This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through September 30, 2023. The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.
See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.
REGULATORY UPDATES
The President/Executive Branch
Presidential Determination Issued Continuing the Sanctions in Cuba
September 18, 2023: 88 FR 64347: On September 13, the President extended for one year the exercise of certain authorities with respect to Cuba under the Trading with the Enemy Act, which was scheduled to expire on September 14, 2023. The president determined that the continuation of the exercise of those authorities with respect to Cuba for 1 year is in the national interest of the United States.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-20302
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Presidential Determination Issued Designating Major Drug Transit or Major Drug Illicit Countries
September 27, 2023: 88 FR 66673: The President issued a Presidential Determination, pursuant to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (FRAA), identifying the following countries as major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
A country’s presence on the foregoing list is not necessarily a reflection of its government’s counterdrug efforts or level of cooperation with the United States. Consistent with the statutory definition of a major drug transit or major illicit drug producing country set forth in sections 481(e)(2) and 481(e)(5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, the reason countries are placed on the list is the combination of geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to be transited or produced, even if a government has engaged in robust and diligent narcotics control and law enforcement measures.
The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 amended the definition of major drug source countries to include source countries of precursor chemicals used to produce illicit drugs significantly affecting the United States. For countries with large chemical and pharmaceutical industries, preventing precursor chemicals from being diverted to the production of illicit drugs is a particularly difficult challenge, including for the United States and other countries with strict regulatory regimes to prevent diversion. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been identified as a major source country due to this change in legislation, and the United States strongly urges the PRC and other chemical source countries to tighten chemical supply chains and prevent diversion.
Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, the President designated Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela as having failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to both adhere to their obligations under the international counternarcotics agreements and to take the measures required by section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. The President also determined, in accordance with provisions of section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that United States programs that support Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela are vital to the national interests of the United States.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21378
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Department of State
DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Bulgaria
September 1, 2023: The State Department approved a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria of Stryker Vehicles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $1.5 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally. The proposed sale will improve Bulgaria’s rapid infantry deployment and force projection capability. Bulgaria will use this enhanced capability to strengthen its homeland defense and deter regional threats. Bulgaria will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and services into its armed forces.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/bulgaria-stryker-vehicles
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Poland
September 12, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Poland of an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $4.0 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on September 11, 2023. The proposed sale will support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization Ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. Further, this proposed sale will improve Poland’s missile defense capability and contribute to Poland’s goal of updating its military capability while further enhancing interoperability with the United States and other allies. Poland will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To South Korea
September 13, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Republic of Korea of F-35 Aircraft and related equipment for an estimated cost of $5.06 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The proposed sale will improve the Republic of Korea’s capability to meet current and future threats by providing credible defense capability to deter aggression in the region and ensure interoperability with U.S. forces. The proposed sale will augment the Republic of Korea’s operational aircraft inventory and enhance its air-to-air and air-to-ground self-defense capability. The Republic of Korea already has F-35s in its inventory and will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/korea-f-35-aircraft
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Poland
September 13, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Poland of F-16 Sustainment and related equipment for an estimated cost of $389 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The proposed sale will improve Poland’s capability to meet current and future threats by increasing the reliability of their F-16 fleet. Poland has purchased sustainment support for the F-16s in its inventory for many years and will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-f-16-sustainment
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Canada
September 15, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Canada of munitions and other systems to be integrated into MQ-9Bs for an estimated cost of $313.4 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The proposed sale will improve Canada’s capability to meet current and future threats by enabling unmanned surveillance and reconnaissance patrols of its northern arctic territories. It will also enable Canada to optimally fulfill its North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) and NATO missions while increasing interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces. Canada will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/canada-mq-9b-integrated-systems
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Kuwait
September 20, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Kuwait of Repair and Recertification of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missiles and support for an estimated cost of $150 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the infrastructure of a Major Non-NATO ally that has been an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. It will also improve Kuwait’s capability to sustain their missile density and ensure readiness for air operations. Kuwait will use this capability as a deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen homeland defense. Kuwait will have no difficulty absorbing this infrastructure, support, and associated services into its armed forces.
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Saudi Arabia
September 21, 2023: The State Department made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of Cooperative Logistics Supply Support Arrangement (CLSSA) Program, Foreign Military Sales Order (FMSO) II and related equipment for an estimated cost of $500 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. This proposed sale will support U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives by supporting a strategic partner’s self-defense and promoting stability in the Middle East. It will also maintain Saudi Arabia’s capability to meet current and future threats by allowing the RSLF to continue to purchase needed spare/repair parts, through their current CLSSA program, to replenish in-country stocks required for general maintenance and sustain the operability of RSLF equipment. The RSLF has participated in the CLSSA program since 1965 and will have no difficulty absorbing these items into its armed forces.
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Department of State Lifts Defense Trade Restrictions on Cyprus
September 14, 2023: 88 FR 63016: On August 18, 2023, the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) announced Secretary Blinken’s certification of the statutory requirements to lift the defense trade restrictions relating to the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) for Fiscal Year 2024. Accordingly, the Department has published a Federal Register notice amending § 126.1(r) of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which continues the suspension of defense trade restrictions for the ROC and its status as a proscribed destination from October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-19851
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DDTC Issues New ITAR Compliance Risk Matrix
September 15, 2023: The Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) issued a new ITAR Compliance Risk Matrix, accompanied by a supplemental risk matrix specific to universities. These risk matrices are intended to assist organizations in assessing their level of ITAR compliance risk and assist in the evaluation of potential compliance risks that are specific to each organization and that, if left unaddressed, may lead to ITAR violations. The new risk matrices are available for download on the DDTC website.
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sys_id=aff9e5101bd975102b6ca932f54bcbf7
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United States Hosts Inaugural Plenary Meeting on the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative Voluntary Code of Conduct
September 15, 2023: The U.S. Department of State hosted the inaugural plenary meeting of Subscribing States to the voluntary Code of Conduct of the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative (ECHRI) in Washington, D.C. on September 14-15. ECHRI was launched at the first Summit for Democracy in 2021 as part of the Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal. ECHRI is a multilateral effort intended to counter state and non-state actors’ misuse of goods and technology to commit serious violations or abuses of human rights by using export controls in pursuit of national security interests.
The Code of Conduct released at the second Summit for Democracy in 2023 is the result of a U.S.-led effort to establish voluntary, nonbinding political commitments by Subscribing States to apply export controls in preventing the proliferation of goods, software, and technologies that could enable serious human rights abuses.
The plenary session marked the first in-person meeting of the 25 Subscribing States and non-government stakeholders to discuss implementation of the Code of Conduct and further integrate human rights criteria into export control regimes. The two-day event also focused on best practices for information sharing and efforts to strengthen consideration of human rights in export controls.
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DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website
September 14 through 27, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at
- Change in name from Kratos RT Logic, Inc. to Kratos S1, Inc. due to corporate reorganization.
- Change in name from GS Optics LLC to Gooch and Housego LLC due to acquisition.
- Change in name from CTS-Nordic Aktiebolag to Cubic Technologies Sweden AB
- Change in address for Milestone Aviation Group Limited, Vertical Aviation No 1 Limited, and Vertical Aviation No 2 Limited from Minerva House, 2nd Floor, Simmonscourt Road, Ballsbridge, Dublin, D04 H9P8, Ireland to Dolmen House, 3rd Floor, 4 Earlsfort Terrace, Dublin, D02 E024, Ireland.
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Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security
Commerce Amends the EAR Re: Transfer of Access Information and Release of Software (Source Code and Object Code)
September 18, 2023: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to make a technical correction that also serves to clarify provisions of the EAR pertaining to the release of “software” as set out in the sections on release and transfer of access information. This final rule clarifies an ambiguity in the EAR by adding a cross-reference addressing transfer of access information in the section on releases of “technology” and “software,” as was originally intended. In addition, the final rule adds a clarifying note that, for purposes of transfer of access information, a release of “software” includes both source code and object code.
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/docman/?task=doc_download&gid=3331
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Commerce Adds Seven HTS Codes and Updates the High Priority List of Critical Items Required by Russia for Its War Effort
September 19, 2023: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced important updates to its list of controlled “common high priority” items identified as critical to Russia’s war effort following productive meetings with key members of the Global Export Control Coalition. BIS has added seven new Harmonized System (HS) codes to the list, including bearings needed for heavy vehicles or other machinery and antennae used for navigation systems. Most of these HTS codes in the list require prior approval for export. Additionally, Tier 3 has been divided into mechanical and non-mechanical items to provide greater clarity. As published in BIS’ previous guidance involving the nine HS codes in Tiers 1 and 2 of highest priority, exporters and reexporters are strongly encouraged to conduct due diligence when encountering the listed HS codes to identify possible third-party intermediaries and attempts at evasion of U.S. export controls.
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United States-Australia-Canada-New Zealand-United Kingdom Release Joint Guidance on Countering Russian Evasion
September 26, 2023: As a follow-up to the establishment of the “Export Enforcement Five” or “E5” partnership to coordinate on export control enforcement issues in June 2023, the governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States issued joint guidance to industry and academia identifying high priority items critical to Russian weapons systems and urging specific actions to prevent diversion of these items to Russia through third countries. Since February 24, 2022, BIS has implemented a series of stringent export controls that restrict Russia’s access to the technologies and other items that it needs to sustain its illegal war in Ukraine. These controls target Russia’s defense, aerospace, and maritime sectors, and have been expanded to Russia’s oil refining, industrial, and commercial sectors, as well as to luxury goods used by Russian elites. BIS’s controls have also been applied to Belarus for its substantial enabling of Russia’s invasion and have been continually updated to align with GECC allies and partners, which include the E5.
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/docman/?task=doc_download&gid=3337
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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
Reminder to file the 2023 Annual Report of Blocked Property
September 22, 2023: On July 3, 2023, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a recent actions notice, reminding holders of property blocked pursuant to OFAC sanctions regulations published in Chapter V of Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) of the requirement to provide OFAC with an Annual Report of Blocked Property (ARBP). Persons subject to this reporting requirement must submit a comprehensive report, as outlined in 31 C.F.R. § 501.603 of the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations (RPPR), of all blocked property held as of June 30 of the current year by September 30.
The annual reports must be filed using the mandatory spreadsheet form TD-F 90-22.50. Completed forms should be sent to ofacreport@treasury.gov or filed through the OFAC Reporting System (ORS). Failure to submit a required ARBP by September 30 constitutes a violation of the RPPR.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230922
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International Organizations
New WTO Publication Provides Insights into The World of Export Regulations and Controls
September 15, 2023: A new WTO publication explores for the first time how the different national export-related frameworks developed beyond the WTO operate in practice and how they are linked to the multilateral trading system. “The book is intended to serve as a guide for policymakers, government officials, academia and members of the public with an interest in the areas covered,” said Suja Rishikesh Mavroidis Director of the WTO’s Market Access Division, in a foreword to the publication. “By fostering a better understanding of the existing international agreements regulating exports and how they link to the multilateral trading system, the WTO can help to strengthen global cooperation, promote transparency and perhaps even inspire future agreements seeking to strike a balance between advancing international trade and protecting the global community against potential risks”, she said.
In terms of the products affected by export-related measures, the publication notes that chemical products are the most frequently affected, followed by optical and measuring instruments, and different types of machinery and pharmaceuticals. The “General Exceptions” provision under Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was the most frequently cited WTO basis for the export-related QRs — 73 per cent of the total — with paragraph (b) of Article XX regarding measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health” cited in 38 per cent of the export measures.
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news23_e/pf23_15sep23_e.htm
| LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES |
This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.
Sanctions
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
September 25, 2023: The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released a rule adding 28 entities to the Entity List, 11 of which are based in the People’s Republic of China (China), 5 in Russia, 5 in Pakistan, along with others located in Finland, Oman, Germany, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The entities listed in action were added to the Entity List for having been involved, being involved, or posing a significant risk of being or becoming involved in activities contrary to the national security or foreign policy of the United States. Among those entities listed, nine entities under the destinations of China, Finland, Germany, and Russia have been implicated in a conspiracy to violate U.S. export controls, including a scheme to supply the Special Technology Center, an entity on the BIS Entity List, with components to make unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU).
China
- Asia Pacific Links Ltd.;
- Guilin Alpha Rubber & Plastics Technology Company Limited;
- Hangzhou Fuyang Koto Machinery Company Limited;
- Nanjing Institute of Astronomical Optics and Technology;
- Raven International Trade Limited;
- S&C Trade PTY Company Limited;
- Shenzhen Caspro Technology Company Limited;
- Speed Business Trading (HK) Ltd.;
- Sunrising Logistics (HK) Ltd.;
- Well Fair International (Hong Kong) Ltd.;
- Yun Xia Yuan.
Finland
- Evelog Oy;
- Luminor Oy;
- Siberica Oy.
Germany
- ICW-Industrial Components Weirich.
Oman
- International Smart Digital Interface Company (ISDIC);
- Moaz Ahmed Mohammed al-Haifi.
Pakistan
- AHD International;
- Genesis Technical Consultancy;
- Indus Tooling Solution;
- Longford Engineering (Pvt) Ltd.;
- Polymaster Engineering.
Russia
- Device Consulting;
- Grant Instrument;
- SMT-iLogic;
- Streloy;
- VSMPO–AVISMA Corporation PJSC.
United Arab Emirates
- New Era Enterprises FZE.
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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
September 6, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Abdelrahim Hamdan Dagalo (Abdelrahim) for his leadership of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an entity whose members have engaged in acts of violence and human rights abuses, including the massacre of civilians, ethnic killings, and use of sexual violence. Since the beginning of conflict between the RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on April 15, 2023, both sides have failed to implement a ceasefire, and the RSF and allied militias have been credibly accused of extensive human rights abuses in Darfur and elsewhere.
Abdelrahim is a high-ranking leader in the RSF and the brother of RSF Commander Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. Abdelrahim is being designated pursuant to Executive Order 14098 for being a foreign person who is or has been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the RSF, an entity that has, or whose members have, engaged in actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Sudan relating to the tenure of such leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors. Abdelrahim is also being designated for being a foreign person who is or has been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the RSF, an entity that has, or whose members have, engaged in the targeting of women, children, or any other civilians through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence), abduction, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge, or through conduct that would constitute a serious abuse or violation of human rights or a violation of international humanitarian law relating to the tenure of such leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors.
Treasury Sanctions Sudanese Paramilitary Leader | U.S. Department of the Treasury
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September 7, 2023: The United States, in coordination with the United Kingdom, sanctioned eleven individuals who are part of the Russia-based Trickbot cybercrime group. Russia has long been a safe haven for cybercriminals, including the Trickbot group. This action was taken by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is concurrently unsealing indictments against nine individuals in connection with the Trickbot malware and Conti ransomware schemes, including seven of the individuals designated here.
The sanctions target key actors involved in management and procurement for the Trickbot group, which has ties to Russian intelligence services and has targeted the U.S. Government and U.S. companies, including hospitals. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Trickbot group targeted many critical infrastructure and health care providers in the United States.
Trickbot, first identified in 2016 by security researchers, was a trojan virus that evolved from the Dyre trojan. Dyre was an online banking trojan operated by Moscow-based individuals who began targeting non-Russian businesses and entities in mid-2014. Dyre and Trickbot were developed and operated by a group of cybercriminals to steal financial data from targets outside of Russia. The Trickbot trojan infected millions of victim computers worldwide, including those of U.S. businesses and individuals. It has since evolved into a highly modular malware suite that provides the Trickbot group the ability to conduct a variety of malicious cyber activities, including ransomware. During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the Trickbot group launched a wave of ransomware disruptions against hospitals and other healthcare centers across the United States. In one instance, the Trickbot group deployed ransomware against three Minnesota medical facilities, disrupting their computer networks and telephones, and causing a diversion of ambulances. Members of the Trickbot group publicly gloated over the ease of targeting the medical facilities and the speed with which ransoms had been paid to the group. Members of the Trickbot group are associated with Russian intelligence services. The Trickbot group’s preparations in 2020 aligned them to Russian state objectives and actions taken by the Russian intelligence services. This included targeting the U.S. Government and U.S. companies. The following individuals have been named:
- Andrey Zhuykov
- Maksim Galochkin
- Maksim Rudenskiy
- Mikhail Tsarev. Tsarev is also known by the monikers Mango, Alexander Grachev, Super Misha, Ivanov Mixail, Misha Krutysha, and Nikita Andreevich Tsarev.
- Dmitry Putilin. Putilin is also known by the online monikers Grad and Staff.
- Maksim Khaliullin. Khaliullin is also known by the online moniker Kagas.
- Sergey Loguntsov
- Vadym Valiakhmetov. Valiakhmetov is known by the online monikers Weldon, Mentos, and Vasm.
- Artem Kurov. Artem Kurov is also known by the online moniker Naned.
- Mikhail Chernov. Chernov is also known by the online moniker Bullet.
- Alexander Mozhaev. Mozhaev is known by the online monikers Green and Rocco.
OFAC designated each of these individuals pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13694, as amended by E.O. 13757, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, an activity described in subsection (a)(ii) of section 1 of E.O. 13694, as amended.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1714
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September 12, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in coordination with the Drug Enforcement Administration, designated key Hizballah operatives and financial facilitators in South America and Lebanon. This action includes Amer Mohamed Akil Rada (Amer), who in addition to his role as a senior Hizballah operative, was one of the operational members of Hizballah who carried out the terrorist attack against the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) in Argentina in 1994 that killed 85 people. Amer and his associates manage a commercial enterprise for Hizballah, including charcoal exports to Lebanon. This action targets seven key individuals and entities in this network that generates revenue for Hizballah’s terrorist activities and enables the terrorist group’s presence and nefarious activities in Latin America. Since its inception, Hizballah has established an extensive global infrastructure that includes commercial activities that allow Hizballah operatives to travel freely, strategically case targets, and transfer materials and funds.
- Amer Mohamed Akil Rada.
- Samer Akil Rada (Samer)
- Mahdy Akil Helbawi (Helbawi).
- Zanga S.A.S.
- Ali Ismail Ajrouch
- Black Diamond SARL
- A.S.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1726
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September 14, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is imposing nearly 100 individual sanctions on Russian elites and Russia’s industrial base, financial institutions, and technology suppliers as the United States continues to leverage sanctions and economic restrictions to undermine Russia’s capacity to wage its war against Ukraine, as described below. The following individuals have been named:
- Andrei Removich Bokarev (Bokarev)
- Olga Vladimirovna Syrovatskaya (Syrovatskaya)
- Transmashholding JSC (Transmash)
- Iskandar Kakhramonovich Makhmudov (Makhmudov)
- Dzhakhangir Iskandarovich Makhmudov (Dzhakhangir).
- Open Joint Stock Company Aero Engine Scientific and Technical Complex Soyuz (Soyuz)
- Open Joint Stock Company Balashikhinskiy Liteyno Mekhanicheskiy Zavod (Balashikha)
- Mkrtich Okroevich Okroyan (Mkrtich)
- Aleksei Yurievich Krivoruchko (Krivoruchko)
- Joint Stock Company Gavrilov Yam Machine Building Plant Agat (Agat)
- Joint Stock Company Star (JSC Star)
- Joint Stock Company Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (NIMI)
- Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Ulyanovskii Patronnyi Zavod (Ulyanovsk Cartridge Works)
OFAC is also designating a Finland-based network that specializes in shipping foreign electronics to Russia-based end-users. Finland-based logistics firms Siberica Oy (Siberica) and Luminor Oy (Luminor) have sent a wide variety of electronics into Russia, including UAV cameras, high-performance optical filters, and lithium batteries. French national Gabriel Temin is Siberica’s owner, managing director, and a member of Siberica’s board of directors and Estonian national Catherine Esther Temin is a deputy board member of Siberica.
- Gabriel Temin
- Catherine Esther Temin
The following Russia-based entities were importing directly from Luminor:
- Flytechgroup Limited Liability Company (Flytechgroup)
- OOO NPK Fotonika Limited Liability Company (NPK Fotonika)
- Globaltrans Limited (Globaltrans)
- Limited Liability Company Aservice (Aservice)
- OOO Mayak (Mayak)
OFAC is also targeting two entities based in Turkey. Russia continues to rely on third-country entities to keep importing much-needed dual-use goods to enable its unprovoked war of aggression on Ukraine. The U.S. Department of the Treasury has repeatedly raised the issue of the shipment or transshipment of dual-use goods to Russia with the Government of Turkey and the Turkish private sector. They are:
- Margiana Insaat Dis Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Margiana)
- Demirci Bilisim Ticaret Sanayi Limited Sirketi (Demirci)
OFAC also designated the owner and director of previously designated Russia-based entity Limited Liability Company AK Microtech (AKM), Russian national Andrei Rostislavovich Khokhlun (Khokhlun), as well as two companies owned by Khokhlun: Russia-based Limited Liability Company Keko R (Keko R) and Slovenia-based Arktec Tehnologije na Podrocju Elektronike doo (Arktec).
OFAC also designated the following Russia-based entities were designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the electronics, technology, manufacturing, construction, and/or financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy:
- OOO Enkor Grupp
- Nauchno Proizvodstvennoe Predpiyatie Itelma
- OOO Makro Grupp
- Limited Liability Company Streloi
- Vertikal Limited (Vertikal)
- OOO VMK (VMK)
- OOO Aiti Tsentr
- Limited Liability Company Baltinfokom
- OOO Bitteriya
- Eastern Trade Limited Liability Company
- Joint Stock Company Echelon Union for Science and Development
- Limited Liability Company Inforion
- Obshchestvos Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu Inforser Inzhiniring
- Intech Engineering LTD
- Joint Stock Company Kraftway Corporation PLS (Kraftway)
- Limited Liability Company Kvarta VK
- OOO Lanprint
- OOO Novyi Ai Ti Proekt
- Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Pluton
- Federal State Unitary Enterprise Rostov on Don Research Institute of Radio Communications’s (RNIIRS)
- Joint Stock Company Signaltek
- Silkway Limited Liability Company
- OOO Solar Sekyuriti (Solar Security)
- Limited Liability Company Status Complains
- Svetlana Rost Joint Stock Company (Svetlana Rost)
- Joint Stock Company Special Economic Zone Technopolis Moscow (Technopolis Moscow)
- OOO Trialkom
- Limited Liability Company Tribit
- OOO Vneshekostil
- Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo Taskom
- Joint Stock Company Avtovaz
- Gaz Group
- Joint Stock Company HMS Group
- Kirovsky Zavod Public Joint Stock Company
- Kriogenmash OAO (Kriogenmash)
- Joint Stock Company Moscow Automotive Factory Moskvich
- JSC Power Machines (Power Machines)
- Publichnoe Aktsionernoe Obschestvo Sollers
- Limited Liability Company Machine Building Plant Tonar
- Joint Stock Company United Metallurgical Company (OMK)
- Open Joint Stock Company Tikhoretsk Machine Construction Plant V.V. Vorovsky
- Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo BashVzryvTekhnologii (BVT)
- Limited Liability Company Gazprom Nedra (Gazprom Nedra)
- Joint Stock Company Gazstroyprom (Gazstroyprom)
- Velesstroi Limited Liability Company (Velesstroi)
- JSC AGD Diamonds (AGD Diamonds)
- Vitalij Victorovich Perfilev (Perfilev)
- Joint Stock Commercial Bank Ak Bars Public Joint Stock Company (Ak Bars Bank)
- Obshchestvo s Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu Kommercheski Bank Sinko Bank (Sinko Bank)
- Katarzyna Ewa Pawlowska Hanafin (Pawlowska)
- Obshchestvo S Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu A1 (A1)
- KSK Group (KSK)
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1731
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September 14, 2023: OFAC issued Russia-Related General License 55A: “Authorizing Certain Services Related to Sakhalin-2”
All transactions prohibited by the determination of November 21, 2022 made pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of Executive Order 14071 (“Prohibitions on Certain Services as They Relate to the Maritime Transport of Crude Oil of Russian Federation Origin”) related to the maritime transport of crude oil originating from the Sakhalin-2 project (“Sakhalin-2 byproduct”) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 28, 2024, provided that the Sakhalin-2 byproduct is solely for importation into Japan.
This general license does not authorize any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized.
Effective September 14, 2023, General License No. 55, dated November 22, 2022, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License No. 55A.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932136/download?inline
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September 14, 2023: OFAC issued Russia-Related General License 72: “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on September 14, 2023”
All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked persons (collectively, the “Blocked Entities”) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, December 13, 2023, provided that any payment to a Blocked Entity is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):
- Joint Stock Company Russian Copper Company;
- Joint Stock Company United Metallurgical Company;
- Transmashholding JSC;
- Joint Stock Company Avtovaz;
- Joint Stock Company Moscow Automotive Factory Moskvich;
- Limited Liability Company Machine Building Plant Tonar;
- Publichnoe Aktsionernoe Obschestvo Sollers;
- Arctic Transshipment Limited Liability Company; or
- Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.
This general license does not authorize:
Any transactions prohibited by Directive 2 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions;
Any transactions prohibited by Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or
Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the RuHSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR other than the Blocked Entities described in this general license, unless separately authorized.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932131/download?inline
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September 15, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 29 individuals and entities in connection with the Iranian regime’s violent suppression of nationwide protests following the death of Mahsa “Zhina” Amini in custody of its ‘Morality Police,’ and the regime’s continued efforts to detain dissenting voices and restrict access to a free and open internet. OFAC’s action targets: 18 key members of the regime’s security forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF); the head of Iran’s Prisons Organization; three individuals and one company in connection with the regime’s systematic censorship and blocking of access to the internet; and three IRGC and regime-controlled media outlets––Fars News, Tasnim News and Press TV––and three senior officials.
Concurrently, the Department of State is imposing visa restrictions on 13 Iranian officials and other individuals for their involvement in the detention or killing of peaceful protestors or inhibiting their rights to freedom of expression or assembly, including through censorship via a country-wide internet shutdown in Iran. Since Mahsa Amini’s death and the protests that followed, the Department of State has imposed visa restrictions on 40 Iranian officials and other individuals for their involvement in acts targeting peaceful protestors.
- Saeed Montazerolmehdi (Montazerolmehdi)
- Hossein Amjadian (Amjadian)
- Alaaddin Aykut (Aykut)
- Abbasali Mohammadian (Mohammadian)
- Hassan Shahrestani (Shahrestani)
- Ahmad Taheri (Taheri)
- Ahmad Naderian (Naderian)
- Seyyed Khalil Safavi (Safavi)
- Delavar Alghasi-Mehr (Alghasi-Mehr)
- Mohammad Mozzami Goudarzi (Goudarzi)
- Roham Bakhsh Habibi (Habibi)
- Khodarahm Sarani (Sarani)
- Mazaher Majidi (Majidi)
- Bahman Reyhani (Reyhani)
- Jamal Shakarami (Shakarami)
- Mohammad Abdollahpour (Abdollahpour)
- Gholamhossein Gheib-Parvar (Gheib-Parvar)
- Ali Akbar Pourjamshidian (Pourjamshidian)
- Abdolreza Abedzadeh (Abedzadeh)
- Gholamali Mohammadi (Mohammadi)
- Alireza Abedinejad
- Yaftar Pazhohan Pishtaz Rayanesh (Yaftar)
- Press TV
- Tasnim News Agency (Tasnim)
- Fars News Agency
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1733
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September 18, 2023: The U.S. government announced the establishment of a humanitarian channel in Qatar (HC) to further facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance to the people of Iran consistent with the U.S. government’s longstanding support for humanitarian trade. Similar to humanitarian channels established under previous administrations, the HC is designed to support the Iranian people’s access to food, agricultural goods, medicine, and medical devices under stringent due diligence measures that guard against money laundering, misuse, and evasion of U.S. sanctions. The HC does not lift any U.S. sanctions on Iran, and the U.S. government continues to impose sanctions on Iran’s malign activity, including in response to Iran’s weapons proliferation and its support for international terrorism. To that end, OFAC added secondary sanctions on the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security.
The following individual has been added to the OFAC SDN List:
- Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230918
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September 19, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned seven individuals and four entities based in Iran, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and Turkey in connection with Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and military aircraft development. This network has facilitated shipments and financial transactions in support of the U.S.-designated Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company’s (HESA’s) UAV and military aircraft production, procurement, and maintenance activities. This action builds on OFAC’s March 9, 2023 designation of five PRC-based companies and one individual responsible for the sale and shipment of thousands of aerospace components, including those with UAV applications, to HESA.
Iran
- HESA
- Mehdi Gogerdchian (Gogerdchian)
China
- Shenzhen Jiasibo Technology Co., Ltd. (Shenzhen Jiasibo)
- Dong Wenbo (Dong)
Russia
- Delta-Aero Technical Service Center LLC (Delta-Aero)
Turkey
- Mehmet Tokdemir (Tokdemir)
- Alaaddin Aykut (Aykut)
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1745
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September 26, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 10 individuals, including several Sinaloa Cartel affiliates and fugitives, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059. Those sanctioned operate under the Los Chapitos faction of Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel. Responsible for a significant portion of the illicit fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States, the Sinaloa Cartel is one of the world’s most damaging transnational criminal organizations. Additionally, OFAC sanctioned the leader of the Clan del Golfo, one of Colombia’s largest criminal enterprises that controls most of the country’s cocaine cultivation, production, and transportation routes.
- Jorge Humberto Figueroa Benitez
- Leobardo Garcia Corrales
- Martin Garcia Corrales
- Liborio Nunez Aguirre
- Samuel Leon Alvarado
- Carlos Mario Limon Vazquez
- Mario Alberto Jimenez Castro (Jimenez Castro)
- Julio Cesar Dominguez Hernandez (Dominguez Hernandez)
- Jesus Miguel Vibanco Garcia (Vibanco Garcia)
- Jobanis de Jesus Avila Villadiego (Avila Villadiego)
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September 27, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned five entities and two individuals based in Iran, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) involved in the procurement of sensitive parts for Iran’s one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program. This network has facilitated shipments and financial transactions in support of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force Self Sufficiency Jihad Organization’s (IRGC ASF SSJO) procurement of servomotors, a critical component used in Iran’s Shahed-series UAVs. Iran has been supplying Russia with Shahed-136 UAVs to support Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. One of the servomotors procured by the network designated was recovered in the remnants of a Russia-operated Shahed-136 that was recently shot down in Ukraine.
Iran
- Pishgam Electronic Safeh Company (PESC)
- Hamid Reza Janghorbani (Janghorbani)
Hong Kong
- Hongkong Himark Electron Model Limited (Hongkong Himark)
People’s Republic of China
- Fan Yang (Fan)
Turkey
- Dal Enerji Madencilik Turizm Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi (Dal Enerji)
- Anka Port Ic Ve Dis Ticaret INSAAT Lojistik Sanayi Limited Sirketi (Anka Port)
United Arab Emirates
- Farhad Ghaedi Goods Wholesalers LLC (Farhad Ghaedi)
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1766
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September 28, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) targeted two entities and one individual for their role in undermining the peace, security, and stability of Sudan. Since the Sudanese people peacefully ousted Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, various actors, including the individual being designated, have taken steps to undermine Sudan’s efforts to establish civilian, democratic governance. His actions have obstructed efforts to reach a ceasefire to end the current conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and opposed Sudanese civilian efforts to resume Sudan’s stalled democratic transition. The two entities designated in this action are RSF-affiliated companies generating revenue from, and contributing to, the conflict in Sudan.
- Ali Karti (Karti)
- GSK Advance Company Ltd (GSK)
- Aviatrade LLC
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1769
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Fines and Penalties
BIS Imposes Penalty Against Pratt & Whitney Component Solutions to Resolve 13 Alleged Violations of the Antiboycott Regulations
September 7, 2023: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed a civil penalty of $48,750 against Pratt & Whitney Component Solutions, Inc (PWCS), located in Muskegon, Michigan, to resolve 13 violations of the antiboycott provisions of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (antiboycott regulations), as alleged in BIS’s Proposed Charging Letter. PWCS voluntarily disclosed the conduct to BIS, cooperated with the investigation by BIS’s Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC), and took remedial measures after discovering the conduct at issue, all of which resulted in a significant reduction in penalty.
As part of the settlement with BIS, PWCS admitted to the conduct set forth in the Proposed Charging Letter, which alleged 13 violations of Section 760.5 of the EAR (Failing to Report the Receipt of a Request to Engage in a Restrictive Trade Practice or Foreign Boycott Against a Country Friendly to the United States). Specifically, between May 2019 and March 2020, on thirteen occasions, PWCS received a request from Qatar Airways, a customer in Qatar, to refrain from importing Israeli-origin goods into Qatar in fulfillment of purchase orders from Qatar Airways. PWCS failed to report to BIS the receipt of these requests, as required by Section 760.5 of the Regulations.
These BIS actions were taken under the authority of the Anti-Boycott Act of 2018, a subpart of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, and its implementing regulations, the EAR. The antiboycott provisions set forth in Part 760 of the EAR discourage, and in certain circumstances prohibit, U.S. persons from taking certain actions in furtherance or support of a boycott maintained by a foreign country against a country friendly to the United States (an unsanctioned foreign boycott). In addition, U.S. persons must report to OAC their receipt of certain boycott-related requests. Reports may be filed electronically or by mail on form BIS 621-P for single transactions or on form BIS 6051P for multiple transactions involving boycott requests received in the same calendar quarter. U.S. persons located in the U.S. must postmark or electronically date stamp their reports by the last day of the month following the calendar quarter in which the underlying request was received. For U.S. persons located outside the U.S., the postmark or date stamp deadline is the last day of the second month following the calendar quarter in which the request was received.
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Justice Department Announces First Criminal Resolution Involving the Illicit Sale and Transport of Iranian Oil in Violation of U.S. Sanctions
September 8, 2023: The Justice Department announced the successful disruption of a multimillion-dollar shipment of crude oil by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a designated foreign terrorist organization, that was bound for another country. This is the first-ever criminal resolution involving a company that violated sanctions by facilitating the illicit sale and transport of Iranian oil and comes in concert with a successful seizure of over 980,000 barrels of contraband crude oil.
The contraband cargo is now the subject of a civil forfeiture action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The United States’ forfeiture complaint alleges that the oil aboard the vessel is subject to forfeiture based on U.S. terrorism and money laundering statutes.
The complaint alleges a scheme involving multiple entities affiliated with Iran’s IRGC and the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) to covertly sell and transport Iranian oil to a customer abroad. Participants in the scheme attempted to disguise the origin of the oil using ship-to-ship transfers, false automatic identification system reporting, falsified documents and other means. The complaint further alleges that the charterer of the vessel used the U.S. financial system to facilitate the transportation of Iranian oil.
The complaint further alleges that the oil constitutes the property of, or provided a “source of influence” over, the IRGC and the IRGC-QF, both of which have been designated by the United States as foreign terrorist organizations, and that the oil facilitated money laundering. The documents allege that profits from oil sales support the IRGC’s full range of malign activities, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, support for terrorism and both domestic and international human rights abuses.
Funds successfully forfeited with a connection to a state sponsor of terrorism may in whole or in part be directed to the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund.
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September 12, 2023: 88 FR 62534: Ruben Beltran Pedroza (“Pedroza”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a) on November 3, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Specifically, Pedroza was convicted of smuggling a Smith & Wesson M&P Shield .40 pistol from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Pedroza to 34 months of confinement, with credit for time served, three years of supervised release and a $100 assessment. BIS received notice of Pedroza’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 554. As provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations, BIS provided notice and opportunity for Pedroza to make a written submission to BIS. BIS has not received a written submission from Pedroza. The Bureau of Industry and Security has decided to deny Pedroza’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of five years from the date of Pedroza’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Pedroza had an interest at the time of his conviction.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-19678
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September 12, 2023: 88 FR 62535: Jonathan Santiago (“Santiago”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a) on October 25, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Specifically, Santiago was convicted of smuggling a Smith & Wesson M&P Shield .40 pistol from the United States to Mexico. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Santiago to 42 months of confinement, with credit for time served and three years of supervised release. BIS received notice of Santiago’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 554. As provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations, BIS provided notice and opportunity for Santiago to make a written submission to BIS. BIS has not received a written submission from Santiago. The Bureau of Industry and Security has decided to deny Santiago’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of seven years from the date of Santiago’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Santiago had an interest at the time of his conviction.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-19679
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September 12, 2023: 88 FR 62536: Nicholas Ayala (“Ayala”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371 and 18 U.S.C. 554 on November 16, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Specifically, Ayala was convicted of conspiring to smuggle various handguns and firearms from the United States to Ecuador. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 36 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $400 special assessment. BIS received notice of Ayala’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 371 and 18 U.S.C. 554. As provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations, BIS provided notice and opportunity for Ayala to make a written submission to BIS. BIS has not received a written submission from Ayala. The Bureau of Industry and Security has decided to deny Ayala’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Ayala’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Ayala had an interest at the time of his conviction.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-19680
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September 12, 2023: 88 FR 62533: Peter Sotis (“Sotis”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C 1701, et seq.) (“IEEPA”) and 18 U.S.C. 554 on January 12, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Specifically, Sotis was convicted of conspiring to export, exported and attempted to export and smuggling four (4) rEvo III rebreathers from the United States to Libya without the required license or written approval. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced him to 57 months in prison, three years of supervised release and a $300 special assessment. BIS received notice of Sotis conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 371, IEEPA and 18 U.S.C 554. As provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations, BIS provided notice and opportunity for Sotis to make a written submission to BIS. BIS received and considered a written submission from Sotis. The Bureau of Industry and Security has decided to deny Sotis’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Sotis’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Sotis had an interest at the time of his conviction.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-19681
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September 14, 2023: A federal jury has convicted Jalal Hajavi of conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) and the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (“ITSR”), smuggling goods from the United States, unlawfully exporting and reexporting goods from the U.S. to Iran without a license, and unlawfully engaging in transactions and dealings based on his participation in a scheme to unlawfully export heavy equipment from the U.S. to Iran by routing the shipments though the United Arab Emirates.
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September 15, 2023: 88 FR 63550: Katie Ellen O’Brien (“O’Brien”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a) and 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2) on January 17, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. Specifically, O’Brien was convicted of making false statements or misrepresentations to the U.S. Government during the course of an investigation and smuggling and attempting to smuggle firearms from the United States to Mexico. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced O’Brien to 60 months confinement with credit for time served, three years supervised release, and a $600 special assessment.
Following issuance of the April 12, 2023 Order, BIS received notification that the last known address listed on the Order was incorrect. Specifically, BIS has since learned that another individual named Katie O’Brien, who is not the intended subject of the Denial Order, resides at the address listed on the April 12, 2023 Order. BIS has subsequently obtained updated information that indicates that the last known address for the individual who is the intended subject of the Denial Order is 1026 East Spence Avenue, Unit 103, Tempe, AZ 85281. Therefore, BIS is amending the April 12, 2023, Order to reflect the last known address of the individual convicted of the listed offenses for purposes of the denial of this individual’s export privileges.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-20049
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September 21, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $9,618,477 settlement with 3M Company (“3M”). 3M has agreed to settle its potential civil liability for 54 apparent violations of OFAC sanctions on Iran that arose from its subsidiary’s sale of reflective license plate sheeting to an Iranian entity controlled by the Iranian Law Enforcement Forces. Between September 2016 and September 2018, 3M East AG sold 43 orders of this product to a reseller with knowledge that it was destined for a customer in Iran. Additionally, one U.S.-person employee of another 3M subsidiary was substantively involved in these sales. OFAC determined that these apparent violations were egregious and were voluntarily self-disclosed.
Separately, OFAC also announced a settlement with Emigrant Bank (Emigrant). Emigrant agreed to remit $31,867.90 to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of sanctions against Iran. For approximately 26 years, Emigrant maintained a Certificate of Deposit account on behalf of two individuals ordinarily resident and located in Iran, for which it processed 30 transactions between June 2017 and March 2021 totaling $91,051.13. Emigrant had actual knowledge of the Iranian address and apparent location of the accountholders during this period. The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that Emigrant’s conduct was non-egregious and voluntarily self-disclosed.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230921
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September 28, 2023: 88 FR 66807: The Bureau of Industry and Security renewed an order denying PJSC Aeroflot’s (“Aeroflot”) export privileges for a period of 180 days on the ground that Aeroflot has engaged in a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR. Therefore, Aeroflot, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
- Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control document;
- Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
- Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:
- Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of Aeroflot any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by Aeroflot of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby Aeroflot acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from Aeroflot of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Obtain from Aeroflot in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
- Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by Aeroflot, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by Aeroflot if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to Aeroflot by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21173
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September 28, 2023: 88 FR 66805: The Bureau of Industry and Security renewed an order denying Azur Air’s (“Azur”) export privileges for a period of 180 days on the grounds that Azur has engaged in a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR. Therefore, Azur, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
- Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control document;
- Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
- Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:
- Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of Azur any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by Azur of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby Azur acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from Azur of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Obtain from Azur in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
- Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by Azur, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by Azur if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to Azur by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21172
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September 28, 2023: 88 FR 66802: The Bureau of Industry and Security renewed an order denying UTair Aviation JSC’s (“UTair”) export privileges for a period of 180 days on the grounds that UTair has engaged in a pattern of repeated, ongoing and/or continuous apparent violations of the EAR. Therefore, UTair, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
- Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control document;
- Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
- Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:
- Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of UTair any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by UTair of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby UTair acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from UTair of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Obtain from UTair in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
- Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by UTair, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by UTair if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to UTair by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.