This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through September 30, 2024. The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.
See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.
In this newsletter, we have added a specific DDTC FAQs section, we think this will be of interest to our readers.
REGULATORY UPDATES
President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Ethiopia
September 6, 2024: On September 17, 2021, by Executive Order 14046, President Biden declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in and in relation to northern Ethiopia.
The situation in and in relation to northern Ethiopia, which has been marked by activities that threaten the peace, security, and stability of Ethiopia and the greater Horn of Africa region, continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14046 of September 17, 2021, must continue in effect beyond September 17, 2024. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14046 with respect to Ethiopia.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/page/3/
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President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Foreign Interference in or Undermining Public Confidence in United States Elections
September 9, 2024: On September 12, 2018, by Executive Order 13848, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the threat of foreign interference in or undermining public confidence in United States elections.
Although there has been no evidence of a foreign power altering the outcomes or vote tabulation in any United States election, foreign powers have historically sought to exploit America’s free and open political system. In recent years, the proliferation of digital devices and internet-based communications has created significant vulnerabilities and magnified the scope and intensity of the threat of foreign interference. The ability of persons located, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States to interfere in or undermine public confidence in United States elections, including through the unauthorized accessing of election and campaign infrastructure or the covert distribution of propaganda and disinformation, continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared on September 12, 2018, must continue in effect beyond September 12, 2024. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13848 with respect to the threat of foreign interference in or undermining public confidence in United States elections.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/page/3/
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President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Certain Terrorist Attacks
September 9, 2024: Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1622(d), provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, within 90 days prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date. Consistent with this provision, President Biden has sent to the Federal Register the enclosed notice, stating that the emergency declared in Proclamation 7463 with respect to the terrorist attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, is to continue in effect for an additional year.
The terrorist threat that led to the declaration on September 14, 2001, of a national emergency continues. For this reason, President Biden has determined that it is necessary to continue in effect after September 14, 2024, the national emergency with respect to the terrorist threat.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/page/3/
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President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism
September 18, 2024: On September 23, 2001, by Executive Order 13224, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, including the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in New York and Pennsylvania and against the Pentagon, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks against United States nationals or the United States.
On September 9, 2019, the President signed Executive Order 13886 to strengthen and consolidate sanctions to combat the continuing threat posed by international terrorism and to take additional steps to deal with the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13224, as amended.
The actions of persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended, and the measures adopted to deal with that emergency, must continue in effect beyond September 23, 2024. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency with respect to persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism declared in Executive Order 13224, as amended.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/
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Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)
Update to US Person Abroad Guidance
September 4, 2024: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) has released an update to the “Guidance for USPAB Authorization Requests” document. The update (v. 2.0) includes several clarifications and a new section, “Support for Space Launch Campaigns”. The updates are summarized below:
- Provides clarification on defense service recipients including vendors, subcontractors, actual or potential customers, or other foreign entities with whom the USPAB may work directly;
- Provides clarification on the scope of an approval in new “Scope of an Authorization” section to include requirements to identify the specific defense articles, programs, and platforms in the application. For developmental programs the authorization may be granted to furnish defense services related to defense articles in a development/prototype phase without identifying a specific defense article, program or platform. However, once the defense article moves beyond the development phase, you must submit a replacement request that identifies the defense article by its specific designation as well as the intended end-use systems and platforms;
- Provides clarification on the identification of end-use systems/platforms. If the defense article for which defense services will be furnished is a system, component, or part, the application must identify the end-use systems and/or platforms for which the defense article will be used on, in, or with. All intended end-use systems and/or platforms must be identified;
- Requests that all documents be submitted in text-searchable PDF format to make it easier on the reviewers to search for specific information in the filing;
- Provides additional guidance in new subsection A on drafting the opening sentence of “Section II – Scope of Request” to identify the defense articles for which the applicant will be providing defense services, as well as any end-use systems and platforms which will incorporate the defense article with which the applicant will work. Whenever possible, identify defense articles by their specific designations (e.g., AN/APG-82(V)1 AESA radar);
- Provides additional guidance in identifying the USML defense service subcategories in Parts 3 and 4 by adding Table 1 to the guidance that lists all of the technical data USML Categories;
- Specifies that contact information should be provided if appointing a third party POC;
- Adds new requirements for the completion of block 8 on the DS-6004 to provide a brief description of the request which identifies the defense services, defense articles, and end-use systems/platforms involved in the request;
- Adds a new section – “Part 5 – Support for Space Launch Campaigns”. If the U.S. persons are employed with a foreign entity that will be involved in space launch campaign activities, additional information is required. The request must identify the following: 1) The specific satellites/payloads to be launched; 2) The launch facility and location; 3) The launch vehicle and launch service provider; and 4) The foreign parties involved in the space launch campaign;
- Modifies the “Statement of Understanding” to identify that the applicant understands that their authorization will be limited to the defense articles and end-use systems/platforms specifically identified in their application; and
- The updates also make various administrative changes to sample letters.
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events
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International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Revisions to Definition and Controls Related to Defense Services; Extension of Comment Period
September 25, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 78278: The Department of State is extending the comment period for a proposed rule published July 29, 2024. The original comment period required submission of comments on or before September 27, 2024. In response to requests from the public, the Department extends the comment period through October 15, 2024.
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Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Update to Republic of Cyprus (ROC) Country Policy
September 27, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 79140: The Department has published a Federal Register notice amending § 126.1(r) of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which continues the suspension of defense trade restrictions for the Republic of Cyprus and its status as a proscribed destination from October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2025.
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events
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DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website
September 3rd through 27th, 2024: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at
- Name change of CPI International, Inc. to Beverly Microwave Division and Microwave Power Products, Inc. due to acquisition by TransDigm Inc.;
- Name change of Cadence Engines Systems Acquistion, LLC to Kinetic Engines Systems Acquistion, LLC due to corporate restructuring;
- Name change of Kongsberg Maritime Spain SLU to Kongsberg Discovery Spain SLU due to corporate restructuring;
- Address change for Paradigm Parachute & Defense Inc., 4040 Ashland Avenue, Pensacola, Florida 32534 to Paradigm Parachute & Defense Inc. at 7303 Plantation Road, Pensacola, Florida 32504;
- Name change of Meta Spectrum Operations LLC to Metrea Spectrum Operations LLC due to corporate rebranding;
- Name change of Adimec Electronic Imaging, Inc. to Teledyne Adimec Electronic Imaging, Inc. due to corporate rebranding;
- Address change for Metrea Executive Aviation LLC, 5525 W. Cypress St, Tampa, FL 33607 to Metrea Executive Aviation LLC, 4751 Jim Walter Blvd., Hangar 7B, Tampa, FL 33607; and
- Address change from Metrea Mission Data Limited, Malvern Science Park, Geraldine Rd, Malvern, Worcestershire, UK WR14 3SZ, to Metrea Mission Data Limited, Third Floor, the Aircraft Factory, 100 Cambridge Grove, London, W6 0LE.
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DDTC Final Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations Posted to Website
June 13, 2023 through September 12, 2024: On September 17, 2024 the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following Final CJ Determinations for CJ’s adjudicated between, June 13, 2023 through September 12, 2024, on its website at:
Readers may find these determinations helpful when performing self-classification work.
| Model Name | Manufacturer | Final Determination | Final Determination Date |
| RAST System AC Motor, Part Number C15-42, NSN 610-50-1273-5927 | Electromech Technologies | USML Category VIII(h)(5) | 6/13/2023 |
| Spectral AI Nexus and ARTemis | MIND Technology, Inc | EAR99 | 6/13/2023 |
| BL-1 Loader, Version 2, Part Number GN-80-00-00-000 | US Advanced Systems LLC | USML Category IV(c) | 6/13/2023 |
| Anti-Personnel Obstacle Breaching System (APBOS), Model MK7 MOD2, NSN 1375-01-508-4975 | Ensign-Bickford Aerospace & Defense Company | USML Category IV(b)(2) | 6/13/2023 |
| Integrated Panel Assemblies, Model 25515, Part Numbers 25515-004 and 25515-007 | Transdigm, Inc | USML Category XII(e)(1) | 6/13/2023 |
| Generic Radiofrequency (RF) Filter Manufacturing and Assembly Process | Smiths Interconnect Americas Inc | Seek CCATS | 6/13/2023 |
| XDE Cobalt, Model Number: V1.0, Part Number: XDE-CBT-OWT-LOQ | Owl Cyber Defense Solutions, LLC | CCL ECCN 5A002.a.1 | 6/13/2023 |
| VISOR Ci ,/Model Number VISOR 36xx series, Part Number 100933xx | Chemring Sensors and Electronic Systems, Inc/CHG Group, Inc | USML Category IV(c) | 7/11/2023 |
| Gyromagnetic Nonlinear Transmission Line, Part Numbers: NLTL-1525-FCV3 and NLTL-1525-FCV3AL | Metamagnetics, Inc | USML Category XI(a)(7) | 7/11/2023 |
| Helios | Ravn Inc | USML Category XI(a)(7) | 7/19/2023 |
| Heli-Basket, HB2000 | Helibasket LLC | EAR99 | 7/19/2023 |
| SWE-400 QUAD | Trakka USA LLC | CCL ECCN 6A003.b.4.b | 7/19/2023 |
| Advanced Systems Susceptibility and Risk Analysis Toolkit (ASSURANT) Software Version 4.0.2, and ASSURANT Commercial Software | Knowledge Based Systems, Inc | EAR99 | 7/19/2023 |
| Face Seal Assembly, Model A, Part Number 913-0067-052 | Enpro Industries, Inc | CCL ECCN 9A619.x | 7/24/2023 |
| Mark 7 Genesys Automated Loading System, 101-1500-xx (various) | Lyman Products Corporation | CCL ECCN 0B505.a | 7/24/2023 |
| Booby Trap Simulator, Model Numbers M117, M118, and M119 | WMDTECH, LLC | CCL ECCN 0A614.a | 7/24/2023 |
| X4 – Fire Control System | Maztech Industries, LLC | USML Category XII(c)(2)(iii) | 7/24/2023 |
| LED 360-degree Situational Awareness Kit with Infrared, Model 07630, NSN 6220-01-629-4494 | Truck-Lite Co, LLC | CCL ECCN 0A606.y.12 | 7/24/2023 |
| Aero Vodochody L-39 Albatross Turbojet Aircraft | Aero Vodochody | USML Category VIII(a)(3) | 7/24/2023 |
| Convoy Escort Vehicle Turret Wire Strain Relief Components | Dillon Aero, Inc | CCL ECCN 0A501.x: 1) Power Up-Converter Cable, Part Number DATV1219 2) Dual Battery Cage Charge Wire, Part Number DAVM0136 ————————– CCL ECCN 0A606.x: 3) Charge Swivel Disconnect Tab, Part Number DAVM0775 4) Disconnect Lanyard, Part Number DAVM0776 5) Swivel Disconnect Bracket Assembly, Part Number DAVM0777 6) Backshell Half, Charge – MMC, Part Number DGV1051 7) Charge Breakaway Pivot – MMC, Part Number DGV1052 ————————– EAR99: 8) Charge Breakaway Bushing – MMC, Part Number DGV1053 |
7/26/2023 |
| Vapor Pinion Instruction Set and Boeing Pinion Instruction Set | ITW Heartland | Seek CCATS | 7/26/2023 |
| Cold Forming Machines (Formax 2, Models FX3 and FXP2; Formax 3, Models FX3 and FXP3; Formax 4, Models FX4 and FXP3; Formax 5, Models FX3 and FXP3; Formax 6, Models XXV; Formax 7, Model FXP7, and Formax 8, Model FXP8); Miscellaneous Cold Forming Tools; Steel Projectiles for Firearms | National Machinery LLC | Seek CCATS: Formax Machines, replacement parts, components, and tooling, for the Formax Machines
USML Category III(d)(6): Steel projectiles, regardless of caliber Technical Support – Response Pending |
7/26/2023 |
| Low-Cost Blue-Chip Slapper (detonator), Part Number 334740 | Excelitas Technologies Corp | CCL ECCN 1A007.b.4 | 7/26/2023 |
| AGM NVG-40, Models: NL1, NL2, NW1, and NW2, Part Numbers: 14NV4122483021, 14NV4122483011, 14NV4122484021, and 14NV4122484011
AGM NVG-50, Models: NL1, NL2, NW1, and NW2, Part Numbers: 14NV5122483021, 14NV5122483011, 14NV5122484011, and 14NV5122484021 |
AGM Global Vision LLC | CCL ECCN 6A992.b | 7/26/2023 |
| Ammo Bearer Pack Kit, Model 98754-MC | MMI Outdoor, Inc | EAR99 | 7/26/2023 |
| Tyton VS2X Series, Part Numbers 19-0251- 01 and 19-0251-11 |
EIZO Rugged Solutions | Seek CCATS | 7/26/2023 |
| Axiom Thruster, Part Number 10007604 | Axiom Space, Inc | CCL ECCN 9A515.h | 8/2/2023 |
| Air-Scooping Electric Thruster | Viridian Space Corporation | Seek CCATS | 8/2/2023 |
| Bumper Assembly, Arresting Hook, Part Number 16L364-3 | Sonfarrel Aerospace, LLC | USML Category VIII(h)(5) | 8/2/2023 |
| X4-Magazine | Magpul Industries Corp | CCL ECCN 0A501.d | 8/2/2023 |
| Large Area Silicon Photodiode Detector Assembly with 904 nm NIR (Near-Infrared) Transmitting Optical Filter, Model Number: PIN 12492-2, Part Number: 90 504 000 | OSI Optoelectronics, Inc | CCL ECCN 0A614.x | 8/2/2023 |
| Bearing, Liquid Oxygen Turbopump; Technology Development and Manufacture, Part Number: 710-005 | Napoleon Engineering Services | CCL ECCN 9A604.x | 8/2/2023 |
| Extra Large Uncrewed Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV), Part Numbers 1717200-1000-1 and 1717401-2000, and its specially designed parts, components, accessories, and attachments | The Boeing Company | USML Category XXI(a) | 8/2/2023 |
| M548A1 Tracked Amphibious Cargo Carrier, Model M548A1, Serial Number CHX426HAB | FMC Corporation | CCL ECCN 0A606.a | 8/19/2023 |
| Hot Zone, Model GS1 | Ochocoarms, dba HotZone Tactical | CCL ECCN 0A504.f | 8/19/2023 |
| Frequency Converter 150kW, 50/400 Hz Part Number 015.09.0130 for the Patriot Missile System and Cable Set | Tiburon Associates, Inc | EAR99 | 8/19/2023 |
| Rake System, its Design, Associated Assemblies, Test Data and Services | Aerodyn Engineering, LLC | USML Category VIII(i): Direction in the integration of the System onto a jet trainer
CCL ECCN 9E619.a: Rake System Design, Vibratory Testing Data, Flow Calibration Data, and Static Calibration Data CCL ECCN 9B619.b: Rake System Assembly, the Vibratory Test Rake System Assembly, and the Flow Calibration Rake |
8/4/2023 |
| Unified Data Library (UDL), Version Number 1.13.0 Sauternes | Bluestaq | CCL ECCN 5D002.c.1 | 8/23/2023 |
| G.L.O.V.E. (Generated Low Output Voltage Emitter), Model and Part Number: CT-F2P Gen4.1 | Sparrow Engineering, Inc | CCL ECCN 0A503 | 8/28/2023 |
| SX-124 Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) Cards, Models SX-124-0000, SX-124-0103, and SX-124-0103v | Spectranetix, Inc | USML Category XI(c)(2) | 8/28/2023 |
| SX-124-5103 – Positioning, Navigation, Timing (PNT) Card with M-Code GPS receiver | Spectranetix, Inc | USML Category XII(d)(2)(ii) | 8/28/2023 |
| Sea Tel, Model 4212 Wideband Antenna, Part Number 140223-1 | Sea Tel Inc, dba Cobham SATCOM | USML Category XI(a)(5)(v) | 8/28/2023 |
| Ka-band SATCOM Terminal, Medium Form Factor, Part Number C810-00383-00, with Receive Array APAR-2EAF1 and Transmit Array APAT-1EAT1 | CesiumAstro, Inc | Seek CCATS | 9/8/2023 |
| Advanced Simulation Combat Operations Trainer Version 7 (ASCOT 7) | PLEXSYS Interface Products Inc | USML Category XI(d): Link 11, Link 16, Link VMF, and JREAP-C modules
USML Category IX(b)(4)(ii): IADS module EAR99: ASCOT 7 Core, Floating Client, ASTERIX interface, Smart Air Tactics, CIGI, Automatic Entity Generation, Group Editor, HLAe, Enhanced Weapons, Jamming, and ATO/ACO/OPTASKLINK |
9/8/2023 |
| AeroGuard Counter-UAS System, Model AeroGuard A6-B | Sanmina Corporation | Seek CCATS | 9/8/2023 |
| .22 Long Rifle Tracer Ammunition, Model Number .22LR Tracer, Part Number .22LRMK1 | Piney Mountain Ammunition Company | USML Category III(a)(6) | 9/18/2023 |
| Multi-Role Tactical Laser (MRTL), Model Number MRTL-A002 | Acme Solutions LLC | USML Category XVIII(a) | 9/18/2023 |
| UAS Kit | THORAD, LLC | Seek CCATS | 9/18/2023 |
| Lynq PRO, Models VL-10000, VL-10100, VL-10200, VL-10300, VL-80000, VL-80006, VL-80012, VL-81012, and VL-82012 | OTTO | Seek CCATS | 9/18/2023 |
| Puma 550 | AeroVironment, Inc | CCL ECCN 9A012.a.2 | 9/18/2023 |
| Double Layer Capacitors, Part Numbers: SCC‐2.7V‐3000F max, SCC‐2.7V-850F max-Low ESR, SCM‐9.0V max-7.5F max, and SCP‐2.1V‐8.5F max | KYOCERA AVX Components Corporation | EAR99 | 9/18/2023 |
| NWUAV Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) Fuel Cell for Unmanned Systems, Model NWFC-1500 | Northwest ULD, Inc | CCL ECCN 9A610.x | 9/18/2023 |
| Cylinder, Indent, Firing Pin, Drawing Number 13051594 Rev B | Cox Manufacturing Company, Inc | EAR99 | 9/22/2023 |
| Infrared Chemiluminescent Light Sticks, Model and Version Number: 6″ Infrared Light Stick – 8 Hour Duration, Part Number: SKU: 9-17040PF | Cyalume Technologies, Inc | EAR99 | 9/22/2023 |
| M710E TACAN Antenna, All-Band, Model Number 710E – NC, Part Number 711001-100 | dB Systems Inc | CCL ECCN 3A611.a | 9/22/2023 |
| Hypervelocity Accelerator System, Version V.1 | Longshot Space Technologies Corp | Seek CCATS | 9/22/2023 |
| 1) HD80-MV-36X-MGI, Part Number 90-4718; 2) HD80-MV-36X-LP-MGI, Part Number 90-4717; 3) HD80RT-MV-36X-LP-MGI, Part Number 90-4713; 4) HD80RT-MV-36X-MGI, Part Number 90-4712; 5) HD80-MV-600-MGI, Part Number 90-4353; 6) HD80-MV-600-LP-MGI, Part Number 90-3317; and 7) HD80RT-MV-600-LP-MGI, Part Number 90-4368 |
Trillium Engineering, LLC | CCL ECCN 6A003.b.4.a | 9/22/2023 |
| Mk48 Nutsack Type 1, Model Number TTS-MK48T1 Gen 1, and MK48 Nutsack Type 2, Model Number TTS-MK48T2 | Tribe Tactical Supply LLC | USML Category I(h)(1) | 9/29/2023 |
| Speaker Modular Mission Payloads (MMP), Model MMP-SPEAKER, and Strobe and Noise Distraction MMP, Model MMP-SAND | Reconrobots Inc | Seek CCATS | 9/29/2023 |
| Computing, Networking, and Cyber Fundamentals Training | Lockstone Technologies LLC | Not a defense service | 9/29/2023 |
| Realtime Enhanced Voice Authentication (REVA) | Eduworks Corporation | Seek CCATS | 10/9/2023 |
| Cold Key Loading Set, Part Number 3867AS145-1 | Form Fit and Function LLC | CCL ECCN 3A611.x | 10/9/2023 |
| RGCS (Resilient Gravitronic Communication System) | UNSPACE, LLC | Seek CCATS | 10/9/2023 |
| Laser Instrumented Diagnostic Suite | BlueHalo, LLC | USML Category XVIII(e) | 10/10/2023 |
| Dual Rotary Variable Differential Transducer, Part Number 25565 | Curtiss-Wright Corp | USML Category VIII(h)(1) | 10/26/2023 |
| Stowable Telescoping Aircraft Boarding Ladder (STABL) Part Number 326C1S5901-201, for T-7A Trainer Aircraft | The Boeing Company | USML Category VIII(f) | 10/26/2023 |
| Cyber Intel Classification Banner, Model CICBv2, Part Number CICB-400 | Arksoft Inc DBA Cyber Intel Systems | EAR99 | 10/30/2023 |
| RF Sensor Assembly, FireBurst, Part Number 2630-202 | Technology Service Corporation | USML Category IV(h)(18) | 11/2/2023 |
| High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), Model M1165A1, Serial Number: 332621 | AM General | USML Category VII(b) |
11/2/2023 |
| MP-781, 40 x 46 mm Training Round, Model and Part Number MP-781 | NonLethal Technologies, Inc | Seek CCATS | 11/2/2023 |
| Electronic Connector, Model Number MIL-C-5015, Part Number MS3452L24-10P | Conesys, Inc | CCL ECCN 3A611.y.1 | 11/2/2023 |
| Starlink Internet Connectivity Services | Space Exploration Technologies Corp | CCL ECCN 5A992.c | 11/7/2023 |
| LiBM5JV-1 (5Ah cell) Part Number LiBM5JV-1 | Vectra Co dba EaglePicher Technologies, LLC | CCL ECCN 3A991.j.2 | 11/7/2023 |
| Equitus 6.0 Integration and Analysis Software | Equitus Corporation | CCL ECCN 5D002.c.1 | 11/7/2023 |
| Unitary Braid Division Multiplexing (“UBDM”) | Rampart Communications, Inc | Seek CCATS | 11/15/2023 |
| Amphibious Bulk Liquid Transfer System (ABLTS), Model ROKNABLTS 001 | Maritime Innovations Inc | CCL ECCN 8A609.x | 11/29/2023 |
| ColdFIRE Photoluminescent Ceramic Powder, Model Number CF-V2, Part Number BST-CF-01 | Battle Sight Technologies, LLC | EAR99 | 12/6/2023 |
| Carbon Plume Mapper Instrument | California Institute of Technology – Jet Propulsion Laboratory | CCL ECCN 9A515.g.3 | 12/6/2023 |
| 3-Inch, 8-Hour LightShape Infrared Light Circle, Part Number: 9-17050PF; 3-Inch, 3-Hour Cyalume LightShape Infrared Light Circle, Part Number: 9-50850PF; Infrared Chemiluminescent Light Pad, Part Number: 9-27621; and Cyalume S.O.S. Light, Part Number: SKU: 9-42741PF | Cyalume Technologies Inc | EAR99 | 12/6/2023 |
| PowerBook T/R Module, Part Number 293999-1 | L3 Harris Technologies, Inc | USML Category XI(c)(1) | 12/22/2023 |
| Accelerometer, CVLG, 1000uA/g, integral 30 ft. twisted shielded pair cable, Model 631M21, Part Number 631M21 | PCB Piezotronics, Inc | EAR99 | 12/26/2023 |
| Tube Assembly – Flanged, Model Number Revision 35, Part Number 294E246 – 35 | Leech Holdings, LLC | Seek CCATS | 12/26/2023 |
| High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) Model 1097R1, Serial Number 003684 and Model 1097A2, Serial Number 214996 | AM General LLC | CCL ECCN 0A606.a | 12/26/2023 |
| C800 Gamma Ray Imaging Spectrometer | H3D, Inc | CCL ECCN 1A004.c.2 | 12/26/2023 |
| Open Mission Systems (OMS), Version 2.2 and Universal Command and Control Interface (UCI), Version 2.2 | The Boeing Company | USML Category VIII(i) | 12/27/2023 |
| Beast Core | Beast Code | Seek CCATS | 12/27/2023 |
| Microwave Solid State Amplifiers, Part Numbers TSA-210040 and TSA-210043 | Teledyne Technologies Incorporated DBA: Teledyne Microwave Solutions |
USML Category VI(a)(7) | 12/28/2023 |
| Gunners’ Display Unit, Part Number MG9900 | Mandus Group LLC | USML Category XII(e)(1) | 12/28/2023 |
| Non-Rechargeable Pistol-Mounted Light with White Light, IR Light, and IR Laser, TWM-30-IR | Bayco Products | USML Category XII(c)(2)(iv) | 12/29/2023 |
| Objective Cell Assembly, Model REV E, Part Number A3256364 | FUJIFILM Optics Co., Ltd | USML Category XII(e)(18) | 12/29/2023 |
| Remote Key Fill Device (RKFD), Model v2, Part Number FT-0106 | Forward Thinking, Inc | USML Category XIII(b)(5) | 12/29/2023 |
| National Instrument (NI) Satellite Link Emulator (SLE) Intellectual Property (IP) | National Instruments Corporation | Seek CCATS | 12/29/2023 |
| Tebis Software, Version V4.1R6SP2, and Installation, Configuration, Implementation, Technical Support, and Training Services for Tebis software | Tebis America Inc | Seek CCATS: Software
Services: (1) Defense service when provided to a foreign person; assist in the design, production, or manufacture of a defense article; and directly related to the defense article; (2) Not a defense service when provided only to U.S. persons or not directly related to a defense article |
1/4/2024 |
| Cyber Attack Emulator Library, Model 8.0, Part Number SN100CYLA | Keysight Technologies, Inc | USML Category IX(b)(4)(iii) | 1/17/2024 |
| IK-1337 Keypad, PCB, design technology, and silicone casing, Model IK-1337 Rev 03, Part numbers IK-1337-PCB, IK-1337-PADBLUE, and IK-1337-PADYELLOW |
iKey, Ltd | 1) USML Category XIII(b)(5): keypad 2) USML Category XI(c)(2): PCB 3) USML Category XI(d): Design technology 4) EAR99: keypad casing |
1/30/2024 |
| SUPERION Passive RF Detection System | Stucan Solutions Corporation | USML Category XI(a)(4)(i) | 2/7/2024 |
| MH-1 Night Vision Housing | Low Light Innovations | EAR99 | 2/7/2024 |
| Solid State Microwave Amplifier, Part Number ALN/111-7015-172 | Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc/CTT, Inc | USML Category XI(c)(3) | 2/7/2024 |
| Mine Clearing Loader | U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) | USML Category IV(c) | 2/7/2024 |
| Voluntary Industry Performance Standards for Firearm Sound Suppressors | Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP | EAR99 | 2/7/2024 |
| Pellets or granules of a Mixture of Boron and Potassium Nitrate, Model BKNO3 (Type IIA and Type IIB) | Hunting Titan Inc | USML Category V(c)(4)(ii)(A) | 2/7/2024 |
| COSA Design Principles and Open Architecture Recommendations (Document) Version 1.0, Document Number: COSA-MGT- 0063 | U.S. Army DEVCOM AVMC TDD | EAR99 | 2/7/2024 |
| Microcircuit Chips, Model and Version Numbers: P1750A, P1750AE, P1753, P1754, and P1757ME | HEICO Corporation DBA: Pyramid Semiconductor Corporation |
USML Category XI(c)(3): Part Number P1757ME
CCL ECCN 3A001.a.2.c: Part Numbers P1750A, P1750AE, P1753, and P1754 |
2/16/2024 |
| Workbench Software, version 1.1, for Royce Geo’s Coordinate, Understand, Resource, Visualize, Enhance (CURVE) operating environment | Royce Geospatial Consultants, Inc | CCL ECCN 5D002.c.1 | 2/16/2024 |
| DRF3182, part number 910-92081-03 | Mercury Systems, Inc | CCL ECCN 5A002.a.4 | 2/18/2024 |
| iPad Pilot Training Software for a military aircraft | Reaction Simulation, LLC | USML Category VIII(i) | 2/18/2024 |
| SPYDR Version 1 | Global Military Expert Consulting and Instruction, LLC DBA: Spotlight Labs |
Seek CCATS | 2/18/2024 |
| Oven-controlled Oscillator, Model and Version Number: OSI5, Part Number: OSI5010-10.0M | Pletronics Inc | CCL ECCN 3A001.b.10 | 2/16/2024 |
| Oven-controlled Oscillator, Model and Version Number: OSF4, Part Number: OSF4005-10.0M | Pletronics Inc | CCL ECCN 3A001.b.10 | 2/16/2024 |
| HV550CE1454 and HVHR550CE1454 Capacitors | Cornell Dubilier Marketing, Inc | USML Category VII(g)(2) | 2/16/2024 |
| DeconStrike, Version 1, Part Number 74-0006 | North American Rescue, LLC | CCL ECCN 1A607.g | 2/16/2024 |
| Swing Arm Assembly, Part Number SA-12 | Military Systems Group, Inc | USML Category VII(g)(8) | 3/13/2024 |
| Signal translation and processing software for the Digital Signal Generation Subsystem (DGEN), Part Number SRC6150A-4, and Radio Frequency Generation (RFGEN) Subsystem | SRC Inc | USML Category XI(d) | 3/23/2024 |
| Flat Based Mounting Bracket, Part Number M09-190 | Military Systems Group, Inc | USML Category VII(g)(8) | 3/23/2024 |
| Virtual Sandtable vTAK software | Virtual Sandtable LLC | Seek CCATS | 3/23/2024 |
| VR-Tak Core, version 4.8 | Applied Research Associates, Inc | Seek CCATS | 3/23/2024 |
| Secure Key Cryptographic Library (SKCL), Model v1.0.27, Part Number v1.0.27 | JET Technology Labs Inc | CCL ECCN 5A002.a | 3/27/2024 |
| Blast Exposure Monitor (BEMO), BEMO | Safariland, LLC | Category XI(a)(7) | 3/27/2024 |
| PlasmaTorch | Trustees of Purdue University | Seek CCATS | 3/27/2024 |
| Four versions of a Communications Management Unit (CMU), and related software | Mercury Systems Inc | USML Category XI(a)(5)(i): Complete base model CMU with operating system and software application for interfacing with defense articles
USML Category XI(d): Software application for interfacing with a defense article (AN/ARC 210(V)) CCL ECCN 9A610.x: CCL ECCN 9D610.a: Software application for interfacing with equipment subject to the EAR (TACAN) |
3/27/2024 |
| THERM-A-GAP 579 Pad, Model 69-1145940-579PN, Part Number 20547279-0 | Parker-Hannifin Corporation, d/b/a Parker-Hannifin Corporation, Chomerics | USML Category XI(c)(10) | 4/1/2024 |
| Port Adapter, Part Number 100405-1020-001, and Starboard Adapter, Part Number 100405-1030-001 | Babcock Integrated Technology Limited | USML Category XX(c) | 4/1/2024 |
| Short Wave Infrared (IR) Stick | Cyalume Technologies, Inc | EAR99 | 4/1/2024 |
| Common Operational Picture Event Response System (COPERS) | KBR, INC. DBA: KBR Wyle Services, LLC | Seek CCATS | 4/1/2024 |
| PASE Low Band Virtual Aperture Array (VAA), Generation 4.0, Part Number P4LV; PASE Low Band Non-VAA, Generation 4.0, Part Number P4LN; and PASE Mid-Band Non-VAA, Generation 4.0, Part Number P4MN | Maerospace Corporation | Seek CCATS | 4/1/2024 |
| 1. Converted AR15 semiautomatic weapon to full auto machine gun; 2. Modified AR15 Lower Receiver- Model Number AR15 A2, Part Number AR15 Lower Receiver (NSN 1005-01-184-4041) |
Everwood Run LLC | 1. USML Category I(b) and 2. USML Category I(g) |
4/1/2024 |
| Runway Surface Monitoring System (RSMS) | Oreyeon | EAR99 | 4/1/2024 |
| Silicon Avalanche Photodiode – SAT Series, Model Number: SAT800 and SAT3000 | Laser Components USA, Inc | EAR99 | 4/1/2024 |
| MBL-15e, Model MBL-15e, Part Number MBL-15e | TLD-ACE Corporation | USML Category IV(c) | 4/1/2024 |
| MERLIN-A Directional Radiation Detector, Model A2, Part Number 5-15-35687 | Spectral Labs Incorporated | USML Category XI(a)(4)(i) | 4/5/2024 |
| RMS-1022D, 1U Dual Node Rugged Server, Model and Version Number: RMS-1022D, Part Number: F109414-F | NCS Technologies, Inc | Seek CCATS | 4/5/2024 |
| Military Symbology Renderer Version 1.0 | Williams Mullen PC | ECCN 3D611.a | 4/16/2024 |
| ATAK Ballistics Plugin, Version 1.0, and WinTAK Ballistics Plugin, Version 1.0 | nVision Technology, Inc. | USML Category XII(f) | 4/16/2024 |
| Mercury Free Space Optical Communications Terminal, Part Number 1426581 | Viasat, Inc. | USML Category XI(a)(5)(iii) | 4/16/2024 |
| Hybrid Battery Supercapacitor (HBS), Model HBS | Wecoso d/b/a West Coast Solutions | USML Category XI(a)(7) | 4/19/2024 |
| HMC1086 2-6GHz 25W GaN HEMT Power Amplifier, Models HMC1086 (bare die) and HMC1086F (packaged die) | Analog Devices, Inc. | ECCN 3A001.b.2.a.4 | 4/19/2024 |
| Troy, Model: BBAI-0001, Part Number: BBAI-0001-P-0001 | BigBear.ai, LLC | CCL ECCN 5A002.a | 4/19/2024 |
| Working Dog Field Decontamination Kit – basic, Model Basic | TDA Research, Inc. | CCL ECCN 1A607.g.2 | 4/24/2024 |
| Mid-Body Housing for MAWL series lasers, Model BEM-MAWL-XBX, NSN 1005-01-696-2360 | B.E. Meyers & Co., Inc. | CCL ECCN 7A611.x | 5/6/2024 |
| Training Screw for MAWL Laser, Model SPK-MAWL-TNG, NSN 5855-01-696-2396 | B.E. Meyers & Co, Inc | CCL ECCN 7A611.x | 5/6/2024 |
| Arming Plug for IZLID series lasers, R05-3PIN, NSN 5935-01-528-0139 | B.E. Meyers & Co, Inc | CCL ECCN 7A611.x | 5/6/2024 |
| Amphibious Excavator Humanitarian Demining System | U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) | USML Category IV(c) | 5/6/2024 |
| Advanced Simulation Combat Operations Trainer Version 7 (ASCOT 7) Feature Modules: Simulated Integrated Air Defense System (IADS); Simulated JREAP-C; Simulated Link 11; Simulated Link 16; and Simulated Link VMF | PLEXSYS Interface Products, Inc. | USML Category IX(b)(4)(ii) (Simulated IADS)
USML Category XI(d) (Simulated JREAP-C, Link 11, Link 16, and Link VMF) |
5/6/2024 |
| Thrifty Wideband Transceiver, Model Thrifty Wideband Quad Transceiver, Part Number 910-00529-001 | Herrick Technology Laboratories, Inc. | CCL ECCN 5A991.b.1 | 5/6/2024 |
| Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing (JHMCS) System Module Assembly for the Next Generation Fixed Wing Helmet (NGFWH). | Gentex Corporation | USML Category VIII(h)(15) | 5/6/2024 |
| Skydio X10 and X10D Drones; Skydio X10 and X10D Controllers; Skydio X10 Gimbals, Model V100-L, Model VT100, Model VT300-L, and Model VT300-Z |
Skydio | Skydio X10 and X10D Drones; Skydio X10 and X10D Controllers; and Skydio X10 Gimbal, Model V100-L – EAR99
Skydio X10 Gimbals, Model VT100, Model VT300-L, and Model VT300-Z – CCL ECCN 6A003.b.4.b |
5/6/2024 |
| 6 Conductor Bulk Cable, part number N13-46T+00011 | New England Wire Technologies | USML Category XII(e)(1) | 5/6/2024 |
| Red Phosphorus/White Phosphorus (RP/WP) Disassembly and Disposition System and Related Services | G. D. O. INC., d/b/a Gradient Technology | RP/WP Disassembly and Disposition System: Seek a CCATS
Services: |
5/6/2024 |
| 37mm Tactical Single Launcher, Models 1415, 1416, 1417, and 1417‐9, Part Numbers 1182510, 1190342, 1184311, and 1186248 |
Lewis Machine & Tool (LMT) | USML Category II(a)(4) | 5/17/2024 |
| IronFist 37/38mm Launcher System, Model Number IF-38-36 | NonLethal Technologies, Inc. | USML Category II(a)(4) | 5/17/2024 |
| Maritime Search-as-a-Service | ThayerMahan Inc. | USML Category XI(d) | 5/17/2024 |
| G222/C27A Spartan Aircraft, Serial Numbers 91-0104 through 91-0106 and 91-0172 through 91-0174 | Alenia Aeronautica | CCL ECCN 9A610.a | 5/17/2024 |
| Solenoid Coil, Model Number: 01-00, Part Number: WE-PN-000651-01-00 | Woodruff Engineering Inc. | Seek a CCATS | 5/17/2024 |
| Blue Steel Ballistics software, Version Number: 1.0 | Blue Steel Ballistics, LLC | Seek a CCATS | 5/28/2024 |
| Rocky Research Brazed Plate Heat Exchanger, Model B315Mx124 IP-SC-S HP | SWEP North America, Inc. | USML Category XVIII(f) | 5/28/2024 |
| Graviton Software | Teledyne FLIR LLC | EAR99 | 6/27/2024 |
| Ammunition Manufacturing Equipment: 247-18A”F333″,T23260-B PCH-BLK, p/n 362974; D3878-8 PUNCH, FORM & BLANK, p/n 302492; D3877-9 INSERT FEMALE POINTING, p/n 17141; 211-286B T19741-D CLIPPING PUN, p/n 92769STK; T-31180D, MANDREL HD TURN 5.56, p/n 84964; T5099-3 PUNCH, SWAGING, p/n 963621; E16117_4 PIERCE PUNCH, p/n 1100618 | Dayton Progress Corporation | Seek a CCATS | 6/27/2024 |
| Scaffolding Used as Production Equipment for Submarines | Senesco Marine, LLC | USML Category XX(c) | 6/27/2024 |
| X-CAL, Model X-CAL, Part Number X-CAL, NSN 6920-01-689-7644 | Explotrain, LLC | CCL ECCN 0A614.a | 6/27/2024 |
| Transmit (TX) and Receive (RX) Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs): TX ASIC Part Number 10091472-1, TX ASIC Part Number 10091472-2, and RX ASIC Part Number 009252 | CHG Group, Inc. | Seek a CCATS | 7/24/2024 |
| Azimuth Bearing, Model AP5007466 7-ICD |
SKF USA Inc. | Seek a CCATS | 7/24/2024 |
| Dive Talk Go | Dive Talk Gear, LLC | CCL ECCN 8A002.q | 7/24/2024 |
| Stingray Humanitarian Demining System | US Army DEVCOM HD R&D Program | USML Category IV(c) | 7/24/2024 |
| WA1548, High Energy Storage Capacitor, Model and Part Number: WA1548 | WA1548, High Energy Storage Capacitor, Model and Part Number: WA1548 | USML Category II(j)(15) | 7/26/2029 |
| Pivoting Accessory Rail Scope / Optic Mount, ARS-000-A1, ARS-000-A2, ARS-000-A3, and ARS-000-FTA | Austin Precision Products, Inc. (dba LaRue Tactical) | EAR99 | 8/1/2024 |
| TFD Supportability Workbench, Version V5.0.9 | Andromeda Systems, Inc. | EAR99 | 8/1/2024 |
| System of Systems Technology Integration Tool Chain for Heterogeneous Electronic Systems (STITCHES) | Apogee Research LLC | USML Category XXI(a) | 8/1/2024 |
| Mobile Fuel and Energy Management (MFEM) Software | Ricardo Defense Inc. | Seek a CCATS | 8/1/2024 |
| Piezo-Resistive Pressure Sensors, Part No. 4260M0136 and 4260M0137 | Kistler Instrument Corporation | Seek a CCATS | 8/1/2024 |
| Vireo; Model Number DRA-16A1 | CesiumAstro | USML Category XV(e)(1)(ii) | 8/20/2024 |
| 3D Coded Aperture Imager (Portable Gamma Camera) | H3D, Inc. | CCL ECCN 1A004.c.2 | 8/22/2024 |
| AM9011 Tuner Chipset, Part Number: AM9011 | Mercury Systems, Inc. | EAR99 | 8/22/2024 |
| Field, Line-of-sight Automated Radiance Exposure (FLARE) Systems, Model and Version Number: FLARE Lantern and FLARE Beacon | Labsphere, Inc. | Seek a CCATS | 8/22/2024 |
| Subphone 580, Model 580 | Subsea Import LLC | CCL ECCN 5A001.b.1.a | 8/22/2024 |
| Rancher Government Carbide and Rancher Federal Consulting Services | Rancher Federal, Inc. DBA Name: Rancher Government Solutions | CCL ECCN 5D002.c.1 | 8/22/2024 |
| Elektron Magnesium Alloy Powder, Model Elektron MAP: Elektron® MAP+91, Elektron® MAP+31, Elektron® MAP+43, and Elektron® MAP+21 | BA Holdings Inc. | Seek a CCATS | 8/22/2024 |
| Fused Coupler, Part No. SSCSAP00A0-50 | Neptec OS, Inc. | Seek a CCATS | 8/22/2024 |
| BQ400 Unmanned Aerial Target Drone | Mountain Horse, LLC | USML Category VIII(a)(10) | 8/22/2024 |
| Gunnery Training System (GTS), Model Number GTS-30-Mk44- 50, Part Number 70786; Model Number GTS-30- Mk44-762, Part Number 70350; Model Number GTS-25-M242- 50, Part Number 70349; and Model Number GTS-25-M242- 762, Part Number 70500 |
American Apex Corporation |
USML Category IX(a)(6) |
8/28/2024 |
| rF1V Antigen and rF1V+cpG 1018 Plague Vaccine | Dynavax Technologies Corporation | EAR99/ECCN 1C991.a | 8/28/2024 |
| High Voltage Power Supply, model dB 2700 | HEICO Corporation | USML Category XII(e)(1) | 8/28/2024 |
| RF Forge | Vadum, Inc. | USML Category XI(a)(7) | 8/28/2024 |
| Onebrief Planning Software | Onebrief, Inc. | Seek a CCATS | 8/28/2024 |
| TNT-Trinitrotoluene | SWORD Defense Systems, Inc. | Seek a CCATS | 8/28/2024 |
| 1. 14C1500 Payload Bay Assembly Forward 2. 14C2000 Payload Bay Assembly AFT 3. 14C3000 Fuselage and Empennage Assembly 4. 14C4000 Wing Assembly Aircraft LH 5. 14C6000 Tail Assembly Aircraft LH 6. 14F1000 Nosecone 7. 14F9050-101 Forward Airbag Door LH 8. 14F9060-101 AFT Airbag Door LH |
Kratos Defense & Security Solutions, Inc. | USML Category VIII(f) | 9/5/2024 |
| HB10K, Remote Tactical Hook System, Model Number HB10K | Helibasket LLC | Seek a CCATS | 9/12/2024 |
| Long Line (Sling-Load Long Line), Model and Part Numbers: LLWL10-XXX; LLWL25-XXX; LLWL30-XXX | Helibasket LLC | EAR99 | 9/12/2024 |
| Tank Wall Interface, Part Number: AF-62983-1 | Eaton Corporation | USML Category VIII(h)(1) | 9/12/2024 |
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DDTC Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Q: What is an Empowered Official (EO)?
A: An Empowered Official (EO) is a term defined in 120.67 of the ITAR. It is a role given by the Corporate Administrator (CA) to a user authorized to sign a licensing application. An EO MUST have a digital certificate to access the licensing application. The system will prompt for the digital certificate password when the EO accesses the Licensing application from the Applications menu.
Q: Is it possible for a defense article to be described in multiple entries on the U.S. Munitions List (USML)?
A: Yes, the Order of Review process in ITAR §120.11 allows for more than one category on the USML to apply to a defense article, and as such, you should review all potentially relevant USML entries. Generally, in cases where an item is described in multiple entries, an enumerated entry takes precedence over an entry controlling the item by virtue of a specially designed catch-all. The exception to this rule is where a SME entry is involved. In all situations, a SME entry will take precedence over a non-SME entry. Thus, a classified guidance system for a missile should be listed under Category IV(h)(30), which is SME, and not IV(h)(1).
If through the Order of Review, one determines a particular item itself is not specifically enumerated in the USML, it may still be controlled by virtue of its parts and components, which are caught via a catch-all. For example, a part or component of an airborne radar system specially designed for the F-35 may not be enumerated or captured in USML Category XI but controlled under the specially designed catch-all of Category VIII(h)(1).
Q: How do I know if an Australian or United Kingdom party is an “Authorized User” under the ITAR § 126.7 exemption?
A: The list of Authorized Users of Australia and the United Kingdom is available in the Defense Export Control and Compliance System (DECCS). To access the list, you must enroll in DECCS, log-in, and navigate to the Authorized User list.
Q: Can a defense article that is produced or manufactured during the life of an agreement (TAA or MLA) using technical data or defense services received via the agreement be transferred to a foreign person who was a party to the agreement after the expiration of that agreement without further DDTC authorization
A: Yes, the transfer of defense articles that were manufactured during the life of a TAA or an MLA may be transferred among the same foreign signatories and sub-licensees and for the same end users and end uses that were previously authorized under the TAA or MLA.
Q: How will the Authorized User list be updated for name changes and mergers and acquisitions? Will there be a gap in Authorized User status to implement those changes?
A: Authorized Users of Australia and the United Kingdom will need to notify their respective government, who will then notify DDTC. There may be a gap in Authorized User status depending on the nature of the name change and the need to update the name on the Authorized User list. The Authorized User list on DECCS is the official list, so parties should ensure the name of the entity they are transferring to via the ITAR § 126.7 exemption is identified appropriately.
Q: Must I obtain a DSP-83 for the transfer of Significant Military Equipment or Classified defense articles when using the 126.7 (AUKUS) exemption?
A: No. 123.10(a) excepts the 126.7 exemption from the DSP-83 requirement. Authorized Users of Australia and the United Kingdom provide nontransfer and use certification through the Authorized User enrollment process.
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Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan
September 3, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Japan has requested to buy follow-on technical support of AEGIS Class Destroyers, which will include sustainment support and services; AEGIS computer software updates; system integration and testing; in-country and on-site engineering support; familiarization; sustainment; all necessary emergent support engineering and technical support services; operational support; system overhauls; system upgrades; on-the-job practical operations and maintenance; combat systems integration; development, testing, and installation of program patches and adaptation data and annual service agreements; technical inquiries by the purchaser; operation; integration; maintenance; field service engineering; problem investigation; technical assistance; solutions to the technical problems arising from post production and testing capabilities; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $150 million. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Corporation, located in Moorestown, NJ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Netherlands
September 6, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of the Netherlands has requested to buy two hundred forty-six (246) AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II tactical missiles; six (6) AIM-9X Block II sidewinder captive air training missiles (CATM); two (2) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder special air training missiles; fourteen (14) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder tactical guidance units; and two (2) AIM-9X Block II Sidewinder CATM guidance units. Also included are missile containers; spares; personnel training and training equipment; classified and unclassified publications and technical documents; warranties; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $691 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/netherlands-aim-9x-sidewinder-block-ii-missiles
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DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Singapore
September 9, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Singapore has requested to buy fifty-four (54) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and two (2) AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM guidance sections. The following non-MDE items will also be included: AMRAAM control section spares, missile containers, and support equipment; Common Munitions Built-In-Test (BIT)/Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); ADU-89/E Adapter Group Computer Test Set; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; weapon system support and software, and classified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; training support and equipment; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $133 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Israel
September 12, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Israel has requested to buy additional Heavy Duty Tank Trailers (HDTT) that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original FMS case, valued at $40.1 million ($0 in MDE), included HDTTs; spare and repair parts; tool kits; driver tools; corrosion protection; publications and technical documentation; U.S. Government support; technical and logistics support services; storage; and other related elements of logistics and program support. This notification is for the items in the original case and the additional HDTTs. The estimated total cost is $164.6 million. Deliveries are estimated to begin in 2027. The principal contractor will be Leonardo DRS, located in Arlington, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/israel-heavy-duty-tank-trailers
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DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan
September 13, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Japan has requested to buy up to nine (9) KC-46A aircraft; up to eighteen (18) PW4062 turbofan engines; up to sixteen (16) AN/ALR-69A radar warning receivers (RWRs); up to thirty-three (33) Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasure (LAIRCM) Guardian Laser Turret Assemblies (GLTAs); and up to eighteen (18) LAIRCM system processor replacements. The following non-MDE items will also be included: missile warning sensors; Cartridge Actuated Devices and Propellent Actuated Devices (CAD/PADs); control interface units; User Data Module (UDM) cards; electronic warfare database support; KIV-77 crypto modules; KY-100 crypto terminals; AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKL); AN/APX-119 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders; communications equipment; Computer Program Identification Numbers (CPINS); integration and test support and equipment; aircraft components, parts, and accessories; support and support equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; training aids, devices, and spare parts; minor modifications and maintenance support; instruments and lab equipment; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; facilities and construction support; unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; jet fuel; transportation and airlift support; warranties; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $4.1 billion. The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region. The principal contractors will be Boeing Corporation, located in Everett, WA; Pratt & Whitney Military Engines, located in East Hartford, CT; RTX Corporation, located in Goleta, CA; and Northrop Grumman Corporation, located in Rolling Meadows, IL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-kc-46a-aerial-refueling-aircraft
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DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Romania
September 13, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Romania has requested to buy thirty-two (32) F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter Conventional Take Off and Landing (CTOL) aircraft; and thirty-three (33) Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines (32 installed, 1 spare). The following non-MDE items will also be included: AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKL); Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment, secure communications, precision navigation, and cryptographic equipment; Cartridge Actuated Devices/Propellant Actuated Devices (CAD/PAD); multi-purpose missile equipment; ammunition and weapons components; aircraft and munitions support and support equipment; integration and test support and equipment; spare and repair parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; training aids and devices, and spare parts; major and minor modifications, maintenance, and maintenance support; integrated computer system; electronic warfare data and Reprogramming Lab support; Electronic Combat International Security Assistance Program (ECISAP) software support; aircraft engine Component Improvement Program (CIP) support; classified and unclassified software and software development, delivery, and integration support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; classified and unclassified personnel training, and training gear and equipment; transportation, ferry, and refueling support; facilities and construction support; studies and surveys; Contractor Logistics Support (CLS); U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $7.2 billion. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, located in Fort Worth, TX. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/romania-f-35-aircraft
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DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States
September 16, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy return, repair, and reshipment of classified and unclassified spare parts for aircraft and related equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $228 million.
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DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Bulgaria
September 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Bulgaria has requested to buy two hundred eighteen (218) Javelin FGM-148F missiles (includes four (4) fly to buy missiles) and one hundred seven (107) Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Units (LWCLU). Also included are Javelin LWCLU Basic Skills Trainers (BST); Javelin Outdoor Trainers (JOT); Battery Coolant Units (BCUs); System Integration and Check Out (SICO); lifecycle support; Javelin Restricted Interactive Electronic Technical Manual (IETM); Javelin operator manuals; tools; Javelin gunner training; Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO) training; Javelin maintenance training; technical assistance; other associated equipment and services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $114 million. The prime contractors will be the Javelin Joint Venture between Lockheed Martin, located in Orlando, FL; and RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/bulgaria-fgm-148f-javelin-missiles
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DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Sweden
September 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Sweden has requested to buy one hundred twenty (120) AN/USQ-190 Multifunctional Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio Systems (MIDS JTRS). The following non-Major Defense Equipment (MDE) items will also be included: communications equipment; support equipment; engineering and technical support and assistance; non-warranty repair and return; training; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $31.5 million. The principal contractor is Data Link Solutions, located in Cedar Rapids, IA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Egypt
September 24, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Egypt has requested to buy seven hundred twenty (720) Stinger missiles for vehicle-based use on existing Avenger systems, including twenty (20) Product Verification Flight Test (PVFT) munitions. The following non-MDE items will also be included: spare and repair parts; testing equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The total estimated cost is $740 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/egypt-stinger-missiles
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DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Iraq
September 24, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government Iraq has requested to buy additional services that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales case, valued at $39 million, included follow-on technical support (FOTS) for vessel maintenance and repair (VMR), which may include ship repair; maintenance; sustainment; support services; repair; upgrades; overhaul services; associated labor and support; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services of off-shore vessels, patrol boats and defenders of U.S. origin; fuel for quarterly tri-lateral exercises; and other related elements of logistics and program support. This notification is for the continuation of this support and services. The estimated total cost is $65 million. The principal contractor will be Amentum, located in Chantilly, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notified Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Australia
September 27, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Australia has requested to buy up to one hundred (100) Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missiles-Extended Range (AARGM-ER) with global positioning system (GPS) precise positioning system (PPS) provided by Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) or M-Code; up to twenty-four (24) AGM-88G AARGM-ER guidance sections (spares); and up to twenty-four (24) AGM-88G AARGM-ER control sections (spares). The following non-MDE items will also be included: missile containers; component parts and support equipment; repair; software (classified and unclassified); publications (classified and unclassified); training (classified and unclassified); transportation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $405 million. The principal contractor will be Northrop Grumman Systems, located in Falls Church, VA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
Department of Commerce Implemented Controls on Quantum Computing and Other Advanced Technologies Alongside International Partners
September 5, 2024: The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published an interim final rule (IFR) implementing controls on critical and emerging technologies that have reached broad technical agreement among our international partners. This IFR includes controls related to quantum computing, semiconductor manufacturing, and other advanced technologies. The action strengthens our international relationships with like-minded countries and ensures that U.S. export controls keep pace with rapidly advancing technologies that pose serious threats to our national security when in the wrong hands.
BIS is implementing worldwide export controls on specific types of items, including:
- Quantum Computing Items: quantum computers, related equipment, components, materials, software, and technology that can be used in the development and maintenance of quantum computers.
- Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing Equipment: tools and machines that are essential for the production of advanced semiconductor devices.
- Gate All-Around Field-Effect Transistor (GAAFET) Technology: technology that produces or develops high-performance computing chips that can be used in supercomputers.
- Additive Manufacturing Items: Equipment, components and related technology and software designed to produce metal or metal alloy components.
The interim rule added new ECCNs to the CCL, revised existing ECCNs, and included a new license exception called “Implemented Export Controls (IEC)” that authorizes exports and reexports to and by countries that have implemented an export control regime equivalent to the U.S. system (15 CFR § 740.24). BIS explains that the IEC exemption will be applicable to “900 series” items, which are ECCNs “for which the third digit is a 9 and the fourth digit is a number from 0 to 7 ( e.g., 3A901).”
Adds the following 18 ECCNs: 2B910, 2D910, 2E903, 2E910, 3A901, 3A904, 3B903, 3B904, 3C907, 3C908, 3C909, 3D901, 3D907, 3E901, 3E905, 4A906, 4D906, and 4E906.
Revises the following 9 ECCNs: 2E003, 3A001, 3B001, 3C001, 3D001, 3D002, 3E001, 4D001, and 4E001.
BIS also added “General Order No. 6 to implement three authorizations in paragraph (f) of supplement no. 1 to part 736 of the EAR,” which principally addressed certain quantum information science and technology (“QIST”) grandfathered development and production activity, deemed export / reexports prior to the rule’s promulgation, and recordkeeping requirements related thereto.
Certain license exceptions for “900 series” ECCNs have also become more restricted. The update was made to 15 CFR § 740.2.
BIS has also added 15 CFR § 742.4(a) that will apply a worldwide licensing requirement “when an ECCN references § 742.4(a)(5) in a National Security license requirement paragraph in the license requirement table of the ECCN,” and establishes BIS presumption of review for certain Country Groups. Country Group A:1 of supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR will receive a presumption of approval for export and reexport. Country Group D:1 or D:5 countries will have a presumption of denial. A case-by-case review will apply to all other Country Groups. A similar worldwide license requirement for Regional Stability reasons has also been implemented “when an ECCN references § 742.6(a)(10) in an RS license requirement in the license requirement table of the ECCN.”
Finally, 15 CFR Part 772.1 was also expanded to include the new definition. “GDSII” or “Graphic Design System II.” GDSII is a database file format for data exchange of integrated circuit artwork or integrated circuit layout artwork. This term is used in ECCNs in Category 3 of the CCL, e.g., ECCN 3D907.
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Commerce Proposed Reporting Requirements for Frontier AI Developers and Compute Providers
September 9, 2024: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking outlining a new mandatory reporting requirement for the world’s leading AI developers and cloud providers.
The proposed rule requires developers of the most powerful AI models and computing clusters to provide detailed reporting to the federal government. This includes reporting about developmental activities, cybersecurity measures, and outcomes from red-teaming efforts, which involve testing for dangerous capabilities like the ability to assist in cyberattacks or lower the barriers to entry for non-experts to develop chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.
This proposed regulatory action follows a pilot survey conducted by BIS earlier this year. The information collected through the proposed reporting requirement will be vital for ensuring these technologies meet stringent standards for safety and reliability, can withstand cyberattacks, and have limited risk of misuse by foreign adversaries or non-state actors, all of which are imperative for maintaining national defense and furthering America’s technological leadership. With this proposed rule, the United States continues to foster innovation while safeguarding against potential abuses that could undermine global security and stability.
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Commerce Implemented Regulatory Changes to Voluntary Self-Disclosure Process and Penalty Guidelines
September 16, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 75477: The U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule making changes to the provisions in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) related to BIS’s policies and practices regarding voluntary self-disclosures (VSDs) and to the Guidance on Charging and Penalty Determinations in Settlement of Administrative Enforcement Cases (BIS Penalty Guidelines).
This rule provides BIS with increased flexibility to determine fair and appropriate penalty amounts while also making it less burdensome for companies to submit certain VSDs. The rule revises the BIS Penalty Guidelines to change how the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) calculates the base penalty in administrative cases and how OEE applies various factors to the base penalty to determine the final penalty.
As part of these efforts, BIS is also announcing the appointment of Raj Parekh as its first-ever Chief of Corporate Enforcement. He will serve as the primary interface between BIS’s special agents, the Department of Commerce’s Office of Chief Counsel for Industry and Security, and the Department of Justice to advance significant corporate investigations. This is the first time BIS has appointed a Chief of Corporate Enforcement, further reflecting BIS’s commitment to this effort.
Here are some highlights related to the update:
- Deliberate decisions “not to disclose a significant apparent violation” will now be considered an aggravating factor for administrative penalties. Revision to 15 CR § 764.5(a). Minor or technical violations were subsequently explained to be violations without aggravating factors. Additionally, the changes allow for bundling of minor and technical violations into quarterly report. OEE’s goal is to resolve minor or technical violations within 60 days.
- A dual track VSD process was developed to help bifurcate relatively minor and technical violations (15 CR § 764.5(c)) from more significant violations (15 CR § 764.5(d)).
- Former 15 CR § 764.5(d) was moved to 15 CR § 764.5(e) and updated to reflect the new dual VSD reporting program.
- Former 15 CR § 764.5(f) was moved to 15 CR § 764.5(g) and updated to permit requests from any person (not just the VAS submitter) for continuation of activity that would otherwise be prohibited by 15 CFR § 764.2(e). Additionally, BIS added that a notification would only be required for the return of unlawfully exported commodities to the United States. Changes to this section also included additional information on VSD formatting and request processes.
- BIS removed a base monetary cap on penalties that did not fit with BIS’ mission of deterrence.
- BIS removed the application of monetary expenditures made for compliance program enhancements from being applied to monetary penalties as a result of enforcement actions.
- BIS has also included additional aggravating factor considerations such as violations that enabled human rights abuses, failure to disclose a significant violation, failure to disclose a violation resulting from the operation of the company’s compliance program, broadened considerations related to historical violations, “language that limited BIS’s review of prior history to five years preceding the date of the transaction giving rise to the apparent violation,” and prior criminal convictions or guilty pleas.
- Whether a violation is considered egregious has been clarified to refer to a determination by the OEE Director only.
- “The “Base Penalty Matrix” under paragraph (IV)(B)(2)(a) and paragraph (IV)(B)(2)(b) are edited as follows: paragraph (IV)(B)(2)(a)(i) provides that in non-egregious VSD cases, the base penalty amount is no longer capped at a maximum of $125,000, but is instead capped at one-half of the transaction value. Paragraph (IV)(B)(2)(a)(ii) provides that, in a non-egregious case not initiated by a VSD, the base penalty amount is no longer based on the applicable schedule amount or capped at $250,000, but is instead capped at the full transaction value. Finally, refences to specific adjustable penalty factor values has been removed.
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‘Export Enforcement Five’ Governments Reaffirm Commitment to Robust Export Control Enforcement to Counter Evasion
September 18, 2024: The governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (collectively, the “Export Enforcement Five” or “E5”) marked the completion of their second annual E5 conference in Washington, D.C. by reaffirming their commitment to robust enforcement of export controls on Russia.
The renewed pledge includes the group’s coordinated efforts to prevent the diversion of sensitive technologies and materials that support Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, the E5 committed to enhancing enforcement-related information sharing and capacity building, increasing outreach and guidance to industry to prevent diversion, and expanding joint investigative efforts to impose penalties that deter and redress violations of our coordinated export controls on Russia.
Since June 2023, BIS and its law enforcement counterparts in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the UK have collaborated closely to partner with industry to harden supply chains of the items – especially common high priority list items – that Russia needs to sustain its unlawful invasion, identify entities that have violated our coordinated export controls, and share investigative information to take coordinated enforcement actions.
In September 2023, the E5 issued the first-of-its-kind Quint Seal Guidance on countering Russian evasion of export controls. Furthermore, the E5 coordinated activities that resulted in detentions, seizures, and investigations that prevented violators from illicitly acquiring items to support the Russian war machine, as well as formed the foundation for an enduring framework for enforcement of export controls more broadly.
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Commerce Announced Proposed Rule to Secure Connected Vehicle Supply Chains from Foreign Adversary Threats
September 23, 2024: the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that would prohibit the sale or import of connected vehicles integrating specific pieces of hardware and software, or those components sold separately, with a sufficient nexus to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or Russia.
The proposed rule focuses on hardware and software integrated into the Vehicle Connectivity System (VCS) and software integrated into the Automated Driving System (ADS). These are the critical systems that, through specific hardware and software, allow for external connectivity and autonomous driving capabilities in connected vehicles. Malicious access to these systems could allow adversaries to access and collect our most sensitive data and remotely manipulate cars on American roads. The proposed rule would apply to all wheeled on-road vehicles such as cars, trucks, and buses, but would exclude vehicles not used on public roads like agricultural or mining vehicles.
BIS and its Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services (OICTS) have found that certain technologies originating from the PRC or Russia present an undue risk to both U.S. critical infrastructure and those who use connected vehicles. This action is a proactive measure designed to protect our national security and the safety of U.S. drivers.
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G7 Announced Industry Guidance on Preventing Evasion of Export Controls and Sanctions Imposed on Russia
September 24, 2024: The United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the European Union (the G7) published, for the first time ever, joint guidance for industry on preventing evasion of the export controls and sanctions imposed on Russia.
The joint guidance outlines the following priority areas:
- Items that pose a heightened risk of being diverted to Russia;
- Red flag indicators of potential export control and/or sanctions evasion; and
- Best practices for industry to use to address these red flags and conduct enhanced due diligence.
Representatives from the G7 Sub-Working Group on Export Control Enforcement met in Brussels, Belgium to announce the release of the guidance document and reaffirm their ongoing commitment to robust, multilateral export control and sanctions enforcement. By issuing this notice, the G7 Sub-Working Group aims to assist industry in identifying evolving Russian evasion practices and complying with multilateral export controls and sanctions. The goal of the guidance is to protect common high priority list items from misappropriation, prevent reputational harm, and mitigate liability risk, all while supporting the continued success of coordinated export controls and sanctions.
Since February 24, 2022, the G7, in coordination with the other members of the Global Export Control Coalition (GECC) (countries listed in supplement no. 3 to part 746 of the Export Administration Regulations), has implemented unprecedented sanctions and export controls that restrict Russia’s access to technologies and other materials required to sustain its military operations and illegal war in Ukraine. One year ago, in September 2023, the G7’s Enforcement Coordination Mechanism established the Sub-Working Group on Export Control Enforcement to provide a forum for exchanging information and operational results, discussing trends in research and analysis, and sharing best practices for enforcement, including through coordinated guidance to industry.
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Export Administration Regulations: Crime Controls and Expansion/Update of U.S. Persons Controls; Extension of Comment Period
September 26, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 78836: On July 29, 2024, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published in the Federal Register a proposed rule, “Export Administration Regulations: Crime Controls and Expansion/Update of U.S. Persons Controls” with comments originally due September 27, 2024. This notification extends the deadline for written comments to October 15, 2024. This extension is being made to allow for commenters to have additional time to review the proposed rule and to benefit from the significant amount of public outreach that BIS is conducting on the rule in preparing their comments. Extending the public comment period will not in any way undermine the rule or national security of the United States.
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Proposed Amendments to End-Use and End-User Based Export Controls, Including U.S. Persons Activities Controls: Military and Intelligence End Uses and End Users; Extension of Comment Period
September 26, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 78835: On July 29, 2024, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published in the Federal Register the proposed rule, “Proposed Amendments to End-Use and End-User Based Export Controls, Including U.S. Persons Activities Controls: Military and Intelligence End Uses and End Users” with comments originally due September 27, 2024. This notification extends the deadline for written comments to October 15, 2024. This extension is being made to allow for commenters to have additional time to review the proposed rule and to be informed by the public outreach that BIS is conducting on the rule in preparing their comments. Extending the public comment period will not in any way undermine the rule or national security of the United States.
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Commerce Updates Validated End User (VEU) Program for Eligible Data Centers to Bolster U.S. National Security, Promote Export Control Compliance
September 30, 2024: The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced the expansion of the Validated End User (VEU) program to include data centers. This update will contribute to the development of a trusted ecosystem for the responsible use of advanced computing and artificial intelligence (AI). This new license exception is an element of the Biden-Harris Administration’s broader strategy to ensure the United States leads the way in responsible AI innovation and development.
This update to the VEU program was designed to protect national security by ensuring high standards for physical and cybersecurity at data centers that house advanced AI systems. It will also reduce licensing burdens on industry by allowing data centers to fulfill the stringent requirements of the VEU program up front, enabling U.S. exporters to ship designated items to pre-approved entities under a general authorization, instead of under multiple individual export licenses.
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U.S. Census Bureau
New Automated Export System (AES) Fatal Error Message
September 13, 2024: To ensure compliance with the Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR), specifically ensuring the Ultimate Consignee Country is not reported as US when the Ultimate Country of Destination is neither US or Puerto Rico, the Census Bureau is deploying a new Fatal Error Response Message in the AES. The response message will be active in the Certification testing environment on September 16, 2024 and will go into the Production environment on September 30, 2024.
Response Code: 25B
Narrative Text: ULT CONS COUNTRY CANNOT BE US
Severity: FATAL
Reason: The Ultimate Consignee Country cannot be reported as US when the Ultimate Country of Destination is neither US or PR.
Resolution: The Ultimate Consignee Country should be reported as the location where the person, party or designee is located abroad. The AES only allows US as the Ultimate Consignee Country when the Ultimate Country of Destination is the US or PR, which would only apply for shipments between the US and PR. Verify the Ultimate Consignee Country, correct and retransmit.
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Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages
September 18, 2024: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected. If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation. Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN. However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.
To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.
Response Code: 166
Narrative: Transportation Reference Number Missing
Severity: Fatal
Reason: The Mode of Transportation is reported as Vessel and the Transportation Reference Number is missing.
Resolution: A number referencing the transportation booking number must be reported on a vessel shipment.
Verify the Transportation Reference Number, correct the shipment and resubmit.
Response Code: 8QR
Narrative: Quantity Relationship Out of Range
Severity: Verify
Reason: For the reported Schedule B/HTS Number, both Quantity (1) and Quantity (2) are required and reported. However, the relationship between Quantity (1) and Quantity (2) is outside of the expected range.
Resolution: For the particular Schedule B/HTS Number reported, there is a relationship between the first quantity and second quantity based on historical statistical averages for that commodity. Ratios outside this pre-determined parameter might indicate either a keying error or misclassification of the product.
Verify the Quantity 1, Quantity 2 and Schedule B/HTS Number, correct the shipment and resubmit (if necessary). If the line item is verified correct as reported, no action is necessary.
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| LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES |
This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.
Fines and Penalties
September 2, 2024: The Justice Department announced the seizure of a Dassault Falcon 900EX aircraft owned and operated for the benefit of Nicolás Maduro Moros and persons affiliated with him in Venezuela. The aircraft was seized in the Dominican Republic and transferred to the Southern District of Florida at the request of the United States based on violations of U.S. export control and sanctions laws. The Dassault Falcon 900EX aircraft was illegally exported from the United Sates and used for the benefit of Maduro and his representatives.
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September 16, 2024: The Justice Department announced criminal charges in five cases from four U.S. Attorney’s offices in connection with the multi-agency Disruptive Technology Strike Force (Strike Force).
The Strike Force is co-led by the Departments of Justice and Commerce to counter efforts by hostile nation states to illicitly acquire sensitive U.S. technology to advance their authoritarian regimes and facilitate human rights abuses. Launched in February 2023, the Strike Force’s work has led to the unsealing of charges against 34 defendants in 24 cases involving alleged export control violations, smuggling, theft of trade secrets, and other charges by actors connected to Russia, China, and Iran.
The cases announced took place over the course of multiple weeks, culminating in the arrest of a Russian national allegedly seeking to illegally export electronics for use in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to Russia. The other cases also cover spearfishing of U.S-based scientists by an employee of a state-owned Chinese defense company and the smuggling of laser welding machines used in nuclear munition production to Russia.
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September 30, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed a civil penalty of $151,875 against Quantum Corporation (Quantum), a data storage, management, and protection company based in San Jose, California, to resolve 45 alleged violations of the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Quantum voluntarily self-disclosed the conduct to BIS, cooperated with the investigation by BIS’s Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC), and implemented remedial measures after discovering the conduct at issue, all of which resulted in a significant reduction in penalty.
https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-imposes-penalty-quantum-corporation-resolve-alleged-violations-antiboycott and https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?close_filters=1&content_type=press_release&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC
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September 30, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced an administrative settlement of $439,992 (partially suspended) against First Call International Inc. (First Call), located in Fort Worth, Texas, for the submission of a backdated document to make it appear that a transaction complied with the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and for exporting military parts without BIS authorization.
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Sanctions
Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
September 4, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 10 individuals and two entities as part of a coordinated U.S. government response to Moscow’s malign influence efforts targeting the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Russian state-sponsored actors have long used a variety of tools, such as generative artificial intelligence (AI) deep fakes and disinformation, in an attempt to undermine confidence in the United States’ election processes and institutions. Beginning in early 2024, executives at RT—Russia’s state-funded news media outlet—began an even more nefarious effort to covertly recruit unwitting American influencers in support of their malign influence campaign. RT used a front company to disguise its own involvement or the involvement of the Russian government in content meant to influence U.S. audiences.
The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Russia-related General License 25E – “Authorizing Transactions Related to Telecommunications and Certain Internet-Based Communications.”
Russia Related General License 25E:
(a) All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications involving the Russian Federation that are prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), are authorized.
(b) The exportation or reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to the Russian Federation of services incident to the exchange of communications over the internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, blogging, social media platforms, collaboration platforms, video conferencing, e-gaming, e-learning platforms, automated translation, web maps, user authentication services, web hosting, and domain name registration services, that is prohibited by the RuHSR, is authorized.
(c) The exportation or reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, to the Russian Federation of software, hardware, or technology incident to the exchange of communications over the internet is authorized, provided that:
- If the software, hardware, or technology is subject to the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (EAR), the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply to the Russian Federation of such software, hardware, or technology is licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce pursuant to the EAR; and
- (ii) If the software, hardware, or technology is not subject to the EAR, the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply to the Russian Federation of such software, hardware, or technology would be eligible for a license exception or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce if it were subject to the EAR.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Afanasyeva, Elena Mikhaylovna of Russia;
- Anisimov, Anton Sergeevich of Russia;
- Brodskaia, Elizaveta Yuryevna of Russia;
- Garaschenko, Aleksey Alekseyevich of Russia;
- Kalashnikov, Konstantin Sergeyevich of Russia;
- Kiyashako, Andrey Vladimirovich of Russia;
- Nezhentsev, Aleksandr Vitalyevich of Russia;
- Simonyan, Margarita Simonovna of Russia;
- Tabak, Valdimir Grigoryevich of Russia; and
- Yermoshkina, Anastasiya Igorevna of Russia.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Autonomous Non-Profit Organization Dialog of Russia; and
- Autonomous Non-Profit Organization Dialog Regions of Russia.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2559 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933141/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240904
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September 4, 2024: OFAC published an alert, “Russian Attempts to Evade Sanctions Using New Overseas Branches and Subsidiaries,” to warn foreign jurisdictions and financial institutions about Russia’s attempts to evade sanctions by opening new overseas branches and subsidiaries of Russian financial institutions.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933146/download?inline
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September 5, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 108, “Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions Involving Certain Blocked Persons or Vessels.”
General License 108:
All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one of the following activities involving the blocked persons described in paragraph (b) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, November 6, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):
(1) The safe docking and anchoring in port of any vessels in which any person listed in paragraph (b) of this general license has a property interest (the “blocked vessels”);
(2) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; or
(3) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.
(b) The authorization in paragraph (a) of this general license applies to the following blocked persons listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and any entity in which any of the following persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest:
(1) Gotik Shipping Co; or
(2) Plio Energy Cargo Shipping OPC Private Limited.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933151/download?inline
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September 10, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned nine Mexican nationals, and 26 Mexico-based entities linked to a fuel theft network that generates tens of millions of dollars benefiting the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG), a violent Mexico-based drug trafficking organization responsible for a significant proportion of fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States. Mexico-based drug trafficking cartels such as CJNG have turned to fuel theft in recent years, resulting in billions of dollars in lost revenue to the Mexican government. This action was coordinated closely with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Government of Mexico, including La Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (UIF), Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Alvarado, Castillo of Mexico;
- Cazarin Molina, Cesar of Mexico;
- Cazarin Molina, Ivan of Mexico;
- Cazarin Ramos, Jahir of Mexico;
- Estrada Medina, Santos Aldair of Mexico;
- Herrera Medina, Brandon Ernesto of Mexico;
- Medina Dias, Domingo of Mexico;
- Rivera Garcia, Patricia of Mexico; and
- Rodriguez Hernandez, Jose Saul of Mexico.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List;
- 3D Modern Printing Press of Mexico;
- Aceites y Lubricantes Maye, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
- Aditivos Y Suministros Etanofuel, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Ahorrocombustibles De Veracruz, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Biocombustibles El Jicaro, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Carburantes Dos Oceanos, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Combustibles Evolutivos y Alternativos Dos Oceanos, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Combustibles y Lubricantes Maye, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Comercializadora Baguette KLIC, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Comercializadora Coffee KLIC, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Constructora JJESA S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Dos Oceanos Combustibles y Carburantes, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Dos Oceanos Paso Del Toro, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Econocombustibles de Veracruz, S.A. De C.V. of Mexico;
- Etanoful, S.A. De C.V. of Mexico;
- Etanoplus, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Magnocombustibles De Veracruz, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
- Maquinas Edja, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Maxi-Gasoil Servicios, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Mayegas, S.A. DE C.V., of Mexico;
- Multiservicios En Combustible Maye De Veracruz, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
- Rapicombustibles De Veracrus, S.A. De C.V., of Mexico;
- Suministros Combustibles Oceanos, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
- Super Tiendas KLIC, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico;
- Traver Permisionarios, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico; and
- Veracruzana De Servicios Hoteleros y Gastronomicos Los Angeles, S.A. DE C.V. of Mexico.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240910 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions
*******
September 11, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three individuals, five companies, and two vessels that are involved in smuggling oil and liquified petroleum gas (LPG) to generate revenue for Hizballah. The network, comprised of Lebanese businessmen and companies and overseen by a senior leader of Hizballah’s finance team, has facilitated dozens of LPG shipments to the Government of Syria and channeled the profits to Hizballah. Illicit oil and LPG smuggling operations generate hundreds of millions of dollars for Hizballah and support the group’s terrorist activities.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Al-Sayid, Muhammad Ibrahim Habib of Lebanon;
- Obeid, Boutros Georges of Lebanon; and
- Zgheib, Ali Nayef of Lebanon.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- European Lebanese International Trade S.A.R.L. ELIT of Lebanon;
- Heavy Industrial Fuels SAL HIF of Lebanon;
- Heavy Oil Distribution Company Hodico S.A.L of Lebanon;
- Heavy Oil Distribution Company Hodico SAL Offshore of Lebanon; and
- H.G. Holding Sal of Lebanon.
The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Alpha Gas (51M771) Tanzania flag; MMSI 677067100 (vessel) [SDGT]; and
- Marina (51M643) Tanzania flag; MMSI 677054300 (vessel) [SDGT].
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240911 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions
*******
September 11, 2024: the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued an update to the March 2019 OFAC Advisory to the Maritime Petroleum Shipping Community to highlight risks associated with shipments to Syria. Amendments to this advisory include updates to certain deceptive shipping practices and risk mitigation measures, along with an updated annex of vessels currently identified as blocked property on OFAC’s SDN List, that have been involved in fuel shipments to Syria.
Additionally, OFAC put on public inspection Interim Final Rule to Extend Recordkeeping Requirements from Five to 10 Years, consistent with the extension of the statute of limitations for violations of certain sanctions administered by OFAC.
OFAC also put on public inspection a Comment Request for Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations and Other Information Collections Maintained by OFAC for comments concerning OFAC’s information requirements.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240911 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933191/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933201/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933196/download?inline
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September 12, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Cambodian businessman Ly Yong Phat (Ly), his conglomerate L.Y.P. Group Co., LTD (L.Y.P. Group), and O‑Smach Resort for their role in serious human rights abuse related to the treatment of trafficked workers subjected to forced labor in online scam centers. OFACalso designated Cambodia-based Garden City Hotel, Koh Kong Resort, and Phnom Penh Hotel for being owned or controlled by Ly.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Ly, Yong Phat of Cambodia.
The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Garden City Hotel of Cambodia;
- Koh Kong Resort of Cambodia
- Y.P Group Co., LTD of Cambodia;
- O-SMACH Resort of Cambodia; and
- Phnom Penh Hotel of Cambodia.
The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued Global Magnitsky General License 8 – “Authorizing Transactions Involving Certain Entities Owned by Ly Yong Phat or L.Y.P. Group Co., LTD.” Additionally, OFAC has issued a related, new Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1191).
General License 8:
All transactions prohibited by the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 583 (GMSR), involving any entity that is blocked solely due to a property interest of Ly Yong Phat (Ly) or L.Y.P. Group Co., LTD (L.Y.P. Group) or any entity in which Ly or L.Y.P. Group owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized, provided that such entity is not identified on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons.
FAQ 1191:
Q: On September 12, 2024, OFAC designated Ly Yong Phat (Ly), L.Y.P. Group Co., LTD (L.Y.P. Group), and the following entities owned by L.Y.P. Group under the Global Magnitsky sanctions authority: O-Smach Resort, Garden City Hotel, Koh Kong Resort, and Phnom Penh Hotel. Can I continue to engage in transactions or other dealings with other entities owned by Ly or L.Y.P. Group that are not listed on OFAC’s Specially Designation Nationals and Blocked Person List (SDN List) without facing sanctions risk?
A: Yes. Although transactions or other dealings involving Ly and L.Y.P. Group are prohibited as a result of OFAC’s designation, OFAC concurrently issued Global Magnitsky General License (GL) 8 authorizing U.S. persons to engage in all transactions with any entity owned 50% or more by Ly or the L.Y.P. Group that is not listed on SDN List.
Non-U.S. persons may engage in the transactions authorized by GL 8 without exposure to sanctions.
GL 8 does not authorize transactions with any entity listed on the SDN List, including the following entities that were designated on September 12, 2024: O-Smach Resort, Garden City Hotel, Koh Kong Resort, and Phnom Penh Hotel. OFAC will continue to closely monitor Ly’s and L.Y.P. Group’s activities and may designate or identify additional entities, as appropriate.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2576 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240912 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933216/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1191
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September 12, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 16 Maduro-aligned officials who obstructed a competitive and inclusive presidential election process in Venezuela and violated the civil and human rights of the people. The individuals sanctioned pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, as amended, include leaders of the Maduro-aligned National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) who impeded a transparent electoral process and the release of accurate election results, as well as the military, intelligence, and government officials responsible for intensifying repression through intimidation, indiscriminate detentions, and censorship. The officials were appointed by Nicolas Maduro, whom OFAC sanctioned in 2017.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Briceno Cisneros, Edward Miguel of Venezuela;
- Brito Hernandez, Asdrubal Jose of Venezuela;
- Bustamante Puerta, Dinorah Yoselin of Venezuela;
- Duenez Reyes, Luis Ernesto of Venezuela;
- Estrada Paredes, Elio Ramon of Venezuela;
- Figueroa Arizaleta, Inocencio Antonio of Venezuela;
- Gil Pacheco, Rosalba of Venezuela;
- Gil Rodriguez, Malaquias of Venezuela;
- Hernandez Larez, Domingo Antonio of Venezuela;
- Hernandez Larez, Jonah Alexander of Venezuela;
- Hildalgo Pandares, Juan Carlos of Venezuela;
- Infante Aparicio, Pedro Jose of Venezuela;
- Marquez Cordero, Fanny Beatriz of Venezuela;
- Maneses Rodrigues, Antonio Jose of Venezuela;
- Munos Palacios, Miguel Antonio of Venezuela; and
- Rodriguez Rodriguez, Caryslia Beatriz of Venezuela.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Beijin Research Institute of Automation for Machinery Industry Co. Ltd. of China.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2577 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240912
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September 13, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 109, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on September 13, 2024” and Russia-related General License 25F, “Authorizing Transactions Related to Telecommunications and Certain Internet-Based Communications.”
OFAC also published an updated, Russia-related Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1040).
General License 109:
(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked entities are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, November 13, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):
(1) Federal State Unitary Enterprise International Information Agency Rossiya Segodnya;
(2) Autonomous Non Profit Organization TV Novosti; or
(3) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.
General License 25F:
(a) All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications involving the Russian Federation that are prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), are authorized.
(b) The exportation or reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to the Russian Federation of services incident to the exchange of communications over the internet, such as instant messaging, chat and email, social networking, sharing of photos and movies, web browsing, blogging, social media platforms, collaboration platforms, video conferencing, e-gaming, e-learning platforms, automated translation, web maps, user authentication services, web hosting, and domain name registration services, that is prohibited by the RuHSR, is authorized.
(c) The exportation or reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States or by U.S. persons, to the Russian Federation of software, hardware, or technology incident to the exchange of communications over the internet is authorized, provided that:
(i) If the software, hardware, or technology is subject to the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (EAR), the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply to the Russian Federation of such software, hardware, or technology is licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce pursuant to the EAR; and
(ii) If the software, hardware, or technology is not subject to the EAR, the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply to the Russian Federation of such software, hardware, or technology would be eligible for a license exception or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce if it were subject to the EAR. (
FAQ 1040:
Q: Are transactions related to telecommunications and certain internet-based communications that involve persons designated pursuant to Executive Order 14024 authorized by Russia-related General License (GL) 25F?
A: GL 25F authorizes certain transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications involving the Russian Federation that are prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR). In addition, GL 25F authorizes certain transactions from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to the Russian Federation that are incident to the exchange of communications over the internet and that are prohibited by the RuHSR. With respect to software, hardware, and technology, GL 25F authorizes the exportation or reexportation, sale, or supply from the United States or by U.S. persons, wherever located, to the Russian Federation of software, hardware, or technology incident to the exchange of communications over the internet that is authorized for export to Russia by the Department of Commerce if it is subject to the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730-774 (EAR), or that would be eligible for a license exception or otherwise authorized for export to Russia by the Department of Commerce if it were subject to the EAR. However, GL 25F explicitly excludes from the authorization any transactions that are prohibited by the RuHSR involving Joint Stock Company Channel One Russia, Television Station Russia-1, Joint Stock Company NTV Broadcasting Company, Limited Liability Company Algoritm, New Eastern Outlook, Oriental Review, Garantex Europe OU, Autonomous Non-Profit Organization Dialog, Autonomous Non-Profit Organization Dialog Regions, Federal State Unitary Enterprise International Information Agency Rossiya Segodnya, or Autonomous Non Profit Organization TV Novosti, which are designated pursuant to Executive Order 14024.
For further information on relevant authorizations, exemptions, and public guidance, please review OFAC’s Fact Sheet, “Preserving Agricultural Trade, Access to Communication, and Other Support to Those Impacted by Russia’s War Against Ukraine.”
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240913 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933211/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933206/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1040
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September 16, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned five individuals and one entity associated with the Intellexa Consortium for their role in developing, operating, and distributing commercial spyware technology that presents a significant threat to the national security of the United States. These designations complement concerted U.S. government actions against commercial spyware vendors, including previous sanctions against individuals and entities associated with the Intellexa Consortium; the Department of Commerce’s addition of commercial spyware vendors to the Entity List; and the Department of State’s visa ban policy targeting those who misuse or profit from the misuse of commercial spyware, subsequently exercised on thirteen individuals.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Artemiou, Artemis of Cyprus;
- Bitzios, Felix of Greece;
- Gambazzi, Andrea Nicola Costantino Hermes of Switzerland;
- Harpaz, Merom of Romania; and
- Karoli, Panagiota of Cyprus.
The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Aliada Group, Inc. of British Virgin Islands.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2581 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240916
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September 16, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned individuals who have undermined fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, in Georgia. Specifically, the Department of the Treasury sanctioned two Georgian government officials associated with brutal crackdowns on peaceful protestors and political opponents, and two private Georgian citizens that are responsible for or complicit in or have directly or indirectly engaged in violently suppressing the exercise of the freedom of peaceful assembly of Georgians engaged in the democratic process and peaceful expression. All four individuals are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse around the world.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Lagazuri, Mileri of Georgia;
- Makharadze, Zurab of Georgia; and
- Morgoshia, Konstantine of Georgia.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2580 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240916
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September 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 12 individuals in connection with the Iranian regime’s ongoing, violent repression of the Iranian people, both within Iran’s borders and abroad. These designations target members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), officials of Iran’s Prisons Organization, and those responsible for lethal operations overseas. This action is in coordination with Canada and Australia, which have also unveiled new sanctions against those connected to human rights abuses in Iran.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Abdi, Ali of Iran;
- Azadeh, Ahmad Reza of Iran;
- Baghlani, Mahmud of Iran;
- Bazvand, Mustafa of Iran;
- Beheshti Rad, Saeed of Iran;
- Farsani, Alireza Babaei of Iran;
- Ghaffarhaddadi, Javad of Iran;
- Khorramdel, Hamid of Iran;
- Panjaki, Yahya Hosseini of Iran;
- Roshan, Gholamerza of Iran;
- Shahkoui, Ali Malek of Iran; and
- Zareikajosangi, Hamid of Iran.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240918 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2587
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September 24, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned five Colombian nationals and two Mexico-based businesses pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059, “Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Illicit Drug Trade.” The Colombian individuals sanctioned are leaders within Colombia’s Clan del Golfo (CDG)—also known as Los Urabeños—which is one of the country’s largest drug trafficking organizations and a key contributor to human smuggling through the Darién Gap. The companies sanctioned are in Mexico and owned by designated Sinaloa Cartel fentanyl traffickers. One of the most notorious and pervasive drug trafficking organizations in the world, the Sinaloa Cartel is responsible for a significant portion of the illicit fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Alcaraz Morales, Wilder de Jesus of Colombia;
- Celis Durango, Alexander of Colombia;
- Cordoba Quinto, Jose Emilson of Colombia;
- Demoya Hernandez, Jose Miguel of Colombia; and
- Sanchez Sanchez, Jose Gonzalo of Colombia.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Farmacia y Mini Super Trinidad of Mexico; and
- Nieves y Paletas Evi of Mexico.
The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing three new, Russia-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs): FAQ 1193, FAQ 1194, and FAQ 1195.
FAQ 1193:
Q: I am a U.S. company with a subsidiary organized and located in Russia. Can I provide the employees or contractors of my Russian subsidiary who are located in Russia with the services prohibited by the Information Technology (IT) and Software Services Determination under the exclusion “(1) any service to an entity located in the Russian Federation that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person?
A: Yes, as long as the services provided are within the employees’ or contractors’ scope of employment for or on behalf of the U.S. subsidiary company located in Russia.
FAQ 1194:
Q: I am a U.S. company with a subsidiary located in a third country (other than Russia). My third-country subsidiary has an employee or contractor located in Russia. Can I provide that employee or contractor located in Russia with the services prohibited by the Information Technology (IT) and Software Services Determination under the exclusion “(1) any service to an entity located in the Russian Federation that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person”?
A: No. The scope of the exclusion applies only to U.S.-owned or controlled entities located in Russia and their employees and contractors acting within the scope of their employment. See FAQ 1193. A U.S. person may not provide a service prohibited by the IT and Software Services Determination to a person located in Russia who is working as an employee or contractor on behalf of a third-country company. OFAC may issue specific licenses on a case-by-case basis.
FAQ 1195:
Q: A U.S. company located in the United States has an employee or contractor located in Russia working directly for the U.S. company. Can the U.S. company provide that employee or contractor located in Russia with the services prohibited by the Information Technology (IT) and Software Services Determination under the exclusion “(1) any service to an entity located in the Russian Federation that is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person”?
A: No. The scope of the exclusion applies only to U.S.-owned or controlled entities located in Russia, and their employees and contractors acting within the scope of their employment. See FAQ 1193. A U.S. person may not provide a service prohibited by the IT and Software Services Determination to a person located in Russia who is working directly for a company located in the United States. OFAC may issue specific licenses on a case-by-case basis. To apply for a specific license.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240924 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2605 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1193 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1194 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1195
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September 25, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned a former member of Haiti’s parliament, Prophane Victor, for his role in forming, supporting, and arming gangs and their members that have committed serious human rights abuse in Haiti. OFAC also designated Luckson Elan, the current leader of the Gran Grif gang, for his involvement in serious human rights abuse related to gang activity in Haiti’s Artibonite department.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Elan, Luckson of Haiti; and
- Victor, Prophane of Haiti.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240925 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions
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September 25, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned more than a dozen entities and vessels for their involvement in the shipment of Iranian crude oil and liquid petroleum gas to Syria and East Asia on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and Hizballah. Among the vessels sanctioned are four ships associated with the fleet of illicit shipping Syrian magnate Abdul Jalil Mallah (Abdul Jalil) and his brother Luay al-Mallah. Since Abdul Jalil’s June 10, 2021 designation for his support to the network of IRGC-QF-backed Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal, Luay al-Mallah has continued to use their shipping empire to support Iran’s malign activities and those of its proxies. Luay al-Mallah is also being designated in this action.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Al-Mallah, Luay of Syria.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Dragon Road Ltd of the Marshall Islands;
- Oryx Denizcilik Limited Sirketi of Turkey;
- Star Ocean Shipmanage Ltd of the Marshall Islands; and
- Tai Feng Hai Shipping Limited of China.
The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Confidence P (3FGV5) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 357747000 (vessel);
- Eternal 8 (3E3694) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352001640 (vessel);
- Eternal Peace (3E3831) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002158 (vessel);
- Eternal Success (3E4722) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002970 (vessel);
- Feng Tai (3E4959) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002635 (vessel);
- Nova (S9U17) Crude/Oil Products Tanker Sao Tome and Principe flag; MMSI 668116245 (vessel);
- Rival 3FZA2) Chemical/Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 3708590000 (vessel);
- Serene I (3EFX8) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 374483000 (vessel); and
- Tiyara (EPUN7) Crude Oil Tanker; MMSI 422471300 (vessel).
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2613
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240925
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September 27, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated seven individuals as part of a coordinated U.S. government response to Iran’s operations that sought to influence or interfere in the 2024 and 2020 presidential elections. Iranian state-sponsored actors undertook a variety of malicious cyber activities, such as hack-and-leak operations and spear-phishing, in an attempt to undermine confidence in the United States’ election processes and institutions and to interfere with political campaigns. The designations undertaken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13848, complement law enforcement actions taken by the Department of Justice against a variety of Iranian election interference actors.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Abdolarahimi, Mohammad Hosein of Iran;
- Askarizadeh, Rahmatollah of Iran;
- Jalili, Masoud of Iran;
- Mahdavia, Ali of Iran;
- Rahimi Hajjiabadi, Sayyed Mehdi of Iran;
- Sadeghi, Fatemah of Iran; and
- Yazdi, Elaheh of Iran.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20240927 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2621
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September 30, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 13K, “Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024.”
General License 13K:
U.S. persons, or entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person, are authorized to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, certifications, or tax refunds to the extent such transactions are prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to the day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation of such U.S. persons or entities, through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 8, 2025.