This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through July 31, 2023. The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.
See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.
REGULATORY UPDATES
The President
President Biden Delegates Authority to Secretary of State to Direct Drawdown of $500 Million in Defense Articles to Support Ukraine
July 6, 2023: 88 FR 43049: President Biden, under section 621 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), delegated to the Secretary of State the authority under section 506(a)(1) of the FAA to direct the drawdown of up to $500 million in defense articles and services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training, to provide assistance to Ukraine and to make the determinations required under such section to direct such a drawdown.
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President Biden Continues the National Emergency with Respect to Hong Kong
July 12, 2023: 88 FR 44669: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for one year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13936 of July 14, 2020, which declared a national emergency with respect to Hong Kong.
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President Biden Delegates Authority to Secretary of State to Direct Drawdown of $922 Million in Defense Articles to Support Ukraine
July 13, 2023: 88 FR 44671: President Biden, under section 621 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), delegated to the Secretary of State:
(1) the authority under section 506(a)(1) of the FAA to direct the drawdown of up to $800 million in defense articles and services of the Department of Defense, and military education and training, to provide assistance to Ukraine and to make the determinations required under such section to direct such a drawdown; and
(2) the authority under section 614(a)(1) of the FAA to determine whether it is important to the security interests of the United States to furnish up to $122 million in assistance to Ukraine without regard to any provision of law within the purview of section 614(a)(1) of the FAA.
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President Biden Continues the National Emergency with Respect to Hostage-Taking and Wrongful Detention
July 14, 2023: 88 FR 45327: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14078, of July 19, 2022, with respect to hostage-taking and the wrongful detention of United States nationals abroad.
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President Biden Continues the National Emergency with Respect to Mali
July 21, 2023: 88 FR 48027: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for one year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 139882 of July 26, 2019, which declared a national emergency with respect to Mali.
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President Biden Continues the National Emergency with Respect to Lebanon
July 25, 2023: 88 FR 48025: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for one year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13441 of August 1, 2007, which declared a national emergency with respect to Lebanon.
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Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)
DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website
July 18 through 26, 2023: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at
- Change in Name and Address from General Electric International, Inc. (Malaysia), MAS Eng Ops Cntr, Complex A, AERO Bldg, Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah, Subang 47200, Malaysia, to GE On Wing Support (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd at Cmplx A-AA MAS Engineering Ops Ctr, Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah Apt, Subang Jaya, Malaysia, and all locations in Malaysia, due to reorganization.
- Change in Name from L3 Technologies Australia Group Pty Ltd. to L3Harris Technologies Australia Pty Ltd. due to merger.
- Change in Name for Philotech Systementwicklung und Software GmbH to Bertrandt Technology Germany GmbH, and all locations in Germany due to corporate rebranding.
- Change in Name and Address from General Electric International, Inc. (Germany), Maria-Theresia, Strasse 35, Muenchen, 85232, Germany, to GE Aviation Deutschland GmbH at Bleichstrasse 64-66, Frankfurt Am Main, Germany, and all locations in Germany, due to reorganization.
- Change in Name and Address from General Electric International, Inc. (South Korea), 13F, GE Tower, 71-3 Cheongdam, Gangnamgu, Seoul, Republic of Korea, and from POBA Gangnam Tower, 343 Hakdongro, Gangnam-gu, Seoul 135-820, Republic of Korea, to GE Aviation Korea, Ltd. at 25/F, Gangnam Finance Center Building, 152, Teheran-ro, Gangnam-gu, Seoul, 06236, Republic of Korea, and all locations in the Republic of Korea, due to reorganization.
- Change in Name and Address from General Elektrik Ticaret ve Servis A.S. (Turkey), Dumlupinar Bulvari 164 501, Kentpark Ofis Bloklari, Cankaya Ankara, Turkey, to GE Marmara Technology Center Muhendislik Hizmetleri Limited Sirketi, at Esentepe Mah. Harman1 Sk.Nida Kule, Sisli, Istanbul, Turkey, and all locations in Turkey, due to reorganization.
- Change in Name from Philotech Iberica S.L. (Spain), to Bertrandt Technology Spain S.L, due to corporate rebranding.
- Change in Name and Address from General Electric International, Inc. (UK), 31 Coull Gardens, Aberdeen AB15 8TQ, United Kingdom, and from 635 Sipson Road, London UB70JE, United Kingdom, to GE Aviation Systems Limited at Cheltenham Rd, Bishops Cleeve, Cheltenham, Gloucestershire GL52 8SF, United Kingdom, and all locations in the United Kingdom, due to reorganization.
- Change in Name and Address from General Electric International, Inc. (Singapore), 11 North Buona Vista Drive #09-07, The Metropolis, Singapore 138589, Singapore, and from 240 Tanjong Pagar Road, GE Tower #04-00, Singapore 088540, Singapore, to GE Aviation International Services Pte. Ltd. at 11 North Buona Vista Drive #09-07, The Metropolis, Singapore 138489, Singapore, and all locations in Singapore, due to reorganization.
- Change in Address for NTK International Corporation from NTK Building, 2-5- 11, Nishi-Shinbashi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 105-0003 Japan, to Higashi-Nihonbashi 1-chome Bldg, 3F 1-4-6 HigashiNihonbashi, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 103-0004 Japan.
- Change in Name from General Electric International, Inc. (Japan) to GE Aviation Distribution Japan Co., Ltd. due to reorganization.
- Change in Name from Stelia Aerospace Composites SAS to Airbus Atlantic Composites SAS due to acquisition.
- Change in Address from Ametrine Technologies Ltd., Ein-Hahoresh M.P., Hefer 38980, Israel to Kibbutz Maabarot, M.P Hefer, 4023000, Israel.
- Change in Name and Address from General Electric International, Inc. (Romania), Strada Barbu Vacarescu, nr. 301-311, Cladirea Lakeview, Etaj 3, Sectorul 2, Bucuresti, Romania, to Unison Engine Components – Bucharest S.A. at 244 C luliu Maniu Boulevard, 6th District, Bucuresti 77826, Romania, due to reorganization.
- Change in Name from Leonardo US Aircraft, Inc. to Leonardo US Aircraft, LLC due to reorganization as a Limited Liability Company.
- Change in Name from Philotech France SAS (France) to Bertrandt Technology France SAS due to corporate rebranding.
- Change in Name from Raytheon Technologies Corporation to RTX Corporation due to corporate rebranding.
- Change in Name from Fenice Poland Sp. z.o.o. to Edison Next Poland sp. z.o.o. due to acquisition.
- Change in Name from Mitsubishi Electric TOKKI Systems Corporation to Mitsubishi Electric Defense and Space Technologies Corporation due to corporate rebranding.
- Change in Address from DRS Signal Solutions, One Milestone Center Court, Germantown, Maryland 20876 to 4910 Executive Court South, Frederick, Maryland, 21703.
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The U.S. Department of State Outlined AUKUS Trade Authorization Mechanism
July 10, 2023: The U.S. Department of State has posted a Fact Sheet outlining the AUKUS Trade Authorization Mechanism (ATAM). According to the Fact Sheet, the mechanism is designed to facilitate trade of U.S. defense articles and defense services between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia in support of AUKUS programs for both Pillar I (providing Australia with a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine capability) and Pillar II (advanced capabilities). This is an interim measure to streamline defense trade of U.S. origin items while the Biden Administration pursues more comprehensive legislative changes. This approach was adopted to address concerns regarding how the speed and efficiency of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) processes would be inadequate for the expected increase in the volume of AUKUS-related defense trade. The implementation of the ATAM involves the following steps:
- Identify the scope of AUKUS programs. This will optimize operations and compliance, as both government and industry will have a clear understanding of which uses/programs are authorized under this Mechanism.
- Identify what technologies are not eligible under this Mechanism.
- Identify which communities in each country would be approved for access to the technology, which includes an obligation to record what is transferred and to secure and protect the technology. This will help reduce the likelihood of unauthorized diversion of sensitive defense technologies and, if necessary, help to investigate any potential diversion.
Next, the utilization of ATAM will proceed as follows:
- The exporter must check proposed transfers under AUKUS against these three basic and transparent criteria (programs, technologies, and authorized communities) that Defense and State would develop, and review with partners.
- Transfers beyond the United Kingdom or Australia, or transfer to a non-AUKUS program or a community not eligible to receive it, would require standard non-ATAM authorization.
- Based on legislation, the U.S. government would need to notify shipments under this authorization exceeding $100 million at least 15 days prior to the shipment. Existing systems will be utilized to conduct congressional notification.
The ATAM will allow DCS transfers of some items typically transferred only under FMS. According to the Fact Sheet, ATAM offers an immediate solution to expedite and secure defense transfers of U.S. defense items for AUKUS projects, leveraging existing authorities (ITAR § 126.4 of the ITAR) to allow seamless and speedy defense trade.
Ensuring swift and secure defense trade under AUKUS - United States Department of State
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The U.S. Department of State Posted Myths and Facts About U.S. Defense Export Controls
July 10, 2023: The U.S. Department of State has posted a Fact Sheet entitled Myths and Facts About U.S. Defense Export Controls. This posting refutes such "myths" as whether obtaining an export license for Direct Commercial Sales takes too long under the ITAR and whether the ITAR unnecessarily prevents U.S. companies from building munitions production facilities abroad.
Myths and Facts about U.S. Defense Export Controls - United States Department of State
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Department of Defense
DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To France
July 7, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of France of AGM-114R2 Hellfire Missiles and related equipment for an estimated cost of $203 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale. The Government of France has requested to buy up to one thousand five hundred fifteen (1,515) AGM-114R2 Hellfire Missiles. Also included are technical assistance; non-standard books; publications; other Hellfire publications; integration support; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost is $203 million.
This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of a NATO Ally that is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. The proposed sale will improve France’s capability to meet current and future threats by building its long-term defense capacity to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity in order to meet its national defense requirements. France will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces. The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.
The prime contractor will be Lockheed Martin Corporation, Orlando, FL. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of U.S. Government or contractor representatives to France. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/Press%20Release%20-%20France%2023-43%20CN.pdf
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Sweden
July 7, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Sweden of Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $605 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.
The Government of Sweden has requested to buy up to two hundred fifty (250) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); and up to six (6) AMRAAM C-8 Guidance Sections. Also included are spare AIM-120 control sections and containers; AMRAAM Test Set (ATS) telemetry kits; encryption devices; munitions support and support equipment; classified software delivery and support; spare parts, consumables, and accessories; repair and return support; transportation support; classified publications and technical documentation; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost is $605 million.
This proposed sale will support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a partner country that is a force for political stability and economic progress in Europe. The proposed sale will improve Sweden’s capability to meet and deter current and future threats in the region by ensuring Sweden has modern, capable air-to-air munitions. This sale will further advance the already high level of Swedish Air Force interoperability with U.S. joint forces and other regional and NATO forces. Sweden will have no difficulty absorbing these articles and services into its armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region.
The principal contractor will be Raytheon Missiles and Defense, Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Sweden. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Germany
July 19, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Germany of AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $2.90 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.
The Government of Germany has requested to buy up to nine hundred sixty-nine (969) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); and up to twelve (12) AMRAAM C8 Guidance Sections. Also included are AIM-120 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM); telemetry kit and control section spares and containers; KGV-135A Communications Security (COMSEC) devices; Common Munitions Built-in-Test Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); ADU 891 Computer Test Set Adapter Groups; munitions support and support equipment; classified software delivery and support; spare parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support; transportation support; classified publications and technical documentation; studies and surveys; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost is $2.90 billion.
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DSCA Notifies Congress Of Potential FMS Sale To Romania
July 27, 2023: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Romania of sixteen (16) Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $120.5 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.
The Government of Romania has requested to buy sixteen (16) Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAVs), Personnel Variant (AAVP-7A1); three (3) Assault Amphibious Vehicles, Command Variant (AAVC-7Al); two (2) Assault Amphibious Vehicles, Recovery Variant (AAVR-7Al); sixteen (16) 50 Cal Machine Guns (Heavy Barrel); and five (5) 7.62 mm M240B Machine Guns. Also included are MK-19 Grenade Launchers; M36E T1 Thermal Sighting Systems (TSS); supply support (spare parts); support equipment (including special mission kits/Enhanced Applique Kits (EAAK)); training, unclassified technical manuals, technical data package, engineering and technical support and assistance (including Contractor Engineering Technical Services (CETS)); and other related elements of program and logistics support. The total estimated program cost is $120.5 million.
Romania – Assault Amphibious Vehicles | Defense Security Cooperation Agency (dsca.mil)
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DOD/DSCA Updates Security Assistance Management Manual and Policy Memos
July 12, 2023: The U.S. Department of Defense's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has made the following updates to its Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) and Policy Memorandums:
- DSCA Policy Memo 23-47, Assignment of Program Code "GK" to track Fiscal Year 2023 Two-Year Funding for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, has been posted.
Program code "GK" is assigned to track Fiscal Year (FY) 2021/2022 funds for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) appropriated under the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Program Appropriations Act (Division K, P.L. 116-260). INCLE activities are authorized under section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), as amended (22 U.S.C. Section 2291).
This memo adds code GK to:
- SCA Policy Memo 23-31, Updates to Security Assistance Management Manual Glossary has been posted.
Effective immediately, this memorandum updates an initial tranche of terms and definitions in the DSCA Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) glossary for an effective understanding of security cooperation language throughout the community.
https://samm.dsca.mil/policy-memoranda/dsca-23-31 and https://samm.dsca.mil/policy-memoranda/dsca-23-47
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U.S. Department of Defense Enters Agreement to Expand Capabilities for Domestic Graphite Mining and Processing for Large-Capacity Batteries
July 17, 2023: The U.S. Department of Defense's Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Base Policy, through its Manufacturing Capability Expansion and Investment Prioritization office, has entered an agreement with Graphite One (Alaska) to secure a reliable, sustainable supply of graphite materials within the U.S. to be used in the production of large-capacity batteries. The $37.5 million agreement, entered into under Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III authorities and using funds appropriated by the Inflation Reduction Act, will aid Graphite One (Alaska) in developing a domestic advanced graphite supply chain solution anchored by the Company's Graphite Creek resource. Graphite One's supply chain strategy includes mining from Graphite Creek and processing the graphite ore through an advanced material and battery anode manufacturing plant expected to be sited in Washington State. Graphite One's strategy also includes plans for a recycling facility to reclaim graphite and other battery materials, to be co-located at the advanced materials manufacturing site; the third link in Graphite One's circular economy strategy. DPA Title III funding will allow Graphite One to fast-track their feasibility study by a full year, informing and expediting decisions to move the project further through its plans for a complete U.S.-based graphite anode supply chain.
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U.S. Department of Commerce
U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Amended the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations
July 3, 2023: 88 Fed. Reg. 42615: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR) (15 CFR Part 713) to reduce the concentration threshold level above which mixtures containing a Schedule 2A chemical are subject to the declaration requirements that apply to Schedule 2A chemical production, processing, and consumption under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This final rule also amends the CWCR to reduce the concentration threshold level above which mixtures containing a Schedule 2A chemical are subject to the declaration and reporting requirements that apply to exports and imports of Schedule 2A chemicals under the CWC. These regulatory amendments bring the CWCR into further alignment with guidelines adopted by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Conference of the States Parties (CSP), which established a low concentration limit for Schedule 2A chemicals.
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U.S. Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration Seeks Public Comments on the Modernization of Its Export Promotion Services and Assistance
July 7, 2023: 88 FR 43286: The U.S. Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration (ITA) includes the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service (CS), which assists and advocates for U.S. businesses in international markets to foster U.S. economic prosperity. Utilizing its network of trade promotion and policy professionals located in 79 countries and 106 U.S. locations, CS promotes U.S. exports, especially among small and medium-sized enterprises; advances and protects U.S. commercial interests overseas; and attracts inward investment into the United States.
CS is seeking feedback from the general public – including businesses that are new to exporting or not currently exporting - on ways to modernize services for the 21st century. CS is reviewing its services to assess their effectiveness in meeting the needs of U.S. exporters and identify opportunities to innovate and enhance services offered, with the objective of driving U.S. innovation and global competitiveness by increasing U.S. exports and ensuring more U.S. regions benefit, as well as workers and businesses from underserved communities. Interested persons have until 5:00 PM ET on August 7, 2023, to submit their comments.
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U.S. Department Of Commerce's Data Privacy Framework Program Launches New Website Enabling U.S. Companies to Participate in Cross-Border Data Transfers
July 20, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce has launched the Data Privacy Framework (DPF) program's website, enabling eligible U.S. companies to self-certify their participation in the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework (EU-U.S. DPF), facilitating cross-border transfers of personal data in compliance with EU law. The DPF program is particularly valuable for small- and medium-sized enterprises that can now access an affordable and streamlined mechanism for personal data transfers from the European Economic Area (comprised of EU countries along with Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway). Data flows between the United States and Europe more than anywhere else in the world, enabling the $7.1 trillion U.S.-EU economic relationship. To participate, companies must self-certify and publicly commit to comply with the EU-U.S. DPF Principles, which are enforceable under U.S. law. They can also self-certify their compliance with the UK Extension to the EU-U.S. DPF and/or the Swiss-U.S. DPF Principles, which will enable personal data transfers from those jurisdictions after they complete their legal processes and deem such transfers to have adequate protection. Eligible companies can now sign up for the EU-U.S. DPF at www.dataprivacyframework.gov. Companies that participate in the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield may begin relying immediately on the EU-U.S. DPF to receive personal data transfers from the European Union/European Economic Area but will need to self-certify to the EU-U.S. DPF by October 10. Companies can now sign up for mechanisms to receive personal data from the United Kingdom and Switzerland. However, they may not rely on these mechanisms to receive personal data until the anticipated recognition by the UK Government and the Swiss Government of the adequacy of those mechanisms enter into force. Organizations interested in self-certifying should review the DPF program requirements, which are available, along with other guidance materials, on the DPF program website.
https://cts.lmsslsecure.com/t/6340695/113404557/95192/31/
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U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security Posted Best Practices for License Applications for Medical-Related Items Destined for Russia, Belarus, and Occupied/Covered Regions of Ukraine
July 24, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has posted on its website "Best Practices" guidance for license applications for medical-related items destined for Russia, Belarus, and occupied/covered regions of Ukraine. Consistent with licensing policies set forth in Sections 746.5, 746.6, 746.8, and 746.10 of the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR Parts 730-774, “EAR”), license applications for health and safety, medical, and humanitarian applications are generally reviewed on a case-by-case basis. This review policy reflects the U.S. Government’s position that the Russian and Belarusian people are not the target of export controls imposed on Russia in response to its invasion and continuing aggression in Ukraine, as well as on Belarus, which has substantially enabled Russia’s actions. However, the U.S. Government reviews all export license applications to evaluate whether approving the application would benefit the Russian or Belarusian government or defense sector, particularly with regard to the usefulness of the items for the treatment of battlefield casualties or the production of chemical and biological weapons and biotechnological (including biopharmaceutical) products. The guidance has sections on:
- End-Use/User Statements
- License Scope
- Export Item Grouping
- Direct Patient Care
- HS Codes
- Best Practices Checklist
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U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
Reminder to file the 2023 Annual Report of Blocked Property
July 3, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) reminds industry that 31 C.F.R. § 501.603 of the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations (RPPR) requires holders of blocked property to provide OFAC with a comprehensive list of all blocked property held as of June 30 of the current year by September 30. Persons that do not hold blocked property as of June 30 do not need to file an Annual Report of Blocked Property (ARBP). Please note that the term blocked property only applies to property that is blocked pursuant to OFAC regulations. Property that was unblocked by an OFAC general or specific license or was previously blocked pursuant to a sanctions program that was terminated on or before June 30, 2023, is not considered blocked property and should not be reported in the ARBP. Similarly, a restricted account of a person ordinarily resident in Iran is not blocked and should not be reported to OFAC in the ARBP, unless there is an interest in the account of a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to an applicable sanctions authority.
Persons filing the 2023 ARBP are required to utilize spreadsheet form TD-F 90-22.50. Completed forms should be filed through the OFAC Reporting System (ORS) or sent to OFACreport@treasury.gov. Failure to submit a required ARBP by September 30 constitutes a violation of the RPPR.
For Additional guidance visit this link: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/16451/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230703
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OFAC to retire PIP, DEL, and SDALL.ZIP file formats of the sanctions list on or about August 15, 2023
July 6, 2023: OFAC announced it will retire the PIP, DEL, and SDALL.ZIP sanctions list file formats on or about August 15, 2023. OFAC will continue to offer for public download the XML, CSV, and FF file formats, the ZIP files SDN_XML and SDN_ Advanced, and PDF versions for OFAC’s sanctions list(s).
OFAC’s Sanctions List Search tool will not be affected by these changes, and users of the search tool will not experience any loss of service.
Members of the public can contact OFAC at OFAC@treasury.gov for questions or to provide feedback on the impact related to the removal of these file formats.
The full list of files to be retired are as follows:
- SDALL.ZIP
- SDN.DEL
- ADD.DEL
- ALT.DEL
- SDN_COMMENTS.DEL
- SDN.PIP
- ADD.PIP
- ALT.PIP
- SDN_COMMENTS.PIP
- CONS_PRIM.DEL
- CONS_ADD.DEL
- CONS_ALT.DEL
- CONS_COMMENTS.DEL
- CONS_PRIM.PIP
- CONS_ADD.PIP
- CONS_ALT.PIP
- CONS_COMMENTS.PIP
Users may continue to access OFAC's sanctions list data formats - via the URLs provided below. However, on or about August 15, 2023, the PIP, DEL, and SDALL.ZIP files listed above will be removed from the below pages and will no longer be available for download.
- OFAC SDN List Data Files: Specially Designated Nationals List - Data Formats & Data Schemas | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov)
- OFAC non-SDN List Data Files (Consolidated List): Consolidated Sanctions List (Non-SDN Lists) | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov)
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OFAC Sanctions Impede Russian Access to Battlefield Supplies and Target Revenue Generators
July 20, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has sanctioned nearly 120 individuals and entities in Russia, Kyrgyz Republic, and the United Arab Emirates pursuant to Executive Order 14024 to further implement the commitments that G7 Leaders made on February 24, 2023 and May 19, 2023. The designations announced by OFAC and the Department of State take measures to inhibit Russia’s access to products that support its military and war efforts; reduce Russia’s revenue from the metals and mining sector; undermine its future energy capabilities; degrade Russia’s access to the international financial system; and starve Russia of G7-produced technology needed for its technology, aerospace, and defense sectors. In a May 19, 2023, Supplemental Alert, the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) identified certain high-priority items, primarily based on the Harmonized System (HS) code classification of components from Russian weapons systems recovered on the battlefield in Ukraine, to assist financial institutions in identifying suspicious transactions relating to possible export control evasion. Items described by these HS codes have been found in multiple Russian weapons systems used against Ukraine, including the Kalibr cruise missile, the Kh-101 cruise missile, and the Orlan-10 UAV.
Many of the entities designated by OFAC have transferred certain of these high-priority items to Russia-based end-users. As a result of these designations, all property and interests in property of the persons above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.
In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. All transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or blocked persons are prohibited unless exempt or authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
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Announcement of OFAC's New Video Series: "Introduction to OFAC"
July 28, 2023: OFAC released the first episode of its “Introduction to OFAC” web series, a series of short videos created to provide viewers with a high-level introduction on the fundamentals of OFAC and sanctions implementation. The first episode introduces viewers to OFAC and its place within the U.S. government, as well as its history, mission, and relationship with the public.
Introduction to OFAC Video Series | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov)
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U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Treasury Department
The Departments of Justice, Commerce, And Treasury Issued A Joint Compliance Note On Voluntary Self-Disclosure Of Potential Violations
July 26, 2023: The Department of Justice, Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a joint compliance note focusing on the voluntary self-disclosure policies that apply to U.S. sanctions, export controls, and other national security laws, including recent updates to certain of those policies. This note marks the second collective effort by the three agencies to inform the private sector about enforcement trends and provide guidance to the business community on compliance with U.S. sanctions and export laws.
The note underscores the importance of an effective and robust compliance program. If a company discovers a potential violation, whether it is an administrative or criminal violation, that company must promptly disclose and remediate. Not only does such reporting make the disclosing company potentially eligible for significant mitigation, but it also alerts national security agencies to activities that may pose a threat to the national security and foreign policy objectives of the U.S. Government.
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The U.K. Government
July 3, 2023: The U.K. Government's Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) has issued Notice to Exporters 2023/11 on its issuance of a revised General Trade License (Syria Sanctions - Earthquake Relief Efforts in Syria). The revised General Trade License replaces the license issued on 15 February 2023, which was due to expire on 31 August 2023. The revised license is identical to the previous license, with the exception that it will remain in force until it is revoked.
The ECJU has also posted on its website updated guidance on complying with professional and business services sanctions related to Russia. This document contains information on services sanctions in the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (‘the Russia Regulations’). It also sets out guidance on applying for licenses and considers what information to include in the cover letter of license applications related to the prohibitions in regulations 54C and 54D of the Russia Regulations.
NTE 2023/11: General Trade Licence Syria Sanctions revised - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)
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U.S. Census Bureau
Schedule B and Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) Updated in the Automated Export System (AES)
July 3, 2023: Effective July 3, 2023, the Schedule B, Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), and HTS Codes That Are Not Valid for AES tables have been updated to accept the changes to the July 1, 2023 codes.
AES will accept shipments with outdated codes during a grace period for 30 days beyond the expiration date of June 30, 2023. Reporting an outdated code after the 30-day grace period will result in a fatal error.
The ACE AESDirect program has been updated with the 2023 codes and will accept shipments with outdated codes during the grace period as well.
The 2023 Schedule B and HTS tables are available for downloading at:
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Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages
July 19, 2023: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected. If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation. Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN. However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.
To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.
Fatal Error Response Code: 068
Narrative: SRN Not on File; Action Not Allowed
Severity: Fatal
Reason: The Shipment is not on file in AES. Therefore, the requested action is not allowed.
Resolution: When the Shipment Filing Action Request Indicator is a Change, Replace, or Cancel, the Shipment Reference Number must exist on a previous filing in AES for the filer.
Verify the Shipment Filing Action Request Indicator and the Shipment Reference Number, correct the shipment and resubmit.
Response Code: 850
Narrative: Improbable Foreign/Domestic Origin
Severity: Verify
Reason: For the reported Schedule B/HTS Number, the Domestic/Foreign Origin Indicator is improbable for this commodity.
Resolution: Certain products are highly unlikely to be either of domestic origin or of foreign origin. This might indicate either a keying error or misclassification of the product.
Verify the Domestic/Foreign Origin Indicator and the Schedule B/HTS Number, correct the shipment, and resubmit (if necessary). If the information is verified correct as reported, no action is necessary.
For a complete list of AES Response Codes, their reasons, and resolutions, see Appendix A – Commodity Filing Response Messages.
It is important that AES filers correct Fatal Errors as soon as they are received in order to comply with Foreign Trade Regulations. These errors must be corrected prior to export for shipments filed pre-departure and as soon as possible for shipments filed post-departure but not later than five calendar days after departure.
For further information or questions, contact the U.S. Census Bureau’s Trade Data Collection Branch.
Telephone: (800) 549-0595; select option 1 for AES
Email: askaes@census.gov
Online: www.census.gov/trade
Blog: blogs.census.gov/globalreach
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Port of Unlading Code Deleted in the Automated Export System (AES)
July 31, 2023: The U.S. Census Bureau announced the following Port of Unlading Code has been DELETED in the AES effective immediately.
Port Name Port Code Country
Liezen 60217 Australia
For further information or questions, contact the U.S. Census Bureau’s Trade Data Collection Branch.
Telephone: (800) 549-0595, select option 1 for AES
Email: askaes@census.gov
Online: www.census.gov/trade
Blog: blogs.census.gov/globalreach
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| LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES |
This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.
Sanctions
July 10, 2023: OFAC issued Venezuela-Related General License 40B, "Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving the Exportation or Reexportation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas to Venezuela:"
Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving the Exportation or Reexportation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas to Venezuela
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this general license, all transactions related to the exportation or reexportation, directly or indirectly, of liquefied petroleum gas to Venezuela, involving the Government of Venezuela, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by E.O. 13850 of November 1, 2018, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019, or E.O. 13884 of August 5, 2019, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, July 10, 2024.
(b) This general license does not authorize:
(1) Any payment-in-kind of petroleum or petroleum products; or
(2) Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the VSR, including transactions involving any blocked persons other than PdVSA, any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, or any Government of Venezuela person that is blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13884.
(c) Effective July 10, 2023, General License No. 40A, dated July 7, 2022, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License No. 40B.
Note to General License No. 40B: Nothing in this general license relieves any persons from compliance with the requirements of other Federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security.
Additionally, OFAC is adding regulations to implement Executive Order (E.O.) 14078 of July 19, 2022, “Bolstering Efforts To Bring Hostages and Wrongfully Detained United States Nationals Home.” These regulations are currently available for public inspection with the Federal Register and will take effect upon publication in the Federal Register on Tuesday, July 11, 2023.
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July 11, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned an individual in Serbia, Aleksandar Vulin, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14033. OFAC has designated Vulin pursuant to E.O. 14033 for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged in, corruption related to the Western Balkans, including corruption by, on behalf of, or otherwise related to a government in the Western Balkans, or a current or former government official at any level of government in the Western Balkans, such as the misappropriation of public assets, expropriation of private assets for personal gain or political purposes, or bribery. Vulin has been implicated in transnational organized crime, illegal narcotics operations, and misuse of public office. Vulin has maintained a mutually beneficial relationship with U.S.-designated Serbian arms dealer Slobodan Tesic, helping ensure that Tesic’s illegal arms shipments can move freely across Serbia’s borders. As a result of this designation, all property and interests in property of Vulin that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.
In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. All transactions by U.S. persons within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. In addition, financial institutions and other persons that engage in certain transactions or activities with the sanctioned individual may expose themselves to sanctions or be subject to an enforcement action.
The following individual has been added to OFAC's SDN List:
- Aleksandar Vulin, of Serbia
Treasury Sanctions Official Linked to Corruption in Serbia | U.S. Department of the Treasury
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July 11, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three Belgian nationals and one Mexican national for international drug trafficking, including cocaine and fentanyl. Those designated are involved in the importation and distribution of narcotics destined for U.S. and European markets.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
- Youssef Ben Azza, of United Arab Emirates
- Othman El Ballouti, of United Arab Emirates
- Younes El Ballouti, of United Arab Emirates
- Franco Tabarez Martinez, of Mexico.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230719
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July 12, 2023: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 10 individuals, including several Sinaloa Cartel members and fugitives, as well as one Mexico-based entity, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059. Those sanctioned are associated with Sinaloa, Mexico-based precursor chemical suppliers and brothers Ludim and Luis Alfonso Zamudio Lerma and ultimately operate under the Los Chapitos faction of the Sinaloa Cartel. Responsible for a significant portion of the illicit fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States, the Sinaloa Cartel is one of the most powerful and pervasive drug trafficking organizations in the world.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
- Eliseo De Leon Becerra, of Mexico
- Jeuri Limon Elenes. of Mexico
- Noel Lopez Perez, of Mexico
- Oscar Noe Medina Gonzalez (a.k.a. "El Panu"; a.k.a. "Pan"; a.k.a. "Panu"), of Mexico
- Ricardo Paez Lopez, of Mexico
- Nestor Isidro Perez Salas (a.k.a. "Chicken Little"; a.k.a. "GARCIA, Nestor Isidro"; a.k.a. "Nini"), of Mexico
- Dora Vanessa Valdez Fernandez, of Mexico
- Angel Guillermo Zamudio Lerma, of Mexico
- Daniel Zamudio Lerma, of Mexico
- Jorge Alberto Zamudio Lerma, of Mexico
The following entity has been added to OFAC's SDN List:
- Rei Compania Internacional, S.A. DE C.V. (a.k.a. Rei Compania International, S.A. DE C.V.), of Mexico.
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July 18, 2023: 88 FR 45816: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has published one general license (GL) issued pursuant to the Burma Sanctions Regulations: GL 5, which was previously made available on OFAC’s website. On June 21, 2023, OFAC issued GL 5 to authorize certain transactions otherwise prohibited by the Burma Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 525. The GL was made available on OFAC’s website when it was issued. The GL has an expiration date of August 5, 2023.
Additionally, The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has published three web general licenses (GLs) issued in the Syria Sanctions Regulations, Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, and Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, and Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, respectively: Syria GL 21B, Iran GL N-2, and Venezuela GL 39B, each of which was previously made available on OFAC’s website. On June 14, 2023, OFAC issued Syria GL 21B, Iran GL N-2, and Venezuela GL 39B to extend the authorization for certain transactions otherwise prohibited by, respectively: the Syria Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 542; the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 560, and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 594; and the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR Part 591. At the time of issuance, OFAC made all three GLs, each of which has an expiration date of June 14, 2024.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 21B: Authorizing Certain Activities To Respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19)
(a) Authorizing certain COVID–19-related transactions prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this general license, the following transactions and activities that are prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 542 (SySR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024:
(1) Exportation of services related to COVID–19. All transactions and activities related to the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of services to Syria that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID–19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID–19); and
(2) COVID–19-related transactions involving certain blocked persons. All transactions and activities involving the Government of Syria, Polymedics LLC, Letia Company, or any entity in which Polymedics LLC or Letia Company owns, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID–19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID–19), provided that any exportation or reexportation of items to Syria must be licensed or otherwise authorized by the Department of Commerce.
(b) This general license does not authorize:
(1) The exportation or reexportation of any goods, technology, or services to military, intelligence, or law enforcement purchasers or importers;
(2) The unblocking of any property blocked pursuant to any part of 31 CFR chapter V; or
(3) Any transactions or activities otherwise prohibited by the SySR, or prohibited by any other part of 31 CFR chapter V, statute, or Executive order, or involving any blocked person other than the blocked persons identified in paragraph (a) of this general license.
(c) Effective June 14, 2023, General License 21A, dated June 10, 2022, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License 21B.
Note 1 to General License 21B: Nothing in this general license relieves any person from compliance with the requirements of other Federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security or the Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
GENERAL LICENSE N–2: Authorizing Certain Activities To Respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19)
(a) Authorizing certain COVID–19-related transactions prohibited by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations. Except as provided in paragraphs (d) and (e) of this general license, the following transactions and activities that are prohibited by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 560 (ITSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024:
(1) Exportation of goods or technology. All transactions and activities related to the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of goods or technology for use in connection with the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID–19 (including research or clinical studies related to COVID–19) to Iran or the Government of Iran, or to persons in third countries purchasing specifically for resale to Iran or the Government of Iran;
(2) Importation of or dealings in certain COVID–19-related goods. All transactions and activities related to the importation into the United States of, or dealings in or related to, goods that previously were exported or reexported to Iran or the Government of Iran pursuant to this general license and that are broken, defective, or non-operational, or are connected to product recalls, adverse events, or other safety concerns, or for routine maintenance or the permanent return of such items to the United States or a third country; and
(3) Exportation or importation of services. All transactions and activities related to the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of services to Iran or the Government of Iran, or the importation into the United States of, or dealings in or related to, Iranian-origin services, in each case that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID–19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID–19).
(b) Authorizing certain transactions involving the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) or the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this general license, all transactions and activities described in paragraph (a) of this general license involving CBI, NIOC, or any entity in which NIOC owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by the ITSR or the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024.
(c) Authorizing certain financial transactions. Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this general license, the processing of funds transfers or trade finance transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to give effect to the transactions and activities authorized in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this general license that are prohibited by the ITSR or the GTSR are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024.
(d) Any exportation or reexportation of goods or technology pursuant to paragraph (a) of this general license is subject to the following conditions:
(1) Any goods or technology exported or reexported must:
(i) Be designated as EAR99 under the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR parts 730 through 774 (EAR); or
(ii) In the case of goods or technology that are not subject to the EAR, not be listed on any multilateral export control regime; and
(2) All exports or reexports made pursuant to this general license must be concluded prior to the expiration date of this general license.
(e) This general license does not authorize:
(1) The exportation or reexportation of goods or technology to CBI, NIOC, or any entity in which NIOC owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest;
(2) The exportation or reexportation of any goods, technology, or services to military, intelligence, or law enforcement purchasers or importers;
(3) The exportation or reexportation of any goods, technology, or services used to facilitate the development or production of a chemical or biological weapon or weapon of mass destruction;
(4) The unblocking of any property blocked pursuant to any part of 31 CFR chapter V; or
(5) Any transactions or activities otherwise prohibited by the ITSR or the GTSR, or prohibited by any other part of 31 CFR chapter V, involving any person blocked pursuant to the GTSR except as identified in paragraph (b) of this general license.
(f) Effective June 14, 2023, General License N–1, dated June 10, 2022, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License N–2.
Note 1 to General License N–2: The export or reexport to Iran of certain food, medicine, medical devices, and agricultural commodities, as well as certain related transactions such as payments and brokering, are broadly authorized under sections 560.530, 560.532, and 560.533 of the ITSR, subject to certain conditions. In addition, transactions or activities authorized under those provisions that involve CBI, NIOC, or any entity in which NIOC owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are also authorized pursuant to Counter Terrorism- and Iran-related General License No. 8A. Those authorizations remain in effect, including with respect to exports or reexports of food, medicine, medical devices, and agricultural commodities intended to respond to COVID–19 that satisfy the applicable criteria of those authorizations.
Note 2 to General License N–2: Nothing in this general license relieves any person from compliance with the requirements of other Federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security or the Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 39B: Authorizing Certain Activities To Respond to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19)
(a) Authorizing certain COVID–19-related transactions involving the Government of Venezuela. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this general license, all transactions and activities involving the Government of Venezuela that are related to the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of COVID–19 (including research or clinical studies relating to COVID–19), that are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13808 of August 27, 2017, as amended by E.O. 13857 of January 25, 2019, or E.O. 13884 of August 5, 2019, each as incorporated into the Venezuela Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 591 (the VSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024.
(b) Authorizing certain COVID–19-related transactions involving certain banks. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this general license, all transactions and activities described in paragraph (a) of this general license involving Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV), Banco de Venezuela, S.A. Banco Universal (Banco de Venezuela), Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo, de la Clase Obrera, Mujer y Comunas, Banco Universal C.A. (Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo), or any entity in which BCV, Banco de Venezuela, or Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo owns, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are prohibited by E.O. 13850 of November 1, 2018, as amended by E.O. 13857, each as incorporated into the VSR, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 14, 2024.
(c) This general license does not authorize:
(1) The exportation or reexportation of any goods, technology, or services to military, intelligence, or law enforcement purchasers or importers;
(2) Any transactions or activities involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), Banco de Desarrollo Economico y Social de Venezuela (BANDES), or Banco Bandes Uruguay S.A. (Bandes Uruguay), or any entity in which PdVSA, BANDES, or Bandes Uruguay owns, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest;
(3) The unblocking of any property blocked pursuant to any part of 31 CFR chapter V; or
(4) Any transactions or activities otherwise prohibited by the VSR, or prohibited by any other part of 31 CFR chapter V, statute, or E.O., or involving any blocked persons other than Government of Venezuela persons blocked solely pursuant to E.O. 13884 or the blocked persons identified in paragraph (b) of this general license.
(d) Effective June 14, 2023, General License 39A, dated June 10, 2022, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License 39B.
Note 1 to General License 39B: Nothing in this general license relieves any person from compliance with the requirements of other Federal agencies, including the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security or the Department of State's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.
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July 20, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is taking action to further implement the commitments that G7 Leaders made on February 24, 2023 and May 19, 2023. The designations announced by OFAC and the Department of State take measures to inhibit Russia’s access to products that support its military and war efforts; reduce Russia’s revenue from the metals and mining sector; undermine its future energy capabilities; degrade Russia’s access to the international financial system; and starve Russia of G7-produced technology needed for its technology, aerospace, and defense sectors.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
- Vasiliy Nikolaevich Anokhin, of Russia
- Valeriy Yevgenyevich Chekalov, of Russia
- Ivan Cvetic, of Russia
- Leonid Vladimirovich Gornin, of Russia
- Tatyana Grigoryevna Ivanova, of Russia
- Aleksey Igorevich Khersontsev of Russia
- Sergey Borisovich Korolev, of Russia
- Aleksey Leonidovich Kudrin, of Russia
- Vladimir Nikolaevich Lepin, of Russia
- Pavel Alekseevich Marinychev, of Russia
- Vasiliy Sergeevich Osmakov, of Russia
- Yong Hyok Rim, of North Korea
- Anatoliy Anatolyevich Smolin, of Russia
- Pavel Nikolaevich Snikkars, of Russia
- Maksim Valeriovych Soldatov, of Ukraine
- Pavel Yurevich Sorokin, of Russia
- Igor Mikhailovich Stramilov, of Russia
- Ilya Eduardovich Torosov, of Russia
The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
- M. Prokhorov General Physics Institute Russian Academy Of Sciences (a.k.a. Federalnoe Gosudarstvennoe Byudzhetnoe Uchrezhdennie Nauki Federalny Issledovatelski Tsentr Institut Obshchei Fiziki Im. A.M. Prokhorova Rossiskoi Akademii Nauk; a.k.a. Prokhorov General Physics Institute Of Ras; a.k.a. Prokhorov General Physics Institute Of The Russian Academy Of Sciences; a.k.a. Russian Academy Of Sciences - Alexandr Mikhailovich Prokhorov General Physics Institute; a.k.a. "GPI RAS"; a.k.a. "IOF RAN"; a.k.a. "IOF RAN FGBU", of Russia.
- Aem Propulsion, of Russia
- Ak Systems (a.k.a. Ak Sistems), of Russia
- Aleksinskii Khimicheskii Kombinat (a.k.a. Aleksinsky Chemical Combine; a.k.a. Aleksinsky Chemical Plant; a.k.a. "AKHK"), of Russia
- Amegino FZE, of Russia
- AO NPO Kurganpribor, of Russia
- AO Vostok Treid Invest, of Russia
- Arsenal Machine Building Plant Open Joint Stock Company (a.k.a. Arsenal Machine Building Plant OJSC; a.k.a. Mz Arsenal OAO; a.k.a. Mz Arsenal PAO; a.k.a. Otkrytoe Aktsionernoe Obschestvo Mashinostroitelnyi Zavod Arsenal, of Russia
- Basis Trade Prosoft LLC (a.k.a. Bazis Treid Prosoft; a.k.a. "Btptrade", of Russia
- Budker Institute Of Nuclear Physics Of Siberian Branch Russian Academy Of Sciences (a.k.a. Budker Institute Of Nuclear Physics Of SB RAS; a.k.a. Federalnoe Gosudarstvennoe Byudzhetnoe Uchrezhdenie Nauki Institut Yadernol Fiziki IM. G.I. Budkera Sibirskogo Otdeleniya Rossiskoi Akademii Nauk; f.k.a. Institute Of Nuclear Physics Of The Siberian Branch Of The Ussr Academy Of Science; a.k.a. Iyaf So Ran Fgbu; a.k.a. "Binp Sb Ras", of Russia
- Burovaya Kompaniya Eurasia LLC, of Russia
- Central Research Institute Of The Russian Air And Space Forces (a.k.a. Federalnoe Gosudarstvennoe Bjudzhetnoe Uchrezhdenie Tsentralnyj Nauchno-Issledovatelskij Institut Vojsk Vosdushno-Kosmicheskoj Oborony Minoborony Rossii; a.k.a. Fgbu Tsnii Vvko Minoborony Rossii; a.k.a. "Tsnii Vvko"), of Russia.
- Closed Joint Stock Company Klimovskiy Specialized Ammunition Plant, of Russia
- Closed Joint Stock Company Superconducting Nanotechnology (a.k.a. Limited Liability Company Superconducting Nanotechnology; a.k.a. Obshchestvo S Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu Sverkhprovodnikovye Nanotekhnologii; a.k.a. Scontel; a.k.a. Skontel AO; a.k.a. Skontel OOO, of Russia
- Federal State Budgetary Institution Of Science Federal Research Center Kazan Scientific Center Of The Russian Academy Of Sciences, of Russia
- Federal State Enterprise Ya M Sverdlov Plant, of Russia
- Federal State Unitary Enterprise Center For Operation Of Space Ground Based Infrastructure, of Russia
- Fund For Development Of Energy Complex Energy, of Russia
- Institute Of Laser Physics Of The Siberian Branch Of The Russian Academy Of Sciences, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Astrophysika National Centre Of Laser Systems And Complexes, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Aviation Electronics And Communication Systems, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Commercial Bank Solidarnost, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Compel, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Experimental Design Bureau Fakel, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Gazprom Avtomatizatsiya, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Locko Bank, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Neftegazavtomatika, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Petersburg Social Commercial Bank, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Research And Production Corporation Precision Systems And Instruments, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Science Research Institute For Precise Instruments, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Scientific And Production Association Critical Information Systems, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Scientific Production Enterprise Research And Design Institute Of Well Logging, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Special Research Bureau Of Moscow Power Engineering Institute, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Tula Cartridge Works, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Ural Mining And Metallurgical Company, of Russia
- Joint Stock Company Uralelektromed, of Russia
- JSC Siberian Service Company, of Russia
- JSC Tinkoff Bank, of Russia
- Kazanskii Gosudarstvennyi Kazennyi Porokhovoi Zavod, of Russia
- Komponenta AO, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company AB Optiks, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company AK Microtech, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Fifth Element Trading, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Fivel, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Forepost Trading, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Fortap, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Imex Expert, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Irbis Sky Tech
- Limited Liability Company Ishimbay Specialized Chemical Plant Of Catalyst, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Knt Kat, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Kosmosavia, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Legion, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Oktanta, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Perm Oil Machine Company, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Private Security Organization Gazpromneft Okhrana, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Private Security Organization Legat, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Proizvostvennaya Kommercheskaya Firma Gazneftemash, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Rn Kat, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Rustmash, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Siaisi, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Sterlitamak Catalyst Plant, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Tyumen Petroleum Research Center, of Russia
- Limited Liability Company Vega Strategic Services
- LLC Altrabeta, of Russia
- LLC IQ Components, of Russia
- LLC Onelek, of Russia
- LLC RM Design And Development, of Russia
- LLC Spetselservis, of Russia
- V. Frunze Arsenal Design Bureau Joint Stock Company, of Russia
- MCI Trading Doo Beograd Palilula
- Nauchno Issledovatelskii I Proektnyi Institut Po Pererabotke Gaza AO, of Russia
- NPF-Radiotekhkomplekt AO, of Russia
- Obshestvo S Ogranichennoj Otvetstvennostyu Nipigaz Aktiv, of Russia
- Obshestvo S Ogranichennoj Otvetstvennostyu Nipigaz IT, of Russia
- OOO Morskie Paromnye Linii Vanino Sakhalin, of Russia
- OOO Radiotekhsnab, of Russia
- Open Joint Stock Company Russian Institute Of Radionavigation And Time, of Russia
- Osipyan Institute Of Solid State Physics Of The Russian Academy Of Sciences, of Russia
- OSOO Kargolayn, of Russia
- OSOO Progress Lider, of Russia
- L. Kapitza Institute For Physical Problems, Russian Academy Of Sciences, of Russia
- Public Joint Stock Company Sakhalin Shipping Company, of Russia
- Radiant EK AO, of Russia
- Region-Prof LLC, of Russia
- Saturn EK OOO, of Russia
- Scientific Production Company Optolink, of Russia
- Space Research Institute Russian Academy Of Sciences, of Russia
- State Unitary Enterprise Of The Donetsk People's Republic Republican Center Trading House Vtormet, of Ukraine
- Staut Company Limited, of Russia
- Tambovskii Porokhovoi Zavod, of Russia
- Technologies Systems And Complexes Limited, of Russia
- UMMC Nonferrous Metals Processing Limited Liability Company, of Russia
- Unistream Commercial Bank JSC, of Russia
- Vityaz Machine Building Company Joint Stock Company, of Russia
- ZAO GTME Tekhnologii, of Russia
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20230720
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July 24, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three Malian transition government and military officials for facilitating the deployment and expansion of the Private Military Company ‘Wagner’s (Wagner Group) activities in Mali. The United States took this step based on evidence showing that these Malian officials have contributed to the Wagner Group’s malicious activities in Mali.
These sanctions respond to the actions of three specific individuals and are not directed against the people of Mali. As the largest bilateral donor of development and humanitarian assistance to Mali, the United States continues to support the Malian people in their pursuit of peace, prosperity, and democracy.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
- Adama Bagayoko of Mali
- Sadio Camara of Mali
- Alou Boi Diarra of Mali
Russia-related Designations | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov)
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July 27, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf, the head of the finance office of the Somalia-based affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), designating him as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf has played a key role in the delivery of foreign fighters, supplies, and ammunition on behalf of ISIS-Somalia, which serves as a hub for disbursing funds and guidance to ISIS branches and networks across the continent. ISIS-Somalia generates much of its revenue through extortion, specifically targeting local communities for money and recruits, often under the threat of violence.
The following individual has been added to OFAC's SDN List:
- Abdiweli Mohamed Yusuf of Somalia
Counter Terrorism Designation | Office of Foreign Assets Control (treasury.gov)
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July 31, 2023: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated key leaders and financial facilitators of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qa’ida in Maldives, including 20 ISIS, ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), and al-Qa’ida operatives. OFAC also designated 29 companies associated with the individuals sanctioned, who include leaders of Maldives-based terrorist-affiliated criminal gangs and associates of key ISIS-K recruiter Mohamad Ameen who was designated by OFAC in 2019. Several of the individuals being designated have also planned or carried out attacks that targeted journalists and local authorities.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
- Ahmed Afraah of The Maldives
- Ahmed Agleel of The Maldives
- Ameen Ahmed of The Maldives
- Milos Bukejlovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Zeljka Cvijanovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Faris Mohamed Didi of The Maldives
- Moosa Inas of The Maldives
- Abdulla Ali Manik of The Maldives
- Ahmed Mubeen of The Maldives
- Jinaau Naseem of The Maldives
- Mohamed Naushad Shareef of The Maldives
- Ali Nihadh of The Maldives
- Ahmed Alif Rauf of The Maldives
- Ibrahim Aleef Rauf of The Maldives
- Mohamed Inthif Rauf of The Maldives
- Mohamed Maathiu Abdul Razzaq of The Maldives
- Ali Shafiu of Afghanistan
- Yoosuf Shaheed of The Maldives
- Hussain Shamil of The Maldives
- Abdulla Shareef of The Maldives
- Ali Shiyam of The Maldives
- Nenad Stevandic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Mohamed Thasleem of The Maldives
- Radovan Viskovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
- 3ZED Investment of The Maldives
- Al Athmaar of The Maldives
- Baum Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- Code A Partnership of The Maldives
- Designer Garage of The Maldives
- Dhawi Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- Eriyadhu Investments Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- Fruit Plus Maldives Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- Furaha Construction Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- Golden Warriors Investment Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- Green Birds of The Maldives
- Inma Maldives of The Maldives
- Jazeera Properties Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- Jazeerat Almaldifi of The Maldives
- Larosa of The Maldives
- Maroc International Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- Multi Construction Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- New Sun Investments Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- Panda Maldives Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- X Investments Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- Sias Investment Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- Sky Nova Investment of The Maldives
- Southern Stallions Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- Street Investments Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- Street Motor Services of The Maldives
- Syskon Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- Vaaly Brothers Pvt Ltd, of The Maldives
- Visions Maldives Pvt Ltd of The Maldives
- White Beach Watersports Pvt Ltd of The Maldives.
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U.S. Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
July 18, 2023: 88 FR 46071: In this rule, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding four entities to the Entity List under the destinations of Greece, Hungary, Ireland, and North Macedonia. These four entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
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Fines and Penalties
July 6, 2023: The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the filing of a forfeiture complaint against over 9,000 rifles, 284 machine guns, approximately 194 rocket launchers, over 70 anti-tank guided missiles, and over 700,000 rounds of ammunition that the U.S. Navy seized in transit from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to militant groups in Yemen. According to court documents, the noted weapons came from four interdictions of stateless DHOW vessels: two from 2021 and two from 2023.
These interdictions led to the discovery and seizure of four large caches of conventional weapons, including long arms and anti-tank missiles, and related munitions – all of which were determined to be primarily of either Iranian, Chinese, or Russian origin. This action follows the government’s March 2023 forfeiture action against over one million rounds of ammunition in route from Iran to Yemen. The network for both actions was involved in the illicit trafficking of advanced conventional weapons systems and components by sanctioned Iranian entities that directly support military action by the Houthi movement in Yemen and the Iranian regime’s campaign of terrorist activities throughout the region. The forfeiture complaint alleges a sophisticated scheme by the IRGC to clandestinely ship weapons to entities that pose grave threats to U.S. national security. This forfeiture action is a product of the U.S. government’s coordinated effort to enforce U.S. sanctions against the IRGC and the Iranian regime and are merely allegations.
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July 7, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced that Jaeyoun Jung of Puyallup, Washington, has agreed to a denial of his export privileges for two years, with such denial suspended during a two-year probationary period and thereafter waived, and to attend export compliance training within twelve months, to settle charges that he committed one violation of EAR § 764.2(a) - Engaging in Prohibited Conduct.
Specifically, on one occasion on or about October 3, 2018, Jung exported from the United States to South Korea optical magnifiers (the "items") without the BIS license required by EAR § 742.7. At all times pertinent to the transaction at issue, these items were subject to the EAR, classified on the Commerce Control List (the "CCL") under Export Control Classification Number ("ECCN") 0A987.e, and controlled for Crime Control ("CC") reasons. The items were valued in total at approximately $10,947. Jung ordered the items from a supplier located in Auburn, Washington. U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers seized the items.
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July 10, 2023: The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the unsealing of an eight-count Indictment charging Gal Luft with offenses related to willfully failing to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”), arms trafficking, Iranian sanctions violations, and making false statements to federal agents. Luft, a dual U.S.-Israeli citizen, was indicted on November 1, 2022, and arrested on February 17, 2023, in the Republic of Cyprus based on the charges in the Indictment. Luft subsequently fled after being released on bail while extradition proceedings were pending and remains a fugitive.
According to the allegations contained in the Indictment, other filings, public information, and statements made during court proceedings; Luft conspired with others in an effort to act within the United States to advance the interests of the People’s Republic of China (“China”) as agents of China-based principals, without registering as foreign agents as required under U.S. law. As part of this scheme, while serving as the co-director of a Maryland-based non-profit think tank, Luft agreed to covertly recruit and pay, on behalf of principals based in China, a former high-ranking U.S. Government official (“Individual-1”), including in 2016 while the former official was an adviser to the then-President-elect, to publicly support certain policies with respect to China without Luft or Individual-1 filing a registration statement as an agent of a foreign principal with the Attorney General of the United States, in violation of FARA.
Additionally, Luft conspired with others and attempted to broker illicit arms transactions with, among others, certain Chinese individuals and entities. In his role as a broker or middleman, Luft worked to find both buyers and sellers of certain weapons and other materials, without a license to do so as required under U.S. law, in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. Among other things, Luft worked to broker a deal for Chinese companies to sell certain weapons to Libya, including anti-tank launchers, grenade launchers, and mortar rounds. Luft also worked to broker deals for certain weapons to be sold to the United Arab Emirates, including aerial bombs and rockets. Luft further worked to broker deals for certain weapons to be sold by a Chinese company to Kenya, including unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs”) – and specifically “strike” UAVs.
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July 11, 2023: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Investigations (ICE) announced that Cesar Ignacio Perez-Barrios, 48, of Mexico, who is a former law enforcement officer, has been sentenced to 46 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release for his involvement in firearms smuggling as a result of an HSI investigation. Perez-Barrios was also ordered to pay a $100 special assessment. Perez-Barrios pleaded guilty to smuggling goods from the United States. On April 28, 2019, Perez-Barrios knowingly attempted to smuggle from the United States into Mexico: five AR-style upper receivers; five AR-style lower receivers; five AR-style barrels; five AR-style buffer tubes; five trigger kits; and five AR-style pistol grips. Perez-Barrios concealed these items in a vehicle a co-conspirator drove while attempting to exit the United States into Mexico. Perez-Barrios expected to be paid for his role in the operation intended to illegally smuggle the firearm parts into Mexico from the United States. Perez-Barrios arranged the transportation of the firearm parts, which are prohibited to export from the United States into Mexico without a valid license. Neither Perez-Barrios nor any of his associates had a valid license or any other lawful authority to export the items to Mexico.
HSI Nogales case results in a man sentenced for conspiracy to smuggle firearms from the US | ICE
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July 14, 2023: The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) arraigned defendant Vadim Konoshchenok, who allegedly smuggled dual-use technologies and ammunition from U.S. companies for Russia’s defense sector. The indictment chared him with conspiracy and other charges related to a global procurement and money laundering network on behalf of the Russian government. Konoshchenok, a Russian citizen with alleged ties to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), was arrested in Estonia on a provisional arrest warrant issued from the Eastern District of New York and extradited from Estonia to the United States on July 13, 2023.
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July 14, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced that Profense LLC (Profense), a manufacturer of defense weapon systems located in Phoenix, AZ, has agreed to pay a civil penalty of $48,500 and B.E. Meyers & Co., Inc. (Meyers), a defense contractor in Redmond, Washington, has agreed to pay a civil penalty of $44,750 to resolve violations of the anti-boycott regulations set forth at EAR Part 760. As part of the settlements with BIS, both Profense and Meyers admitted to the conduct set forth in the Proposed Charging Letters, which alleged violations involving the furnishing of information by U.S. persons about their business relationships with boycotted countries or blacklisted persons and the failure to report the receipt of requests to take action in support of a foreign boycott of a country friendly to the United States. Specifically, both Profense and Meyers participated in a trade show in Bahrain in 2019. In connection with the shipment of products (goods) for display at the trade show, each company furnished to its freight forwarder a commercial invoice/packing list certifying that the goods were not of Israeli origin and not manufactured by a company on the “Israeli Boycott Blacklist.” A “blacklist” in this context is a boycott-based list of persons with whom a boycotting country requires U.S. Persons to refuse to do business (see Section 760.2(a)(4) of the EAR). Furnishing such information is prohibited by Section 760.2(d) of the EAR. In addition, both companies failed to report to BIS the receipt of the request to furnish such information as required by Section 760.5 of the EAR. The antiboycott provisions set forth in Part 760 of the EAR discourage, and in certain circumstances prohibit, U.S. persons from taking certain actions in furtherance or support of a boycott maintained by a foreign country against a country friendly to the United States (i.e., an unsanctioned foreign boycott). In addition, U.S. persons must report to OAC their receipt of certain boycott-related requests, whether or not they intend to comply with them. Reports may be filed electronically or by mail on form BIS-621P for single transactions or on form BIS-6051P for multiple transactions involving boycott requests received in the same calendar quarter.
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July 14, 2023: The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that Vadim Konoshchenok, 48, of Tallinn, Estonia, with alleged ties to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) has been charged with conspiracy and other charges related to a global procurement and money laundering network on behalf of the Russian government. Konoshchenok was arrested in Estonia on a provisional arrest warrant issued from the Eastern District of New York and extradited from Estonia to the United States on July 13. According to the indictment and court filings, Konoshchenok and his co-defendants were affiliated with Serniya Engineering and Sertal LLC (the Serniya Network), Moscow-based companies that operate under the direction of Russian intelligence services to procure advanced electronics and sophisticated testing equipment for Russia’s military-industrial complex and research and development sector, some of which can be used in the development of nuclear and hypersonic weapons, quantum computing and other military applications.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the Department of Commerce (DOC) Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) levied sanctions against Serniya, Sertal, and several individuals and companies engaged in the scheme, calling them “instrumental to the Russian Federation’s war machine.” As alleged in the indictment, the Serniya Network was licensed to conduct highly sensitive and classified procurement activities by Russia’s FSB, Russia’s principal security agency and the main successor agency to the Soviet Union’s KGB. According to court documents, in electronic communications, Konoshchenok explicitly identified himself as an FSB “Colonel” and enclosed a photograph of himself wearing his FSB uniform. Additionally, a review of electronic communications equipment recovered from Konoshchenok revealed saved contacts beginning with the prefix “FSB” and email addresses from “FSB[.]ru” domains. One of Konoshchenok’s calendar entries referenced an “FSB order.”
As described in the indictment, Estonia was a popular transshipment point, where Konoshchenok would smuggle U.S.-origin items across the border into Russia. On Oct. 27, 2022, Konoshchenok was detained by Estonian authorities while attempting to cross into Russia from Estonia with approximately 35 different types of semiconductors and electronic components, including several U.S.-origin and export-controlled items. Konoshchenok has also been repeatedly stopped by Estonian border officials attempting to smuggle hundreds of thousands of American-made and export-controlled rounds into Russia, including 6.5 mm, 7 mm, .338, and .308 magnum rounds, which are commonly used by snipers, as well as military-grade .223 rounds. Konoshchenok used an Estonian front company called Stonebridge Resources and communicated frequently with other co-conspirators about sourcing, transporting, and paying for controlled items. In electronic communications, Konoshchenok is clear that his fee is “10%” because he “can’t do less. Sanctions . . . Sanction item for 10%.” To date, over half a ton of military-grade ammunition linked to Konoshchenok has been recovered or interdicted before being smuggled into Russia. DOJ's Task Force KleptoCapture, an interagency law enforcement task force dedicated to enforcing the sweeping sanctions, export restrictions, and economic countermeasures that the United States has imposed, along with its allies and partners, in response to Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine, coordinated this case.
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July 17, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued Orders denying export privileges to the following two individuals:
- Tyler James Sumlin - Until September 11. 2026 - On September 11, 2019, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Florida, Tyler James Sumlin (“Sumlin”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a). Specifically, Sumlin was convicted of attempting to smuggle from the United States. to Mexico firearms, namely silencers, a short-barreled rifle, and a destructive device. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Sumlin to five years of probation, a $100 assessment, and a $150 criminal fine.
- Victor Thomas Diaz, III - Until April 18, 2032 - On April 18, 2022, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Victor Thomas Diaz, III (“Diaz”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371. Specifically, Diaz was convicted of conspiring to knowingly, intentionally, and willfully engage in the business of dealing firearms without a license. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Diaz to 24 months of confinement, three years of supervised release, and a $200 assessment.
https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1540-e2876/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2023/1541-e2877/file
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July 21, 2023: Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation has agreed to pay the United States $377,453,150 to resolve allegations that it violated the False Claims Act by improperly billing commercial and international costs to its government contracts. Booz Allen, which is headquartered in McLean, Virginia, provides a range of management, consulting, and engineering services to the government, as well as commercial and international customers.
Under government contracting rules, there must be a nexus between the costs charged to a government contract and the objective of the contract. Thus, a contractor may charge to a government contract costs directly related to that contract, as well as indirect costs that benefit multiple contracts including the government contract. A contractor may not charge costs to a government contract, however, that have no relationship to that contract. This prohibition prevents government contractors from using taxpayer funds to subsidize non-government related work.
The settlement resolves allegations that from approximately 2011 to 2021, Booz Allen improperly charged costs to its government contracts and subcontracts that instead should have been billed to its commercial and international contracts. In particular, the government alleged that Booz Allen improperly allocated indirect costs associated with its commercial and international business to its government contracts and subcontracts that either had no relationship to those contracts and subcontracts or were allocated to those contracts and subcontracts in disproportionate amounts. The government further alleged that Booz Allen failed to disclose to the government the methods by which it accounted for costs supporting its commercial and international businesses. As a result, Booz Allen obtained reimbursement from the government for the costs of commercial activities that provided no benefit to the United States.
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July 25, 2023: The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced that Behrouz Mokhtari, 72, of McLean, Virginia, has been sentenced to 41 months in prison followed by three years of supervised release for violating U.S. sanctions against Iran by conspiring to engage in prohibited business activities on behalf of persons and entities in Iran. In addition, Mokhtari was ordered to forfeit approximately $2,862,598 in proceeds derived from his criminal activity as well as a residence he purchased in Campbell, California, for over $1.5 million using such proceeds. Mokhtari pleaded guilty earlier this year in the District of Maryland to two counts of conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economics Power ACT (IEEPA). According to court documents, Mokhtari engaged in a conspiracy lasting from at least March 2018 until at least September 2020, in which he conducted numerous business activities on behalf of Iranian entities without first obtaining the required licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
In a separate conspiracy lasting from about February 2013 until at least June 2017, Mokhtari and a number of Iranian nationals agreed to conduct illicit shipments of petrochemical products to and from Iran, utilizing his front company, East & West Shipping Inc., in Panama to do so. Mokhtari held management positions and/or maintained ownership control of numerous businesses in Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), collectively referred to as “the FSR Network.” Using the FSR Network, he and his co-conspirators illegally provided services to Iranian entities, such as the refinement and transport of petrochemical products. Mokhtari and his co-conspirators used FSR Network bank accounts in the UAE, including Bitubiz FZE, to process these U.S. dollar transactions. Mokhtari admitted that he knew that, as a U.S. citizen, engaging in business with Iranian entities without first obtaining a license or permission from OFAC is prohibited. He further knew that it was illegal to engage in transactions intended to evade Iranian sanctions or to engage in transactions related to goods and services of Iranian origin or export.
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July 26, 2023: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an Order renewing the temporary denial of export privileges of Empresa de Transporte Aéreocargo del Sur, S.A. ) a/k/a Aerocargo del Sur Transportation Company ) a/k/a EMTRASUR in Caracas, Venezuela. The initial TDO, issued on August 2, 2022, was based on evidence that EMTRASUR engaged in conduct prohibited by a TDO that had been previously issued against Iranian airline Mahan Air a/k/a Mahan Airlines a/k/a Mahan Airways (“Mahan Air”) and the Regulations when EMTRASUR, through its parent company, acquired custody and/or control from Mahan Air of a U.S-origin Boeing 747 aircraft bearing manufacturer’s serial number 23413 (“MSN 23413”), an item subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991, in or around October 2021.6 Moreover, the initial TDO, issued on August 2, 2022, was also based on evidence that EMTRASUR had continued to use MSN 23413 on flights into Iran and Russia in violation of General Prohibition 10, which (among other restrictions) prohibits the continued use of an item that was known to have been exported or reexported in violation of the EAR. As also noted in OEE’s initial request, MSN 23413 was detained by Argentinian authorities on or about June 8, 2022, where it presently remains. On or about August 2, 2022, the United States Department of Justice transmitted a request to Argentinian authorities for the seizure of MSN 23413 following the unsealing of a seizure warrant in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
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