This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through October 31, 2023. The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.
See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.
REGULATORY UPDATES
The President
President Biden Continues National Emergency With Respect To Syria.
October 12, 2023: 88 FR 71271: On October 14, 2019, by Executive Order 13894, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in and in relation to Syria.
The situation in and in relation to Syria, and in particular the actions by the Government of Turkey to conduct a military offensive into northeast Syria, undermines the campaign to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, endangers civilians, and further threatens to undermine the peace, security, and stability in the region, and continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, the President determined that the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13894 of October 14, 2019, must continue in effect beyond October 14, 2023. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act, the President continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13894 with respect to the situation in and in relation to Syria.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-22862
*******
Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)
DDTC Name and Address Changes Posted To Website
October 2 through 30, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at
- Change in name and address from General Electric International Operations Company (Abu Dhabi), 17th Floor, WTC The Office Tower, Hamdan Street, Box No. 34637, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC – Abu Dhabi at Al Hisn, East 6, C5, Building Amna Ahmed Mohamed Onwani, 621, Zayet The First St., Al Hisn, Abu Dhabi 20035, United Arab Emirates, and all locations in the United Arab Emirates due to corporate reorganization.
- Change in name from NGK Spark Plugs Co., Ltd. to Niterra Co., Ltd. due to corporate reorganization.
- Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc. (Argentina), Enrique Butty 275, 6th Floor, Office 103C, Ciudad Autonoma de Buenos Aires, C1001AFA, Argentina to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC, Sucursal Argentina at Maipu 1300, Piso 9, Ciudad Autonoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina, and all locations in Argentina due to corporate reorganization.
- Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc. DLF Cyber City, Sector 25A DLF Phase III, Building No 7 A, Gurgaon 122002, India and AIFCS Bldg 1, Rafi Marg, New Delhi, India to GE India Industrial Pvt Ltd. A-18 First Floor, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase II, New Delhi 110020, India, and all locations in India due to corporate reorganization.
- Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc. 6F, No. 8, Minsheng E. Rd., Section 3, NanShan Minshen Bldg, Taipei, Taiwan and 7F, No. 8, Minsheng E. Rd., Taipei, Taiwan to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC – Taiwan Branch 15F-2, No. 168 Section 3, Nanjing E. Rd., Taipei City, 10488 Taiwan, and all locations in Taiwan due to corporate reorganization.
- Change in name from Netherlands Ministry of Defence’s Defence Materiel Organisation to Materiel and IT Command, ‘Commando Materieel en IT.’ due to government reorganization.
- Change in name from Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering Co., Ltd. to Hanwha Ocean Co., Ltd. due to acquisition.
- Change in name from LR Nederland B.V. to LRQA Nederland B.V. due to corporate rebranding.
- Change in name from General Electric International, Inc. (Chile) to Industrial C&S Chile SpA. due to corporate reorganization.
- Change in name from Sogeti Deutschland GmbH to Capgemini Engineering Deutschland S.A.S. & Co. KG. due to corporate reorganization.
- Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc., Carrera 7 #166-50, Oficina 02-109 B, Bogota D.C., Colombia to Aviation Systems North America LLC, Sucursal Colombia, Carrera 7 #71-21, Torre B, Oficina 602, Bogota D.C., Colombia due to corporate reorganization.
- Change in name from Aerojet Rocketdyne Holdings, Inc. to L3Harris Technologies, Inc. due to merger.
- Change in name from Quantel-USA, Inc. to Lumibird Photonics USA, Inc. due to acquisition by Lumibird.
- Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc., 5th Floor, Tatweer Tower, King Fahad Road, Riyadh 11433, Saudi Arabia to Branch of General Electric Aviation Systems North America LLC, Building Number 7546, Qurtubah District, Unit 1110, Riyadh 13244, Saudi Arabia due to corporate reorganization.
- Change in names from STS Aviation Services International Limited, NAAS Aviation Services International Limited, and Triumph Aviation Services International Limited to STS Aviation Services Ireland Limited due to merger.
- Change in name from Pinnacles Solutions, Inc. to Pinnacles Solutions, LLC due to acquisition by NANA Regional Corporation, Inc.
- Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc., Calle Osiris, Num. 13, Planta 1, Edificio Osiris, Madrid 28037, Spain to GE Aviation Systems North America LLC, Sucursal en Espana, Spaces Rio, Calle de Manzanares, 4, Madrid 28005, Spain due to corporate reorganization.
- Change in name and address from General Electric International, Inc, C Ring Road, Najma Intersection, Doha, Qatar to GE Aviation Systems North America QSTP-B, Qatar Science & Technology Park-B, Al Gharafa Street, Al Rayyan, Education City, Doha, Qatar due to corporate reorganization.
*******
DDTC Final Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations Posted to Website
October 11, 2022 through May 25, 2023: On October 12, 2023 the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following Final CJ Determinations for CJ’s adjudicated between October 11, 2022 and May 25, 2023, on its website at:
Readers may find these determinations helpful when performing self-classification work.
| Model Name | Description | Final Determination Date
|
Final Determination | Manufacturer |
| Gerber files for a printed circuit board (part number 33244-20 PCB) used for proof-of-concept during the development of a Variable Emissivity Panel for Identification of Friend or Foe (VEPIFF) | Gerber files describing a flexible printed circuit board | 2023-05-25 | USML Category XI(d) | Intellisense Systems, Inc |
| Talyn Platform, Model & Version 1 | Unmanned aerial electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) cargo transportation platform that can operate without airport infrastructure | 2023-05-25 | Seek CCATS | Talyn Air, Inc |
| Quad Element P I N Photodiode, Part Number OG-QPPP-7000-25 | An InGaAs-based PIN photodiode | 2023-05-25 | USML Category XII(e)(1) | Optogration, Inc |
| SAFEScreen Psychophys-iological Touch Screen Stress Analyzer (PTSSA)TM | An investigative tool to determine deceptiveness or inappropriate (unlawful) behavior patterns of individuals being tested | 2023-05-25 | EAR99 | THORAD LLC |
| 2x Extender, See-spot Device for ECOSI, Part Number 14245-3082 | Provides magnification and greater daylight operation capabilities to the ECOSI (a device used to see the infrared spot on targets produced by coded target markers and laser target designators) | 2023-05-25 | CCL ECCN 7A611.x | Optics 1, Inc |
| Griffin ESAF Det Socket Kapton Disc, part number 332400-C; Initiator Kapton Sleeve, part number 332629-002 B; and Initiator Polyimide Wrap, part number 332845-A | Electrically insulating pieces | 2023-05-25 | EAR99 | Excelitas Technologies Corp |
| NW-230 Engine, Model and Part Number: NW-230 | A two-stroke reciprocating engine system planned for use in unmanned systems including aerial vehicles | 2023-05-25 | EAR99 | Northwest ULD, Inc |
| Written training material or PowerPoint presentations for de-escalation training, post traumatic stress disorder counselor training, and humanitarian aid | Training and humanitarian assistance including food, water, and clothing | 2023-05-25 | EAR99 | National De-escalation Training Center |
| Training on the Operation and Use of the Mi-17 Helicopter | Training of foreign personnel on the operation and use of the utility transport model of the Mi-17 helicopter in an Mi-17 simulator | 2023-05-25 | USML Category VIII(i) | Concord XXI USA, LLC |
| Microneedle Sensor Patch for Continuous Interstitial Fluid Cortisol Measurement | A skin-worn continuous cortisol monitor device that can detect circulating levels of cortisol to assess cognitive performance and fatigue | 2023-05-25 | EAR99 | Biolinq Incorporated |
| Mask Light Amplified Microphone, Part Number: N1001682-00 | Hands-free supplemental cockpit lighting for fixed wing aircraft that use electret microphones | 2023-05-25 | CCL ECCN 9A610.x | Gentex Corporation |
| Rapid Attack Payload Targeted Release (RAPTR) System, consisting of 1) RAPTR Control Module, Part Number 1C0512; 2) RAPTR Energetic Module, Part Number D12476; 3) RAPTR Handheld, Part Number EB0721-600; 4) RAPTR Adapter Plate, Part Number F22104 | Weaponization system for unmanned air and vehicle platforms, and its constituent elements | 2023-05-23 | RAPTR System: USML Category IV(a)(6) 1) Control Module: USML Category IV(c) 2) Energetic Module: USML Category V(a)(15) 3) Handheld: Category USML Category IV(c) 4) Adapter Plate: USML Category IV(c) | Ensign-Bickford Aerospace & Defense Company |
| Optical Transceiver, D-Lightsys, consisting of part numbers ACSM2410IP201 and ACSM2410IP202, firmware version 1.0.901-629-4494 | Electro-optical transceiver consisting of a pair of transmitter and receiver modules | 2023-05-18 | USML Category VIII(h)(1) | Radiall America, Inc |
| LED 360-degree Situational Awareness Kit with Infrared, Model 07630, NSN 6220-01-629-4494 | 360-degree situational awareness infrared external lighting kit | 2023-05-18 | CCL ECCN 0A606.y.12 | Truck-Lite Co., LLC |
| 100G Ethernet Network Switch with RESCUE module, Model and Version Number: SX-154-4110, Part Number: SX1544110 | An electronic component used to provide encrypted bridging between different security domains | 2023-05-18 | USML Category XIII(b)(4) | Spectranetix, Inc |
| Avcon King Air Hardpoints, Model KA HARDPOINT | Kit consisting of Internal mounts and racks that, once installed, allows for the attachment of external stores on the wings of certain models of the King Air aircraft | 2023-05-15 | EAR99 | Butler National Corporation |
| IXD Tera, Model V1.3 (1 Gigabit) (part number IXD-MC) and Model 2.0 (10 Gigabit) (part number IXD-HC) | Hardware and operating system software in a custom configuration to provide uni-directional and bidirectional transfers between two networks | 2023-05-15 | Seek CCATS | Owl Cyber Defense Solutions, LLC |
| XDE Radium, part numbers XDE‐RAD‐OWT‐OI‐LOQ v1.4 (optical) and XDE‐RAD‐OWT‐DI‐LOQ (digital) | Security device for computers and networks | 2023-05-15 | Seek CCATS | Owl Cyber Defense Solutions, LLC |
| Aeternus and LLUL-21 3D Printed Night Vision Housings | 3D printed night vision housings designed for handheld or helmet-mounted devices | 2023-04-13 | EAR99 | Low Light Innovations LLC |
| Joint Chemical Agent Detector – Solid Liquid Adapter (JCAD-SLA) Kit, Part Number: 5-15-35000 | A chemical particulates kit that gives operators the ability to identify trace amounts of solid and liquid residues, including explosives, narcotics, pharmaceuticals, and fourth generation agents | 2023-04-13 | CCL ECCN 1A607.j | Smiths Detection US, LLC |
| Joint Chemical Agent Detector – Solid Liquid Adapter (JCAD-SLA) Kit, Part Number: 5-15-35000 | A chemical particulates kit that gives operators the ability to identify trace amounts of solid and liquid residues, including explosives, narcotics, pharmaceuticals, and fourth generation agents | 2023-04-13 | CCL ECCN 1A607.j | Smiths Detection US, LLC |
| Holographic Enabled Display System, Version 3.0 (HEDS3), and Augmented Reality Display System (ARDS) | Holographic display systems that overlay information received from sensors on what the user is viewing | 2023-04-13 | EAR99 | Creative Microsystems Corporation |
| GC Patrol Shield Model 3.1 | A lightweight shield that exceeds the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) NIJ 0108.01 Level III Standard | 2023-03-22 | USML Category XIII(e)(5) | Graphene Composites Usa, Inc |
| LumY, Model 2302 V2, Part Number 12002 | Through-wall radar sensor capable of 2 dimensional detection | 2023-03-22 | USML Category XI(a)(3)(xvi) | Lumineye Inc |
| Foresight Advisory Services, Model Number: LNGVWS-FO01 Part Number: 001, and Foresight Facilitation Training, Model Number: LNGVWS-FA01 Part Number: 001 | Foresight advisory services on long-range thinking and strategic planning using futures literacy, futures studies, and foresight, and training in facilitation for foresight, to empower groups in their search of insights when doing foresight exercises | 2023-03-17 | EAR99 | Longviews S.R.L. |
| Mode-locked Laser, Model MLO-100, Part Numbers MLO-100-100 and MLO-100-200 and Mode-Lockable Fiber Laser Oscillator, Model FO-100, Part Numbers FO-100-100 and FO-100-200 | A laser and a mode-lockable fiber laser oscillator, which is a component of the laser | 2023-03-14 | EAR99 | Vescent Photonics LLC |
| Back Driven Recovery Assist, Secure and Traverse System (BDRAST) Control Module Part Number: 0711617-001 | An integrated hydraulic control module, designed to control the hydraulics in a helicopter RAST system | 2023-03-14 | USML Category VIII(h)(5) | Arkwin Industries, Inc |
| Fuel System Preservation Cart, Model & Part Number: S-277LM | Fuel filtration cart for a military aircraft | 2023-03-14 | CCL ECCN 9B610.a | Maney Aircraft, Inc |
| Fuselage Section of an A-4N Skyhawk Aircraft, Serial Number 14483 | A-4N Skyhawk fuselage that does not include the wings, tail, engine, sensors, avionics, communications, or navigation systems | 2023-03-14 | CCL ECCN 9A610.x | Top Aces Corp |
| Advanced Technology Search Tool; Crossover Scenario Modelling Tool; Capability Spider Chart; and Dynamic Technology Database | Software and digital tools for assessing technology competitiveness and identifying critical areas of investment | 2023-03-14 | EAR99 | TechNext, Inc |
| tM 35, Part Number: 72020 | A thermal imaging device that can be attached to a rifle scope and can also be used as a stand-alone monocular | 2023-02-22 | USML Category XII(c)(2)(i) | Swarovski Optik North America |
| 2001 AMGN, Model M1043A2, VIN: 190440 | Vehicle, model M1043A2, VIN 190440 | 2023-02-22 | USML Category VII(b) | Dakap s.r.o. |
| Chilled Water Expansion Tank, Part Number: 142-232ITAR | Expansion Tank for a naval warship | 2023-02-06 | CCL ECCN 8A609.x | Samuel Pressure Vessel Group Inc |
| VXE30 Unmanned Aerial System, Part Number: 107-102560 | Vertical Take Off and Landing (VTOL) small Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) designed for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) | 2023-02-06 | Seek CCATS | Edge Autonomy Holdings, LLC |
| Enhanced Waterside Security Barrier (EWSB), Version 1 & Version 2, Part Numbers: 3114M-001 & 3144M-00 | A floating barrier system designed to protect ships and waterfront assets from waterside threats | 2023-01-31 | Seek CCATS | Oceanetics |
| DCON Mitt, Model DCON-MITT, Part Number: CW-MFMT-CT10-01MT | Absorbent microfiber mitt used to remove contaminants from surfaces | 2023-01-31 | EAR99 | Tradeways, Ltd |
| Advanced Tactics Courses | Close Air Support (CAS) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) courses | 2023-01-20 | USML Category IX(e)(3) | The Vidar Group, LLC |
| 3D Hyperspectral Imaging, Model: Visualizer 3.1, Update 3.1 | A radiation-imaging algorithm used to estimate the energy, and distribution in space, of radiation sources | 2023-01-12 | Seek CCATS | H3D, Inc |
| FuzeX, Model and Version Number: FuzeX | An inert system that acts as a safe classroom alternative to aid in the training and education of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel in Render Safe Procedures (RSPs) | 2023-01-12 | CCL ECCN 0A614.a | Explotrain, LLC |
| MAGCOM Version 1, Part Number 01000064 | A wireless transmission system that converts an input signal to magnetic waves for both transmission and reception of the received magnetic waves, which are then converted to an output signal | 2023-01-11 | USML Category XII(e)(8) | ZRF, LLC |
| Mediator Fluid | A solution of one or more ferrocene derivatives, lithium chloride (LiCl), and water, used as a liquid desiccant to absorb moisture in certain applications | 2023-01-11 | USML Category V(f)(4)(xv) | Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) |
| Multi Weapon Aiming Device, Model and Version: MWAD Version 1, Part Number: MB-MWAD | A ballistic computer that digitally displays range and azimuth for indirect fire weapon systems | 2023-01-11 | USML Category XII(c)(2)(iii) | MATBOCK, LLC |
| LX32 | A component for a PIN-diode linear attenuator | 2022-12-30 | USML Category XII(e)(1) | Teledyne Technologies Incorporated |
| “Bread Box” Small Explosive Protective Transport Bag | Protective bag for transporting small explosives and energetics | 2022-12-30 | EAR99 | Hazard Protection Systems, Inc |
| Multicoupler Frame, Part Number SP-4326-1 | A frame that holds up to four one-to-four multicouplers and allows radiofrequency signals to be distributed to multiple receiving devices | 2022-12-30 | Seek CCATS | Silver Palm Technologies, LLC |
| Helios, Versions: 1.0-1.2 | Cybersecurity platforms designed to mitigate against memory corruption exploits | 2022-12-30 | Seek CCATS | Idaho Scientific, LLC |
| Max-Viz 1400 Enhanced Vision System Cameras; P/Ns 756500103, 756500104, 756500105, 756500106, 756500107, and 756500108 | Aircraft camera designed to enhance situational awareness during takeoff and landing | 2022-12-30 | CCL ECCN 6A003.b.4.b | Astronics PECO, Inc |
| FLIGHTLAB AH-64E Flight Dynamics Development Model, Version FDM-AH-64E-A | AH-64E simulation software used to perform variable fidelity modeling and engineering analysis | 2022-12-30 | USML Category VIII(i) | Advanced Rotorcraft Technology, Inc |
| Polyalphaolefin Resistant Shielded 760 Double End Z Shape Right Angle Cable Assy, Part Number: 178-6784-001 | A shielded cable assembly that is incorporated into a multi-function radar that is used in an air defense system | 2022-12-30 | USML Category XII(e)(1) | Teledyne Technologies Incorporated |
| Advanced Pilot Training for the Mi-17 Helicopter | Advanced pilot training on foreign origin Mi-17 helicopters | 2022-12-30 | USML Category VIII(i) | Concord XXI USA, LLC |
| Remote Initiation System | Wireless detonation system for energetic charges | 2022-12-30 | Seek CCATS | Ensign-Bickford Aerospace & Defense Company |
| Ultra 8000 Series Multi-Sensor Airborne Gimbals, Models 8000, 8500, 8500 XR, and 8500 FW | 9” stabilized gimbal assemblies incorporating an InSb midwave-infrared (MWIR) focal plane array (FPA). The different sub-models have different tracking and zoom capabilities | 2022-12-30 | CCL ECCN 6A003.b.4.a | Teledyne Technologies Incorporated |
| FuseBlox, Part Number 001AZ-103 | A self-aligning docking and connection device that can dock without requiring relative velocity between the docking spacecraft | 2022-12-30 | CCL ECCN 9A515.x | SpaceWorks Enterprises, Inc |
| Hearing Protection Helmet (HPH) System, Models HPH-Basic, HPHComm-Boom, HPH-Comm-Cup, and HPH-Comm-SPP | Helmet providing hearing protection, head protection, and communication capabilities | 2022-12-30 | Seek CCATS | Creare LLC |
| Night Vision Goggle (NVG) Flight Training to Foreign Military Personnel | Night Vision Goggle (NVG) Flight Training to Foreign Military Personnel | 2022-12-30 | USML Category XII(f) | Concord XXI USA, LLC |
| Multi-Function Stationary Infantry Target (MF-SIT) lifter with LOMAH, Model and Part Number MFSIT-155 and Stationary Armor Target (SAT) with LOMAH, Model and Part Number SAT-AA25 | Stationary ballistic targets upgraded with a location of miss and hit (LOMAH) electronic device that indicates performance accuracy | 2022-12-30 | USML Category IX(a)(1)(ii) | InVeris Training Solutions, Inc |
| Cuvier Deep Hybrid Autonomous Underwater Vehicle, Model Cuvier Deep; and Cuvier Deep Hybrid Autonomous Underwater Vehicle – Future Configuration | Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (UAVs) | 2022-12-21 | CCL ECCN 8A001.c | 3D at Depth, Inc |
| Inlet Shell, Outlet Shell, and Diaphragm (Part Numbers M0 101793, A2 101792, and M0 101663) for Diaphragm Tank | Machined tank shell of aluminum, machined tank shell of aluminum with helicoil inserts, and formed diaphragm of Viton-F | 2022-12-21 | Seek CCATS | Benchmark Space Systems, Inc |
| Metallic Hose Assemblies, Part Numbers AE1002867H and AE100120H v.A | Metallic hose assemblies, pneumatic | 2022-12-21 | USML Category XX(c) | Danfoss Power Solutions II, LLC |
| Procurement Specification – Cathelco Marine Growth Prevention System (MGPS), Model and Version Number: Specification PS-256-01 | Technical information created for the purpose of qualifying equipment proposed for an ITAR vessel | 2022-12-13 | USML Category VI(g) | EVAC North America Inc |
| Advanced Architecture Phase, Amplitude and Time Simulator (A2PATS) | Test environment for electronic subsystems of various platforms | 2022-11-25 | USML Category XI(a)(11) | Textron, Inc |
| Ball Screw Assembly, part numbers 2417 and 2418 (sub-supplier part numbers TS05957-0500-02 and TS05957-0400-02) | Screw spindle shaft and a nut packaged as an assembly with recirculating balls | 2022-11-22 | Seek CCATS | Learjet Inc |
| Ball screw assembly for a missile flight control surface | Ball Screw Assembly | 2022-11-22 | CCL ECCN 9A604.x | Learjet Inc |
| Glass Preform, Part Number: R-9869 | Glass preform for a naval gun round | 2022-11-22 | EAR99 | Electro-Glass Products, Inc |
| Overvoltage Spark Gap, Part Number OGP-44R-21 | Rugged ceramic-metal Krypton-filled switch used in a crowbar circuit | 2022-11-09 | USML Category XII(e)(1) | Excelitas Technologies Corp |
| Thermal Module, Model No. ODI 384, version 1.0, Part No. ODI-MOD384 | A 384×288 focal plane array thermal sensor linked to a control board and to a 1280×1024 micro-LED display, intended for OEMs to build into their hand-held or riflescope enclosure | 2022-11-09 | USML Category XII(e)(4) | Outcome Driven Innovation Inc |
| Common Control Module (CCM), Part Number A0033 | System that augments a UAV flight control system | 2022-11-09 | USML Category VIII(h)(17) | The SURVICE Engineering Company |
| Bid Information for Ocean Research Vessel No. NCPOR/VOM-14/1/2022 | Information associated with a response to a Tender Notice issued by India’s National Centre for Polar & Ocean Research (NCPOR) for a new Ocean Research Vessel | 2022-11-02 | Seek CCATS | TAI Engineers LLC |
| Container MK 825 MOD 0, Model DL8410944, Part Number: 8410944 | Shipping and storage container for a missile | 2022-11-02 | USML Category IV(c) | B&P Manufacturing |
| Project Hermes Radar | An airborne detect and avoid radar for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) operating in the 15.4-16.6 GHz range | 2022-11-02 | CCL ECCN 6A008.e | Echodyne Corp |
| Ruggedized Drone Mitigation System, Model Number DD-SP360 and Ruggedized Handheld Drone Mitigation Unit, Model Number HH-SP1 | Ruggedized drone mitigation systems using a dual-band, dual-antenna system that provides 360-degree coverage for a range up to five kilometers | 2022-11-02 | USML Category XI(a)(4)(iii) | Vigilant Drone Defense Inc |
| C137 Ammunition Container, Part Number: 9804981 | Container used for the storage and transportation of a rocket | 2022-11-02 | USML Category IV(c) | Nammo Defense Systems Inc |
| Information associated with the design of an Ocean Research Vessel | Information associated with a proposal for the design of the NOAA Class B Ocean Research Vessel | 2022-11-02 | Seek CCATS | TAI Engineers LLC |
| Hi-Q Antennae, Models: Hi-Q-4-OTM, Hi-Q-4.5-OTM, Hi-Q-5-OTM, Hi-Q-6-OTM, Hi-Q-OTM-HVY, and Hi-Q-MRZR | High frequency tunable antennnas that resonate and receive radio frequency signals in the HF 1.8 Mhz to 30 Mhz spectrum | 2022-10-31 | CCL ECCN 3A611.x | Viking Exports LLC |
| Ultra 6000 | A medium-wave infrared (MWIR) thermal imaging system for commercial airborne operations | 2022-10-31 | CCL ECCN 6A003.b.4.a | Teledyne Technologies Incorporated |
| (1) Sea Scan Ranger, (2) Ranger 750, and (3) Ranger 1500 | Synthetic Aperture Sonars (SAS), without real-time processing, designed for Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) | 2022-10-31 | CCL ECCN 6A991: (1) and (2); Seek CCATS: (3) | Atlas North America, LLC |
| Odyssey International | Autonomous navigation and hazard avoidance software for unmanned maritime and ground platforms | 2022-10-31 | USML Category VI(g) | Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc |
| GSM Geo-Location | Cellphone geolocation software | 2022-10-28 | Seek CCATS | Defentek Inc |
| Nomex False Deck Panel, Part Numbers 100009, 100156, 100164, 221910, 221911, 221912, and SM3252 | False deck panel for use inside navy vessels. The panel operates as a floor for the sailors to walk on | 2022-10-28 | CCL ECCN 8A609.x | Plascore, Inc |
| T Series Gamma Detector Module, Model T410 | Modules that detect gamma radiation from a standoff distance | 2022-10-11 | Seek CCATS | H3D, Inc |
*******
Department of Defense
DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Oman
October 3, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Oman of TOW 2B Radio Frequency Missiles (BGM-71F-7-RF) and Support and related equipment for an estimated cost of $70 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of Oman, a friendly country that continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. Further, the proposed sale will improve the Royal Army of Oman’s capability to meet current and future threats by enhancing the strength of its homeland defense. Oman will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and services into its armed forces.
*******
DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Spain
October 4, 2023 – The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Spain of PATRIOT Configuration-3+ Modernized Fire Units and related equipment for an estimated cost of $2.8 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by improving the security of a NATO ally which is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. Further, the proposed sale of the PATRIOT missile system will improve Spain’s missile defense capability, increase the defensive capabilities of its military, and support its goal of improving national and territorial defense and interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces. Spain will use the PATRIOT to defend its territorial integrity and for regional stability. Spain will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.
*******
DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Finland
October 23, 2023 – The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Finland of Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missiles-Extended Range (AARGM-ER) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $500 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by improving the security of a NATO Ally that is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. Further, the proposed sale will improve Finland’s capability to meet current and future threats by strengthening its self-defense capabilities and ensuring interoperability with United States and other allied forces. Finland will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.
*******
DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Lithuania
October 23, 2023 – The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Lithuania of AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $100 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a NATO Ally that is an important force for ensuring peace and stability in Europe. Further, the proposed sale will be for use with the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) and will improve Lithuania’s capability to conduct self-defense and regional security missions while enhancing interoperability with the U.S. and other NATO members. Lithuania will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.
*******
DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To The United Kingdom
October 23, 2023 – The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of the United Kingdom of Joint Air-to-Ground Missiles (JAGM) for an estimated cost of $957.4 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a NATO Ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. Further, the proposed sale will improve the United Kingdom’s capability to meet current and future threats. The United Kingdom will use the enhanced capability to strengthen its homeland defense and deter regional threats. The United Kingdom will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment and services into its armed forces.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/united-kingdom-joint-air-ground-missiles-jagm
*******
DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan
October 24, 2023 – The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Japan of Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM) Block 2B Tactical Missiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $74.6 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a major ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Indo-Pacific region. Further, the proposed sale will improve Japan’s capability to meet current and future threats by providing significantly enhanced self-defense for surface units defending/transiting/patrolling critical air and sea lines of communication and will not alter the basic military balance in the region.
*******
DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Latvia
October 24, 2023 – The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Latvia of M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and related equipment for an estimated cost of $220 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale, which will support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a NATO Ally that is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. Further, the proposed sale will improve Latvia’s capability to meet current and future threats and will enhance its interoperability with U.S. and other allied forces. Latvia will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/latvia-m142-high-mobility-artillery-rocket-systems
*******
Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
Commerce Issued Rule to Strengthen National Security Partnership to Secure Semiconductor Supply Chains with Republic of Korea
October 13, 2023: The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a rule updating the general authorizations for Samsung and SK hynix— companies headquartered in the Republic of Korea (RoK) – for their semiconductor fabrication facilities in the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Samsung’s and SK hynix’s PRC facilities are Validated End-Users (VEUs). VEUs can apply for, and after national security review and approval by the U.S. government, obtain a general authorization to acquire certain items rather than seeking multiple individual licenses. The updated rule updates the items that may be exported to these companies under the VEU authorization.
The updated rule allows these companies to continue their operations in the PRC. The VEU authorizations announced in the updated rule reflect close consultations between the United States and ROK through various channels, including the Korea-U.S. Supply Chain and Commercial Dialogue (SCCD) and the SCCD Working Group on Export Controls announced in November 2022.
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/docman/?task=doc_download&gid=3351
*******
BIS Announces Implementation of 2022 Wassenaar Arrangement Decisions
October 17, 2023: 88 FR 71932: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) maintains, as part of its Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the Commerce Control List (CCL), which identifies certain items subject to Department of Commerce jurisdiction. During the December 2022 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA) Plenary meeting, Participating States of the WA (Participating States) made certain decisions affecting the WA dual-use and munitions control lists, which BIS is now implementing via amendments to the CCL. BIS seeks comments on restricting STA eligibility for countries in EAR Country Group A:5 of certain technology for the development of supersonic aero gas turbine engine components controlled under ECCN 9E003.k, formerly controlled under ECCN 9E001 as part of its ongoing assessment of current export control licensing policy.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-22299
*******
BIS Implements Export Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing Items
October 25, 2023: 88 FR 73424: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released the interim final rule (IFR) “Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use”, which amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement controls on advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs), computer commodities that contain such ICs, and certain semiconductor manufacturing items. The IFR also made other EAR changes to ensure appropriate related controls, including on certain “U.S. person” activities. The IFR updated the technical parameters used for classifying items controlled under ECCN 3A090 to counter workarounds for the former controls that entailed using larger numbers of smaller data chips to match the power of one restricted chip.
The IFR also created new .z paragraphs for nine ECCNs (3A001.z, 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 5A002.z, 5A004.z, 5A992.z, 5D002.z, and 5D992.z) to capture items the BIS determined have performance levels that meet or exceed relevant parameters, and in certain cases, requires exporters to identify the .z items in the electronic export information filing and/or the commercial invoice for export clearance.
Additionally, the IFR expanded the end-use controls in EAR §744.23, imposing a license requirement on the export, reexport, and transfer of advanced computing items identified in ECCN 3A090, 4A090 or one of the new .z paragraphs to or within any country that is not a D:1, D:4, D:5 country, or the reexport and in-country transfer from or within Macau or a D:5 country of 3E001 items developed by an entity or parent entity based in Macau or a D:5 country.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-23049
*******
BIS Announces 90 Day Moratorium on Firearms and Ammunition Export Licenses
October 27, 2023: Effective October 27, 2023, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) paused for approximately 90 days the issuance of new export licenses involving certain firearms, related components, night vision devices and ammunition under its jurisdiction and the provision of new export assistance activities for such products to all non-governmental end users worldwide, apart from those in certain destinations to facilitate a review of export control policies. The BIS may take additional steps to further U.S. national security and foreign policy interests following the review. During this “pause” period, the BIS will further assess current firearm export control review policies to determine whether any changes are warranted to advance U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. The review will be conducted with urgency and will enable the Department to assess and mitigate the risk of firearms being diverted to entities or activities that promote regional instability, violate human rights, or to refuel criminal activities more effectively. This pause applies to the issuance of new licenses involving certain firearms, related components, night vision devices, and and ammunition controlled under four Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs): ECCN 0A501, ECCN 0A502, ECCN 0A504, and ECCN 0A505. Only applications for firearms, night vision devices, and ammunition regulated by the EAR to non-governmental end users located in Ukraine, Israel, and Country Group A:1 will be considered.
*******
U.S. Census Bureau
Census Bureau Issues Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages
October 18, 2023: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected. If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation. Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN. However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.
To help stakeholders take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.
Fatal Error Response Code: 161
Narrative: Equipment Number Not Allowed for MOT
Severity: Fatal
Reason: The Mode of Transportation Code reported does not allow an Equipment Number.
Resolution: One or more Equipment Numbers may be reported for vessel, air, rail or truck shipments. An Equipment Number cannot be reported for any other Mode of Transportation.
Verify the Mode of Transportation Code and the Equipment Number, correct the shipment and resubmit.
Response Code: 851
Narrative: Improbable Commodity for Air Shipment
Severity: Verify
Reason: For the reported Schedule B/HTS Number, a Mode of Transportation of Air is improbable for this commodity.
Resolution: Certain products are highly unlikely to be exported with a Mode of Transportation Air. This might indicate either a keying error or misclassification of the product.
Verify the Mode of Transportation and the Schedule B/HTS Number, correct the shipment and resubmit (if necessary). If the information is verified correct as reported, no action is necessary.
For a complete list of AES Response Codes, their reasons, and resolutions, see Appendix A – Commodity Filing Response Messages.
It is important that AES filers correct Fatal Errors as soon as they are received in order to comply with the Foreign Trade Regulations. These errors must be corrected prior to export for shipments filed predeparture and as soon as possible for shipments filed postdeparture but not later than five calendar days after departure.
For further information or questions, contact the U.S. Census Bureau’s Trade Data Collection Branch. Telephone: (800) 549-0595, select option 1 for AES.
*******
| LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES |
This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.
Sanctions
U.S. Department of State
October 20, 2023: The State Department designated three entities pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13382, which targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The three entities, based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), have worked to supply missile‐applicable items to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program.
The Department of State designated General Technology Limited, Beijing Luo Luo Technology Development Co Ltd., and Changzhou Utek Composite Company Ltd. pursuant to E.O. 13382 for having engaged, or attempted to engage, in activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a risk of materially contributing to, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery (including missiles capable of delivering such weapons), including any efforts to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use such items, by Pakistan.
General Technology Limited has worked to supply brazing materials, which are used to join components in ballistic missile rocket engines, and in the production of combustion chambers. Beijing Luo Luo Technology Development Co Ltd. has worked to supply mandrels and other machinery, which can be used in the production of solid‐propellant rocket motors and can be controlled by the Missile Technology Control Regime. Changzhou Utek Composite Company Ltd. has worked since 2019 to supply D‐glass glass fiber, quartz fabric, and high silica cloth, all of which have applications in missile systems.
*******
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
October 6, 2023: 88 FR 70352: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 49 entities under 52 entries to the Entity List. These entries have been listed under the destinations of the People’s Republic of China (China) (42), Estonia (1), Finland (1), Germany (1), India (3), Turkey (2), United Arab Emirates (1), and the United Kingdom (1). These entities have been added to the Entity List for providing support to Russia’s military and/or defense industrial base. Specifically, these entities supplied Russian consignees connected to the Russian defense sector with U.S.-origin integrated circuits after March 1, 2023. These integrated circuits are classified under Harmonized Tariff System (HTS)- 6 codes 854231, 854232, 854233, and/or 854239. These HTS–6 codes are identified under supplement no. 4 to part 746 (Russian and Belarusian Industry Sector Sanctions Pursuant to § 746.5(a)(1)(ii)). All U.S.-origin items classified under these HTS–6 codes have been controlled for export and reexport and transfer within Russia since September 15, 2022. Such U.S.- origin items require a license under § 746.5(a)(1)(ii) of the EAR when destined to Russia or Belarus.1 Therefore, the documented shipments by these entities to Russia of such U.S.- origin items are contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests under § 744.11(b) of the EAR.
China
- Ace Electronics (HK) Co., Limited;
- Alliance Electro Tech Co., Limited;
- Alpha Trading Investments Limited;
- Asialink Shanghai Int’l Logistics Co., Ltd.;
- Benico Limited;
- C & I Semiconductor Co., Ltd.;
- Check IC Solution Limited;
- Chengdu Jingxin Technology Co. Ltd.;
- China Shengshi International Trade, Ltd.;
- E-Chips Solution Co. Ltd.;
- Farteco Limited;
- Glite Electronic Technology Co., Limited;
- Global Broker Solutions Limited;
- Grants Promotion Service Limited;
- Guangdong Munpower Electronic Commerce Co. Ltd.;
- Huayuanshitong Technology Co. Ltd.;
- IMAXChip;
- Insight Electronics;
- Kingford PCB Electronics Co., Ltd.;
- Kobi International Company;
- Most Technology Limited;
- New Wally Target International Trade Co., Limited;
- Nuopuxun Electronic Technology Co., Limited;
- Onstar Electronics Co. Ltd.;
- PT Technology Asia Limited;
- Robotronix Semiconductors Limited;
- Rui En Koo Technology Co. Ltd;
- Shaanxi Yingsaeir Electronic Technology Co. Ltd.;
- Shanghai IP3 Information Technology Co. Ltd.;
- Shenzhen One World International Logistics Co., Limited;
- Shvabe Opto-Electronics Co. LTD.;
- Suntop Semiconductor Co., LTD.;
- Tordan Industry Limited;
- TYT Electronics Co. Ltd.;
- UCreate Electronics Group;
- Wargos Industry Limited;
- Win Key Limited;
- Xin Quan Electronics Hong Kong Co., Limited;
- ZeYuan Technology Limited;
- Zhejiang Foso Electronics Technology Co. Ltd.;
- Zixis Limited; and
- Zone Chips Electronics Hong Kong Co., Limited.
Estonia
- Elmec Trade OU.
Finland
- PT Technology Asia Limited.
Germany
- Interquest GmbH.
India
- Abhar Technologies and Services Private Limited;
- C & I Semiconductor Co., Ltd.; and
- Innovio Ventures.
Turkey
- LL Chip Elektrik Elektronic Paz; and
- Scitech Tasimacilik Ticaret Limited
United Arab Emirates
- Hulm al Sahra Elect Devices TR.
United Kingdom
- China Shengshi International Trade Ltd.
*******
Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
October 3, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 28 individuals and entities involved with the international proliferation of illicit drugs, including a China-based network responsible for the manufacturing and distribution of ton quantities of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and MDMA precursors. These individuals and entities designated by OFAC are also involved in the global trafficking of xylazine and “nitazenes,” which are highly potent and often mixed with illicit fentanyl or other drugs.
- Wang Shucheng
- Du Changgen
- Hubei Vast Chemical Co., Limited
- Hebei Guanlang Biotechnology Co., Limited
- Hebei Xiuna Trading Co., LTD.
- Shanghai Jarred Industrial Co., LTD.
- Hanhong Pharmaceutical Technology Co., LTD
- Gan Xuebi a.k.a Bella Chen
- Song Xueqin a.k.a. Shelly Song
- Yang Qi a.k.a. Daisy Yang
- Gao Lanfang
- Wang Mingming
- Wang Mingjing
- Hebei Crovell Biotech Co., LTD.
- Zhang Wei
- Qingdao Cemo Technology Develop Co., LTD
- Hebei Yaxin Restaurant Management Co., LTD.
- Jinhu Minsheng Pharmaceutical Machinery Co. LTD.
- Shen Xingbiao
- Valerian Labs, Inc. and Valerian Labs Distribution Corp.
- Bahman Djebelibak a.k.a. Bobby Shah
- Jiangsu Bangdeya New Material Technology Co., LTD.
- Wang Jiantong
- Xia Fengbing
- Xingtai Dong Chuang New Material Technology Co., LTD.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1779
*******
October 12, 2023: The Price Cap Coalition issued an advisory to provide recommendations concerning specific best practices in the maritime oil industry. The advisory reflects efforts to promote responsible practices in the industry to prevent and disrupt sanctioned trade and enhance compliance with the price caps on crude oil and petroleum products of Russian Federation origin, put in place by the G7, the European Union, and Australia (“the Price Cap Coalition” or “Coalition”).
The advisory is directed at both government and private sector actors (“industry stakeholders”) involved in the maritime trade of crude oil and refined petroleum products. The Coalition is committed to encouraging responsible maritime trade in crude oil and petroleum products within a reputable, safe, and secure market. Recent developments in the maritime oil trade, described below, expose industry stakeholders to increased safety, environmental, economic, reputational, financial, logistical, and legal risks. The advisory outlines best practices industry stakeholders can adopt to reduce risks while promoting the safe flow of oil on the market. The recommendations build upon previous guidance issued by the Price Cap Coalition such as the May 2020 Sanctions Advisory for the Maritime Industry, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) December 2020 Maritime Guidance, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) February 2023 Guidance on Implementation of the Price Cap Policy, OFAC’s April 2023 Alert on Possible Evasion of the Russian Oil Price Cap, OFSI’s UK Maritime Services Ban and Oil Price Cap Industry Guidance, and the European Commission’s Oil Price Cap Guidance.
Increased Risks from Recent Developments in the Maritime Oil Trade
Geopolitical changes continue to impact and shape the world’s maritime oil trade, shifting trade routes, broadening the scope of shipping service providers, and, at times, resulting in loss of transparency. As “shadow” trade has become more pronounced, often involving actors and cargo affiliated with countries and persons subject to sanctions or associated with other illicit activity. This shadow trade is characterized by irregular and often high-risk shipping practices that generate significant concerns for both the public and private sectors. These heightened risks include but are not limited to:
- Maritime Safety and Marine Environment: The vessels engaged in this shadow trade, sometimes called the “shadow fleet,” are typically older ships, many of which are operating past their traditional lifespans. These vessels are often registered with flag states that fail to meet their international obligations. There is also an increased risk of falsified registration. Vessels in the shadow trade may fabricate or neglect the appropriate surveys or inspections and lack regulatory certificates required under international conventions. Additionally, crews employed on shadow fleet vessels may face pressure to disregard prudent shipboard practices, including those provided by the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (“STCW”). These factors (i.e., vessel age; substandard certifications; inadequate safety and maintenance standards performed by substandard flags or unrecognized organizations; imprudence by crew) could increase the likelihood of marine casualties.
- Insurance and Economic: Oil spills can create tremendous environmental damage and impose immense economic costs on coastal states. Ships involved in the shadow trade may rely on unproven Protection and Indemnity (P&I) insurance providers that operate in jurisdictions with opaque or limited regulation, and insufficient capital, reinsurance arrangements, and/or technical expertise to handle a major claim in the event of a marine casualty. Accordingly, it is more challenging to hold such vessels accountable for the heavy economic burden generated by environmental damage.
- Reputational, Logistical, and Financial: Actors involved in the shadow trade often conceal their ownership structures and the origin of their cargo. The ownership of shadow fleet tankers may be concealed through complex corporate arrangements, with a recent increase of single vessel fleets. These vessels may disable or manipulate AIS systems to conceal illicit activity or other information about their voyages. Such deceptive practices may cause industry stakeholders to unknowingly engage in transactions that are inconsistent with industry stakeholders’ compliance policies, affect industry stakeholders’ reputations, and trigger de-risking behavior from counterparties. This de-risking can result in loss of access to reputable service providers, financing, customers, and ports.
- Legal and Sanctions: A coalition of over thirty countries have adopted a variety of economic measures in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine, including the oil price cap policy implemented by the Price Cap Coalition. Bad actors may use deceptive practices to gain or maintain access to Price Cap Coalition services to transport Russian oil or petroleum products 3 to be sold above the price cap or to engage in activity that may otherwise violate the Coalition’s sanctions, laws, or regulations.
Recommended Actions
The following recommendations are best practices that the Coalition encourages industry stakeholders to adopt, subject to applicable laws and regulations and, as appropriate according to their risk, based on: (i) their role; (ii) the information available to them; and (iii) the types of transactions in which they engage:
Recommendation 1: Require appropriately capitalized P&I insurance. The shadow trade involves ships that may rely on unknown, untested, sporadic, or fraudulent insurance. Without legitimate, continuous insurance coverage, these ships may be unable to pay the costs of accidents in which they are involved, including oil spills, which entail tremendous environmental damage and safety risks and associated costs. The Coalition encourages industry stakeholders to require that vessels have continuous and appropriate maritime insurance coverage for the entirety of their voyages. The Coalition further recommends that industry stakeholders require vessels to be insured by legitimate insurance providers with sufficient coverage for CLC9 liabilities. If an industry participant is engaging with a ship that is not insured by such a legitimate insurance provider, the industry participant should conduct sufficient due diligence to ensure that the insurer can cover all relevant risks. Such due diligence could include, as feasible, a review of an insurer’s financial soundness, track record, regulatory record, and/or ownership structure.
Recommendation 2: Receive classification from an International Association of Classification Societies10 member society. The information gathered by classification societies is useful in enabling insurers, port states, and other industry stakeholders to make informed decisions about the seaworthiness of vessels. Some ships involved in the shadow trade have shifted away from industry standard classification societies, and instead use societies that are not a part of, or have been removed from, the International Association of Classification Societies. The Coalition encourages11 industry stakeholders to ensure counterparties receive classification from IACS member classification societies to ensure vessels are fit for the service intended.
Recommendation 3: Best-practice use of Automatic Identification Systems (“AIS”). Consistent with the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (“SOLAS”), industry stakeholders should promote the continuous broadcasting of AIS throughout the lifetime of a voyage. If a ship needs to disable its AIS in response to a legitimate safety concern, the ship should document the circumstances that necessitated disablement. Industry stakeholders should also vigilantly monitor irregular AIS patterns or data that are inconsistent with actual ship locations. By requiring that ships with which they engage use AIS in accordance with the SOLAS, industry stakeholders will improve their understanding of vessels’ activities, and reduce their exposure to criminal actors and associated risks.
- If accessible, complement AIS Tracking with Long-Range Identification and Tracking
(“LRIT”). In instances of AIS outages or suspected AIS manipulation, industry
stakeholders such as flagging registries that have access to LRIT should use it to determine the true location of vessels, including, where feasible, those leased to third parties. For those industry stakeholders who have access to LRIT, combining AIS and LRIT is a best practice for mitigating risk.
Recommendation 4: Monitor high-risk ship-to-ship transfers. While ship-to-ship (STS) transfers (the transfer of cargo between ships at sea) are often conducted for legitimate purposes, such transfers can also be used to conceal the origin or destination of cargo in circumvention of sanctions or other regulations. Furthermore, STS transfers of crude oil or petroleum products outside of safe and sheltered waters entail heightened environmental and safety risks. Industry stakeholders should recognize these enhanced risks and, as appropriate to their role, conduct enhanced due diligence in the context of STS transfers, including the notification of STS oil cargo transfers as required by Annex I of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (“MARPOL“), especially in areas at higher risk for illicit trading activity or AIS manipulation. It is also recommended that industry stakeholders verify oil record logs to hold accountable record of cargo movements aboard vessels.
Recommendation 5: Request associated shipping and ancillary costs. The inflation of shipping and ancillary costs (e.g., freight, customs, insurance), or the bundling of such costs, are tactics that may be used to conceal that Russian oil was purchased above the price cap. The billing of commercially unreasonable or opaque shipping and ancillary costs should be viewed as a sign of potential price cap evasion. Shipping, freight, customs, and insurance costs are not included in the price caps and must be invoiced separately and at commercially reasonable rates. Industry stakeholders involved in the Russian oil trade that use “Cost, Insurance, Freight” contracts or whose counterparts use such agreements should require an itemized breakdown of all costs to determine the price paid for oil or petroleum products. This may require that industry stakeholders update contractual terms and conditions with sellers or counterparts or adjust invoicing models to show the price of the oil until the port of loading and the price for transportation and other services separately.
Recommendation 6: Undertake appropriate due diligence. Industry stakeholders should carry out appropriate due diligence. Heightened diligence may be appropriate for ships that have undergone numerous administrative changes (e.g., re-flagging). Industry stakeholders may also wish to conduct increased diligence when dealing with intermediary companies (e.g., management companies, traders, brokerages, etc.) that conceal their beneficial ownership or otherwise engage in unusually opaque practices. Such companies may be more likely to engage in deceptive practices and expose counterparties to heightened risks. Industry stakeholders’ due diligence should be calibrated according to the specificities of their business and the related risk exposure. Due diligence is especially important where market assessments indicate that Russian oil prices exceed the price cap, and Coalition services are being used or sought.
Recommendation 7: Report ships that trigger concerns. If an industry participant is aware of potentially illicit or unsafe maritime oil trade, including suspected breaches of the oil price cap, they should report this to relevant authorities. By reporting these concerning behaviors, industry stakeholders can collectively help protect the trade from malign activity, while promoting safety and integrity across the market.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1797
*******
October 12, 2023: OFAC Issued General License No. 73: “Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions Involving Certain Persons or Vessels”.
General License No. 73: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one of the following activities involving the blocked persons or vessels described in paragraph are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 8, 2024, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations (RuHSR): (1) The safe docking and anchoring of any of the blocked vessels listed this general license (“blocked vessels”) in port; (2) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; or (3) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.
The authorizations in this general license apply to the following blocked persons and vessels listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and any entity in which any of the following persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest: (1) Ice Pearl Navigation Corp (registered owner of YASA GOLDEN BOSPHORUS, IMO 9334038); or (2) Lumber Marine SA (registered owner of SCF PRIMORYE, IMO 9421960).
The general license does not authorize: (1) The entry into any new commercial contracts involving the property or interests in property of any blocked persons, including the blocked entities and vessels described in this general license, except as otherwise authorized; (2) The offloading of any cargo onboard any of the blocked vessels, including the offloading of crude oil or petroleum products of Russian Federation origin, except for the offloading of cargo that is ordinarily incident and necessary to address vessel emergencies authorized pursuant to this general license; (3) Any transactions related to the sale of crude oil or petroleum products of Russian Federation origin; (4) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 2 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions; (5) Any transactions prohibited by Directive 4 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation; or (6) Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the RuHSR, including transactions involving the property or interests in property of any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, other than transactions involving the blocked persons or vessels in this general license, unless separately authorized.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932196/download?inline
*******
October 18, 2023: In response to the signing of an electoral roadmap agreement between Venezuela’s Unitary Platform and representatives of Maduro, and in support of the Venezuelan people, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued 4 General Licenses suspending select sanctions. The OFAC also published a FAQ related to the suspension of sanctions and the newly-issued General Licenses.
- General License 44 authorizes transactions involving the oil and gas sector in Venezuela. The license will be renewed only if Venezuela meets its commitments under the electoral roadmap as well as other commitments with respect to those who are wrongfully detained.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932231/download?inline
- General License 43 authorizes dealings with Minerven – the Venezuelan state-owned gold mining company – which Treasury assesses would have the effect of reducing black-market trading in gold.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932226/download?inline
- Amended two relevant licenses to remove the secondary trading ban on certain Venezuelan sovereign bonds and PdVSA debt and equity. The ban on trading in the primary Venezuelan bond market remains in place. Treasury assessed that this, too, would have the positive effect of displacing nefarious players in this market, and with negligible financial benefit to the Venezuelan regime.
- https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932221/download?inline
- https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932216/download?inline
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1822
*******
October 18, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 11 individuals, eight entities, and one vessel based in Iran, Hong Kong, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Venezuela that are enabling Iran’s destabilizing ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs. The persons designated have materially supported Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL), or their subordinates in the production and proliferation of missiles and UAVs.
- Fanavaran Sanat Ertebatat Company of Iran
- Armin Ghorsi Anbaran of Iran
- Hossein Hemsi of Iran
- Saberin Kish Company of Iran
- Alireza Matinkia of Iran
- Electro Optic Sairan Industries Co. of Iran
- Sarmad Electronic Sepahan Company of Iran
- Ghasem Damavandian of Iran
- Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani of Iran
- Seyed Hojatollah Ghoreishi of Iran
- Jaber Reihani of Iran
- Seyed Hamzeh Ghalandari of Iran
- Cargo Vessel PARNIA of Iran
- Lin Jinghe A/K/A Gary Lam of the PRC
- Yongxin Li A/K/A Emma Lee of the PRC
- Yiu Wa Yung A/K/A Stephen Yung of the PRC
- Nanxigu Technology Co., Limited of Hong Kong
- Dali RF Technology Co., Limited of Hong Kong
- ICGOO Electronics Limited of Hong Kong
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231018_33
*******
October 18, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on ten key Hamas terrorist group members, operatives, and financial facilitators in Gaza and elsewhere including Sudan, Turkey, Algeria, and Qatar. The action targets members managing assets in a secret Hamas investment portfolio, a Qatar-based financial facilitator with close ties to the Iranian regime, a key Hamas commander, and a Gaza-based virtual currency exchange and its operator. The designations are part of a continuous effort by the United States to root out Hamas’s sources of revenue in the West Bank and Gaza and across the region and is taken in close coordination with regional partners and allies.
- Musa Muhammad Salim Dudin of Palestine
- Abdelbasit Hamza Elhassan Mohamed Khair of Sudan
- Amer Kamal Sharif Alshawa of Turkey
- Ahmed Sadu Jahleb of Egypt
- Aiman Ahmad Al-Duwaik of Jordan
- Walid Mohammed Mustafa Jadallah of Jordan
- Muhammad Ahmad ‘Abd Al-Dayim Nasrallah of Jordan
- Ayman Nofal of Palestine
- Buy Cash Money and Money Transfer Company of Palestine
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1816
*******
October 20, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two individuals and four entities that form a core part of Specially Designated National (SDN) and Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik’s (Dodik) patronage network. Members of this network, which include Dodik’s adult children, facilitate Dodik’s ongoing corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) RS entity, allowing him to siphon public funds from the RS and enrich himself and his family at the expense of BiH citizens and functional governance in the country.
Dodik previously served as a member of BiH’s Presidency and is widely known for openly calling for, and supporting, the unilateral transfer of state competencies from the BiH government to the RS, one of two entities that comprise BiH. Dodik has used his official BiH position and a network of personal ties and companies to accumulate personal wealth through graft, bribery, and other forms of corruption. His divisive ethno-nationalistic rhetoric reflects his efforts to advance these political goals and divert attention from his corrupt activities. Additionally, Dodik has publicly denigrated other ethnic and religious groups within BiH, further sowing division and political gridlock.
- Igor Dodik of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Gorica Dodik of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Global Liberty d.o.o. Laktasi of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Agro Voce d.o.o. Laktasi of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Agape Gorica Dodik i Ivana Dodik s.p. Banja Luka of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Fruit Eco d.o.o. Gradiska of Bosnia and Herzegovina
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1825
*******
October 25, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 8H, authorizing transactions related to energy involving certain entities.
For the purposes of the general license, the term “related to energy” means the extraction, production, refinement, liquefaction, gasification, regasification, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, transport, or purchase of petroleum, including crude oil, lease condensates, unfinished oils, natural gas liquids, petroleum products, natural gas, or other products capable of producing energy, such as coal, wood, or agricultural products used to manufacture biofuels, or uranium in any form, as well as the development, production, generation, transmission, or exchange of power, through any means, including nuclear, thermal, and renewable energy sources.
The general license does not authorize:
- Any transactions prohibited by Directive 1A under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Certain Sovereign Debt of the Russian Federation;
- The opening or maintaining of a correspondent account or payable-through account for or on behalf of any entity subject to Directive 2 under E.O. 14024, Prohibitions Related to Correspondent or Payable-Through Accounts and Processing of Transactions Involving Certain Foreign Financial Institutions;
- Any debit to an account on the books of a U.S. financial institution of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation; or
- Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR other than the blocked persons described in paragraph (a) of this general license, unless separately authorized.
The entities authorized by the General License are:
- State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs Vnesheconombank
- Public Joint Stock Company Bank Financial Corporation Otkritie
- Sovcombank Open Joint Stock Company
- Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia
- VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company
- Joint Stock Company Alfa-Bank
- Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank
- Bank Zenit Public Joint Stock Company
- Bank Saint-Petersburg Public Joint Stock Company
- Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest; or
- The Central Bank of the Russian Federation
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932246/download?inline
*******
October 27, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed a second round of sanctions on key Hamas-linked officials and financial networks following the October 7 barbaric attacks on Israel and its civilian population. The action targets additional assets in Hamas’s investment portfolio and individuals who are facilitating sanctions evasion by Hamas-affiliated companies. Treasury is also designating a Hamas official in Iran and members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as well as a Gaza-based entity that has served as a conduit for illicit Iranian funds to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
- Khaled Qaddoumi of Jordan
- Ali Morshed Shirazi of Lebanon
- Mostafa Mohammad Khani of Iran
- Ali Ahmad Faizullahi of Iran
- Al-Ansar Charity Association of Palestine
- Nasser Al Sheikh Ali of Palestine
- Zawaya Group for Development and Investment Co. LTD of Sudan
- Zawaya Group for Development Investment Sociedad Limitada of Spain
- Larrycom for Investment Company of Sudan
- Alaeddin Senguler of Turkey
- Gulsah Yigidoglu of Turkey
- Arwa Mangoush of Turkey
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1845
*******
October 31, 2023: Pursuant to Executive Order 14014, “Blocking Property With Respect to the Situation in Burma” (the “Order”), the Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) determined, in consultation with the Department of State that the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) is a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of Burma, and that the following activities by a U.S. person are prohibited on or after December 15, 2023 except to the extent provided by law, or unless licensed or otherwise authorized by OFAC: the provision, exportation, or reexportation, directly or indirectly, of financial services to or for the benefit of MOGE or its property or interests in property.
All other activities with MOGE or involving MOGE’s property or interests in property are permitted, provided such activities are not otherwise prohibited by law, the Order, or any other sanctions program implemented by OFAC. Therefore, the following persons and entities have been added to the SDN list:
- Swe Swe Aung of Burma
- Maung Maung Aye of Burma
- Zaw Min of Burma
- Charlie Than of Burma
- Kan Zaw of Burma
- Sky Royal Hero Company Limited of Burma
- Suntac International Trading Company Limited of Burma
- Suntac Technologies Company Limited of Burma
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20231031
Fines and Penalties
October 4, 2023: 88 FR 68568: On December 1, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, Carlos Eduardo Zepeda (“Zepeda”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Zepeda was convicted of smuggling from the United States to Mexico approximately 800 rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Zepeda to 24 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment. BIS received notice of Zepeda’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 554. As provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or the “Regulations”), BIS provided notice and opportunity for Zepeda to make a written submission to BIS. 15 CFR 766.25. BIS has not received a written submission from Zepeda. BIS has decided to deny Zepeda’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of seven years from the date of Zepeda’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Zepeda had an interest at the time of his conviction.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21900
*******
October 4, 2023: 88 FR 68567: On May 24, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Jacques Yves Sebastien Duroseau (“Duroseau”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371, 50 U.S.C. 4819, section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) (“AECA”), and 18 U.S.C. 554. Specifically, Duroseau was convicted of conspiring to illegally export and smuggle firearms and controlled equipment from the United States to Haiti, as well as transporting United States Munitions List-controlled firearms and Commerce Control List-controlled riflescopes without a license to the Haitian Army. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Duroseau to 60 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release and a $400 assessment. BIS received notice of Duroseau’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 371, 50 U.S.C. 4819, section 38 of the AECA and 18 U.S.C. 554. BIS provided notice and opportunity for Duroseau to make a written submission to BIS, as provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or the “Regulations”). 15 CFR 766.25. BIS has not received a written submission from Duroseau. The BIS has decided to deny Duroseau’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Duroseau’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Duroseau had an interest at the time of his conviction.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21901
*******
October 4, 2023: 88 FR 68566: On October 21, 2021, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Saphara Lynn Anderson (“Anderson”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371. Specifically, Anderson was convicted of conspiring to export ammunition from the United States to Mexico. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced Anderson to probation for 60 months and a $100 special assessment. BIS received notice of Anderson’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 371. As provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or the “Regulations”), BIS provided notice and opportunity for Anderson to make a written submission to BIS. 15 CFR 766.25. BIS has not received a written submission from Anderson. The BIS has decided to deny Anderson’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of seven years from the date of Anderson’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Anderson had an interest at the time of her conviction.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21899
*******
October 4, 2023: 88 FR 68565: On March 2, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Leonel Molina, Jr. (“Molina”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Molina was convicted of smuggling from the United States to Mexico Wolf 7.62x39mm caliber ammunition, without a license or written approval from the United States Department of Commerce. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Molina to 46 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a $100 assessment. BIS received notice of Molina’s conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. 554. As provided in section 766.25 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR” or the “Regulations”), BIS provided notice and opportunity for Molina to make a written submission to BIS. 15 CFR 766.25. BIS has not received a written submission from Molina. The BIS has decided to deny Molina’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Molina’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Molina had an interest at the time of his conviction.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-21902
*******
October 13, 2023: 88 FR 70928: On April 21, 2022, the BIS issued an order denying Aviastar—TU’s (“Aviastar”) export privileges for a period of 180 days on the ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. The renewal is based upon the facts underlying the issuance of the TDO and the renewal orders subsequently issued in this matter on October 17, 2022, and April 14, 2023, as well as other evidence developed during this investigation. This evidence demonstrates that Aviastar has acted, and continues to act, in blatant disregard for U.S. export controls and the terms of existing TDOs. The TDO, initially issued on April 21, 2022, was based on evidence that Aviastar violated the Regulations by operating multiple aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights into and out of Russia after March 2, 2022 from destinations including, but not limited to, Hangzhou, China; Shenzhen, China; and Zhengzhou, China from/to Novosibirsk, Russia and Abakan, Russia, without the required BIS authorization.
Further evidence indicated that Aviastar also operated aircraft subject to the EAR on domestic flights within Russia, potentially in violation of Section 736.2(b)(10) of the Regulations.
BIS also presented evidence that, while subject to a TDO, Aviastar operated aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights both into and out of Russia, in violation of the Regulations and the terms of the existing TDO.
Specifically, previous renewal orders detailed Aviastar’s continued operation of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, on flights into and out of Russia from/to Zhengzhou, China and Hangzhou, China, as well as on domestic flights within Russia.
In its September 19, 2023 request for TDO renewal, BIS submitted evidence that Aviastar violated the TDO and/or the Regulations by operating aircraft subject to the EAR and flown into Russia on or after March 2, 2022, on flights within Russia, in apparent violation of Section 736.2(b)(10) of the Regulations, as well as the TDO.
First, Aviastar—TU, 5 b. 7 Leningradsky prospekt, g. Moskva, 125040, Moscow, Russia, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
- Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control document;
- Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
- Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:
- Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of Aviastar any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by Aviastar of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby Aviastar acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from Aviastar of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Obtain from Aviastar in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
- Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by Aviastar, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by Aviastar if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to Aviastar by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-22614
*******
October 13, 2023: 88 FR 70925: On October 13, 2022, the BIS issued an order denying URAL’s export privileges for a period of 180 days on the ground that issuance of the order was necessary in the public interest to prevent an imminent violation of the Regulations. Evidence presented by BIS indicated that, after the initial October 13, 2022, TDO issued, URAL continued to operate aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights both into and within Russia, in violation of the Regulations and the TDO itself.
Specifically, the April 10, 2023, renewal order detailed URAL’s continued operation of aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, on flights into and out of Russia from/to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and Khujand, Tajikistan, as well as within Russia. Since that time, URAL has continued to engage in conduct prohibited by the TDO and Regulations. In its September 15, 2023, request for renewal of the TDO, BIS submitted evidence that URAL continues to operate aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b, both on flights into and within Russia, in violation of the April 10, 2023 TDO and/or the Regulations. Specifically, BIS’s evidence and related investigation demonstrates that URAL has continued to operate aircraft subject to the EAR, including, but not limited to, on flights into and out of Russia from/to Dushanbe, Tajikistan, Tamchy, Kyrgyzstan, and Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, as well as domestically within Russia.
First, URAL Airlines JSC, Utrenniy Lane 1-g, Yekaterinburg, Russia 620025, when acting for or on their behalf, any successors or assigns, agents, or employees may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or in any other activity subject to the EAR including, but not limited to:
- Applying for, obtaining, or using any license (except directly related to safety of flight), license exception, or export control document;
- Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
- Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the EAR, or from any other activity subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations.
Second, that no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:
- Export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or on behalf of URAL any item subject to the EAR except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by URAL of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby URAL acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from URAL of any item subject to the EAR that has been exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations;
- Obtain from URAL in the United States any item subject to the EAR with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations; or
- Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by URAL, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by URAL if such service involves the use of any item subject to the EAR that has been or will be exported from the United States except directly related to safety of flight and authorized by BIS pursuant to Section 764.3(a)(2) of the Regulations. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification, or testing.
Third, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in section 766.23 of the EAR, any other person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to URAL by ownership, control, position of responsibility, affiliation, or other connection in the conduct of trade or business may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.
https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-22604
*******
October 25, 2023: 88 FR 73309: The Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce (“BIS”), has notified Dina Zhu, of Lawrenceville, GA (“Zhu”), of its intention to initiate an administrative proceeding against Zhu pursuant to section 766.3 of the Export Administration Regulations, through the issuance of a Proposed Charging Letter to Zhu that alleges that Zhu committed one violation of the Regulations, specifically: 15 CFR 764.2(c)—Attempted Unlicensed Export to China.
On or about November 30, 2018, Zhu engaged in conduct prohibited by the Regulations by attempting to export optical sighting devices, items subject to the Regulations, and valued at approximately $25,000, from the United States to the Peoples Republic of China, via Hong Kong, without the required Department of Commerce export license. At the time of the attempted export, the items were classified under export control classification 0A987 and controlled on Crime Control grounds.
Pursuant to Section 742.7 of the Regulations, a Department of Commerce export license was required before the items could be exported to Hong Kong or China. OEE was able to interdict this transaction by issuing the courier a re-delivery order to return or unload the shipment pursuant to Section 758.8 of the Regulations.
BIS and Zhu have entered into a Settlement Agreement pursuant to Section 766.18(a) of the Regulations, whereby they agreed to settle this matter in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth therein;
First, for a period of one (1) year from the date of the Order, Zhu, with a last known address of 101 Windsor Chase Drive, Lawrenceville, GA 30043, and when acting for or on her behalf, her successors, assigns, representatives, agents, or employees (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Denied Person”), may not, directly or indirectly, participate in any way in any transaction involving any commodity, software or technology (hereinafter collectively referred to as “item”) exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or in any other activity subject to the Regulations, including, but not limited to:
- Applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license exception, or export control document;
- Carrying on negotiations concerning, or ordering, buying, receiving, using, selling, delivering, storing, disposing of, forwarding, transporting, financing, or otherwise servicing in any way, any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or engaging in any other activity subject to the Regulations; or
- Benefitting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States that is subject to the Regulations, or from any other activity subject to the Regulations.
Second, no person may, directly or indirectly, do any of the following:
- Export or reexport to or on behalf of the Denied Person any item subject to the Regulations;
- Take any action that facilitates the acquisition or attempted acquisition by the Denied Person of the ownership, possession, or control of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States, including financing or other support activities related to a transaction whereby the Denied Person acquires or attempts to acquire such ownership, possession or control;
- Take any action to acquire from or to facilitate the acquisition or attempted acquisition from the Denied Person of any item subject to the Regulations that has been exported from the United States;
- Obtain from the Denied Person in the United States any item subject to the Regulations with knowledge or reason to know that the item will be, or is intended to be, exported from the United States; or
- Engage in any transaction to service any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States and which is owned, possessed or controlled by the Denied Person, or service any item, of whatever origin, that is owned, possessed or controlled by the Denied Person if such service involves the use of any item subject to the Regulations that has been or will be exported from the United States. For purposes of this paragraph, servicing means installation, maintenance, repair, modification or testing.
Third, any licenses issued under the Regulations in which Zhu has an interest as of the date of this Order shall be revoked by BIS.
Fourth, that, after notice and opportunity for comment as provided in Section 766.23 of the Regulation, any person, firm, corporation, or business organization related to Zhu by affiliation, ownership, control, or position of responsibility in the conduct or trade or related services may also be made subject to the provisions of this Order.
Fifth, as authorized by Section 766.18(c) of the Regulations, the denial period shall be imposed and extended for a second year, but for that second year shall be suspended for a probationary period and shall thereafter be waived, provided that Zhu has not committed another violation of ECRA, the Regulations, or any order, license or authorization issued under ECRA or the Regulations. If Zhu commits another violation of ECRA, the Regulations, or any order, license or authorization issued under ECRA or the Regulations during the two-year period from the date of the Order the suspended portion of the Order may be modified or revoked by BIS pursuant to Section 766.17(c) of the Regulations. If the suspension of the denial is modified or revoked, BIS may extend the active denial period up to two-years from the date of the Order.