorizes certain export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of items not specified in ECCNs 3B001, 3B002, 3B993, 3B994, 3D992, 3D993, 3D994, 3E992, 3E993, or 3E994 to specific entities on the Entity list.  License Exception RFF overcomes license requirements in the license requirements column of a specific entity when § 740.26 is referenced in that Entity List entry (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administrations Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. parts 730 – 774).  Transactions under RFF must meet all of the applicable criteria identified under paragraph (a) and must comply with the restrictions set forth in paragraph (b) of this section.

The full terms of License Exception RFF are described in § 740.26.

AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C72 (RFF) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:

  • Report License Code: C72 Restricted Fabrication Facility (RFF)
  • Allowable ECCNs: All except 3B001, 3B002, 3B993, 3B994, 3D992, 3D993, 3D994, 3E992, 3E993, or 3E994.
  • Allowable countries: All
  • Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG

 

 

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December 19, 2024: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected.  If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation.  Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN.  However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.

To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

 

Response Code:  256

Narrative:     USPPI Postal Code Not Valid for State

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        The Postal Code and State Code reported in the USPPI Address do not match.

Resolution:  The reported USPPI State Code must be valid for the state associated to the Postal Code.

Verify the USPPI State Code and Postal Code combination, correct the shipment and resubmit.

Response Code:  501

Narrative:     Export Information Code Missing

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        The Export Information Code was not reported.

Resolution:  An Export Information Code must be reported on every shipment. For a complete list of Export Information Codes, refer to ‘Appendix E – Commodity Filing Export Information’ of the AESTIR.

Verify the Export Information Code, correct the shipment and resubmit.

 

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December 19, 2024: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected.  If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation.  Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN.  However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.

 

To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

 

Response Code:  256

Narrative:     USPPI Postal Code Not Valid for State

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        The Postal Code and State Code reported in the USPPI Address do not match.

Resolution:  The reported USPPI State Code must be valid for the state associated to the Postal Code.

Verify the USPPI State Code and Postal Code combination, correct the shipment and resubmit.

Response Code:  501

Narrative:     Export Information Code Missing

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        The Export Information Code was not reported.

Resolution:  An Export Information Code must be reported on every shipment. For a complete list of Export Information Codes, refer to ‘Appendix E – Commodity Filing Export Information’ of the AESTIR.

Verify the Export Information Code, correct the shipment and resubmit.

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Changes to the Reporting Requirements of the USML Category XXI Determination Number and Goods Exported Under for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program in AES

 

December 30, 2024:

 

On Thursday, August 10, 2023, the Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau (Census Bureau) published a final rule (2023-16970.pdf (govinfo.gov) announcing the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) collection of a new data element – Category XXI Determination Number in the Automated Export System (AES).

The purpose of this requirement is to prevent the unauthorized use of USML Category XXI, which is limited to those articles and services designated by DDTC under that category.

Effective January 1, 2025, AES will generate a fatal error (FATAL ERR 5C2 CAT XXI DETERMINATION NBR UNKNOWN) back to the filer if USML Category XXI “21” is selected in AES and the CAT XXI DETERMINATION NBR is UNKNOWN or missing.

DDTC is also aware of a subset of exporters using DDTC USML Category Code “21” as a workaround to export items under License Code/License Exemption Code “S94” for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) that are not items described on the USML. Most such articles would have been subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) if they were not being exported via an FMS authorization.  However, effective October 15, 2013, items to be exported under FMS authority are not “subject to the EAR” pursuant to § 734.3(b)(1)(vi) of the EAR because they are “defense articles” pursuant to section 47 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2794).

To continue to provide a valid means of exporting such items under S94 when Fatal Error Code 5C2 takes effect, the DDTC is also implementing DDTC USML Category Code “55” and Fatal Error Code 5C3 within AES.

The Addition of USML Category Code “55”

The AES Trade Interface Requirements (AESTIR), Appendix L has been updated by adding DDTC USML Category Code “55” (Articles Exported Under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Authority and Not Described on the U.S. Munitions List (USML)).  Category Code “55” is to be reported on the EEI ONLY when the export is to take place under the FMS program and the item to be exported is not described in USML Categories I-XXI (i.e., is normally subject to the EAR when not exported pursuant to a Foreign Military Sales authorization).

See the following instructions to determine how exports under the FMS program should be reported on the EEI. Exports under the FMS program are reported under Automated Export System (AES) License Code/License Exemption Code S94.  By using DDTC USML Category Code “55” and the AES License Code/License Exemption Code S94, you are certifying that the terms, provisions, and conditions of the FMS program have been met.

  • License Code/License Exemption Code S94 (FMS Program Exports) – Reported for any export under the FMS program. Any of the USML Category Codes are eligible with License Code/License Exemption Code S94. However, USML Category Code “55” may only be used in conjunction with License Code/License Exemption Code S94.
  • Export Information Codes FS and FI – these Export Information Codes are the only eligible Export Information Codes to be reported with USML Category Code “55” under License Code/License Exemption Code S94.

 

If the USML Category Code “55” is reported under any other license types, AES will generate a fatal error (FATAL ERR 5C3-DDTC USML CATEG 55 NOT ELIG FOR LIC TYPE) back to the filer.

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

 

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Fines and Penalties

 

December 3, 2024: A San Bernardino County man was arrested on a federal criminal complaint alleging that he exported to North Korea shipments of firearms, ammunition and other military items that were concealed inside shipping containers bound from Long Beach.

 

Shenghua Wen, 41, of Ontario, CA is charged with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a felony that carries a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years in federal prison.

Wen – a Chinese national illegally residing in the United States – was arrested this morning and is expected to make his initial appearance this afternoon in United States District Court in downtown Los Angeles. His arraignment is expected to occur in the coming weeks.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/ontario-man-arrested-complaint-alleging-he-exported-shipments-firearms-ammunition-and

 

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December 3, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $14,550,000 settlement with Aiotec GmbH ("Aiotec"). Aiotec, a Berlin, Germany -headquartered company that sources industrial equipment for the energy sector, has agreed to settle its potential civil liability for one apparent violation of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR). This apparent violation of the ITSR arose from Aiotec's participation in a conspiracy between 2015 and 2019 to cause a U.S. company to indirectly sell and supply an Australian polypropylene plant to Iran, and remit payments for the sale of the plant through U.S. financial institutions. This settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that Aiotec's conduct was not voluntarily self-disclosed and constituted an egregious case.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241203_33v and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933666/download?inline

 

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December 11, 2024: A 12-count indictment was unsealed, charging Natalya Ivanovna Mazulina, of Federal Way, Washington, also known as “Natasha Mazulina,” for her alleged involvement in a scheme to circumvent U.S. export laws and sanctions on Russia. Mazulina, the Western regional manager of a freight forwarding company based in Jamaica, New York, which operated out of John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK airport) in Queens, New York, and Seattle-Tacoma International Airport in Washington State, was arrested in Seattle and will be arraigned in the Eastern District of New York later.

 

Mazulina is charged with conspiracy to export controlled goods to Russia without a license, conspiracy to defraud the U.S., conspiracy to commit money laundering, exporting controlled goods to Russia without a license, filing false export documents with the U.S. government, and smuggling goods contrary to U.S. law. If convicted, she faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for each count of conspiring to export or exporting controlled goods to Russia without a license; a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for conspiring to commit money laundering; up to 10 years in prison for each count of smuggling; and a maximum penalty of five years in prison for each count of conspiracy and filing false export documents with the U.S. government. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/manager-us-freight-forwarding-company-indicted-circumventing-export-controls

 

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December 13, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $257,690 settlement with C.H. Robinson International Inc. (CHR). CHR agreed to settle its potential civil liability for 82 apparent violations by five of its non-U.S. subsidiaries, which provided freight brokerage or transportation services for shipments in apparent violation of OFAC sanctions on Cuba and Iran. The settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that the apparent violations were voluntarily self-disclosed and were not egregious.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241213

 

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December 18, 2024: As part of a settlement agreement, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed a civil penalty of $3,300,000 against Integra Technologies, Inc. (“Integra”), a radio frequency and microwave power solutions engineering and manufacturing company headquartered in El Segundo, California. The penalty relates to Integra’s shipments to Russia of transistors and related products, which can be used for avionics or radar systems. Integra made a significant number of shipments to Russia, several of which occurred after such products had been designated by the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom as Common High Priority List (CHPL) items. The CHPL items are items that Russia specifically seeks to procure for its defense industrial base to support weapons programs used in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

 

Integra sold approximately $6.67 million of transistors and related products, including CHPL items, to Russian end users between February 2023 and October 2023. All of these sales occurred without the requisite license or other authorization from BIS. Integra voluntarily disclosed the conduct to BIS and cooperated with the investigation by BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement. This voluntary self-disclosure (VSD) resulted in a significant reduction of the penalty. BIS also agreed to suspend $1.5 million of the penalty due to Integra’s limited ability to pay.

 

As part of the settlement agreement, Integra admitted to the conduct set forth in a Proposed Charging Letter, which alleged 94 violations of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Specifically, on 94 occasions between February 2023 and October 2023, Integra sold and exported transistors and related products via two third-party distributors to eight different Russian end users, without any license or authorization from BIS. The transistors that Integra exported were added to the CHPL in July 2023.

At the time of the violations, Integra was aware that it was shipping transistors and related products to Russian end users. However, because Integra’s export compliance program lacked procedures requiring regular review of revisions to the EAR, Integra failed to recognize that, as of February 2023, such items required a license for export to Russia. Integra did not realize its error until October 2023, after which Integra promptly stopped all shipments intended for Russian end users and filed a voluntary self-disclosure with BIS. Integra stated that, at the time of the relevant shipments, it believed the specific EAR99 products it sent to Russian end users were technologically suitable only for civil end use, rather than military end use.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-imposes-penalty-against-integra-technologies-inc-unlicensed-shipments-common-high

 

*******

 

December 18, 2024: Mahdi Mohammad Sadeghi, 42, a dual U.S.-Iranian national of Natick, Massachusetts, and Mohammad Abedininajafabadi, also known as Mohammad Abedini (Abedini), 38, of Tehran, Iran, have been charged with conspiring to export sophisticated electronic components from the United States to Iran in violation of U.S. export control and sanctions laws. Abedini is also charged with providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), that resulted in the deaths of three U.S. service members who were killed by a one-way attack Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), also known as a drone, on a military base in Jordan.

 

Sadeghi was arrested and made his initial appearance in the District of Massachusetts. Abedini was also arrested in Italy by Italian authorities at the request of the United States.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/founder-iranian-company-arrested-providing-material-support-islamic-revolutionary-guard

 

*******

 

December 23, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed, as part of a settlement agreement, a civil penalty of $180,000 against The Indium Corporation of America (Indium), a materials refiner, smelter, manufacturer, and supplier to the global electronics, semiconductor, thin-film, and thermal management markets. Indium is headquartered in Clinton, NY.

 

The penalty relates to Indium’s shipments to Russia of solder materials used in electronics manufacturing valued at approximately $96,506. Indium cooperated with the investigation conducted by BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) and took remedial measures after discovering the conduct at issue, which resulted in a significant reduction in the penalty.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-imposes-180000-mitigated-penalty-against-indium-corporation-11-exports

 

*******

 

December 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a settlement with an individual ("U.S. Person-1"). U.S. Person-1 agreed to remit $45,179 to settle their potential civil liability for six apparent violations of OFAC's Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations. Between January 2021 and June 2021, U.S. Person-1 executed six payments totaling $45,179 on behalf of a blocked individual with knowledge that the individual was sanctioned. The settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that the apparent violations were not self-disclosed and that three of the apparent violations were egregious.

 

OFAC also announced a settlement with Córdoba Music Group LLC (Córdoba). Córdoba, a manufacturer of musical instruments based in California, agreed to remit $41,591 to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of sanctions on Iran. On nine occasions, Córdoba shipped instruments and related accessories that it knew were ultimately destined for Iran. The settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that Córdoba's conduct was non-egregious and voluntarily self-disclosed.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933701/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933726/download?inline

 

*******

December 31, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $22,172 settlement with SkyGeek Logistics, Inc. (SkyGeek). SkyGeek agreed to settle its potential civil liability for six apparent violations of OFAC sanctions related to Russia’s aerospace and technology sectors. In 2024, SkyGeek attempted two refunds and sent four shipments to two Specially Designated Nationals in the United Arab Emirates sanctioned in connection with these sectors. The settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that the apparent violations were non-egregious and that certain of its conduct was voluntarily self-disclosed.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241231_33

 

*******

 

Sanctions

 

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

December 5, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 96830: In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 140 entities to the Entity List. These entries are listed on the Entity List under the destinations of China, People's Republic of (China), Japan, South Korea, and Singapore and have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. This final rule also modifies 14 existing entries on the Entity List, consisting of revisions to 14 entries under China. This final rule publishes concurrently with BIS's interim final rule, “Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items” (0694-AJ74), which makes additional changes to the EAR controls on advanced computing items and semiconductor manufacturing items. This final rule is part of this larger effort to ensure that appropriate EAR controls are in place on these items, including in connection with transactions destined to or otherwise involving the entities being added to the Entity List, as well as for existing entries on the Entity List that are being modified.

 

All of these entities (those newly added and those being modified) are involved with the development and production of “advanced-node integrated circuits” (“advanced-node ICs”) and/or semiconductor manufacturing items, and/or have supported the Chinese government's Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy. Additionally, this final rule designates nine of these entities being added and seven of the entries being modified as entities for which entity-specific restrictions involving foreign-produced items apply. This final rule also amends the EAR by removing three entities from the Validated End-User (VEU) Program.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/05/2024-28267/additions-and-modifications-to-the-entity-list-removals-from-the-validated-end-user-veu-program and

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/05/2024-28267/additions-and-modifications-to-the-entity-list-removals-from-the-validated-end-user-veu-program

 

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December 10, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 99702: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 8 entities to the Entity List for activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy under the destinations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (2), Burma (2), and Russia (4). These Entity List additions are related to enabling human rights violations.

 

Of the two PRC entities added, one was added because it enables human rights violations, including high-technology surveillance targeted at the general population of the people of China, Uyghurs, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups. The other entity was added due to enabling the PRC’s public security establishment to carry out human rights violations.

 

Four entities, two under the destination of Burma and two under the destination of Russia, were added to the Entity List for supplying the Burmese military with parts and components that have enabled the military to carry out human rights violations, including brutal aerial attacks against the civilian population.

 

The remaining two Russian entities were added for supplying facial recognition technology to the Russian government to target peaceful protesters, an integral component of Russia’s mass surveillance apparatus.

 

Burma

  • Sky Aviator Company Limited; and
  • Synepex Shwe Company Ltd.

 

China

  • Beijing Zhongdun Security Technology Group Co., Ltd.; and
  • Zhejiang Uniview Technologies Co., Ltd.

 

Russia

  • Aviasnab LLC;
  • Joint Stock Company Gorizont;
  • NtechLab LLC; and
  • Technology Videoanalysis LLC.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/11/2024-29136/additions-to-the-entity-list and

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-adds-8-entities-entity-list-enabling-human-rights-abuses

 

*******

December 30, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published its third quarterly update of the boycott Requester List. This list notifies companies, financial institutions, freight forwarders, individuals, and other U.S. persons of potential sources of certain boycott-related requests they may receive during the regular course of business.

A party’s inclusion on the boycott Requester List does not mean that U.S. persons are restricted from dealing with the listed party. However, a party’s inclusion puts U.S. persons on notice that the listed party is more likely to make reportable boycott-related requests. The updated public list of entities who have been identified as having made a boycott-related request in reports received by BIS includes a total of 38 additions. BIS also removed over 20 entities. This announcement builds on the second quarterly update published in October.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-updates-boycott-requester-list-1

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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

December 2, 2024: On the International Day for the Abolition of Slavery, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three former Government of Uzbekistan officials who were involved in human trafficking and gender-based violence, including physical and sexual violence against children at a state-run orphanage in Urgench, Uzbekistan. All three individuals are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse around the world.

 

Concurrently, these individuals are now subject to visa restrictions by the Department of State under Section 7031(c) of the annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act. Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where the Secretary of State has credible information that foreign officials have been involved in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights, those individuals and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the United States.

 

Promoting accountability for gender-based violence is a top priority for the U.S. government. President Biden issued a Memorandum on Promoting Accountability for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in November 2022 that directs the U.S. government to strengthen our exercise of financial, diplomatic, and legal tools against these types of abuses.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Khudaiberganoya, Yulduz of Uzbekistan;
  • Kuryazov, Anvar of Uzebekistan; and
  • Masharipov, Aybek of Uzbekistan.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241202 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions

 

*******

December 3, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on 35 entities and vessels that play a critical role in transporting illicit Iranian petroleum to foreign markets. This action imposes additional costs on Iran’s petroleum sector following Iran’s attack against Israel on October 1, 2024, as well as Iran’s announced nuclear escalations, building upon the sanctions issued on October 11. Petroleum revenues provide the Iranian regime with the resources to fund its nuclear program, develop advanced drones and missiles, and provide ongoing financial and material support for the terrorist activities of its regional proxies.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Ceres Shipping Limited of China;
  • Constellation Maritime Services Limited of Liberia;
  • Eunomia Limited of China;
  • Gaffodil Co., Limited of China;
  • Galileos Marine Services L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Inaya Ship Management Private Limited of Pakistan;
  • Lightship Management Ltd of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Lufindo Holding Limited of Seychelles;
  • Ocean Glory Giant Ogg SA of Panama;
  • Shanhai Future Ship Management Co Ltd of China;
  • Shanghai Legendary Ship Management Company Limited of China;
  • Tightship Shipping Management Private Limited of India;
  • Vision Ship Management LLP of India; and
  • Yurimaguas Ltd of the Marshall Islands.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Bertha (E5U5084) Crude Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag; MMSI 518999103 (vessel);
  • Black Panther (3EZT6) Chemical/Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 372988000 (vessel);
  • Ceres I (S9U4) Crude Oil Tanker Sao Tome and Principe flag; MMSI 668116233 (vessel);
  • Elva (S9A3) Crude Oil Tanker Sao Tome and Principe flag; MMSI 668116202 (vessel);
  • Fiona II (HPOE) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 351073000 (vessel);
  • FT Island (HQAI6) Crude Oil Tanker Honduras flag; MMSI 334017000 (vessel);
  • Jaya (V7A6410) Crude Oil Tanker Marshall Islands flag; MMSI 538010982 (vessel);
  • Lady Lucy (5LKL2) Chemical/Products Tanker Liberia flag; MMSI 636022783 (vessel);
  • Lara II (3EQL7) Oil Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 374740000 (vessel);
  • Lioness (3FLM9) Chemical/Products Tanker Panama flag;  MMSI 353722000 (vessel);
  • Masal (EPHO6) Crude Oil Tanker Iran flag; MMSI 422169700 (vessel);
  • Merope (3E2648) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002495 (vessel);
  • Min Hang (E5U5075) Crude Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag; MMSI 518999094 (vessel);
  • Olive (E5U5271) Crude Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag; MMSI 518999290 (vessel);
  • Phonix (8RCY3) Crude Oil Tanker Guyana flag; MMSI 750308000 (vessel);
  • Rio Napo E5U4369) Chemical/Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag; MMSI 518998389 (vessel);
  • Tonil (3E2323) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002482 (vessel);
  • Vanity (T7BL8) Crude Oil Tanker San Marino flag; MMSI 268241802 (vessel);
  • Veronica III (3E2317) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002475 (vessel);
  • Vesna (V3MD7) Crude Oil Tanker Belize flag; MMSI 312242000 (vessel); and
  • Yuri (E5U5230) Crude Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag; MMSI 518999249 (vessel).

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241203

 

*******

 

December 4, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned five individuals and four entities that are associated with or leverage the TGR Group, a sprawling international network of businesses and employees that have facilitated significant sanctions circumvention on behalf of Russian elites. This action also identifies a Wyoming-based entity that is owned 50 percent or more by a sanctioned individual. This action continues the G7 commitment to hold accountable parties that evade or offset the impact of international sanctions, including by using digital assets, and to impose costs on illicit actors that use digital assets to enhance and transfer their wealth. These designations are the result of a collaborative effort with the United Kingdom’s (UK) National Crime Agency, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Bradens, Andrejs of the United Kingdom;
  • Chirkinyan, Elena of the United Kingdom;
  • Krasnov, Nikita Vladimirovich of Russia;
  • Magomedov, Khadzhi Murat Dalgatovich of Russia; and
  • Rossi, George of the United Kingdom.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Pullman Global Solutions LLC of the United States;
  • Siam Expert Trading Company Limited of Thailand;
  • TGR Corporate Concierge Ltd of the United Kingdom;
  • TGR DWC-LLC of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • TGR Partners of Russia.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241204 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions

 

*******

 

December 9, 2024: On International Anti-Corruption Day, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 28 individuals and businesses involved in a global gold smuggling and money laundering network based in Zimbabwe, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Abakumov, Dmytro of Ukraine;
  • Crosby, David Paul of the United Kingdom;
  • Pattni, Kamlesh Mansukhlal Damji of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Pattni, Mishaal Hitesh of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Sanjay, Raj Vaya of Zimbabwe;
  • Sinha, Swetang of Zimbabwe;
  • Sood, Rahul of India;
  • Vaya, Mukesh Mansukhlal of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • Vaya, Sanjay Keshavji of Zimbabwe.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Fiza Gold and Bullion Trading L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Golden Luxury Jewellery Trading L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Manurama Limited of Kenya;
  • Marwa Investments Limited of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Memories Golden Jewellery L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Mirdk Fyuels OSOO of Krygyzstan;
  • Precious Bullion DMCC of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Royal Sona OSOO of Krygyzstan;
  • Rubini Investment Group Limited of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Ruhmeer Diamonds DMCC of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Sahara Petroleum OSOO of Krygyzstan;
  • Sakhara Petroleum OSOO of Krygyzstan;
  • Samaria Holdings Limited of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Skorus Investments PVT LTD of Zimbabwe;
  • Sun Multinational DMCC of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Sun Star Travel & Tourism L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Suprim EF IKS OSOO of Krygyzstan;
  • Suzan General Trading JLT of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • Suzan General Trading PVT LTD of Zimbabwe.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2740 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241209

 

*******

 

December 10, 2024: In recognition of International Human Rights Day (IHRD), the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced new designations and highlighting other human rights-related sanctions actions taken over the last year. IHRD is observed annually on December 10 in commemoration of the United Nations’ adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on that day in 1948.

 

This action sanctions one individual and one entity involved in abuses against prisoners held in Houthi-run prisons in Yemen and one individual providing support to Bashar al-Assad. State also announced steps to impose visa restrictions on dozens of individuals pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and designated one official under Section 7031(c) of the annual Appropriations Act for involvement in a gross violation of human rights. For more information about the State’s actions, please see their fact sheet.

 

The following individual was added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Abulqader Hasan Yahya, Al-Murtadha of Yemen.

 

The following entity was added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Houthi National Committee For Prisoners Affairs of Yemen.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2741 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241209

 

*******

 

December 10, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned cybersecurity company Sichuan Silence Information Technology Company, Limited (Sichuan Silence), and one of its employees, Guan Tianfeng (Guan), both based in People’s Republic of China (PRC), for their roles in the April 2020 compromise of tens of thousands of firewalls worldwide. Many of the victims were U.S. critical infrastructure companies.

 

Malicious cyber actors, including those operating in China, continue to be one of the greatest and most persistent threats to U.S. national security, as highlighted in the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Guan, Tianfeng of China.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Sichaun Silence Information Technology Company, Limited of China.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241210 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2742

 

*******

 

December 16, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned nine individuals and seven entities that have provided financial and military support to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).  Also, the U.S. Department of State sanctioned three targets related to the DPRK’s ballistic missile program.  These actions reflect the DPRK’s escalating provocation and hostile military posturing that exacerbate global tensions and destabilize regional peace and security.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Choe, Chol Ryong of North Korea;
  • Im, Song Jin of North Korea;
  • Ju Chang il of North Korea;
  • Kim, Geum Cheol of North Korea;
  • Kim, Myong Jin of North Korea;
  • Kim, Yon Hui of China;
  • Kim, Yong Bok of North Korea;
  • Pak, Jong Chon of North Korea;
  • Ri, Chang Ho of North Korea;
  • Rim, Ryong Nam of North Korea; and
  • Ro Kwang Chol of North Korea.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • DV Ink Limited Liability Company of Russia;
  • Golden Triangle Bank of China;
  • Korea Mandal Credit Bank of North Korea;
  • Novosibirskoblgaz Limited Liability Company of Russia;
  • Okryu Trading Company of China;
  • Second Academy of Natural Sciences Foreign Affairs Bureau of North Korea;
  • Sibregiongaz, AO of Russia; and
  • Vostok Trading Limited Liability Company of North Korea.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241216 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2751

 

*******

 

December 17, 2024:  The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 12 individuals and eight entities, located across seven countries, who are linked to the global illicit drug trade. This action, taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059, underscores the United States’ commitment to combating the synthetic drug threat at home and abroad.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Betancourt Rosero, Camilo Esteban of Colombia;
  • Casarrubia Posada of Colombia;
  • Grinevicius, Arnas of Lithuania;
  • Karpavicius, Rokas of Lithuania;
  • Karpe, Jurga of Lithuania;
  • Labutis, Virginijus of Lithuania;
  • Leung, Ho Kai of New Zealand;
  • Lu, Huaying of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Osten Blanco, Orozman Orlando of Colombia;
  • Perez Castaneda, Luis Armando of Colombia;
  • Perrilla Sandoval, Allende of Colombia;
  • Staskus, Saulius of Lithuania;
  • Thackray, David Jonathan of Australia; and
  • Zhang, Jian Al Owais of the United Arab Emirates.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Atiya S A S of Colombia;
  • Dragon Secure GmbH of Switzerland;
  • Green Alpine Trading, LLC of the United Arab Emirates;
  • JT Trading Limited of New Zealand;
  • Karpis AG of Switzerland;
  • Lake Forest SP Z O O of Poland;
  • MB PTERA of Lithuania;
  • TNK Trading Limited of New Zealand; and
  • UAB Flavour Labs of Lithuania.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241217

 

*******

 

December 17, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two individuals and one entity involved in a network that launders millions of dollars of illicit funds generated by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) information technology (IT) workers and cybercrime to support the DPRK Government. Based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Lu Huaying and Zhang Jian worked through a UAE-based front company to facilitate money laundering and cryptocurrency conversion services that funneled the illicit proceeds back to Pyongyang. This network is led by OFAC-sanctioned Sim Hyon Sop (Sim), a PRC-based banking representative for the DPRK who orchestrates money laundering schemes to fund the regime.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Lu, Huaying of China; and
  • Zhang, Jian of China.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Green Alpine Trading, LLC of the United Arab Emirates.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2752

 

*******

 

December 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two entities and two individuals for their role in developing and procuring components for sensitive navigational systems for the Iranian military. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC ASF SSJO) and other Iranian organizations rely on these strategic components that are necessary for the production and proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles. Concurrent with this action, the U.S. Department of State designated one individual and two entities involved in Iranian UAV and missile development. Treasury’s action was taken in coordination with the Department of Commerce and the Department of Justice, the latter of which charged and helped coordinate the arrest of one of the individuals OFAC sanctioned.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Abedininajafababi, Mohammad of Iran; and
  • Merat, Kaveh of Iran.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Illumove SA of Switzerland; and
  • Sanat Danesh Rahpuyan Aflak Company Ltd of Iran.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2755 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241218

 

*******

 

December 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated three individuals and four entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) that form part of U.S.-designated Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik’s (Dodik) financial network and enable the Dodik family’s continued attempts to evade sanctions. This action also targets a BiH politician who serves as a key enabler of Dodik’s corruption and destabilizing political agenda.

 

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 1B, "Authorizing Certain Activities Involving Federal State Budgetary Institution Marine Rescue Service," and Russia-related General License 115 "Authorizing Transactions Involving Gazprombank Related to Civil Nuclear Energy."

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 1B: “Authorizing Certain Activities Involving Federal State Budgetary Institution Marine Rescue Service”

 

(a) All transactions and activities prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14039, E.O. 14024, or the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019, 22 U.S.C. 9526 note, as amended (PEESA), involving Federal State Budgetary Institution Marine Rescue Service (MRS), or any entity in which MRS owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are not related to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, the TurkStream pipeline project, or any project that is a successor to either such project, are authorized.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 115: “Authorizing Transactions Involving Gazprombank Related to Civil Nuclear Energy”

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 involving Gazprombank Joint Stock Company (“Gazprombank”), or any entity in which Gazprombank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are related to civil nuclear energy are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 30, 2025.

 

(b) For the purposes of this general license, the term “related to civil nuclear energy” means transactions undertaken solely to maintain or support civil nuclear projects initiated before November 21, 2024.

 

OFAC also issued one new Russia-related Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1203).

 

Russia-related Frequently Asked Question 1203:

 

Q: What does General License (GL) 115 ("Authorizing Transactions Involving Gazprombank Related to Civil Nuclear Energy") authorize with respect to civil nuclear energy-related payments?

 

A: GL 115 generally authorizes all transactions involving Gazprombank Joint Stock Company ("Gazprombank"), or any entity in which Gazprombank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, related to civil nuclear energy. Civil nuclear energy means the following activities when undertaken solely to maintain or support civil nuclear energy projects and operations initiated or under construction as of November 21, 2024: the extraction, production, refinement, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, transport, or purchase of uranium in any form; the production, generation, transmission, or exchange of nuclear power, fuel, or waste; and the operation of civil nuclear energy projects. However, GL 115 does not authorize, for instance, transactions involving Gazprombank related to the development of new civil nuclear energy power plants after November 21, 2024, or related to the Paks II nuclear power plant project, including Paks II. Nuclear Power Plant Private Limited Company (Paks II. Ltd.), or any successor project.

 

Non-U.S. persons generally do not risk exposure to U.S. sanctions for engaging in transactions with blocked persons, including transactions related to existing civil nuclear energy as described in GL 115, where those transactions would not require a specific license if engaged in by a U.S. person.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Dobric, Aleksandar of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
  • Dobric, Mirko of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
  • Kosarac, Stasa of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Best Service D.O.O. of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
  • Nimbus Innovations D.O.O Banja Luka of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
  • Vorto D.O.O. of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
  • Zelena Jabuka D.O.O. of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241218 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2756 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933721/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933706/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1203

 

*******

 

December 19, 2024:  The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned a dozen individuals and entities based in multiple jurisdictions, including the head of the Houthi-aligned Central Bank of Yemen branch in Sana’a, for their roles in trafficking arms, laundering money, and shipping illicit Iranian petroleum for the benefit of the Houthis. Among the persons designated are key smuggling operatives, arms traffickers, and shipping and financial facilitators who have enabled the Houthis to acquire and transport an array of dual-use and weapons components, as well as generate revenue to support their destabilizing regional activities. Additionally, OFAC identified five cryptocurrency wallets associated with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)-backed Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal (al-Jamal), who operates under the aliases “Khrpi,” “Ahmad Sa’idi,” and “Hisham,” among others.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • ABD-AL-WADUD, Wail Muhmmad Said of Yemen;
  • Al-Hadi, Ahmad Muhammad Muhmmad Hasan of Yemen;
  • Al-Madani, Hashem Ismail Ali Ahmed of Yemen;
  • Hajj, Umar Ahmad Umar Ahamd of Yemen;
  • Kanniappan, JR, Ezekial of Malaysia; and
  • Venayagamoorthy, Puvaneswaran of Malaysia.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Al Hazmi Exchange Khaled Al Hazmi And Brother Company General Partnership of Yemen;
  • Atlantic Navigation OPC Private Limited of India;
  • Blu Shipping M SDN. BHD. Of Malaysia;
  • Brecalin Hong Kong Co Ltd of China;
  • Galaxy Management NV of Suriname;
  • Ghezel Hesar Prison of Iran; and
  • Journey Investment Company of the Marshall Islands.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241219 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2757

 

*******

 

December 19, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)  sanctioned two Georgian officials from Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs which has engaged in brutal crackdowns on media members, opposition figures, and protesters — including during demonstrations throughout 2024. These officials are being sanctioned under Executive Order (E.O.) 13818 (Global Magnitsky), following the September 16, 2024 sanctions of two other Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs officials. This action was coordinated with the United Kingdom, which designated five individuals responsible for human rights violations in Georgia.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Gomelauri, Vakhtang of Georgia; and
  • Kezevadze, Mirza of Georgia.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241219

 

*******

 

December 27, 2024: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 116, "Authorizing Transactions Involving Entities Owned by Bidzina Ivanishvili." OFAC has also issued one new, Russia-related Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1204).

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 116: “Authorizing Transactions Involving Entities Owned by Bidzina Ivanishvili”

 

  • All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 involving any entity that is blocked solely due to a property interest of Bidzina Ivanishvili (Ivanishvili), or any entity in which Ivanishvili owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized, provided that such entity is not identified on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons.

 

Russia-related Frequently Asked Question 1204

 

Q: On December 27, 2024, OFAC designated Bidzina Ivanishvili (Ivanishvili) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024. Can I continue to engage in transactions or other dealings with entities owned by Ivanishvili that are not listed on OFAC's Specially Designation Nationals and Blocked Person List (SDN List) without facing sanctions risk?

 

A: Although transactions or other dealings involving Ivanishvili are generally prohibited as a result of OFAC's designation, OFAC concurrently issued General License (GL) 116 authorizing U.S. persons to engage in all transactions with any entity owned 50% or more by Ivanishvili provided that such entity is not identified on the SDN List. Non-U.S. persons may also engage in the transactions authorized by GL 116 without the risk of sanctions under E.O. 14024, as amended. However, U.S. persons are still prohibited from transacting with Ivanishvili himself unless exempt or otherwise authorized by OFAC. Additionally, as provided in paragraph (b), GL 116 does not authorize certain transactions, including transactions related to the Singapore Court of Appeal Case or related proceedings as specified in paragraph (b)(3) of the GL.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241227

 

*******

 

December 31, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Russian judge Olesya Mendeleeva (Mendeleeva) for her role in the arbitrary detention of Moscow city councilor and human rights defender, Alexei Gorinov. Mendeleeva is designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world. This action is also undertaken in the spirit of the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (P. L. 112-208)

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Mendeleeva, Olesya Anatolevna of Russia.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2765

 

*******

 

December 31, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated a subordinate organization of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and a Moscow-based affiliate organization of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and its director pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13848, the U.S. election interference authority. As affiliates of the IRGC and GRU, these actors aimed to stoke socio-political tensions and influence the U.S. electorate during the 2024 U.S. election. These actions build on sanctions previously imposed on the IRGC, the GRU, and their numerous subordinate and proxy organizations, pursuant to several authorities targeting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and malicious cyber-enabled activities.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Korovin, Valery Mikhaylovich of Russia.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Cognitive Design Production Center of Iran; and
  • International Non-Profit Foundation.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241231

DDTC Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 

Q:

Does the term “at the company facilities” in ITAR 120.64(a)(2) include only a company headquarters, or does it also include travel to other facilities?

A:

If a contracted employee is employed ordinarily at their company's facilities, they may also provide services for the company's clients outside the company's facilities. Such activities are within the definition of a regular employee in ITAR 120.64(a)(2).

Q:

If an item is described on the Excluded Technology List (ETL), is there any carveout that would allow it to be eligible under the ITAR § 126.7 (AUKUS) exemption?

A:

No.  If an item is described on the ETL, it is ineligible for transfer under the ITAR § 126.7 exemption.

Q:

If my commodity is not called out specifically in the EAR or the ITAR, do I need to submit a Commodity Jurisdiction Determination Request?

A:

If you are unable to determine the classification of an item after reviewing the USML and Commerce Control List per the Order of Review (see ITAR §120.11), you may submit a commodity jurisdiction determination to DDTC.

Q:

After the expiration of a Manufacturing License Agreement (MLA) may foreign parties continue to use and exchange technical data previously authorized for export among the same foreign signatories, sub-licensees and end-users?

A:

The continued use and exchange of the technical data previously authorized for export among the same foreign signatories, sub-licensees and end-users is generally permitted even after the agreement has terminated or expired. However, the foreign parties may not continue to use the technical data to manufacture absent separate authority. The foreign parties must seek approval from DDTC via a General Correspondence request to continue manufacturing using ITAR-controlled technical data after the expiration of an MLA. If the continued manufacturing activity requires the furnishing of a defense service by a U.S. person, then separate DDTC authorization would be required.

Q:

I have my technical data encrypted in accordance with section 120.54(a)(5) so that sending, taking, or storing it outside the United States is not considered an export, reexport, or retransfer. I understand that "access information" as defined in section 120.55 means "information that allows access to encrypted technical data . . . in an unencrypted form" and that examples include decryption keys, network access codes, and passwords. Further, I know that section 120.56(b) prohibits regulated persons from providing access information to foreign persons if the foreign persons are not otherwise authorized to receive the technical data that is encrypted. How do I determine if a violation of section 120.56(b) may have occurred?

A:

In the case of section 120.56(b) that would be where a regulated person provided access information to a foreign person, such that the foreign person could access, view, or possess encrypted technical data in an unencrypted form through the use of that access information and the foreign person is not authorized to have the technical data.

DECEMBER 2024 EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATES Read More »

NOVEMBER 2024 EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through November 30, 2024.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and

persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

President

 

President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Iran

 

November 1, 2024: On November 14, 1979, by Executive Order 12170, the President declared a national emergency with respect to Iran pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and took related steps to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the situation in Iran.

 

U.S. relations with Iran have not yet normalized, and the process of implementing the agreements with Iran, dated January 19, 1981, is ongoing.  For this reason, the national emergency declared on November 14, 1979, and the measures adopted on that date to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency with respect to Iran declared in Executive Order 12170.

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/11/01/notice-to-the-speaker-of-the-house-and-president-of-the-senate-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-iran/

and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/page/2/

 

*******

 

President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to the Threat from Securities Investments That Finance Certain Companies of the People’s Republic of China

 

November 7, 2024: On November 12, 2020, by Executive Order 13959, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the threat from securities investments that finance certain companies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

 

The President found that the PRC is exploiting United States capital to resource and enable the development and modernization of its military, intelligence, and other security apparatuses, which continues to allow the PRC to directly threaten the United States homeland and United States forces overseas.  Through the national strategy of Military‑Civil Fusion, the PRC increases the size of the country’s military-industrial complex by compelling civilian Chinese companies to support its military and intelligence activities.  Those companies, though remaining ostensibly private and civilian, directly support the PRC’s military, intelligence, and security apparatuses and aid in their development and modernization.  At the same time, those companies raise capital by selling securities to United States investors that trade on public exchanges both here and abroad, lobbying United States index providers and funds to include these securities in market offerings, and engaging in other acts to ensure access to United States capital.

 

The President further found that the PRC’s military-industrial complex, by directly supporting the efforts of the PRC’s military, intelligence, and other security apparatuses, constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.

 

On January 13, 2021, the President signed Executive Order 13974 amending Executive Order 13959.

 

On June 3, 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order 14032, which expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13959.  President Biden found that additional steps are necessary to address that national emergency, including the threat posed by the military-industrial complex of the PRC and its involvement in military, intelligence, and security research and development programs, and weapons and related equipment production under the PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy.  In addition, President Biden found that the use of Chinese surveillance technology outside the PRC and the development or use of Chinese surveillance technology to facilitate repression or serious human rights abuse constituted unusual and extraordinary threats to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and President Biden expanded the national emergency to address these threats.  Executive Order 14032 amended Executive Order 13959 and revoked Executive Order 13974 in its entirety.

 

The threat from securities investments that finance certain companies of the PRC and certain uses, and development of Chinese surveillance technology continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.

 

For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13959 of November 12, 2020, expanded in scope by Executive Order 14032 of June 3, 2021, must continue in effect beyond November 12, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13959 with respect to the threat from securities investments that finance certain companies of the PRC and expanded in Executive Order 14032.

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/11/07/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-the-threat-from-securities-investments-that-finance-certain-companies-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-3/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/

 

*******

 

President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

 

November 7, 2024: On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order 12938, the President declared a national emergency with respect to the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction) and the means of delivering such weapons.  On July 28, 1998, by Executive Order 13094, the President amended Executive Order 12938 to respond more effectively to the worldwide threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation activities.  On June 28, 2005, by Executive Order 13382, the President, among other things, further amended Executive Order 12938 to improve our ability to combat proliferation.  The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994, with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering such weapons must continue beyond November 14, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden Continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12938, as amended.

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/11/07/notice-to-the-speaker-of-the-house-and-president-of-the-senate-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-the-proliferation-of-weapons-of-mass-destruction/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/

 

*******

 

President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Nicaragua

 

November 22, 2024: On November 27, 2018, by Executive Order 13851, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in Nicaragua.  On October 24, 2022, President Biden issued Executive Order 14088 to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13851.

 

The situation in Nicaragua, including the violent response by the Government of Nicaragua to the protests that began on April 18, 2018, and the Ortega-Murillo regime’s continued systematic dismantling and undermining of democratic institutions and the rule of law, its use of indiscriminate violence and repressive tactics against civilians, as well as its corruption leading to the destabilization of Nicaragua’s economy, continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared on November 27, 2018, must continue in effect beyond November 27, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden is continuing for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13851 with respect to the situation in Nicaragua.

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/11/22/press-release-notice-to-the-speaker-of-the-house-and-president-of-the-senate-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-the-situation-in-nicaragua/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/

 

*******

 

Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

Extension of Comment Period for the Rule Proposing Changes to U.S. Munitions List Categories IV and XV

 

November 15, 2024: The Department of State is extending the comment period for the proposed rule “International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR): U.S. Munitions List Categories IV and XV” (89 FR 84482, Oct. 23, 2024). The original comment period required submission of comments on or before November 22, 2024.  In response to requests from the public, the Department extends the comment period through December 23, 2024.

 

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events and

https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2024-27059

 

 

*******

 

International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Extension of an Existing Temporary Modification of Category VIII of the U.S. Munitions List

 

November 26, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 93170: The Department of State, pursuant to its regulations and in the interest of the national security and foreign policy of the United States, extended a previous temporary modification of the United States Munitions List (USML) Category VIII.

 

On December 4, 2023, the Department of State published a final rule in the Federal Register at 88 FR 84072 temporarily modifying the note to USML Category VIII(h)(1), such that parts, components, accessories, and attachments specially designed for aircraft identified in paragraph (h)(1) are not released from that paragraph due to their use in the KF-21 aircraft.

 

The Department of State previously determined it is in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States to allow manufacturers to apply for export authorizations to participate in development of the KF-21 aircraft by using certain defense articles described in paragraph (h)(1) without removing those defense articles from the USML simply because they are used in the KF-21.

 

Now, the Department of State again determined it is in the security and foreign policy interests of the United States to extend the validity period of this temporary modification. Accordingly, pursuant to International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) § 126.2, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs hereby extends the previous temporary modification of the Note to paragraph (h)(1) of USML Category VIII.

 

Section 126.2 of the ITAR provides that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade Controls may order the temporary suspension or modification of any or all provisions of the ITAR when in the interest of the security and foreign policy of the United States. Section 120.1(b) of the ITAR authorizes the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs to exercise this authority for the Department of State.

 

This temporary modification, already effective and currently reflected in the USML at ITAR § 121.1, is hereby extended until December 1, 2026, or when terminated by the Department of State, whichever occurs first.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/11/26/2024-27592/international-traffic-in-arms-regulations-extension-of-an-existing-temporary-modification-of

 

*******

 

Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Poland

 

November 1, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government  Poland of has requested to buy mobile Ground Control Approach (GCA-2000) systems, which consist of ultra-high frequency radios; AN/UPX interrogators; radio navigation equipment; test equipment; precision navigation; spare and repair parts; consumables; accessories; warranties; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $105 million. The principal contractor will be L3Harris, located in Melbourne, FL. There is no known offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Repubic of Korea

 

November 4, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Republic of Korea (ROK) has requested to buy four (4) E-7 Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft; ten (10) CFM56 jet engines (8 installed, 2 spares); seven (7) Guardian Laser Transmitter Assemblies (GLTA) (4 installed, 3 spares); eight (8) AN/AAR-57 AN/AAQ 24(V)N Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) System Processor Replacements (LSPR) (4 installed, 4 spares); ten (10) Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) (EGI) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) – or M-Code receiver (8 installed, 2 spares); and six (6) Multifunctional Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio Systems with Tactical Targeting Network Technology (MIDS JTRS TTNT) (4 installed, 2 spares). The following non-MDE items will also be included: AN/ARC-210 radios; digital radar warning receivers; AN/ALE-47 electronic countermeasure dispensers; LAIRCM control interface units; missile warning sensors; AN/APX-119 identification friend or foe (IFF) transponders; KY100M narrowband/wideband terminals; KIV-77 Mode 4/5 IFF cryptographic appliqué; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; KG-175 Link encryptors; communications security (COMSEC) cables and other COMSEC devices and equipment; communications equipment; precision navigation; Computer Program Identification Numbers (CPINS); user data module cards; testing and test equipment; major and minor modifications and maintenance support; aircraft components, parts, and accessories; training aids and devices, and spare parts; instruments and lab equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; aircraft ferry and transportation support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $4.92 billion. The principal contractor will be The Boeing Company, located in Renton, WA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/republic-korea-e-7-airborne-early-warning-control-aircraft and

https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/archive-date/202411

 

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Czech Republic

 

November 5, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of the Czech Republic has requested to buy a two-sector fixed satellite communications turnkey system, based on a Large Enterprise Terminals (LET) system, consisting of the following non-MDE items: communications equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $184 million. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the Czech Republic.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/czech-republic-large-enterprise-terminals-system and

https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/archive-date/202411

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Greece

 

November 14, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Greece has requested to buy equipment and services for follow-on support of its F-16 engines. The following non-MDE items will be included: engine components, parts, and accessories; aircraft engine and ground handling equipment; major and minor modifications; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $160 million. The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region. The principal contractor will be General Electric Aerospace, located in Evendale, OH. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Greece. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/greece-f-16-engine-follow-support

 

*******

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the United Kingdom

 

November 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government the United Kingdom has requested to buy forty-six (46) Tactical Combat Training System Increment II (TCTS II) air combat training systems. The following non-MDE items will also be included: containers; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $70 million. The principal contractors will be Collins Aerospace, located in Cedar Rapids, IA, and Leonardo DRS Systems, located in Fort Walton Beach, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/united-kingdom-tactical-combat-training-system-increment-ii

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Republic of Korea

 

November 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Republic of Korea has requested to buy equipment and services to upgrade its F-15K aircraft fleet, including ninety-six (96) Advanced Display Core Processor II (ADCP II) mission system computers; seventy (70) AN/APG-82(v)1 Active Electronically Scanned Arrays (AESA) radars; seventy (70) AN/ALQ-250 Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS) electronic warfare (EW) suites; and seventy (70) AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS). The following non-MDE items will also be included: Joint Mission Planning Systems (JMPS) with unique planning components; Computer Program Identification Numbers (CPINs); Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems; major modifications and maintenance support; aircraft components, parts, and accessories; spare parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support; training aids and devices; weapons software and software support; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; aerial refueling support; aircraft ferry and transportation support; facilities and construction support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $6.2 billion. The primary contractors will be Boeing Company, based in Arlington, VA; Raytheon Technologies, located in Forest, MS; and BAE Systems, situated in Falls Church, VA. The U. S. Government is not aware of any offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/republic-korea-f-15k-aircraft-upgrade

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Ukraine

 

November 19, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of Ukraine has requested to buy equipment and services for refurbishment of vehicles; technical assistance; training; publications; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $100 million. The principal contractor(s) will be determined from approved vendors. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/ukraine-blanket-order-sustainment-us-army-supplied-systems-0

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the United Kingdom

 

November 27, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of the United Kingdom has requested to buy a High Gain Measurement System (HGMS) with off-aspect mid frequency line arrays (MFLAs), HGMS components that include acoustic sensors, cables, test hardware and software; containers; anchoring equipment; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $125 million. The principal contractor will be Leidos, Inc., located in Reston, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO)

 

November 29, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy critical spare and repair parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support for F-16 aircraft; Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar spare parts and support; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $320 million. Deliveries are estimated to begin in 2025. This equipment will be transferred from U.S. Government stock. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO)

 

November 29, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy extended services provided under a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at $41.6 million ($0 in MDE), included services related to follow-on support for the Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment (IMSE) and Experimental Force (EXFOR) system, including repair and return of equipment; management, replacement, and repair services; U.S. Government liaison support as required; contract engineering and technical support; logistics; contractor operation and management of the OCONUS depot, including repair and replacement; and other related elements of logistics and program support. This notification is for an extension of those same services for an additional two years. The estimated total cost is $65 million. The principal contractor will be General Dynamics Mission Systems, located in Fairfax, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

BIS Releases New Edition of “Don’t Let This Happen to You!”

November 12, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Export Enforcement published an updated version of “Don’t Let This Happen to You!”, a compendium of case examples highlighting BIS criminal and administrative enforcement efforts. The publication was last updated in July 2024.

The updated version includes new enforcement cases involving: the first Disruptive Technology Strike Force case to result in a stand-alone administrative penalty; a criminal case against an illicit Russian procurement network; a criminal case where export-controlled items were smuggled outside of the United States and used in an assassination plot; an administrative case against a semiconductor wafer manufacturing company for unauthorized shipments to a party on the Entity List; and violations of the antiboycott regulations. Exporters are encouraged to review the publication, which provides useful illustrations of the type of conduct that gets companies and universities in trouble.

BIS Export Enforcement protects and promotes U.S. national security by aggressively investigating violations of export control and antiboycott regulations and by partnering with industry and academia to facilitate compliance with those regulation.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-releases-new-edition-dont-let-happen-you-0

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Export Administration Regulation: Revisions to Space-Related Export Controls; Extension of Comment Period

 

November 18, 2024: On October 23, 2024, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published in the Federal Register the interim final rule, “Export Administration Regulations: Revisions to Space Related Export Controls” with comments originally due November 22, 2024. This notification extends the deadline for written comments to December 23, 2024. This extension is being made to allow commenters to have additional time to review the interim final rule and to be informed by the public outreach that BIS is conducting on the rule in preparing their comments.  Extending the public comment period will not in any way undermine the rule or national security of the United States.

 

https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/export-administration-regulations-revisions-space-related-export-controls-extension and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?content_type=All&created=1&field_countries=All&field_learn_support_topics=All&field_news_updates_topic=All&news_search_query=&page=1&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

 

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Export Administration Regulations: Revisions to Space-Related Controls, including Addition of License Exception Commercial Space Activities (CSA); Extension of Comment Period

 

November 18, 2024: On October 23, 2024, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published in the Federal Register the proposed rule, “Export Administration Regulations: Revisions to Space Related Export Controls, Including Addition of License Exception Commercial Space Activities (CSA)” with comments originally due November 22, 2024. This notification extends the deadline for written comments to December 23, 2024. This extension is being made to allow commenters to have additional time to review the proposed rule and to be informed by the public outreach that BIS is conducting on the rule in preparing their comments. Extending the public comment period will not in any way undermine the rule or national security of the United States.

 

https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/export-administration-regulations-revisions-space-related-export-controls-including and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?content_type=All&created=1&field_countries=All&field_learn_support_topics=All&field_news_updates_topic=All&news_search_query=&page=1&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

 

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Department of Commerce Strengthens Restrictions on Exports to Pakistan to Address Diversion Concerns

 

November 25, 2024: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule imposing new controls on exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) involving six key categories of items – some of which were previously controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons – to Pakistan to address diversion concerns. BIS has determined that these items have been sought by entities on the Entity List, as well as front companies acting on their behalf. Controlling such items on a countrywide basis will allow the U.S. Government to review proposed transactions to mitigate the risk of diversion to an end use or end user of concern, while facilitating trade for legitimate commercial and civil end uses.

The items controlled in this rule are listed on the Commerce Control List under Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) 1B999, 2A992, 2B999,1 3A992, 3A999, and 6A996. Items that fall within the scope of these ECCNs include the following:

  • Particle accelerators;
  • Certain stainless or alloy pipes and valves;
  • Certain pumps and welders;
  • Oscilloscopes;
  • Chromatographs and spectrometers; and

A BIS license will now be required for regional stability reasons to export, reexport, or transfer items (in-country) under these six ECCNs to or within Pakistan. Applications for such transactions will be denied if the U.S. Government determines that there is an unacceptable risk of use in an end use of concern or diversion to an end user of concern. The availability of license exceptions is limited.

https://www.federalregister.gov/ and

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-strengthens-restrictions-exports-pakistan-address-diversion-concerns

 

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U.S. Census Bureau

Implementation of SPD 15 in the American Community Survey

November 5, 2024: Earlier this year, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published the results of its review of Statistical Policy Directive No. 15 (SPD 15) and issued updated standards for maintaining, collecting and presenting race and ethnicity data across federal agencies. The updated 2024 SPD 15 requires the use of a combined race and ethnicity question, the addition of a new “Middle Eastern or North African” minimum reporting category, and the collection of detailed race and ethnicity responses.

Since then, programs across the U.S. Census Bureau have been assessing how and when to implement the updated race and ethnicity standards set by OMB in the 2024 SPD 15. We expect race and ethnicity data that align with the revised standards will enhance the entire range of Census Bureau data products that describe the demographic makeup and socioeconomic characteristics of our country and our diverse communities.

The U.S. Census Bureau recognizes the importance of implementing the updated standards as quickly as possible, while maintaining the high-quality American Community Survey (ACS) data that are relied upon by so many both inside and outside of government. We have given careful consideration regarding the implementation of the updated race and ethnicity standards, including an assessment of cost, risk, and benefit. Based on these assessments, we decided to implement the finalized 2024 SPD 15 published by OMB on March 28, 2024, in the 2027 ACS data collection cycle. This means:

  • The first ACS 1-year estimates produced using the updated standards will be the 2027 ACS 1-year data, planned for release in September 2028.
  • The first 5-year estimates produced solely using the data collected under the 2024 SPD 15 will be available in the 2027-2031 ACS 5-year data, scheduled for release in December 2032.
  • Until the ACS has 5 years of data collected using the updated standards, the Census Bureau will produce ACS 5-year estimates using a bridging technique, starting with the 2023-2027 ACS 5-year release scheduled for December 2028. Providing data products at low levels of geography following the 2024 SPD 15 will allow data users to gain new insights into the demographic makeup and socioeconomic characteristics of our diverse communities.

In making a final decision about the timing, the Census Bureau weighed the need for producing data under the updated standards as quickly as possible against the need for accurate data. The ACS program conducted an assessment of what would be necessary to implement the updated 2024 SPD 15 in the ACS in either the 2026 ACS or the 2027 ACS. This assessment considered multiple factors including the amount of time and resources needed to implement the change accurately and how the implementation of the 2024 SPD 15 could be accomplished alongside work on critical projects to modernize operations at the Census Bureau.

The Census Bureau also considered federal and nonfederal stakeholder feedback in its assessment. The Census Bureau solicited public feedback on the timing of the implementation of the updated 2024 SPD 15 through a Federal Register notice published on July 12, 2024. The ACS program and OMB also solicited comments about the timing of implementation from federal agencies that use ACS data. We appreciate those who responded with their thoughtful comments.

Related to this effort, the Census Bureau is participating in OMB’s Federal Committee on SPD 15, which will provide statistical tools such as bridging programs to crosswalk data collected under the 1997 SPD 15 and the revised 2024 SPD 15, and best practices for coding detailed racial and ethnic groups and write-in responses.

As we continue the work of implementing the updated standards in the ACS, we will keep the public, stakeholders, and data users informed. We look forward to implementing the updated race/ethnicity standards to improve and produce race/ethnicity statistics for our country.

Port of Unlading Codes Updated in the Automated Export System (AES) 

November 18, 2024: Please note the following Port of Unlading Code Name has been UPDATED in the AES effective immediately.

Port Name           Port Code          Country

Whonnock, BC     12488                 Canada

The following Port of Unlading Code Country has been UPDATED in the AES effective immediately.

Port Name           Port Code          Country

Tolu                      30111                  Colombia

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Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages

November 19, 2024: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected.  If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation.  Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN.  However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.

To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

Response Code:  512

Narrative:      ECCN Missing

Severity:        Fatal

Reason:        The License Code/License Exemption Code requires an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN), but it was not reported.

Resolution:  The License Code/License Exemption Code requires the reporting of an ECCN. See ‘Appendix F – License and License Exemption Type Codes’ and reporting guidelines.

Verify the License Code/License Exemption Code requirements, correct the shipment and resubmit.

Response Code:  626

Narrative:      1st UOM Code Missing

Severity:        Fatal

Reason:         The Schedule B/HTS Number reported requires a Unit of Measure (1)  and Unit of Measure (1) is missing.

Resolution:  The Schedule B/HTS Number reported requires the Units for 1st Quantity to be reported.

Verify the Unit of Measure for the 1st Quantity, correct the shipment and resubmit.

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

 

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Fines and Penalties

 

November 1, 2024: As part of a settlement agreement, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed a civil penalty of $500,000 against GlobalFoundries U.S. Inc., a semiconductor wafer manufacturing company headquartered in Malta, New York, and its subsidiary, GlobalFoundries U.S. 2 LLC (collectively, “GlobalFoundries”).

 

The penalty relates to GlobalFoundries’ shipments of semiconductor wafers valued at approximately $17.1 million to SJ Semiconductor (SJS), a company on the BIS Entity List, without the requisite license or other authorization from BIS. GlobalFoundries voluntarily disclosed the conduct to BIS, cooperated with the investigation by BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement (OEE), and took remedial measures after discovering the conduct at issue, which resulted in a significant reduction in the penalty.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-imposes-500000-mitigated-penalty-against-globalfoundries-74-shipments-entity

 

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November 1, 2024: Vadim Yermolenko, 43, a dual U.S.-Russian national and resident of New Jersey, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Export Control Reform Act, conspiracy to commit bank fraud, and conspiracy to defraud the United States for his role in a transnational procurement and money laundering network that sought to acquire sensitive dual-use electronics for Russian military and intelligence services.

 

The defendant and his co-conspirators unlawfully purchased and exported highly sensitive, export controlled electronic components, some of which can be used in the development of nuclear and hypersonic weapons, quantum computing and other military applications.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/new-jersey-resident-pleads-guilty-helping-russias-defense-sector-evade-us-export-controls

 

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November 13, 2024: Stanislav Romanyuk, 39, a citizen of Ukraine last residing in Estonia, was sentenced to 33 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release, for his role in a scheme to violate U.S. export laws and regulations by attempting to smuggle a dual-use export-controlled item to Russia.

 

According to court documents and statements made in court, beginning in 2018, Romanyuk, who operated Estonia-based BY Trade OÜ, conspired with Vadims Ananics and Eriks Mamonovs, both citizens of Latvia who operated the Latvia-based corporation CNC Weld. Romanyuk, Ananics, and Mamonovs violated U.S. export laws and regulations with individuals in Russia and a Russian company to smuggle to Russia a 500 Series CPWZ Precision Jig Grinder that was manufactured in Connecticut.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ukrainian-national-involved-scheme-export-dual-use-high-precision-jig-grinder-russia and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?content_type=All&created=1&field_countries=All&field_learn_support_topics=All&field_news_updates_topic=All&news_search_query=&page=1&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

 

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November 14, 2024: George Semerene Quintero (Semerene), 61, of Venezuela, was sentenced to 30 months in prison to be followed by three years of supervised release for conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and for his role in a scheme to evade U.S. sanctions imposed on Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA), a Venezuelan state-owned oil company.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/venezuelan-national-sentenced-sanctions-evasion-scheme and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?content_type=All&created=1&field_countries=All&field_learn_support_topics=All&field_news_updates_topic=All&news_search_query=&page=1&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

 

 

November 14, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $178,421 settlement with American Life Insurance Company (ALICO), a subsidiary of MetLife, Inc.  ALICO agreed to settle its potential civil liability for 2,331 apparent violations of OFAC sanctions on Iran.  The apparent violations related to insurance policies provided to entities in the United Arab Emirates that were owned or controlled by the Government of Iran.  The settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that the apparent violations were voluntarily self-disclosed and were not egregious.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241114_33

 

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November 15, 2024:  The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) has notified Moheed Latif, Hamza Latif, and Abdu Latif Chaudhry, and their company M&M Wireless Communications, Inc. (“M&M), of its intention to initiate an administrative proceeding against the individuals and M&M pursuant to Section 766.3 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”). The individuals and M&M jointly committed 94 Violations of the EAR, including 4 acts of Misrepresentation and Concealment of Facts (15 C.F.R 764.2(g)) and 90 acts of Failure to Comply with Recordkeeping requirements (15 C.F.R. 764.2(i)).

 

Misrepresentation and Concealment of Facts

 

On four occasions between November 24, 2020 and November 17, 2021, M&M made false and misleading statements and falsified material facts a to U.S. based freight forwarding company in preparing and submitting “export control documents” as defined in Section 772.1 of the EAR. M&M provided false information to file Electronic Export Information (“EEI”) on four separate occasions where BIS inspected and detained the shipment.

 

Failure to Comply with Recordkeeping Requirements

 

On May 10, 2022, the Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”) served M&M with a BIS Administrative Subpoena requesting the records, including but not limited to, invoices, correspondence with foreign purchasers, air waybills, and bills of lading, in connection with 90 exports. On June 10, 2022, OEE received a response from M&M stating that no such records existed.

 

Settlement

 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection has imposed a $5.4 million penalty and $462,669 civil forfeiture action against M&M.

 

BIS and M&M have entered into a Settlement Agreement:

 

  • For a period of three (3) years, M&M shall be made subject to a three-year denial of its export privileges under the EAR.

 

  • M&M shall complete export compliance training on the EAR within twelve (12) months of date of order.

 

 

  • Verification of attendance of an export compliance training are made conditions to the granting, restoration, or continuing validity of any export license, license exception, permission, privilege granted, or to be granted to M&M.

 

 

https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/docman/?task=doc_download&gid=1648emid=

 

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November 26, 2024: Richard Shih, 77, the founder and former chief executive officer of a California-based international logistics and freight forwarding company with offices in Grapevine, Texas, pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate export laws by shipping goods to Chinese companies on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List.

 

Shih pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the Export Control Reform Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, which carries a maximum sentence of up to five years in federal prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/founder-us-freight-forwarding-company-pleads-guilty-conspiring-illegally-export-goods-united

 

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November 26, 2024: On Nov. 20 in the District of Oregon, Sanjay Kaushik, 57, of India, was indicted for conspiring to export controlled aviation components with dual civilian and military applications to end users in Russia, in violation of the Export Control Reform Act. Kaushik was also charged with attempting to illegally export a navigation and flight control system from Oregon to Russia through India, and with making false statements in connection with an export. He was arrested in Miami, Florida, on Oct. 17, pursuant to a criminal complaint and arrest warrant issued by the District of Oregon.

 

If convicted, Kaushik faces maximum penalties of 20 years in prison and up to a $1 million for each count in the indictment. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/indian-national-charged-conspiring-illegally-export-us-aviation-components-russia

 

Sanctions

 

 

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

November 1, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 87279: In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) makes changes to the export controls against Russia and Belarus under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). This final rule expands the scope of the Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions by imposing controls on nine key precursors for riot control agents and a chemical weapon that Russia has deployed against Ukraine in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This final rule also makes adjustments to exclusions, exceptions, and licensing policy for exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) to certain components of the governments of Country Group A:5 and A:6 destinations that are in Russia and Belarus. Lastly, this final rule clarifies that the Russia/Belarus-Military End User and Procurement Foreign-Direct Product (FDP) rule and the EAR's other Entity List FDP rules' license requirements extend to or within any destination or to any end user or party that otherwise meets the criteria. This final rule is being published concurrently with a BIS final rule, “Additions and Revisions of Entities to the Entity List” (RIN 0694-AJ94), which includes additional changes related to export controls related to Russia and Belarus.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/11/01/2024-25445/implementation-of-additional-export-controls-against-russia-and-belarus-under-the-export and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?content_type=All&created=1&field_countries=All&field_learn_support_topics=All&field_news_updates_topic=All&news_search_query=&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

 

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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

November 6, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated one individual and one entity who support a corrupt patronage network in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) that attempted to evade U.S. sanctions. This network is directly linked to U.S.-designated Igor Dodik (Igor), the son of Milorad Dodik (Dodik), the U.S.-designated President of BiH’s Republika Srpska (RS), one of two entities that make up BiH. For years, Dodik has used his official position to accumulate personal wealth through companies linked to himself and Igor. This corruption has contributed to an undermining of public confidence in BiH state institutions and the rule of law.

 

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) also issued Balkans-related General License (No. 5A), “Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Pumps Manufactured or Distributed by Kaldera Company EL PGP d.o.o. or Elpring d.o.o. Laktasi for the Treatment or Distribution of Drinking Water.”

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 5A: Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Pumps Manufactured or Distributed  by Kaldera Company EL PGP d.o.o. or Elpring d.o.o. Laktasi for the Treatment or Distribution of Drinking Water

 

  • All transactions prohibited by the Western Balkans Stabilization Regulations, 31 CFR part 588 (WBSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the manufacture, distribution, operation, installation, or maintenance and repair of pumps manufactured or distributed by Kaldera Company EL PGP d.o.o. (Kaldera), Elpring d.o.o. Laktasi (Elpring), or any entity in which Kaldera or Elpring owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are currently or are intended solely for use in the treatment or distribution of drinking water, are authorized.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Perisic, Vladimir of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Elpring D.O.O. Laktasi, XVI of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241106 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2709 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933566/download?inline

 

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November 7, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)  issued Venezuela General License 5Q, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 2020 8.5 Percent Bond on or After March 7, 2025,” and Venezuela General License 8O, “Authorizing Transactions Involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) Necessary for the Limited Maintenance of Essential Operations in Venezuela or the Wind Down of Operations in Venezuela for Certain Entities.”

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 5Q Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to the  Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 2020 8.5 Percent Bond on or After March 7, 2025

 

  • On or after March 7, 2025, all transactions related to, the provision of financing for, and other dealings in the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 2020 8.5 Percent Bond that would be prohibited by subsection l(a)(iii) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13835 of May 21, 2018, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019, and incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized.

 

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 😯 Authorizing Transactions Involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) Necessary for the Limited Maintenance of Essential Operations in Venezuela or the Wind Down of Operations in Venezuela for Certain Entities

 

  • All transactions and activities prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13850 of November 1, 2018, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019, or E.O. 13884 of August 5, 2019, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the limited maintenance of essential operations, contracts, or other agreements, that: (i) are for safety or the preservation of assets in Venezuela; (ii) involve PdVSA or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest; and (iii) were in effect prior to July 26, 2019, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, May 9, 2025, for the following entities and their subsidiaries (collectively, the “Covered Entities”):

 

  • Halliburton
  • Schlumberger Limited
  • Baker Hughes Holdings LLC
  • Weatherford International, Public Limited Company

 

Note to paragraph (a). Transactions and activities necessary for safety or the preservation of assets in Venezuela that are authorized by paragraph (a) of this general license include: transactions and activities necessary to ensure the safety of personnel, or the integrity of operations and assets in Venezuela; participation in shareholder and board of directors meetings; making payments on third-party invoices for transactions and activities authorized by paragraph (a) of this general license, or incurred prior to April 21, 2020, provided such activity was authorized at the time it occurred; payment of local taxes and purchase of utility services in Venezuela; and payment of salaries for employees and contractors in Venezuela.

 

(b) All transactions and activities prohibited by E.O. 13850, as amended, or E.O. 13884, each as incorporated into the VSR, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of operations, contracts, or other agreements in Venezuela involving PdVSA or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, and that were in effect prior to July 26, 2019, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, May 9, 2025, for the Covered Entities.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241107 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933576/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933581/download?inline

 

*******

 

November 12, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Abdel Rahman Joma’a Barakallah (Barakallah) for his leadership role in the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a primary party responsible for the ongoing violence against civilians in Sudan since April 2023. Barakallah led the RSF’s campaign in West Darfur, which was marked by credible claims of serious human rights abuses, including targeting of civilians, conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), and ethnically motivated violence. This action is in furtherance of the United Nations Security Council’s November 8 designation of Barakallah and fellow RSF commander Osman Mohamed Hamid Mohamed, who was previously designated by the Department of the Treasury in May 2024.

 

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) amended the Burma Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 525, to further implement E.O. 14014 and reissued them in their entirety. This regulatory amendment is currently available for public inspection with the Federal Register and will take effect upon publication in the Federal Register on November 13, 2024.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Barkallah, Abdel Rahman Joma’a of Sudan.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2710 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933591/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241112

 

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November 13, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published two new insurance-related FAQs (FAQ 1199 and FAQ 1200).

 

FAQ 1199:

 

Q: Can a claim be paid under a policy issued to a blocked individual or entity if the payment is to an innocent third-party (for example, the injured party in an automobile accident)?

A: The insurance company should contact OFAC for additional guidance. OFAC will work with you on the specifics of the case. Although authorizing payments to blocked persons is rarely aligned with the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives of OFAC sanctions, circumstances may weigh in favor of authorizing payments to innocent third parties. Ultimately, the insurance policy itself is a blocked contract, so all otherwise prohibited dealings related to the policy would require OFAC authorization.

 

FAQ 1200:

 

Q: If a non-sanctioned person files a claim with their insurance company for a loss caused by a blocked person, such as a designated terrorist organization, is the insurance company permitted to pay the claim?

 

A: OFAC is aware that insurers at times receive claims from non-sanctioned persons in non-comprehensively sanctioned jurisdictions for losses caused by individuals or entities on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List). For example, a U.S. insurance company may receive a claim request for death, injury, or property damage caused by a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Under this scenario, the mere fact that a blocked person has caused the loss does not in and of itself create a blocked interest in the policy or any claim or payment under the policy, nor does it constitute a dealing involving the blocked person. Therefore, U.S. insurers may pay such claims to non-sanctioned recipients, provided the payment is not prohibited by other OFAC sanctions regulations (e.g., the recipient resides in a sanctioned jurisdiction and no other authorization applies). This guidance does not apply to scenarios in which a person is seeking reimbursement for payments that were made or will be made to a blocked person.

 

OFAC encourages insurers who receive claims for losses caused by a blocked person to conduct necessary due diligence to ensure there are no other potential sanctions risks associated with making or facilitating related claim payments (e.g., the involvement of a blocked financial institution).

OFAC is aware that some insurance policies may include subrogation rights, which provide a legal right for the insurer to pursue reimbursement from the liable third-party for payment of the claim. The mere existence of such rights in a situation involving a loss caused by a blocked person does not create an interest of the blocked person in the policy or claims made under the policy. However, claims paid as described above and all other obligations of the insurer on behalf of the insured (or their non-sanctioned beneficiaries) under a given policy must not be contingent on the successful pursuit of a subrogated claim by the insurer against a blocked person.

 

OFAC does not require U.S. persons to obtain a specific license to initiate legal proceedings against a blocked person. For example, a U.S. attorney, insurer, or other service provider initiating arbitral proceedings against a Specially Designated Global Terrorist does not require a specific license. In most OFAC programs, however, a license would generally be required to enter a settlement agreement with a blocked person, to accept payment from a blocked person, or to enforce an order or award transferring blocked property. Please see the relevant OFAC implementing regulations and the Sanctions Programs and Country Information page on OFAC’s website for further program-specific information. For guidance on how to request and apply for a specific license, please see 31 CFR § 501.801 and the License Application page on OFAC's website.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241113 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1199 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1200

 

*******

 

November 14, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 26 companies, individuals, and vessels associated with the Al-Qatirji Company, a Syrian conglomerate responsible for generating hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and the Houthis through the sale of Iranian oil to Syria and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Previously designated for its role in facilitating the sale of fuel between the Syrian regime and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Al-Qatirji Company has morphed into one of the main channels through which the IRGC-QF generates revenue and funds its regional proxy groups. OFAC is expanding its targeting of Al-Qatirji’s network and its fleet of vessels to inhibit the IRGC-QF from benefiting from this relationship.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Katerji, Abbas of Syria; and
  • Qatirji, Muhammad Agha Ahmed Rashdi of Syria.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Amitis Jazireh Ship Management Co LLC of Iran;
  • Bluespectrum Shipping S.A. of Panama;
  • Elias Shipping & trading Group SA of Panama;
  • Moshtaq Tejarat Sanat Co JSC of Iran;
  • Nativa Management Ltd of the Marshall Islands;
  • Pearl Shipping & Trading Ltd of Lebanon;
  • Salina Ship Management PVT Ltd of India;
  • Softwater Naviagtion Holding Ltd of the Marshall Islands; and
  • Veline Shiptrade Incorporated of Seychelles.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Baron (8RCB2) Chemical/Products Tanker Guyana flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9080493; MMSI 667001798 (vessel);
  • Celine 3E2126) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9305609; MMSI 352001369 (vessel);
  • Chloe (8RAX1) Crude Oil Tanker Guyana flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9173745; MMSI 750656000 (vessel);
  • Eline (8PAA5) Crude Oil Tanker Barbados flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9292486; MMSI 314856000 (vessel);
  • Joel (T8A4642) Crude Oil Tanker Palau flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9198094; MMSI 511101321 (vessel);
  • Lelia (8PAB1) Crude Oil Tanker Barbados flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9258870; MMSI 314861000 (vessel);
  • Lotus (EPNF3) Crude Oil Tanker Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9203784; MMSI 422300300 (vessel);
  • Ramona (8RPE6) Crude Oil Tanker Guyana flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9233222; MMSI 750925000 (vessel);
  • Rex 1 (3EUU2) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9219056; MMSI 372979000 (vessel);
  • Romina (EPMH6) Crude Oil Tanker Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9114608; MMSI 422278900 (vessel); and
  • Star 5 (EPPV7) Crude Oil Tanker Iran flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9150377; MMSI 422362100 (vessel).

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2712 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241114

 

*******

 

November 18, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Amana the Settlement Movement of Gush Emunim Central Cooperative Association Ltd (Amana), a settlement development organization that is involved with U.S.-sanctioned individuals and outposts that perpetrate violence in the West Bank, and its subsidiary Binyanei Bar Amana Ltd. This action, taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14115, is part of an ongoing multilateral approach by the United States and its partners to hold accountable those who are threatening the peace, security, and stability of the West Bank. Amana has also been sanctioned by the United Kingdom and Canada.Top of Form

 

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issued West Bank-related General License 1, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Entities Blocked on November 18, 2024.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 1: Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Entities Blocked on November 18, 2024

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14115 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving Amana The Settlement Movement Of Gush Emunim Central Cooperative Association Ltd (Amana), Binyanei Bar Amana Ltd (BBA), or any entity in which Amana or BBA owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 10, 2025, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked interest-bearing account and reported to the Office of Foreign Assets Control consistent with § 501.603 of the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations, 31 CFR part 501.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Koshlevsky, Shabtai of Israel;
  • Levi, Itamar Yehuda of Israel; and
  • Sabah, Zohar of Israel.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Amana The Settlment Movement of Gush Emunium Central Cooperative Association LTD of Israel;
  • Binyanei Bar Amana Ltd of Israel; and
  • Eyal Yehuda Company Ltd of Israel.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241118 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2715 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933616/download?inline

 

*******

 

November 19, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned a network of nine Mexican nationals involved in fentanyl, heroin, and other deadly drug trafficking and money laundering. Individuals designated in this network also engage in human smuggling in furtherance of their drug trafficking activities. Additionally, as members of the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG), some of the individuals sanctioned played a prominent role in the early stages of the U.S. opioid crisis, a leading factor driving the United States’ modern fentanyl crisis. CJNG is a violent Mexico-based drug trafficking organization responsible for a significant proportion of fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Arias Ponce, Erandiny Jazim of Mexico;
  • Castaneda Meza, Giovanni of Mexico;
  • Castaneda Meza, Ivan Atzayacatl of Mexico;
  • Castaneda Meza, Juan Carlos of Mexico;
  • Catellanos Meza, Roberto of Mexico;
  • Catillo Lopez, Jose Adrian of Mexico;
  • Castillo Peinado, Araceli of Mexico;
  • Castro Alvarez, Jose Sinue of Mexico; and
  • Navarro Quezada, Luis Alonso of Mexico.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241119

 

*******

 

November 19, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated six senior Hamas officials, including the terrorist group’s representatives abroad, a senior member of the Hamas military wing, the Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, as well as individuals involved in supporting the terrorist group’s fundraising efforts and weapons smuggling into Gaza.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Akari, Musa Daud Muhammad of Turkey;
  • Ghanimat, Abd Al-Rahman Ismail Abd Al-Rahman of Turkey;
  • Hamad, Gazi of Saudi Arabia;
  • Mari, Salama Aziz Muhammad of Turkey;
  • Naim, Basem of Palestine; and
  • Nazzal, Mohammad of Syria.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241119

 

*******

 

November 21, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took another major step in implementing commitments made by G7 leaders to curtail Russia’s use of the international financial system to further its war against Ukraine. OFAC’s action includes the designation of Gazprombank, more than 50 internationally connected Russian banks, more than 40 Russian securities registrars, and 15 Russian finance officials. OFAC also issued an alert describing sanctions risks related to Russia’s System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS), which the Kremlin created and uses to evade sanctions.

 

The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related GL 53A, "Authorizing Transactions for Diplomatic Missions of the Russian Federation Involving Gazprombank Joint Stock Company or Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024," Russia-related GL 55C, "Authorizing Certain Services Related to Sakhalin-2," Russia-related GL 113, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Financial Institutions Blocked on November 21, 2024," and Russia-related GL 114, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Certain Entities Blocked on November 21, 2024."

 

Additionally, OFAC issued two new Russia-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ 1201, FAQ 1202).

 

OFAC is also publishing a new, Russia-related Alert, "Sanctions Risk for Foreign Financial Institutions that Join Russian Financial Messaging System, System for Transfer of Financial Messages."

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 53A: Authorizing Transactions for Diplomatic Missions of the Russian Federation Involving Gazprombank Joint Stock Company or Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024

 

(a) U.S. persons are authorized to engage in all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the official business of diplomatic or consular missions of the Government of the Russian Federation (“Russian missions”) that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 and involve Gazprombank Joint Stock Company (Gazprombank), or any entity in which Gazprombank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, or are prohibited by Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 55C: Authorizing Certain Services Related to Sakhalin-2

 

(a)  All transactions prohibited by the determination of November 21, 2022 made pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 (“Prohibitions on Certain Services as They Relate to the Maritime Transport of Crude Oil of Russian Federation Origin”) related to the maritime transport of crude oil originating from the Sakhalin-2 project (“Sakhalin-2 byproduct”) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 28, 2025, provided that the Sakalin-2 byproduct is solely for importation into Japan.

 

(b) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 involving Gazprombank Joint Stock Company (Gazprombank) or any entity in which Gazprombank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are related to the Sakhalin-2 project, including such transactions involving Sakhalin Energy LLC, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 28, 2025.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 113: Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Financial Institutions Blocked on November 21, 2024

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions involving the blocked persons listed in the Annex to this general license, and any entity in which those blocked persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 20, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 114: Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Certain Entities Blocked on November 21, 2024

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or the facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity issued or guaranteed by the following blocked entities (“Covered Debt or Equity”) to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 20, 2024:

 

(1) Gazprombank Joint Stock Company;

(2) Interstate Bank; or

(3) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

(b) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of Covered Debt or Equity that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, November 21, 2024 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 20, 2024.

 

(c) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, November 21, 2024 that (i) include a blocked person described in paragraph (a) of this general license as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to Covered Debt or Equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 20, 2024, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

FAQ 1201:

 

Q: What authorizations exist for diplomatic or consular missions operating in Russia and Russian diplomatic or consular missions operating abroad?

 

A: The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued several authorizations related to U.S. and third-country diplomatic or consular missions operating in Russia and Russian diplomatic or consular missions operating abroad.

 

FAQ 1202:

 

Q: Following the November 21, 2024 designation of Russian financial institutions, Treasury has now designated a significant number of financial institutions in Russia. Will this negatively impact the processing of personal, non-commercial remittances to or from Russia?

 

A: No. Treasury's sanctions target Russian financial institutions that have continued to help Russia gain access to the critical goods it needs to prosecute its war in Ukraine. As a general matter, personal, non-commercial remittances are not the target of sanctions imposed by the United States on Russia.

 

There remain a number of non-sanctioned Russian banks, subsidiaries of foreign banks, and money service businesses that can continue to process legitimate transactions, including non-commercial, personal remittances.

 

U.S. and foreign financial institutions may continue to process transactions for activities, such as the facilitation of personal non-commercial remittances, that do not involve blocked persons and are not otherwise prohibited by OFAC. In addition, OFAC maintains various authorizations related to legitimate humanitarian activity and agricultural and medical trade, which include authorizations for dealings with certain sanctioned Russian financial institutions, such as General License (GL) 6D (authorizing transactions related to certain agricultural and medical activities); U.S. and foreign financial institutions may continue to process transactions for such authorized activities as well.

 

Please see link below for full list of sanctioned entities and individuals.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241121 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2725 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933626/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933621/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933631/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933636/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1201 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1197 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933656/download?inline

 

*******

 

November 26, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned five Mexican individuals associated with the Gulf Cartel, one of Mexico’s most dangerous criminal organizations. Those designated are tied to the Gulf Cartel’s involvement in criminal activities associated with illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, human smuggling, and narcotics trafficking in the Gulf of Mexico. IUU fishing often involves criminal activity, forced labor, and human rights abuses, and is often a revenue stream for criminal organizations. IUU fishing is also a threat to U.S. maritime security, as criminal organizations may use the same vessels for smuggling narcotics and humans across borders.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Carrillo Sapien, Ildelfonso of Mexico;
  • Decuir Garcia, Raul of Mexico;
  • Guerra Salinas, Ismael of Mexico;
  • Guerra Salinas, Omar of Mexico; and
  • Sierra Angulo, Franscisco Javier of Mexico.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241126 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2729

 

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November 27, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 21 security and cabinet-level officials aligned with Nicolas Maduro. These individuals are sanctioned pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, as amended, for being current or former officials of the Government of Venezuela. They have supported and carried out Maduro’s orders to repress civil society in his efforts to fraudulently declare himself the winner of Venezuela’s July 28 presidential election, thus ignoring the will of the overwhelming majority of Venezuelan voters who elected Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia as their next president.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Aigster Villamizar, Carlos Eduardo of Venezuela;
  • Balestrini Jaramillo, Angel Daniel of Venezuela;
  • Cabello Contreras, Daniella Desiree of Venezuela;
  • Castillo Bolle, William Alfredo of Venezuela;
  • Coronado Millan, Anibal Eduardo of Venezuela;
  • Fernandez Alayon, Jesus Ramon of Venezuela;
  • Garcia Zerpa, Julio Jose of Venezuela;
  • Herrera Duarte, Jose Yunior of Venezuela;
  • Lizano Colmenter, Pablo Ernesto of Venezuela;
  • Marcano Tabata, Javier Jose of Venezuela;
  • Matheus Melendez, Alberto Alexander of Venezuela;
  • Menendez Prieto, Ricardo Jose of Venezuela;
  • Nazaret Nanez Contreras, Freddy Alfred of Venezuela;
  • Perez Davila, America Valentina of Venezuela;
  • Reyes Rivero, Luis Gerardo of Venezuela;
  • Rivera Bastardo, Jose Alfredo of Venezuela;
  • Rodriguez Cabello, Alexis Jose of Venezuela;
  • Rodriguez Dias, Dilio Guilermo of Venezuela;
  • Romero Bolivar, Orlando Ramon of Venezuela;
  • Santiago Servigna, Ruben of Venezuela; and
  • Villamizar Gomez, Jesus Rafael of Venezuela.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2730 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241127

 

NOVEMBER 2024 EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATES Read More »

OCTOBER 2024 EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through October 31, 2024.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and

persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 

REGULATORY UPDATES

President

 

President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to the Situation in and in Relation to Syria

 

October 10, 2024: On October 14, 2019, by Executive Order 13894, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in and in relation to Syria.

 

The situation in and in relation to Syria undermines the campaign to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, endangers civilians, and further threatens to undermine the peace, security, and stability in the region, and continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13894 of October 14, 2019, must continue in effect beyond October 14, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13894 with respect to the situation in and in relation to Syria.

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/10/10/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-the-situation-in-and-in-relation-to-syria-4/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/page/2/

 

*******

 

President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to the Democratic Republic of the Congo

 

October 11, 2024: On October 27, 2006, by Executive Order 13413, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in or in relation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has been marked by widespread violence and atrocities that continue to threaten regional stability.  The President took additional steps to address this national emergency in Executive Order 13671 of July 8, 2014.

 

The situation in or in relation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13413 of October 27, 2006, as amended by Executive Order 13671 of July 8, 2014, must continue in effect beyond October 27, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency with respect to the situation in or in relation to the Democratic Republic of the Congo declared in Executive Order 13413, as amended by Executive Order 13671.

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/10/11/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-4/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/

 

*******

 

President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Sudan

 

October 25, 2024: On November 3, 1997, by Executive Order 13067, the President declared a national emergency with respect to Sudan pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) and took related steps to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by the actions and policies of the Government of Sudan.  On April 26, 2006, by Executive Order 13400, the President determined that the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region posed an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13067, and ordered the blocking of property of certain persons connected to the Darfur region.  On October 13, 2006, by Executive Order 13412, the President took additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13067 and expanded in Executive Order 13400.  In Executive Order 13412, the President also took steps to implement the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-344).

 

On January 13, 2017, by Executive Order 13761, the President found that positive efforts by the Government of Sudan between July 2016 and January 2017 improved certain conditions that Executive Orders 13067 and 13412 were intended to address.  Given these developments, and in order to encourage the Government of Sudan to sustain and enhance these efforts, section 1 of Executive Order 13761 provided that sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order 13067 and the entirety of Executive Order 13412 would be revoked as of July 12, 2017, provided that the criteria in section 12(b) of Executive Order 13761 had been met.

 

On July 11, 2017, by Executive Order 13804, the President amended Executive Order 13761, extending until October 12, 2017, the effective date in section 1 of Executive Order 13761.  On October 12, 2017, pursuant to Executive Order 13761, as amended by Executive Order 13804, sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order 13067 and the entirety of Executive Order 13412 were revoked.

 

On May 4, 2023, by Executive Order 14098, the President further expanded the scope of the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13067, finding that the situation in Sudan, including the military’s seizure of power in October 2021 and the outbreak of inter-service fighting in April 2023, constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.

 

The crisis that led to the declaration of a national emergency in Executive Order 13067 of November 3, 1997; the expansion of the scope of that emergency in Executive Order 13400 of April 26, 2006; the taking of additional steps with respect to that emergency in Executive Order 13412 of October 13, 2006, Executive Order 13761 of January 13, 2017, and Executive Order 13804 of July 11, 2017; and the further expansion of the scope of that emergency in Executive Order 14098 of May 4, 2023, has not been resolved.  The policies and actions of the Government of Sudan, and the situation in Sudan and Darfur, continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13067, as expanded by Executive Orders 13400 and 14098, must continue in effect beyond November 3, 2024.

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/10/25/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-sudan-4/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/

 

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Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

Changes to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and U.S. Munitions List Categories IV and XV

 

October 23, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 84482: The Department of State published proposed rule to amend the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). This rule proposed to amend § 121.0 and § 121.1 of the ITAR and add new exemptions to § 126.8. These proposed changes would revise existing USML definitions, along with USML Categories IV and XV, and certain entries under USML Categories VI, VII, VIII, XI, XIII, and XX. Further, the proposed addition to § 126.8 would create three new licensing exemptions intended to promote U.S. industrial base participation in civil space activity commensurate with national security and foreign policy goals.

 

With this rule, the Department proposed to amend specific paragraphs within the USML to address controls that were identified as potentially requiring addition, removal, revision, or clarification. The Department proposed the following general types of changes to the ITAR: (1) USML Modernization Efforts, (2) Civil Space-Related License Exemptions and Special Licensing Provisions, and (3) USML Category Revisions.

 

USML Modernization Efforts:

 

The Department is modernizing the USML, specifically to improve its usability, clarity, and consistency in structure and regulatory text. This proposed rule contains revisions to that effect in the following areas:

  • Revision and Removal of Notes and Expansion of § 121.0 Definitions;
  • Removal of Specially Designed as a Criterion in Certain Paragraphs;
  • Consistency in Construction; and
  • Clarification of Internal References and Standardization of Regulatory Text tructure of USML Categories.

 

Civil Space-Related License Exemptions and Special Licensing Provisions:

 

The Department proposed to add to part 126 three new licensing exemptions intended to promote U.S. industrial base participation in civil space activity commensurate with its national security and foreign policy goals. The Department further proposed to codify a fourth licensing exemption currently provided as guidance in an existing note within the USML.

 

Official Space Agency Exemption

 

This license exemption, proposed to be in a new § 126.8(a), would authorize certain transfers of defense articles and defense services when conducted entirely within the scope of an official U.S. government agency space program listed in § 126.8(a)(2). While the proposed list of articles and services subject to the exemption applies to several NASA spacecraft, the Department emphasizes this licensing exemption does not similarly apply to the space launch vehicles for these spacecraft. The Department assesses the underlying launch vehicle technology is independent of the spacecraft that potentially warrant a licensing exemption, in part due to the implicitly civil, multilateral, or scientific mission of these specific spacecraft.

 

Space Activity Exemption

 

This exemption, proposed to be in a new § 126.8(b), consists of four provisions. The first would authorize certain transfers of defense articles and § 120.32(a)(2) defense services supporting space launches. Certain transfers of electrical connectors would be eligible for this exemption, as the Department assesses that, while they continue to warrant regulation by this subchapter, certain transfers of these articles may be conducted under a licensing exemption without risk to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.

 

The Department requested public comment on additional space technologies having both military and commercial applications that should be considered for incorporation into this exemption. Comments on the benefit of such an expansion of the exemption to the regulated community and any perceived or recommended proliferation risk mitigations are also requested.

 

The second provision would authorize certain services related to the transmission of space launch vehicle telemetry, to improve safety of flight and support the growing space launch industry. The Department proposed to limit this authorization to space launch vehicles since similar data can be used by rockets and missiles to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

 

The third provision would authorize certain services to support collaboration with foreign persons when on-orbit defense articles are utilized in support of fundamental research, as defined in § 120.34(a)(8).

 

The fourth provision would authorize certain services associated with radiofrequency transmissions using on-orbit defense articles, including geolocating certain automated information broadcasts, emergency transmissions, and cellular transmissions.

 

Space Tourism and Research Exemption

This exemption, proposed to be in a new § 126.8(c), would authorize certain transfers of manned spacecraft for space tourism or in support of fundamental research, as defined in § 120.34(a)(8).

 

The Department noted the proposed research exemptions apply specifically to certain basic and applied research, and not to the engineering development phase of research and development. Similarly, they do not apply to the design and development of a defense article or to research either not intended for publication or subject to publication restrictions or non-disclosure agreements.

 

Special Licensing Provision for Defense Articles Incorporated Into Spacecraft Subject to the EAR

This exemption, proposed to be in a new § 126.8(d), would authorize certain transfers of defense articles while they are incorporated into spacecraft subject to the EAR. This is consistent with two current notes (note 2 to paragraph (e) and note 2 to paragraph (e)(17)) the Department proposed to remove from Category XV.

 

Satellite Signature Reduction

 

In addition to the proposed exemptions previously described, the Department also requests public comment on specific regulatory changes or clarifications to facilitate industry efforts to reduce the apparent magnitude, as viewed from Earth, of satellite brightness. Commenters should be cognizant of the Department's continued need to control signature reduction technologies that provide a critical military or intelligence advantage, including technologies to reduce spacecraft signatures as viewed in, or between, orbits.

 

USML Category Revisions:

 

USML Category IV

 

The Department proposed to update the title of Category IV to better reflect the items described therein and to avoid the potential misinterpretation that the list of items in the title is exhaustive.

 

Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2)

 

The Department proposed minor adjustments to USML Category IV(a)(1) and (2) for consistency in construction of the control text.

 

The proposed changes to USML Category IV relate to the controls on the following items:

 

  • Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS);
  • Anti-Tank Missiles;
  • Rockets;
  • Bombs;
  • Mines;
  • Grenades;
  • Loitering Munitions;
  • Kinetic Kill Vehicles;
  • Post-Boost Vehicles;
  • Hypersonic Glide Vehicles;
  • Re-Entry Vehicles;
  • Range and Payload;
  • Model Rockets;
  • Launch Platforms;
  • Propulsion Systems;
  • Rocket Stages, Motors, and Engines;
  • Air-Breathing Engines and Pressure Gain Combustion-Based Propulsion Systems;
  • Flight Control Systems, Guidance Systems, and Attitude Control Equipment;
  • Thrust Vector Control Systems;
  • Thermal Protection Systems (g., Heat Shields and Heat Sinks);
  • Self-Destruct Systems;
  • Separation Systems;
  • SAFF Components;
  • Seeker Systems;
  • Test Equipment; and
  • Non-Nuclear Warheads.

 

Changes to USML Category IV(c): The Department notes it will address issues related USML Category IV(c) in a separate rulemaking. However, the Department still welcomes comments related to this paragraph.

 

Changes to USML Category IV(h):

The Department proposed to modify USML Category IV(h) to economize the text of its subordinate paragraphs. Currently, some subordinate paragraphs of (h) require an article be used in an end item described elsewhere in Category IV. The Department proposed to clearly stipulate in paragraph (h) that the articles in its subordinate paragraphs are for end-items described elsewhere in Category IV, thereby eliminating the need to repeat that requirement in each of its subordinate paragraphs. Consistent with its intent to move systems from paragraph (h) to paragraph (e), the Department also proposed to delete the reference to systems and subsystems in paragraph (h).

 

The proposed changes to USML Category IV(h) relate to the controls on the following items:

 

  • Grip Stocks for MANPADS;
  • Nozzles, Nozzle Throats, Nose Tips, Nose Fairings, and Aerospikes;
  • Engine or Motor Mounts;
  • Combustion Chambers;
  • Injectors;
  • Penetration Aids;
  • Motor Cases;
  • Liners and Insulation;
  • Radomes, Sensor Windows, Antenna Windows, and Embedded Antennae;
  • Payload Fairings;
  • Launch Canisters;
  • Fuzes;
  • Propellant Tanks and Altimeters;
  • Umbilical and Interstage Electrical Connectors; and
  • Turbo Pumps.

 

USML Category IV(i) Technical Data and Defense Services: The Department proposed minor modifications to USML Category IV(i) for consistency in construction of the control text.

 

USML Category VI, VII, VIII, and XX Conforming Changes:

 

The Department proposed to modify USML Category VI(f)(6) and (7) to avoid overlap in controls between those paragraphs and the proposed revision and intent of Category IV(b). As such, the Department proposed to clarify these paragraphs only describe certain integration equipment, aircraft launch and recovery equipment, and certain shipborne defensive systems, not articles described in Category IV(b). The Department further proposed to split paragraph (f)(6) into three subordinate paragraphs for ease of parsing and adjust the “MT” designations for consistency with the MTCR Annex.

 

 

Similarly, the Department proposed to modify USML Category VII(g)(2) to avoid overlap in controls between that paragraph and the proposed revision and intent of Category IV(b), and therefore proposed to clarify paragraph (g)(2) only describes articles not already described in Category IV(b).

 

The Department proposed to add USML Category VII(g)(15) and modify USML Category VIII(h)(6) to ensure items designed for integrating certain defense articles are described in the same USML category as the platform they are being integrated into and to avoid ambiguity about whether they are controlled in USML Category IV(b).

 

Subsequent to these changes, these paragraphs will only describe articles that assist in the integration between a vehicle and either a launching system or a self-launching munition.

 

The Department also proposed minor changes to USML Categories: XI; XII; and XIII. (refer to link at end of article)

 

USML Category XV

 

The proposed changes to USML Category XV relate to the controls on the following items:

 

  • Spacecraft;
  • Detection or Mitigation of a Nuclear Detonation;
  • Detect and Track Objects;
  • Spacecraft for Signals Intelligence;
  • Constellations;
  • Space-Based Weapons;
  • Spacecraft With Remote Sensing Capabilities;
  • Radar Remote Sensing;
  • Position, Navigation, and Timing;
  • Autonomous Collision Avoidance;
  • Suborbital Craft;
  • Inspection or Surveillance;
  • Classified Spacecraft;
  • Articles Jettisoned From Another Spacecraft;
  • Ground Control Systems;
  • Movement of Systems;
  • Active Cooling Systems;
  • Vibration Suppression Systems;
  • Attitude Determination and Control Systems;
  • Thermal Protection Systems (g., Heat Shields and Heat Sinks);
  • Spacecraft Propulsion;
  • Spacecraft Parts, Components, Accessories, and Attachments;
  • Antennas;
  • Optics;
  • Focal Plane Arrays;
  • Optical Bench Assemblies;
  • Directed Energy Systems;
  • Control Moment Gyroscopes;
  • Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuits (MMICs);
  • Oscillators for Radar;
  • Star Trackers;
  • Primary, Secondary, or Hosted Payloads; and
  • Payloads Developed with Department of Defense Funding.

 

The Department proposed the following additions to USML Category XV:

 

  • The Department proposed to add paragraphs (a)(14) through (16). These paragraphs designate, respectively, spacecraft capable of non-cooperative grappling or docking, in-orbit construction of other defense articles, and deploying multiple spacecraft into different orbits.
    • The technology required to facilitate non-cooperative docking is likely to be used in an adversarial manner. A spacecraft capable of in-orbit construction of other defense articles represents a critical logistical advantage. And spacecraft that can rapidly deploy multiple spacecraft into multiple different orbits provide a critical military or intelligence advantage when compared to commercial systems that may be able to achieve the same result over a much longer timeframe.
  • Addition of USML Category XV(e)(22). The Department proposed to add a new paragraph at USML Category XV(e)(22) for technologies that facilitate the signature reduction of in-orbit spacecraft observations. The proposed regulatory text reflects the Department's intent to exclude technology used only to minimize light pollution, as seen from the ground.
  • Notes USML Category XV(e): The Department proposed to eliminate note 1 to USML Category XV(e), as the jurisdiction of articles not described in paragraph (e) is already addressed in the order of review at § 120.11. Note 2 to paragraph (e) delegates the licensing of articles described in paragraph (e) when integrated into a spacecraft subject to the EAR. The Department proposed a licensing exemption in § 126.8 to codify this exemption and to facilitate the deletion of note 2. The Department also proposed to delete notes 3 and 4 to paragraph (e), as the proposed revisions to USML Category XV remove all but one reference to space-qualified and the Department assesses notes 3 and 4 are no longer required to identify space-qualified atomic clocks.

 

USML Category XV(f) Technical Data and Defense Services:

The Department proposed to modify USML Category XV(f) by incorporating guidance currently provided in notes 1 through 3 to paragraph (f), which is not already included in the definition of technical data at § 120.33 or the proposed definition of “spacecraft housekeeping data and output at § 121.0.” The Department also proposed to delete the explanatory information regarding defense services found in the control text, as it assesses such information does not provide substantial guidance beyond the order of review provided at § 120.11 and the USML text, and similar redundancy is not provided in other USML Categories.

 

Please see the federal register notice below for the complete proposed revisions to ITAR and USML Categories IV and XV.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/23/2024-24091/international-traffic-in-arms-regulations-itar-us-munitions-list-categories-iv-and-xv and

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events

 

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DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

 

October 7 through 31, 2024: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Name change of Eurocopter Kazkahstan Engineering LLP to Airbus Helicopters Kazakhstan Engineering due to merger;
  • Name change of Celemetrix Australia Pty Ltd to Trescal Australia Pty Ltd due to merger;
  • Name change of Delom Services Inc. to Wajax Limited due to corporate rebranding;
  • Name change of Bayanat AI PLC and AI Yah Satellite Communications Company PJSC to Space42 PLC due to merger;
  • Name change of WESCO Integrated Supply Polska Sp. z. o. o. to Vallen Integrated Supply Polska Sp z. o.o. due to merger.
  • Address change of ALTEN LTD from 41 Moorgate, London EC2 R6PP, United Kingdom to Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS, United Kingdom.
  • Address change of Filial af GE Aviation Systems North America LLC’s Denmark operations from Osterfaelled Torv 3, Copenhagen 2100, Denmark to Frederiksborggade 15, 3 Copenhagen 1358, Denmark.

 

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Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To India

 

October 7, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of India has requested to buy fifty-three (53) MK 54 MOD 0 Lightweight Torpedo all up rounds. The following non-MDE items will also be included: Recoverable Exercise Torpedoes (REXTORP); air launch accessories; classified and unclassified torpedo spare parts; torpedo containers; torpedo support equipment, including test equipment and tools; torpedo support services; classified and unclassified books and other publications; other technical assistance, including technical support, technical program management, infrastructure support, test equipment sustainment, exercise firing assistance, contract management, and initial follow-on-technical support (FOTS); in-country torpedo training; related equipment and services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $175 million.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/india-mk-54-mod-0-lightweight-torpedoes

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Italy

 

October 7, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Italy has requested to buy the Electronic Attack (EA)-37B mission system, consisting of the following non-Major Defense Equipment: Network Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT) systems; System Control and Monitoring subsystems; Radio Frequency Receiver (RFR) subsystems; Software-defined Radio (SDR) subsystems; Counter Radar Assembly; Array Panels; AN/ARC-210 RT-2036 radios; KG-250 In-line Network Encryptors; KY-100 Narrow/wideband Terminals; KIV-77 Mode 4/5 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF); AN/PYQ-10C Simple Key Loaders; integration and test support and equipment; aircraft support and support equipment; secure communications equipment, precision navigation, and cryptographic devices; major and minor modifications, maintenance, and maintenance support; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; facilities and construction support; transportation and airlift support; warranties; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $680 million. The principal contractor will be BAE Systems, located in Hudson, NH. The U.S. government is not aware of any offset agreements in connection with this potential sale

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/italy-electronic-attack-mission-system

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Romania

 

October 7, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Romania has requested to buy four (4) AN/MPQ-64 F1 Sentinel radar systems. The following non-MDE items will also be included: IPS 250X High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptors (HAIPE); KIV-77 Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF) crypto appliqué with Mode 5 and Mode S capability; AN/PSN-13 Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receivers (DAGR) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM); AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKL); support equipment; spare and repair parts, consumables, accessories and repair and return support; classified software; classified command and control (C2) systems and communications and data supply systems; prime movers; new equipment training; weapon system support and test equipment; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; classified software; classified books and publications; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $110 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Andover, MA. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/romania-sentinel-radar-systems

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Saudi Arabia

 

October 11, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested to buy two thousand five hundred three (2,503) AGM-114R3 Hellfire II missiles (3 for lot acceptance testing). Also included are support and test equipment; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; software delivery and support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; storage; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The total estimated cost is $655 million. The principal contractor will be The Lockheed Martin Corporation, Troy, AL. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kingdom-saudi-arabia-agm-114r3-hellfire-ii-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Saudi Arabia

 

October 11, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested to buy ten thousand (10,000) M456 series, 105mm, High Explosive Anti-Tank Tracer cartridges. Also included are various types of tanks, howitzer, and machine gun ammunition; propelling charges; fuses; primers; grenades; support and test equipment; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; software delivery and support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; storage; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The total estimated cost is $139 million. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Saudi Arabia.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kingdom-saudi-arabia-ammunition-artillery-systems-machine-guns-and

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Saudi Arabia

 

October 11, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested to buy two-hundred twenty (220) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder Tactical Missiles. Also included are missile containers; support equipment; spares; missile software; training; and U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $251.8 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Arlington, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kingdom-saudi-arabia-aim-9x-block-ii-sidewinder-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To United Arab Emirates

 

October 11, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of the United Arab Emirates has requested to buy two hundred fifty-nine (259) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) M31A1 Unitary Pods (1,554 missiles at six missiles per pod) and two hundred three (203) Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) M57 Unitary Missiles. Also included are publications; personnel training and training equipment; software development; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost is $1.2 billion. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin, Grand Prairie, TX. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will require the temporary assignment of four (4) U.S. Government and four (4) U.S. contractor representatives to the United Arab Emirates for a duration of no longer than ten (10) days to support new software equipment training and the stockpile reliability program.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/united-arab-emirates-gmlrs-and-atacms-munitions

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To The Netherlands

 

October 16, 2024: : The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government the Netherlands has requested to buy the following non-Major Defense Equipment items: AN/PRC-117G radios; AN/PRC-152A radios; AN/PRC-160 radios; AN/PRC-163 radios; AN/PRC-167 radios; tactical key loaders; network encryptors; Government and contractor technical assistance; spares; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $1.42 billion. The principal contractor will be L3Harris Global Communications, Inc., located in Rochester, NY. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the principal contractor. Products and services of TrellisWare Technologies, Inc., located in San Diego, CA, and ViaSat, Inc., located in Carlsbad, CA are included in the Foreign Military Sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/netherlands-radio-equipment

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

 

October 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government Japan has requested to buy up to two hundred twelve (212) Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM) Block 2B, RIM-116E. The following non-MDE items will also be included: RAM Guided Missiles Round Pack (GMRP); Tri-Pack shipping and storage containers; training equipment; operator manuals and technical documentation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support and assistance; support for establishment of an Intermediate Level Maintenance Facility (ILMF); and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $360 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-rolling-airframe-missile-block-2b-tactical-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Poland

 

October 23, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Poland has requested to buy fifty-eight (58) Improved Programmable Display Generators (48 installed, 10 spares); three (3) AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) Flight Test Vehicles, Captive Carry; three (3) Small Diameter Bomb II (SDB II), GBU53/B Guided Test Vehicles (GTV); eight (8) SDB II, GBU-53/B Captive Carry Reliability Trainers; two (2) SDB I, GBU-39(T-1)/B Guided Test Vehicles (GTV); fifty-eight (58) Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS) Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) (EGI) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) or M-Code capability and Precise Positioning Service (PPS) (48 installed, 10 spares); fifty-eight (58) AN/APG-83 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) Scalable Agile Beam Radars (SABR) (48 installed, 10 spares); sixty (60) Modular Mission Computer (MMC) 7000AH upgrades, or equivalent (48 installed, 12 spares); sixty (60) Next Generation Mission Computer (XMC), or next generation equivalent (48 installed, 12 spares); seventy-three (73) AN/ALQ-257 Integrated Viper Electronic Warfare Suites (IVEWS), or seventy-three (73) AN/ALQ-254V(1) Viper Shield advanced electronic warfare (EW) suites, or equivalent (63 installed, 10 spares); two (2) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder Special Air Training Missiles; and two (2) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM). The following non-MDE items will also be included: major modifications and maintenance equipment; Phased Array Warning System (PAWS-2) missile warning systems; Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems (JHMCS II); AN/ARC-238 radios (or equivalent); AN/APX-126/127 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe (AIFF) with combined interrogator/transponder (CIT) and Mode 5 (or equivalent); AN/ALE-47 Countermeasure Dispenser Systems (CMDS), classified countermeasure processors, sequencer switching units, and control display units; AN/ALQ-254V(1) Viper Shield advanced EW suites, including lab assets (or equivalent); KY-58, KIV-78, or equivalent, KGV-135A, AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKLs), MS-110 reconnaissance pods, communications security (COMSEC) cables, and cryptographic devices; tactical synthetic aperture radars; Joint Mission Planning Systems (JMPS) with unique planning components and software; AGM-158 JASSM classified test equipment; aircraft components, parts, and accessories; spare parts, accessories and consumables, and repair and return support; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $7.30 billion. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin, located in Greenville, SC. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-f-16-viper-midlife-upgrade

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Saudi Arabia

 

October 24, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested to buy five hundred seven (507) tube-launched, optically-tracked, wireless-guided (TOW) 2A, radio frequency (RF) missiles (BGM-71E-4B-RF) (including 7 “fly-to-buy” missiles); and five hundred seven (507) TOW 2B, RF missiles (BGM-71F-3-RF) (including 7 “fly-to-buy” missiles). The following non-MDE is also included: support and test equipment; simulators; generators; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; communications equipment; software delivery and support; facilities and construction support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; support equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $440 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation located in Tucson, AZ. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kingdom-saudi-arabia-tow-2a-tow-2b-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

 

October 25, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Japan has requested to buy up to two (2) BQM-177A Subsonic Sea-Skimming Aerial Targets (SSAT) for Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEV). The following non-MDE items will also be included: GQM-163 target drones; follow-on technical support for ASEVs, including for Combat Systems Sea Qualification Trials (CSSQT) and sustainment support services; Aegis computer software updates; combat systems integration; system integration, testing, overhauls, and upgrades; development, familiarization, operational, and maintenance support; classified books and other publications (technical and non-technical); adaption data; annual service agreements; test support; technical documentation; personnel training; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $113 million. The principal contractor for the BQM-177A SSATs will be Kratos Defense, located in Sacramento, CA, and Fort Walton Beach, FL. The principal contractor for the GQM-163A target drones will be Northrop Grumman, located in Chandler, AZ. The principal contractor for the Aegis Weapon System (AWS) will be Lockheed Martin Corporation, located in Moorestown, NJ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-subsonic-sea-skimming-aerial-targets-and-follow-technical

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office

 

October 25, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States has requested to buy three (3) National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) medium-range air defense solutions, that include: three (3) AN/MPQ-64F1 Sentinel radar systems; one hundred twenty-three (123) Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles-Extended Range (AMRAAM-ER); two (2) AMRAAM-C8 guidance sections; and four (4) Multifunctional Information Distribution Systems (MIDS). Also included are fire distribution centers (FDC); Canister Launcher Systems (CLS); electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) systems; Tactical Control Center (TCC) systems; FDC indoor training simulator; radar communication nodes; MIDS Link 16-capable radios; IPS 250X High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptions (HAIPE); KIV-77 Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF) Crypto Applique; AN/PSN-13 Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers (DAGR) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM); AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKL), code loaders and cable sets; AIM-120 control sections and containers; AMRAAM and AMRAAM-ER Captive Air Training Missiles (CATMs); AIM-120ER load trainers; weapon system support and support equipment; spare parts, consumables, accessories and repair and return support; classified software; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor technical support, engineering and logistics support services; warranty services; Systems Integration and Checkout (SICO); and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated cost is $1.16 billion. The principal contractor will be Raytheon, located in Andover, MA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-36

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office

 

October 25, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States has requested to buy AN/TPS-77 and AN/TPS-78 radar turnkey systems; spare and repair parts, consumables and accessories; repair and return support; transportation support; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated cost is $828 million. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the recipient.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-antps

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Switzerland

 

October 28, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Switzerland has requested to buy sustainment support for its five (5) PATRIOT Fire Units and missile inventory. The following non-MDE items will be included: general electronic test station equipment and program sets; Foreign Liaison Officer support; international engineering services; Field Surveillance Program; modification and upgrade kits; unclassified and classified repair and return; classified missile processing; unclassified and classified spares; transportation; publications and technical documentation; training; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated cost is $450 million. The prime contractors will be RTX Corporation, located in Tewksbury, MA; Lockheed Martin, located in Dallas, TX; and Leidos, located in Huntsville, AL. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/switzerland-patriot-sustainment

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Denmark

 

October 29, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Denmark has requested to buy up to two hundred three (203) AIM-120D-3 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); and up to nine (9) AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM guidance sections to include precise position provided by either Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module or M-Code. The following non-MDE items will also be included: spare AMRAAM control sections; missile containers and support equipment; munitions support and support equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; weapons software and support equipment; classified software delivery and support; classified publications and technical documentation; transportation support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $744 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/denmark-aim-120d-3-advanced-medium-range-air-air-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Argentina

 

October 30, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Argentina has requested to buy equipment and services to support twenty-four (24) F-16 Block 10/15 aircraft procured through third-party transfer. These items include: thirty-six (36) AIM-120 C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); two (2) AIM-120 C-8 AMRAAM guidance sections; one hundred two (102) MK-82 500lb general purpose bombs; fifty (50) MXU-650 air foil groups for 500lb GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided bombs; one hundred two (102) FMU-152A/B joint programmable fuzes with FZU-63A/B fuze systems; and fifty (50) computer control groups MAU-169L/B. The following non-MDE items will also be included: weapons and weapons support equipment; explosive charges, devices, propellants, and components; AN/ARC-238 radios; Joint Mission Planning Systems (JMPS); FMU-169D/B inert fuzes; Ground Support System (GSS) for Link-16; KY-58M and KIV-78 cryptographic devices, AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKL), communications security (COMSEC) cables, and other COMSEC devices and equipment; cartridges, chaffs, and flares; practical explosive ordinance disposal system trainer; avionics support; communications equipment; precision navigation; Computer Program Identification Numbers (CPINS); electronic warfare database support; major and minor modifications and maintenance support; aircraft components, parts, and accessories; instruments and lab equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; clothing, textiles, and individual equipment; jet fuel; aircraft ferry, aerial refueling, and transportation support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $941 million. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin, located in Fort Worth, TX. There are no known offsets proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Argentina.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/argentina-f-16-aircraft-equipment-and-support

 

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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

BIS Updates Boycott Requester List

 

October 1, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published its second quarterly update of the boycott Requester List. This list notifies companies, financial institutions, freight forwarders, individuals, and other U.S. persons of potential sources of certain boycott-related requests they may receive during the regular course of business. A party’s inclusion on the Requester List does not mean that U.S. persons are restricted from dealing with the listed party; a party’s inclusion does mean that U.S. persons are on notice that the listed party is more likely to make reportable boycott-related requests. The updated public list of entities who have been identified as having made a boycott-related request in reports received by BIS includes a total of 36 additions. BIS has also removed 21 entities.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-updates-boycott-requester-list-0

 

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Expansion of Validated End User Authorization: Data Center Validated End User Authorization

 

October 2, 2024: 89. Fed. Reg. 80080: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to expand the Validated End User Authorization (VEU) program to include VEU Authorization for data centers located in specified destinations (“Data Center VEU” or “Data Center VEU Authorization”). This expansion of the VEU program to include Data Center VEU is intended to facilitate quick and reliable export or reexport of items on the Commerce Control List necessary for a data center, including advanced computing items, to preapproved trusted end users. Data Center VEU adopts much of the framework of the existing VEU program, with additional requirements. This expansion of eligibility is intended to update the VEU program to recognize the advancement and benefits of artificial intelligence. As under the original VEU Authorization Program, the U.S. government will rigorously review Data Center VEU candidates' applications subject to detailed and verifiable criteria.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/02/2024-22587/expansion-of-validated-end-user-authorization-data-center-validated-end-user-authorization

 

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BIS Issues Guidance to Financial Institutions on Best Practices for Compliance with the Export Administration Regulations

 

October 9, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published guidance for financial institutions (FIs) concerning best practice recommendations for complying with the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).

 

The guidance provides both background information on the EAR and recommendations for steps financial institutions can take to minimize the likelihood of EAR violations. The recommendations include a description of EAR-related due diligence best practices, the encouragement of ongoing transaction reviews for red flags, and a delineation of which types of real-time transaction screenings are and are not regarded as a best practice.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-issues-guidance-financial-institutions-best-practices-compliance-export

 

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Effectiveness of Licensing Procedures for the Export and Reexport of Agricultural Commodities to Cuba

 

October 16, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 8356: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is requesting public comments on the effectiveness of its licensing procedures as defined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for the export and reexport of agricultural commodities to Cuba. BIS will include a description of any comments it receives in its biennial report to Congress, as required by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, as amended (TSRA).

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/16/2024-23828/effectiveness-of-licensing-procedures-for-the-export-and-reexport-of-agricultural-commodities-to

 

 

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Commerce Announces Series of Rules to Modernize Space-Related Export Controls

 

October 17, 2024: The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released three rules—one Final Rule, one Interim Final Rule, and one Proposed Rule—to modernize BIS’s space-related export controls. These updated controls will further U.S. innovation and technology leadership while protecting U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.

 

This action is the result of an extensive review—directed by the National Space Council, which is led by Vice President Kamala Harristo enable a globally competitive U.S. space industrial base, while strengthening U.S. international space partnerships. These updates reflect the Biden-Harris Administration’s commitment to maintaining U.S. leadership in space, protecting our national security, and strengthening our foreign alliances.

 

The series of regulatory changes modernizing space-related export controls consists of the following rules:

  1. 89 Fed. Reg. 84766: In a Final Rule, BIS is removing license requirements for exports of certain items involving remote sensing or space-based logistics, assembly, or servicing spacecraft destined for Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. This rule deepens the United States’ commitment to some of its closest allies, furthering our collective security, reducing unnecessary export control restrictions, and ensuring secure trade.

 

  1. 89 Fed. Reg. 84770: In an Interim Final Rule, BIS is removing license requirements for exports of certain spacecraft components to over 40 allies and partners worldwide, reducing licensing requirements for the least sensitive components for most destinations, and broadening license exceptions to support additional National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) cooperative programs. These changes advance international cooperation and bolster America’s global leadership in space technology.

 

  1. 89 Fed. Reg. 84784: Additionally, in a Proposed Rule published in concert with the Department of State, BIS outlines initial proposals to transfer jurisdiction of certain space-related defense articles that no longer provide a critical military or intelligence advantage from the U.S. Munitions List (USML) maintained by the Department of State to the Commerce Control List. Examples include spacecraft capable of refueling other spacecraft and spacecraft capable of autonomous collision avoidance. This proposed transfer would enable the use of BIS license exceptions that facilitate exports of commercial space items to close allies and partners. BIS welcomes public comment from all interested parties on this Proposed Rule within 30 days of publication.

 

These actions mark a pivotal step in updating and modernizing the U.S. Government’s space-related export controls and enhancing international partnerships while continuing to deny critical technologies to our adversaries.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-announces-series-rules-modernize-space-related-export-controls and

https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-23932.pdf?utm_campaign=pi+subscription+mailing+list&utm_medium=email&utm_source=federalregister.gov and

https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-23958.pdf?utm_campaign=pi+subscription+mailing+list&utm_medium=email&utm_source=federalregister.gov and

https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2024-23975.pdf?utm_campaign=pi+subscription+mailing+list&utm_medium=email&utm_source=federalregister.gov

 

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U.S. Census Bureau

 

October 17, 2024:

 

Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages

When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected.  If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation.  Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN.  However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.

To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

Response Code:  105


Narrative:     Mode of Transportation Unknown

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        The Mode of Transportation Code reported is not valid in AES.

Resolution:  The Mode of Transportation Code reported must be one recognized in AES and listed in the ‘Appendix T - Mode of Transportation Codes’.

Verify the Mode of Transportation Code, correct the shipment and resubmit.

Response Code:  147

Narrative:     Routed Export Indicator Missing

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        The Routed Export Indicator is missing.

Resolution:  A routed export transaction is a transaction in which the Foreign Principal Party in Interest (FPPI) authorizes a U.S. agent to facilitate the export of items from the United States and to prepare and file Electronic Export Information (EEI).  You must report the Routed Export Indicator as Yes or No.

Verify whether or not this is a routed export transaction, correct the shipment and resubmit.

It is important that AES filers correct Fatal Errors as soon as they are received in order to comply with the Foreign Trade Regulations.  These errors must be corrected prior to export for shipments filed predeparture and as soon as possible for shipments filed postdeparture but not later than five calendar days after departure.

 

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October 21, 2024:

Port of Unlading Codes Updated in the Automated Export System (AES) 

October 21, 2024

Please note the following Port of Unlading Code Name has been UPDATED in the AES effective immediately.

Port Name           Port Code          Country

Whannock, BC     12488                 Canada

The following Port of Unlading Codes have been ADDED to the AES effective immediately.

Port Name           Port Code          Country

Tolu 30111 Columbia
Krishnapatnam 53356 India
Nghi Son 55203 Vietnam
Phu My 55209 Vietnam
Nghe Tinh 55210 Vietnam
Morowali 56029 Indonesia

 

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Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR): Clarification of Filing Requirements Regarding In-Transit Shipments and Other FTR Provisions

 

October 31, 2024: 89. Fed. Reg. 86762: The Bureau of the Census (Census Bureau) proposed to amend its regulations to clarify the requirements governing in-transit shipments from foreign countries through the United States that are subsequently exported to a foreign destination. This rulemaking proposed to clarify who is the U.S. Principal Party in Interest (USPPI) and revise the entry number description when goods are entered into the United States for consumption or warehousing, and then stored in a warehouse or storage facility or admitted into a Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ) before being exported. This rule also proposed to clarify that when a customs broker is the USPPI and they are requested to provide information from the customs entry for the filing of the Electronic Export Information (EEI), that they obtain consent from their client, as required in the customs regulations. Additionally, this proposed rule revises several sections, including definitions, mandatory filing requirements, responsibilities of parties to the export transaction, confidentiality, penalties, and voluntary self-disclosures to ensure clarity, accuracy, and consistency throughout the FTR.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/31/2024-24482/foreign-trade-regulations-ftr-clarification-of-filing-requirements-regarding-in-transit-shipments

 

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

 

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Fines and Penalties

 

Violations of the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations by Precision Castparts Corp.

 

October 7, 2024: Precision Castparts Corp. (“Precision”) entered into a three-year Consent Agreement to settle allegations that it violated the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in connection with twenty-four export violations involving unauthorized exports of Technical Data to Foreign-Person Employees (FPEs). All the violations were Voluntarily Disclosed to the Department of State by Precision in 2019 Precision agreed to pay a fine of three million ($3,000,000) of which one million ($100,00,000) will be used by Precision for remedial compliance measures.

 

Violations:

 

Precision disclosed the following violations to the Department:

 

Unauthorized Exports of Technical Data to Foreign-Person Employees

 

On October 17, 2019, Precision submitted a full voluntary disclosure describing unauthorized exports of technical data to certain foreign person employees at Precision’s wholly owned subsidiary, Mold Masters, identified as USML Category XIX(g), pertaining to tools (specifically, wax pattern and core dies) and wax patterns consumed in the subsequent production of casting blades used in gas turbine engines of 5th generation fighter aircraft to 46 FPEs, lawfully permitted to work in the United States, from Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Bhutan, Peru, and Burundi. Precision’s subsequent review has confirmed that eight (8) of the wax patterns relate to the hot section components for the 5th generation fighter aircraft.

 

Precision disclosed that, although these employees had lawful U.S. employment authorization, the prior ownership of Mold Masters’ did not validate their U.S.-person status when hiring employees for roles requiring authorization for the export of technical data or secure ITAR employee licenses. Violations persisted when FPEs present at the time of Precision’s acquisition of Mold Masters in 2018 continued to work under the same conditions through 2019. Mold Masters’ prior record keeping procedures failed to capture information such as specific dates, work assignments, or information on specific technical data.

 

Remedial Measures:

 

Precision is required to ensure that adequate resources are dedicated to ITAR compliance throughout its ITAR-regulated operating divisions, subsidiaries, and business units. Precision must establish policies and procedures for all of Precision’s employees with responsibility for AECA and ITAR compliance to address lines of authority, staffing levels, performance evaluations, and career paths.

 

Precision, in coordination with the Designated Official (as defined below), shall conduct an internal review of AECA and ITAR compliance resources and establish the necessary actions to ensure that sufficient resources are dedicated to AECA and IT AR compliance.

 

Precision shall appoint, in accordance with the provisions of the Consent Agreement and in consultation with and the approval of the Director, Defense Trade Controls Compliance - DTCC, a qualified individual to serve as a Designated Official for the entire term that the Consent Agreement is in force. The term "Designated Official" in this Consent Agreement refers to a Special Compliance Officer (SCO) 1 or Internal Special Compliance Officer (ISCO)2 during the term of their appointment.

 

Precision shall strengthen corporate compliance procedures focused principally on Precision’s business operations such that: (a) all Precision employees engaged in AECA and ITAR-regulated activities are

familiar with the AECA and the ITAR, and their own and Precision's responsibilities thereunder; (b) all persons responsible for supervising those employees, including senior managers of those units, are knowledgeable about the underlying policies and principles of the AECA and the ITAR; and (c) there are records indicating the names of employees, trainers, and level and area of training received.

 

Precision shall enhance its AECA and ITAR compliance program with specific attention to the areas described in paragraphs 9(k)(I)(i) through 9(k)(1)(vii) of the agreement. Precision shall provide to DTCC written confirmation that the company has completed this action.

 

Precision agreed to implement a comprehensive, automated export compliance system throughout its operating divisions, subsidiaries, and business units engaged in AECA and ITAR-regulated activities to strengthen its internal controls for ensuring compliance with the AECA and the ITAR. This system shall track the decision process from the initiation to conclusion of a request for export, reexport, or retransfer

authorization. The automated export compliance system shall improve Precision’s ability to oversee and monitor export, reexport, and retransfer activity. This system shall also cover the initial identification of all technical data and technical assistance in any form proposed to be disclosed to any foreign persons. Precision shall ensure the use of a means of alerting users to the AECA and ITAR requirements on electronic transmissions of ITAR-controlled technical data. In order to prevent unintentional or accidental transmissions to unauthorized recipients, Precision shall also provide training lo all employees to ensure that any type of electronic transmissions of ITAR-controlled technical data are sent in accordance with Precision’s export compliance policies and procedures.

 

Classification Review:

 

Precision shall, under the supervision of the Designated Official, review, verify, and complete the export control jurisdiction of all hardware and/or software that Precision’s AECA and ITAR-regulated operating divisions, subsidiaries and business units, and any defense services or technical data, directly related to such hardware and not related to any hardware.

 

Also, separately, prior to export, re-export and/or retransfer, Precision shall review, verify, and complete the export control jurisdiction of each hardware item (and any defense services or technical data, including software, directly related to such hardware item and not related to any hardware) and items procured from

suppliers for which such jurisdiction was not previously and accurately determined and/or verified in accordance with this paragraph.

 

Audits:

 

One audit shall be performed during the Consent Agreement. Precision shall have the audit conducted by an outside consultant with expertise in AECA and ITAR matters, approved by the Director, DTCC. The audit shall be conducted under the supervision of the Designated Official. The audit shall provide a thorough assessment of the effectiveness of Precision’s implementation of all measures set forth in this Consent Agreement with focus on those actions undertaken to address the compliance issues identified in the Proposed Charging Letter, the policies, procedures, and training established by Precision. The Designated Official or the Director, DTCC, may identify other areas (e.g., transactional review of agreements, Precision's information technology systems) for the audit.

 

Debarment:

 

Precision has cooperated with the Department's review, has expressed regret for these activities, and has taken steps to improve its compliance programs. It has also undertaken to pay a cash penalty and agrees to implement the significant additional remedial compliance actions specified in the Consent Agreement. For these reasons, the Department has determined not to impose an administrative debarment of Precision.

 

Onsite Reviews by the Department:

 

For the purpose of assessing compliance with the provisions of the AECA, the ITAR and future authorizations, Precision agreed to arrange and facilitate, with minimum advance notice, onsite reviews by the Department while this Consent Agreement remains in effect.

 

Copies of the Charging Letter, Agreement and Order can be found at the following links:

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=52a07c224701d21827972464336d4375 and

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=a5a07c224701d21827972464336d436e and

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=4aa07c224701d21827972464336d4372

 

Editor’s note: The compliance measures described here are representative of the direction the Department of State is taking with larger companies and their compliance programs. However small companies should review to align their programs to focus on the same compliance points noted.

 

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October 9, 2024: Zhanna Soldatenkova and Ruslan Almetov, both Russian nationals, were indicted along with Arthur Petrov, a dual Russian and German national, for export control violations, smuggling, wire fraud, and money laundering in connection with their alleged participation in a scheme to procure U.S.-sourced microelectronics subject to U.S. export controls on behalf of a Russia-based supplier of critical electronics components for manufacturers supplying weaponry and other equipment to the Russian military.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/two-russian-nationals-charged-their-participation-illicit-procurement-network-exported

 

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October 17, 2024: Lin Chen pleaded guilty in federal court to illegally exporting U.S. technology to a prohibited end user in China, in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). The plea was accepted by the Hon. William Alsup, Senior U.S. District Judge.

 

In pleading guilty, Chen, 65, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), admitted to acting on behalf of Jiangsu Hantang International Trade Group Corp., Ltd. (JHI), a company headquartered in Nanjing, PRC, to procure a wafer cutting machine on behalf of Chengdu GaStone Technology Co., Ltd. (GaStone), an entity located in Chengdu, PRC.  Chen admitted to knowing that GaStone was designated on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List on Aug. 1, 2014.  Federal regulations restrict the export of certain items to companies, research institutions, and other entities identified on the Department of Commerce’s Entity List. Under applicable Department of Commerce regulations, wafer cutting machines, which are used to cut thin semiconductors used in electronics (also known as silicon wafers), require a license for export to end-users such as GaStone.

 

Chen’s sentencing hearing is scheduled for January 28, 2025, before the Judge Alsup.  The maximum statutory penalty for an IEEPA violation is up to 20 years in prison and a $1 million fine.  However, any sentence will be imposed by the court only after consideration of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the federal statute governing the imposition of a sentence.

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/chinese-national-pleads-guilty-illegally-exporting-semiconductor-manufacturing-machine

 

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October 17, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced an $860,000 settlement with Vietnam Beverage Company Limited (VBCL). VBCL, a Vietnam-based alcoholic beverage company, has agreed to settle its subsidiaries' potential civil liability for 43 apparent violations of the North Korea Sanctions Regulations. Between April 2016 and October 2018, VBCL's subsidiaries caused U.S. financial institutions to process approximately $1,141,547 in payments for the sale of alcoholic beverages to North Korea. This settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that conduct at issue was not voluntarily disclosed and constituted a non-egregious case.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241017_33 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933501/download?inline

 

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October 25, 2024: Yuksel Senbol, 36, of Orlando, Florida, was sentenced to 15 months in prison for conspiracy to defraud the United States, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering, conspiracy to violate the Export Control Reform Act, violating the Export Control Reform Act, and violating the Arms Export Control Act. As part of her sentence, the court also entered an order of forfeiture in the amount of $275,430.90, the proceeds of Senbol’s fraud and money laundering scheme. Senbol pleaded guilty on May 7.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/defense-contractor-sentenced-15-months-prison-fraud-money-laundering-and-unlawful-export

 

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October 25, 2024: A federal jury convicted Brian Assi, also known as Brahim Assi, of conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR), attempted unlawful export of goods from the United States to Iran without a license, attempted smuggling goods from the United States, submitting false or misleading export information, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Sentencing Brian Assi is scheduled for Jan. 7, 2025.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/foreign-national-convicted-conspiring-export-us-made-drill-rigs-iran-violation-us-sanctions

 

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October 28, 2024: The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 7-year prison sentence of a former UCLA electrical engineering adjunct professor relating to his exporting of military-grade semiconductor chips without a license to China in collaboration with a Chinese enterprise that develops weapons.

 

Federal regulations found in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) require that a license be obtained for the export of certain items, which are assigned an Export Control Classification Number (“ECCN”). The list of ECCNs provides the “reasons for control” associated with each number.

 

In July 2019, a jury found Shih guilty of 18 counts of violating various offenses arising out of the export of the MMICs, including a violation of the IEEPA based on the fact that the semiconductor chips were assigned ECCNs that listed national security as a reason for control.

 

Senior District Court Judge John A. Kronstadt of the Central District of California ordered entry of a judgment of acquittal on the violation of the IEEPA violation, finding that the government had not proven that a license was required to export the MMICs, and declined to apply a sentencing enhancement providing for a higher base level if national security controls were evaded.

 

The Ninth Circuit reversed and reinstated the conviction on the overturned count. Kronstadt, on remand, applied the enhancement and sentenced Shih to two 7-year terms of imprisonment, to be run concurrently.

 

http://www.metnews.com/

 

*******

 

October 30, 2024: The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is adding 40 foreign entities, as well as 4 addresses, to the Entity List in connection with their support for the Kremlin’s illegal war in Ukraine and tightening restrictions on 49 foreign entities that were already on the Entity List to address their procurement of high-priority U.S.-branded microelectronics and other items on behalf of Russia. These entities are located in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as India, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, Türkiye, Estonia, Finland, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United Kingdom (UK). BIS is also imposing additional restrictions on the export of 9 chemical precursors used to produce riot control agents (RCAs) and chemical weapons used on the battlefield against Ukraine in violation of treaty commitments. These actions underscore the extensive controls the United States has placed on entities enabling Russian aggression against Ukraine since the further invasion in February 2022.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-targets-illicit-procurement-networks-supplying-russias-military-and

 

Sanctions

 

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

October 16, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 834428: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding eight persons to the Unverified List (UVL). Of the eight persons being added, three are under the destination of China, People's Republic of (China); two are under the destination of Germany; one is under the destination of Pakistan; and two are under the destination of Türkiye. BIS is also amending the EAR by removing two persons from the UVL. Of the two persons being removed, one is under the destination of Saudi Arabia, and the other is under the destination of China.

 

Additions to the UVL:

 

  • Hengye Technology Co., Ltd of China;
  • Skytop Electronics Ltd. of China;
  • YXS Technology Co., Ltd. of China;
  • Arabian Aviation Trade Group of Germany;
  • Tiptrans Limited of Germany;
  • Marshal Traders of Pakistan;
  • Pegasus Technic Services of Turkey;
  • Vast Polymers of Turkey; and
  • Ambalaj Sanayi Ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi of Turkey.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/10/16/2024-23638/revisions-to-the-unverified-list

 

*******

October 21, 2024: the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 26 entities to the Entity List for activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy under the destinations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (6), Egypt (1), Pakistan (16), and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (3). These additions are related to alleged violations of export controls, involvement in weapons programs of concern, and evasion of U.S. sanctions and export controls on Russia and Iran.

 

Nine of the entities under the destination of Pakistan were added for acting as front companies and procurement agents for the Advanced Engineering Research Organization, a Pakistan-based company added to the Entity List in 2014. The remaining 7 Pakistani entities were added for contributions to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program.

 

Three entities under the destination of the UAE and one under the destination of Egypt were added for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin parts to evade U.S. sanctions and export controls imposed following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

 

Six entities under the destination of the PRC were added for acquiring U.S.-origin items in support of the PRC’s military modernization, dilatory and evasive conduct during end-use checks, and procurement of U.S.-origin items for Iran’s weapons of mass destruction and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-adds-26-entities-entity-list-actions-contrary-us-national-security-interests

 

*******

 

 

October 30, 2024: The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is adding 40 foreign entities, as well as 4 addresses, to the Entity List in connection with their support for the Kremlin’s illegal war in Ukraine and tightening restrictions on 49 foreign entities that were already on the Entity List to address their procurement of high-priority U.S.-branded microelectronics and other items on behalf of Russia. These entities are located in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as well as India, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, Türkiye, Estonia, Finland, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United Kingdom (UK). BIS is also imposing additional restrictions on the export of 9 chemical precursors used to produce riot control agents (RCAs) and chemical weapons used on the battlefield against Ukraine in violation of treaty commitments. These actions underscore the extensive controls the United States has placed on entities enabling Russian aggression against Ukraine since the further invasion in February 2022.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-targets-illicit-procurement-networks-supplying-russias-military-and

 

*******

 

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

October 1, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated seven individuals, and two entities associated with the Russia-based cybercriminal group Evil Corp, in a tri-lateral action with the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). On December 5, 2019, OFAC designated Evil Corp, its leader and founder Maksim Viktorovich Yakubets and over a dozen Evil Corp members, facilitators, and affiliated companies pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13694, as amended by E.O. 13757 (“E.O. 13694, as amended”). The United Kingdom and Australia concurrently designated select Evil Corp-affiliated individuals designated by OFAC. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Justice has unsealed an indictment charging one Evil Corp member in connection with his use of BitPaymer ransomware targeting victims in the United States. This designation also coincides with the second day of the U.S.-hosted Counter Ransomware Initiative summit which involves over 50 countries working together to counter the threat of ransomware.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Benderskit, Eduard Vitalyevich of Russia;
  • Pogodin, Vadim Gennadievich of Russia;
  • Ramazanov, Beyat Enverovich of Russia;
  • Ryzhenkov, Aleksandr Viktorovich of Russia;
  • Ryzehenkov, Sergey Viktorovich of Russia;
  • Shchetinin, Aleksey, Yevgenevich of Russia; and
  • Yakubets, Viktor Grigoryevich of Russia.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Solar-Invest LLC of Russia; and
  • Vympel-Assistance LLC of Russia.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241001 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2623

 

*******

 

October 1, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)  designated Hilltop Youth, a violent extremist group that has repeatedly attacked Palestinians and destroyed Palestinian homes and property in the West Bank, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14115. Through these violent activities, Hilltop Youth is actively destabilizing the West Bank and harming the peace and security of Palestinians and Israelis alike. Hilltop Youth has devastated Palestinian communities and carried out killings, mass arson, and other so-called “price tag” attacks to exact revenge and intimidate Palestinian civilians, and has repeatedly clashed with the Israeli military as it counters their activities.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Suissa, Avichai of Israel; and
  • Yardeni, Eitan of Russia.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Hilltop Youth.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241001 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2622

 

*******

 

October 2, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated one individual and three companies that have facilitated weapons procurement and smuggling operations for Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis. This action targets key procurement operatives and suppliers located in Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that have enabled the Houthis to acquire dual-use materials and components needed to manufacture, maintain, and deploy an arsenal of advanced missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against U.S. and allied interests.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Al-kulani, Hasan Ahmad Hasan Muhammad of Iran.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Gemini Marine Limited of the Marshall Islands;
  • Shenzhen Boyu Imports and Exports Co. of China; and
  • Shenzhen Jinghon Electronics Limited of China.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Frunze (E5U4323) Crude Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag; Registration Identification IMO 9263643; MMSI 518998343 (vessel); and
  • Izumo (TRBQ9) Crude Oil Tanker Gabon flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9249324; MMSI 626466000 (vessel).

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2627 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241002

 

*******

 

October 7, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated three individuals and one sham charity that are prominent international financial supporters of Hamas, as well as one Hamas-controlled financial institution in Gaza. OFAC also designated a longstanding Hamas supporter and nine of his businesses. These actors play critical roles in external fundraising for Hamas, often under the guise of charitable work, that finance the group’s terrorist activities. This action, which is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, highlights the abuse of the non-profit organization (NPO) sector by terrorist financiers through the use of sham charities to generate revenue.

 

The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) also issued Counter Terrorism General License 30, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on October 7, 2024," and Counter Terrorism General License 31, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Certain Entities Blocked on October 7, 2024."

 

General License 30: Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on October 7, 2024

 

All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked persons are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, November 21, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the GTSR:

 

(1) Al Ahmar Trading Group;

(2) Al Salam Trading and Agencies General Establishment;

(3) Sabaturk Dis Ticaret Anomin Sirketi;

(4) Vivid Enerji Yatirimlari Anonim Sirketi;

(5) Investrade Portfoy Yonetimi Anomim Sirketi; or

(6) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

General License 31: Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Certain Entities Blocked on October 7, 2024

 

 (a) All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or the facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity of Investrade Portfoy Yonetimi Anomim Sirketi (Investrade Portfoy), and any entity in which Investrade Portfoy owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest ( “Covered Debt or Equity”), to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 am eastern standard time November 21, 2024:

 

(b) All transactions prohibited by the GTSR that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of Covered Debt or Equity that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern daylight time, October 7, 2024, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time November 21, 2024.

 

(c) All transactions prohibited by the GTSR that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern daylight time, October 7, 2024, that (i) include a blocked person described in paragraph (a) of this general license as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to Covered Debt or Equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, November 21, 2024, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the GTSR.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Al Ahmar, Hamid Abdullah Hussein of Yemen;
  • Al-zeer, Majed of Jordan;
  • Doughman, Abel Saad al-Din Hassan of Austria; and
  • Hanoun, Muhammad Mahoud Ahmad Awad of Jordan.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Al Ahmar Oils and Supply Distribution of Yemen;
  • Al Ahmar Trading Group of Yemen;
  • Al Salam Trading and Agencies General Establishment of Yemen;
  • Al-Intaj Bank of Gaza;
  • Associazione Benefica Di Soldarieta of Italy;
  • Investrade Portfoy Yonetimi Anonim Sirketi of Turkey;
  • Saba , Trade & Investment S.R.O of Czech Republic;
  • Sabafon International Sal Offshore of Lebanon;
  • Sabaturk Dis Ticaret Anonim Sirketi of Turkey;
  • Sama International Media of Yemen; and
  • Vivid Enerji Yatirimlari Anonim Sirketi of Turkey.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241007 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2632 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933471/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933476/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933481/download?inline

 

*******

October 8, 2024:  The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Algoney Hamdan Daglo Musa (Algoney), pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14098, for leading efforts to supply weapons to continue the war in Sudan. The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has caused immense devastation, leaving tens of thousands dead, more than 11 million displaced, and millions facing emergency levels of hunger.  Algoney is the procurement director of the RSF and a brother of Mohammed Hamdan Daglo (Hemedti), the leader of the RSF. Algoney has extended this war by leading RSF efforts to procure weapons and military materiel. By arming the RSF, his actions have directly contributed to the RSF’s ongoing siege of El Fasher in North Darfur, a city of nearly two million vulnerable civilians, and the RSF’s operations elsewhere in Sudan.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Musa, Algoney Hamdan Daglo of Sudan.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2635 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241008

 

*******

 

October 10, 2024: OFAC issued a new Russia-related Frequently Asked Question (FAQ): 1197.

 

FAQ 1197:

 

Q: I’m a U.S. person with securities held at the National Settlement Depository (NSD), which were transferred pursuant to Russian Decree 840 to another Russian registrar.  Am I required to block these securities? 

 

A: Yes.  On June 12, 2024, OFAC designated the National Settlement Depository (NSD), along with the Moscow Exchange (MOEX) and the National Clearing Center (NCC) pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy. As noted in the accompanying press release, Russia has reoriented the architecture of its financial system to facilitate investment into its defense industry and acquisition of goods needed to further its aggression against Ukraine.

Alongside this designation, OFAC issued, and subsequently extended, two general licenses to allow for wind-down of certain transactions involving NSD, MOEX, and NCC, and the divestment of securities held at NSD, among other authorized activities. These general licenses (General License 99A and General License 100A) are in place through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 12, 2024. Following the expiration of GLs 99A and 100A, any securities in the possession or control of U.S. persons that are held at NSD should be treated as blocked, and dividends or other income received via NSD should be treated as blocked.

OFAC is aware that the Russian Federation has attempted to take action to evade or avoid OFAC sanctions on NSD via Presidential Decree 840 by requiring the transfer of certain securities to local Russian registrars. OFAC cautions that such transfers may not be authorized under the general licenses and may be considered null and void pursuant to OFAC’s regulations (see 31 CFR § 587.202). OFAC understands that these transactions may involve other blocked persons, including certain local Russian registrars. OFAC is also investigating the remaining non-blocked local Russian registrars for future designation under E.O. 14024.  The general licenses do not authorize transactions involving any blocked person other than those identified in the authorizations, and any transfer made in violation of OFAC sanctions is null and void. As such, U.S. persons should continue to treat these securities as blocked.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1197 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241010

 

*******

 

October 11, 2024: The United States expanded sanctions on Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sectors in response to Iran’s October 1 attack on Israel, its second direct attack on Israel this year. This action intensifies financial pressure on Iran, limiting the regime’s ability to earn critical energy revenues to undermine stability in the region and attack U.S. partners and allies. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is identifying the petroleum and petrochemical sectors of the Iranian economy pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which allows Treasury to target a broader range of activities relating to Iran’s trade in petroleum and petrochemical products. E.O. 13902 provides authority to identify and impose sanctions on key sectors of Iran’s economy to deny the Iranian government financial resources that may be used to fund and support its nuclear program, missile development, terrorism and terrorist proxy networks, and malign regional influence. Pursuant to this determination, the Treasury may impose sanctions on any person determined to operate in the petroleum and petrochemical sectors of the Iranian economy.

 

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published a Determination pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 13902, "Petroleum and Petrochemical Sectors of the Iranian Economy".

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Alya Marine Sendirian Berhad of Malaysia;
  • Cathay Harvest Marine Ltd of China;
  • Celia Armas Ltd of China;
  • Davina Shipping Inc of the Marshall Islands;
  • Delnaz Ship Management SDN BHD of Malaysia;
  • Derecttor Company Limited of China;
  • Diamante Tankers Incorporated of Panama;
  • Elza Shipping SA of Liberia;
  • Engen Management NV of Suriname;
  • Gabbaro Ship Services Pvt Ltd of Mumbai;
  • Glazing Future Management NV of Suriname;
  • Harry Victor Ship Management and Operation L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Jazira Das International Refinded Oil Products Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Max Maritime Solutions FZE of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Rita Shipping Inc of the Marshall Islands; and
  • Strong Roots Provider NV of Suriname.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Anhona (V3GK3) Oil Products Tanker Belize flag; MMSI 312171000 (vessel);
  • Aventus I (3E2078) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352898820 (vessel);
  • Bendingo (8P2397) Crude Oil Tanker Barbados flag; MMSI 314925000 (vessel);
  • Berg 1 (3DCZ1) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; (vessel);
  • Carina (8P2232) Crude Oil Tanker Barbados flag; MMSI 314872000 (vessel);
  • Carnatic (8P2398) Crude Oil Tanker Barbados flag; MMSI 314926000 (vessel);
  • Carol (V4BC4) LPG Tanker St. Kitts and Nevis flag; MMSI 341575000 (vessel);
  • Cross Ocean (3E4640) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002860 (vessel);
  • Crystal Rose (3E4037) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352001298 (vessel);
  • Davina T8A4843) Crude Oil Tanker Palau flag; MMSI 511101471 (vessel);
  • Dimitra II (T7BI5) Crude Oil Tanker San Marino flag;   MMSI 268249801 (vessel);
  • Elza (D5SE4) Crude Oil Tanker Liberia flag; MMSI 636018950 (vessel);
  • Goodwin (E5U5022) Crude Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag;  MMSI 518999041 (vessel);
  • Hornet, Crude Oil Tanker Eswatini flag;  MMSI 6987100 (vessel);
  • Luna Prime (3E2167) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352001994 (vessel);
  • Octans (S9A15) Crude Oil Tanker Sao Tome and Principe flag; (vessel);
  • Salvia (T7BJ6) Crude Oil Tanker San Marino flag; MMSI 268240702 (vessel);
  • Satina (3E2250) Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002316 (vessel);
  • Shanaye Queen (9WNN6) Crude Oil Tanker Malaysia flag; MMSI 533132105 (vessel);
  • Spirit of Casper (3E6116) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352003872 (vessel);
  • Tyche I (3E5017) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002704 (vessel);
  • Voras (TJM8VO) Crude Oil Tanker Cameroon flag; MMSI 613916701 (vessel); and
  • Wen Yao (E5U5189) Crude Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag; MMSI 518999208 (vessel).

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2644 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933491/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241011

 

*******

 

October 15, 2024: In a joint action with Canada, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated the Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network, or “Samidoun,” a sham charity that serves as an international fundraiser for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorist organization. The PFLP, which was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the U.S. Department of State in October 1997 and October 2001, respectively, uses Samidoun to maintain fundraising operations in both Europe and North America. Also designated is Khaled Barakat, a member of the PFLP’s leadership. Together, Samidoun and Barakat play critical roles in external fundraising for the PFLP. This action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended.

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Barakat, Khaled of Canada.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network of Canada.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2646 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241015

 

*******

October 16, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated three individuals, and four associated companies involved in a Lebanon-based sanctions evasion network that generates millions of dollars in revenue for Hizballah. Hizballah’s finance team is responsible for the establishment and operation of Hizballah commercial projects throughout Lebanon, some of which are financed and facilitated by Iran. OFAC also designated three individuals involved in the illegal production and trafficking of Captagon that has benefitted Bashar al-Assad’s regime and its allies, including Hizballah. The illegal trade in Captagon, a dangerous, highly addictive amphetamine, has become a billion-dollar illicit enterprise operated by senior members of the Syrian regime.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Atwi, Silvana of Lebanon;
  • Falhout, Raji of Syria;
  • Ghaffar, Haidar Houssam Al Din Abdul of Lebanon;
  • Hamadi, Houssam Hasan of Lebanon;
  • Hamideh, Abdellatif of Syria; and
  • Hamieh, Khaldoun of Syria.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Global Tradeline Sarl of Lebanon;
  • GM Farm of Lebanon;
  • Liban Oui Sarl of Lebanon; and
  • United Sons of Lebanon.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241016 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2648

 

*******

 

October 17, 2024:  The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted three entities and one individual for their involvement in the development and production of Russia’s Garpiya series long-range attack unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The Garpiya has been deployed by Russia in its brutal war against Ukraine, destroying critical infrastructure and causing mass casualties. Designed and developed by People’s Republic of China (PRC)-based experts, the Garpiya is produced at PRC-based factories in collaboration with Russian defense firms before transferring the drones to Russia for use against Ukraine.

 

These private companies and individuals were involved in the development and production of military equipment for a U.S.-sanctioned Russian defense firm for use by the Russian military in Ukraine.  While the United States previously imposed sanctions on PRC entities providing critical inputs to Russia’s military-industrial base, these are the first U.S. sanctions imposed on PRC entities directly developing and producing complete weapons systems in partnership with Russian firms.

 

The following individual have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Yamshchikov, Artem Mikhailovich of Russia.

 

The following entites have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Limited Liability Company Trading House Vector of Russia;
  • Redlepus Vector Industry Shenzhen Co Ltd of China; and
  • Xiamen Limbach Aircraft Engine Co., Ltd. of China.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2651 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241017

 

*******

 

October 17, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned eighteen companies, individuals, and vessels for their ties to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)-backed Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal (al-Jamal) and his network. Included in this action are the captains of vessels transporting illicit oil as well as the companies that managed and operated these ships. The revenue from al-Jamal’s network continues to enable Houthi attacks in the region, including missile and unmanned aerial vehicle attacks on Israel and commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Barkhordar, Ali of Iran;
  • Durrani, Whaid Ullah of Pakistan;
  • Keot, Dipankar Mohan of India;
  • Skiriban, Yevhen of Ukraine; and
  • Warikoo Rattanlal, Rahul Rattanlal of India.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Changtai Shipping Limited of the Marshall Islands;
  • Eco Max Fze of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Eco Max Trading Fze of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Indo Gukf Ship Management LLC of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Motionavigations Limited of the Marshall Islands.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Gratia (T8A4616) Chemical/Oil Tanker Palau flag; MMSI 511101304 (vessel);
  • Juvenis (T8A4619) Chemical/Oil Tanker Palau flag; MMSI 511101307 (vessel);
  • Kapok (3E6616) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352003068 (vessel);
  • Kukki (8PVO7) Chemical/Oil Tanker Barbados flag; MMSI 314823000 (vessel);
  • Liana (T8A3765) Oil Products Tanker Palau flag; MMSI 511100596 (vessel);
  • Marbel (E5U4474) Chemical/Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag; MMSI 518998494 (vessel);
  • Onyx (E5U4643) Products Tanker Cook Islands flag; MMSI 518998663 (vessel); and
  • Trophy (E5U4515) Chemical/Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag;  MMSI 518998535 (vessel).

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2652 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241017

 

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October 21, 2024: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued an updated Maritime Oil Industry Advisory for both government and private sector actors involved in the global maritime industry. Updates to the advisory include recommendations concerning specific best practices and reflects the Price Cap Coalition’s ongoing commitment to promote responsible practices in the industry, disrupt sanctioned trade, and enhance compliance with the price cap.

 

The Price Cap Coalition, which includes G7 countries as well as the European Union, Australia, and New Zealand, is updating its advisory for both government and private sector actors involved in the global maritime industry. The advisory provides recommendations concerning specific best practices and reflects the Coalition’s ongoing commitment to promoting responsible practices in the industry, disrupting sanctioned trade, and enhancing compliance with the price cap.

 

The Coalition originally published its advisory on October 12, 2023. This update provides stakeholders with new recommendations on meeting international obligations, enhancing due diligence around tanker sales, avoiding interactions with sanctioned counterparties, and raising internal awareness.

 

The Coalition remains focused on reducing the revenues Russia uses to fuel its brutal war against Ukraine while maintaining energy market stability.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2659 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241021

 

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October 24, 2024: the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Mirghani Idris Suleiman (Idris) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14098, for leading the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) efforts to acquire weapons for use in its ongoing war with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Idris has been at the center of weapons deals that have fueled the brutality and scale of the war, serving as Director General of Defense Industries System (DIS), the SAF’s primary weapons production and procurement arm. OFAC designated DIS on June 1, 2023, for being responsible for, or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged or attempted to engage in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Sudan,

 

The following individual have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

Suleiman, Mirghani Idris of Sudan.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241024 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2672

 

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October 30, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned 275 individuals and entities involved in supplying Russia with advanced technology and equipment that it desperately needs to support its war machine. This action targets both individual actors and sprawling sanctions evasion networks across 17 jurisdictions, including India, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Switzerland, Thailand, and Türkiye. In addition to disrupting global evasion networks, this action also targets domestic Russian importers and producers of key inputs and other materiel for Russia’s military-industrial base.

 

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 8K, "Authorizing Transactions Related to Energy," Russia-related General License 25G, "Authorizing Transactions Related to Telecommunications and Certain Internet-Based Communications," Russia-related General License 110, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on October 30, 2024," Russia-related General License 111, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Certain Entities Blocked on October 30, 2024," and Russia-related General License 112, "Authorizing Civil Aviation Safety and Wind Down Transactions Involving Shaurya Aeronautics Private Limited."

 

Additionally, OFAC has issued one new Russia-related Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1198).

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 8K: Authorizing Transactions Related to Energy

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 involving one or more of the following entities that are related to energy are authorized, through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 30, 2025:

 

(1) State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs Vnesheconombank;

(2) Public Joint Stock Company Bank Financial Corporation Otkritie;

(3) Sovcombank Open Joint Stock Company;

(4) Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia;

(5) VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company;

(6) Joint Stock Company Alfa-Bank;

(7) Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank;

(8) Bank Zenit Public Joint Stock Company;

(9) Bank Saint-Petersburg Public Joint Stock Company;

(10) National Clearing Center (NCC);

(11) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest; or

(12) the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.

 

(b) For the purposes of this general license, the term “related to energy” means the extraction, production, refinement, liquefaction, gasification, regasification, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, transport, or purchase of petroleum, including crude oil, lease condensates, unfinished oils, natural gas liquids, petroleum products, natural gas, or other     products capable of producing energy, such as coal, wood, or agricultural products used to manufacture biofuels, or uranium in any form, as well as the development, production, generation, transmission, or exchange of power, through any means, including nuclear, thermal, and renewable energy sources.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 25G: Authorizing Transactions Related to Telecommunications and Certain Internet-Based Communications

 

(a) All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications involving the Russian Federation that are prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), are authorized.

 

(b) The exportation or reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to the Russian Federation of services incident to the exchange of communications over the internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, blogging, social media platforms, collaboration platforms, video conferencing, e-gaming, e-learning platforms, automated translation, web maps, user authentication services, web hosting, and domain name registration services, that is prohibited by the RuHSR, is authorized.

 

(c) The exportation or reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, to the Russian Federation of software, hardware, or technology incident to the exchange of communications over the internet is authorized, provided that:

 

(1) If the software, hardware, or technology is subject to the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (EAR), the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply to the Russian Federation of such software, hardware, or technology is licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce pursuant to the EAR; and

 

(2) If the software, hardware, or technology is not subject to the EAR, the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply to the Russian Federation of such software, hardware, or technology would be eligible for a license exception or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce if it were subject to the EAR.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 110: Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on October 30, 2024

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked entities are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 14, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):

 

(1) XH Smart Tech China Co Ltd;

(2) Lokesh Machines Limited;

(3) Galaxy Bearings Ltd;

(4) Orbit Fintrade LLP;

(5) Wuhan Huazhong Numerical Control Co Ltd;

(6) Beijing Dynamic Power Co Limited;

(7) Sharpline Automation Private Limited; or

(8) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 111: Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Certain Entities Blocked on October 30, 2024

  1. a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or the facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity issued or guaranteed by the following blocked entities (“Covered Debt or Equity”) to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 14, 2024:

 

(1) XH Smart Tech China Co Ltd;

(2) Lokesh Machines Limited;

(3) Galaxy Bearings Ltd;

(4) Beijing Dynamic Power Co Limited;

(5) Wuhan Huazhong Numerical Control Co Ltd; or

(6) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly,  individually or in aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

(b) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of Covered Debt or Equity that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern daylight time, October 30, 2024 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 14, 2024.

 

(c) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern daylight time, October 30, 2024 that (i) include a blocked person described in paragraph (a) of this general license as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to Covered Debt or Equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 14, 2024, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

GENERAL LICENSE NO. 112: Authorizing Civil Aviation Safety and Wind Down Transactions Involving Shaurya Aeronautics Private Limited

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the provision, exportation, or reexportation of goods, technology, or services to ensure the safety of civil aviation involving Shaurya Aeronautics Private Limited (Shaurya), or any entity in which Shaurya owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest (collectively, the “Blocked Persons”), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 14, 2024, provided that the goods, technology, or services that are provided, exported, or reexported are for use on aircraft operated solely for civil aviation purposes.

 

(b) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving the Blocked Persons, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 14, 2024, provided that any payment to the Blocked Persons must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

FAQ 1198:

 

Q:  In light of the designation of Shreya Life Sciences Private Limited (Shreya), are U.S. persons authorized to engage in transactions related to pharmaceutical and other humanitarian-related goods involving Shreya and its subsidiaries?

 

A: Yes. As a general matter, humanitarian trade is not the target of U.S. sanctions.

OFAC has issued Russia-related General License (GL) 6D, which authorizes, among other things, certain transactions related to the production, manufacturing, sale, transport, or provision of medicine and medical devices. U.S. persons may continue to engage in authorized transactions involving Shreya under GL 6D. Additionally, non-U.S. persons generally would not face sanctions risk for engaging in transactions authorized for U.S. persons under general licenses issued pursuant to the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions program. For further information, please review the OFAC Food Security Fact Sheet: Russia Sanctions and Agricultural Trade

 

Please see link below for full list of sanctioned entities and individuals.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241030 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2700 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933531/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933536/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933541/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933546/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933551/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1198

 

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October 31, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned five Mexican nationals, and two Mexico-based entities linked to La Linea, a violent Mexico-based drug trafficking organization responsible for trafficking fentanyl and other deadly drugs into the United States. This action was coordinated closely with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Government of Mexico, including La Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (UIF), Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit.

 

The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued an OFAC Compliance Communiqué: Sanctions Compliance Guidance for the Maritime Shipping Industry to aid maritime sector stakeholders in identifying certain new or common fact patterns that may be indicative of sanctions evasion, addressing common counterparty due diligence issues, and implementing best practices to promote sanctions compliance.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Aguayo, Adrian of Mexico;
  • Carrasco Levya, Josefa Yadira of Mexico;
  • Nieto Fierro, Heber of Mexico;
  • Oretega Gallegos, Jorge Adrian of Mexico; and
  • Salas Aguayo, Jesus of Mexico.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Y H. El Remate, Sociedad Anonima De Capital Variable; and
  • Soluciones Tecnologicas y Paqueteria Tres, Sociedad Anonima De Capital Variable.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241031 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2704 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933556/download?inline

OCTOBER 2024 EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATES Read More »

SEPTEMBER 2024 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through September 30, 2024.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

 See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

 In this newsletter, we have added a specific DDTC FAQs section, we think this will be of interest to our readers.

 

 REGULATORY UPDATES

President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Ethiopia

 September 6, 2024: On September 17, 2021, by Executive Order 14046, President Biden declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in and in relation to northern Ethiopia.

The situation in and in relation to northern Ethiopia, which has been marked by activities that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Ethiopia and the greater Horn of Africa region, continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14046 of September 17, 2021, must continue in effect beyond September 17, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14046 with respect to Ethiopia.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/09/06/press-release-notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-ethiopia/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/page/3/

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President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Foreign Interference in or Undermining Public Confidence in United States Elections

 September 9, 2024: On September 12, 2018, by Executive Order 13848, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the threat of foreign interference in or undermining public confidence in United States elections.

Although there has been no evidence of a foreign power altering the outcomes or vote tabulation in any United States election, foreign powers have historically sought to exploit America’s free and open political system.  In recent years, the proliferation of digital devices and internet-based communications has created significant vulnerabilities and magnified the scope and intensity of the threat of foreign interference.  The ability of persons located, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States to interfere in or undermine public confidence in United States elections, including through the unauthorized accessing of election and campaign infrastructure or the covert distribution of propaganda and disinformation, continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared on September 12, 2018, must continue in effect beyond September 12, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13848 with respect to the threat of foreign interference in or undermining public confidence in United States elections.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/09/09/press-release-notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-foreign-interference-in-or-undermining-public-confidence-in-united-states-elections-2/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/page/3/

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 President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks

 September 9, 2024:   Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1622(d), provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, within 90 days prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date.  Consistent with this provision, President Biden has sent to the Federal Register the enclosed notice, stating that the emergency declared in Proclamation 7463 with respect to the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, is to continue in effect for an additional year.

The terrorist threat that led to the declaration on September 14, 2001, of a national emergency continues.  For this reason, President Biden has determined that it is necessary to continue in effect after September 14, 2024, the national emergency with respect to the terrorist threat.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/09/09/message-to-the-congress-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-certain-terrorist-attacks/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/page/3/

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President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism

 September 18, 2024: On September 23, 2001, by Executive Order 13224, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, including the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in New York and Pennsylvania and against the Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks against United States nationals or the United States.

On September 9, 2019, the President signed Executive Order 13886 to strengthen and consolidate sanctions to combat the continuing threat posed by international terrorism and to take additional steps to deal with the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13224, as amended.

The actions of persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended, and the measures adopted to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond September 23, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency with respect to persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism declared in Executive Order 13224, as amended.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/09/18/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-persons-who-commit-threaten-to-commit-or-support-terrorism-3/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/

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 Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 Update to US Person Abroad Guidance

September 4, 2024: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) has released an update to the “Guidance for USPAB Authorization Requests” document. The update (v. 2.0) includes several clarifications and a new section, “Support for Space Launch Campaigns”. The updates are summarized below:

  • Provides clarification on defense service recipients including vendors, subcontractors, actual or potential customers, or other foreign entities with whom the USPAB may work directly;
  • Provides clarification on the scope of an approval in new “Scope of an Authorization” section to include requirements to identify the specific defense articles, programs, and platforms in the application. For developmental programs the authorization may be granted to furnish defense services related to defense articles in a development/prototype phase without identifying a specific defense article, program or platform. However, once the defense article moves beyond the development phase, you must submit a replacement request that identifies the defense article by its specific designation as well as the intended end-use systems and platforms;
  • Provides clarification on the identification of end-use systems/platforms. If the defense article for which defense services will be furnished is a system, component, or part, the application must identify the end-use systems and/or platforms for which the defense article will be used on, in, or with. All intended end-use systems and/or platforms must be identified;
  • Requests that all documents be submitted in text-searchable PDF format to make it easier on the reviewers to search for specific information in the filing;
  • Provides additional guidance in new subsection A on drafting the opening sentence of “Section II – Scope of Request” to identify the defense articles for which the applicant will be providing defense services, as well as any end-use systems and platforms which will incorporate the defense article with which the applicant will work. Whenever possible, identify defense articles by their specific designations (e.g., AN/APG-82(V)1 AESA radar);
  • Provides additional guidance in identifying the USML defense service subcategories in Parts 3 and 4 by adding Table 1 to the guidance that lists all of the technical data USML Categories;
  • Specifies that contact information should be provided if appointing a third party POC;
  • Adds new requirements for the completion of block 8 on the DS-6004 to provide a brief description of the request which identifies the defense services, defense articles, and end-use systems/platforms involved in the request;
  • Adds a new section – “Part 5 – Support for Space Launch Campaigns”. If the U.S. persons are employed with a foreign entity that will be involved in space launch campaign activities, additional information is required. The request must identify the following: 1) The specific satellites/payloads to be launched; 2) The launch facility and location; 3) The launch vehicle and launch service provider; and 4) The foreign parties involved in the space launch campaign;
  • Modifies the “Statement of Understanding” to identify that the applicant understands that their authorization will be limited to the defense articles and end-use systems/platforms specifically identified in their application; and
  • The updates also make various administrative changes to sample letters.

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=f9ccfe96dbb4130044f9ff621f961929 and

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events

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International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Revisions to Definition and Controls Related to Defense Services; Extension of Comment Period

 September 25, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 78278: The Department of State is extending the comment period for a proposed rule published July 29, 2024. The original comment period required submission of comments on or before September 27, 2024. In response to requests from the public, the Department extends the comment period through October 15, 2024.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/09/25/2024-22041/international-traffic-in-arms-regulations-revisions-to-definition-and-controls-related-to-defense

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 Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Update to Republic of Cyprus (ROC) Country Policy

 September 27, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 79140: The Department has published a Federal Register notice amending § 126.1(r) of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which continues the suspension of defense trade restrictions for the Republic of Cyprus and its status as a proscribed destination from October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025.

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events

*******

DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

September 3rd through 27th, 2024: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Name change of CPI International, Inc. to Beverly Microwave Division and Microwave Power Products, Inc. due to acquisition by TransDigm Inc.;
  • Name change of Cadence Engines Systems Acquistion, LLC to Kinetic Engines Systems Acquistion, LLC due to corporate restructuring;
  • Name change of Kongsberg Maritime Spain SLU to Kongsberg Discovery Spain SLU due to corporate restructuring;
  • Address change for Paradigm Parachute & Defense Inc., 4040 Ashland Avenue, Pensacola, Florida 32534 to Paradigm Parachute & Defense Inc. at 7303 Plantation Road, Pensacola, Florida 32504;
  • Name change of Meta Spectrum Operations LLC to Metrea Spectrum Operations LLC due to corporate rebranding;
  • Name change of Adimec Electronic Imaging, Inc. to Teledyne Adimec Electronic Imaging, Inc. due to corporate rebranding;
  • Address change for Metrea Executive Aviation LLC, 5525 W. Cypress St, Tampa, FL 33607 to Metrea Executive Aviation LLC, 4751 Jim Walter Blvd., Hangar 7B, Tampa, FL 33607; and
  • Address change from Metrea Mission Data Limited, Malvern Science Park, Geraldine Rd, Malvern, Worcestershire, UK WR14 3SZ, to Metrea Mission Data Limited, Third Floor, the Aircraft Factory, 100 Cambridge Grove, London, W6 0LE.

 *******

 DDTC Final Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations Posted to Website

 June 13, 2023 through September 12, 2024: On September 17, 2024 the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following Final CJ Determinations for CJ’s adjudicated between, June 13, 2023 through September 12, 2024, on its website at:

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=6ea6afdcdbc36300529d368d7c96194b

Readers may find these determinations helpful when performing self-classification work.

Model Name Manufacturer Final Determination Final Determination Date
RAST System AC Motor, Part Number C15-42, NSN 610-50-1273-5927 Electromech Technologies USML Category VIII(h)(5) 6/13/2023
Spectral AI Nexus and ARTemis MIND Technology, Inc EAR99 6/13/2023
BL-1 Loader, Version 2, Part Number GN-80-00-00-000 US Advanced Systems LLC USML Category IV(c) 6/13/2023
Anti-Personnel Obstacle Breaching System (APBOS), Model MK7 MOD2, NSN 1375-01-508-4975 Ensign-Bickford Aerospace & Defense Company USML Category IV(b)(2) 6/13/2023
Integrated Panel Assemblies, Model 25515, Part Numbers 25515-004 and 25515-007 Transdigm, Inc USML Category XII(e)(1) 6/13/2023
Generic Radiofrequency (RF) Filter Manufacturing and Assembly Process Smiths Interconnect Americas Inc Seek CCATS 6/13/2023
XDE Cobalt, Model Number: V1.0, Part Number: XDE-CBT-OWT-LOQ Owl Cyber Defense Solutions, LLC CCL ECCN 5A002.a.1 6/13/2023
VISOR Ci ,/Model Number VISOR 36xx series, Part Number 100933xx Chemring Sensors and Electronic Systems, Inc/CHG Group, Inc USML Category IV(c) 7/11/2023
Gyromagnetic Nonlinear Transmission Line, Part Numbers: NLTL-1525-FCV3 and NLTL-1525-FCV3AL Metamagnetics, Inc USML Category XI(a)(7) 7/11/2023
Helios Ravn Inc USML Category XI(a)(7) 7/19/2023
Heli-Basket, HB2000 Helibasket LLC EAR99 7/19/2023
SWE-400 QUAD Trakka USA LLC CCL ECCN 6A003.b.4.b 7/19/2023
Advanced Systems Susceptibility and Risk Analysis Toolkit (ASSURANT) Software Version 4.0.2, and ASSURANT Commercial Software Knowledge Based Systems, Inc EAR99 7/19/2023
Face Seal Assembly, Model A, Part Number 913-0067-052 Enpro Industries, Inc CCL ECCN 9A619.x 7/24/2023
Mark 7 Genesys Automated Loading System, 101-1500-xx (various) Lyman Products Corporation CCL ECCN 0B505.a 7/24/2023
Booby Trap Simulator, Model Numbers M117, M118, and M119 WMDTECH, LLC CCL ECCN 0A614.a 7/24/2023
X4 - Fire Control System Maztech Industries, LLC USML Category XII(c)(2)(iii) 7/24/2023
LED 360-degree Situational Awareness Kit with Infrared, Model 07630, NSN 6220-01-629-4494 Truck-Lite Co, LLC CCL ECCN 0A606.y.12 7/24/2023
Aero Vodochody L-39 Albatross Turbojet Aircraft Aero Vodochody USML Category VIII(a)(3) 7/24/2023
Convoy Escort Vehicle Turret Wire Strain Relief Components Dillon Aero, Inc CCL ECCN 0A501.x:  1) Power Up-Converter Cable, Part Number DATV1219
2) Dual Battery Cage Charge Wire, Part Number DAVM0136
--------------------------
CCL ECCN 0A606.x:  3) Charge Swivel Disconnect Tab, Part Number DAVM0775
4) Disconnect Lanyard, Part Number DAVM0776
5) Swivel Disconnect Bracket Assembly, Part Number DAVM0777
6) Backshell Half, Charge – MMC, Part Number DGV1051
7) Charge Breakaway Pivot – MMC, Part Number DGV1052
--------------------------
EAR99:  8) Charge Breakaway Bushing – MMC, Part Number DGV1053
7/26/2023
Vapor Pinion Instruction Set and Boeing Pinion Instruction Set ITW Heartland Seek CCATS 7/26/2023
Cold Forming Machines (Formax 2, Models FX3 and FXP2; Formax 3, Models FX3 and FXP3; Formax 4, Models FX4 and FXP3; Formax 5, Models FX3 and FXP3; Formax 6, Models XXV; Formax 7, Model FXP7, and Formax 8, Model FXP8); Miscellaneous Cold Forming Tools; Steel Projectiles for Firearms National Machinery LLC Seek CCATS:  Formax Machines, replacement parts, components, and tooling, for the Formax Machines

USML Category III(d)(6):  Steel projectiles, regardless of caliber

Technical Support – Response Pending

7/26/2023
Low-Cost Blue-Chip Slapper (detonator), Part Number 334740 Excelitas Technologies Corp CCL ECCN 1A007.b.4 7/26/2023
AGM NVG-40, Models: NL1, NL2, NW1, and NW2, Part Numbers: 14NV4122483021, 14NV4122483011, 14NV4122484021, and 14NV4122484011

AGM NVG-50, Models: NL1, NL2, NW1, and NW2, Part Numbers: 14NV5122483021, 14NV5122483011, 14NV5122484011, and 14NV5122484021

AGM Global Vision LLC CCL ECCN 6A992.b 7/26/2023
Ammo Bearer Pack Kit, Model 98754-MC MMI Outdoor, Inc EAR99 7/26/2023
Tyton VS2X Series, Part Numbers 19-0251-
01 and 19-0251-11
EIZO Rugged Solutions Seek CCATS 7/26/2023
Axiom Thruster, Part Number 10007604 Axiom Space, Inc CCL ECCN 9A515.h 8/2/2023
Air-Scooping Electric Thruster Viridian Space Corporation Seek CCATS 8/2/2023
Bumper Assembly, Arresting Hook, Part Number 16L364-3 Sonfarrel Aerospace, LLC USML Category VIII(h)(5) 8/2/2023
X4-Magazine Magpul Industries Corp CCL ECCN 0A501.d 8/2/2023
Large Area Silicon Photodiode Detector Assembly with 904 nm NIR (Near-Infrared) Transmitting Optical Filter, Model Number: PIN 12492-2, Part Number: 90 504 000 OSI Optoelectronics, Inc CCL ECCN 0A614.x 8/2/2023
Bearing, Liquid Oxygen Turbopump; Technology Development and Manufacture, Part Number: 710-005 Napoleon Engineering Services CCL ECCN 9A604.x 8/2/2023
Extra Large Uncrewed Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV), Part Numbers 1717200-1000-1 and 1717401-2000, and its specially designed parts, components, accessories, and attachments The Boeing Company USML Category XXI(a) 8/2/2023
M548A1 Tracked Amphibious Cargo Carrier, Model M548A1, Serial Number CHX426HAB FMC Corporation CCL ECCN 0A606.a 8/19/2023
Hot Zone, Model GS1 Ochocoarms, dba HotZone Tactical CCL ECCN 0A504.f 8/19/2023
Frequency Converter 150kW, 50/400 Hz Part Number 015.09.0130 for the Patriot Missile System and Cable Set Tiburon Associates, Inc EAR99 8/19/2023
Rake System, its Design, Associated Assemblies, Test Data and Services Aerodyn Engineering, LLC USML Category VIII(i):  Direction in the integration of the System onto a jet trainer

CCL ECCN 9E619.a:  Rake System Design, Vibratory Testing Data, Flow Calibration Data, and Static Calibration Data

CCL ECCN 9B619.b:  Rake System Assembly, the Vibratory Test Rake System Assembly, and the Flow Calibration Rake

8/4/2023
Unified Data Library (UDL), Version Number 1.13.0 Sauternes Bluestaq CCL ECCN 5D002.c.1 8/23/2023
G.L.O.V.E. (Generated Low Output Voltage Emitter), Model and Part Number: CT-F2P Gen4.1 Sparrow Engineering, Inc CCL ECCN 0A503 8/28/2023
SX-124 Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Cards, Models SX-124-0000, SX-124-0103, and SX-124-0103v Spectranetix, Inc USML Category XI(c)(2) 8/28/2023
SX-124-5103 - Positioning, Navigation, Timing (PNT) Card with M-Code GPS receiver Spectranetix, Inc USML Category XII(d)(2)(ii) 8/28/2023
Sea Tel, Model 4212 Wideband Antenna, Part Number 140223-1 Sea Tel Inc, dba Cobham SATCOM USML Category XI(a)(5)(v) 8/28/2023
Ka-band SATCOM Terminal, Medium Form Factor, Part Number C810-00383-00, with Receive Array APAR-2EAF1 and Transmit Array APAT-1EAT1 CesiumAstro, Inc Seek CCATS 9/8/2023
Advanced Simulation Combat Operations Trainer Version 7 (ASCOT 7) PLEXSYS Interface Products Inc USML Category XI(d):  Link 11, Link 16, Link VMF, and JREAP-C modules

USML Category IX(b)(4)(ii):  IADS module

EAR99:  ASCOT 7 Core, Floating Client, ASTERIX interface, Smart Air Tactics, CIGI, Automatic Entity Generation, Group Editor, HLAe, Enhanced Weapons, Jamming, and ATO/ACO/OPTASKLINK

9/8/2023
AeroGuard Counter-UAS System, Model AeroGuard A6-B Sanmina Corporation Seek CCATS 9/8/2023
.22 Long Rifle Tracer Ammunition, Model Number .22LR Tracer, Part Number .22LRMK1 Piney Mountain Ammunition Company USML Category III(a)(6) 9/18/2023
Multi-Role Tactical Laser (MRTL), Model Number MRTL-A002 Acme Solutions LLC USML Category XVIII(a) 9/18/2023
UAS Kit THORAD, LLC Seek CCATS 9/18/2023
Lynq PRO, Models   VL-10000, VL-10100, VL-10200, VL-10300, VL-80000, VL-80006, VL-80012, VL-81012, and VL-82012 OTTO Seek CCATS 9/18/2023
Puma 550 AeroVironment, Inc CCL ECCN 9A012.a.2 9/18/2023
Double Layer Capacitors, Part Numbers: SCC‐2.7V‐3000F max, SCC‐2.7V-850F max-Low ESR, SCM‐9.0V max-7.5F max, and SCP‐2.1V‐8.5F max KYOCERA AVX Components Corporation EAR99 9/18/2023
NWUAV Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) Fuel Cell for Unmanned Systems, Model NWFC-1500 Northwest ULD, Inc CCL ECCN 9A610.x 9/18/2023
Cylinder, Indent, Firing Pin, Drawing Number 13051594 Rev B Cox Manufacturing Company, Inc EAR99 9/22/2023
Infrared Chemiluminescent Light Sticks, Model and Version Number: 6" Infrared Light Stick - 8 Hour Duration, Part Number: SKU: 9-17040PF Cyalume Technologies, Inc EAR99 9/22/2023
M710E TACAN Antenna, All-Band, Model Number 710E - NC, Part Number 711001-100 dB Systems Inc CCL ECCN 3A611.a 9/22/2023
Hypervelocity Accelerator System, Version V.1 Longshot Space Technologies Corp Seek CCATS 9/22/2023
1) HD80-MV-36X-MGI, Part Number 90-4718;
2) HD80-MV-36X-LP-MGI, Part Number 90-4717;
3) HD80RT-MV-36X-LP-MGI, Part Number 90-4713;
4) HD80RT-MV-36X-MGI, Part Number 90-4712;
5) HD80-MV-600-MGI, Part Number 90-4353;
6) HD80-MV-600-LP-MGI, Part Number 90-3317; and
7) HD80RT-MV-600-LP-MGI, Part Number 90-4368
Trillium Engineering, LLC CCL ECCN 6A003.b.4.a 9/22/2023
Mk48 Nutsack Type 1, Model Number TTS-MK48T1 Gen 1, and  MK48 Nutsack Type 2, Model Number TTS-MK48T2 Tribe Tactical Supply LLC USML Category I(h)(1) 9/29/2023
Speaker Modular Mission Payloads (MMP), Model MMP-SPEAKER, and Strobe and Noise Distraction MMP, Model MMP-SAND Reconrobots Inc Seek CCATS 9/29/2023
Computing, Networking, and Cyber Fundamentals Training Lockstone Technologies LLC Not a defense service 9/29/2023
Realtime Enhanced Voice Authentication (REVA) Eduworks Corporation Seek CCATS 10/9/2023
Cold Key Loading Set, Part Number 3867AS145-1 Form Fit and Function LLC CCL ECCN 3A611.x 10/9/2023
RGCS (Resilient Gravitronic Communication System) UNSPACE, LLC Seek CCATS 10/9/2023
Laser Instrumented Diagnostic Suite BlueHalo, LLC USML Category XVIII(e) 10/10/2023
Dual Rotary Variable Differential Transducer, Part Number 25565 Curtiss-Wright Corp USML Category VIII(h)(1) 10/26/2023
Stowable Telescoping Aircraft Boarding Ladder (STABL) Part Number 326C1S5901-201, for T-7A Trainer Aircraft The Boeing Company USML Category VIII(f) 10/26/2023
Cyber Intel Classification Banner, Model CICBv2, Part Number CICB-400 Arksoft Inc DBA Cyber Intel Systems EAR99 10/30/2023
RF Sensor Assembly, FireBurst, Part Number 2630-202 Technology Service Corporation USML Category IV(h)(18) 11/2/2023
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), Model M1165A1, Serial Number: 332621 AM General USML Category
VII(b)
11/2/2023
MP-781, 40 x 46 mm Training Round, Model and Part Number MP-781 NonLethal Technologies, Inc Seek CCATS 11/2/2023
Electronic Connector, Model Number MIL-C-5015, Part Number MS3452L24-10P Conesys, Inc CCL ECCN 3A611.y.1 11/2/2023
Starlink Internet Connectivity Services Space Exploration Technologies Corp CCL ECCN 5A992.c 11/7/2023
LiBM5JV-1 (5Ah cell) Part Number LiBM5JV-1 Vectra Co dba EaglePicher Technologies, LLC  CCL ECCN 3A991.j.2 11/7/2023
Equitus 6.0 Integration and Analysis Software Equitus Corporation CCL ECCN 5D002.c.1 11/7/2023
Unitary Braid Division Multiplexing ("UBDM") Rampart Communications, Inc Seek CCATS 11/15/2023
Amphibious Bulk Liquid Transfer System (ABLTS), Model ROKNABLTS 001 Maritime Innovations Inc CCL ECCN 8A609.x 11/29/2023
ColdFIRE Photoluminescent Ceramic Powder, Model Number CF-V2, Part Number BST-CF-01 Battle Sight Technologies, LLC EAR99 12/6/2023
Carbon Plume Mapper Instrument California Institute of Technology - Jet Propulsion Laboratory CCL ECCN 9A515.g.3 12/6/2023
3-Inch, 8-Hour LightShape Infrared Light Circle, Part Number: 9-17050PF; 3-Inch, 3-Hour Cyalume LightShape Infrared Light Circle, Part Number: 9-50850PF; Infrared Chemiluminescent Light Pad, Part Number: 9-27621; and Cyalume S.O.S. Light, Part Number: SKU: 9-42741PF Cyalume Technologies Inc EAR99 12/6/2023
PowerBook T/R Module, Part Number 293999-1 L3 Harris Technologies, Inc USML Category XI(c)(1) 12/22/2023
Accelerometer, CVLG, 1000uA/g, integral 30 ft. twisted shielded pair cable, Model 631M21, Part Number 631M21 PCB Piezotronics, Inc EAR99 12/26/2023
Tube Assembly - Flanged, Model Number Revision 35, Part Number 294E246 - 35 Leech Holdings, LLC Seek CCATS 12/26/2023
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Model 1097R1, Serial Number 003684 and Model 1097A2, Serial Number 214996 AM General LLC CCL ECCN 0A606.a 12/26/2023
C800 Gamma Ray Imaging Spectrometer H3D, Inc CCL ECCN 1A004.c.2 12/26/2023
Open Mission Systems (OMS), Version 2.2 and Universal Command and Control Interface (UCI), Version 2.2 The Boeing Company USML Category VIII(i) 12/27/2023
Beast Core Beast Code Seek CCATS 12/27/2023
Microwave Solid State Amplifiers, Part Numbers TSA-210040 and TSA-210043 Teledyne Technologies Incorporated
DBA: Teledyne Microwave Solutions
USML Category VI(a)(7) 12/28/2023
Gunners' Display Unit, Part Number MG9900 Mandus Group LLC USML Category XII(e)(1) 12/28/2023
Non-Rechargeable Pistol-Mounted Light with White Light, IR Light, and IR Laser, TWM-30-IR Bayco Products USML Category XII(c)(2)(iv) 12/29/2023
Objective Cell Assembly, Model REV E, Part Number A3256364 FUJIFILM Optics Co., Ltd USML Category XII(e)(18) 12/29/2023
Remote Key Fill Device (RKFD), Model v2, Part Number FT-0106 Forward Thinking, Inc USML Category XIII(b)(5) 12/29/2023
National Instrument (NI) Satellite Link Emulator (SLE) Intellectual Property (IP) National Instruments Corporation Seek CCATS 12/29/2023
Tebis Software, Version V4.1R6SP2, and Installation, Configuration, Implementation, Technical Support, and Training Services for Tebis software Tebis America Inc Seek CCATS:  Software

Services: (1) Defense service when provided to a foreign person; assist in the design, production, or manufacture of a defense article; and directly related to the defense article; (2) Not a defense service when provided only to U.S. persons or not directly related to a defense article

1/4/2024
Cyber Attack Emulator Library, Model 8.0, Part Number SN100CYLA Keysight Technologies, Inc USML Category IX(b)(4)(iii) 1/17/2024
IK-1337 Keypad, PCB, design technology, and silicone casing, Model IK-1337 Rev 03, Part numbers IK-1337-PCB, IK-1337-PADBLUE,
and IK-1337-PADYELLOW
iKey, Ltd 1) USML Category XIII(b)(5):  keypad
2) USML Category XI(c)(2):  PCB
3) USML Category XI(d):  Design technology
4) EAR99:  keypad casing
1/30/2024
SUPERION Passive RF Detection System Stucan Solutions Corporation USML Category XI(a)(4)(i) 2/7/2024
MH-1 Night Vision Housing Low Light Innovations EAR99 2/7/2024
Solid State Microwave Amplifier, Part Number ALN/111-7015-172 Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc/CTT, Inc USML Category XI(c)(3) 2/7/2024
Mine Clearing Loader U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) USML Category IV(c) 2/7/2024
Voluntary Industry Performance Standards for Firearm Sound Suppressors Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP EAR99 2/7/2024
Pellets or granules of a Mixture of Boron and Potassium Nitrate, Model BKNO3 (Type IIA and Type IIB) Hunting Titan Inc USML Category V(c)(4)(ii)(A) 2/7/2024
COSA Design Principles and Open Architecture Recommendations (Document) Version 1.0, Document Number: COSA-MGT- 0063 U.S. Army DEVCOM AVMC TDD EAR99 2/7/2024
Microcircuit Chips, Model and Version Numbers: P1750A, P1750AE, P1753, P1754, and P1757ME HEICO Corporation
DBA: Pyramid Semiconductor Corporation
USML Category XI(c)(3):  Part Number P1757ME

CCL ECCN 3A001.a.2.c:  Part Numbers P1750A, P1750AE, P1753, and P1754

2/16/2024
Workbench Software, version 1.1, for Royce Geo's Coordinate, Understand, Resource, Visualize, Enhance (CURVE) operating environment Royce Geospatial Consultants, Inc CCL ECCN 5D002.c.1 2/16/2024
DRF3182, part number 910-92081-03 Mercury Systems, Inc CCL ECCN 5A002.a.4 2/18/2024
iPad Pilot Training Software for a military aircraft Reaction Simulation, LLC USML Category VIII(i) 2/18/2024
SPYDR Version 1 Global Military Expert Consulting and Instruction, LLC
DBA: Spotlight Labs
Seek CCATS 2/18/2024
Oven-controlled Oscillator, Model and Version Number: OSI5, Part Number: OSI5010-10.0M Pletronics Inc CCL ECCN 3A001.b.10 2/16/2024
Oven-controlled Oscillator, Model and Version Number: OSF4, Part Number: OSF4005-10.0M Pletronics Inc CCL ECCN 3A001.b.10 2/16/2024
HV550CE1454 and HVHR550CE1454 Capacitors Cornell Dubilier Marketing, Inc USML Category VII(g)(2) 2/16/2024
DeconStrike, Version 1, Part Number 74-0006 North American Rescue, LLC CCL ECCN 1A607.g 2/16/2024
Swing Arm Assembly, Part Number SA-12 Military Systems Group, Inc USML Category VII(g)(8) 3/13/2024
Signal translation and processing software for the Digital Signal Generation Subsystem (DGEN), Part Number SRC6150A-4, and Radio Frequency Generation (RFGEN) Subsystem SRC Inc USML Category XI(d) 3/23/2024
Flat Based Mounting Bracket, Part Number M09-190 Military Systems Group, Inc USML Category VII(g)(8) 3/23/2024
Virtual Sandtable vTAK software Virtual Sandtable LLC Seek CCATS 3/23/2024
VR-Tak Core, version 4.8 Applied Research Associates, Inc Seek CCATS 3/23/2024
Secure Key Cryptographic Library (SKCL), Model v1.0.27, Part Number v1.0.27 JET Technology Labs Inc CCL ECCN 5A002.a 3/27/2024
Blast Exposure Monitor (BEMO), BEMO Safariland, LLC Category XI(a)(7) 3/27/2024
PlasmaTorch Trustees of Purdue University Seek CCATS 3/27/2024
Four versions of a Communications Management Unit (CMU), and related software Mercury Systems Inc USML Category XI(a)(5)(i):  Complete base model CMU with operating system and software application for interfacing with defense articles

USML Category XI(d):  Software application for interfacing with a defense article (AN/ARC 210(V))

CCL ECCN 9A610.x:
1.  Base model CMU with operating system only
2.  K-version CMU with operating system only
3.  Complete base model CMU with operating system and software application for interfacing only with equipment subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)

CCL ECCN 9D610.a:  Software application for interfacing with equipment subject to the EAR (TACAN)

3/27/2024
THERM-A-GAP 579 Pad, Model 69-1145940-579PN, Part Number 20547279-0 Parker-Hannifin Corporation, d/b/a Parker-Hannifin Corporation, Chomerics USML Category XI(c)(10) 4/1/2024
Port Adapter, Part Number 100405-1020-001, and Starboard Adapter, Part Number 100405-1030-001 Babcock Integrated Technology Limited USML Category XX(c) 4/1/2024
Short Wave Infrared (IR) Stick Cyalume Technologies, Inc EAR99 4/1/2024
Common Operational Picture Event Response System (COPERS) KBR, INC. DBA: KBR Wyle Services, LLC Seek CCATS 4/1/2024
PASE Low Band Virtual Aperture Array (VAA), Generation 4.0, Part Number P4LV; PASE Low Band Non-VAA, Generation 4.0, Part Number P4LN; and PASE Mid-Band Non-VAA, Generation 4.0, Part Number P4MN Maerospace Corporation Seek CCATS 4/1/2024
1. Converted AR15 semiautomatic weapon to full auto machine gun;
2. Modified AR15 Lower Receiver- Model Number AR15 A2, Part Number AR15 Lower Receiver (NSN 1005-01-184-4041)
Everwood Run LLC 1. USML Category I(b) and
2. USML Category I(g)
4/1/2024
Runway Surface Monitoring System (RSMS) Oreyeon EAR99 4/1/2024
Silicon Avalanche Photodiode - SAT Series, Model Number: SAT800 and SAT3000 Laser Components USA, Inc EAR99 4/1/2024
MBL-15e, Model MBL-15e, Part Number MBL-15e TLD-ACE Corporation USML Category IV(c) 4/1/2024
MERLIN-A Directional Radiation Detector, Model A2, Part Number 5-15-35687 Spectral Labs Incorporated USML Category XI(a)(4)(i) 4/5/2024
RMS-1022D, 1U Dual Node Rugged Server, Model and Version Number: RMS-1022D, Part Number: F109414-F NCS Technologies, Inc Seek CCATS 4/5/2024
Military Symbology Renderer Version 1.0 Williams Mullen PC ECCN 3D611.a 4/16/2024
ATAK Ballistics Plugin, Version 1.0, and WinTAK Ballistics Plugin, Version 1.0 nVision Technology, Inc. USML Category XII(f) 4/16/2024
Mercury Free Space Optical Communications Terminal, Part Number 1426581 Viasat, Inc. USML Category XI(a)(5)(iii) 4/16/2024
Hybrid Battery Supercapacitor (HBS), Model HBS Wecoso d/b/a West Coast Solutions USML Category XI(a)(7) 4/19/2024
HMC1086 2-6GHz 25W GaN HEMT Power Amplifier, Models HMC1086 (bare die) and HMC1086F (packaged die) Analog Devices, Inc. ECCN 3A001.b.2.a.4 4/19/2024
Troy, Model: BBAI-0001, Part Number: BBAI-0001-P-0001 BigBear.ai, LLC CCL ECCN 5A002.a 4/19/2024
Working Dog Field Decontamination Kit - basic, Model Basic TDA Research, Inc. CCL ECCN 1A607.g.2 4/24/2024
Mid-Body Housing for MAWL series lasers, Model BEM-MAWL-XBX, NSN 1005-01-696-2360 B.E. Meyers & Co., Inc. CCL ECCN 7A611.x 5/6/2024
Training Screw for MAWL Laser, Model SPK-MAWL-TNG, NSN 5855-01-696-2396 B.E. Meyers & Co, Inc CCL ECCN 7A611.x 5/6/2024
Arming Plug for IZLID series lasers, R05-3PIN, NSN 5935-01-528-0139 B.E. Meyers & Co, Inc CCL ECCN 7A611.x 5/6/2024
Amphibious Excavator Humanitarian Demining System U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) USML Category IV(c) 5/6/2024
Advanced Simulation Combat Operations Trainer Version 7 (ASCOT 7) Feature Modules: Simulated Integrated Air Defense System (IADS); Simulated JREAP-C; Simulated Link 11; Simulated Link 16; and Simulated Link VMF PLEXSYS Interface Products, Inc. USML Category IX(b)(4)(ii) (Simulated IADS)

USML Category XI(d) (Simulated JREAP-C, Link 11, Link 16, and Link VMF)

5/6/2024
Thrifty Wideband Transceiver, Model Thrifty Wideband Quad Transceiver, Part Number 910-00529-001 Herrick Technology Laboratories, Inc. CCL ECCN 5A991.b.1 5/6/2024
Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing (JHMCS) System Module Assembly for the Next Generation Fixed Wing Helmet (NGFWH). Gentex Corporation USML Category VIII(h)(15) 5/6/2024
Skydio X10 and X10D Drones; Skydio X10 and X10D
Controllers; Skydio X10 Gimbals, Model V100-L, Model
VT100, Model VT300-L, and Model VT300-Z
Skydio Skydio X10 and X10D Drones; Skydio X10 and X10D Controllers; and Skydio X10 Gimbal, Model V100-L – EAR99

Skydio X10 Gimbals, Model VT100, Model VT300-L, and Model VT300-Z – CCL ECCN 6A003.b.4.b

5/6/2024
6 Conductor Bulk Cable, part number N13-46T+00011 New England Wire Technologies USML Category XII(e)(1) 5/6/2024
Red Phosphorus/White Phosphorus (RP/WP) Disassembly and Disposition System and Related Services G. D. O. INC., d/b/a Gradient Technology RP/WP Disassembly and Disposition System: Seek a CCATS

Services:
(1) USML Category III(e) when done for a system designed for USML Category III munitions
(2) Not a defense service if for a system designed for end-items not described on the USML

5/6/2024
37mm Tactical Single Launcher, Models 1415, 1416, 1417, and 1417‐9, Part Numbers 1182510, 1190342, 1184311,
and 1186248
Lewis Machine & Tool (LMT) USML Category II(a)(4) 5/17/2024
IronFist 37/38mm Launcher System, Model Number IF-38-36 NonLethal Technologies, Inc. USML Category II(a)(4) 5/17/2024
Maritime Search-as-a-Service ThayerMahan Inc. USML Category XI(d) 5/17/2024
G222/C27A Spartan Aircraft, Serial Numbers 91-0104 through 91-0106 and 91-0172 through 91-0174 Alenia Aeronautica CCL ECCN 9A610.a 5/17/2024
Solenoid Coil, Model Number: 01-00, Part Number: WE-PN-000651-01-00 Woodruff Engineering Inc. Seek a CCATS 5/17/2024
Blue Steel Ballistics software, Version Number: 1.0 Blue Steel Ballistics, LLC Seek a CCATS 5/28/2024
Rocky Research Brazed Plate Heat Exchanger, Model B315Mx124 IP-SC-S HP SWEP North America, Inc. USML Category XVIII(f) 5/28/2024
Graviton Software Teledyne FLIR LLC EAR99 6/27/2024
Ammunition Manufacturing Equipment: 247-18A"F333",T23260-B PCH-BLK, p/n 362974; D3878-8 PUNCH, FORM & BLANK, p/n 302492; D3877-9 INSERT FEMALE POINTING, p/n 17141; 211-286B T19741-D CLIPPING PUN, p/n 92769STK; T-31180D, MANDREL HD TURN 5.56, p/n 84964; T5099-3 PUNCH, SWAGING, p/n 963621; E16117_4 PIERCE PUNCH, p/n 1100618 Dayton Progress Corporation Seek a CCATS 6/27/2024
Scaffolding Used as Production Equipment for Submarines Senesco Marine, LLC USML Category XX(c) 6/27/2024
X-CAL, Model X-CAL, Part Number X-CAL, NSN 6920-01-689-7644 Explotrain, LLC CCL ECCN 0A614.a 6/27/2024
Transmit (TX) and Receive (RX) Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs): TX ASIC Part Number 10091472-1, TX ASIC Part Number 10091472-2, and RX ASIC Part Number 009252 CHG Group, Inc. Seek a CCATS 7/24/2024
Azimuth
Bearing,
Model
AP5007466
7-ICD
SKF USA Inc. Seek a CCATS 7/24/2024
Dive Talk Go Dive Talk Gear, LLC CCL ECCN 8A002.q 7/24/2024
Stingray Humanitarian Demining System US Army DEVCOM HD R&D Program USML Category IV(c) 7/24/2024
WA1548, High Energy Storage Capacitor, Model and Part Number: WA1548 WA1548, High Energy Storage Capacitor, Model and Part Number: WA1548 USML Category II(j)(15) 7/26/2029
Pivoting Accessory Rail Scope / Optic Mount, ARS-000-A1, ARS-000-A2, ARS-000-A3, and ARS-000-FTA Austin Precision Products, Inc. (dba LaRue Tactical) EAR99 8/1/2024
TFD Supportability Workbench, Version V5.0.9 Andromeda Systems, Inc. EAR99 8/1/2024
System of Systems Technology Integration Tool Chain for Heterogeneous Electronic Systems (STITCHES) Apogee Research LLC USML Category XXI(a) 8/1/2024
Mobile Fuel and Energy Management (MFEM) Software Ricardo Defense Inc. Seek a CCATS 8/1/2024
Piezo-Resistive Pressure Sensors, Part No. 4260M0136 and 4260M0137 Kistler Instrument Corporation Seek a CCATS 8/1/2024
Vireo; Model Number DRA-16A1 CesiumAstro USML Category XV(e)(1)(ii) 8/20/2024
3D Coded Aperture Imager (Portable Gamma Camera) H3D, Inc. CCL ECCN 1A004.c.2 8/22/2024
AM9011 Tuner Chipset, Part Number: AM9011 Mercury Systems, Inc. EAR99 8/22/2024
Field, Line-of-sight Automated Radiance Exposure (FLARE) Systems, Model and Version Number: FLARE Lantern and FLARE Beacon Labsphere, Inc. Seek a CCATS 8/22/2024
Subphone 580, Model 580 Subsea Import LLC CCL ECCN 5A001.b.1.a 8/22/2024
Rancher Government Carbide and Rancher Federal Consulting Services Rancher Federal, Inc. DBA Name: Rancher Government Solutions CCL ECCN 5D002.c.1 8/22/2024
Elektron Magnesium Alloy Powder, Model Elektron MAP: Elektron® MAP+91, Elektron® MAP+31, Elektron® MAP+43, and Elektron® MAP+21 BA Holdings Inc. Seek a CCATS 8/22/2024
Fused Coupler, Part No. SSCSAP00A0-50 Neptec OS, Inc. Seek a CCATS 8/22/2024
BQ400 Unmanned Aerial Target Drone Mountain Horse, LLC USML Category VIII(a)(10) 8/22/2024
Gunnery Training
System (GTS),
Model Number
GTS-30-Mk44-
50, Part Number
70786; Model
Number GTS-30-
Mk44-762, Part
Number 70350;
Model Number
GTS-25-M242-
50, Part Number
70349; and
Model Number
GTS-25-M242-
762, Part
Number 70500
American
Apex
Corporation
USML
Category
IX(a)(6)
8/28/2024
rF1V Antigen and rF1V+cpG 1018 Plague Vaccine Dynavax Technologies Corporation EAR99/ECCN 1C991.a 8/28/2024
High Voltage Power Supply, model dB 2700 HEICO Corporation USML Category XII(e)(1) 8/28/2024
RF Forge Vadum, Inc. USML Category XI(a)(7) 8/28/2024
Onebrief Planning Software Onebrief, Inc. Seek a CCATS 8/28/2024
TNT-Trinitrotoluene SWORD Defense Systems, Inc. Seek a CCATS 8/28/2024
1. 14C1500 Payload Bay Assembly Forward
2. 14C2000 Payload Bay Assembly AFT
3. 14C3000 Fuselage and Empennage Assembly
4. 14C4000 Wing Assembly Aircraft LH
5. 14C6000 Tail Assembly Aircraft LH
6. 14F1000 Nosecone
7. 14F9050-101 Forward Airbag Door LH
8. 14F9060-101 AFT Airbag Door LH
Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc. USML Category VIII(f) 9/5/2024
HB10K, Remote Tactical Hook System, Model Number HB10K Helibasket LLC Seek a CCATS 9/12/2024
Long Line (Sling-Load Long Line), Model and Part Numbers: LLWL10-XXX; LLWL25-XXX; LLWL30-XXX Helibasket LLC EAR99 9/12/2024
Tank Wall Interface, Part Number: AF-62983-1 Eaton Corporation USML Category VIII(h)(1) 9/12/2024

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 DDTC Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

Q: What is an Empowered Official (EO)?

A: An Empowered Official (EO) is a term defined in 120.67 of the ITAR. It is a role given by the Corporate Administrator (CA) to a user authorized to sign a licensing application. An EO MUST have a digital certificate to access the licensing application. The system will prompt for the digital certificate password when the EO accesses the Licensing application from the Applications menu.

 

Q: Is it possible for a defense article to be described in multiple entries on the U.S. Munitions List (USML)?

A: Yes, the Order of Review process in ITAR §120.11 allows for more than one category on the USML to apply to a defense article, and as such, you should review all potentially relevant USML entries. Generally, in cases where an item is described in multiple entries, an enumerated entry takes precedence over an entry controlling the item by virtue of a specially designed catch-all. The exception to this rule is where a SME entry is involved. In all situations, a SME entry will take precedence over a non-SME entry. Thus, a classified guidance system for a missile should be listed under Category IV(h)(30), which is SME, and not IV(h)(1).

If through the Order of Review, one determines a particular item itself is not specifically enumerated in the USML, it may still be controlled by virtue of its parts and components, which are caught via a catch-all. For example, a part or component of an airborne radar system specially designed for the F-35 may not be enumerated or captured in USML Category XI but controlled under the specially designed catch-all of Category VIII(h)(1).

 

Q: How do I know if an Australian or United Kingdom party is an "Authorized User" under the ITAR § 126.7 exemption?

A: The list of Authorized Users of Australia and the United Kingdom is available in the Defense Export Control and Compliance System (DECCS).  To access the list, you must enroll in DECCS, log-in, and navigate to the Authorized User list.

 

Q: Can a defense article that is produced or manufactured during the life of an agreement (TAA or MLA) using technical data or defense services received via the agreement be transferred to a foreign person who was a party to the agreement after the expiration of that agreement without further DDTC authorization

A: Yes, the transfer of defense articles that were manufactured during the life of a TAA or an MLA may be transferred among the same foreign signatories and sub-licensees and for the same end users and end uses that were previously authorized under the TAA or MLA.

 

Q: How will the Authorized User list be updated for name changes and mergers and acquisitions? Will there be a gap in Authorized User status to implement those changes?

A: Authorized Users of Australia and the United Kingdom will need to notify their respective government, who will then notify DDTC. There may be a gap in Authorized User status depending on the nature of the name change and the need to update the name on the Authorized User list. The Authorized User list on DECCS is the official list, so parties should ensure the name of the entity they are transferring to via the ITAR § 126.7 exemption is identified appropriately.

 

Q: Must I obtain a DSP-83 for the transfer of Significant Military Equipment or Classified defense articles when using the 126.7 (AUKUS) exemption?

A: No. 123.10(a) excepts the 126.7 exemption from the DSP-83 requirement. Authorized Users of Australia and the United Kingdom provide nontransfer and use certification through the Authorized User enrollment process.

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Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

September 3, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Japan has requested to buy follow-on technical support of AEGIS Class Destroyers, which will include sustainment support and services; AEGIS computer software updates; system integration and testing; in-country and on-site engineering support; familiarization; sustainment; all necessary emergent support engineering and technical support services; operational support; system overhauls; system upgrades; on-the-job practical operations and maintenance; combat systems integration; development, testing, and installation of program patches and adaptation data and annual service agreements; technical inquiries by the purchaser; operation; integration; maintenance; field service engineering; problem investigation; technical assistance; solutions to the technical problems arising from post production and testing capabilities; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $150 million. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Corporation, located in Moorestown, NJ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-aegis-class-destroyer-follow-technical-support

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DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Netherlands

September 6, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of the Netherlands has requested to buy two hundred forty-six (246) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II tactical missiles; six (6) AIM-9X Block II sidewinder captive air training missiles (CATM); two (2) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder special air training missiles; fourteen (14) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder tactical guidance units; and two (2) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder CATM guidance units. Also included are missile containers; spares; personnel training and training equipment; classified and unclassified publications and technical documents; warranties; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $691 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/netherlands-aim-9x-sidewinder-block-ii-missiles

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DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Singapore

September 9, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Singapore has requested to buy fifty-four (54) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and two (2) AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM guidance sections. The following non-MDE items will also be included: AMRAAM control section spares, missile containers, and support equipment; Common Munitions Built-In-Test (BIT)/Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); ADU-89/E Adapter Group Computer Test Set; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; weapon system support and software, and classified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; training support and equipment; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $133 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/singapore-aim-120c-8-advanced-medium-range-air-air-missiles

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 DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Israel

 September 12, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Israel has requested to buy additional Heavy Duty Tank Trailers (HDTT) that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original FMS case, valued at $40.1 million ($0 in MDE), included HDTTs; spare and repair parts; tool kits; driver tools; corrosion protection; publications and technical documentation; U.S. Government support; technical and logistics support services; storage; and other related elements of logistics and program support. This notification is for the items in the original case and the additional HDTTs. The estimated total cost is $164.6 million. Deliveries are estimated to begin in 2027. The principal contractor will be Leonardo DRS, located in Arlington, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/israel-heavy-duty-tank-trailers

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 DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan

 September 13, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Japan has requested to buy up to nine (9) KC-46A aircraft; up to eighteen (18) PW4062 turbofan engines; up to sixteen (16) AN/ALR-69A radar warning receivers (RWRs); up to thirty-three (33) Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure (LAIRCM) Guardian Laser Turret Assemblies (GLTAs); and up to eighteen (18) LAIRCM system processor replacements. The following non-MDE items will also be included: missile warning sensors; Cartridge Actuated Devices and Propellent Actuated Devices (CAD/PADs); control interface units; User Data Module (UDM) cards; electronic warfare database support; KIV-77 crypto modules; KY-100 crypto terminals; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKL); AN/APX-119 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders; communications equipment; Computer Program Identification Numbers (CPINS); integration and test support and equipment; aircraft components, parts, and accessories; support and support equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; training aids, devices, and spare parts; minor modifications and maintenance support; instruments and lab equipment; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; facilities and construction support; unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; jet fuel; transportation and airlift support; warranties; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $4.1 billion. The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region. The principal contractors will be Boeing Corporation, located in Everett, WA; Pratt & Whitney Military Engines, located in East Hartford, CT; RTX Corporation, located in Goleta, CA; and Northrop Grumman Corporation, located in Rolling Meadows, IL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-kc-46a-aerial-refueling-aircraft

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 DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Romania

 September 13, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Romania has requested to buy thirty-two (32) F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL) aircraft; and thirty-three (33) Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines (32 installed, 1 spare). The following non-MDE items will also be included: AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKL); Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment, secure communications, precision navigation, and cryptographic equipment; Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD); multi-purpose missile equipment; ammunition and weapons components; aircraft and munitions support and support equipment; integration and test support and equipment; spare and repair parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; training aids and devices, and spare parts; major and minor modifications, maintenance, and maintenance support; integrated computer system; electronic warfare data and Reprogramming Lab support; Electronic Combat International Security Assistance Program (ECISAP) software support; aircraft engine Component Improvement Program (CIP) support; classified and unclassified software and software development, delivery, and integration support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; classified and unclassified personnel training, and training gear and equipment; transportation, ferry, and refueling support; facilities and construction support; studies and surveys; Contractor Logistics Support (CLS); U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $7.2 billion. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, located in Fort Worth, TX. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/romania-f-35-aircraft

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 DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States

 September 16, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy return, repair, and reshipment of classified and unclassified spare parts for aircraft and related equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $228 million.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-35

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 DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Bulgaria

 September 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Bulgaria has requested to buy two hundred eighteen (218) Javelin FGM-148F missiles (includes four (4) fly to buy missiles) and one hundred seven (107) Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Units (LWCLU). Also included are Javelin LWCLU Basic Skills Trainers (BST); Javelin Outdoor Trainers (JOT); Battery Coolant Units (BCUs); System Integration and Check Out (SICO); lifecycle support; Javelin Restricted Interactive Electronic Technical Manual (IETM); Javelin operator manuals; tools; Javelin gunner training; Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO) training; Javelin maintenance training; technical assistance; other associated equipment and services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $114 million. The prime contractors will be the Javelin Joint Venture between Lockheed Martin, located in Orlando, FL; and RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/bulgaria-fgm-148f-javelin-missiles

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 DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Sweden

 September 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Sweden has requested to buy one hundred twenty (120) AN/USQ-190 Multifunctional Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio Systems (MIDS JTRS). The following non-Major Defense Equipment (MDE) items will also be included: communications equipment; support equipment; engineering and technical support and assistance; non-warranty repair and return; training; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $31.5 million. The principal contractor is Data Link Solutions, located in Cedar Rapids, IA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/sweden-multifunctional-information-distribution-system-joint-tactical

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 DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Egypt

 September 24, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Egypt has requested to buy seven hundred twenty (720) Stinger missiles for vehicle-based use on existing Avenger systems, including twenty (20) Product Verification Flight Test (PVFT) munitions. The following non-MDE items will also be included: spare and repair parts; testing equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The total estimated cost is $740 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/egypt-stinger-missiles

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 DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Iraq

September 24, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government Iraq has requested to buy additional services that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales case, valued at $39 million, included follow-on technical support (FOTS) for vessel maintenance and repair (VMR), which may include ship repair; maintenance; sustainment; support services; repair; upgrades; overhaul services; associated labor and support; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services of off-shore vessels, patrol boats and defenders of U.S. origin; fuel for quarterly tri-lateral exercises; and other related elements of logistics and program support. This notification is for the continuation of this support and services. The estimated total cost is $65 million. The principal contractor will be Amentum, located in Chantilly, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/iraq-follow-technical-support-vessel-maintenance-and-repair

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DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Australia

 September 27, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Australia has requested to buy up to one hundred (100) Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missiles-Extended Range (AARGM-ER) with global positioning system (GPS) precise positioning system (PPS) provided by Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) or M-Code; up to twenty-four (24) AGM-88G AARGM-ER guidance sections (spares); and up to twenty-four (24) AGM-88G AARGM-ER control sections (spares). The following non-MDE items will also be included: missile containers; component parts and support equipment; repair; software (classified and unclassified); publications (classified and unclassified); training (classified and unclassified); transportation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $405 million. The principal contractor will be Northrop Grumman Systems, located in Falls Church, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-advanced-anti-radiation-guided-missiles-extended-range

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 Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 Department of Commerce Implemented Controls on Quantum Computing and Other Advanced Technologies Alongside International Partners

September 5, 2024: The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule (IFR) implementing controls on critical and emerging technologies that have reached broad technical agreement among our international partners. This IFR includes controls related to quantum computing, semiconductor manufacturing, and other advanced technologies. The action strengthens our international relationships with like-minded countries and ensures that U.S. export controls keep pace with rapidly advancing technologies that pose serious threats to our national security when in the wrong hands.

BIS is implementing worldwide export controls on specific types of items, including:

  • Quantum Computing Items: quantum computers, related equipment, components, materials, software, and technology that can be used in the development and maintenance of quantum computers.
  • Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment: tools and machines that are essential for the production of advanced semiconductor devices.
  • Gate All-Around Field-Effect Transistor (GAAFET) Technology: technology that produces or develops high-performance computing chips that can be used in supercomputers.
  • Additive Manufacturing Items: Equipment, components and related technology and software designed to produce metal or metal alloy components.

The interim rule added new ECCNs to the CCL, revised existing ECCNs, and included a new license exception called “Implemented Export Controls (IEC)” that authorizes exports and reexports to and by countries that have implemented an export control regime equivalent to the U.S. system (15 CFR § 740.24).  BIS explains that the IEC exemption will be applicable to “900 series” items, which are ECCNs “for which the third digit is a 9 and the fourth digit is a number from 0 to 7 ( e.g., 3A901).”

Adds the following 18 ECCNs: 2B910, 2D910, 2E903, 2E910, 3A901, 3A904, 3B903, 3B904, 3C907, 3C908, 3C909, 3D901, 3D907, 3E901, 3E905, 4A906, 4D906, and 4E906.

Revises the following 9 ECCNs: 2E003, 3A001, 3B001, 3C001, 3D001, 3D002, 3E001, 4D001, and 4E001.

BIS also added “General Order No. 6 to implement three authorizations in paragraph (f) of supplement no. 1 to part 736 of the EAR,” which principally addressed certain quantum information science and technology (“QIST”) grandfathered development and production activity, deemed export / reexports prior to the rule’s promulgation, and recordkeeping requirements related thereto.

Certain license exceptions for “900 series” ECCNs have also become more restricted.  The update was made to 15 CFR § 740.2.

BIS has also added 15 CFR § 742.4(a) that will apply a worldwide licensing requirement “when an ECCN references § 742.4(a)(5) in a National Security license requirement paragraph in the license requirement table of the ECCN,” and establishes BIS presumption of review for certain Country Groups.  Country Group A:1 of supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR will receive a presumption of approval for export and reexport.  Country Group D:1 or D:5 countries will have a presumption of denial.  A case-by-case review will apply to all other Country Groups.  A similar worldwide license requirement for Regional Stability reasons has also been implemented “when an ECCN references § 742.6(a)(10) in an RS license requirement in the license requirement table of the ECCN.”

Finally, 15 CFR Part 772.1 was also expanded to include the new definition.  “GDSII” or “Graphic Design System II.”  GDSII is a database file format for data exchange of integrated circuit artwork or integrated circuit layout artwork. This term is used in ECCNs in Category 3 of the CCL, e.g., ECCN 3D907.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-implements-controls-quantum-computing-and-other-advanced and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

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 Commerce Proposed Reporting Requirements for Frontier AI Developers and Compute Providers

September 9, 2024: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking outlining a new mandatory reporting requirement for the world’s leading AI developers and cloud providers.

The proposed rule requires developers of the most powerful AI models and computing clusters to provide detailed reporting to the federal government. This includes reporting about developmental activities, cybersecurity measures, and outcomes from red-teaming efforts, which involve testing for dangerous capabilities like the ability to assist in cyberattacks or lower the barriers to entry for non-experts to develop chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.

This proposed regulatory action follows a pilot survey conducted by BIS earlier this year. The information collected through the proposed reporting requirement will be vital for ensuring these technologies meet stringent standards for safety and reliability, can withstand cyberattacks, and have limited risk of misuse by foreign adversaries or non-state actors, all of which are imperative for maintaining national defense and furthering America’s technological leadership. With this proposed rule, the United States continues to foster innovation while safeguarding against potential abuses that could undermine global security and stability.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-proposes-reporting-requirements-frontier-ai-developers-and-compute-providers

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 Commerce Implemented Regulatory Changes to Voluntary Self-Disclosure Process and Penalty Guidelines

September 16, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 75477: The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule making changes to the provisions in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) related to BIS’s policies and practices regarding voluntary self-disclosures (VSDs) and to the Guidance on Charging and Penalty Determinations in Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases (BIS Penalty Guidelines).

This rule provides BIS with increased flexibility to determine fair and appropriate penalty amounts while also making it less burdensome for companies to submit certain VSDs. The rule revises the BIS Penalty Guidelines to change how the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) calculates the base penalty in administrative cases and how OEE applies various factors to the base penalty to determine the final penalty.

As part of these efforts, BIS is also announcing the appointment of Raj Parekh as its first-ever Chief of Corporate Enforcement. He will serve as the primary interface between BIS’s special agents, the Department of Commerce’s Office of Chief Counsel for Industry and Security, and the Department of Justice to advance significant corporate investigations. This is the first time BIS has appointed a Chief of Corporate Enforcement, further reflecting BIS’s commitment to this effort.

Here are some highlights related to the update:

  • Deliberate decisions “not to disclose a significant apparent violation” will now be considered an aggravating factor for administrative penalties.  Revision to 15 CR § 764.5(a).  Minor or technical violations were subsequently explained to be violations without aggravating factors.  Additionally, the changes allow for bundling of minor and technical violations into quarterly report.  OEE’s goal is to resolve minor or technical violations within 60 days.
  • A dual track VSD process was developed to help bifurcate relatively minor and technical violations (15 CR § 764.5(c)) from more significant violations (15 CR § 764.5(d)).
  • Former 15 CR § 764.5(d) was moved to 15 CR § 764.5(e) and updated to reflect the new dual VSD reporting program.
  • Former 15 CR § 764.5(f) was moved to 15 CR § 764.5(g) and updated to permit requests from any person (not just the VAS submitter) for continuation of activity that would otherwise be prohibited by 15 CFR § 764.2(e).  Additionally, BIS added that a notification would only be required for the return of unlawfully exported commodities to the United States.  Changes to this section also included additional information on VSD formatting and request processes.
  • BIS removed a base monetary cap on penalties that did not fit with BIS’ mission of deterrence.
  • BIS removed the application of monetary expenditures made for compliance program enhancements from being applied to monetary penalties as a result of enforcement actions.
  • BIS has also included additional aggravating factor considerations such as violations that enabled human rights abuses, failure to disclose a significant violation, failure to disclose a violation resulting from the operation of the company’s compliance program, broadened considerations related to historical violations, “language that limited BIS’s review of prior history to five years preceding the date of the transaction giving rise to the apparent violation,” and prior criminal convictions or guilty pleas.
  • Whether a violation is considered egregious has been clarified to refer to a determination by the OEE Director only.
  • “The “Base Penalty Matrix” under paragraph (IV)(B)(2)(a) and paragraph (IV)(B)(2)(b) are edited as follows: paragraph (IV)(B)(2)(a)(i) provides that in non-egregious VSD cases, the base penalty amount is no longer capped at a maximum of $125,000, but is instead capped at one-half of the transaction value. Paragraph (IV)(B)(2)(a)(ii) provides that, in a non-egregious case not initiated by a VSD, the base penalty amount is no longer based on the applicable schedule amount or capped at $250,000, but is instead capped at the full transaction value. Finally, refences to specific adjustable penalty factor values has been removed.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-implements-regulatory-changes-voluntary-self-disclosure-process-and-penalty

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 ‘Export Enforcement Five’ Governments Reaffirm Commitment to Robust Export Control Enforcement to Counter Evasion

September 18, 2024: The governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (collectively, the “Export Enforcement Five” or “E5”) marked the completion of their second annual E5 conference in Washington, D.C. by reaffirming their commitment to robust enforcement of export controls on Russia.

The renewed pledge includes the group’s coordinated efforts to prevent the diversion of sensitive technologies and materials that support Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, the E5 committed to enhancing enforcement-related information sharing and capacity building, increasing outreach and guidance to industry to prevent diversion, and expanding joint investigative efforts to impose penalties that deter and redress violations of our coordinated export controls on Russia.

Since June 2023, BIS and its law enforcement counterparts in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK have collaborated closely to partner with industry to harden supply chains of the items – especially common high priority list items – that Russia needs to sustain its unlawful invasion, identify entities that have violated our coordinated export controls, and share investigative information to take coordinated enforcement actions.

In September 2023, the E5 issued the first-of-its-kind Quint Seal Guidance on countering Russian evasion of export controls. Furthermore, the E5 coordinated activities that resulted in detentions, seizures, and investigations that prevented violators from illicitly acquiring items to support the Russian war machine, as well as formed the foundation for an enduring framework for enforcement of export controls more broadly.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/export-enforcement-five-governments-reaffirm-commitment-robust-export-control

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 Commerce Announced Proposed Rule to Secure Connected Vehicle Supply Chains from Foreign Adversary Threats

September 23, 2024: the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that would prohibit the sale or import of connected vehicles integrating specific pieces of hardware and software, or those components sold separately, with a sufficient nexus to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or Russia.

The proposed rule focuses on hardware and software integrated into the Vehicle Connectivity System (VCS) and software integrated into the Automated Driving System (ADS). These are the critical systems that, through specific hardware and software, allow for external connectivity and autonomous driving capabilities in connected vehicles. Malicious access to these systems could allow adversaries to access and collect our most sensitive data and remotely manipulate cars on American roads. The proposed rule would apply to all wheeled on-road vehicles such as cars, trucks, and buses, but would exclude vehicles not used on public roads like agricultural or mining vehicles.

BIS and its Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services (OICTS) have found that certain technologies originating from the PRC or Russia present an undue risk to both U.S. critical infrastructure and those who use connected vehicles. This action is a proactive measure designed to protect our national security and the safety of U.S. drivers.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-announces-proposed-rule-secure-connected-vehicle-supply-chains-foreign and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

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G7 Announced Industry Guidance on Preventing Evasion of Export Controls and Sanctions Imposed on Russia

September 24, 2024:  The United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union (the G7) published, for the first time ever, joint guidance for industry on preventing evasion of the export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.

The joint guidance outlines the following priority areas:

  • Items that pose a heightened risk of being diverted to Russia;
  • Red flag indicators of potential export control and/or sanctions evasion; and
  • Best practices for industry to use to address these red flags and conduct enhanced due diligence.

Representatives from the G7 Sub-Working Group on Export Control Enforcement met in Brussels, Belgium to announce the release of the guidance document and reaffirm their ongoing commitment to robust, multilateral export control and sanctions enforcement. By issuing this notice, the G7 Sub-Working Group aims to assist industry in identifying evolving Russian evasion practices and complying with multilateral export controls and sanctions. The goal of the guidance is to protect common high priority list items from misappropriation, prevent reputational harm, and mitigate liability risk, all while supporting the continued success of coordinated export controls and sanctions.

Since February 24, 2022, the G7, in coordination with the other members of the Global Export Control Coalition (GECC) (countries listed in supplement no. 3 to part 746 of the Export Administration Regulations), has implemented unprecedented sanctions and export controls that restrict Russia’s access to technologies and other materials required to sustain its military operations and illegal war in Ukraine. One year ago, in September 2023, the G7’s Enforcement Coordination Mechanism established the Sub-Working Group on Export Control Enforcement to provide a forum for exchanging information and operational results, discussing trends in research and analysis, and sharing best practices for enforcement, including through coordinated guidance to industry.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/g7-announces-industry-guidance-preventing-evasion-export-controls-and-sanctions and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

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Export Administration Regulations: Crime Controls and Expansion/Update of U.S. Persons Controls; Extension of Comment Period

September 26, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 78836: On July 29, 2024, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published in the Federal Register a proposed rule, “Export Administration Regulations: Crime Controls and Expansion/Update of U.S. Persons Controls” with comments originally due September 27, 2024. This notification extends the deadline for written comments to October 15, 2024. This extension is being made to allow for commenters to have additional time to review the proposed rule and to benefit from the significant amount of public outreach that BIS is conducting on the rule in preparing their comments. Extending the public comment period will not in any way undermine the rule or national security of the United States.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/09/26/2024-22145/export-administration-regulations-crime-controls-and-expansionupdate-of-us-persons-controls

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Proposed Amendments to End-Use and End-User Based Export Controls, Including U.S. Persons Activities Controls: Military and Intelligence End Uses and End Users; Extension of Comment Period

September 26, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 78835: On July 29, 2024, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published in the Federal Register the proposed rule, “Proposed Amendments to End-Use and End-User Based Export Controls, Including U.S. Persons Activities Controls: Military and Intelligence End Uses and End Users” with comments originally due September 27, 2024. This notification extends the deadline for written comments to October 15, 2024. This extension is being made to allow for commenters to have additional time to review the proposed rule and to be informed by the public outreach that BIS is conducting on the rule in preparing their comments. Extending the public comment period will not in any way undermine the rule or national security of the United States.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/09/26/2024-22146/proposed-amendments-to-end-use-and-end-user-based-export-controls-including-us-persons-activities

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Commerce Updates Validated End User (VEU) Program for Eligible Data Centers to Bolster U.S. National Security, Promote Export Control Compliance

September 30, 2024:  The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced the expansion of the Validated End User (VEU) program to include data centers.  This update will contribute to the development of a trusted ecosystem for the responsible use of advanced computing and artificial intelligence (AI). This new license exception is an element of the Biden-Harris Administration’s broader strategy to ensure the United States leads the way in responsible AI innovation and development.

This update to the VEU program was designed to protect national security by ensuring high standards for physical and cybersecurity at data centers that house advanced AI systems. It will also reduce licensing burdens on industry by allowing data centers to fulfill the stringent requirements of the VEU program up front, enabling U.S. exporters to ship designated items to pre-approved entities under a general authorization, instead of under multiple individual export licenses.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-updates-validated-end-user-veu-program-eligible-data-centers-bolster-us

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U.S. Census Bureau

New Automated Export System (AES) Fatal Error Message

September 13, 2024: To ensure compliance with the Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR), specifically ensuring the Ultimate Consignee Country is not reported as US when the Ultimate Country of Destination is neither US or Puerto Rico, the Census Bureau is deploying a new Fatal Error Response Message in the AES. The response message will be active in the Certification testing environment on September 16, 2024 and will go into the Production environment on September 30, 2024.

Response Code: 25B

Narrative Text: ULT CONS COUNTRY CANNOT BE US

Severity: FATAL

Reason: The Ultimate Consignee Country cannot be reported as US when the Ultimate Country of Destination is neither US or PR.

Resolution: The Ultimate Consignee Country should be reported as the location where the person, party or designee is located abroad. The AES only allows US as the Ultimate Consignee Country when the Ultimate Country of Destination is the US or PR, which would only apply for shipments between the US and PR. Verify the Ultimate Consignee Country, correct and retransmit.

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 Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages

 September 18, 2024: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected.  If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation.  Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN.  However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.

To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

Response Code: 166

Narrative:     Transportation Reference Number Missing

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        The Mode of Transportation is reported as Vessel and the Transportation Reference Number is missing.

Resolution:  A number referencing the transportation booking number must be reported on a vessel shipment.

Verify the Transportation Reference Number, correct the shipment and resubmit.
Response Code:  8QR

Narrative:     Quantity Relationship Out of Range

Severity:       Verify

Reason:        For the reported Schedule B/HTS Number, both Quantity (1) and Quantity (2) are required and reported.  However, the relationship between Quantity (1) and Quantity (2) is outside of the expected range.

Resolution:  For the particular Schedule B/HTS Number reported, there is a relationship between the first quantity and second quantity based on historical statistical averages for that commodity.  Ratios outside this pre-determined parameter might indicate either a keying error or misclassification of the product.

Verify the Quantity 1, Quantity 2 and Schedule B/HTS Number, correct the shipment and resubmit (if necessary).  If the line item is verified correct as reported, no action is necessary.

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LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

 This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Fines and Penalties

 

September 2, 2024:  The Justice Department announced the seizure of a Dassault Falcon 900EX aircraft owned and operated for the benefit of Nicolás Maduro Moros and persons affiliated with him in Venezuela. The aircraft was seized in the Dominican Republic and transferred to the Southern District of Florida at the request of the United States based on violations of U.S. export control and sanctions laws. The Dassault Falcon 900EX aircraft was illegally exported from the United Sates and used for the benefit of Maduro and his representatives.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-seizes-aircraft-used-nicolas-maduro-moros-violation-us-export-control-and

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September 16, 2024: The Justice Department announced criminal charges in five cases from four U.S. Attorney’s offices in connection with the multi-agency Disruptive Technology Strike Force (Strike Force).

The Strike Force is co-led by the Departments of Justice and Commerce to counter efforts by hostile nation states to illicitly acquire sensitive U.S. technology to advance their authoritarian regimes and facilitate human rights abuses. Launched in February 2023, the Strike Force’s work has led to the unsealing of charges against 34 defendants in 24 cases involving alleged export control violations, smuggling, theft of trade secrets, and other charges by actors connected to Russia, China, and Iran.

The cases announced took place over the course of multiple weeks, culminating in the arrest of a Russian national allegedly seeking to illegally export electronics for use in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to Russia. The other cases also cover spearfishing of U.S-based scientists by an employee of a state-owned Chinese defense company and the smuggling of laser welding machines used in nuclear munition production to Russia.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-five-cases-tied-disruptive-technology-strike-force

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 September 30, 2024:  The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed a civil penalty of $151,875 against Quantum Corporation (Quantum), a data storage, management, and protection company based in San Jose, California, to resolve 45 alleged violations of the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Quantum voluntarily self-disclosed the conduct to BIS, cooperated with the investigation by BIS’s Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC), and implemented remedial measures after discovering the conduct at issue, all of which resulted in a significant reduction in penalty.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-imposes-penalty-quantum-corporation-resolve-alleged-violations-antiboycott and https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

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September 30, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced an administrative settlement of $439,992 (partially suspended) against First Call International Inc. (First Call), located in Fort Worth, Texas, for the submission of a backdated document to make it appear that a transaction complied with the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and for exporting military parts without BIS authorization.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-imposes-administrative-penalties-against-first-call-international-inc-submission

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Sanctions

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 September 4, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 10 individuals and two entities as part of a coordinated U.S. government response to Moscow’s malign influence efforts targeting the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Russian state-sponsored actors have long used a variety of tools, such as generative artificial intelligence (AI) deep fakes and disinformation, in an attempt to undermine confidence in the United States’ election processes and institutions. Beginning in early 2024, executives at RT—Russia’s state-funded news media outlet—began an even more nefarious effort to covertly recruit unwitting American influencers in support of their malign influence campaign. RT used a front company to disguise its own involvement or the involvement of the Russian government in content meant to influence U.S. audiences.

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Russia-related General License 25E - "Authorizing Transactions Related to Telecommunications and Certain Internet-Based Communications."

Russia Related General License 25E:

(a) All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications involving the Russian Federation that are prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), are authorized.

(b) The exportation or reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to the Russian Federation of services incident to the exchange of communications over the internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, blogging, social media platforms, collaboration platforms, video conferencing, e-gaming, e-learning platforms, automated translation, web maps, user authentication services, web hosting, and domain name registration services, that is prohibited by the RuHSR, is authorized.

(c) The exportation or reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, to the Russian Federation of software, hardware, or technology incident to the exchange of communications over the internet is authorized, provided that:

  • If the software, hardware, or technology is subject to the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (EAR), the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply to the Russian Federation of such software, hardware, or technology is licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce pursuant to the EAR; and
  • (ii) If the software, hardware, or technology is not subject to the EAR, the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply to the Russian Federation of such software, hardware, or technology would be eligible for a license exception or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce if it were subject to the EAR.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Afanasyeva, Elena Mikhaylovna of Russia;
  • Anisimov, Anton Sergeevich of Russia;
  • Brodskaia, Elizaveta Yuryevna of Russia;
  • Garaschenko, Aleksey Alekseyevich of Russia;
  • Kalashnikov, Konstantin Sergeyevich of Russia;
  • Kiyashako, Andrey Vladimirovich of Russia;
  • Nezhentsev, Aleksandr Vitalyevich of Russia;
  • Simonyan, Margarita Simonovna of Russia;
  • Tabak, Valdimir Grigoryevich of Russia; and
  • Yermoshkina, Anastasiya Igorevna of Russia.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Autonomous Non-Profit Organization Dialog of Russia; and
  • Autonomous Non-Profit Organization Dialog Regions of Russia.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2559 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933141/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240904

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September 4, 2024: OFAC published an alert, "Russian Attempts to Evade Sanctions Using New Overseas Branches and Subsidiaries," to warn foreign jurisdictions and financial institutions about Russia’s attempts to evade sanctions by opening new overseas branches and subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933146/download?inline

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September 5, 2024: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)  issued Russia-related General License 108, "Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions Involving Certain Blocked Persons or Vessels."

General License 108:

All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one of the following activities involving the blocked persons described in paragraph (b) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, November 6, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):

(1) The safe docking and anchoring in port of any vessels in which any person listed in paragraph (b) of this general license has a property interest (the “blocked vessels”);

(2) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; or

(3) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.

(b) The authorization in paragraph (a) of this general license applies to the following blocked persons listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and any entity in which any of the following persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest:

(1) Gotik Shipping Co; or

(2) Plio Energy Cargo Shipping OPC Private Limited.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933151/download?inline

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September 10, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned nine Mexican nationals, and 26 Mexico-based entities linked to a fuel theft network that generates tens of millions of dollars benefiting the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG), a violent Mexico-based drug trafficking organization responsible for a significant proportion of fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States. Mexico-based drug trafficking cartels such as CJNG have turned to fuel theft in recent years, resulting in billions of dollars in lost revenue to the Mexican government. This action was coordinated closely with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Government of Mexico, including La Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (UIF), Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Alvarado, Castillo of Mexico;
  • Cazarin Molina, Cesar of Mexico;
  • Cazarin Molina, Ivan of Mexico;
  • Cazarin Ramos, Jahir of Mexico;
  • Estrada Medina, Santos Aldair of Mexico;
  • Herrera Medina, Brandon Ernesto of Mexico;
  • Medina Dias, Domingo of Mexico;
  • Rivera Garcia, Patricia of Mexico; and
  • Rodriguez Hernandez, Jose Saul of Mexico.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List;

  • 3D Modern Printing Press of Mexico;
  • Aceites y Lubricantes Maye, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
  • Aditivos Y Suministros Etanofuel, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Ahorrocombustibles De Veracruz, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Biocombustibles El Jicaro, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Carburantes Dos Oceanos, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Combustibles Evolutivos y Alternativos Dos Oceanos, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Combustibles y Lubricantes Maye, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Comercializadora Baguette KLIC, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Comercializadora Coffee KLIC, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Constructora JJESA S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Dos Oceanos Combustibles y Carburantes, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Dos Oceanos Paso Del Toro, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Econocombustibles de Veracruz, S.A. De C.V. of Mexico;
  • Etanoful, S.A. De C.V. of Mexico;
  • Etanoplus, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Magnocombustibles De Veracruz, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
  • Maquinas Edja, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Maxi-Gasoil Servicios, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Mayegas, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Multiservicios En Combustible Maye De Veracruz, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
  • Rapicombustibles De Veracrus, S.A. De C.V., of Mexico;
  • Suministros Combustibles Oceanos, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
  • Super Tiendas KLIC, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
  • Traver Permisionarios, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico; and
  • Veracruzana De Servicios Hoteleros y Gastronomicos Los Angeles, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240910 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions

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September 11, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three individuals, five companies, and two vessels that are involved in smuggling oil and liquified petroleum gas (LPG) to generate revenue for Hizballah. The network, comprised of Lebanese businessmen and companies and overseen by a senior leader of Hizballah’s finance team, has facilitated dozens of LPG shipments to the Government of Syria and channeled the profits to Hizballah. Illicit oil and LPG smuggling operations generate hundreds of millions of dollars for Hizballah and support the group’s terrorist activities.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Al-Sayid, Muhammad Ibrahim Habib of Lebanon;
  • Obeid, Boutros Georges of Lebanon; and
  • Zgheib, Ali Nayef of Lebanon.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • European Lebanese International Trade S.A.R.L. ELIT of Lebanon;
  • Heavy Industrial Fuels SAL HIF of Lebanon;
  • Heavy Oil Distribution Company Hodico S.A.L of Lebanon;
  • Heavy Oil Distribution Company Hodico SAL Offshore of Lebanon; and
  • H.G. Holding Sal of Lebanon.

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Alpha Gas (51M771) Tanzania flag; MMSI 677067100 (vessel) [SDGT]; and
  • Marina (51M643) Tanzania flag; MMSI 677054300 (vessel) [SDGT].

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240911 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions

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September 11, 2024: the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued an update to the March 2019 OFAC Advisory to the Maritime Petroleum Shipping Community to highlight risks associated with shipments to Syria. Amendments to this advisory include updates to certain deceptive shipping practices and risk mitigation measures, along with an updated annex of vessels currently identified as blocked property on OFAC’s SDN List, that have been involved in fuel shipments to Syria.

Additionally, OFAC put on public inspection Interim Final Rule to Extend Recordkeeping Requirements from Five to 10 Years, consistent with the extension of the statute of limitations for violations of certain sanctions administered by OFAC.

OFAC also put on public inspection a Comment Request for Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations and Other Information Collections Maintained by OFAC for comments concerning OFAC's information requirements.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240911 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933191/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933201/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933196/download?inline

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September 12, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Cambodian businessman Ly Yong Phat (Ly), his conglomerate L.Y.P. Group Co., LTD (L.Y.P. Group), and O‑Smach Resort for their role in serious human rights abuse related to the treatment of trafficked workers subjected to forced labor in online scam centers. OFACalso designated Cambodia-based Garden City Hotel, Koh Kong Resort, and Phnom Penh Hotel for being owned or controlled by Ly.

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Ly, Yong Phat of Cambodia.

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Garden City Hotel of Cambodia;
  • Koh Kong Resort of Cambodia
  • Y.P Group Co., LTD of Cambodia;
  • O-SMACH Resort of Cambodia; and
  • Phnom Penh Hotel of Cambodia.

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued Global Magnitsky General License 8 - "Authorizing Transactions Involving Certain Entities Owned by Ly Yong Phat or L.Y.P. Group Co., LTD." Additionally, OFAC has issued a related, new Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1191).

General License 8:

All transactions prohibited by the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 583 (GMSR), involving any entity that is blocked solely due to a property interest of Ly Yong Phat (Ly) or L.Y.P. Group Co., LTD (L.Y.P. Group) or any entity in which Ly or L.Y.P. Group owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized, provided that such entity is not identified on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons.

FAQ 1191:

Q: On September 12, 2024, OFAC designated Ly Yong Phat (Ly), L.Y.P. Group Co., LTD (L.Y.P. Group), and the following entities owned by L.Y.P. Group under the Global Magnitsky sanctions authority: O-Smach Resort, Garden City Hotel, Koh Kong Resort, and Phnom Penh Hotel. Can I continue to engage in transactions or other dealings with other entities owned by Ly or L.Y.P. Group that are not listed on OFAC's Specially Designation Nationals and Blocked Person List (SDN List) without facing sanctions risk?

A: Yes. Although transactions or other dealings involving Ly and L.Y.P. Group are prohibited as a result of OFAC's designation, OFAC concurrently issued Global Magnitsky General License (GL) 8 authorizing U.S. persons to engage in all transactions with any entity owned 50% or more by Ly or the L.Y.P. Group that is not listed on SDN List.

Non-U.S. persons may engage in the transactions authorized by GL 8 without exposure to sanctions.

GL 8 does not authorize transactions with any entity listed on the SDN List, including the following entities that were designated on September 12, 2024: O-Smach Resort, Garden City Hotel, Koh Kong Resort, and Phnom Penh Hotel. OFAC will continue to closely monitor Ly's and L.Y.P. Group's activities and may designate or identify additional entities, as appropriate.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2576 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240912 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933216/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1191

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September 12, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 16 Maduro-aligned officials who obstructed a competitive and inclusive presidential election process in Venezuela and violated the civil and human rights of the people. The individuals sanctioned pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, as amended, include leaders of the Maduro-aligned National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) who impeded a transparent electoral process and the release of accurate election results, as well as the military, intelligence, and government officials responsible for intensifying repression through intimidation, indiscriminate detentions, and censorship. The officials were appointed by Nicolas Maduro, whom OFAC sanctioned in 2017.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Briceno Cisneros, Edward Miguel of Venezuela;
  • Brito Hernandez, Asdrubal Jose of Venezuela;
  • Bustamante Puerta, Dinorah Yoselin of Venezuela;
  • Duenez Reyes, Luis Ernesto of Venezuela;
  • Estrada Paredes, Elio Ramon of Venezuela;
  • Figueroa Arizaleta, Inocencio Antonio of Venezuela;
  • Gil Pacheco, Rosalba of Venezuela;
  • Gil Rodriguez, Malaquias of Venezuela;
  • Hernandez Larez, Domingo Antonio of Venezuela;
  • Hernandez Larez, Jonah Alexander of Venezuela;
  • Hildalgo Pandares, Juan Carlos of Venezuela;
  • Infante Aparicio, Pedro Jose of Venezuela;
  • Marquez Cordero, Fanny Beatriz of Venezuela;
  • Maneses Rodrigues, Antonio Jose of Venezuela;
  • Munos Palacios, Miguel Antonio of Venezuela; and
  • Rodriguez Rodriguez, Caryslia Beatriz of Venezuela.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Beijin Research Institute of Automation for Machinery Industry Co. Ltd. of China.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2577 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240912

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September 13, 2024: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 109, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on September 13, 2024" and Russia-related General License 25F, "Authorizing Transactions Related to Telecommunications and Certain Internet-Based Communications."

OFAC also published an updated, Russia-related Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1040).

General License 109:

(a)  All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked entities are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, November 13, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):

(1) Federal State Unitary Enterprise International Information Agency Rossiya Segodnya;

(2) Autonomous Non Profit Organization TV Novosti; or

(3) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 General License 25F:

(a) All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications involving the Russian Federation that are prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), are authorized.

(b) The exportation or reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to the Russian Federation of services incident to the exchange of communications over the internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, blogging, social media platforms, collaboration platforms, video conferencing, e-gaming, e-learning platforms, automated translation, web maps, user authentication services, web hosting, and domain name registration services, that is prohibited by the RuHSR, is authorized.

(c) The exportation or reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, to the Russian Federation of software, hardware, or technology incident to the exchange of communications over the internet is authorized, provided that:

(i) If the software, hardware, or technology is subject to the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (EAR), the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply to the Russian Federation of such software, hardware, or technology is licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce pursuant to the EAR; and

(ii) If the software, hardware, or technology is not subject to the EAR, the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply to the Russian Federation of such software, hardware, or technology would be eligible for a license exception or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce if it were subject to the EAR. (

 

FAQ 1040:

Q: Are transactions related to telecommunications and certain internet-based communications that involve persons designated pursuant to Executive Order 14024 authorized by Russia-related General License (GL) 25F?

A: GL 25F authorizes certain transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications involving the Russian Federation that are prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR). In addition, GL 25F authorizes certain transactions from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to the Russian Federation that are incident to the exchange of communications over the internet and that are prohibited by the RuHSR. With respect to software, hardware, and technology, GL 25F authorizes the exportation or reexportation, sale, or supply from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to the Russian Federation of software, hardware, or technology incident to the exchange of communications over the internet that is authorized for export to Russia by the Department of Commerce if it is subject to the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730-774 (EAR), or that would be eligible for a license exception or otherwise authorized for export to Russia by the Department of Commerce if it were subject to the EAR. However, GL 25F explicitly excludes from the authorization any transactions that are prohibited by the RuHSR involving Joint Stock Company Channel One Russia, Television Station Russia-1, Joint Stock Company NTV Broadcasting Company, Limited Liability Company Algoritm, New Eastern Outlook, Oriental Review, Garantex Europe OU, Autonomous Non-Profit Organization Dialog, Autonomous Non-Profit Organization Dialog Regions, Federal State Unitary Enterprise International Information Agency Rossiya Segodnya, or Autonomous Non Profit Organization TV Novosti, which are designated pursuant to Executive Order 14024.

For further information on relevant authorizations, exemptions, and public guidance, please review OFAC’s Fact Sheet, "Preserving Agricultural Trade, Access to Communication, and Other Support to Those Impacted by Russia’s War Against Ukraine."

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240913 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933211/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933206/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1040

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September 16, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned five individuals and one entity associated with the Intellexa Consortium for their role in developing, operating, and distributing commercial spyware technology that presents a significant threat to the national security of the United States. These designations complement concerted U.S. government actions against commercial spyware vendors, including previous sanctions against individuals and entities associated with the Intellexa Consortium; the Department of Commerce’s addition of commercial spyware vendors to the Entity List; and the Department of State’s visa ban policy targeting those who misuse or profit from the misuse of commercial spyware, subsequently exercised on thirteen individuals.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Artemiou, Artemis of Cyprus;
  • Bitzios, Felix of Greece;
  • Gambazzi, Andrea Nicola Costantino Hermes of Switzerland;
  • Harpaz, Merom of Romania; and
  • Karoli, Panagiota of Cyprus.

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Aliada Group, Inc. of British Virgin Islands.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2581 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240916

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September 16, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned individuals who have undermined fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, in Georgia.  Specifically, the Department of the Treasury sanctioned two Georgian government officials associated with brutal crackdowns on peaceful protestors and political opponents, and two private Georgian citizens that are responsible for or complicit in or have directly or indirectly engaged in violently suppressing the exercise of the freedom of peaceful assembly of Georgians engaged in the democratic process and peaceful expression. All four individuals are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse around the world.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Lagazuri, Mileri of Georgia;
  • Makharadze, Zurab of Georgia; and
  • Morgoshia, Konstantine of Georgia.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2580 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240916

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September 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 12 individuals in connection with the Iranian regime’s ongoing, violent repression of the Iranian people, both within Iran’s borders and abroad. These designations target members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), officials of Iran’s Prisons Organization, and those responsible for lethal operations overseas. This action is in coordination with Canada and Australia, which have also unveiled new sanctions against those connected to human rights abuses in Iran.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Abdi, Ali of Iran;
  • Azadeh, Ahmad Reza of Iran;
  • Baghlani, Mahmud of Iran;
  • Bazvand, Mustafa of Iran;
  • Beheshti Rad, Saeed of Iran;
  • Farsani, Alireza Babaei of Iran;
  • Ghaffarhaddadi, Javad of Iran;
  • Khorramdel, Hamid of Iran;
  • Panjaki, Yahya Hosseini of Iran;
  • Roshan, Gholamerza of Iran;
  • Shahkoui, Ali Malek of Iran; and
  • Zareikajosangi, Hamid of Iran.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240918 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2587

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September 24, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned five Colombian nationals and two Mexico-based businesses pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059, “Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Illicit Drug Trade.”  The Colombian individuals sanctioned are leaders within Colombia’s Clan del Golfo (CDG)—also known as Los Urabeños—which is one of the country’s largest drug trafficking organizations and a key contributor to human smuggling through the Darién Gap. The companies sanctioned are in Mexico and owned by designated Sinaloa Cartel fentanyl traffickers. One of the most notorious and pervasive drug trafficking organizations in the world, the Sinaloa Cartel is responsible for a significant portion of the illicit fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Alcaraz Morales, Wilder de Jesus of Colombia;
  • Celis Durango, Alexander of Colombia;
  • Cordoba Quinto, Jose Emilson of Colombia;
  • Demoya Hernandez, Jose Miguel of Colombia; and
  • Sanchez Sanchez, Jose Gonzalo of Colombia.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Farmacia y Mini Super Trinidad of Mexico; and
  • Nieves y Paletas Evi of Mexico.

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing three new, Russia-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs): FAQ 1193, FAQ 1194, and FAQ 1195.

 

FAQ 1193:

Q: I am a U.S. company with a subsidiary organized and located in Russia. Can I provide the employees or contractors of my Russian subsidiary who are located in Russia with the services prohibited by the Information Technology (IT) and Software Services Determination under the exclusion "(1) any service to an entity located in the Russian Federation that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person?

A: Yes, as long as the services provided are within the employees’ or contractors’ scope of employment for or on behalf of the U.S. subsidiary company located in Russia.

 

FAQ 1194:

 Q: I am a U.S. company with a subsidiary located in a third country (other than Russia). My third-country subsidiary has an employee or contractor located in Russia. Can I provide that employee or contractor located in Russia with the services prohibited by the Information Technology (IT) and Software Services Determination under the exclusion "(1) any service to an entity located in the Russian Federation that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person"?

A: No. The scope of the exclusion applies only to U.S.-owned or controlled entities located in Russia and their employees and contractors acting within the scope of their employment. See FAQ 1193. A U.S. person may not provide a service prohibited by the IT and Software Services Determination to a person located in Russia who is working as an employee or contractor on behalf of a third-country company. OFAC may issue specific licenses on a case-by-case basis.

 

FAQ 1195:

 Q:  A U.S. company located in the United States has an employee or contractor located in Russia working directly for the U.S. company. Can the U.S. company provide that employee or contractor located in Russia with the services prohibited by the Information Technology (IT) and Software Services Determination under the exclusion "(1) any service to an entity located in the Russian Federation that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person"?

A: No. The scope of the exclusion applies only to U.S.-owned or controlled entities located in Russia, and their employees and contractors acting within the scope of their employment. See FAQ 1193. A U.S. person may not provide a service prohibited by the IT and Software Services Determination to a person located in Russia who is working directly for a company located in the United States. OFAC may issue specific licenses on a case-by-case basis. To apply for a specific license.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240924 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2605 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1193 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1194 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1195

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September 25, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned a former member of Haiti’s parliament, Prophane Victor, for his role in forming, supporting, and arming gangs and their members that have committed serious human rights abuse in Haiti. OFAC also designated Luckson Elan, the current leader of the Gran Grif gang, for his involvement in serious human rights abuse related to gang activity in Haiti’s Artibonite department.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Elan, Luckson of Haiti; and
  • Victor, Prophane of Haiti.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240925 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions

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September 25, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned more than a dozen entities and vessels for their involvement in the shipment of Iranian crude oil and liquid petroleum gas to Syria and East Asia on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Hizballah. Among the vessels sanctioned are four ships associated with the fleet of illicit shipping Syrian magnate Abdul Jalil Mallah (Abdul Jalil) and his brother Luay al-Mallah. Since Abdul Jalil’s June 10, 2021 designation for his support to the network of IRGC-QF-backed Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal, Luay al-Mallah has continued to use their shipping empire to support Iran’s malign activities and those of its proxies. Luay al-Mallah is also being designated in this action.

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Al-Mallah, Luay of Syria.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Dragon Road Ltd of the Marshall Islands;
  • Oryx Denizcilik Limited Sirketi of Turkey;
  • Star Ocean Shipmanage Ltd of the Marshall Islands; and
  • Tai Feng Hai Shipping Limited of China.

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Confidence P (3FGV5) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 357747000 (vessel);
  • Eternal 8 (3E3694) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352001640 (vessel);
  • Eternal Peace (3E3831) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002158 (vessel);
  • Eternal Success (3E4722) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002970 (vessel);
  • Feng Tai (3E4959) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002635 (vessel);
  • Nova  (S9U17) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Sao Tome and Principe flag; MMSI 668116245 (vessel);
  • Rival 3FZA2) Chemical/Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 3708590000 (vessel);
  • Serene I (3EFX8) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 374483000 (vessel); and
  • Tiyara (EPUN7) Crude Oil Tanker; MMSI 422471300 (vessel).

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2613

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240925

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September 27, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated seven individuals as part of a coordinated U.S. government response to Iran’s operations that sought to influence or interfere in the 2024 and 2020 presidential elections. Iranian state-sponsored actors undertook a variety of malicious cyber activities, such as hack-and-leak operations and spear-phishing, in an attempt to undermine confidence in the United States’ election processes and institutions and to interfere with political campaigns. The designations undertaken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13848, complement law enforcement actions taken by the Department of Justice against a variety of Iranian election interference actors.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Abdolarahimi, Mohammad Hosein of Iran;
  • Askarizadeh, Rahmatollah of Iran;
  • Jalili, Masoud of Iran;
  • Mahdavia, Ali of Iran;
  • Rahimi Hajjiabadi, Sayyed Mehdi of Iran;
  • Sadeghi, Fatemah of Iran; and
  • Yazdi, Elaheh of Iran.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240927 and

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2621

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September 30, 2024: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 13K, "Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024."

General License 13K:

U.S. persons, or entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person, are authorized to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, certifications, or tax refunds to the extent such transactions are prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to the day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation of such U.S. persons or entities, through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 8, 2025.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933451/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240930

SEPTEMBER 2024 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES Read More »

AUGUST 2024 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through August 31, 2024.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that  States Government may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions.

Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

  

REGULATORY UPDATES

President

 

President Biden Continued the National Emergency With Respect to the Advancement by Countries of Concern in Sensitive Technologies and Products Critical for the Military, Intelligence, Surveillance, or Cyber-Enabled Capabilities of Such Countries

 

August 6, 2024:  On August 9, 2023, by Executive Order 14105, President Biden declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security of the United States constituted by the advancement by countries of concern in sensitive technologies and products critical for the military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber­enabled capabilities of such countries.  As described in Executive Order 14105, this threat to the national security of the United States has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, and certain United States investments risk exacerbating this threat.

 

Certain ongoing activities, such as the comprehensive, long-term strategies of countries of concern that direct, facilitate, or otherwise support advancements in sensitive technologies and products that are critical to such countries’ military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled capabilities, significantly enhance such countries’ ability to conduct activities that threaten the national security of the United States.  As part of this ongoing strategy of advancing the development of these sensitive technologies and products, countries of concern are exploiting or have the ability to exploit certain United States outbound investments, including certain intangible benefits that often accompany United States investments and that help companies succeed.  Such investments risk exacerbating this threat to United States national security.

 

For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14105 of August 9, 2023, must continue in effect beyond August 9, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14105 with respect to the threat posed by the advancement by countries of concern in sensitive technologies and products critical for the military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber­enabled capabilities of such countries.

 

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/08/06/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-the-advancement-by-countries-of-concern-in-sensitive-technologies-and-products-critical-for-the-military-intelligence-surveillanc/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/

 

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Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

 

DDTC Website Updates

 

August 1, 2024: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) launched the next phase of its redesigned website on Wednesday, July 31st. This second phase of updates includes key Registration and Licensing pages and features a number of significant enhancements including improved navigation, searchability, and accessibility. Check out the new look!

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events&timeframe=all&t=Notice

 

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Final Rule: Amendments to the Definition of Activities That are not Exports, Reexports, Retransfers, or Temporary Imports – the "Sovereign Deployments Rule"

 

August 14, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 66310: On August 15, 2024, the Department of State published a final rule in the Federal Register  amending the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) section 120.54 to expand the definition of “activities that are not exports, reexports, retransfers, or temporary imports,” subject to certain conditions, to include:  1) the taking of a defense article subject to the reexport or retransfer requirements of the ITAR by the armed forces of a foreign government or United Nations military personnel on a deployment or training exercise outside a previously approved country; and 2) the reexport of retransfer of a foreign defense article previously imported into the United States that has since been exported from the United States pursuant to an ITAR license or other approval, that was not the subject of any enhancement or modification while in the United States.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/15/2024-18249/international-traffic-in-arms-regulations-amendments-to-the-definition-of-activities-that-are-not and

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events&cat=Report

 

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International Traffic in Arms Regulations: § 126.7 Exemption for Defense Trade and Cooperation Among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States

 

August 20, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 67270: The Department of State published an interim final rule in the Federal Register that took effect on September 1, 2024.  This rule amends the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to create an exemption for certain exports, reexports, retransfers, and temporary imports of defense articles and defense services, and certain brokering activities between or among authorized users within Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

 

The exemption is available for all defense articles and defense services, except for those contained on the excluded technology list in Supplement No. 2 to part 126 of the ITAR.  The rule also introduces a provision to allow for certain transfers of classified defense articles to certain dual nationals, codifies an expedited license review process for Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada, and makes changes to other ITAR sections to support the exemption.

 

The basic elements of the exemption are:

 

1. The U.S. exporter must be an authorized user i.e. registered with the Department of State.

To prove eligibility in transactions where you will be receiving Australian or UK technical data or hardware, you will need to show your DOS registration to the foreign authorized party or use the DOS OPT IN process to allow for the DOS to validate your company as an authorized user.

2. The foreign party in Australia or the U.K. must be an authorized user, posted on the DDTC website in the DECCS portal.

3. All the foreign parties in the transaction are in Australia or the U.K. are authorized users posted in the DDTC website DECCS portal.

4. For Hardware transfers, all the freight forwarders will need to be authorized users. The U.S. freight forwarders will need to be registered with DDTC, the foreign freight forwarders will need to follow the same process as the authorized users/ contractors.

5. The defense article, technical data or defense service cannot be excluded. The excluded list is Found at Supplement No #2 to Part 126.

6. The use of the defense article, technical data, or defense services must be wholly with Australia or the U.K.

 

As of September 3, 2024 75 authorized users were listed in the DECCS portal.

 

See our FAQ section for 10 FAQs on the 126.7 exemption.

 

Starting August 20, 2024, interested parties may submit comments to the Department over the following 90 days by using one of the methods described in the rule.

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=720a340b97889a5067b1791ad053af20 and

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events&cat=Event

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Department of State and Department of Treasury Designations in Support of Ukraine

 

August 23, 2024: Building on the sanctions already imposed on Russia in response to its continued war of aggression against Ukraine, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Department of State targeted nearly 400 individuals and entities both in Russia and outside its borders—including in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East—whose products and services enable Russia to sustain its war effort and evade sanctions. The United States government will continue to support Ukraine as it defends its independence and hold Russia accountable for its aggression.

 

Please see link below for full list of sanctioned individuals.

 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2546 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240823

 

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Violations of the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations by RTX Corporation

 

August 29, 2024: RTX Corporation (“RTX”) entered into a three year Consent Agreement to settle allegations that it violated the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in connection with 750 export violations involving unauthorized exports of defense articles  resulting from the failure to establish proper jurisdiction and classification; unauthorized exports of defense articles, including classified defense articles; unauthorized exports of defense articles (laptops) by employees via hand-carry to proscribed destinations listed in 22 C.F.R. 126.1; and  violations of terms, conditions, and provisos of DDTC authorizations by its subsidiaries, Collins Aerospace, Pratt & Whitney and Raytheon. All of the violations were Voluntarily Disclosed to the Department of State by RTX over a number of years pursuant to 113 Voluntary Disclosures, most related to the acquisition of Rockwell Collins, by UTC, a company Raytheon merged with in 2020. RTX agreed to pay a fine of two hundred million dollars ($200,00,000) of which one hundred million dollars ($100,00,000) will be used by RTX for remedial compliance measures.

 

550 of the 750 violations were a result of misclassification of defense articles as EAR regulated. The misclassification resulted in exports to China, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Mexico Iran, Lebanon, Russia, Australia, Belgium, The Netherlands, The Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the U.K. Several of the exports were deemed to have caused harm to the national security of the United States, as the exports involved the release of sensitive technical data to sanctioned destinations related to major US programs.

 

Violations:

 

RTX disclosed the following violations to the Department:

 

Unauthorized Exports, Reexports, Retransfers, and Temporary Imports Resulting from the Failure to Establish Proper Jurisdiction and Classification

 

Since 2020, RTX has submitted 27 voluntary disclosures to the Department demonstrating systemic failures to establish proper jurisdiction and classification of defense articles within certain operating divisions.

 

Unauthorized Exports to the PRC Resulting from Misclassification

 

RTX disclosed that it exported without authorization technical data to the PRC on numerous occasions between 2014 and 2023 predominantly because of a historical misinterpretation by Rockwell Collins of the ITAR’s “specially designed” definition and release criteria in 22 C.F.R. 120.41.

In two disclosures that RTX initially submitted to the Department in 2021 and 2022, it disclosed unauthorized exports that occurred at RTX’s facility in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in the form of unauthorized releases of USML Category VIII(i) technical data related to the Boeing E-3 Sentry Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft and the Embraer KC-390 Millenium Medium Weight Transport Plane to Chinese foreign-person employees (FPE).

In a subsequent disclosure submitted to the Department in 2023, RTX disclosed that in January 2023 it exported without authorization USML Category VIII(i) technical data, misclassified in March 2018, related to an aluminum display housing component of the F-22 Raptor Fighter Aircraft to two Chinese FPEs at Collins’ facility in Shanghai, PRC.

In a separate 2023 disclosure, RTX described a jurisdiction and classification review that it undertook following the discovery of the systemic violations described in the previous paragraphs. The review revealed that between March 2015 and May 2023 Respondent exported without authorization USML Category XI(d) technical data to Chinese entities.

 

Unauthorized Procurement from the PRC Resulting from Misclassification

 

RTX disclosed that between 2015 and 2023, Rockwell Collins and, for a period following the acquisition, Collins, exported without authorization technical data controlled under USML Category XI(d) to entities in the PRC to procure approximately 45 distinct USML Category XI(c)(2) printed wiring boards (PWBs). Subsequently, Rockwell Collins (and Collins) delivered these PWBs to other prime contractors and directly to U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) customers for ultimate end use in U.S. and foreign military platforms.

In at least one disclosure, RTX reported that, following issuance of purchase orders and production of the PWBs by its Chinese suppliers, it caused the retransfer without authorization of technical data in the form of first-article inspection reports to its Chinese FPEs in Shanghai.

 

Harm to National Security

 

In a 2023 disclosure, RTX disclosed that, predominantly as a result of misclassifications UTC Aerospace Systems made between 2013 and 2017, it exported without authorization USML Category VIII(i) technical data to entities in - 9 - multiple foreign countries, including the PRC, as between 2019 and 2021. Respondent also disclosed that, at the time of the exports, it had incorrectly classified the technical data, which related to the environmental control system of the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, under the EAR.

 

Unauthorized Exports Related to Sensitive Military Platforms Resulting from Misclassification

 

RTX disclosed that between August 2017 and August 2022, Raytheon Company, and subsequently RAY, exported without authorization USML Category IV(c), IV(h), VI(f), XI(c), XI(d), and XII(e) defense articles to Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United Kingdom. The unauthorized exports comprised parts, components, and technical data related to sensitive U.S. and foreign government military platforms, including but not limited to the:

  • Tomahawk Cruise Missile;
  • RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow Missile (ESSM);
  • RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile;
  • Standard Missile-2; and the
  • PAVEWAY Laser Guided Bomb.

 

Unauthorized Reexports, Retransfers, and Temporary Imports Resulting from Misclassification

 

In seven disclosures, RTX reported that its failure to establish proper jurisdiction and classification of defense articles resulted in violations committed by its foreign affiliates in France and Germany.

 

Unauthorized Exports, Reexports, and Retransfers of Defense Articles, including Classified Defense Articles

Since 2019, RTX has submitted dozens of voluntary disclosures to the Department describing additional unauthorized exports of defense articles, including classified defense articles.

 

Unauthorized Exports of Classified Defense Articles

 

In four disclosures, RTX disclosed that it exported without authorization classified defense articles controlled under USML Categories IV(h), IV(i), and XI(c) to Australia, Germany, Norway, and the UAE related to the following programs:

  • National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System;
  • RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow Missile;
  • Tomahawk Cruise Missile; and
  • AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile Extended Range (AMRAAM-ER)

 

Harm to National Security

 

RTX disclosed that in October 2020, it exported without authorization USML Category IV(i) classified technical data to Norway.

 

Additional Unauthorized Exports of Classified Defense Articles

 

In a 2021 disclosure, RTX described its unauthorized temporary exports of classified components related to the ESSM to Australia and Germany. In July 2020, RTX prepared to temporarily export eight unclassified USML Category IV(h) transition sections for the ESSM Block 1 Guided Missile Assembly to Germany for repair under a DSP-73 authorization. Two of the eight transition sections included “erroneously installed” USML Category IV(h) S-Band Transceiver Modules (SBT), which are classified, designated SME, and were not authorized for temporary export under the DSP-73.

In the same disclosure, RTX disclosed the unauthorized export of one classified USML Category XI(c) “erroneously installed” hard drive to Australia. In September 2019, RTX prepared to export to Australia an oscilloscope intended for use with the MK698 Guided Missile Test Set in support of the ESSM program.

In a 2023 disclosure, RTX described the unauthorized export of classified USML Category IV(i) technical data to Australia. In November 2021, Respondent exported a CD-ROM intended to include software related to the AMRAAM to its Australian affiliate, Raytheon Australia (RA), under a DDTC authorization.

In each of these four disclosures, RTX identified the primary root cause of the violations as individual employees’ failures to verify whether the defense articles were classified or approved under the relevant DDTC authorizations prior to the unauthorized exports.

 

Other Unauthorized Exports, Reexports, and Retransfers of Defense Articles

 

In 54 disclosures submitted to the Department since 2019, RTX disclosed that it exported, reexported, and retransferred without authorization hundreds of defense articles, some of which qualified as SME, to or within 25 different countries, including the PRC.

 

Unauthorized Exports of Defense Articles by Employees via Hand-Carry to Proscribed Destinations

 

Since 2019, RTX has submitted three voluntary disclosures describing unauthorized exports of defense articles to proscribed destinations during employee travel.

 

Unauthorized Exports to Lebanon

 

In a 2021 disclosure, RTX described the unauthorized export of defense articles to Lebanon, a proscribed destination listed in 22 C.F.R. 126.1, during two personal trips one employee took in 2020 and 2021. The employee hand-carried his RTX-issued laptop, which contained ITAR-controlled technical data and was “capable of accessing the Raytheon U.S. network using a secure Virtual Private Network,” on both trips.

 

 

Harm to National Security

 

RTX discovered these violations during a standard monthly compliance review in July 2021 and, following an internal investigation, determined that the employee’s laptop contained USML Category IV(i) technical data related to the Standard Missile-3, Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), and ESSM Block 2.

 

Unauthorized Exports to Russia

 

In a 2022 disclosure, RTX described the unauthorized exports of defense articles to Russia, a proscribed destination listed in 22 C.F.R. 126.1, during one employee’s personal trip in May and June of 2021. The employee hand carried his RTX-issued laptop, which contained ITAR-controlled technical data, to St. Petersburg, Russia and attempted to use the laptop while in Russia.

 

Unauthorized Exports to Iran

 

In a 2019 disclosure, Respondent described the unauthorized export of defense articles to Iran, a proscribed destination listed in 22 C.F.R. 126.1, during one employee’s personal travel.

 

Violations of Terms, Conditions, and Provisos of DDTC Authorizations

 

Respondent has submitted 36 disclosures to the Department related to its violations of terms, conditions, and provisos of DDTC authorizations on numerous occasions dating back to 2019. These violations comprise:

  • Failure to furnish or properly complete DSP-83 Nontransfer and Use Certificates;
  • Failure to return in a timely manner to the United States defense articles previously exported under DSP-73 temporary export licenses;
  • Failure to file or the filing of inaccurate annual sales reports related to Department-issued manufacturing licensing agreements (MLA);
  • Failure to file in a timely manner reports related to payments reportable under 22 C.F.R. 130;
  • Failure to notify DDTC in a timely manner of actions related to Departmentissued authorizations (e.g., agreement termination, agreement execution, failure to conclude agreements, initial export of technical data pursuant to an agreement);
  • Foreign manufacture of defense articles valued in excess of that authorized by the relevant MLA; and
  • Misrepresentation or omission of facts in export or temporary import control documents (e.g., citation of incorrect Department-issued authorizations in electronic export information filings, submission of amendments to Department-issued MLAs containing inaccurate valuations of defense articles manufactured abroad)

 

In additional to the payment of $100 million dollars RTX is required to undertake the following actions:

 

Remedial Measures:

 

RTX shall ensure that adequate resources are dedicated to ITAR compliance throughout its ITAR-regulated operating divisions, subsidiaries, and business units. RTX shall establish policies and procedures for all of RTX’s employees with responsibility for AECA and ITAR compliance to address lines of authority, staffing levels, performance evaluations, and career paths.

 

RTX, in coordination with the Designated Official (as defined below), shall conduct an internal review of AECA and ITAR compliance resources and establish the necessary actions to ensure that sufficient resources are dedicated to AECA and IT AR compliance.

 

RTX shall appoint, in accordance with the provisions of this Consent Agreement and in consultation with and the approval of the Director, Defense Trade Controls Compliance - DTCC, a qualified individual to serve as a Designated Official for the entire term that the Consent Agreement is in force. The term "Designated Official" in this Consent Agreement refers to a Special Compliance Officer (SCO) 1 or Internal Special Compliance Officer (ISCO)2 during the term of their appointment.

 

RTX shall strengthen corporate compliance procedures focused principally on RTX’s business operations such that: (a) all RTX employees engaged in AECA and ITAR-regulated activities are

familiar with the AECA and the ITAR, and their own and RTX's responsibilities thereunder; (b) all persons responsible for supervising those employees, including senior managers of those units, are knowledgeable about the underlying policies and principles of the AECA and the ITAR; and (c) there are records indicating the names of employees, trainers, and level and area of training received.

 

RTX shall enhance its AECA and ITAR compliance program with specific attention to the areas described in paragraphs 9(k)(I)(i) through 9(k)(1)(vii) of the agreement. Respondent shall provide to DTCC written confirmation that the company has completed this action.

 

RTX agreed to implement a comprehensive, automated export compliance system throughout its operating divisions, subsidiaries, and business units engaged in AECA and ITAR-regulated activities to strengthen its internal controls for ensuring compliance with the AECA and the ITAR. This system shall track the decision process from the initiation to conclusion of a request for export, reexport, or retransfer

authorization. The automated export compliance system shall improve RTX's ability to oversee and monitor export, reexport, and retransfer activity. This system shall also cover the initial identification of all technical data and technical assistance in any form proposed to be disclosed to any foreign persons. RTX shall ensure the use of a means of alerting users to the AECA and ITAR requirements on electronic transmissions of ITAR-controlled technical data. In order to prevent unintentional or accidental transmissions to unauthorized recipients, RTX shall also provide training lo all employees to ensure that any type of electronic transmissions of ITAR-controlled technical data are sent in accordance with RTX’s export compliance policies and procedures.

 

Classification Review:

 

RTX shall, under the supervision of the Designated Official, review, verify, and complete the export control jurisdiction of all hardware and/or software that RTX’s AECA and ITAR-regulated operating divisions, subsidiaries and business units, and any defense services or technical data, directly related to such hardware and not related to any hardware.

 

Also, separately, prior to export, re-export and/or retransfer, RTX shall review, verify, and complete the export control jurisdiction of each hardware item (and any defense services or technical data, including software, directly related to such hardware item and not related to any hardware) and items procured from

suppliers for which such jurisdiction was not previously and accurately determined and/or verified in accordance with this paragraph.

 

Audits:

 

One audit shall be performed during the Consent Agreement. RTX shall have the audit conducted by an outside consultant with expertise in AECA and ITAR matters, approved by the Director, DTCC. The audit shall be conducted under the supervision of the Designated Official. The audit shall provide a thorough assessment of the effectiveness of RTX's implementation of all measures set forth in this Consent Agreement with focus on those actions undertaken to address the compliance issues identified in the Proposed Charging Letter, the policies, procedures, and training established by Boeing. The Designated Official or the Director, DTCC, may identify other areas (e.g., transactional review of agreements, Respondent's information technology systems) for the audit.

 

Debarment:

 

RTX has cooperated with the Department's review, has expressed regret for these activities, and has taken steps to improve its compliance programs. It has also undertaken to pay a cash penalty and agrees to implement the significant additional remedial compliance actions specified in the Consent Agreement. For these reasons, the Department determined not to impose an administrative debarment of Boeing.

 

Onsite Reviews by the Department:

For the purpose of assessing compliance with the provisions of the AECA, the ITAR and future authorizations, RTX agreed to arrange and facilitate, with minimum advance notice, onsite reviews by the Department while this Consent Agreement remains in effect.

 

Copies of the Charging Letter, Agreement and Order can be found at the following links:

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=016068ca9790565467b1791ad053affa and

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=3c6068ca9790565467b1791ad053aff2 and

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=096068ca9790565467b1791ad053aff7

 

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DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

 

August 12 through 30, 2024: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Name change from Kongsberg Protech Systems USA Corporation to Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace Inc. due to corporate restructuring;
  • Name change from Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace, Inc. to Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace Holding Inc due to corporate restructuring;
  • Name change from Communications & Power Industries LLC to CPI International, Inc., Beverly Microwave Division, and Microwave Products, Inc. due to divestment of subsidiaries;
  • Address change for Wärtsilä Netherlands B.V at t Hanzelaan 95, 8017 JE Zwolle, the Netherlands to Wärtsilä Netherlands B.V. at Innovatiestraat 4, 8051 TC Hattem, the Netherlands.
  • Name change from Communications & Power Industries LLC to CPI International, Beverly Microwave Division and Microwave Power Products, Inc. due to Acquisition.

 

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DDTC FAQS – ITAR 126.7 EXEMPTION

 

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQS) related to the Australia/UK Exemption (AUKUS)

 

  1. Q: Does the ITAR § 126.7 exemption obviate the need to obtain a Foreign Person Employee DSP-5 license for U.S. person employers?

 

A: The foreign person, in their capacity as a natural person, must become an Authorized User to avail themselves of the exemption.  A DDTC authorization (e.g., DSP-5 FPE license) would be required for the transfer of any technical data beyond the scope and limitations of the ITAR § 126.7 exemption.  This would include, for example, transfers of defense articles described on the ETL.

 

  1. Q: How do I use the ITAR § 126.7 exemption in the Automated Export System (AES)?

 

A: Exporters of defense articles must electronically file Electronic Export Information (EEI) using the AES citing code “126.7” in the appropriate field in the EEI for each shipment.  This new code appears in the existing AES drop-down menu.

 

  1. Q: The end-users on my license application are all Australian, U.K, or Canadian entities but some intermediate consignees are located in different countries. Is my application still eligible for the expedited procedures outlined in ITAR § 126.15?

 

A: No.  The expedited procedures described in ITAR § 126.15 are available only when the export application would authorize the export of defense articles or defense services to only Australia, the United Kingdom, or Canada.  Any application that would authorize exports to parties in any other country will be subject to routine DDTC adjudication processes.

 

  1. How often will the Authorized User list of Australian and United Kingdom parties be updated?

A: The Authorized User list in DECCS is the official, up-to-date record of Australian and United Kingdom Authorized Users. DDTC will update the Authorized User list as needed.

 

  1. Q: If a U.S. company has United Kingdom and/or Australia subsidiaries on its DDTC registration, will these subsidiaries be treated as the U.S. Company?

 

A: No.  Legal entities incorporated in Australia or the United Kingdom are foreign persons, considered to be entities of those countries, and must enroll as Authorized Users through their governments to participate in transfers or activities pursuant to the ITAR § 126.7 exemption.

 

  1. Q: How do I know if an Australian or United Kingdom party is an "Authorized User" under the ITAR § 126.7 exemption?

 

A: The list of Authorized Users of Australia and the United Kingdom is available in the Defense Export Control and Compliance System (DECCS).  To access the list, you must enroll in DECCS, log-in, and navigate to the Authorized User list.

 

  1. Q: Will the Authorized User list be integrated into common automated screening tools used widely throughout industry?

 

A: DDTC does not develop or support such third-party screening software and cannot speak to its integration with the Authorized User list.

 

  1. Q: Where is the Excluded Technology List (ETL)?

 

A: The ETL that is applicable to ITAR § 126.7 is codified in Supplement No. 2 to Part 126 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

 

  1. Q: How should I note for DDTC in my license application the fact that the expedited licensing procedures provided for in ITAR § 126.15 apply?

 

A: DDTC will apply the expedited licensing procedures to export license applications that qualify for expedited treatment under ITAR § 126.15 automatically.  There is no need to request expedited treatment specifically.  However, applicants always are encouraged to submit any information that they believe would help facilitate an expeditious and streamlined review by the Department.

 

  1. Q: How does the § 126.7 exemption work?

 

A: The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) § 126.7 exemption simplifies the transfer of ITAR-controlled defense articles, including technical data, the performance of defense services, and engaging in brokering activities between and among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States within an approved Authorized User group of government, private sector, and research and academic entities.  When all requirements are met, parties may engage in such activities without the need for additional Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) authorization.  More information on who is an Authorized User is available in a corresponding FAQ.

 

Please see list of all FAQS related to AUKUS at the link below.

 

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_faq_detail&sys_id=1f3b2dad970416980083b3b0f053afc9

 

 

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Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

 

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Norway

 

August 9, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government Norway has requested to buy sixteen (16) M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS); fifteen (15) M30A2 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Alternative Warhead (AW) pods with Insensitive Munitions Propulsion System (IMPS); fifteen (15) M31A2 GMLRS Unitary (GMLRS-U) high explosive pods with IMPS; and one hundred (100) M57 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) pods. Also included are Low Cost Reduced Range Practice Rocket (LCRRPR) pods; interactive electronic technical manuals; integration support services; spare parts; tool kits; test equipment; contractor logistics support; training; training equipment; technical assistance; technical publications; transportation; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $580 million.

 

The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin, located in Grand Prairie, TX. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/norway-m142-high-mobility-artillery-rocket-systems

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Israel

 

August 13, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government Israel has requested to buy up to fifty (50) new F-15IA multi-role fighter aircraft, as well as Mid-Life Update modification kits for its existing twenty-five (25) F-15I multi-role fighter aircraft; one hundred twenty (120) F110-GE-129 engines; ninety (90) Advanced Display Core Processors II; seventy-five (75) APG-82(V)1 Active Electronically Scanned Array radars; fifty (50) AN/AAQ-13 LANTIRN navigation pods with containers; three-hundred twenty (320) LAU-128 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile launchers; twenty-five (25) M61A Vulcan cannons; and one hundred eighty (180) Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System devices with M-Code. Also included are Cartridge Actuated Devices and Propellant Actuated Devices; Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems; APX-119 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) systems; KIV-77 Mode 4/5 IFF cryptographic appliques; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; impulse cartridges, chaff, and flares; integration and test support and equipment; aircraft and munitions support and support equipment; secure communications equipment, precision navigation, and cryptographic devices; classified software development, delivery, and support; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; major and minor modifications, maintenance, and maintenance support; facilities and construction support; transportation and airlift support; classified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; warranties; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $18.82 billion. Deliveries are estimated to begin in 2029. The prime contractor will be The Boeing Corporation, located in St. Louis, MO. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/israel-f-15ia-and-f-15i-aircraft and

https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/archive-date/202408

 

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August 13, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Israel has requested to buy thirty (30) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and one (1) AMRAAM guidance section (spare). The following non-MDE items will also be included: AMRAAM control sections and containers; Common Munitions Built-In-Test/Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); ADU-891/E Adapter Group Computer Test Sets; spare parts, consumables, accessories, repair and return support, classified and unclassified publications, and technical documentation; classified software delivery and support; munitions support and support equipment; test support and support equipment; personnel training and training equipment; warranties; studies and surveys; contractor logistics support services; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $102.5 million. These items will be sourced from new production.

 

The prime contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/israel-advanced-medium-range-air-air-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Israel

 

August 13, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Israel has requested to buy thirty-two thousand seven hundred thirty-nine (32,739) 120mm tank cartridges, consisting of 120mm M1147 High Explosive Multi-Purpose with Tracer (HEMP-T) cartridges and/or 120mm M830A1 High Explosive Multi-Purpose Anti-Tank (MPAT) with Tracer cartridges. The following non-MDE is also included: various 120mm tank munitions; 120mm munitions canisters; transportation costs; publications and technical documentation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $774.1 million. Deliveries are estimated to begin in 2027. The principal contractors will be General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems, located in St. Petersburg, FL, and Northrop Grumman Defense Systems, located in Falls Church, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/israel-120mm-tank-cartridges

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Israel

 

August 13, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Israel has requested to buy fifty thousand (50,000) M933A1 120mm High Explosive (HE) mortar cartridges with M783 fuzes that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original FMS case, valued at $0.41 million ($0.37 million in MDE), included four hundred (400) M933A1 120mm HE mortar cartridges with M783 fuzes. This notification is for a combined total of fifty thousand four hundred (50,400) M933A1 120mm HE mortar cartridges with M783 fuzes. Also included are publications; technical documentation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $61.1 million. Deliveries are estimated to begin in 2026. The principal contractor will be General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems Inc., located in Quebec, Canada. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/israel-m933a1-120mm-high-explosive-mortar-cartridges

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Israel

 

August 13, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Israel has requested to buy additional modified M1148A1P2 Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) Load Handling System (LHS) 8-ton cargo trucks that will be added to a previously-implemented Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original FMS case, valued at $62.4 million ($0 in Major Defense Equipment (MDE)), included modified M1148A1P2 FMTV LHS 8-ton cargo trucks and support. This notification is for the combined total of modified M1148A1P2 FMTV LHS 8-ton cargo trucks. Also included are armor b-kits; corrosion protection; special tools and test equipment; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; software delivery and support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; storage; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $583.1 million. Deliveries are estimated to begin in 2026. The principal contractor will be the Oshkosh Corporation, located in Oshkosh, WI. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/israel-m1148a1p2-family-medium-tactical-vehicles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Germany

 

August 15, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Germany has requested to buy up to six hundred (600) PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) missiles (includes ten (10) fly-to-buy missiles). The following non-MDE items will also be included: tools and test equipment; range and test programs; support equipment; associated publications and technical documentation; training equipment; spare and repair parts; new equipment training; transportation; quality assurance team support; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance, engineering, and logistics support services; systems integration and checkout; field office support; participation in the International Engineering Services Program and Field Surveillance Programs; launcher modification kits; MSE conversion kits; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $5.0 billion. The prime contractor will be Lockheed Martin, located in Dallas, TX. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/germany-patriot-advanced-capability-3-missile-segment-enhancement

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Germany

 

August 15, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Denmark has requested to buy up to five thousand eight hundred thirty-two (5,832) M1156 Precision Guidance Kits (PGK). Also included are ancillary items; compatibility testing; firing tables; technical assistance; technical data; new equipment training; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $85 million. The principal contractor will be Northrop Grumman, located in Minneapolis, MN. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/denmark-precision-guidance-kits

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Italy

 

August 15, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Italy has requested to buy six (6) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) MQ-9 Block 5 Aircraft; three (3) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) MQ-9 Mobile Ground Control Stations (MGCS); twelve (12) AN/DAS-4 Multi-spectral Target Systems; nine (9) LYNX AN/APY-8 Block 20A Synthetic Aperture Radars with Maritime Wide Area Surveillance (MWAS) capability; and one (1) Embedded Global Positioning & Inertial Navigation System (EGI). The following non-MDE items will also be included: Reaper/Predator engines; Ruggedized Aircraft Maintenance Test Stations (RAMTS); AN/ARC-210 Ultra High Frequency (UHF)/Very High Frequency (VHF) Radios (RT-2036); Ground Data Terminals (GDT) (line of sight link); AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders; KIV-77 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Cryptographic Applique; Transponder IFF AN/APX-119; KY100M Narrowband/Wideband terminal communications security (COMSEC) device; UAS MQ-9 Fixed Ground Control System (FGCS); satellite communications (SATCOM) Earth Terminal Subsystems (SETSS); precision navigation; integration and test support and equipment; aircraft or engine support equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; major modifications, maintenance, and maintenance support; facilities and construction support; transportation and airlift support; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; special insurance and warranties; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $738 million. The principal contractor will be General Atomics, located in San Diego, CA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/italy-mq-9-block-5-aircraft

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Canada

 

August 16, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Canada has requested to buy forty-eight (48) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II+ Tactical Missiles; one hundred twenty (120) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II Tactical Missiles; forty-eight (48) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II Captive Air Training Missiles; forty-eight (48) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II Special Air Training Missiles; four (4) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II+ Tactical Guidance Units; twelve (12) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II Tactical Guidance Units; and eight (8) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II Guidance Units. The following non-MDE items will also be included: Active Optical Target Detectors; KGV-135A COMSEC chips; missile containers; training aids, spares; support equipment; training, missile software; and U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, logistical, and program support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $264.6 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement(s) will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/canada-aim-9x-sidewinder-block-ii-and-block-ii-tactical-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Republic of Korea

 

August 19, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Republic of Korea (ROK) has requested to buy up to thirty-six (36) AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters; up to seventy-six (76) T700-GE-701D Engines (72 installed, 4 spares); up to thirty-six (36) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (M-TADS/PNVS); up to fourteen (14) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Mast Mounted Assembly (MMA); up to fourteen (14) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Radar Electronic Units (REU); up to fourteen (14) AN/APR-48B Modernized-Radar Frequency Interferometers (MRFI); up to four hundred fifty-six (456) AGM-114R2 (N) Hellfire Missiles; up to six (6) M36E8 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM); up to one hundred fifty-two (152) AGM-179A Joint Air-to-Ground Missiles (JAGM); up to forty (40) AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (36 installed, 4 spares). The following non-MDE items will also be included: AN/AVR-2B laser detecting sets; AN/APX-123A Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders; IDM-401 improved data modems; Enhanced Image Intensifier (EI2) cameras; AN/ARN-149 (V)3 automatic direction finders; ASN-157 Doppler Radar Velocity Sensors; AN/APN-209 radar altimeters; AN/PYQ-10(C) Simple Key Loader; Airborne Global Positioning System (GPS)/Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (EGI); AN/APR-39C(V)1+ Radar Signal Detecting sets; ARC-220 High Frequency Communication Systems; KIV-77 Mark XIIA IFF Crypto Applique; Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) software update; M230E-1 30mm automatic gun; M139 AWS 20mm automatic gun; M261 rocket launchers; M299 missile launchers; 2.75-inch rockets; 30mm rounds; MG62 Cartridge Impulse BBU-35/N; A965 cartridges, 25.4mm rounds; M839 decoys; L410 flares; M206 aircraft countermeasures decoy flares; Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PADs); U.S. Government engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of program and logistics support. The estimated total cost is $3.5 billion. The principal contractors will be Boeing, located in Mesa, AZ; and Lockheed Martin, located in Orlando, FL. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/republic-korea-ah-64e-apache-helicopters

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Australia

 

August 19, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Australia has requested to buy three hundred fifty (350) Javelin FGM-148F missiles (includes four (4) fly-to-buy missiles). Also included is U.S. Government technical assistance; technical data; repair and return services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $100 million. The prime contractors will be the Javelin Joint Venture between RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ, and Lockheed Martin, located in Orlando, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-fgm-148f-javelin-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Finland

 

August 19, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Finland has requested to buy five thousand five hundred (5,500) M1156A1 Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) multi-option fuzes that will be added to a previously-implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at $.97 million, included technical data/reports; U.S. Government technical assistance; incidental travel; transportation; PGK spare parts; equipment training; and related elements of logistics and program support. This notification includes the original aforementioned items and adds five thousand five hundred (5,500) M1156A1 PGK multi-option fuzes. The following non-MDE items will also be included: ancillary items; compatibility testing; firing tables; integration kits; antennas; key loaders; precision-guided munition simulator; technical assistance; technical data/reports; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $70 million. The principal contractor will be Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, located in Dulles, VA. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/finland-m1156a1-precision-guidance-kits

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Netherlands

 

August 19, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of the Netherlands has requested to buy training in support of its CH-47 and AH-64 helicopter fleet. Included is training ammunition; Army Supply Class I-VI and VIII-X items; information technology (IT) equipment; ground components; parts and accessories; Installation Management Command (IMCOM)-related service support; U.S. Government and contractor personnel assistance; miscellaneous service contract support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $305 million. A principal contractor is not associated with this proposed sale. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/netherlands-ch-47-and-ah-64-helicopter-training

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Tunisia

 

August 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress The Government of Tunisia has requested to buy additional non-MDE 65’ SAFE Archangel boats and additional non-MDE articles and services that will be added to a previously implemented case. The original FMS case, valued at $49.3 million, included non-MDE 65’ SAFE Archangel boats and non-MDE articles and services, consisting of commercial variant marine global positioning systems; navigation systems; communications equipment; training; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost is $110 million. The principal contractor is SAFE Boats International, located in Bremerton, Washington. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/tunisia-65-safe-archangel-boats

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Government of Denmark

 

August 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress The Government of Denmark has requested to buy three hundred thirty-nine (339) M982A1 Excalibur tactical projectiles. Also included are Portable Electronic Fire Control Systems (PEFCS); Improved Platform Integration Kits (iPIK); Simple Key Loaders (SKLs); extractors; Surface Danger Zones (SDZs); training for new equipment; spare parts; U.S. Government technical assistance; technical data; repair and return services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $121 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, Arizona. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/denmark-excalibur-projectiles

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Government of Norway

 

August 22, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress The Government of Norway has requested to buy one hundred (100) Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles-Extended Range (AMRAAM-ER) and four (4) AMRAAM AIM-120C-8 guidance sections. The following non-MDE items will also be included: AMRAAM containers and support equipment; spare parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support; weapons software and support equipment, and classified software delivery and support; transportation support; classified publications and technical documentation; training equipment and support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $405 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/norway-advanced-medium-range-air-air-missiles-extended-range

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Government of Romania

 

August 22, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress The Government of Romania has requested to buy up to one hundred eighty-six (186) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and four (4) AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM guidance sections. The following non-MDE items will also be included: AIM-120 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATMs), missile containers, propulsion sections, control sections, telemetry kits, and warhead spares; KGV-135A Cryptographic Devices; Common Munitions Built-In-Test (BIT)/Reprogramming Equipment (CMBREs); ADU-891 Computer Test Set Adapter Groups; spare parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support; munitions support and support equipment; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; warranties; studies and surveys; transportation support; contractor logistics support (CLS); U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $592 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/romania-aim-120-advanced-medium-range-air-air-missiles

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Government of Australia

 

August 23, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress The Government of Australia has requested to buy AH-64E Apache sustainment support services, including U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; technical data and publications; personnel training; and other related elements of logistics, and program support. The estimated total cost is $300 million. The principal contractors will be The Boeing Company, located in Mesa, AZ, and Lockheed Martin, located in Orlando, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-ah-64e-apache-sustainment-support-services

 

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Government of India

 

August 23, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress The Government of India has requested to buy AN/SSQ-53G High Altitude Anti-Submarine Warfare (HAASW) sonobuoys; AN/SSQ-62F HAASW sonobuoys; AN/SSQ-36 sonobuoys; technical and publications and data documentation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering and technical support; and other related elements of logistics and program services and support. The estimated total cost is $52.8 million. The principal contractor(s) will be Sparton Corporation, located in De Leon Springs, FL, or Undersea Sensor Systems Inc. (USSI), located in Columbia City, IN, or a combination of both. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

 

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/india-anti-submarine-warfare-sonobuoys

 

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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

BIS Publishes New Export Control Compliance Resources for the Academic Community

 

August 14, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Export Enforcement published new resources for the academic community: a compliance note on voluntary self-disclosure trends and a compendium of export compliance resources. These resources align with BIS’s ongoing commitment to support academic institutions in their efforts to comply with export controls.

 

The compliance note, Trends in Voluntary Self-Disclosures Related to Academia to Inform Improvements to Export Compliance Plans, details conduct commonly disclosed by academic institutions over the past ten years that constitutes export control violations. The document also highlights actions universities can take to address and prevent these violations, including enhanced training programs and improved internal controls.

 

The Compendium of Resources offers a comprehensive guide to export compliance tools, including informational and vetting resources, BIS-specific resources, and examples of recent enforcement actions. These tools should help academic institutions integrate export control requirements into everyday operations for professors, students, staff, and visitors, which in turn helps minimize the risk of violations.

 

Together, the compliance note and the compendium of resources build on the efforts of the Academic Outreach Initiative, first announced in June 2022. The Academic Outreach Initiative is intended to help academic institutions maintain an open, collaborative research environment in a way that also protects them from national security risk, and it includes strategically prioritized engagement, the assignment of outreach agents to prioritized institutions, background briefings, and trainings.

 

https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/academic-voluntary-self-disclosures-compliance-note-812 and

https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/compendium-resources-final-v40pdf and

https://www.bis.gov/sites/default/files/files/Academic%20Outreach%20Initiative%20Policy%20Memo%20--%20FINAL.pdf and

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-publishes-new-export-control-compliance-resources-academic-community

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Commerce Tightens Export Controls, Targets Illicit Procurement Networks For Supplying Russian War Machine

 

August 23, 2024:  The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) took aggressive action to further restrict the supply of both U.S.-origin and “U.S. branded” (i.e., labeled) items to Russia and Belarus for the Kremlin’s illegal war on Ukraine. The actions will further constrain Russia’s ability to arm its military by targeting illicit procurement networks designed to circumvent global export controls.

 

Key actions include:

  1. Further tightening controls on Russia by expanding the scope of the Russia/Belarus Military End User (MEU) and Procurement Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rule and imposing additional license requirements on operation software for computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools;
  2. Cutting off exports to foreign companies on the BIS Entity List; applying the expanded Russia/Belarus MEU and Procurement FDP rule to dozens of entities outside Russia;
  3. Restricting trade to additional foreign addresses and issuing guidance to exporters on identifying suspicious transactions related to foreign corporate service providers and listed foreign addresses, strengthening recently implemented restrictions on shell company addresses; and
  4. Providing guidance and recommendations on contractual language referencing export regulations (the Export Administration Regulations, or EAR), specifically, restrictions that target unlawful reexports to Russia and Belarus.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-tightens-export-controls-targets-illicit-procurement-networks-supplying

 

 

U.S. Census Bureau

 

Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages

 

August 20, 2024: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected.  If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation.  Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN.  However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.

To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

Response Code:  303

Narrative:     Sold En Route Indicator Must be Y or N

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:       The Party Type is identified as Ultimate Consignee and the Sold En Route Indicator is not reported as Yes or No.

Resolution: The Ultimate Consignee information must be reported on an EEI including a valid Sold En Route Indicator. If the Ultimate Consignee is known and reported, set the Sold En Route Indicator to No. If the cargo is to be Sold En Route and the ultimate consignee is not known at the time of export, then set the Sold En Route Indicator to Yes.

Verify the Ultimate Consignee and the Sold En Route Indicator, correct the shipment and resubmit.
Response Code:  538

Narrative:     Shipping Weight Must Be Greater Than Zero For MOT

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:       The Mode of Transportation Code reported was one that identifies a Vessel, Rail, Truck, or Air shipment and the Shipping Weight was not reported.

Resolution: When the Mode of Transportation is Vessel, Rail, Truck or Air, the Shipping Weight must be reported.

Verify the Mode of Transportation and Shipping Weight, correct the shipment and resubmit.


For a complete list of AES Response Codes, their reasons, and resolutions, see Appendix A – Commodity Filing Response Messages.

It is important that AES filers correct Fatal Errors as soon as they are received in order to comply with the Foreign Trade Regulations.  These errors must be corrected prior to export for shipments filed predeparture and as soon as possible for shipments filed postdeparture but not later than five calendar days after departure.

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Update to License Code C68 (NAC) (NO notification required)

August 22, 2024: On October 25, 2023, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule “Export Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing Items” (SME IFR) and “Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Updates and Corrections” (AC/S IFR). On April 4, 2024, BIS published a rule (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/04/04/2024-07004/implementation-of-additional-export-controls-certain-advanced-computing-items-supercomputer-and) to correct inadvertent errors in those rules and make additional clarifications for the rule. This rule revises the header of § 740.8 to reference License Exception ACA in addition to License Exception NAC. BIS has separated License Exception NAC into two separate license exceptions that will reside in the same section of the EAR § 740.8: Notified Advanced Computing (NAC) will authorize exports and reexports of specified items to Macau and destinations in Country Group D:5 and entities headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5, wherever located, that require a notification to BIS, while Advanced Computing Authorized (ACA) will authorize exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) of specified items to destinations in Country Group D:1 or D:4 (except Macau and destinations specified in Country Group D:5) that do not require a notification to BIS. License Exception ACA will also authorize transfers (in-country) to Macau and destinations in Country Group D:5, and entities headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in, Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5, that do not require a notification to BIS.

Update to License Code C68 (NAC) (NO notification required)

An update has been made to AES to revise the name of License Code C68 to Advanced Computing Authorized (ACA) (NO notification required)

The full terms of License Exception ACA are described in § 740.8.

AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C68 (ACA) (No notification required) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:

  • Report License Code: C68 Advanced Computing Authorized (ACA) (NO notification required), if no advanced notification was required.
  • Report License Number: Report “ACA” in the license number block.
  • Allowable ECCNs: 3A090, 4A090, 3A001, 4A003, 4A004, 4A005, 5A002, 5A004, 5A992, 5D002, or 5D992.
  • Allowable countries: Destinations specified in Country Groups D:1, D:4, and D:5.
  • “.z” must be entered as the first characters to appear in the Commodity Description block for 3A001.z, 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 5A002.z, 5A004.z, 5A992.z, 5D002.z, or 5D992.z.
  • Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
  • Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)

Please note that all license exceptions are also subject to the restrictions in § 740.2 and part 746 of the EAR, which would remove eligibility for embargoed and sanctioned countries, e.g., Belarus, Cuba, Russia, Iran, and Syria.

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Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

Important Announcement for Users of OFAC’s Compliance Hotline

 

August 2, 2024: To improve efficiency in responding to requests for sanctions guidance from the public, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is updating its Compliance Hotline by streamlining and enhancing the query submission process.

Thanks to helpful feedback from Compliance Hotline users, OFAC is transitioning to a single, user-friendly online platform to receive questions from the public.  Users can now submit queries—and provide all necessary details—directly through OFAC’s new OFAC Compliance Hotline page.  This new platform is designed to improve OFAC’s tracking of queries and help OFAC assess when additional public guidance may be helpful.

OFAC will fully transition its Compliance Hotline to this web form platform by January 1, 2025, and will retire other existing forms of contacting the OFAC Compliance Hotline according to the following schedule:  OFAC will retire the Compliance Hotline email (OFAC_Feedback@treasury.gov) on August 16, 2024; and its Compliance Hotline telephone (1-800-540-6322 and 202-622-2490) on December 31, 2024.

Please submit questions about how to comply with OFAC-administered sanctions programs or where to find helpful guidance on OFAC’s website via the new online OFAC Compliance Hotline.

As a reminder, please continue to use OFAC’s License Application page for license applications and requests for formal interpretive guidance.  Other information about contacting OFAC, including where to submit voluntary self-disclosures or appeal designations, can be found on our Contact OFAC page.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240802_33 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/ofac-compliance-hotline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/contact-ofac

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Publication of Regulatory Amendments

 

August 20, 2024: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published a final rule to update terminology and references across several sanctions programs’ regulations, and  added a general license to the Burma Sanctions Regulations to authorize the provision of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components for medical devices, or software updates for medical devices to individuals whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the Burma Sanctions Regulations.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240820

 

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OFAC Modernization Efforts

 

August 21, 2024: The United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced several initiatives underway aimed at assisting the public with sanctions implementation. As part of these efforts, OFAC amended several Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) to ensure published guidance remains current. OFAC will continue reviewing FAQs through an ongoing process that is focused on providing up-to-date and useful information to the public.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240821 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/updated/2024-08-21

 

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

 

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Fines and Penalties

 

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

August 9, 2024: Arthur Petrov Allegedly Participated in a Russia-Based Illicit Procurement Network That, Subsequent to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, Illegally Procured Large Quantities of Sensitive Microelectronics for a Russian Company.

 

Petrov, 33, a dual Russian-German citizen who has resided in Russia and Cyprus, is charged with one count of conspiracy to defraud the U.S., which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison; one count of conspiracy to violate the Export Control Reform Act (“ECRA”), which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison; three counts of violating the ECRA, each of which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison; one count of conspiracy to smuggle goods from the U.S., which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison; three counts of smuggling goods from the U.S., which each carry a maximum sentence of 10 years in prison; one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison; and one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/russian-german-national-extradited-illegally-exporting-russia-sensitive-us-sourced and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

 

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August 15, 2024: As part of a settlement agreement to resolve alleged violations of U.S. export controls, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed a $5.8 million civil penalty against TE Connectivity Corporation (TE), located in Middletown, Pennsylvania, and TE Connectivity HK Limited, located in Kwai Chung, New Territories, Hong Kong, for shipments of low-level items to parties tied to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) hypersonics, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and military electronics programs.

 

The alleged violations involved shipments of $1.74 million in Items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to parties on the BIS Entity List and for restricted end uses in China.  Specifically, TE sent items such as wires, printed circuit-board connectors, and pressure and temperature scanners to parties previously placed on the BIS Entity List for supporting the PRC’s military modernization efforts in the fields of hypersonics, UAVs, and electronics. TE voluntarily disclosed the conduct to BIS, cooperated with the investigation by BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement, and took remedial measures after discovering the conduct at issue, which resulted in a significant reduction in the penalty.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-imposes-58-million-penalty-against-pennsylvania-company-shipments-low-level-items and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

 

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August 15, 2024: The Justice Department unsealed an indictment charging U.S.-Iranian national Jeffrey Chance Nader, 68, with crimes related to the illicit export of U.S.-manufactured aircraft components, including components used on military aircraft, to Iran in violation of U.S. economic sanctions and other federal laws. Nader was arrested yesterday in California.

 

This prosecution was coordinated through the Disruptive Technology Strike Force, an interagency law enforcement strike force co-led by the Departments of Justice and Commerce designed to target illicit actors, protect supply chains, and prevent critical technology from being acquired by authoritarian regimes and hostile nation states. Under the leadership of the Assistant Attorney General for National Security and the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement, the Strike Force leverages tools and authorities across the U.S. Government to enhance the criminal and administrative enforcement of export control laws.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-man-indicted-unlawfully-exporting-aircraft-components-iran and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

 

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August 15, 2024: A Bulgarian national made his initial appearance in a federal court in San Antonio Monday after being extradited from Greece.

 

According to court documents, Milan Dimitrov, 50, allegedly conspired with Ilias Sabirov, 52, of Russia, and Dimitar Dimitrov, 74, of Bulgaria, to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) in a scheme to procure sensitive radiation-hardened integrated circuits from the United States and illegally export those components to Russia through Bulgaria without the required licenses from the U.S. government.

 

Milan Dimitrov is charged with two counts of IEEPA violations, one count of money laundering, and one count of making false statements to the Department of Commerce in violation of ECRA. Each count in the indictment carries up to 20 years in federal prison.

 

Sabirov and Dimitar Dimitrov currently remain at large. The two were charged in the same indictment in December 2020 with two counts of IEEPA violations and one count of money laundering.

 

The indictment alleges that between at least May 2014 and May 2018 the defendants used the Bulgarian company Multi Technology Integration Group EEOD (MTIG) to receive export-controlled items from the United States and transship them to Russia without the required licenses.

 

According to the indictment, Sabirov is the head of two Russian companies—Cosmos Complect and OOO Sovtest Comp.—and controls MTIG. Both Dimitar Dimitrov and Milan Dimitrov worked for

Sabirov at Cosmos Complect and MTIG.

 

As alleged, in 2014, the defendants met with the supplier of the radiation-hardened circuits in Austin and were informed that radiation-hardened circuits could not be shipped to Russia because of U.S. trade restrictions. Sabirov then established MTIG in Bulgaria to purchase the controlled electronic circuits, which did not require a license for export to Bulgaria. The radiation-hardened properties of these circuits made them resistant to damage or malfunction in the harsh outer-space environment. The circuits were controlled for export to Russia for these very reasons. The parts were shipped to Bulgaria in 2015, and MTIG soon thereafter transshipped them to Sabirov’s companies in Russia. OOO Sovtest Comp. transferred over $1 million to MTIG for the parts.

 

In the same timeframe, MTIG—at Sabirov’s direction—ordered over $1.7 million in other electronic components produced by another U.S.-based electronics manufacturer. MTIG bought these parts to fulfill part of its contract with OOO Sovtest Comp. Again, the parts were shipped from the United States to Bulgaria, where they were merely repackaged and then shipped to Russia.

 

In late 2018, a Department of Commerce Export Control Officer interviewed Milan Dimitrov during a visit to MTIG to determine whether the radiation-hardened components were still in MTIG’s possession in Bulgaria. Milan Dimitrov, among other things, falsely denied sending the components to Russia.

 

U.S. Attorney Jaime Esparza of the Western District of Texas made the announcement.

The Commerce Department’s Office of Export Enforcement and the FBI are investigating this case with assistance from Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS).

 

https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdtx/pr/bulgarian-national-extradited-scheme-illegally-export-us-origin-sensitive and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

 

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August 16, 2024: 89. Fed. Reg.: On August 18, 2021, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Marco Antonio Peralta-Vega was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Peralta-Vega was convicted of smuggling various firearms and ammunition from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 36 months in prison with credit for time served, three years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment, and denied export privileges for a period of 10 years.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/16/2024-18399/order-denying-export-privileges-in-the-matter-of-marco-antonio-peralta-vega-1537-e-bristol-dr

 

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August 16, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 66674: On November 28, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Kenan L'Homme was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, L'Homme pleaded guilty to willfully and knowingly attempting to export from the United States the following eleven (11) items: one (1) Smith & Wesson model M&P pistol; one (1) CZ P-10F pistol; one (1) Taurus revolver; one (1) Glock model 26 pistol; one (1) Glock model 43 pistol; one (1) Glock model 30s pistol; one (1) Anderson AR-15 lower unit; one (1) Aero Precision AR-15 lower unit; and three (3) Glock model 23s pistols. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 36 months in prison, a $200 special assessment, denied export privileges for a period of 6 years.

 

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/16/2024-18401/order-denying-export-privileges-in-the-matter-of-kenan-lhomme-67-chastain-circle-newman-ga-30263

 

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August 16, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 66676: On November 17, 2023, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California entered judgment against Yi-Chi Shih for violating (among other statutes) 50 U.S.C. 1705 (“IEEPA”) and 18 U.S.C. 1001. Specifically, Shih was convicted of knowingly and willfully exporting Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuits (MMIC) from the United States to China without the required licenses. He was also found to have made false statements to federal agents. Yi-Chi Shih has been denied export privileges for 10 years.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/16/2024-18400/order-denying-export-privileges-in-the-matter-of-yi-chi-shih-currently-incarcerated-at-inmate-number

 

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August 16, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 66676: On October 31, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Rami Najm Ghanem was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371, 18 U.S.C. 554 and section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C 2778) (“AECA”). Specifically, Ghanem was convicted of having knowingly and willfully engaged in the business of weapons brokering activities without the required licenses, and of having engaged in negotiating and arranging contracts, purchases, sales, and transfers of defense articles, foreign defense articles, defense services, and foreign defense services, including for machine guns. Mr. Ghanem has been denied export privileges for 10 years.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/16/2024-18397/order-denying-export-privileges-in-the-matter-of-rami-najm-ghanem-inmate-number-73420-112-mcfp

 

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August 20, 2024: George Semerene Quintero (Semerene), 60, of Venezuela, plead guilty to conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) for his role in a scheme to evade U.S. sanctions imposed on Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), a Venezuelan state-owned oil company.

 

Semerene is scheduled to be sentenced on Nov. 5 and faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison and denied export privileges for 10 years. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/venezuelan-national-pleads-guilty-sanctions-evasion-scheme

 

*******

 

August 26, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed a civil penalty of $44,750 against Streamlight, Inc. (Streamlight), a global manufacturer of portable lighting products located in Eagleville, Pennsylvania, to resolve three alleged violations of the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Streamlight voluntarily self-disclosed the conduct to BIS, cooperated with the investigation by BIS’s Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC), and implemented remedial measures after discovering the conduct at issue, all of which resulted in a significant reduction in penalty.

 

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-imposes-penalty-pennsylvania-company-streamlight-inc-resolve-alleged-violations

Sanctions

 

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

 

Implementation of Additional Sanctions Against Russia and Belarus Under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)

 

August 27, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 68539: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) made changes to the Russian and Belarusian sanctions under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). This final rule expanded the scope of the Russia/Belarus-Military End User (MEU) Foreign-Direct Product (FDP) rule, and renamed it accordingly, so that the rule will also apply to transactions involving entities on the Entity List that pose a significant risk of involvement in the supply or diversion of items subject to the EAR to procurement networks for Russia's and Belarus's defense industry or intelligence services. This final rule also added controls on the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or within Russia or Belarus of “software” for the operation of computer numerical control (CNC) machine tools. In addition, this final rule makes corrections and clarifications to certain aspects of the EAR's Russia and Belarus sanctions.

 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/08/27/2024-19132/implementation-of-additional-sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus-under-the-export-administration

 

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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

 

August 2, 2024: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 99A - "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions and Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, MOEX, NCC, or NSD;" and Russia-related General License 100A - "Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity or the Conversion of Currencies Involving MOEX, NCC, or NSD."

 

General License 99A:

 

(a)All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked entities are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 12, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):

 

(1) Moscow Exchange (MOEX);

(2) National Clearing Center (NCC);

(3) Non-Bank Credit Institution Joint Stock Company National Settlement Depository (NSD); and

(4) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly,  individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

(b) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or the facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity issued or guaranteed by any of the blocked entities identified in paragraph (a) (“Covered Debt or Equity”) to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 12, 2024.

 

(c) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of Covered Debt or Equity that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern daylight time, June 12, 2024 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 12, 2024.

 

(d) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern daylight time June 12, 2024 that (i) include a blocked person described in paragraph (a) of this general license as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to Covered Debt or Equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 12, 2024, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the RuHSR.

 

General License 100A:

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment of debt or equity to a non-U.S. person, who is not a person whose property or interests in property are blocked, or the conversion of currencies, involving one or more of the following blocked entities that is acting solely as a securities, trade, or settlement depository, central counterparty or clearing house, or public trading market, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 12, 2024:

 

(1) Moscow Exchange (MOEX);

(2) National Clearing Center (NCC);

(3) Non-Bank Credit Institution Joint Stock Company National Settlement Depository (NSD); and

(4) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240802 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933086/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933091/download?inline

 

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August 6, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Paraguayan tobacco company Tabacalera del Este S.A. (Tabesa) for providing financial support to Paraguay’s former president, Horacio Manuel Cartes Jara (Cartes), who OFAC sanctioned on January 26, 2023 for his involvement in corruption. Tabesa was designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world.

 

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Tabacalera Del Este S.A. of Paraguay.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240806 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions

 

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August 9, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against 19 individuals, 14 entities, and one aircraft pursuant to Belarus-related Executive Order (E.O.) 14038. This action targets persons involved in supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine through military resource production and transshipment of goods to Russia, sanctions evasion on behalf of Belarusian defense entities, and revenue generation for Belarusian oligarchs in Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s inner circle. OFAC designated five of these targets—three individuals and two entities—pursuant to Russia-related E.O. 14024.

 

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) also issued Russia-related General License 101, "Authorizing Civil Aviation Safety and Wind Down Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on August 9, 2024.

 

General License 101:

 

  • All transactions prohibited by the Belarus Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 548 (BSR), and Executive Order (E.O.) 14024, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the provision, exportation, or reexportation of goods, technology, or services to ensure the safety of civil aviation involving one or more of the following blocked entities (collectively, the “Blocked Entities”) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, September 10, 2024, provided that the goods, technology, or services that are provided, exported, or reexported are for use on aircraft operated solely for civil aviation purposes:

 

(1) Aviakompaniya Belkanto LLC;

(2) Aviakompaniya Rada LLC;

(3) UE RubiStar; or

(4) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

(b) All transactions prohibited by the BSR or E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving any of the Blocked Entities are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, September 10, 2024, provided that any payment to a Blocked Entity is made into a blocked account in accordance with the BSR and the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Arkadiev, Vladimir Mikhailovich of Russia;
  • Barabanov, Oleg Fedorovich of Belarus;
  • Chivel, Yuri Aleksandrovich of Belarus;
  • Chudakov, Vladimir Vladimirovich of Belarus;
  • Dimenshtein, Arkady Samuilovich of Belarus;
  • Gerasim, Oleg Romualdovich of Belarus;
  • Ishchenko, Dmitry Olegovich of Belarus;
  • Kastianok, Siarhei Uldadzimiravich of Belarus;
  • Krokhotin, Evgeniy Yurievich of Belarus;
  • Leschanka, Aliaksandr Mikalayevich of Belarus;
  • Mikholap, Evgeniy Ivanovich of Belarus;
  • Nareiko, Ivan Nikolaevich of Belarus;
  • Pavlenko, Vladislav Nikolaevich of Belarus;
  • Petrov, Oleg Vladimirovich of Belarus;
  • Savruk, Viktoriya Orestovna of Belarus;
  • Sidaruk, Siarhei Mikalaevich of Belarus;
  • Yavorki, Aleksey Nikolaevich of Belarus;
  • Zamulevich, Dmitriy Mikhailovich of Belarus; and
  • Zharski, Aliaksandr Uladzimiravich of Belarus.

 

The following entites have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • ALC DISKOMS of Belarus;
  • Aviakompaniya Belkanto LLC of Belarus;
  • Aviakompaniya Rada LLC of Belarus;
  • Joint Stock Company Plant Legmash of Belarus;
  • KB Unmanned Helicopters LLC of Belarus;
  • Limited Liability Company Tochanya Mekhanikaof Belarus;
  • LLC Alyurtekh of Belarus;
  • LLC Grosver Group of Belarus;
  • LLC Laboratory of Additive Technologies of Belarus;
  • LLC MOT of Belarus;
  • OOO Ruchservomotor of Belarus;
  • Ruzekspeditsiya LLC of Belarus;
  • UE Rubistar of Belarus; and
  • VLATE Logistik LLC of Belarus.

 

 

The following aircraft has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • EW-001PB;  Aircraft Model 767-32KER; Aircraft Manufacturer's Serial Number (MSN) 33968; Aircraft Tail Number EW-001PB (aircraft) [BELARUS-EO14038].

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240809 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions

 

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August 12, 2024: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 102, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving VPower Finance Security (Hong Kong) Limited."

 

General License 102:

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the transportation, delivery, or storage of currency; cash processing services; or maintenance of automated teller machines (ATMs) within Hong Kong involving VPower Finance Security (Hong Kong) Limited (“VPower”) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, November 12, 2024.

 

(b) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the provision and staffing of customer service centers for mass transit railway stations within Hong Kong involving VPower are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, November 12, 2024.

 

 

General License 5P:

 

(a) On or after November 12, 2024, all transactions related to, the provision of financing for, and other dealings in the Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. 2020 8.5 Percent Bond that would be prohibited by subsection l(a)(iii) of Executive Order (E.O.) 13835 of May 21, 2018, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019, and incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240812 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933101/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933106/download?inline

 

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August 15, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned several companies, individuals, and vessels for their involvement in the shipment of Iranian commodities, including oil and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), to Yemen and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on behalf of the network of Iran-based, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)-backed Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal.  OFAC is also updating the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) entry for the sanctioned vessel ARTURA (IMO: 9150365), which was responsible for shipping commodities for Sa’id al-Jamal, to reflect the changing of its name to OHAR.

The revenue from al-Jamal’s network helps finance the Houthis’ reckless targeting of shipping in the Red Sea and civilian infrastructure, which has led to grave consequences for both the region and the international community.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Khot, Arif Ibrahim of India.

 

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Arafat shipping company of the Marshall Islands;
  • DP Shipping Limited of the Marshall Islands:
  • K F D General Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Kai Heng Long Global Energy Limited of China;
  • KDS Shipping Limited of the Marshall Islands;
  • ONX Trading FZE of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • Transmarine Navigation M SDN. BHD. Of Malaysia.

 

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

 

  • Divine Power (T8A4414) Chemical/Products Tanker Palau flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9171357; MMSI 511101150 (vessel);
  • Fengshun H9ZK) LPG Tanker Eswatini flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9007386; MMSI 374350000 (vessel);
  • Lady Liberty (3FTM2) LPG Tanker Sao Tome and Principe flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9005065; MMSI 668116262 (vessel);
  • LPG OM (T8A4415) LPG Tanker Palau flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9160475; MMSI 511101151 (vessel);
  • Parvati (3E3842) LPG Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8519966; MMSI 352002268 (vessel);
  • Raha Gas (T8A4761) LPG Tanker Palau flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 8818219; MMSI 511101405 (vessel); and
  • Victoria (S9Z6) LPG Tanker Sao Tome and Principe flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9113379; MMSI 668116259 (vessel).

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240815 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions

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August 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the former President of Haiti, Michel Joseph Martelly (Martelly), pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059 of December 15, 2021, “Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Illicit Drug Trade.”

 

The following individual has been added to OFAC’s Non-SDN Menu-Based Sanctions List:

 

  • Martelly, Michel Joseph of Haiti.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240820

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2542

 

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August 23, 2024: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 103 - "Authorizing Transactions Related to Imports of Certain Diamond Jewelry Prohibited by Executive Order 14068;" Russia-related General License 104 - "Authorizing Transactions Related to Imports of Certain Diamonds Prohibited by Executive Order 14068;" Russia-related General License 105 - "Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions and the Unloading of Cargo Involving Certain Blocked Persons or Vessels;" Russia-related General License 106 - "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on August 23, 2024;" and Russia-related General License 107 - "Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions Involving Certain Blocked Persons or Vessels."

 

Additionally, OFAC issued one new, Russia-related Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1189)

 

General License 103:

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by the determination of February 8, 2024 made pursuant to sections 1(a)(i)(A) and 1(a)(i)(D) of Executive Order 14068 (“Prohibitions Related to Imports of Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds of Russian Federation Origin and Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds Exported from the Russian Federation”) that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the importation and entry into the United States, including importation for admission into a foreign trade zone located in the United States, of diamond jewelry that was physically located outside of the Russian Federation prior to March 1, 2024, and not exported or reexported from the Russian Federation on or after March 1, 2024, are authorized.

 

General License 104:

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by the determination of February 8, 2024 made pursuant to section 1(a)(i)(B) of Executive Order (E.O.) 14068 (“Prohibitions Related to Imports of Certain Categories of Diamonds”) that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the importation and entry into the United States, including importation for admission into a foreign trade zone located in the United States, of the following categories of diamonds are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, September 1, 2025, provided that the diamonds were physically located outside of the Russian Federation before, and were not exported or re-exported from the Russian Federation since:

 

(1) March 1, 2024 for non-industrial diamonds with a weight of 1.0 carat or greater; or

(2) September 1, 2024 for non-industrial diamonds with a weight of 0.5 carats or greater.

 

 

General License 105:

 

(a)  All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one of the following activities involving White Fox Ship Management FZCO or any entity in which White Fox Ship Management FZCO owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 23, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):

 

(1) The safe docking and anchoring in port of any vessels in which any person listed in paragraph (2) of this general license has a property interest (the “blocked vessels”);

(3) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; or

(4) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.

 

(b) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the delivery and offloading of cargo involving the blocked persons identified in paragraph (a) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 23, 2024, provided that the cargo was loaded prior to August 23, 2024.

 

General License 106:

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked entities are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 9, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):

 

(1) General Technology Group Dalian Machine Tool Import & Export Co Ltd;

(2) Public Joint Stock Company Yakutskaya Toplivno Energeticheskaya Kompaniya (YATEC);

(3) Joint Stock Company Holdingovaya Kompaniya SDS Ugol;

(4) Public Joint Stock Company Ugolnaya Kompaniya Yuzhnyi Kuzbass;

(5) Joint Stock Company Stroiservis;

(6) Guangzhou Chiphome Information Technology Limited;

(7) Chengdu Jingxin Technology Co Ltd;

(8) Shenzhen Huashuo Semiconductor Co Ltd;

(9) AirBridgeCargo Airlines Limited Liability Company;

(10) Speech Technology Center Limited;

(11) Idronaut S.R.L.;

(12) GRK Bystrinskoye;

(13) Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Evraz Nizhnetagilski Metallurgicheski Kombinat (NTMK);

(14) Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Evraz Vanadi Tula;

(15) Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Evraz Market;

(16) Limited Liability Company Volga Dnepr Airlines;

(17) Atran Limited Liability Company; or

(18) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.

 

General License 107:

 

(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one of the following activities involving the blocked persons described in paragraph (b) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 23, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):

 

(1) The safe docking and anchoring in port of any vessels in which any person listed in paragraph (2) of this general license has a property interest (the “blocked vessels”);

(3) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; or

(4) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.

 

(b) The authorization in paragraph (a) of this general license applies to the following blocked persons listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and any entity in which any of the following persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest:

 

(1) Ocean Speedstar Solutions OPC Private Limited; or

(2) Zara Shipholding Co.

 

FAQ 1189:

 

Q: What additional authorizations did Treasury issue on August 23, 2024 with respect to certain diamonds and diamond jewelry prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14068?

 

A: Treasury issued two general licenses (GLs), GL 103 and GL 104, authorizing certain transactions with respect to certain diamonds and diamond jewelry that would otherwise be prohibited by E.O. 14068 in “Prohibitions Related to Imports of Certain Categories of Diamonds” (the “Diamonds Determination”) and “Prohibitions Related to the Imports of Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds of Russian Federation Origin and Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds Exported from the Russian Federation” (the “Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds Determination”).

 

General License 103 authorizes the importation into the United States of diamond jewelry if that jewelry was physically located outside of the Russian Federation before, and not exported or reexported from the Russian Federation since, March 01, 2024. This means that the importation ban issued pursuant to the Diamond Jewelry and Unsorted Diamonds Determination under E.O. 14068 no longer applies to diamond jewelry that was located outside of Russia and not exported or reexported from Russia since March 01, 2024.

 

General License 104 authorizes through September 01, 2025 the importation into the United States of non-industrial diamonds, substantially transformed into other products outside of the Russian Federation, with a weight of 1.0 carat or greater, if those diamonds were physically located outside of the Russian Federation before, and not exported or reexported from the Russian Federation since, March 01, 2024. GL 104 also authorizes the importation into the United States of non-industrial diamonds, substantially transformed into other products outside of the Russian Federation, with a weight of 0.5 carats or greater if those diamonds were physically located outside of the Russian Federation before, and not exported or reexported from the Russian Federation since, September 01, 2024. This means that, for non-industrial diamonds that meet these parameters, the importation ban issued pursuant to the Diamonds Determination under E.O. 14068 no longer applies.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933116/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933121/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933126/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933131/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933131/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933136/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1189 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240823

 

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August 27, 2024: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published one new, basic information Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1190)

 

Q: Do U.S. sanctions target persons for engaging in political speech, religious practice, or other constitutionally protected activities?

 

A: OFAC does not sanction persons for their engagement in activities subject to U.S. constitutional protection, such as protected speech or religious practice or for their religious beliefs; nor do U.S. persons violate OFAC sanctions for engaging in such constitutionally protected activity. Furthermore, additional limitations and authorizations are in place to ensure that U.S. sanctions do not restrict the exchange of information or informational materials, or personal communication. The majority of OFAC sanctions programs are promulgated pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., which limits the authority to “regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly . . . any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of value . . . or, the importation from any country, or the exportation to any country, whether commercial or otherwise, . . . of any information or informational materials.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1), (3).

 

No authorization is necessary for U.S. persons to engage in activities that are not prohibited by or are otherwise exempt from sanctions. If you are concerned that potential sanctions may interfere with constitutionally protected activities, please reach out to OFAC for further guidance as described here.

 

https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1190 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240827

 

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AUGUST 2024 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES Read More »

JULY 2024 EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS UPDATES

This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through July 31, 2024.  The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.

See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.

In this newsletter, we have added a specific DDTC FAQs section which we think will be of interest to our readers.

REGULATORY UPDATES

President

President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Hong Kong

July 10, 2024: On July 14, 2020, by Executive Order 13936, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the situation with respect to Hong Kong.

The situation with respect to Hong Kong, including recent actions taken by the People’s Republic of China to fundamentally undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy, continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared on July 14, 2020, must continue in effect beyond July 14, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13936 with respect to the situation in Hong Kong.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/07/10/notice-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-hong-kong-4/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/

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President Biden Launches the Ukraine Compact

July 11, 2024: President Biden launched the Ukraine Compact at the 33rd NATO Summit in Washington D.C., an event with 23 allies and partners as part of the U.S. commitment to Ukraine’s long-term security. This Compact fulfills the promise President Biden and these countries made in Vilnius in 2023 to negotiate long-term bilateral security agreements with Ukraine to support Ukraine as it defends itself now, and to deter aggression against Ukraine in the future as part of its bridge to NATO membership. The signatories committed to providing Ukraine with ammunition, weapons, and training to resist Russian aggression. Leveraging each of the agreements, this historic Compact creates a unified and comprehensive security architecture to support Ukraine today and, in the future, in war and in peace.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/07/11/president-joe-biden-launches-the-ukraine-compact/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/page/4/

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President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Hostage-Taking and the Wrongful Detention of United States Nationals Abroad.

On July 16, 2022, by Executive Order 14078, President Biden declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by hostage-taking and the wrongful detention of United States nationals abroad.

Hostage-taking and the wrongful detention of United States nationals are heinous acts that undermine the rule of law.  Terrorist organizations, criminal groups, and other malicious actors who take hostages for financial, political, or other gain — as well as foreign states that engage in the practice of wrongful detention, including for political leverage or to seek concessions from the United States — threaten the integrity of the international political system and the safety of United States nationals and other persons abroad.  Hostage-taking and the wrongful detention of United States nationals abroad continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14078 of July 19, 2022, must continue in effect beyond July 19, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14078 with respect to hostage-taking and the wrongful detention of United States nationals abroad.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/07/16/letter-to-the-speaker-of-the-house-and-president-of-the-senate-on-the-continuation-of-the-national-emergency-with-respect-to-hostage-taking-and-the-wrongful-detention-of-united-states-nationals-abroad/ and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/page/3/

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Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)

Proposed Rule: Revisions to Definition of Defense Services and Enhancement

July 25, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 60980: On July 29, 2024, the Department of State published in the Federal Register a proposed rule to revise the definition of defense service and the scope of related controls in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

The Department of State undertook a review of the definition of defense service in the ITAR (ITAR 120.32). This review focused on identifying activities of U.S. persons that (1) provide a critical military or intelligence advantage such that they warrant control under the ITAR and are activities that are not currently subject to the ITAR; or (2) are controlled under the ITAR, but the current control language would benefit from additional clarity. Following the review, the Department of State proposes a revised definition of defense service to better describe existing controls and the scope of activities it would regulate through the revised definition and proposes certain additions to the ITAR’s United States Munitions List (“USML”).

Included in this proposal is specific language regarding the furnishing of intelligence-related assistance that is not directly related to a defense article to certain types of foreign persons (i.e., a foreign unit, force, or government) or their proxies or agents. The Department of State assessed that these activities warrant and require control equivalent to those of intelligence-related defense articles since such assistance (including training or consulting) similarly furnishes a critical military or intelligence advantage to the foreign person. Review of such activity by the Department of State for consistency with U.S. foreign policy and national security interests is necessary prior to any furnishing of such services. Further, the inclusion of the activities in this proposed rule is reflective of the stated aims of AECA § 38(a)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(2)) and principles in the United States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy.

First, a proposed revision would amend the definition of defense services at § 120.32(a)(1) by revising the list of regulated activities currently found in (a)(1) to include “assistance, including training or consulting, to foreign persons in the development (including, e.g., design), production (including, e.g., engineering and manufacture), assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, disabling, degradation, destruction, operation, processing, use, or demilitarization of a defense article.” This revised list moves several activities currently individually specified in (a)(1) (i.e., design, engineering, and manufacture) into parentheticals following defined terms in which they are included. Those activities were folded into the revised definitions of “production” and “development” at § 120.43 by a recent ITAR rule (87 FR 16396, Mar. 23, 2022).

In addition, the revised list of activities includes two new references, “disabling” and “degradation.” The Department of State proposes these terms to make explicit that the act of harming a military capability through the disabling or degradation of defense articles via any method remains controlled. In assessing non-traditional methods of disrupting a nation's military capabilities during its review, the Department of State noted that, while the current definition of defense service includes such activities, advances in technology that facilitate such activities merit explicit reference. The proposed revision clarifies that cyber services, or any other activities, that disable and degrade defense articles, but fall short of total destruction or demilitarization, are included within the definition of defense service at § 120.32(a)(1).

The Department of State also proposes a clarifying addition to the introductory text of paragraph (a)(1) to better describe the scope of activities controlled by the definition. In describing the assistance covered by the paragraph, the Department of State proposes to replace the parenthetical “(including training)” with a new clause clarifying that assistance includes training or consulting. In so doing, the Department of State does not intend to add a new level of control to its existing control of defense services, but rather intends to clarify that it does not treat training to mean only direct instructional activity. The proposed addition would reaffirm that providing the tools or means of furnishing training to a foreign person so that the foreign person may conduct training in lieu of the regulated person is included in the control. Such consulting is not limited to the furnishing of a completed product ,but includes assisting in the development of such training.

Second, the proposed amendments would remove § 120.32(a)(2) from the definition of defense service as redundant since the furnishing of technical data to a foreign person is already a controlled event described in §§ 120.50 through 120.52. Further, the proposed amendments would remove current paragraph (a)(3). In their stead, these two provisions are replaced by a proposed new paragraph (a)(2) that directs persons to the USML where descriptions of services to be controlled under ITAR are provided. The Department of State includes a proposed note to § 120.32 directing the regulated community to the new location.

Specifically, the proposed paragraph (a)(2) directs persons to two new proposed USML entries in Category IX that would control defense services related to intelligence and military assistance. The proposed entries differ from the type of defense services described in paragraph (a)(1), which directly relate to defense articles and already have corresponding entries in each USML category (e.g., Category I(i), Category II(k), etc.).

The two new entries are proposed for 2 reserved paragraphs of USML Category IX, and the category is proposed to be renamed “Military Training Equipment, Intelligence Defense Services, and Military Defense Services” to more accurately describe the controls in the category. The Department proposes to reserve new paragraph (s)(1) for use as a future entry and to place the new controls in proposed paragraphs (s)(2) and (3) within that category. For purposes of this preamble, the intelligence assistance controlled by paragraph (s)(2) is referred to as “intelligence assistance” and the military and paramilitary assistance controlled by paragraph (s)(3) are referred to by the singular “military assistance.”

The introductory text of proposed new USML Category IX(s)(2) describes defense services relating to intelligence assistance that do not necessarily involve defense articles. Following the introductory control text of proposed USML Category IX(s)(2), subsequent paragraphs would provide specified carve-outs to the general description of activities described in paragraph (s)(2). Similar carve-out provisions are also proposed to the military assistance control in USML Category IX(s)(3). The Department of State determined that rather than relying solely on the definition of defense service, it would be better to direct users to the USML to conduct their classification analysis since this approach is similar to how users currently conduct defense article classification analysis, and it allows for a more detailed articulation of certain specific activities meriting ITAR control. Moreover, AECA § 38(a)(1) (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)) provides that defense services, like defense articles, are to be designated on the USML. By adding specific entries in addition to the existing USML paragraphs controlling defense services, including those furnished in connection with a defense article, the Department of State brings additional clarity to the regulations. Further to that effort, the Department of State proposes to amend § 120.11, which describes the order of review, to include a proposed paragraph (d) specific to defense services and to redesignate current paragraph (d) as paragraph (e).

As to the objective of the proposed additions to the USML, the Department of State determined revised and clarified controls are warranted and necessary to address the risks to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests posed by U.S. persons furnishing assistance in intelligence activities. In particular, the Department of State determined that certain intelligence activities that do not involve defense articles provide a critical military or intelligence advantage such that they warrant and require revised controls under the ITAR.

The proposed USML Category IX(s)(3) describes defense services relating to military assistance that do not necessarily involve defense articles and provides specified carve-outs to the controls. Persons furnishing certain military assistance to foreign persons can cause local and regional instability in a manner equal to or greater than the supply of a tangible article or weapon to a foreign person end-user. The proposed inclusion of certain specific forms of military assistance as a defense service within the USML is intended to provide U.S. persons with clear notice that such activities require authorization as, depending on the circumstances, the activities may be counter to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, the stated aims of AECA § 38(a)(2) (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(2)), Conventional Arms Transfer Policy objectives, or shared interests with our allies and partners.

To ensure that the military assistance controls are consistent with ITAR § 120.3(b) and only control those activities that provide a critical military or intelligence advantage, the proposed controls described in USML Category IX(s)(3) would regulate a higher level of support than front-line combatant activities. The Department of State notes, however, that although not intended for control in proposed Category IX(s)(3), such activities may be otherwise regulated by other provisions in the ITAR, or by regulations administered by other agencies of the U.S. Government. In conjunction with the addition of this proposed USML entry, the Department of State is proposing to remove the existing USML entry for military training at current Category IX(e)(3). In so doing, the Department does not intend to narrow the scope of what is controlled by that existing military training entry, but rather aims to bring additional clarity to that control as part of new text proposed as Category IX(s)(3).

See the following links for the full text of the proposed rule including the USML additions:

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events and

https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/2024-16501/international-traffic-in-arms-regulations-revisions-to-definition-and-controls-related-to-defense

 

DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website

July 25 through July 26, 2024: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at    

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:

  • Change in Name from Babcock Land Limited to Babcock Land Defence Limited due to internal corporate restructuring;
  • Change in Address for Landes High End Machining b.v. from Magelhaenstraat 15, 7825VL, Emmen, Netherlands to Maxwellstraat 31, 7825 GA, Emmen, Netherlands;
  • Change in Name from Air Liquide advanced Technologies to Aerospace & Defense Oxygen Systems due to corporate restructuring;
  • Change in Name from Safran Data Systems to Safran Defense & Space, Inc due to corporate restructuring.
  • Change in Name from SeaTec Consulting Inc. to Oliver Wyman Government Services LLC due to merger;
  • Change in Address for Metrea Management Limited, MAFX UK Limited, Metrea Discovery Partners Limited, and Metrea Discovery Partners Holding 1 Limited from Third Floor, O’Gorman House, 37 Ixworth Place, London, SW3 3QH, United Kingdom to Third Floor, The Aircraft Factory, 100 Cambridge Grove, London, W6 0LE, United Kingdom;
  • Change in Name from Ferranti Technologies Limited to ESUK Aerospace and Simulation Limited due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name from CASS Professional Services, Corp. dba Metrea Strategic Mobility to Metrea Strategic Mobility Inc. due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name from Teledyne FLIR Surveillance, Inc. to Teledyne FLIR Defense, Inc., due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name from Airbus Helicopters International Services to Airbus International Services DAC due to corporate rebranding;
  • Change in Name and Address from Assistance Aéronautique et Aérospatiale SAS, 10 rue Mercoeur, 75011 Paris, France to Daher Industrial Services SAS at Immeuble BELAÏA, 7 avenue de l’Union, F-94390 ORLY, FRANCE, due to merger;
  • Change in Name from Ayesa Air Control Ingenieria Aeronautica, S.L. to Alten Soluciones Productos Auditoria E Ingenieria SAU due to merger; and
  • Change in Address for ATEXIS France from 10/12 Boulevard Pythagore, 13127 Vitrolles, France to 14 Draille Des Tribales, 13127 Vitrolles, France, and all other locations in France.
  • Change in Name from Rafaut SAS to ARESIA-Villeneuve due to merger.
  • Change in Name from Alkan SAS to ARESIA-Valenton due to merger.
  • Change in Address for Metrea Simulations AB formerly at Stora Skondals Vag 9, Skondal 128 63, Sweden to Metrea Simulations AB at Luntmakargatan 66, 113 51 Stockholm, Sweden
  • Change in Name from Globes Elektronik GmbH & Co KG to Milexia Deutschland GmbH due to merger.

Please note the DDTC website was revamped on 7/31/2024 and the name and address announcements are now found under a tab “Amending Authorizations”.

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DDTC FAQs

On March 25, 2024, DDTC published a short series of Frequently Asked Questions regarding joint ventures and how those contractual arrangements affect an exporter’s DDTC registration. The following are a few of the key points from the FAQs.

  • DDTC views joint ventures as separate legal entities, rather than as a subsidiary or affiliate of the parties to the joint venture agreement. If the entity formed from a joint venture will be engaging in military or defense related activities that are subject to the ITAR, the joint venture entity must separately incorporate and register with DDTC.
  • If a DDTC registered entity enters into a joint venture that results in 50% or more ownership of the new entity, the joint venture must be added to the registrant’s existing DDTC registration as a subsidiary. The same rule applies even if it is a foreign incorporated joint venture. Alternatively, if the DDTC registered entity owns less than 50% of the joint venture but is responsible for managing the day-to-day operations of the joint venture, then the joint venture entity would still be added to the existing DDTC registration and listed as a controlled affiliate.
  • If a joint venture entity is equally owned (50/50) by two DDTC registered companies and control of business operations is also equally shared, then DDTC will consider other factors in deciding under which entity the joint venture will be registered, such as which of the registered entities is engaging in more ITAR specific activities or projects. If the joint venture is independently managed, then the joint venture entity must register with DDTC independently.
  • If a U.S. incorporated joint venture is managed by foreign persons but will be engaging in ITAR-controlled activities, a U.S. person must be appointed as a senior officer for the U.S. joint venture and the joint venture can then apply for independent DDTC registration. If no U.S. person is acting as a senior officer of the joint venture, then it cannot register with DDTC and cannot conduct ITAR-controlled activities.

https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_faq_cat&topic=2a3d376cdb3bc30044f9ff621f961982&subtopic=d6ca9bd387054a909012a7d40cbb3598#d6ca9bd387054a909012a7d40cbb3598

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Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)

DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Czech Republic

July 17, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government the Czech Republic has requested to buy two hundred (200) Hellfire Air-to-Ground Missiles, AGM-114R; four (4) Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM); and six hundred (600) WGU-59A/B Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) II (single variant). The following non-MDE (Major Defense Equipment) is also included: support equipment; dummy cartridge rounds; containers; training material; inert components; publications; repair of repairables; and training and technical support. The estimated total cost is $138.26 million. The principal contractors will be Lockheed Martin, located in Orlando, FL, and BAE Systems, Inc., located in Nashua, NH. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/czech-republic-hellfire-missiles-and-advanced-precision-kill-weapon and

https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/archive-date/202407

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Saudi Arabia

July 23, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested to buy follow-on logistics support and services, including for Joint Mission Planning Software (JMPS) hardware and support; KIV-77/78 cryptographic devices and support; spares and repair parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; calibration support and test equipment; ground and personnel equipment; classified and unclassified software and software support, classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support, in support of, but not limited to, KC-130J, C-130, E-3, RE-3, KE-3, KA 350, Bell 212, and Bell 412 aircraft. The estimated total program cost is $2.8 billion. There will be various contractors associated with the provision of equipment and services involved with this case, and there is no prime contractor. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kingdom-saudi-arabia-system-logistics-and-sustainment-support and

https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/archive-date/202407

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Belgium

July 25, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Belgium has requested to buy up to one hundred ninety-six (196) Guided Bomb Unit (GBU)-53/B Small Diameter Bombs-Increment II (SDB-II) All-Up-Rounds (AURs). Also included are SDB-II Weapons Load Crew Trainers (WLCT); training aids and devices; spare and repair parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support; unclassified software delivery and support; unclassified publications and technical documentation; major modifications and maintenance support; training and training equipment; munitions support and support equipment; transportation support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $115 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Arlington, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/belgium-small-diameter-bomb-increment-ii and

https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/archive-date/202407

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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Slovakia

July 31, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Slovakia has requested to buy twelve (12) AH-1Z attack helicopters; twenty-six (26) T-700 GE 401C engines (24 installed, 2 spares); one thousand six hundred eighty (1,680) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS), WGU-59/B; and fourteen (14) Honeywell embedded global positioning systems (GPS)/inertial navigation systems (INS) (EGIs) (12 installed, 2 spares). The following non-MDE items will also be included: support and test equipment; aircraft; weapons and munitions; countermeasures; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; communications equipment; mission planning; software delivery and support; Helmet Mounted Display System/Optimized TopOwl, Target Sight Systems and containers; technical refresh mission computers; ANVIS-9 night vision cueing displays; AN/ARC-210 Generation 6 receiver-transmitter 2036 radio equipment; AN/APX-123A identification friend or foe (IFF) Mode 5 mounting trays and batteries; cartridge actuated devices/propellant actuated devices (CAD/PADs); facilities and construction support; transportation; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; countermeasures, including M299 launchers, LAU-61C/A and LAU-68F/A rocket launchers, M151 high explosive warheads for airborne 2.75 inch rockets; MK66 MOD 4, 2.75-inch rocket motors; WTU-1B warheads; M197 20 mm armament pod gun assemblies; 20 mm PGU-27A/B target practice rounds; 20 mm PGU-28A/B semi armor piercing high explosive incendiary rounds; AN/ALE-47 chaff and flare countermeasures system; MJU-32A/B and MJU-49B decoy flares; SMB875B/ALE flare simulators; RR-129A/AL chaff cartridges; RR-144A/AL training chaff cartridges; CCU-136A/A impulse cartridges; AN/AAR-47 missile warning system; AN/APR-39C radar warning receiver and conversion kits; KIV-78A cryptographic appliques; AN/PYQ-10C Simple Key Loader with KOV-21 cryptographic card; U.S. Government and contractor engineering; field service representative services; technical and logistical support services; studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $600 million. The principal contractors will be Bell Textron, located in Fort Worth, TX; and the General Electric Company, located in Lynn, MA. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/slovakia-ah-1z-attack-helicopters

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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)

BIS Releases New Edition of “Don’t Let This Happen to You!”

July 1, 2024: the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Export Enforcement published an updated version of “Don’t Let This Happen to You!”, a compendium of case examples highlighting BIS criminal and administrative enforcement efforts. The publication was last updated in March 2024.

The updated version includes new enforcement cases involving a voluntary self-disclosure by an academic institution, violations of the antiboycott regulations, firearms export violations, export violations related to China and Iran, and non-compliance with a BIS settlement agreement. Exporters are encouraged to review the publication, which provides useful illustrations of the type of conduct that gets companies and universities in trouble.

BIS Export Enforcement protects and promotes U.S. national security by aggressively investigating violations of export control and antiboycott regulations and by partnering with industry and academia to facilitate compliance with those regulations.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-releases-new-edition-dont-let-happen-you and

https://www.bis.gov/sites/default/files/files/DLTHTY%21_7-1-2024.pdf

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BIS Issues Guidance on Addressing Export Diversion Risks

July 10, 2024:  The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published guidance outlining the different actions that BIS takes to inform industry and academia about parties – beyond those identified on public screening lists like the Entity List – those present risks of diversion of items subject to BIS export controls to countries or entities of concern. The guidance also outlines certain responsibilities companies and universities must comply with BIS regulations, as well as additional steps they should take to mitigate diversion risks.

https://www.bis.gov/sites/default/files/files/Guidance-for-Complying-with-BIS-Letters-Identifying-Transaction-Parties-of-Diversion-Risk_v8.pdf and

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-issues-guidance-addressing-export-diversion-risks

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BIS Sets Higher KYC Standards for Companies and Universities Over Russia Diversion Concerns 

July 10, 2024: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) released new guidance (the “July 10 Release”) outlining different types of precautionary letters (“supplier list” letters, “Project Guardian” requests, “red flag” letters, and “is informed” letters) that BIS may send to “companies and universities” to notify them of “parties of national security concern, such as those that present a risk of diverting [Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”)] items to restricted end uses or end users in Russia.

https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20240726-bis-sets-higher-kyc-standards-for-companies-and-universities-over-russia-diversion-concerns

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BIS Issues Statement on Export Controls and Restrictions Against Russia

July 15, 2024: As part of BIS’ regular consultations on export control cooperation, the European Commission hosted a meeting with counterparts from Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States on 10 July 2024, to discuss ongoing efforts to align and enhance export restriction measures imposed in response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.

The swift, unprecedented and massive export restrictions that have been collectively imposed since February 2022 have been calculated and continuously adjusted over time to maximize their effect on Russia’s military industrial base. As Russia intensifies illicit procurement attempts, it must not be given access to those items needed to manufacture its weapons and supply its military —either directly from the coalition of partner nations, or indirectly through transshipment networks often involving non-sanctioning third countries. Companies that seek to profit from selling coalition commodities, software and technology into Russia do so at the collective’s expense.

The regulatory services for each government will continue to enhance and expand, as appropriate, regulatory requirements in light of information from the battlefield, in order to maintain the effectiveness of the measures placed. The national competent authorities will continue to hold those who violate the laws accountable.

BIS and its foreign government counterparts are grateful for the efforts of industry to devote appropriate resources to know their customers and counter the risks of illegal transshipment. BIS and Industry has collectively developed specific tools to support industry compliance, such as the Common High Priority List (CHPL) of battlefield items. BIS is also actively identifying companies associated with Russia’s military-industrial complex and involved in the circumvention of our measures. BIS will continue to issue public guidance to improve the reach and effect of our export restrictions imposed in response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.

BIS encourages industry to take advantage of the significant information and guidance issued to improve its compliance screening. BIS calls on responsible exporters to improve export compliance systems and exercise enhanced due diligence. This includes making efficient use of sources such as public business registries, commercially available trade databases, and information collected by non-profit organizations to identify companies that present a high risk of future diversion. These would notably include companies with a prior record of diverting controlled items from any of the aligned export control systems to Russia.

The ability of industry to identify high-risk transactions can make a difference. The collective actions will be both complementary and coordinated so that BIS and counterparts continue to effectively address the ongoing threat to international security.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/statement-export-controls-and-restrictions-against-russia and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

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BIS Announces Major Update to Participation in Global Standards Development

July 18, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 58265: The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule (IFR) amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to reinforce the United States’ leadership and participation in global standards development, while continuing to prevent transfers of technology that harm our national security. This IFR ensures that U.S. companies can actively participate in the development of international standards without being unreasonably hindered by export controls and associated compliance concerns. Without the revisions to the EAR announced, there is greater risk that standards would be developed without the participation and input of U.S. companies, which harms U.S. national security.

Key updates include:

  • Revising the definition of standards-related activities to accurately reflect the U.S. model of public-private cooperation in standards to further global innovation and trade.
  • Clarifying the applicability of export controls to specific “software” and “technology” for “standards-related activity” to promote transparency and effectiveness in U.S. contributions to global standards.

In addition, this rule is essential in supporting ongoing efforts under the U.S. Government National Standards Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technology (USG NSSCET), which aims to enhance U.S. leadership in the development of standards for critical technologies. By facilitating easier participation, the rule advances U.S. interests in global technology standards, which are pivotal in shaping the future of industries and ensuring security benefits derived from technological advancements.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/department-commerce-announces-major-update-us-leadership-global-standards-development and

https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/US-Gov-National-Standards-Strategy-2023.pdf

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BIS Expands The Scope of the Foreign Direct Product Rule Concerning Iran

July 24, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) implemented an expansion of controls on the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of certain foreign-produced items located in or destined to Iran, to address ongoing concerns regarding Iran’s potential use of U.S. technology in weapons systems.

This rule implements the requirements of the No Technology for Terror Act (the Act), which was passed in April as part of emergency supplemental appropriations for the current fiscal year. As required by the Act, the BIS rule expands the scope of the Export Administration Regulations’ (EAR) Iran Foreign Direct Product rule (FDPR). The expansion, effective July 23, 2024, is designed to further impede Iran’s ability to procure technology and components critical for military systems, including advanced drones that pose threats to U.S. forces and allies.

The expanded controls build upon existing restrictions on Iran that apply under the Iran FDPR by imposing licensing requirements for the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of additional foreign-produced items located in or destined to Iran and by adding a new end-user scope that targets transactions involving such items in which the Government of Iran is a party.

This rule reflects BIS’ efforts to ensure robust enforcement of export controls and to prevent the proliferation of weapons systems that threaten U.S. troops overseas or key allies.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/iran-fdp-media-advisory and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

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BIS Proposes Restrictions on U.S. Persons’ Support for Foreign Military, Intelligence, and Security Services and Controls to Protect National Security and Human Rights

July 25, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 60985: The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published proposed rules seeking public comment on enhanced restrictions on exports, reexports, or support to military or intelligence end users and end uses in countries of concern, consistent with the Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). These rules complement proposed revisions, also published, regarding the scope of defense services controlled by the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) pursuant to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). BIS is seeking public comment on the proposed rules, which include expanding restrictions against exporting items to, or providing support for, military or intelligence services in countries of concern.

The specific controls proposed in these rules include:

  • S. Persons’ Activity Controls: Expanded restrictions on U.S. persons’ support activities regarding end uses and end users of concern, including facilitating the acquisition of certain foreign-origin items by military, intelligence, and security services of concern, as well as performing maintenance, repair, and overhaul of such foreign-origin items.
  • End-Use and End-User Controls: Expanded restrictions to apply to all items subject to the EAR when destined to the armed forces or national guard of countries subjected to a U.S. arms embargo as well as civilian or military intelligence agencies (e.,intelligence end users) of over 40 countries of concern. Such controls are also proposed to apply to all items on the Commerce Control List when destined to foreign-security end users (e.g., police and security agencies) or military-support end users (e.g., defense contractors) in countries subject to a U.S. arms embargo.
  • Item Controls: New restrictions on the export of certain facial recognition technologies that can enable mass surveillance to protect and promote human rights.

https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-proposes-restrictions-us-persons-support-foreign-military-intelligence-and and

https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/2024-16498/export-administration-regulations-crime-controls-and-expansionupdate-of-us-persons-controls and

https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/2024-16496/end-use-and-end-user-based-export-controls-including-us-persons-activities-controls-military-and

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BIS Issues Standards-Related Activities and the Export Administration Regulations; Corrections

July 25, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 60302: On July 18, 2024, BIS published in the Federal Register the interim final rule (IFR), “Standards-Related Activities and the Export Administration Regulations” (89 FR 58265) that revised parts 734, 744 and 772 of the EAR. The revisions in the July 18, 2024, rule inadvertently reverted changes to part 744 that were amended in a final rule that BIS published on June 18, 2024 (89 FR 51644). This document corrects the inadvertent revisions introduced in the Federal Register on July 18, 2024, specifically to §§ 744.11, 744.16, and supplement no. 4 to part 744, to reintroduce language that was added in the June 18, 2024, rule that reflected the addition of paragraph (f) under § 744.16.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/07/25/2024-16379/standards-related-activities-and-the-export-administration-regulations-corrections

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End-Use and End-User Based Export Controls, Including U.S. Persons Activities Controls: Military and Intelligence End Uses and End Users

July 29, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 60985: The Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), seeks public comment on proposed changes to existing restrictions under the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) on military and intelligence end uses and end users and related U.S. persons activities controls, as well as the proposed addition of a military-support end-user control. These proposed revisions and additions to the EAR's end-use, end-user, and “U.S. persons” activity controls would implement expanded Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) authority to control certain “U.S. persons” activities under the EAR. Specific to the EAR's “U.S. persons” activities controls, BIS is proposing amendments to control `support' furnished by “U.S. persons” to military end users and military-production activities, as well as intelligence end users that are not otherwise already regulated under or prohibited by U.S. law. In addition, BIS is proposing to revise the definition of `support' set forth in the EAR's “U.S. person” activity control provision in response to requests by the public for clarification. The revisions and additions, along with clarifications, to end use, end user, and “U.S. persons” activity controls under the EAR, would further the national security and the foreign policy of the United States.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/07/29/2024-16496/end-use-and-end-user-based-export-controls-including-us-persons-activities-controls-military-and

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 U.S. Census Bureau

Schedule B and Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) Updated in the Automated Export System (AES)

July 1, 2024:

Effective immediately, the Schedule B, Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), and HTS Codes That Are Not Valid for AES tables have been updated to accept the changes to the July 1, 2024 codes.

AES will accept shipments with outdated codes during a grace period for 30 days beyond the expiration date of June 30, 2024Reporting an outdated code after the 30-day grace period will result in a fatal error.

The ACE AESDirect program has been updated with the 2024 codes and will accept shipments with outdated codes during the grace period as well.

The 2024 Schedule B and HTS tables are available for downloading at:

https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aes/concordance.html

The current list of HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available at:

https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aes/documentlibrary/concordance/hts-not-for-aes.txt     

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Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages

July 18, 2024

When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected.  If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation.  Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN.  However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.

To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.

Response Code:  531

Narrative:     Foreign/Domestic Origin Indicator Not Allowed For HH

Severity:       Fatal

Reason:        When the Export Information Code reported is HH for household goods, the Foreign/Domestic Origin Indicator is not allowed.

Resolution:  The Foreign/Domestic Origin Indicator should not be reported when the Export Information Code is HH for household goods.

Verify the Export Information Code and Foreign/Domestic Origin Indicator, correct the shipment and resubmit.

Response Code:  8W1

Narrative:     Shipping Weight/Quantity 1 Out of Range

Severity:       Verify

Reason:        For the reported Schedule B/HTS Number, the Shipping Weight/Quantity (1) ratio is outside of the expected range.

Resolution:  For a particular Schedule B/HTS Number reported, the shipping weight divided by the first quantity should fall within a certain parameter based on historical statistical averages for that commodity.  Ratios outside this pre-determined parameter might indicate either a keying error or misclassification of the product.

Verify the Shipping Weight, Quantity 1, and Schedule B/HTS Number, correct the shipment and resubmit (if necessary).  If the line item is verified correct as reported, no action is necessary.

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Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

July 5, 2024: the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued its OFAC Guidance: Production Submission Standards, updating OFAC’s former data delivery standards.  This guidance provides technical and general guidance to persons submitting material to OFAC and applies primarily to persons providing responses to administrative subpoenas, requests for information, disclosures, and especially for submissions that may entail voluminous documentation.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240705

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July 8, 2024: OFAC issued updated Venezuela General License 40C, Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving the Exportation or Reexportation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas to Venezuela.

General License 40C:

All transactions related to the exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, of liquefied petroleum gas to Venezuela, involving the Government of Venezuela, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by E.O. 13850 of November 1, 2018, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019, or E.O. 13884 of August 5, 2019, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, July 8, 2025.

This general license does not authorize:

Any payment-in-kind of petroleum or petroleum products; or

Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the VSR, including transactions involving any blocked persons other than PdVSA, any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, or any Government of Venezuela person that is blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13884.

Effective July 8, 2024, General License No. 40B, dated July 10, 2023, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License No. 40C.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933001/download?inline

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240708

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OFAC Basics Video Series - My Funds are Blocked, Now What?

July 12, 2024: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) released the second video in its “OFAC Basics” video series, "My Funds Are Blocked, Now What?" This video provides viewers with guidance on what it means when funds are blocked in connection with OFAC sanctions, as well as recommended steps for what to do if your funds have been blocked.

The “OFAC Basics” series serves as a companion series to the “Introduction to OFAC” series, available here. For more information on this video series, please see the blog post below:

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240712_33 and

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rc8jvauiEtc and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/ofac-video-series

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Updates to OFAC Licensing Portal Application Status and Hotline

July 18, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took additional steps to provide greater transparency and information to specific license applicants by providing more detailed updates regarding the status of their applications via the public Licensing Portal. Applicants will now receive one of ten following case statuses to better indicate where their application is in the processing timeline.

  • Received
  • Guidance Issued
  • Returned Without Action
  • Pending Management Review
  • Pending Interagency Review
  • Pending Treasury Coordination
  • Pending with Applicant
  • Approved
  • Denied
  • Closed

Concurrently, OFAC is implementing updates to the Licensing Division hotline, including updating menus and transitioning to a callback-only system. These changes are aimed at helping the public access the information they need faster, reducing call wait times, and improving the overall customer experience.

https://licensing.ofac.treas.gov/Apply/Introduction.aspx and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240718_33

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July 22, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) released guidance addressing questions raised by recent legislation that extended the statute of limitations for violations of certain sanctions that the agency administers.  As explained in the guidance, OFAC may now commence an enforcement action for civil violations of International Emergency Economic Powers Act- or Trading with Enemy Act-based sanctions prohibitions within 10 years of the latest date of the violation if such date was after April 24, 2019.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933056/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240722

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July 23, 2024: As part of implementing the historic Rebuilding Economic Prosperity and Opportunity for Ukrainians Act (the “REPO for Ukrainians Act”), the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a new reporting requirement for financial institutions holding Russian sovereign assets. Pursuant to section 104(a) of the REPO for Ukrainians Act, all financial institutions at which Russian sovereign assets are located, and that know or should know of such assets, must provide notice of such assets to OFAC no later than August 2, 2024, or within 10 days of the detection of such assets, and can do so via OFAC’s new form.

As described in more detail in the full instructions and in the REPO for Ukrainians Act Report Form, financial institutions should not re-report information on Russian sovereign assets that was previously reported to OFAC. A notice of these reporting instructions will be published in the Federal Register.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2479 and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933066/download?inline and

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933061/download?inline

 

LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES

This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.

 

Fines and Penalties

July 2, 2024: Douglas Edward Robertson, 56, of Olathe, Kansas, the former vice president of KanRus Trading Company Inc., pleaded guilty for his role in a years-long conspiracy to circumvent U.S. export laws by filing false export forms with the U.S. government and, after Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, continued to sell and export sophisticated and controlled avionics equipment to customers in Russia without the required licenses from the U.S. Department of Commerce.

As a result of the guilty plea, Robertson faces a statutory maximum penalty of five years in prison for the conspiracy count, 20 years in prison for each of the two Export Control Reform Act counts, and 20 years in prison for the money laundering count. A sentencing hearing is scheduled for October 3, 2024.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/vice-president-kansas-company-pleads-guilty-crimes-related-scheme-illegally-export-us and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC 

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July 9, 2024: Nikolay Goltsev, 38, of Montreal, and Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, 53, of Brooklyn, New York, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit export control violations for their roles in a global procurement scheme on behalf of sanctioned Russian companies, including Russian military companies. Some of the electronic components shipped by the defendants were later found in seized Russian weapons platforms and signals intelligence equipment in Ukraine.

Goltsev and Nasriddinov are scheduled to be sentenced on Dec. 10 and Dec. 11, respectively. They each face a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/new-york-man-and-canadian-national-plead-guilty-multi-million-dollar-export-control-scheme and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

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July 16, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 57853: On April 9, 2021, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Ruben Arnulfo Chavarin (“Chavarin”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Chavarin was convicted of smuggling ammunition from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Chavarin to 78 months of imprisonment, with credit for time served, three years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment and additional monetary penalties of $10,307.20.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/07/16/2024-15619/in-the-matter-of-ruben-arnulfo-chavarin-1042-e-15th-street-douglas-az-85607-order-denying-export

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July 16, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 57852: On December 4, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Robert Wise (“Wise”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371. Specifically, Wise was convicted of conspiring to commit international money laundering by using international wire transfers to conduct U.S. dollar transactions for the benefit of a sanctioned Russian oligarch. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Wise to time served, two years of supervised release, with the first 12 months in home detention, and a $100,000 fine.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/07/16/2024-15618/in-the-matter-of-robert-wise-145-cliff-avenue-pelham-ny-10803-order-denying-export-privileges

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July 17, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg 58103: In the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Melanie Ann Espinoza (“Espinoza”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Espinoza was convicted of smuggling approximately 7,000 rounds of Wolf 7.62 x 39 caliber ammunition, 1,500 rounds of Wolf .223 caliber ammunition, 2,000 rounds of Wolf 9 mm caliber ammunition and 50 rounds of Magtech Super .38 ammunition. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced Espinoza to nine months of imprisonment, with credit for time served, three years of supervised release, and a $100 special assessment.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/07/17/2024-15636/in-the-matter-of-melanie-ann-espinoza-6605-w-pasadena-ave-apt-3-glendale-az-85301-order-denying

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July 17, 2024: Maxim Marchenko was sentenced by U.S. District Judge Nelson S. Román to three years in prison for his role in procuring dual-use, military grade OLED micro-displays for Russian end users.  Marchenko previously pled guilty to money laundering and smuggling charges before U.S. Magistrate Judge Victoria Reznik on February 29, 2024.

In addition to the prison term, Marchenko, 52, a Russian citizen who resided in Hong Kong, was sentenced to three years of supervised release.

https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/russian-international-money-launderer-sentenced-three-years-prison-illicitly-procuring and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

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July 17, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 58103: On December 14, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Charles McGonigal (“McGonigal”), was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371. Specifically, McGonigal was convicted of conspiring to violate U.S. sanctions against Russia by going to work for a Russian oligarch whom he once investigated. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced McGonigal to 50 months in prison, three years of supervised release, a $100 special assessment and a fine of $40,000.

Pursuant to section 1760(e) of the Export Control Reform Act (“ECRA”),[1] the export privileges of any person who has been convicted of certain offenses, including, but not limited to, 18 U.S.C. 371, may be denied for a period of up to ten (10) years from the date of his/her conviction. 50 U.S.C. 4819(e). In addition, any Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) licenses or other authorizations issued under ECRA, in which the person had an interest at the time of the conviction, may be revoked. Id.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/07/17/2024-15637/in-the-matter-of-charles-mcgonigal-175-w-13th-street-apt-8g-new-york-ny-10011-order-denying-export

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July 22, 2024: Ray Hunt, also known as Abdolrahman Hantoosh, Rahman Hantoosh and Rahman Natooshas, 70, of Owens Cross Roads, Alabama, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to export U.S.-origin goods to the Islamic Republic of Iran in violation of trade sanctions.

Hunt pleaded guilty to a conspiracy charge and faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alabama-man-pleads-guilty-violating-iran-sanctions and

https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC

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July 26, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $7,452,501 settlement with State Street Bank and Trust Company (State Street), a Massachusetts-based financial institution, on behalf of itself and its subsidiary, Charles River Systems, Inc. (Charles River).  State Street agreed to settle its potential civil liability for 38 apparent violations of OFAC's Ukraine-/Russia-Related sanctions.  The apparent violations involved invoices that were redated or reissued by Charles River between 2016 and 2020 for certain customers who were subject to Directive 1 of Executive Order 13662, as well as certain payments outside of the applicable debt tenor accepted by Charles River from these customers.  The settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that the apparent violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and were egregious.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933081/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933076/download?inline

Sanctions

Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)

July 1, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned a Mexico-based money launderer and China-based members of a money laundering organization with criminal links to the Sinaloa Cartel as part of ongoing efforts to disrupt the flow of illicit narcotics into the United States. This action is the result of the U.S. government’s ongoing efforts, in cooperation with the Mexican government, to disrupt the trafficking of fentanyl and save lives — a priority under the President’s Unity Agenda. The action furthers efforts by Treasury’s Counter-Fentanyl Strike Force, which leverages Treasury’s unique expertise and capabilities to disrupt the illicit financial networks relied upon by the cartels.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

  • Acosta Ovalle, Diego of Mexico;
  • He, Jiaxuan of China; and
  • Tong, Peiji of China.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240701

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions?page=2

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June 10, 2024: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 13J, "Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024."

General License 13J:

U.S. persons, or entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person, are authorized to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, certifications, or tax refunds to the extent such transactions are prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to the day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation of such U.S. persons or entities, through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, October 9, 2024.

This general license does not authorize:

Any debit to an account on the books of a U.S. financial institution of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, or the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or

Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized.

Effective July 10, 2024, General License No. 13I, dated April 12, 2024, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License No. 13J.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933006/download?inline and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240710

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July 11, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Tren de Aragua, a Venezuela-based transnational criminal organization that is expanding throughout the Western Hemisphere and engaging in diverse criminal activities, such as human smuggling and trafficking, gender-based violence, money laundering, and illicit drug trafficking.

The following individuals have been added to OFACs SDN List:

  • Ben Haim, Reut of Israel;
  • Manne, Isachar of Israel; and
  • Sarid, Aviad Shlomo of Israel.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Hamohoch Farm of the West Bank;
  • Lehava of Israrel;
  • Manne Farm Outpost of the West Bank;
  • Meitarim Farm of the West Bank;
  • Neriya’s Farm of the West Bank;
  • Tren de Aguara of Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Ecuado, Brazil, Bolivia, Panama, United States.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240711 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions

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July 16, 2024:  The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three Mexican accountants and four Mexican companies linked, directly or indirectly, to timeshare fraud led by the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG). Concurrently, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a Notice, jointly with OFAC and FBI, to financial institutions that provides an overview of timeshare fraud schemes in Mexico associated with CJNG and other Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Arredondo Pinzon, Griselda Margarita of Mexico;
  • Foubert Cadena, Xeyda Del Refugio of Mexico; and
  • Sanchez Martinez, Emiliano of Mexico.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Bona Fide Consultores FS S.A.S., of Mexico;
  • Constructora Sandgris, S. DE R.L. DE C.V., of Mexico;
  • Pacifica Axis Real Estate, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico; and
  • Realty & Maintenance BJ, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2465 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933016/download?inline= and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240716

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July 18, 2024: The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Abdul Karim Conteh Human Smuggling Organization (Karim HSO), a transnational criminal organization (TCO) based in Tijuana, Mexico. Human smuggling is a federal crime in which criminals smuggle noncitizens into the United States, as well as transport and harbor noncitizens already in the country illegally, all in deliberate violation of U.S. immigration laws. Together with Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice components, and other U.S. and foreign partners, OFAC targets these networks to disrupt their finances and illicit profits and ultimately dismantle their operations, which threaten the national security of the United States,

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Conteh, Abdul Karim of Mexico;
  • Kamara, Issa of Mexico;
  • Pidoukou, Pasaman Francis Marin Abee of Mexico; and
  • Roblero Pivaral, Veronica of Mexico.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List;

  • Abdul Karim Conteh Human Smuggling Organization of Mexico;

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2470 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240718

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July 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated and identified as blocked property a dozen persons and vessels, respectively, that have played a critical role in financing the Houthis’ destabilizing regional activities as part of the network of Sa’id al-Jamal. This action included Indonesia-based Malaysian and Singaporean national Mohammad Roslan Bin Ahmad and People’s Republic of China (PRC)-based Chinese national Zhuang Liang, who have facilitated illicit shipments and engaged in money laundering for the network. Sa’id al-Jamal’s network continues to provide tens of millions of dollars in revenue to the Houthis in Yemen through its shipment of Iranian commodities, including oil, a funding stream underpinning the Houthis’ ongoing attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea. This action targets numerous aspects of this illicit network across the spectrum of its operations, from clients and facilitators to insurance providers, vessels, and ship management firms.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Bin Ahmad, Mohammad Rosland of Indonesia; and
  • Zhuang, Liang of China.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Alpha Shine Marine Services L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Ascent General Insurance Company of Thailand;
  • Barco Ship Management Inc, of the United Arab Emirates;
  • Fornacis Energy Trading Co. L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates; and
  • Sea Knot Shipping Inc. of the Marshall Islands.

The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Kasper, Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9293143; (vessel);
  • Mirova Dynamic, Crude Oil Tanker Unknown flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9237618 (vessel);
  • Oceanic II, Products Tanker Hong Kong flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9275995 (vessel);
  • Tirex, Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9203772 (vessel); and
  • Wanji, Chemical/Products Tanker Panama flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 9215103 (vessel).

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240718 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions?page=0

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July 19, 2024: The United States designated Yuliya Vladimirovna Pankratova (Pankratova) and Denis Olegovich Degtyarenko (Degtyarenko), two members of the Russian hacktivist group Cyber Army of Russia Reborn (CARR) for their roles in cyber operations against U.S. critical infrastructure. These two individuals are the group’s leader and a primary hacker, respectively.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Degtyarenko, Denis Olegovich of Russia; and
  • Pankratova, Yuliya Vladimirovna.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2473 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240719

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July 23, 2024: The United States has taken action against a network of three individuals associated with the expanded activities of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on the African continent. These individuals serve as key financiers and trusted operatives, enabling the activities of ISIS and its leaders across Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa. They also serve as critical links between far-flung ISIS operations, including ISIS affiliates in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Somalia, and ISIS cells in South Africa, allowing ISIS leadership to leverage each affiliate’s capabilities to conduct terrorist attacks that undermine peace and security in the region.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Gangat, Zayd of South Africa;
  • Nabagala, Hamidah of the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and
  • Swalleh, Abubakar of South Africa.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240723 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2477

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July 23, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two Mexican members of Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) and two Mexican companies. CJNG, a Mexico-based criminal organization, is one of the largest producers and traffickers of illicit fentanyl to the United States. OFAC coordinated this action with the Government of Mexico, including its financial intelligence unit, La Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (UIF), as well as U.S. Government partners, including the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Homeland Security Investigations, and Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigations.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Banuelos Ramires, Jaun Carlos of Mexico; and
  • Rivera Ibarra Gerardo of Mexico.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Fornely Lab S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico; and
  • Inmobiliaria Universal DEJA VU S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240723 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2478

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July 24, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned a network of six individuals and five entities based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), involved in the procurement of items supporting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) ballistic missile and space programs. In flagrant violation of multiple United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), the DPRK has continued to conduct launches using ballistic missile technology, including a recent failed effort to place a military satellite into orbit in late May 2024. Moreover, the DPRK has supplied ballistic missiles to the Russian Federation, which continues to target civilian population centers and infrastructure in Ukraine, sustaining Russia’s brutal and unprovoked war.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Chen, Tianxin of China;
  • Du, Jiaxin of China;
  • Han, Dejian of China;
  • Shi, Anhui of China;
  • Shi, Qianpei of China; and
  • Wang, Dongliang of China.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Beijing Jinghua Qidi Electronic Technology Co., LTD. of China;
  • Beijing Sanshuda Electronics Science And Technology Co., LTD.
  • Qidong Hengcheng Electronics Factory of China;
  • Shenzen City Mean Well Electronics Co., LTD. of China; and
  • Yidatong Tianjin Metal Materials Co., LTD.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2482 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240724

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July 25, 2024: The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Lopez Human Smuggling Organization (Lopez HSO), a transnational criminal organization (TCO) based in Guatemala. Human smuggling is a federal crime that includes bringing migrants into the United States illegally, as well as unlawfully transporting and harboring migrants already in the country. Working with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components and other U.S. and foreign partners, OFAC sanctions aim to disrupt and ultimately dismantle these networks’ operations, which threaten the national security of the United States.

 

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Hernandez Vanegas, Karen Stefany of Guatemala;
  • Lopez Ambrosio, Whiskey Hans of Guatemala; and
  • Lopez Escobar, Ronaldo Galindo of Guatemala.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Lopez Human Smuggling Organization of Guatemala

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240725 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933071/download?inline=

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July 25, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on the Congo River Alliance, known by its French name Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), a coalition of rebel groups that seeks to overthrow the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and is driving political instability, violent conflict, and civilian displacement. The principal member of AFC is the U.S.- and UN-sanctioned March 23 Movement (M23), an armed group with a long history of destabilizing the DRC’s North Kivu province and perpetrating human rights abuses. OFAC is also targeting individuals and entities associated with AFC, including Bertrand Bisimwa, the president of M23; Twirwaneho, an AFC-affiliated armed group in the DRC’s South Kivu province; and Charles Sematama, a commander and deputy military leader of Twirwaneho.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Bismwa, Bertrand of The Democratic Republic Republic of the Congo; and
  • Sematama, Charles of The Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Congo River Alliance of The Democratic Republic of the Congo; and
  • Twirwanheo of The Democratic Republic of the Congo.

https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240725 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions?page=0

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July 30, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted five individuals and seven entities based in Iran, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Hong Kong that have facilitated procurements on behalf of subordinates of Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Those designated procure various components, including accelerometers and gyroscopes, which serve as key inputs to Iran’s ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program. Iran’s acquisition of critical missile and UAV components continues to enable its proliferation of weapons systems to its proxies in the Middle East and to Russia.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Abdollahi, Mohammad of Iran;
  • Hashemi, Sayyed Ali Seraj of Iran;
  • Javar, Saeed Hamidi of Iran;
  • Sorbani, Ezzatullah Ghasemian of Iran; and
  • Tong, Thomas Ho Ming of China.

The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

  • Azmoon Pajohan Hesgar Limited Liability Company of Iran;
  • Bright Shore Inc Limited of China;
  • BTW International Limited of China;
  • Buy Best Electronic Pars Company of Iran;
  • Cloud Element Company Limited of China;
  • Shenzhen Rion Technology Co., Ltd. of China; and
  • Tas Technology Company Limited of China.

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2510 and https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions?page=0

 

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