This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through March 31, 2025. The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.
See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and
persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.
In this newsletter, we have added a specific DDTC FAQs section, we think this will be of interest to our readers.
REGULATORY UPDATES
Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)
30-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Application/License for Permanent/Temporary Export or Temporary Import of Classified Defense Articles and Related Classified Technical Data
March 14, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 11640: The Department of State has submitted the information collection described below to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for approval. In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the Department of State requested comments on this collection from all interested individuals and organizations. The purpose of this Notice is to allow 30 days for public comment.
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DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website
March 3 through March 21, 2025: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at
- Change in Address of PVP Advanced EO Systems, Inc. from 14312 Franklin Avenue, Suite 100, Tustin, CA 92780 to 26776 Simpatica Circle, Lake Forest, CA 92680;
- Change in Address of Capgemini UK Plc from No 1 Forge End, Woking, Surrey, GU21 6DB, United Kingdom to 95 Queen Victoria Street, London, EC4V 4HN, United Kingdom;
- Change in Name of Airholding S.A. to Embraer Portugal, S.A due to acquisition;
- Change in Name of Mitsubishi Electric Logistics Corporation to MD Logis Corporation due to acquisition.
- Change in Name of subsidiaries of Curtiss-Wright Corporation due to corporate restructuring;
| Dy4, Inc. |
Curtiss-Wright DS, Inc. |
| Curtiss-Wright Controls Electronic Systems, Inc, | |
| Pacific Star Communications, Inc. | |
| Tactical Communications Group, LLC | |
| Teletronics Technology Corporation | |
| Acra Control Inc. |
- Change in Name of ELEB Equipamentos Ltda. to Embraer, Brazil due to acquisition;
- Change in Name and Address of Econocom Infogerance System, 21, avenue Descarter – Immeuble Astrale, Le Plessis-Robinson, France 92350 to Econocom Workplace Infra Innovation, 40, quai de Dion Bouton, Puteaux, France 92800 due to corporate restructuring;
- Change in Name of Compro Computer Services, Inc. to Aechelon Technology, Inc. due to acquisition;
- Change in Address of ALTEN S.A. from 40, Avenue Andre Morizet, 92100 Boulogne-Billancourt, FRANCE to ALTEN S.A., 221 Bis, Boulevard Jean Jaures, 92100 Boulogne-Billancourt, FRANCE.
- Change in Address of Mikuni Aerospace Corporation, Nagoya Sales Office address from 1-17-26 Nishki, Naka-ku, Nagoya, Aichi, Japan to 3-20- 27 Niskiki, Naka-ku, Nagoya, Aichi Prefecture 460-003, Japan.
- Change in Name of CPI International, Inc. to CPI Electron Device Business, Inc. due to corporate restructuring.
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DDTC Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Q: What are the License Status Definitions?
A:
- Draft
- License request that has not been signed and submitted for a company.
- Awaiting Signature
- The license request is waiting for the Empowered Official’s review and signature.
- Submitted
- Empowered Official has signed the license request and is sent to DDTC for review.
- In Review
- DDTC has received and is reviewing the license request.
- The license request status can be found in the Track Status page and the user must be part of an access group containing that license request, in order to see it.
- Final
- The license request has been fully processed and will be displayed in Track Status.
- Rejected
- The license request has been rejected by DDTC.
Q: If I am exporting an aircraft that is controlled under Category VIII(a), regardless of whether it is a bomber, fighter, or attack helicopter, must I individually itemize all of the inclusive systems (e.g., electronics, folding wings, batteries, weapons, etc.) in Blocks 9 through 12 as separate items on the DSP 5 license?
A: No for items physically (mechanically, electronically, etc.) incorporated into the aircraft. This does not include spare parts, components, etc. that are to accompany the aircraft during shipment, as these items must be accounted for separately as their own unique line item(s).
Q: What is “DECCS”?
A: “DECCS” stands for Defense Export Control and Compliance System. It is DDTC’s cloud-based modernization replacement of the DTRADE and EFS systems.
Q: How does the § 126.7 exemption work?
A: The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) § 126.7 exemption simplifies the transfer of ITAR-controlled defense articles, including technical data, the performance of defense services, and engaging in brokering activities between and among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States within an approved Authorized User group of government, private sector, and research and academic entities. When all requirements are met, parties may engage in such activities without the need for additional Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) authorization. More information on who is an Authorized User is available in a corresponding FAQ.
Q: Do I need to amend my DDTC authorizations if they only contain items moving from on USML category to another?
A: No. Both agreements and licenses are valid until their expiration. However, if a license is to be amended for reasons unrelated to Export Control Reform, then the category designations must be updated as well. For agreements, if a major amendment to an agreement is submitted, category designations must be updated; but if a minor amendment is submitted, category designations do not necessarily need to be updated. Furthermore, during the transition period, when information on an In Furtherance Of license does not match that which was presented in its parent agreement, the applicant should note the disparities on the cover letter (15.1) for that license. For example: “Gas turbine engines formerly designated USML Category VIII(b) here designated as Cat XIX(a).”
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REMINDER: ITS TIME FOR ANNUAL SALES REPORT FILINGS TO BE MADE WITH DDTC FOR MANUFACTURING LICENSE AGREEMENTS AND WAREHOUSING DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS FOR SALES AND TRANSFERS THAT OCCURRED IN 2024
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Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan
March 10, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Japan has requested to buy equipment and services in support of its indigenous Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectiles (HVGP) capability, including test preparation, test, and transportation support; coordination meetings in the United States and Japan; etc. The estimated total cost is $200 million. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Japan.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Australia
March 10, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Australia has requested to buy fifty-four (54) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System-Alternate Warhead (GMLRS-AW) rounds. The following non-MDE items will also be included: telemetry kits; engineering services; technical assistance; and other related logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $91.2 million. The principal contractors will be Lockheed Martin, located in Grand Prairie, TX; and Lockheed Martin, Australia. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Australia
March 18, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Australia has requested to buy MJU-61 decoy flares; MJU-64 decoy flares; MJU-66 flare countermeasures; MJU-76 flare countermeasures; RR-198A/L chaff cartridges; CCU-145/A impulse cartridges; other support equipment (MK-3 pallet); U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $165 million. The principal contractors will be Kilgore Flares Company, LLC, located in Toone, TN; Armtec Countermeasures Company, located in Coachella, CA; Alloy Surface Company, Inc, located in Aston, PA; and CCI Capco LLC, located in Grand Junction, CO. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Saudi Arabia
March 18, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested to buy two thousand (2,000) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS). The following non-MDE items will be included: APKWS spare parts; support equipment; missile software; training; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $100 million. The principal contractor will be BAE Systems, Inc., located in Falls Church, VA. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Qatar
March 26, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of Qatar has requested to buy eight (8) MQ-9B Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA); two hundred (200) KMU-572 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) tail kits for Guided Bomb Unit (GBU)-38 or Laser JDAM GBU-54; three hundred (300) BLU-111 500-lb general purpose bombs; one hundred (100) MXU-650 air foil groups (AFG) for Paveway II GBU-12; one hundred (100) MAU-169 computer control groups (CCG) for Paveway II GBU-12; twenty-eight (28) Embedded Global Positioning System (GPS)/Inertial Navigation System (INS) (EGI) security devices with M-Code; twelve (12) EGI security devices with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Modules (SAASM); ten (10) Lynx AN/APY-8 Synthetic Aperture Radars (SAR); ten (10) L3 Rio Grande communications intelligence (COMINT) sensor suites; one hundred ten (110) AGM-114R2 Hellfire II missiles; and eight (8) M36E9 Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM). The following non-MDE items will also be included: Honeywell TPE-331 turboprop engines; Certifiable Ground Control Stations (CGCS); FMU-139D/B fuze systems; DSU-38 laser illuminated target detectors for GBU-54; KY-100M narrowband/wideband terminals; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKLs); Keying Identification Verification (KIV)-77 Mode 5 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) cryptographic appliques; Intrusion Prevention System (IPS)-250X High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE) Type 1 cryptographic communications security (COMSEC) devices; Cryptographic Core Modernization (CCM)-700A Type 1 COMSEC chips; AN/DPX-7 IFF transponders; Link-16 KOR-24A Small Tactical Terminals (STTs); Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) Electronic Surveillance Measure systems; AE-4500 Electronic Support Measure; Compact Multi-band Data Link (CMDL); Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receiver (ROVER) 6Si compatible systems; Common Munitions Built-in-Test Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE) Plus Block II; Mayflower Multi-Platform Anti-Jam GPS Navigation Antennas (MAGNA)-I, AS-4841; imaging systems; Electro-Optical/Infrared (EO/IR) Multi-Spectrum Targeting System (MTS); Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars (SeaSpray 7500 maritime radars); Due Regard Radar (DRR); Automatic Information System (AIS) transponders; Rohde & Schwartz Ultra High Frequency (UHF)/Very High Frequency (VHF) radios; satellite communications (SATCOM) ground station antennas, modems, and terminals with Unifi Security Gateway (USG) encryption; Ku-Band SATCOM GA-ASI Transportable Earth Stations (GATES); secure SATCOM systems; DSU-33D/B bomb components; M299 Longbow Hellfire launchers; weapons loading equipment; spare and repair parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; weapons integration; support and test equipment; facilities and construction support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; transportation and airlift support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $1.96 billion. The principal contractors will be General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, located in Poway, CA; Lockheed Martin, located in Bethesda, MD; RTX Corporation, located in Waltham, MA; L3Harris, Inc., located in Melbourne, FL; Boeing Corporation, located in Arlington, VA; and Leonardo SpA, located in Rome, Italy. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/qatar-mq-9b-remotely-piloted-aircraft
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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
SNAP-R has migrated to a new database. To access, you need to first migrate your old SNAP-R account.
Go to https://www.bis.gov/ and click on the Licensing subheading. Then click “Apply for licenses (SNAP-R).”
Then click “Migrate Legacy Account” and enter your SNAP-R login information.
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U.S. Census Bureau
Update to Automated Export System (AES)
March 5, 2025:
This message is a follow-up to the broadcast released on May 11, 2022, titled Expansion of Foreign Trade Zone Identifier to 9-characters (Effective May 17, 2022). The severity of Response Message 15A is being upgraded to “Compliance Alert” from “Informational” for a minimum of 120 days, and then will be upgraded to a severity of “Fatal” at a later date. This is to ensure further compliance with the changes outlined in Federal Register Notice 85 FR 60479 that requires the expansion of the Foreign Trade Zone Identifier from 7 to 9-characters.
Response Code: 15A
Narrative Text: FTZ MUST BE 9 CHARACTERS ALPHANUMERIC
Severity: COMPLIANCE ALERT
Reason: The Foreign Trade Zone Indicator reported on the SC2 record does not have the required format of 3 numeric characters which is a valid zone followed by 6 alphanumeric characters.
Resolution: The Foreign Trade Zone Indicator must be specified in the required format. The first 3 positions must be numeric and represent the general-purpose zone. The next 3 positions are alphanumeric and represent the subzone. The last 3 positions are alphanumeric and represent the site. The Foreign Trade Zone Indicator must be left justified with no trailing spaces. Insert zeros when there is no sub zone or site. Report leading zero(s) when the general-purpose zone is less than 3 numerics, and when the subzone or site is 1 alphanumeric. Verify the Foreign Trade Zone Indicator, correct the SC2 record and retransmit.
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Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages
March 24, 2025:
When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected. If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation. Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN. However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.
To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.
Response Code: 119
Narrative: Carrier Code Not Allowed for MOT
Severity: Fatal
Reason: A Carrier ID (SCAC/IATA) is reported but the Mode of Transportation Code indicates a carrier code is not allowed.
Resolution: A Carrier ID (SCAC/IATA) must be reported for Modes of Transportation vessel, air, rail and truck. A Carrier ID (SCAC/IATA) is not allowed to be reported for Modes of Transportation other than vessel, air, rail or truck (i.e., mail, fixed, etc.).
Verify the Mode of Transportation and the Carrier ID (SCAC/IATA), correct the shipment and resubmit.
Response Code: 331
Narrative: Ultimate Consignee Country Unknown
Severity: Fatal
Reason: The Ultimate Consignee Country code reported is not valid in AES.
Resolution: The Ultimate Consignee Country code must be a valid ISO Country code found in Appendix C – ISO Country Codes.
Verify the Ultimate Consignee Country code, correct the shipment and resubmit.
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Port of Unlading Codes Added in the Automated Export System (AES)
March 25, 2025:
Please note the following Port of Unlading Codes have been ADDED to the AES effective immediately.
Port Name Port Code Country
| Fort Frances | 09602 | Canada |
| Puerto Madero | 20192 | Mexico |
| Alvarado | 20196 | Mexico |
| LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES |
This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.
Fines and Penalties
Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
March 18, 2025: The United States filed a civil forfeiture complaint in the Southern District of Florida against a Dassault Falcon 900 EX aircraft, bearing tail number T7-ESPRT, which was smuggled from the United States under false pretenses and operated for the benefit of Nicolás Maduro Moros (Maduro) and his representatives in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (the Maduro Regime) in violation of U.S. sanctions and export control laws. The aircraft was seized last year in the Dominican Republic at the request of the United States.
This filing alleges that the Dassault Falcon 900 EX aircraft was purchased and maintained in violation of U.S. sanctions against Maduro and the Maduro Regime. According to the complaint, the aircraft is forfeitable based on violations of U.S. law, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and money laundering violations.
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March 26, 2025: An indictment was unsealed charging Mohammad Jawaid Aziz, also known as Jawaid Aziz Siddiqui and Jay Siddiqui, 67, of Pakistan and Canada, with conspiracy to violate U.S. export laws and violating U.S. export laws. Siddiqui was arrested on March 21 in the Western District of Washington while attempting to cross into the United States from Canada. He remains detained, pending transfer to the District of Minnesota.
As alleged, from as early as 2003 through approximately March 2019, Siddiqui operated an illicit procurement network through his Canada-based company Diversified Technology Services. The purpose of the network was to obtain U.S.-origin goods on behalf of prohibited entities in Pakistan that were associated with the country’s nuclear, missile, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) programs.
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Sanctions
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
March 25, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 14046 and 90 Fed. Reg. 14032: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 80 entities to the Entity List from China, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), South Africa, Iran, Taiwan, and others for activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy. As part of these measures, BIS is working toward the following objectives:
- Restrict the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ability to acquire and develop high-performance and exascale computing capabilities, as well as quantum technologies, for military applications;
- Impede China’s development of its hypersonic weapons program;
- Prevent entities associated with the Test Flying Academy of South Africa (TFASA) from using U.S. items to train Chinese military forces;
- Disrupt Iran’s procurement of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related defense items; and
- Impair the development of unsafeguarded nuclear activities and ballistic missile program.
Specifically, these revisions to the Entity List include:
- 12 entities—11 under the destination of China and one under the destination of Taiwan—are added for engaging in the development of advanced AI, supercomputers, and high-performance AI chips for China-based end-users with close ties to the country’s military-industrial complex.
- 13 entities, including under the destinations of China, are added for their contributions to unsafeguarded nuclear activities.
- 7 entities are added for contributions to ballistic missile programs.
- 27 Chinese entities are added for acquiring or attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of China’s military modernization. These entities have demonstrable ties to activities of concern, including the development of hypersonic weapons and the design and modeling of vehicles in hypersonic flight.
- 7 entities located in China are added for acquiring or attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of advancing the CCP’s quantum technology capabilities, presenting serious ramifications for U.S. national security given the military applications of quantum technologies.
- 2 Chinese entities are being added for selling products to parties on the Entity List, including Huawei and affiliated entity HiSilicon.
- 2 entities in Iran and China are added for attempting to procure U.S.-origin items for Iran’s defense industry and unmanned aerial vehicle programs.
- 10 entities under the destinations of China, South Africa, and the UAE are added due to their links to the Test Flying Academy of South Africa (TFASA) —a party added to the Entity List on June 12, 2023—and the training of Chinese military forces using Western and NATO sources.
BIS also modified one existing entity, Dart Aviation, under four entries on the Entity List under the destinations of France, Iran, Senegal, and the United Kingdom. This entry is modified by adding two additional aliases and one additional address. Dart Aviation was added to the Entity List in 2019 for transshipping U.S.-origin items to sanctioned destinations.
These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States:
China
- Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence;
- Beijing Innovation Wisdom Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Henan Dingxin Information Industry Co., Ltd.;
- Inspur (Beijing) Electronic Information Industry Co., Ltd.;
- Inspur Electronic Information Industry Co., Ltd.;
- Inspur Electronic Information (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd.;
- Inspur (HK) Electronics Co., Ltd.;
- Inspur Software Co., Ltd.;
- Nettrix Information Industry Co., Ltd.;
- Suma Techology Co., Ltd.;
- Suma-USI Electronics Co., Ltd;
- Aeronautics Computing Technique Research Institute;
- Aerospace Star Technology Application Co., Ltd.;
- Air Force Engineering University;
- Anhui Kehua Sci-Tech Trading Co., Ltd.;
- Associated Opto-electronics (Chongqing) Co., Ltd.;
- Beijing Foundfresh Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Beijing Graphene Institute Co., Ltd;
- Beijing Guoke Tianxun Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Chengdu Aircraft Design and Research Institute;
- China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology Beijing Institute of Precision Mechatronics Control Equipment;
- China Aeronautical Radio Electronics Research Institute;
- Chinese Academy of Sciences Technology and Engineering Center for Space Utilization;
- Chongqing Southwest Integrated Circuit Design Co., Ltd.;
- Gyro Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Harbin Aerospace Star Data System Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Jiangxi Hongdu Aviation Industry Group Co., Ltd.;
- Mohammad Reza Rajabi;
- Nanjing Chunhui Technology Industry Co., Ltd.;
- Nanjing Fiberglass Research and Design Institute;
- Nanjing Panda Handa Technology Co., Ltd.;
- National Inspection and Testing Holding Group Nanjing National Materials Testing Co., Ltd.;
- Ningbo Institute of Materials Technology and Engineering;
- ORICAS Import and Export (Beijing) Corporation;
- Physike Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Scikro (Hong Kong) Instruments Limited;
- Scikro (Shanghai) Instrument Co., Ltd.;
- Shaanxi Aerospace Science and Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Shanghai Aviation Electronic Co., Ltd.;
- Silk Road Trading Company Ltd.;
- Singleton (Suzhou) Electronics Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Space Star Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Stratum FT Limited;
- Suzhou Changfeng Avionics Co., Ltd.;
- Suzhou SIP Hi-Tech Precision Electronics Co., Ltd.;
- Tianjin Aerospace Zhongwei Data System Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Xi’an Aerospace Automation Co., Ltd.;
- Xi’an Aerospace Tianhui Data Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Xi’an Sunward Aeromat Co., Ltd.;
- Xi’an Xiangteng Microelectronics Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Xi’an Xiangxun Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Zhejiang Aerospace Hengjia Data Technology Co., Ltd.; and
- Zibo Topred International Trading Company Limited.
Taiwan
- Inspur Taiwan.
Iran
- Mohammad Reza Rajabi; and
- Silk Road Trading Company Ltd.
Pakistan
- Allied Business Concerns (Pvt) Ltd;
- Ariston Trade Links;
- Britlite Engineering Company;
- Global Traders;
- Indentech International;
- IntraLink Incorporated;
- Linkers Automation (Pvt) Ltd;
- NA Enterprises;
- Otto Manufacturing;
- Potohar Industrial & Trading Concern;
- Proc-Master;
- Professional Systems (Pvt) Ltd.;
- Rachna Supplies (Pvt) Ltd;
- RASTEK Technologies;
- Rehman Engineering and Services;
- Resource Enterprises;
- Sine Technologies;
- Supply Source Co.; and
- The Sadidians.
South Africa
- Ascenso Aviation;
- Blue Sky Aviation (Pty) Ltd.; and
- Wingman Concept (Pty) Ltd.
United Arab Emirates
- Astec Astronomy FZCO;
- Roche Consulting Limited;
- TFASA Helicopter International; and
- TG Training 2023 FZCO.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/03/28/2025-05427/additions-to-the-entity-list and
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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
March 2, 2025: OFAC has published a frequently asked question (FAQ 1218) regarding the President’s February 26 announcement on energy-related authorizations in Venezuela.
FAQ 1218:
Q: How is Treasury planning to implement the President’s February 26 announcement on energy-related authorizations in Venezuela?
A: Treasury is preparing to take action to wind-down General License 41 and other specific licenses as appropriate. We will issue additional guidance to assist implementation concurrent with any changes to the authorization(s).
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1218 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250302
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March 4, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Iran-based Behrouz Parsarad (Parsarad), the sole administrator of Nemesis, an online darknet marketplace, which was subject of an international law enforcement operation and was taken down in 2024. Prior to its takedown by law enforcement, narcotics traffickers and cybercriminals openly traded in illegal drugs and services on Nemesis, which was designed with built-in money laundering features. Nemesis had over 30,000 active users and 1,000 vendors and facilitated the sale of nearly $30 million worth of drugs around the world between 2021 and 2024, including to the United States. These sanctions designation is OFAC’s first action as a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-led interagency Joint Criminal Opioid and Darknet Enforcement (JCODE) Team.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Parsarad, Behrouz of Iran.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0040
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934026/download?inline
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March 4, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued Venezuela General License 41A, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Certain Transactions Related to Chevron Corporation’s Joint Ventures in Venezuela.”
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 41A: “Authorizing the Wind Down of Certain Transactions Related to Chevron Corporation’s Joint Ventures in Venezuela”
(a) All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions previously authorized by Venezuela General License 41 related to the operation and management by Chevron Corporation or its subsidiaries (“Chevron”) of Chevron’s joint ventures in Venezuela (collectively, the “Chevron JVs”) involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13850, as amended by E.O. 13857, or E.O. 13884, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 3, 2025.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250304
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March 5, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against seven high-ranking members of Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis. These individuals have smuggled military-grade items and weapon systems into Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and also negotiated Houthi weapons procurements from Russia. OFAC also designated one Houthi-affiliated operative and his company that have recruited Yemeni civilians to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine and generated revenue to support the Houthis’ militant operations.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Abdulsalam, Mohammad of Yemen;
- Alagri, Abdulmalek Abdullah Mohammed of Yemen;
- Al-Hadi, Ali Muhammad Muhsin Salih of Yemen;
- Al-Houthi, Mohamed Ali of Yemen;
- Al-Jabri, Abdulwali Abdoh Hasan of Yemen;
- Almarwani, Eshaq Abdulmalek Abdullah of Yemen;
- Al-Mashat, Mahdi Mohammed Hussein of Yemen; and
- Gaber, Khaled Hussein Saleh of Yemen.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Al-Jabri General Trading and Investment Co
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250305 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0041
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March 5, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Zhou Shuai, a Shanghai-based malicious cyber actor and data broker, and his company, Shanghai Heiying Information Technology Company, Limited (Shanghai Heiying). In collaboration with another malicious cyber actor, U.S.-sanctioned Yin Kecheng, Zhou Shuai illegally acquired, brokered, and sold data from highly sensitive U.S. critical infrastructure networks. Malicious cyber actors, particularly those operating in China, continue to be one of the greatest and most persistent threats to U.S. national security, as highlighted in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s most recent Annual Threat Assessment.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Zhou, Shuai of China.
The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SND List:
- Shanghai Heiying Information Technology Company Limited of China.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250305 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0042
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March 5, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued Counter Terrorism General License 22A, “Transactions Related to the Provision of Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, Medical Devices, Replacement Parts and Components, or Software Updates Involving Ansarallah”; Counter Terrorism General License 23A, “Authorizing Transactions Related to Telecommunications, Mail, and Certain Internet-Based Communications Involving Ansarallah”; Counter Terrorism General License 24A, “Authorizing Noncommercial, Personal Remittances Involving Ansarallah”; Counter Terrorism General License 25A, “Authorizing the Offloading of Refined Petroleum Products in Yemen Involving Ansarallah”; Counter Terrorism General License 26A, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Necessary to Port and Airport Operations Involving Ansarallah”; and Counter Terrorism General License 28A, “Authorizing Transactions for Third-Country Diplomatic and Consular Missions Involving Ansarallah”.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 22A: “Transactions Related to the Provision of Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, Medical Devices, Replacement Parts and Components, or Software Updates Involving Ansarallah”
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this general license, all transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the provision (including sale) of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components for medical devices, or software updates for medical devices to Yemen, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for provision to Yemen, are authorized.
(b) For the purposes of this general license, agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices are defined as follows:
(1) Agricultural commodities. Agricultural commodities are products that:
(i) Fall within the term “agricultural commodity” as defined in section 102 of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978 (7 U.S.C. 5602); and
(ii) Are intended for ultimate use in Yemen as:
(A) Food for humans (including raw, processed, and packaged foods; live animals; vitamins and minerals; food additives or supplements; and bottled drinking water) or animals (including animal feeds);
(B) Seeds for food crops;
(C) Fertilizers or organic fertilizers; or
(D) Reproductive materials (such as live animals, fertilized eggs, embryos, and semen) for the production of food animals.
(2) Medicine. Medicine is an item that falls within the definition of the term “drug” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
(3) Medical devices. A medical device is an item that falls within the definition of “device” in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321).
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 23A: “Authorizing Transactions Related to Telecommunications, Mail, and Certain Internet Based Communications Involving Ansarallah”
(a)(1) All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, with respect to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications within Yemen are authorized.
(b) The exportation, reexportation, or provision, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to Yemen, of services, software, hardware, or technology incident to the exchange of communications over the internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, blogging, social media platforms, collaboration platforms, video conferencing, voice over internet protocol (VOIP), e-gaming, elearning platforms, automated translation, web maps, and user authentication services, as well as cloud-based services in support of the foregoing, and domain name registration services, involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that is prohibited by the GTSR or FTOSR, is authorized, provided the exportation, reexportation, or provision is not to a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to the GTSR or FTOSR.
(c) All transactions of common carriers incident to the receipt or transmission of mail and packages between the United States and Yemen, or within Yemen, involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by the GTSR or the FTOSR are authorized, provided that the importation or exportation of such mail and packages is not to or from any person blocked pursuant to the GTSR or the FTOSR.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 24A: “Authorizing Noncommercial, Personal Remittances Involving Ansarallah”
(a) All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the transfer of noncommercial, personal remittances to or from an individual in Yemen, are authorized, provided the individual is not a person whose property or interests in property are blocked pursuant to the GTSR or the FTOSR.
Note to paragraph (a). Noncommercial, personal remittances do not include charitable donations of funds to or for the benefit of an entity or funds transfers for use in supporting or operating a business, including a family-owned business.
(b) Transferring institutions may rely on the originator of a funds transfer with regard to compliance with paragraph (a) of this general license, provided that the transferring institution does not know or have reason to know that the funds transfer is not in compliance with paragraph (a).
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 25A: “Authorizing the Offloading of Refined Petroleum Products in Yemen Involving Ansarallah”
(a) All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the delivery and offloading of refined petroleum products for personal, commercial, or humanitarian use in Yemen are authorized, through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 4, 2025, provided the refined petroleum products were loaded on a vessel prior to March 5, 2025
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 26A: “Authorizing Certain Transactions Necessary to Port and Airport Operations Involving Ansarallah”
(a) All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the operation of, or import or export of goods or transit of passengers through, ports and airports in Yemen are authorized.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 28A: “Authorizing Transactions for Third-Country Diplomatic and Consular Missions Involving Ansarallah”
(a) All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR), involving Ansarallah, or any entity in which Ansarallah owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the official business of third-country diplomatic or consular missions to Yemen are authorized.
Additionally, OFAC has issued a new Counter Terrorism Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1219).
FAQ 1219:
Q: On March 4, 2025, the Department of State (State) designated Ansarallah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). What actions did OFAC take related to this announcement?
A: OFAC implemented State’s designation of Ansarallah (“the Houthis”) as an FTO by updating the existing Ansarallah entry on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List). Ansarallah was already listed on the SDN List as a result of State’s February 16, 2024 designation of the group as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).
OFAC also updated three Ansarallah-related general licenses (GLs) to authorize certain transactions under the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (FTOSR) (31 C.F.R. part 597): agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices (GL 22A); noncommercial, personal remittances (GL 24A); and third-country diplomatic missions (GL 28A).
OFAC also amended three additional Ansarallah-related GLs. Specifically, OFAC issued GL 25A, which winds down the previously issued GL by authorizing the delivery and offloading of refined petroleum products in Yemen through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time April 4, 2025, provided such products were loaded on a vessel prior to March 5, 2025. Authorizations in GL 25A replace and supersede previous authorization for transactions related to the provision of refined petroleum products in GL 25. Additionally, OFAC issued GL 26A to exclude refined petroleum products from goods that can be imported or exported through ports and airports in Yemen. OFAC also issued GL 23A, which eliminates the previous authorization of transactions for the receipt or transmission of telecommunications to or from Yemen and now only authorizes transactions within Yemen for the receipt or transmission of telecommunications involving Ansarallah.
The above GLs supplement broad preexisting humanitarian GLs in the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR) and FTOSR covering the United States government, certain international organizations and entities, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and for the provision of food, other agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices for personal, non-commercial use. For more information on these baseline humanitarian general licenses, please consult OFAC’s Supplemental Guidance for the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance, and FAQs 1105, 1106, 1107, and 1108. Other humanitarian-related guidance documents are available in the NGO section of OFAC’s Information for Industry Groups webpage. Note that activities authorized by GLs issued by OFAC do not relieve persons from compliance with any other laws or requirements of other federal agencies.
As a result of OFAC’s amendments to Ansarallah-related GLs in conjunction with the FTO designation, OFAC has also removed OFAC’s Compliance Communiqué: Guidance for the Provision of Humanitarian-Related Assistance and Critical Commodities to the Yemeni People.
Non-U.S. persons may engage in or facilitate transactions for which a U.S. person would not require a specific license pursuant to the GTSR or FTOSR without exposure to sanctions under the GTSR or FTOSR.
OFAC prioritizes specific license applications and requests for guidance related to humanitarian activity. OFAC encourages anyone with questions to reach out to the OFAC Compliance Hotline.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250305
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934031/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934036/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934041/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934046/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934051/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934056/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1219
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March 13, 2025: The Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Foxtrot Network, a transnational criminal organization (TCO) primarily based in Sweden that has trafficked illicit drugs and that carried out attacks on Israelis and Jews in Europe, along with its fugitive leader Rawa Majid. In January 2024, the Foxtrot Network orchestrated an attack on the Israeli Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, on behalf of the Government of Iran.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Majid, Rawa of Iran.
The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Foxtrot Network of Sweden.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250312
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0047
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March 13, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Iran’s Minister of Petroleum, Mohsen Paknejad, who oversees the export of tens of billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil and has allocated billions of dollars’ worth of oil to Iran’s armed forces for export. OFAC also designated several entities in multiple jurisdictions, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and India, for their ownership or operation of vessels that have delivered Iranian oil to the PRC, or lifted Iranian oil from storage in Dalian, PRC. These sanctions apply further pressure on the “shadow fleet” and other vessels upon which Iran depends to deliver its oil to the PRC, advancing United States’ commitment to reduce Iran’s oil exports to zero.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Pankejad, Mohsen of Iran.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Aren Ship Management of Bangladesh;
- Celestite Maritime Inc of the Marshall Islands;
- Fallon Shipping Company Limited of Seychelles;
- Hong Kong Heshun Transportation Trading Limited of China;
- Huaxia Trading Ltd of China;
- Itaugua Services Inc of Liberia;
- Lake View Ship Management Private Limited of India;
- Marine Solution PVT Ltd of Sri Lanka;
- Neptune Marine Ltd of the Marshall Islands;
- Bintang Samudra Utama of Indonesia;
- Gianira Adhinusa Senatama of Indonesia;
- Sea Services Providers NV of Suriname;
- Seasky Marine Co., Limited of China;
- Shipload Maritime PTE. LTD of Singapore;
- Sun Science International Co., Limited of China;
- Turquoise Sea Marine Limited of Seychelles; and
- United Tankers LTD of the Marshall Islands.
The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Blue Gulf (T8A4799) Crude Oil Tanker Palau flag; MMSI 511101436 (vessel);
- Celebes (YDA3301) Tug Indonesia flag; MMSI 525018077 (vessel);
- Corona Fun (3E5355) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352003958 (vessel);
- Itaugua (D6A3529) Crude Oil Tanker Comoros flag; MMSI 620999528 (vessel);
- Lexi (TJ04M) Crude Oil Tanker Cameroon flag; MMSI 613806561 (vessel);
- Lyda N (T8A4077) Crude Oil Tanker Palau flag; MMSI 511100863 (vessel);
- Malili (YBEN) Tug Indonesia flag; MMSI 525018442 (vessel);
- Marina Vision (YDA3415) Tug Indonesia flag; MMSI 525010379 (vessel);
- Neso (3E5143) Crude Oil Tanker PANAMA flag; MMSI 352003483 (vessel);
- Peace Hill (VRGO9) Crude Oil Tanker Hong Kong flag; MMSI 477738400 (vessel);
- Polaris 1(EPXT5) Chemical/Oil Tanker Iran flag; MMSI 422546600 (vessel);
- Seasky (T7BN2) Crude Oil Tanker San Marino flag; MMSI 268242902 (vessel); and
- SHANNON II (8P2369) Crude Oil Tanker Barbados flag; MMSI 314903000 (vessel).
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0049
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250313
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March 18, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Jumilca Sandivel Hernandez Perez (Hernandez Perez), a key leader of the Lopez Human Smuggling Organization (HSO), a Guatemala-based Transnational Criminal Organization responsible for the smuggling of thousands of illegal aliens from Guatemala, through Mexico, and into the United States. Additionally, Hernandez Perez has coordinated her illegal activity with members of the violent U.S.-sanctioned drug trafficking organization, La Linea, which among other heinous acts is responsible for the November 2019 murders of nine American citizens, including six children, in the Mexican state of Sonora.
OFAC published a new Counter Terrorism-related OFAC Alert, “International Cartels Designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists.”
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Hernandez, Perez of Mexico.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0051 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934096/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250318
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March 20, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated a “teapot” oil refinery and its chief executive officer for purchasing and refining hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian crude oil, including from vessels linked to the Foreign Terrorist Organization, Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis, and the Iranian Ministry of Defense of Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL).
The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published the Final Rule to Extend Recordkeeping Requirements from Five to 10 Years, consistent with the extension of the statute of limitations for violations of certain sanctions administered by OFAC.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Wang, Xueqing of China.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Astrid Menks Limited of China;
- Britney Ryder Limited of China;
- Canes Ventici Limited of China;
- Citywallship Management Co Ltd of China;
- Huaying Huizhou Daya Vay Petrochemical Terminal Storage Co. Ltd of China;
- Jetee Co., Limited of China;
- Lyrari Group Ltd of Virgin Islands;
- Placencia Services Incorporation of Liberia;
- Sea Breeze Shipping Inc of Panama;
- Seapalm Shipping Limited of Seychelles;
- Setasean Ship Management Limited of China;
- Shandong Shouguang Luqing Petrochemical Co., Ltd. of China; and
- Zenith Bridge Inc of Panama.
The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Aurora Riley (HPKT) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 356024000 (vessel);
- Brava Lake (8P2225) Crude Oil Tanker Barbados flag; MMSI 314867000 (vessel);
- Catalina 7 (3E4129) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352001485 (vessel);
- Montrose (T7BJ4) Crude Oil Tanker San Marino flag; MMSI 268240502 (vessel);
- Natalina 7 D6A3622) Crude Oil Tanker Comoros flag; MMSI 620999608 (vessel);
- Titan (TJ03M) Crude Oil Tanker Unknown flag; IMO 9293741 (vessel);
- Viola (3EHD8) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 354951000 (vessel); and
- Volans (8PDO3) Crude Oil Tanker Barbados flag; MMSI 314679000 (vessel).
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250320
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0056
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934131/download?inline
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March 24, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Venezuela General License 41B, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Certain Transactions Related to Chevron Corporation’s Joint Ventures in Venezuela.”
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 41B: “Authorizing the Wind Down of Certain Transactions Related to Chevron Corporation’s Joint Ventures in Venezuela”
(a) All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions previously authorized by Venezuela General License 41, issued on November 26, 2022, related to the operation and management by Chevron Corporation or its subsidiaries (“Chevron”) of Chevron’s joint ventures in Venezuela (collectively, the “Chevron JVs”) involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13850, as amended by E.O. 13857, or E.O. 13884, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, May 27, 2025.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/934071/download?inline
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March 25, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), imposed sanctions on three Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) officials who were involved in the abduction, detention, and probable death of former FBI Special Agent Robert A. “Bob” Levinson. The individuals designated, Reza Amiri Moghadam, Gholamhossein Mohammadnia, and Taqi Daneshvar, all played a role in Mr. Levinson’s abduction, probable death, and Iran’s efforts to cover up or obfuscate their responsibility. This action follows the December 2020 OFAC designations of two Iranian MOIS officers, Mohammad Baseri and Ahmad Khazai, who acted in their capacity as MOIS officers in Mr. Levinson’s abduction, detention, and probable death.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Daneshvar, Taqi of Iran;
- Moghadam, Reza Amiri of Iran; and
- Mohammadnia, Gholamhossein of Iran.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0059 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250325
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March 28, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated five individuals, and three associated companies involved in a Lebanon-based sanctions evasion network supporting the Hizballah finance team. The Hizballah finance team manages a variety of lucrative commercial projects and oil smuggling networks, often in conjunction with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps – Qods Force (IRGC-QF), to generate and transfer revenue for Hizballah. The Hizballah finance team uses front companies to generate millions of dollars in revenue for Hizballah and support the group’s terrorist activities, while also allowing key associates and family members, like those designated, to enrich themselves through these commercial enterprises.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Al-Bazzal, Rashid Qasim of Lebanon;
- Ayyub, Fatimah ‘Abdallah of Lebanon;
- Ayyub, Hawra’ ‘Abdallah of Turkey;
- Khafaja, Jamil Mohamad of Lebanon; and
- Murtada, Mahasin Mahmud of Turkey.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Lebanese United Group SAL of Lebanon;
- Ravee Sarl of Lebanon; and
- Securol Glass Curtains of Lebanon.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250328 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0063
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March 31, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated six individuals and seven entities involved in a money laundering network supporting the Sinaloa Cartel, one of the most notorious and violent drug trafficking organizations in the world, and a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The Sinaloa Cartel is responsible for a significant portion of the illicit fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States and has exploited multiple ports of entry along the southern border for its criminal activities. This action is the culmination of a coordinated investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigations, Homeland Security Investigations, and the Government of Mexico, including the Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera, Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Amador Valenzuela, Christian Noe of Mexico;
- Benguiat Jimenez, Alberto David of Mexico City;
- Diaz Rodriguez, Salvador of Mexico;
- Esparragoza Rosas, Enrique Dann of Mexico;
- Paez Vargas, Israel Daniel of Mexico; and
- Viramontes Sesteaga, Alan of Mexico.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Grupo Unter Empresarial S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
- Grupo Vindende S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
- Grupo Zipfel De Mexico S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
- Personas Unidas Hoas, S.A.P.I DE C.V. of Mexico;
- Productions Pipos S. DE. R.L. DE C.V. of Mexico;
- Scatman and Hatman Corp, S.A.P.I. DE C.V. of Mexico; and
- Tapagas Mexico S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico.