This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through December 31, 2024. The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.
See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and
persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.
REGULATORY UPDATES
President
President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to the Global Illicit Drug Trade
December 11, 2024: On December 15, 2021, by Executive Order 14059, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by global illicit drug trafficking.
The trafficking into the United States of illicit drugs, including fentanyl and other synthetic opioids, is causing the deaths of tens of thousands of Americans annually, as well as countless more non-fatal overdoses with their own tragic human toll. Drug cartels, transnational criminal organizations, and their facilitators are the primary sources of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals that fuel the current opioid epidemic, as well as drug-related violence that harms our communities. International drug trafficking — including the illicit production, global sale, and widespread distribution of illegal drugs; the rise of extremely potent drugs such as fentanyl and other synthetic opioids; as well as the growing role of Internet-based drug sales — continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14059 of December 15, 2021, must continue in effect beyond December 15, 2024. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14059 with respect to global illicit drug trafficking.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/
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President Biden Continued the National Emergency with Respect to Serious Human Rights Abuse and Corruption
December 11, 2024: On December 20, 2017, by Executive Order 13818, the President declared a national emergency with respect to serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world and, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), took related steps to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.
The prevalence and severity of human rights abuse and corruption that have their source, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States, continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. For this reason, the national emergency declared on December 20, 2017, must continue in effect beyond December 20, 2024. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13818 with respect to serious human rights abuse and corruption.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/
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Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)
Pay.gov To No Longer Accept Amazon Pay Payments
December 5, 2024: After February 22, 2025, Pay.gov will no longer accept Amazon Pay as a valid payment option. Please be sure to have a different form of payment available when paying for a new or renewed Registration.
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events
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Public Notice: 12542 - Final Rule: DDTC Registration Fees
December 6, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 99081: On December 10, 2024, the Department of State published a final rule, regarding changes to the three tiers of Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) registration fees. The new regulation will go into effect on January 9, 2025.
New Registrants
Effective January 9, 2025, first-time registrants will pay the $3000 Tier 1 fee to register with DDTC.
Registration Renewals
For registrations scheduled for renewal, DDTC will continue to send the standard e-mail reminder notifications (90 and 30 days prior to expiration) requesting registrants to log into the Defense Export Control and Compliance System (DECCS) to view the renewal fee and begin the renewal application.
Current registrations expiring on or after March 31, 2025, will be issued standard reminder notifications under the new fee structure included in the final rule.
Registrants issued 90-day reminder notifications with the fee structure under the prior regulation may pay the amount listed in DECCS under DDTC’s prior fee structure.
The final rule’s revised registration fees are as follows.
(1) Tier 1: The first tier is a set registration fee of $3,000 per year. This new registration fee amount applies to first time registrants. It also applies to those renewing registrations and for whom the Department did not issue a favorable determination on a license application or other request for authorization during the 12-month period ending 90 days prior to the expiration of the current registration.
The Tier 1 registration fee also applies to registrants who are wholly exempt from income tax pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3), such as non-profit organizations. Such registrants must attach proof of tax-exempt status (for example, an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) certification form) for the registration fee to be reduced to a Tier 1 amount. The IRS certification must apply to all entities, subsidiaries, and affiliates listed in the registration submission.
(2) Tier 2: The second tier is a set registration fee of $4,000 for registrants renewing their registrations who have submitted license applications or other requests for authorization and received five or fewer favorable determinations during the 12-month period ending 90 days prior to the expiration of their current registration.
(3) Tier 3: The third tier is a calculated registration fee for registrants who have submitted license applications or other requests for authorization and received more than five favorable determinations during the 12-month period ending 90 days prior to the expiration of their current registration. For these registrants, the registration fee calculation is $4,000 plus $1,100 times the total number of favorable determinations over five.
For potential discounts for Tier 1 or Tier 3 registrants, see below.
All registration payments must be completed electronically, through the DECCS Registration application. Once DDTC reviews and issues the registration submission, a “Make Payment” button will appear on your DECCS Registration dashboard.
DDTC recommends all registrants frequently check their DECCS Registration payment portal and email regarding their registration’s payment status. For more guidance on how to make a registration payment, accepted payment methods, and payment status, review the Registration User Guides.
Tier 1 Discount
DDTC is instituting a one-year initiative for qualifying Tier 1 registrants who may petition DDTC for a $500 discount, for a total registration fee of $2,500.
To qualify, Tier 1 registrants must provide some form of proof that $3,000 constitutes 1 percent or more of their total revenue for the last calendar year. DDTC does not prescribe a certain set of documents for this purpose. Examples may include relevant documentation, or a signed attestation (subject to penalties under law for submitting a false statement) by a senior officer empowered by the registrant stating that $3000 constitutes 1 percent or more of their total revenue for the registrant’s last calendar year. Registrants who do not provide sufficient proof in the form of documentation or attestation may not receive the discount. DDTC will make efforts to contact those who have requested the discount, but who did not provide sufficient proof.
For purposes of this discount, “total revenue” is the total amount of income and is not limited to sales of ITAR controlled defense articles. Applicants must submit a discount request at least 30 calendar days prior to expiration of their current registration term. Such requests are encouraged to be made well in advance of 30 days to allow DDTC to review the request, and to contact the requestor if necessary or if sufficient proof was not provided.
At the end of the one-year pilot period the Department will assess the impact of the initiative and consider an extension of the special consideration initiative.
Tier 3 Discount
The Department is maintaining its 3% Total License Value discount for Tier 3 registrants. If the registration fee calculated using the Tier 3 formula listed is greater than 3 percent of the total value of all approvals, the registration fee will be revised to either 3 percent of the total value of all applications or $4,000, whichever is greater.
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events
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DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website
December 16, 2024: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at
- Address change of Raytheon Systems France S.A.R.L. from 175 Rue Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Issy-les-Moulineaux, 92130, France to 8 Rue Rouget de L’Isle, Issy-les-Moulineaux, 92130, France; and
- Address Change of Pilatus Training Solutions Australia Pty Ltd from 81 Pearson Street, Sale, Victoria 3850 to 26-28 Wellington Park Way, Sale, Victoria 3850, Australia.
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Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To India
December 2, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of India has requested to buy thirty (30) Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Joint Tactical Radio Systems (MIDS-JTRS). The following non-MDE items will also be included: advanced data transfer systems; external fuel tanks; AN/AAS 44C(V) forward looking infrared (FLIR) systems; an operator machine interface assistant; spare containers; facilities study, design, construction and support; support and test equipment; munitions; integration and test support; spare and repair parts; intermediate and depot-level repair capabilities and associated spares; communications equipment; software development, delivery and support, including Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS); Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services, including Navy Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) repair capabilities and Performance Based Logistics (PBL); studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $1.17 billion. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin Rotary and Mission Systems, located in Owego, NY. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Tunisia
December 3, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Tunisia has requested to buy one hundred eighty-four (184) Javelin FGM-148F missiles (includes four (4) fly-to-buy missiles); and thirty (30) Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Units (LWCLU). Also included is missile simulation round System Integration and Check out (SICO); Javelin Restricted Interactive Electronic Technical Manual (IETM); Javelin operator manual and Technical Assistance (TAGM); tools; spare parts; indoor/outdoor trainers; Javelin gunner training; Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO) training; Javelin maintenance training; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated cost is $107.7 million. The prime contractors will be the Javelin Joint Venture between Lockheed Martin, located in Orlando, FL, and RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/tunisia-javelin-missiles
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To The Netherlands
December 6, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of the Netherlands has requested to buy up to two hundred twenty-six (226) AIM-120D3 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); up to five (5) AIM-120D3 AMRAAM guidance sections, to include precise position provided by either Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module or M-Code; and one (1) AIM-120 AMRAAM Integrated Test Vehicle (ITV). The following non-MDE items will also be included: AMRAAM control sections, missile containers and support equipment; KGV-135A encryption devices; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; weapons system support and software; classified software delivery and support; classified publications and technical documentation; transportation support; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is up to $807 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. The purchaser typically requests offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Kuwait
December 10, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Kuwait has requested to buy equipment and services required to refurbish existing maintenance facilities in Kuwait, including sustainment maintenance; special tools; repair parts; common tools; shop equipment and fixtures; materiel handling equipment; two-years of initial repair parts; bench stock; mandatory replacement materials; capability to repair small/medium arms of up to 100 mm; cables; wiring harnesses (including wiring harness manufacturing); hydraulics; fuel oil pumps; starters; generators; AGT1500 hang-on parts; functionality testing and limited repairs authorized in the technical manuals for communications equipment, fire control, night vision, and laser devices; capability to perform enhanced repairs on AGT1500 engines consistent with the TIGER Process; five years of facility operation and maintenance; field service representatives, technicians, mechanics, and other support personnel; on-the-job training; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $300 million. The principal contractors will be BAE Systems, located in York, PA; U.S. Ordnance, located in McCarran, NV; DRS Technologies, located in Arlington, VA; L3Harris Corporation, located in Tysons Corner, VA; Northrop Grumman, located in West Falls Church, VA; and RTX Corporation, located in McKinney, TX. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kuwait-maintenance-repair-sustainment-capability
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Ukraine
December 10, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Ukraine has requested to buy the Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS); AN/PYQ-10 Simple Key Loaders (SKL); minor modifications and maintenance support; engine Component Improvement Program (CIP); spare and repair parts, consumables, and accessories; repair and return support; weapons software, weapons software support equipment, and classified and unclassified software and delivery support; classified and unclassified publications and documentation; personnel training and training equipment; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $266.4 million. The principal contractors will be Sabena, located in Charleroi, Belgium; Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, located in Fort Worth, TX; and Pratt and Whitney, located in East Hartford, CT. The U.S. Government is not aware of any proposed offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/ukraine-f-16-sustainment-services
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To The Republic of Korea
December 16, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Republic of Korea (ROK) has requested to buy modified MK 99 fire control system (FCS) cabinets; updated Weapon Direct System (WDS) software modification, integration, and installation; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $300 million. The principal contractors will include BAE Systems, Inc., Integrated Defense Solutions, located in Rockville, MD. Additional contractors will be determined by competition to select approved vendors. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Norway
December 17, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Norway has requested to buy eight thousand one (8,001) M1156A1 Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) multi-option fuzes that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at $2.79 million, included PGK cutaway models; fuze wrenches; enhanced portable inductive artillery fuze setters; GPS antennae and cables; improved Platform Integration Kits; PGK-associated hardware for testing; labor support; training aids; technical data and reports; U.S. Government technical assistance; incidental travel; transportation; PGK spare parts; equipment training; and related elements of logistics and program support. This notification is for eight thousand one (8,001) M1156A1 PGK multi-option fuzes. The following non-MDE items will also be included: PGK cutaway models; fuze wrenches; enhanced portable inductive artillery fuze setters; GPS antennae and cables; improved Platform Integration Kits; PGK-associated hardware for testing; labor support; training aids; technical data and reports; U.S. Government technical assistance; incidental travel; transportation; PGK spare parts; equipment training; and related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $130 million. The principal contractor will be Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems, located in Dulles, VA. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/norway-m1156a1-precision-guidance-kits-fuzes
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Greece
December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Greece has requested to buy Aerosonde Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) with Lycoming heavy-fuel engines; Global Positioning System (GPS) with Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM); TASE400 Electro Optical (EO)/Medium Wave Infrared (MWIR)/Long-Range Spotter-High Definition (LRS-HD) payloads; avionics; video and telemetry datalink subsystems, and secondary payload bays; Ground Control Stations; ground data terminals; launch and recovery trailers; ground support equipment; “fly as you drive” M1117 ASV interface kits and integration; initial spares package; initial spares replenishment; new equipment training; program management support; contractor logistics support and Field Service Representative support; technical data and publications; quality assurance services; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support, that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The principal contractor will be Textron Systems, located in Hunt Valley, MD. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in The United States
December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy sixteen (16) MK 75 76 mm gun mounts. The following non-MDE items will be included: shipping containers; technical assistance to overhaul guns to be ready for use; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $30 million. The equipment will be purchased from U.S. stock and then overhauled to be ready for use condition by the U.S. Coast Guard. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this sale.
Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to the recipient.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in The United States
December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy three hundred nine (309) Multifunctional Information Distribution System Joint Tactical Radio Systems (MIDS JTRS) Variant 5 (V5). The following non-MDE items will also be included: non-recurring engineering; testing, certification, and other activities necessary to integrate the MIDS JTRS V5 Block Upgrade Three on the recipient’s Patriot, HE-2K, P-3, and F-16 Block 20 platforms; communications equipment and services needed to accelerate the modernization of the recipient’s Advanced Tactical Datalink System; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $265 million. The principal contractor(s) will be selected through competitive procurements conducted by the U.S. Government in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Egypt
December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Egypt has requested a possible sale to refurbish and upgrade five hundred fifty-five (555) M1A1 Abrams tanks into M1A1SA configuration tanks. Included are five hundred fifty-five (555) AN/VAS- 5B Driver Vision Enhancer (DVE-A) Kits; five hundred fifty-five (555) Thermal Imaging System (TIS) Gunner's Sights; M250 Smoke Grenade Launchers; AGT-1500 tank engines; X-1100 tank transmissions; spare parts; support equipment; depot level support; Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE); repair parts; repair and return program; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $4.69 billion. The M1A1SA tank contractor will be General Dynamics Land Systems, Sterling Heights, MI. Refurbishment and upgrade will take place at the Egyptian Tank Plant, Cairo, Egypt. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Egypt
December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Egypt has requested to buy an additional five hundred forty-three (543) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS) that will be added to a previously implemented case whose value was under the congressional notification threshold. The original Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case, valued at $8 million ($5.2 million in MDE), included two hundred sixteen (216) APKWS. This notification is for a combined total of seven hundred fifty-nine (759) APKWS. The following non-MDE items will also be included: test support equipment; spare and repair parts; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; transportation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $30 million. The principal contractor will be BAE Systems, located in Nashua, NH. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/egypt-advanced-precision-kill-weapon-system-apkws
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Egypt
December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Egypt has requested to buy two thousand one hundred eighty-three (2,183) Hellfire Air-to- Ground Missiles, AGM-114R. The following non MDE items will also be included: spare and repair parts; U.S. Government technical assistance; integrated logistics support; hardware equipment; technical publications; repair and return services; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The total estimated cost is $630 million. The principal contractor will be Lockheed Martin, located in Orlando, FL. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/egypt-hellfire-agm-114r-missiles
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Morocco
December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Kingdom of Morocco has requested to buy up to thirty (30) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and one (1) AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM guidance section. Also included are AMRAAM telemetry kits, control section spares, and containers; Common Munitions Built-in-Test Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); ADU-891 Computer Test Set Adapter Groups; munitions support and support equipment; classified software delivery and support; spare parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support; transportation support; classified publications and technical documentation; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $88.37 million. The prime contractor will be RTX Corporation located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Morocco
December 20, 2024: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Kingdom of Morocco has requested to buy five hundred (500) GBU-39B Small Diameter Bombs I (SDBI); and two (2) GBU-39 (T-1)/B inert practice bombs with fuze. The following non-MDE items will also be included: GBU-39 tactical training rounds; containers, weapons system support, and support and test equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; publications and technical data; personnel training and training equipment; warranties; transportation support; site surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, logistics, and technical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $86 million. The principal contractor will be Boeing Corporation, located in St. Louis, MO. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/kingdom-morocco-gbu-39b-small-diameter-bombs-sdb-i
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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
Commerce Strengthens Export Controls to Restrict China’s Capability to Produce Advanced Semiconductors for Military Applications
December 2, 2024: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced a package of rules designed to further impair the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) capability to produce advanced-node semiconductors that can be used in the next generation of advanced weapon systems and in artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced computing, which have significant military applications. This action is a proactive measure enhancing the Department of Commerce’s work to impede the PRC’s ability to procure and produce the technologies necessary for its military modernization.
The rules include new controls on 24 types of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and 3 types of software tools for developing or producing semiconductors; new controls on high-bandwidth memory (HBM); new red flag guidance to address compliance and diversion concerns; 140 Entity List additions and 14 modifications spanning PRC tool manufacturers, semiconductor fabs, and investment companies involved in advancing the PRC government’s military modernization; and several critical regulatory changes to enhance the effectiveness of our previous controls.
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Public Briefing on Changes to Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items
December 4, 2024: 89 Fed Reg. 96095: On December 2, 2024, the Office of the Federal Register posted for public inspection two related Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) rules: an interim final rule, “Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items,” (RIN 0694-AJ74) and a final rule, “Additions and Modifications to the Entity List; Removals from the Validated End-User (VEU) Program” (RIN 0694-AJ77).
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Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items
December 5, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 96790: In this interim final rule (IFR), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) made changes to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) controls for certain advanced computing items, supercomputers, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, which includes adding new controls for certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment and related items, creating new Foreign Direct Product (FDP) rules for certain commodities to impair the capability to produce “advanced-node integrated circuits” (“advanced-node ICs”) by certain destinations or entities of concern, adding new controls for certain high bandwidth memory important for advanced computing, and clarifying controls on certain software keys that allow for the use of items such as software tools. This IFR publishes concurrently with another BIS final rule entitled, “Additions and Modifications to the Entity List; and Removals from the Validated End-User (VEU) Program” (Entity List rule) that adds to and modifies the Entity List to ensure appropriate EAR controls are in place for certain critical technologies and to minimize the risk of diversion to entities of concern.
In this IFR, BIS made changes to EAR controls for advanced computing items, supercomputers, and SME. The five categories of changes implemented by this IFR are described in section III as follows:
- Addition of two new FDP rules in § 734.9 of the EAR for certain types of advanced SME and for entities on the Entity List involved in the production of “advanced-node ICs”;
- Additional revisions related to the production of semiconductors and other conforming changes, including revisions to de minimis provisions that correlate to the new FDP rules, establishment of new License Exception Restricted Fabrication “Facility” (RFF), addition of eight new Red Flags, clarifications to § 744.23, and revisions and conforming changes to other parts of the EAR;
- Addition of HBM controls, including addition of new ECCN 3A090.c and License Exceptions HBM;
- Clarification to software keys to address when authorization is required; and
- Revisions to the CCL in supplement no. 1 to part 774, including revisions to eight existing ECCNs and addition of eight new ECCNs.
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Commerce Issues Final Rule to Formalize Information and Communications Technology and Services ICTS Program
December 5, 2024: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule cementing the procedures it will follow in investigating foreign adversary threats to information and communications technology and services (ICTS) transactions that may harm U.S. national security, pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13873: Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain.
This final rule demonstrates the Biden-Harris Administration’s proactive efforts to address the potential national security risks associated with the ICTS supply chain and the abuse of U.S. critical infrastructure by foreign adversaries. It is a significant step in formalizing the operations of the Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services (OICTS), which was established within BIS in March 2022 to implement EO 13873 and related executive orders.
Since its formation, OICTS has completed or undertaken several key investigations and rulemakings. In June 2024, OICTS announced a first-of-its-kind final determination prohibiting Kaspersky Lab, Inc., the U.S. subsidiary of a Russia-based anti-virus software and cybersecurity company, from selling its software within the United States or providing updates to software already in use, amongst other activities.
Additionally, in September 2024, OICTS issued a proposed rule that would prohibit the sale or import of connected vehicles integrating specific pieces of hardware and software, or those components sold separately, with a sufficient nexus to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or Russia. These actions underscore the critical role of OICTS in protecting American technologies and services from potentially malicious foreign adversary intervention or interference.
https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-issues-final-rule-formalize-icts-program
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BIS Publishes Assessment on the Use of Mature-Node Chips
December 6, 2024: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released a report on the use of mature-node semiconductor chips, or legacy chips, in supply chains that directly or indirectly support U.S. critical infrastructure. The report includes key findings related to U.S. companies’ use of legacy chips manufactured by entities based in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The report, based on data BIS collected pursuant to an authority under the Defense Production Act (DPA), shows:
- Companies that sell products containing legacy chips continue to lack visibility into their semiconductor supply chains. About half of surveyed companies were unable to determine whether their products contained any chips manufactured by PRC-based foundries.
- Based on the information respondents provided, U.S. companies’ use of chips made in PRC-based foundries is pervasive. More than 2/3 of their products contain PRC-origin chips. However, these legacy chips represent a limited share of the total number of chips used in those products.
- Capacity expansion in China has already begun to cause pricing pressure that may weaken U.S. chip suppliers’ competitive positions.
https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/public-report-use-mature-node-semiconductors-december-2024 and
https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-publishes-assessment-use-mature-node-chips
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Implementation of Certain Australia Group Decisions
December 23, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 104408: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement changes agreed to by Australia Group (AG) member countries at recent meetings. These include controlling: instruments for the automated chemical synthesis of peptides (automated peptide synthesizers), dipropylamine, and neosaxitoxin; and revising the controls for botulinum toxins, toxic gas monitors, and centrifugal separators. This rule also makes minor conforming changes for the new controls and revisions to existing controls.
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U.S. Census Bureau
REVISION BIS LICENSE TYPE C65 – (TGL) Temporary General License
December 5, 2024
On Monday, December 2, 2024, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) put on public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register an interim final rule (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-12-05/pdf/2024-28270.pdf) with an effective date of Monday, December 2, 2024 for most provisions. The IFR is expected to publish in the Federal Register on Thursday, December 5, 2024.
Among other actions, this interim final rule amended the existing Temporary General License (TGL) in supplement number 1 to part 736, paragraph (d), General Order number 4 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). General Order number 4 is amended to add newly added semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) ECCNs to this authorization in paragraph (d)(1)(i) and add 3A090.c under certain conditions to this authorization in paragraph (d)(2)(ii).
Revised License Code C65 (TGL)
An update has been made to AES to revise License Code C65 “Temporary General License” (TGL), which authorizes certain exports, reexports, in-country transfers, and exports from abroad destined to or within China or Macau by companies not headquartered in Country Groups D:1 or D:5 or E (see supplement no. 1 to part 740 of the EAR) to continue or engage in integration, assembly (mounting), inspection, testing, quality assurance, and distribution of items covered by ECCN 3A090.a or .b, 4A090, and associated software and technology in ECCN 3D001 (for 3A090.a or .b), 3E001 (for 3A090.a or .b), 4D090, or 4E001; or any item that is a computer, integrated circuit, “electronic assembly” or “component” and associated software and technology, specified elsewhere on Commerce Control List (supplement no. 1 to part 774), which meets or exceeds the performance parameters of ECCN 3A090.a or .b or 4A090.
Under the new interim final rule, ECCNs added to the “Less Restricted SME “parts,” “components”, or “equipment” paragraph (d)(1)(i) include 3B001.c.4, 3B993.b.1, c.2, c.3, d.4, f.2, f.3, o.2, q.1, q.2, 3B994, 3D993.a (for commodities specified in paragraph (d)(1)(i)(B)), 3D993.b through .d, 3D994, 3E993.a (for commodities specified in paragraph (d)(1)(i)(B)), 3E993.b, and 3E994.
Additionally, paragraph (d)(2)(ii) pertaining to advanced computing items is revised by adding 3A090.c when destined to or within Macau or a destination in Country Group D:5. A new paragraph, (d)(2)(ii)(B), is added to add an additional ultimate end use for 3A090.c, 3D001 (for 3A090.c), 3E001 (for 3A090.c).
The full terms of this Temporary General License are described in General Order No. 4 of in paragraph (d) in supplement no. 1 to part 736 of the EAR. See paragraph (d)(3) for item-based changes to validity dates.
AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C65 (TGL) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:
- AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C65 (TGL) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES.
- Report License Code: C65 Temporary General License (TGL)
- Allowable ECCNs until December 31, 2025 under General Order #4 (d)(1)(i)(A): ECCNs 3A001.z; 3A090.a and 3A090.b; 3D001 (for “software” for commodities controlled by 3A001.z, 3A090.a and 3A090.b); 3E001 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 3A001.z, 3A090.a and .b); 4A003.z; 4A004.z; 4A005.z; 4A090; 4D001 (for “software” for commodities controlled by 4A003.z, 4A004.z, and 4A005.z); 4D090; 4E001 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 4A090 or “software” specified by 4D001 (for 4A003.z, 4A004.z, and 4A005.z); 4D090; 5A002.z; 5A004.z; 5A992.z; 5D002.z; 5D992.z; 5E002 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 5A002.z or 5A004.z or “software” specified by 5D002 (for 5A002.z or 5A004.z commodities)); or 5E992 (for “technology” for commodities controlled by 5A992.z or “software” controlled by 5D992.z) of the Commerce Control List (CCL).
- Allowable ECCNs until December 31, 2026 under General order #4 (d)(1): ECCN 3A991, 3B001.c.4, 3B992, 3B993.b.1, c.2, c.3, d.4, f.2, f.3, o.2, q.1, q.2, 3B994, 3D991, a (for commodities specified in this paragraph), 3D993.b through d, 3D994, 3E993.a (for commodities specified in this paragraph), 3E991, 3E993.b, or 3E994.
- Allowable ECCNs until December 31, 2026 under General Order #4 (d)(2)(i)(B): 3A090.c, 3D001 (for 3A090.c), and 3E001 (for 3A090.c)
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NEW BIS LICENSE TYPE C71 – (HBM) High Bandwidth Memory
December 5, 2024:
On Monday, December 2, 2024, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) put on public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register an interim final rule (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-12-05/pdf/2024-28270.pdf) with an effective date of Monday, December 2, 2024 and a compliance date of December 31 for most provisions. The IFR is expected to publish in the Federal Register on Thursday, December 5, 2024. Among other actions, this interim final rule established new controls on high-bandwidth memory units under ECCN 3A090.c, and also creates a License Exception High Bandwidth Memory (HBM) in § 740.25 of the Export Administrations Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. parts 730 – 774, which can be used for certain less advanced HBM units. This license exception, as specified under § 740.25, authorizes the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of items specified in ECCN 3A090.c on the Commerce Control List if all terms and conditions within paragraphs (a) through (e) are met.
(in-country) If the 3A090.c items are destined for packaging at any packaging site either (i) headquartered outside of Country Group A:5 or A:6 of supplement no. 1 to part 740, or (ii) having an ultimate parent headquartered in Macau or a location specified in Country Group D:5 of supplement no. 1 to part 740, then the finished, co-packaged products must be sent back to the exporter, reexporter, or transferor for export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to the purchaser. This allows the exporter, reexporter, or transferor to confirm that no diversion to unauthorized end-users has occurred.
For other packaging sites that face lower diversion risk, it is possible to claim License Exception HBM without needing to send the co-packaged products back to the exporter, reexporter, or transferor, if certain conditions are met (for example, the co-packaged products must not exceed the technical thresholds in ECCN3A090.
License Exception HBM under paragraph (b) specifies that the exporter, reexporter, or transferor must be headquartered in the United States or a destination specified in Country Group A:5 of supplement no. 1 to part 740, without an ultimate parent headquartered in Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5 of supplement no. 1 to part 740. No other exporter, reexporter, or transferor may use License Exception HBM.
3A090.c items exported, reexported, or transferred to or within Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5 of supplement no. 1 to part 740 must be directly purchased by the end user. 3A090.c items must be shipped directly to the packaging site, which is included to prevent diversion.
New License Code C71 (HBM)
An update has been made to AES to create new License Codes C71 “High Bandwidth Memory” (HBM) which authorizes certain export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of items specified in ECCN 3A090.c. (in-country)
AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C71 (HBM) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:
- Report License Code: C71 Restricted Fabrication Facility (HBM)
- Allowable ECCNs: 3A090.c
- Allowable countries: All Countries
- Allowable Export Information Codes:
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LICENSE TYPE C72 – (RFF) Restricted Fabrication Facility
December 5, 2024:
On Monday, December 2, 2024, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) put on public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register an interim final rule (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-12-05/pdf/2024-28270.pdf) with an effective date of Monday, December 2, 2024 for most provisions. The IFR is expected to publish in the Federal Register on Thursday, December 5, 2024. Among other actions, this interim final rule established a new License Exception Restricted Fabrication Facility (RFF) in § 740.26 of the Export Administrations Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. parts 730 - 774. This license exception as specified under the paragraph (a) (Eligibility requirements) authorizes the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of items not specified in ECCNs 3B001, 3B002, 3B993, 3B994, 3D992, 3D993, 3D994, 3E992, 3E993, or 3E994 to specific entities on the Entity List when § 740.26 is referenced in the Entity List “License requirement” entry.
The new License Exception RFF will allow certain items, including specified semiconductor manufacturing equipment, to be exported, reexported, exported from abroad, or transferred (in-country) to certain fabrication facilities that are subject to end user-based license requirements but that are not currently producing “advanced node ICs”.
License Exception RFF overcomes license requirements in the license requirements column of a specific entity when § 740.26 is referenced in that Entity List entry (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administrations Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. parts 730 – 774). This license exception does not overcome destination-based license requirements, end-use based license requirements in other sections of part 744, or license requirements that apply to other entities on the Entity List if other listed entities are a party to the transaction.
License Exception RFF may not be used for the operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, or refurbishing of commodities specified in ECCNs 3B001.a.4, c, d, f.1, f.5, k to n, p.2, p.4, r, or 3B002.c, or 3B993, or 3B994. Also, any item exported, exported from abroad, reexported, or transferred under License Exception RFF may not be used to produce “advanced-node ICs.” A notification that must be sent to BIS 45 days prior to exporting, reexporting, exporting from abroad, or transferring (in-country) that includes the end-user’s name and address, description of item(s), purchase price, and anticipated shipping date of export, reexport, or transfer (in-country).
In addition, a notification must be sent to BIS within one business day of learning that the end use has changed to “advance-node integrated circuit” “production.” There is also a reporting requirement for installation of SME that must be sent to BIS within 30 days of installation. An annual end-use confirmation report that must be sent to BIS by the exporter, reexporter, or transferor that confirms that the installed equipment is not being used in the productions of “advanced-node ICs.”
New License Code C72 (RFF)
An update has been made to AES to create new License Codes C72 “Restricted Fabrication Facility” (RFF), which authorizes certain export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of items not specified in ECCNs 3B001, 3B002, 3B993, 3B994, 3D992, 3D993, 3D994, 3E992, 3E993, or 3E994 to specific entities on the Entity list. License Exception RFF overcomes license requirements in the license requirements column of a specific entity when § 740.26 is referenced in that Entity List entry (Supplement No. 4 to Part 744 of the Export Administrations Regulations (EAR), 15 C.F.R. parts 730 – 774). Transactions under RFF must meet all of the applicable criteria identified under paragraph (a) and must comply with the restrictions set forth in paragraph (b) of this section.
The full terms of License Exception RFF are described in § 740.26.
AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C72 (RFF) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:
- Report License Code: C72 Restricted Fabrication Facility (RFF)
- Allowable ECCNs: All except 3B001, 3B002, 3B993, 3B994, 3D992, 3D993, 3D994, 3E992, 3E993, or 3E994.
- Allowable countries: All
- Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
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December 19, 2024: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected. If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation. Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN. However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.
To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.
Response Code: 256
Narrative: USPPI Postal Code Not Valid for State
Severity: Fatal
Reason: The Postal Code and State Code reported in the USPPI Address do not match.
Resolution: The reported USPPI State Code must be valid for the state associated to the Postal Code.
Verify the USPPI State Code and Postal Code combination, correct the shipment and resubmit.
Response Code: 501
Narrative: Export Information Code Missing
Severity: Fatal
Reason: The Export Information Code was not reported.
Resolution: An Export Information Code must be reported on every shipment. For a complete list of Export Information Codes, refer to ‘Appendix E – Commodity Filing Export Information’ of the AESTIR.
Verify the Export Information Code, correct the shipment and resubmit.
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December 19, 2024: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected. If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation. Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN. However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.
To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.
Response Code: 256
Narrative: USPPI Postal Code Not Valid for State
Severity: Fatal
Reason: The Postal Code and State Code reported in the USPPI Address do not match.
Resolution: The reported USPPI State Code must be valid for the state associated to the Postal Code.
Verify the USPPI State Code and Postal Code combination, correct the shipment and resubmit.
Response Code: 501
Narrative: Export Information Code Missing
Severity: Fatal
Reason: The Export Information Code was not reported.
Resolution: An Export Information Code must be reported on every shipment. For a complete list of Export Information Codes, refer to ‘Appendix E – Commodity Filing Export Information’ of the AESTIR.
Verify the Export Information Code, correct the shipment and resubmit.
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Changes to the Reporting Requirements of the USML Category XXI Determination Number and Goods Exported Under for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program in AES
December 30, 2024:
On Thursday, August 10, 2023, the Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau (Census Bureau) published a final rule (2023-16970.pdf (govinfo.gov) announcing the Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) collection of a new data element – Category XXI Determination Number in the Automated Export System (AES).
The purpose of this requirement is to prevent the unauthorized use of USML Category XXI, which is limited to those articles and services designated by DDTC under that category.
Effective January 1, 2025, AES will generate a fatal error (FATAL ERR 5C2 CAT XXI DETERMINATION NBR UNKNOWN) back to the filer if USML Category XXI “21” is selected in AES and the CAT XXI DETERMINATION NBR is UNKNOWN or missing.
DDTC is also aware of a subset of exporters using DDTC USML Category Code “21” as a workaround to export items under License Code/License Exemption Code “S94” for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) that are not items described on the USML. Most such articles would have been subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) if they were not being exported via an FMS authorization. However, effective October 15, 2013, items to be exported under FMS authority are not “subject to the EAR” pursuant to § 734.3(b)(1)(vi) of the EAR because they are “defense articles” pursuant to section 47 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2794).
To continue to provide a valid means of exporting such items under S94 when Fatal Error Code 5C2 takes effect, the DDTC is also implementing DDTC USML Category Code “55” and Fatal Error Code 5C3 within AES.
The Addition of USML Category Code “55”
The AES Trade Interface Requirements (AESTIR), Appendix L has been updated by adding DDTC USML Category Code “55” (Articles Exported Under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Authority and Not Described on the U.S. Munitions List (USML)). Category Code “55” is to be reported on the EEI ONLY when the export is to take place under the FMS program and the item to be exported is not described in USML Categories I-XXI (i.e., is normally subject to the EAR when not exported pursuant to a Foreign Military Sales authorization).
See the following instructions to determine how exports under the FMS program should be reported on the EEI. Exports under the FMS program are reported under Automated Export System (AES) License Code/License Exemption Code S94. By using DDTC USML Category Code “55” and the AES License Code/License Exemption Code S94, you are certifying that the terms, provisions, and conditions of the FMS program have been met.
- License Code/License Exemption Code S94 (FMS Program Exports) – Reported for any export under the FMS program. Any of the USML Category Codes are eligible with License Code/License Exemption Code S94. However, USML Category Code “55” may only be used in conjunction with License Code/License Exemption Code S94.
- Export Information Codes FS and FI – these Export Information Codes are the only eligible Export Information Codes to be reported with USML Category Code “55” under License Code/License Exemption Code S94.
If the USML Category Code “55” is reported under any other license types, AES will generate a fatal error (FATAL ERR 5C3-DDTC USML CATEG 55 NOT ELIG FOR LIC TYPE) back to the filer.
| LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES |
This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.
Fines and Penalties
December 3, 2024: A San Bernardino County man was arrested on a federal criminal complaint alleging that he exported to North Korea shipments of firearms, ammunition and other military items that were concealed inside shipping containers bound from Long Beach.
Shenghua Wen, 41, of Ontario, CA is charged with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a felony that carries a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years in federal prison.
Wen – a Chinese national illegally residing in the United States – was arrested this morning and is expected to make his initial appearance this afternoon in United States District Court in downtown Los Angeles. His arraignment is expected to occur in the coming weeks.
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December 3, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $14,550,000 settlement with Aiotec GmbH ("Aiotec"). Aiotec, a Berlin, Germany -headquartered company that sources industrial equipment for the energy sector, has agreed to settle its potential civil liability for one apparent violation of the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (ITSR). This apparent violation of the ITSR arose from Aiotec's participation in a conspiracy between 2015 and 2019 to cause a U.S. company to indirectly sell and supply an Australian polypropylene plant to Iran, and remit payments for the sale of the plant through U.S. financial institutions. This settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that Aiotec's conduct was not voluntarily self-disclosed and constituted an egregious case.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241203_33v and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933666/download?inline
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December 11, 2024: A 12-count indictment was unsealed, charging Natalya Ivanovna Mazulina, of Federal Way, Washington, also known as “Natasha Mazulina,” for her alleged involvement in a scheme to circumvent U.S. export laws and sanctions on Russia. Mazulina, the Western regional manager of a freight forwarding company based in Jamaica, New York, which operated out of John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK airport) in Queens, New York, and Seattle-Tacoma International Airport in Washington State, was arrested in Seattle and will be arraigned in the Eastern District of New York later.
Mazulina is charged with conspiracy to export controlled goods to Russia without a license, conspiracy to defraud the U.S., conspiracy to commit money laundering, exporting controlled goods to Russia without a license, filing false export documents with the U.S. government, and smuggling goods contrary to U.S. law. If convicted, she faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for each count of conspiring to export or exporting controlled goods to Russia without a license; a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison for conspiring to commit money laundering; up to 10 years in prison for each count of smuggling; and a maximum penalty of five years in prison for each count of conspiracy and filing false export documents with the U.S. government. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.
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December 13, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $257,690 settlement with C.H. Robinson International Inc. (CHR). CHR agreed to settle its potential civil liability for 82 apparent violations by five of its non-U.S. subsidiaries, which provided freight brokerage or transportation services for shipments in apparent violation of OFAC sanctions on Cuba and Iran. The settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that the apparent violations were voluntarily self-disclosed and were not egregious.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241213
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December 18, 2024: As part of a settlement agreement, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed a civil penalty of $3,300,000 against Integra Technologies, Inc. (“Integra”), a radio frequency and microwave power solutions engineering and manufacturing company headquartered in El Segundo, California. The penalty relates to Integra’s shipments to Russia of transistors and related products, which can be used for avionics or radar systems. Integra made a significant number of shipments to Russia, several of which occurred after such products had been designated by the United States, the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom as Common High Priority List (CHPL) items. The CHPL items are items that Russia specifically seeks to procure for its defense industrial base to support weapons programs used in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Integra sold approximately $6.67 million of transistors and related products, including CHPL items, to Russian end users between February 2023 and October 2023. All of these sales occurred without the requisite license or other authorization from BIS. Integra voluntarily disclosed the conduct to BIS and cooperated with the investigation by BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement. This voluntary self-disclosure (VSD) resulted in a significant reduction of the penalty. BIS also agreed to suspend $1.5 million of the penalty due to Integra’s limited ability to pay.
As part of the settlement agreement, Integra admitted to the conduct set forth in a Proposed Charging Letter, which alleged 94 violations of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Specifically, on 94 occasions between February 2023 and October 2023, Integra sold and exported transistors and related products via two third-party distributors to eight different Russian end users, without any license or authorization from BIS. The transistors that Integra exported were added to the CHPL in July 2023.
At the time of the violations, Integra was aware that it was shipping transistors and related products to Russian end users. However, because Integra’s export compliance program lacked procedures requiring regular review of revisions to the EAR, Integra failed to recognize that, as of February 2023, such items required a license for export to Russia. Integra did not realize its error until October 2023, after which Integra promptly stopped all shipments intended for Russian end users and filed a voluntary self-disclosure with BIS. Integra stated that, at the time of the relevant shipments, it believed the specific EAR99 products it sent to Russian end users were technologically suitable only for civil end use, rather than military end use.
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December 18, 2024: Mahdi Mohammad Sadeghi, 42, a dual U.S.-Iranian national of Natick, Massachusetts, and Mohammad Abedininajafabadi, also known as Mohammad Abedini (Abedini), 38, of Tehran, Iran, have been charged with conspiring to export sophisticated electronic components from the United States to Iran in violation of U.S. export control and sanctions laws. Abedini is also charged with providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), that resulted in the deaths of three U.S. service members who were killed by a one-way attack Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), also known as a drone, on a military base in Jordan.
Sadeghi was arrested and made his initial appearance in the District of Massachusetts. Abedini was also arrested in Italy by Italian authorities at the request of the United States.
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December 23, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) imposed, as part of a settlement agreement, a civil penalty of $180,000 against The Indium Corporation of America (Indium), a materials refiner, smelter, manufacturer, and supplier to the global electronics, semiconductor, thin-film, and thermal management markets. Indium is headquartered in Clinton, NY.
The penalty relates to Indium’s shipments to Russia of solder materials used in electronics manufacturing valued at approximately $96,506. Indium cooperated with the investigation conducted by BIS’s Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) and took remedial measures after discovering the conduct at issue, which resulted in a significant reduction in the penalty.
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December 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a settlement with an individual ("U.S. Person-1"). U.S. Person-1 agreed to remit $45,179 to settle their potential civil liability for six apparent violations of OFAC's Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations. Between January 2021 and June 2021, U.S. Person-1 executed six payments totaling $45,179 on behalf of a blocked individual with knowledge that the individual was sanctioned. The settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that the apparent violations were not self-disclosed and that three of the apparent violations were egregious.
OFAC also announced a settlement with Córdoba Music Group LLC (Córdoba). Córdoba, a manufacturer of musical instruments based in California, agreed to remit $41,591 to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of sanctions on Iran. On nine occasions, Córdoba shipped instruments and related accessories that it knew were ultimately destined for Iran. The settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that Córdoba's conduct was non-egregious and voluntarily self-disclosed.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933701/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933726/download?inline
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December 31, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $22,172 settlement with SkyGeek Logistics, Inc. (SkyGeek). SkyGeek agreed to settle its potential civil liability for six apparent violations of OFAC sanctions related to Russia’s aerospace and technology sectors. In 2024, SkyGeek attempted two refunds and sent four shipments to two Specially Designated Nationals in the United Arab Emirates sanctioned in connection with these sectors. The settlement amount reflects OFAC's determination that the apparent violations were non-egregious and that certain of its conduct was voluntarily self-disclosed.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241231_33
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Sanctions
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
December 5, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 96830: In this final rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 140 entities to the Entity List. These entries are listed on the Entity List under the destinations of China, People's Republic of (China), Japan, South Korea, and Singapore and have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. This final rule also modifies 14 existing entries on the Entity List, consisting of revisions to 14 entries under China. This final rule publishes concurrently with BIS's interim final rule, “Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule Additions, and Refinements to Controls for Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items” (0694-AJ74), which makes additional changes to the EAR controls on advanced computing items and semiconductor manufacturing items. This final rule is part of this larger effort to ensure that appropriate EAR controls are in place on these items, including in connection with transactions destined to or otherwise involving the entities being added to the Entity List, as well as for existing entries on the Entity List that are being modified.
All of these entities (those newly added and those being modified) are involved with the development and production of “advanced-node integrated circuits” (“advanced-node ICs”) and/or semiconductor manufacturing items, and/or have supported the Chinese government's Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) Development Strategy. Additionally, this final rule designates nine of these entities being added and seven of the entries being modified as entities for which entity-specific restrictions involving foreign-produced items apply. This final rule also amends the EAR by removing three entities from the Validated End-User (VEU) Program.
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December 10, 2024: 89 Fed. Reg. 99702: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 8 entities to the Entity List for activities contrary to U.S. national security and foreign policy under the destinations of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (2), Burma (2), and Russia (4). These Entity List additions are related to enabling human rights violations.
Of the two PRC entities added, one was added because it enables human rights violations, including high-technology surveillance targeted at the general population of the people of China, Uyghurs, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups. The other entity was added due to enabling the PRC’s public security establishment to carry out human rights violations.
Four entities, two under the destination of Burma and two under the destination of Russia, were added to the Entity List for supplying the Burmese military with parts and components that have enabled the military to carry out human rights violations, including brutal aerial attacks against the civilian population.
The remaining two Russian entities were added for supplying facial recognition technology to the Russian government to target peaceful protesters, an integral component of Russia’s mass surveillance apparatus.
Burma
- Sky Aviator Company Limited; and
- Synepex Shwe Company Ltd.
China
- Beijing Zhongdun Security Technology Group Co., Ltd.; and
- Zhejiang Uniview Technologies Co., Ltd.
Russia
- Aviasnab LLC;
- Joint Stock Company Gorizont;
- NtechLab LLC; and
- Technology Videoanalysis LLC.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/11/2024-29136/additions-to-the-entity-list and
https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-adds-8-entities-entity-list-enabling-human-rights-abuses
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December 30, 2024: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published its third quarterly update of the boycott Requester List. This list notifies companies, financial institutions, freight forwarders, individuals, and other U.S. persons of potential sources of certain boycott-related requests they may receive during the regular course of business.
A party’s inclusion on the boycott Requester List does not mean that U.S. persons are restricted from dealing with the listed party. However, a party’s inclusion puts U.S. persons on notice that the listed party is more likely to make reportable boycott-related requests. The updated public list of entities who have been identified as having made a boycott-related request in reports received by BIS includes a total of 38 additions. BIS also removed over 20 entities. This announcement builds on the second quarterly update published in October.
https://www.bis.gov/press-release/bis-updates-boycott-requester-list-1
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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
December 2, 2024: On the International Day for the Abolition of Slavery, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three former Government of Uzbekistan officials who were involved in human trafficking and gender-based violence, including physical and sexual violence against children at a state-run orphanage in Urgench, Uzbekistan. All three individuals are being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse around the world.
Concurrently, these individuals are now subject to visa restrictions by the Department of State under Section 7031(c) of the annual Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act. Section 7031(c) provides that, in cases where the Secretary of State has credible information that foreign officials have been involved in significant corruption or a gross violation of human rights, those individuals and their immediate family members are ineligible for entry into the United States.
Promoting accountability for gender-based violence is a top priority for the U.S. government. President Biden issued a Memorandum on Promoting Accountability for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in November 2022 that directs the U.S. government to strengthen our exercise of financial, diplomatic, and legal tools against these types of abuses.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Khudaiberganoya, Yulduz of Uzbekistan;
- Kuryazov, Anvar of Uzebekistan; and
- Masharipov, Aybek of Uzbekistan.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241202 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions
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December 3, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on 35 entities and vessels that play a critical role in transporting illicit Iranian petroleum to foreign markets. This action imposes additional costs on Iran’s petroleum sector following Iran’s attack against Israel on October 1, 2024, as well as Iran’s announced nuclear escalations, building upon the sanctions issued on October 11. Petroleum revenues provide the Iranian regime with the resources to fund its nuclear program, develop advanced drones and missiles, and provide ongoing financial and material support for the terrorist activities of its regional proxies.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Ceres Shipping Limited of China;
- Constellation Maritime Services Limited of Liberia;
- Eunomia Limited of China;
- Gaffodil Co., Limited of China;
- Galileos Marine Services L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates;
- Inaya Ship Management Private Limited of Pakistan;
- Lightship Management Ltd of the United Arab Emirates;
- Lufindo Holding Limited of Seychelles;
- Ocean Glory Giant Ogg SA of Panama;
- Shanhai Future Ship Management Co Ltd of China;
- Shanghai Legendary Ship Management Company Limited of China;
- Tightship Shipping Management Private Limited of India;
- Vision Ship Management LLP of India; and
- Yurimaguas Ltd of the Marshall Islands.
The following vessels have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Bertha (E5U5084) Crude Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag; MMSI 518999103 (vessel);
- Black Panther (3EZT6) Chemical/Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 372988000 (vessel);
- Ceres I (S9U4) Crude Oil Tanker Sao Tome and Principe flag; MMSI 668116233 (vessel);
- Elva (S9A3) Crude Oil Tanker Sao Tome and Principe flag; MMSI 668116202 (vessel);
- Fiona II (HPOE) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 351073000 (vessel);
- FT Island (HQAI6) Crude Oil Tanker Honduras flag; MMSI 334017000 (vessel);
- Jaya (V7A6410) Crude Oil Tanker Marshall Islands flag; MMSI 538010982 (vessel);
- Lady Lucy (5LKL2) Chemical/Products Tanker Liberia flag; MMSI 636022783 (vessel);
- Lara II (3EQL7) Oil Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 374740000 (vessel);
- Lioness (3FLM9) Chemical/Products Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 353722000 (vessel);
- Masal (EPHO6) Crude Oil Tanker Iran flag; MMSI 422169700 (vessel);
- Merope (3E2648) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002495 (vessel);
- Min Hang (E5U5075) Crude Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag; MMSI 518999094 (vessel);
- Olive (E5U5271) Crude Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag; MMSI 518999290 (vessel);
- Phonix (8RCY3) Crude Oil Tanker Guyana flag; MMSI 750308000 (vessel);
- Rio Napo E5U4369) Chemical/Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag; MMSI 518998389 (vessel);
- Tonil (3E2323) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002482 (vessel);
- Vanity (T7BL8) Crude Oil Tanker San Marino flag; MMSI 268241802 (vessel);
- Veronica III (3E2317) Crude Oil Tanker Panama flag; MMSI 352002475 (vessel);
- Vesna (V3MD7) Crude Oil Tanker Belize flag; MMSI 312242000 (vessel); and
- Yuri (E5U5230) Crude Oil Tanker Cook Islands flag; MMSI 518999249 (vessel).
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241203
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December 4, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned five individuals and four entities that are associated with or leverage the TGR Group, a sprawling international network of businesses and employees that have facilitated significant sanctions circumvention on behalf of Russian elites. This action also identifies a Wyoming-based entity that is owned 50 percent or more by a sanctioned individual. This action continues the G7 commitment to hold accountable parties that evade or offset the impact of international sanctions, including by using digital assets, and to impose costs on illicit actors that use digital assets to enhance and transfer their wealth. These designations are the result of a collaborative effort with the United Kingdom’s (UK) National Crime Agency, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Bradens, Andrejs of the United Kingdom;
- Chirkinyan, Elena of the United Kingdom;
- Krasnov, Nikita Vladimirovich of Russia;
- Magomedov, Khadzhi Murat Dalgatovich of Russia; and
- Rossi, George of the United Kingdom.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Pullman Global Solutions LLC of the United States;
- Siam Expert Trading Company Limited of Thailand;
- TGR Corporate Concierge Ltd of the United Kingdom;
- TGR DWC-LLC of the United Arab Emirates; and
- TGR Partners of Russia.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241204 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions
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December 9, 2024: On International Anti-Corruption Day, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 28 individuals and businesses involved in a global gold smuggling and money laundering network based in Zimbabwe, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Abakumov, Dmytro of Ukraine;
- Crosby, David Paul of the United Kingdom;
- Pattni, Kamlesh Mansukhlal Damji of the United Arab Emirates;
- Pattni, Mishaal Hitesh of the United Arab Emirates;
- Sanjay, Raj Vaya of Zimbabwe;
- Sinha, Swetang of Zimbabwe;
- Sood, Rahul of India;
- Vaya, Mukesh Mansukhlal of the United Arab Emirates; and
- Vaya, Sanjay Keshavji of Zimbabwe.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Fiza Gold and Bullion Trading L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates;
- Golden Luxury Jewellery Trading L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates;
- Manurama Limited of Kenya;
- Marwa Investments Limited of the United Arab Emirates;
- Memories Golden Jewellery L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates;
- Mirdk Fyuels OSOO of Krygyzstan;
- Precious Bullion DMCC of the United Arab Emirates;
- Royal Sona OSOO of Krygyzstan;
- Rubini Investment Group Limited of the United Arab Emirates;
- Ruhmeer Diamonds DMCC of the United Arab Emirates;
- Sahara Petroleum OSOO of Krygyzstan;
- Sakhara Petroleum OSOO of Krygyzstan;
- Samaria Holdings Limited of the United Arab Emirates;
- Skorus Investments PVT LTD of Zimbabwe;
- Sun Multinational DMCC of the United Arab Emirates;
- Sun Star Travel & Tourism L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
- Suprim EF IKS OSOO of Krygyzstan;
- Suzan General Trading JLT of the United Arab Emirates; and
- Suzan General Trading PVT LTD of Zimbabwe.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2740 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241209
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December 10, 2024: In recognition of International Human Rights Day (IHRD), the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced new designations and highlighting other human rights-related sanctions actions taken over the last year. IHRD is observed annually on December 10 in commemoration of the United Nations’ adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on that day in 1948.
This action sanctions one individual and one entity involved in abuses against prisoners held in Houthi-run prisons in Yemen and one individual providing support to Bashar al-Assad. State also announced steps to impose visa restrictions on dozens of individuals pursuant to Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and designated one official under Section 7031(c) of the annual Appropriations Act for involvement in a gross violation of human rights. For more information about the State’s actions, please see their fact sheet.
The following individual was added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Abulqader Hasan Yahya, Al-Murtadha of Yemen.
The following entity was added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Houthi National Committee For Prisoners Affairs of Yemen.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2741 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241209
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December 10, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned cybersecurity company Sichuan Silence Information Technology Company, Limited (Sichuan Silence), and one of its employees, Guan Tianfeng (Guan), both based in People’s Republic of China (PRC), for their roles in the April 2020 compromise of tens of thousands of firewalls worldwide. Many of the victims were U.S. critical infrastructure companies.
Malicious cyber actors, including those operating in China, continue to be one of the greatest and most persistent threats to U.S. national security, as highlighted in the 2024 Annual Threat Assessment released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Guan, Tianfeng of China.
The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Sichaun Silence Information Technology Company, Limited of China.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241210 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2742
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December 16, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned nine individuals and seven entities that have provided financial and military support to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Also, the U.S. Department of State sanctioned three targets related to the DPRK’s ballistic missile program. These actions reflect the DPRK’s escalating provocation and hostile military posturing that exacerbate global tensions and destabilize regional peace and security.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Choe, Chol Ryong of North Korea;
- Im, Song Jin of North Korea;
- Ju Chang il of North Korea;
- Kim, Geum Cheol of North Korea;
- Kim, Myong Jin of North Korea;
- Kim, Yon Hui of China;
- Kim, Yong Bok of North Korea;
- Pak, Jong Chon of North Korea;
- Ri, Chang Ho of North Korea;
- Rim, Ryong Nam of North Korea; and
- Ro Kwang Chol of North Korea.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- DV Ink Limited Liability Company of Russia;
- Golden Triangle Bank of China;
- Korea Mandal Credit Bank of North Korea;
- Novosibirskoblgaz Limited Liability Company of Russia;
- Okryu Trading Company of China;
- Second Academy of Natural Sciences Foreign Affairs Bureau of North Korea;
- Sibregiongaz, AO of Russia; and
- Vostok Trading Limited Liability Company of North Korea.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241216 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2751
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December 17, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 12 individuals and eight entities, located across seven countries, who are linked to the global illicit drug trade. This action, taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059, underscores the United States’ commitment to combating the synthetic drug threat at home and abroad.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Betancourt Rosero, Camilo Esteban of Colombia;
- Casarrubia Posada of Colombia;
- Grinevicius, Arnas of Lithuania;
- Karpavicius, Rokas of Lithuania;
- Karpe, Jurga of Lithuania;
- Labutis, Virginijus of Lithuania;
- Leung, Ho Kai of New Zealand;
- Lu, Huaying of the United Arab Emirates;
- Osten Blanco, Orozman Orlando of Colombia;
- Perez Castaneda, Luis Armando of Colombia;
- Perrilla Sandoval, Allende of Colombia;
- Staskus, Saulius of Lithuania;
- Thackray, David Jonathan of Australia; and
- Zhang, Jian Al Owais of the United Arab Emirates.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Atiya S A S of Colombia;
- Dragon Secure GmbH of Switzerland;
- Green Alpine Trading, LLC of the United Arab Emirates;
- JT Trading Limited of New Zealand;
- Karpis AG of Switzerland;
- Lake Forest SP Z O O of Poland;
- MB PTERA of Lithuania;
- TNK Trading Limited of New Zealand; and
- UAB Flavour Labs of Lithuania.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241217
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December 17, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two individuals and one entity involved in a network that launders millions of dollars of illicit funds generated by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) information technology (IT) workers and cybercrime to support the DPRK Government. Based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Lu Huaying and Zhang Jian worked through a UAE-based front company to facilitate money laundering and cryptocurrency conversion services that funneled the illicit proceeds back to Pyongyang. This network is led by OFAC-sanctioned Sim Hyon Sop (Sim), a PRC-based banking representative for the DPRK who orchestrates money laundering schemes to fund the regime.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Lu, Huaying of China; and
- Zhang, Jian of China.
The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Green Alpine Trading, LLC of the United Arab Emirates.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2752
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December 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two entities and two individuals for their role in developing and procuring components for sensitive navigational systems for the Iranian military. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization (IRGC ASF SSJO) and other Iranian organizations rely on these strategic components that are necessary for the production and proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles. Concurrent with this action, the U.S. Department of State designated one individual and two entities involved in Iranian UAV and missile development. Treasury’s action was taken in coordination with the Department of Commerce and the Department of Justice, the latter of which charged and helped coordinate the arrest of one of the individuals OFAC sanctioned.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Abedininajafababi, Mohammad of Iran; and
- Merat, Kaveh of Iran.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Illumove SA of Switzerland; and
- Sanat Danesh Rahpuyan Aflak Company Ltd of Iran.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2755 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241218
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December 18, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated three individuals and four entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) that form part of U.S.-designated Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik’s (Dodik) financial network and enable the Dodik family’s continued attempts to evade sanctions. This action also targets a BiH politician who serves as a key enabler of Dodik’s corruption and destabilizing political agenda.
The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 1B, "Authorizing Certain Activities Involving Federal State Budgetary Institution Marine Rescue Service," and Russia-related General License 115 "Authorizing Transactions Involving Gazprombank Related to Civil Nuclear Energy."
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 1B: “Authorizing Certain Activities Involving Federal State Budgetary Institution Marine Rescue Service”
(a) All transactions and activities prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14039, E.O. 14024, or the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019, 22 U.S.C. 9526 note, as amended (PEESA), involving Federal State Budgetary Institution Marine Rescue Service (MRS), or any entity in which MRS owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are not related to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, the TurkStream pipeline project, or any project that is a successor to either such project, are authorized.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 115: “Authorizing Transactions Involving Gazprombank Related to Civil Nuclear Energy”
(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 involving Gazprombank Joint Stock Company (“Gazprombank”), or any entity in which Gazprombank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are related to civil nuclear energy are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 30, 2025.
(b) For the purposes of this general license, the term “related to civil nuclear energy” means transactions undertaken solely to maintain or support civil nuclear projects initiated before November 21, 2024.
OFAC also issued one new Russia-related Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1203).
Russia-related Frequently Asked Question 1203:
Q: What does General License (GL) 115 ("Authorizing Transactions Involving Gazprombank Related to Civil Nuclear Energy") authorize with respect to civil nuclear energy-related payments?
A: GL 115 generally authorizes all transactions involving Gazprombank Joint Stock Company ("Gazprombank"), or any entity in which Gazprombank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, related to civil nuclear energy. Civil nuclear energy means the following activities when undertaken solely to maintain or support civil nuclear energy projects and operations initiated or under construction as of November 21, 2024: the extraction, production, refinement, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, transport, or purchase of uranium in any form; the production, generation, transmission, or exchange of nuclear power, fuel, or waste; and the operation of civil nuclear energy projects. However, GL 115 does not authorize, for instance, transactions involving Gazprombank related to the development of new civil nuclear energy power plants after November 21, 2024, or related to the Paks II nuclear power plant project, including Paks II. Nuclear Power Plant Private Limited Company (Paks II. Ltd.), or any successor project.
Non-U.S. persons generally do not risk exposure to U.S. sanctions for engaging in transactions with blocked persons, including transactions related to existing civil nuclear energy as described in GL 115, where those transactions would not require a specific license if engaged in by a U.S. person.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Dobric, Aleksandar of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Dobric, Mirko of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
- Kosarac, Stasa of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Best Service D.O.O. of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Nimbus Innovations D.O.O Banja Luka of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Vorto D.O.O. of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
- Zelena Jabuka D.O.O. of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241218 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2756 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933721/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933706/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/1203
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December 19, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned a dozen individuals and entities based in multiple jurisdictions, including the head of the Houthi-aligned Central Bank of Yemen branch in Sana’a, for their roles in trafficking arms, laundering money, and shipping illicit Iranian petroleum for the benefit of the Houthis. Among the persons designated are key smuggling operatives, arms traffickers, and shipping and financial facilitators who have enabled the Houthis to acquire and transport an array of dual-use and weapons components, as well as generate revenue to support their destabilizing regional activities. Additionally, OFAC identified five cryptocurrency wallets associated with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)-backed Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal (al-Jamal), who operates under the aliases “Khrpi,” “Ahmad Sa’idi,” and “Hisham,” among others.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- ABD-AL-WADUD, Wail Muhmmad Said of Yemen;
- Al-Hadi, Ahmad Muhammad Muhmmad Hasan of Yemen;
- Al-Madani, Hashem Ismail Ali Ahmed of Yemen;
- Hajj, Umar Ahmad Umar Ahamd of Yemen;
- Kanniappan, JR, Ezekial of Malaysia; and
- Venayagamoorthy, Puvaneswaran of Malaysia.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Al Hazmi Exchange Khaled Al Hazmi And Brother Company General Partnership of Yemen;
- Atlantic Navigation OPC Private Limited of India;
- Blu Shipping M SDN. BHD. Of Malaysia;
- Brecalin Hong Kong Co Ltd of China;
- Galaxy Management NV of Suriname;
- Ghezel Hesar Prison of Iran; and
- Journey Investment Company of the Marshall Islands.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241219 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2757
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December 19, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two Georgian officials from Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs which has engaged in brutal crackdowns on media members, opposition figures, and protesters — including during demonstrations throughout 2024. These officials are being sanctioned under Executive Order (E.O.) 13818 (Global Magnitsky), following the September 16, 2024 sanctions of two other Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs officials. This action was coordinated with the United Kingdom, which designated five individuals responsible for human rights violations in Georgia.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Gomelauri, Vakhtang of Georgia; and
- Kezevadze, Mirza of Georgia.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241219
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December 27, 2024: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 116, "Authorizing Transactions Involving Entities Owned by Bidzina Ivanishvili." OFAC has also issued one new, Russia-related Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1204).
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 116: “Authorizing Transactions Involving Entities Owned by Bidzina Ivanishvili”
- All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 involving any entity that is blocked solely due to a property interest of Bidzina Ivanishvili (Ivanishvili), or any entity in which Ivanishvili owns, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized, provided that such entity is not identified on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons.
Russia-related Frequently Asked Question 1204
Q: On December 27, 2024, OFAC designated Bidzina Ivanishvili (Ivanishvili) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024. Can I continue to engage in transactions or other dealings with entities owned by Ivanishvili that are not listed on OFAC's Specially Designation Nationals and Blocked Person List (SDN List) without facing sanctions risk?
A: Although transactions or other dealings involving Ivanishvili are generally prohibited as a result of OFAC's designation, OFAC concurrently issued General License (GL) 116 authorizing U.S. persons to engage in all transactions with any entity owned 50% or more by Ivanishvili provided that such entity is not identified on the SDN List. Non-U.S. persons may also engage in the transactions authorized by GL 116 without the risk of sanctions under E.O. 14024, as amended. However, U.S. persons are still prohibited from transacting with Ivanishvili himself unless exempt or otherwise authorized by OFAC. Additionally, as provided in paragraph (b), GL 116 does not authorize certain transactions, including transactions related to the Singapore Court of Appeal Case or related proceedings as specified in paragraph (b)(3) of the GL.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20241227
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December 31, 2024: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Russian judge Olesya Mendeleeva (Mendeleeva) for her role in the arbitrary detention of Moscow city councilor and human rights defender, Alexei Gorinov. Mendeleeva is designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world. This action is also undertaken in the spirit of the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (P. L. 112-208)
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Mendeleeva, Olesya Anatolevna of Russia.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2765
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December 31, 2024: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated a subordinate organization of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and a Moscow-based affiliate organization of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and its director pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13848, the U.S. election interference authority. As affiliates of the IRGC and GRU, these actors aimed to stoke socio-political tensions and influence the U.S. electorate during the 2024 U.S. election. These actions build on sanctions previously imposed on the IRGC, the GRU, and their numerous subordinate and proxy organizations, pursuant to several authorities targeting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and malicious cyber-enabled activities.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Korovin, Valery Mikhaylovich of Russia.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Cognitive Design Production Center of Iran; and
- International Non-Profit Foundation.