LATEST EXPORT CONTROLS AND COMPLIANCE UPDATE
January 2025
This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through January 31, 2025. The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.
See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and
persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.
In this newsletter, we have added a specific DDTC FAQs section, we think this will be of interest to our readers.
REGULATORY UPDATES
President
President Trump Announces America First Trade Policy
January 20, 2025: In 2017, President Trump’s Administration pursued trade and economic policies that put the American economy, the American worker, and our national security first. President Trump will established a robust and reinvigorated trade policy that promotes investment and productivity, enhances the Nation’s industrial and technological advantages, defends the economic and national security, and — above all — benefits American workers, manufacturers, farmers, ranchers, entrepreneurs, and businesses.
Addressing Unfair and Unbalanced Trade. The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the United States Trade Representative, shall investigate the causes of the country’s large and persistent annual trade deficits in goods, as well as the economic and national security implications and risks resulting from such deficits, and recommend appropriate measures, such as a global supplemental tariff or other policies, to remedy such deficits.
The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall investigate the feasibility of establishing and recommend the best methods for designing, building, and implementing an External Revenue Service (ERS) to collect tariffs, duties, and other foreign trade-related revenues.
The United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, shall undertake a review of, and identify, any unfair trade practices by other countries and recommend appropriate actions to remedy such practices under applicable authorities, including, but not limited to, the Constitution of the United States; sections 71 through 75 of title 15, United States Code; sections 1337, 1338, 2252, 2253, and 2411 of title 19, United States Code; section 1701 of title 50, United States Code; and trade agreement implementing acts.
The United States Trade Representative shall commence the public consultation process set out in section 4611(b) of title 19, United States Code, with respect to the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in preparation for the July 2026 review of the USMCA. Additionally, the United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies, shall assess the impact of the USMCA on American workers, farmers, ranchers, service providers, and other businesses and make recommendations regarding the United States’ participation in the agreement. The United States Trade Representative shall also report to appropriate congressional committees on the operation of the USMCA and related matters consistent with section 4611(b) of title 19, United States Code.
The Secretary of the Treasury shall review and assess the policies and practices of major United States trading partners with respect to the rate of exchange between their currencies and the United States dollar pursuant to section 4421 of title 19, United States Code, and section 5305 of title 22, United States Code. The Secretary of the Treasury shall recommend appropriate measures to counter currency manipulation or misalignment that prevents effective balance of payments adjustments or that provides trading partners with an unfair competitive advantage in international trade, and shall identify any countries that he believes should be designated as currency manipulators.
The United States Trade Representative shall review existing United States trade agreements and sectoral trade agreements and recommend any revisions that may be necessary or appropriate to achieve or maintain the general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions with respect to free trade agreement partner countries.
The United States Trade Representative shall identify countries with which the United States can negotiate agreements on a bilateral or sector-specific basis to obtain export market access for American workers, farmers, ranchers, service providers, and other businesses and shall make recommendations regarding such potential agreements.
The Secretary of Commerce shall review policies and regulations regarding the application of antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) laws, including with regard to transnational subsidies, cost adjustments, affiliations, and “zeroing.” Further, the Secretary of Commerce shall review procedures for conducting verifications pursuant to section 1677 of title 19, United States Code, and assess whether these procedures sufficiently induce compliance by foreign respondents and governments involved in AD/CVD proceedings. The Secretary of Commerce shall consider modifications to these procedures, as appropriate.
The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, in consultation with the United States Trade Representative, shall assess the loss of tariff revenues and the risks from importing counterfeit products and contraband drugs, e.g., fentanyl, that each result from the current implementation of the $800 or less, duty-free de minimis exemption under section 1321 of title 19, United States Code, and shall recommend modifications as warranted to protect both the revenue of the United States and the public health by preventing unlawful importations.
The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, shall investigate whether any foreign country subjects United States citizens or corporations to discriminatory or extraterritorial taxes pursuant to section 891 of title 26, United States Code.
The United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, shall review the impact of all trade agreements — including the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement — on the volume of Federal procurement covered by Executive Order 13788 of April 18, 2017 (Buy American and Hire American), and shall make recommendations to ensure that such agreements are being implemented in a manner that favors domestic workers and manufacturers, not foreign nations.
Economic and Trade Relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The United States Trade Representative shall review the Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China to determine whether the PRC is acting in accordance with this agreement, and shall recommend appropriate actions to be taken based upon the findings of this review, up to and including the imposition of tariffs or other measures as needed.
The United States Trade Representative shall assess the May 14, 2024, report entitled “Four-Year Review of Actions Taken in the Section 301 Investigation: China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation” and consider potential additional tariff modifications as needed under section 2411 of title 19, United States Code — particularly with respect to industrial supply chains and circumvention through third countries, including an updated estimate of the costs imposed by any unfair trade practices identified in such review — and he shall recommend such actions as are necessary to remediate any issues identified in connection with this process.
The United States Trade Representative shall investigate other acts, policies, and practices by the PRC that may be unreasonable or discriminatory and that may burden or restrict United States commerce, and shall make recommendations regarding appropriate responsive actions, including, but not limited to, actions authorized by section 2411 of title 19, United States Code.
The Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative shall assess legislative proposals regarding Permanent Normal Trade Relations with the PRC and make recommendations regarding any proposed changes to such legislative proposals.
The Secretary of Commerce shall assess the status of United States intellectual property rights such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks conferred upon PRC persons, and shall make recommendations to ensure reciprocal and balanced treatment of intellectual property rights with the PRC.
Additional Economic Security Matters. The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of any other relevant agencies, shall conduct a full economic and security review of the United States’ industrial and manufacturing base to assess whether it is necessary to initiate investigations to adjust imports that threaten the national security of the United States under section 1862 of title 19, United States Code.
The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the Senior Counselor for Trade and Manufacturing, shall review and assess the effectiveness of the exclusions, exemptions, and other import adjustment measures on steel and aluminum under section 1862 of title 19, United States Code, in responding to threats to the national security of the United States, and shall make recommendations based upon the findings of this review.
The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce, in cooperation with the heads of other agencies with export control authorities, shall review the United States export control system and advise on modifications in light of developments involving strategic adversaries or geopolitical rivals as well as all other relevant national security and global considerations. Specifically, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall assess and make recommendations regarding how to maintain, obtain, and enhance our Nation’s technological edge and how to identify and eliminate loopholes in existing export controls -– especially those that enable the transfer of strategic goods, software, services, and technology to countries to strategic rivals and their proxies. In addition, they shall assess and make recommendations regarding export control enforcement policies and practices, and enforcement mechanisms to incentivize compliance by foreign countries, including appropriate trade and national security measures.
The Secretary of Commerce shall review and recommend appropriate action with respect to the rulemaking by the Office of Information and Communication Technology and Services (ICTS) on connected vehicles, and shall consider whether controls on ICTS transactions should be expanded to account for additional connected products.
The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and, as appropriate, the heads of any other relevant agencies, shall review whether Executive Order 14105 of August 9, 2023 (Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern) should be modified or rescinded and replaced, and assess whether the final rule entitled “Provisions Pertaining to U.S. Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern,” 89 Fed. Reg. 90398 (November 15, 2024), which implements Executive Order 14105, includes sufficient controls to address national security threats. The Secretary of the Treasury shall make recommendations based upon the findings of this review, including potential modifications to the Outbound Investment Security Program.
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall assess any distorting impact of foreign government financial contributions or subsidies on United States Federal procurement programs and propose guidance, regulations, or legislation to combat such distortion.
The Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall assess the unlawful migration and fentanyl flows from Canada, Mexico, the PRC, and any other relevant jurisdictions and recommend appropriate trade and national security measures to resolve that emergency.
Reports. The results of the reviews and investigations, findings, identifications, and recommendations identified above.
Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/america-first-trade-policy/
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Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)
Department of State 2025 Civil Monetary Penalties Inflationary Adjustment and New Maximum Penalty for Violation of Section 38 of the AECA
January 10, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 1866: On January 10, 2025, the Department of State published a final rule to adjust the civil monetary penalties at section 127.10 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) as part of a larger rule amending penalties for all regulatory provisions maintained and enforced by the Department of State. ITAR section 127.10(a)(1)(i) through (iii) providing maximum penalties under sections 38 (22 U.S.C. 2778), 39A (22 U.S.C. 2779a), and 40 (22 U.S.C. 2780) of the AECA, respectively, are adjusted for inflation in accordance with the December 2024 guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB M-25-02). The revised amounts for violations of those sections will apply to those penalties assessed on or after January 10, 2025, regardless of the date on which the underlying facts or violations occurred.
The Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs is authorized to impose a civil penalty, as follows:
(i) For each violation of 22 U.S.C. 2778, an amount not to exceed the greater of $1,271,078 (from $1,238,892) or the amount that is twice the value of the transaction that is the basis of the violation with respect to which the penalty is imposed;
(ii) For each violation of 22 U.S.C. 2779a, an amount not to exceed $1,055,721 (from $1,028,988), or five times the amount of the prohibited incentive payment, whichever is greater; and
(iii) For each violation of 22 U.S.C. 2780, an amount not to exceed $1,256,607 (from $1,224,787).
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Interim Final Rule: Targeted Revisions To Certain Parts Of USML Categories II, IV, V, VII Through XIV And XIX Through XXI.
January 17, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 5594: The Department of State published an interim final rule in the Federal Register that, after a 240-day delayed effective date, will amend §§ 121.0 and 121.1 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) by revising certain U.S. Munitions List (USML) definitions, adding new definitions, and revising certain parts of USML Categories II, IV, V, VII through XIV, and XIX through XXI.
USML Category II
In USML Category II, Note 2 to paragraph (a)(5) is revised to correct a typographical error.
USML Category IV
USML Category IV paragraph (c) is revised and paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) are added to more clearly describe the equipment controlled therein, and to differentiate between equipment specially designed for commodities enumerated in paragraphs (a) or (b) of Category IV under the new paragraph (c)(1), and equipment specially designed for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) under the new paragraph (c)(2), similar to how they are differentiated in paragraph 4.b of the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List. This amendment also replaces the undefined term “apparatus and devices” with the § 120.40 defined term “equipment.”
USML Category V
USML Category V paragraph (c)(2) is revised to add the CAS Registry Number for pentaborane and to replace the comma after “pentaborane” with a semicolon, in order to clarify this paragraph describes derivatives of carboranes, decaboranes, and pentaborane. Paragraph (f)(4)(x) is revised to correct the CAS Registry Number. Paragraphs (e)(10), (f)(19), and (g)(4) are revised to correct typographical errors.
USML Category VII
Note 3 to USML Category VII is revised to further clarify the universe of ground vehicles described, with no change to the scope of controls. Specifically, the types of vehicular control and locomotion employed are irrelevant when evaluating a vehicle against the control criteria. The Department affirms that although some unmanned ground vehicles, based on their method of control or locomotion, may be referred to by the public colloquially as “robots,” they must still be evaluated against the criteria in USML Category VII.
USML Category VIII
USML Category VIII(h)(1) is revised to clarify which commodities are described therein by incorporating relevant portions of the existing note to paragraph (h)(1). This revision also serves to facilitate reference to the included list of aircraft by other USML paragraphs, and to better align controls with the Department’s intent around U.S. Government technology demonstrators. Additionally, it precludes release of commodities from paragraph (h)(1) based solely on their subsequent use in aircraft included in USML Category XXI (pursuant to the procedures therein) or in foreign advanced military aircraft. Foreign advanced military aircraft, as newly defined in § 121.0, include non-U.S. origin aircraft and foreign derivatives of U.S. origin aircraft, either in development or entering production after 2023, with one or more of the following advanced military capabilities: Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) fire control radar, integrated signature management, electronic warfare systems, or the ability to engage targets beyond visual range (BVR). The Department further highlights the use of the term “AESA fire control radar” to ensure that AESA weather radars commonly used in civil aviation are clearly excluded from this list of advanced military capabilities. The year 2023 was chosen as the production year in this definition to ensure alignment with the temporary modification to the USML issued on December 4, 2023 (88 FR 84072), and extended on November 26, 2024 (89 FR 93170), which states that parts used in or with the KF-21 continue to be described on the USML.
As practitioners have confused the F-15SE (Silent Eagle) with the F-15E (Strike Eagle), the F-15SE nomenclature is also clarified. Further, the “B1B” is replaced by “B-1.” As the B-1A never entered into production, this change does not change the export classification of existing items. The Department makes this change consistent with the majority of aircraft listed in the paragraph and its intent to include future variants of those aircraft. The Department notes the only aircraft listed with series letters (F-15SE, F/A-18E/F, and EA-18G) in this paragraph intentionally exclude earlier variants (for example, the control does not include the F-15A, which is an F-15 variant developed before the F-15SE). Additionally, the Department adds the MQ-25 and the RQ-170 to the list of aircraft in paragraph (h)(1)(i). The MQ-25 provides a critical military advantage in its ability to support the future Navy carrier air wing and is central to the Navy’s strategic Unmanned Campaign Framework. The RQ-170 is a high-altitude, long-endurance, low-observable unmanned aerial vehicle that provides a critical military and intelligence advantage in its ability to perform key intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, target acquisition, and electronic warfare functions. Paragraph (h)(1) describes articles used in some of the most advanced U.S. military aircraft. The changes to paragraph (h)(1) ensure those specially designed articles are not released from this entry based on their subsequent use in USML Category XXI aircraft, foreign advanced military aircraft, or U.S. Government (USG) technology demonstrator aircraft.
Ensuring those elements are not released from paragraph (h)(1) based on subsequent use in foreign advanced military aircraft is consistent with the language of § 120.3(a)(2). With this change, the Department treats use of these commodities in foreign advanced military aircraft as it has in their use in advanced U.S. military aircraft. This addition facilitates opportunities for reuse and commonality with partner aircraft by enabling U.S. content to be utilized in those platforms without unnecessary redesigns or unmerited removal from the USML.
The Department further considered amending the language to remove commodities designed exclusively for non-Department of Defense (DoD) USG technology demonstrators from paragraph (h)(1). The Department declines to do so, as such commodities are generally not currently described in paragraph (h)(1). Specifically, USG technology demonstrators are unique among the aircraft listed in paragraph (h)(1), as some technology demonstrators are described on the USML, while others are not. The Department notes commodities used in technology demonstrators are often developed exclusively for those demonstrators or repurposed from other USML or CCL platforms for time and cost savings; those commodities must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis for proper export classification. Specifically, for USG technology demonstrators that are themselves not described on the USML (“these aircraft”), it is generally the case that:
- Articles designed for and used only in other aircraft listed in paragraph (h)(1) before and during subsequent unmodified use in these aircraft generally remain described in paragraph (h)(1), as explained by the following analysis:
- In the context of paragraph (h)(1), such articles meet the criteria in, and thus are caught by, § 120.41(a)(1) as having properties peculiarly responsible for the controlled characteristic ( e., their use in the listed aircraft), and (a)(2) for their use in or with the other listed aircraft.
- In the context of paragraph (h)(1), such articles are not released by § 120.41(b)(3), (4), or (5), as they were originally developed for aircraft described in either USML Category VIII or XXI, and the USG technology demonstrator does not enter production as defined in § 120.43.
- Articles designed for, and used in, aircraft subject to the EAR prior to unmodified use in these aircraft are not described in paragraph (h)(1) but may be described elsewhere on the USML, as explained by the following analysis:
- In the context of paragraph (h)(1), there are circumstances wherein such articles would be released by § 120.41(b)(3), regardless of meeting the criteria in § 120.41(a).
- With contemporaneous documentation, there are circumstances in which the articles would also be released by paragraph (b)(4) or (5).
- Articles designed for, and only used in, these aircraft are not described in paragraph (h)(1), but may be described elsewhere on the USML, as explained by the following analysis:
- In the context of paragraph (h)(1), such articles meet the criteria in § 120.41(a)(1) as having properties peculiarly responsible for the controlled characteristic ( e., their use in the listed aircraft), but not (a)(2) unless they are used in or with a defense article.
- In the context of paragraph (h)(1), such articles are not released by § 120.41(b)(3), as the USG technology demonstrator does not enter production. However, they could be released by paragraph (b)(4), as they were developed with the knowledge they would be used in these aircraft, often in a system that is subject to the EAR.
- In contrast, articles designed for, and only used in, USG technology demonstrators described on the USML are described in paragraph (h)(1), as explained in the following analysis:
- In the context of paragraph (h)(1), such articles meet the criteria in § 120.41(a)(1) as having properties peculiarly responsible for the controlled characteristic ( e., their use in the listed aircraft), and (a)(2) for their use in or with aircraft described in USML Category VIII.
- In the context of paragraph (h)(1), such articles are not released by § 120.41(b)(3), (4), or (5), as they were originally developed for an aircraft described in USML Category VIII. The Department is also amending the text of the current “Note to paragraph (h)(1),” redesignating it as “Note 1 to paragraph to (h)(1),” and adding “Note 2 to paragraph (h)(1).” The addition of “Note 2 to paragraph (h)(1)” outlines an example of the scope of paragraph (h)(1) for articles used in USG technology demonstrators.
- With these revisions to paragraph (h)(1) and the notes to paragraph (h)(1), the Department also terminates the temporary modification to Category VIII of the USML that was issued on December 4, 2023 (88 FR 84072) and extended on November 26, 2024 (89 FR 93170).
The Department notes certain commodities designed exclusively for DoD-funded developmental aircraft, including aircraft jointly funded by DoD and another agency, remain defense articles described in paragraph (f) of USML Category VIII.
Paragraph (h)(29) of USML Category VIII is revised to clarify the commodities described therein include both those designed for the aircraft listed and the defense articles described in paragraph (h)(1), with a change in control via the removal of commodities specially designed for USG technology demonstrators.
The note located at the end of USML Category VIII is moved to follow USML Category VIII paragraph (h), renamed “Note 1 to paragraph (h),” and revised for clarity, with no change in scope.
USML Category IX
USML Category IX(e)(2) is placed in reserve to eliminate redundancy. Technical data directly related to the software and databases enumerated in paragraph (b)(4) is already described in paragraph (e)(1).
USML Category X
Developmental exoskeletons have been identified as a technology warranting ITAR control due to the critical military advantage they provide. Thus, Category X is amended by removing paragraph (b) from reserve and adding a new paragraph (b) to describe exoskeletons under development for DoD, along with standard exclusions applied to other developmental articles to provide advance notice to industry and to avoid controlling those that do not provide a critical military advantage.
The Department also amends Category X to align body armor protection levels with the most recent NIJ standard, 0123.00, “Specification for NIJ Ballistic Protection Levels and Associated Test Threats.” All references to “NIJ Type IV” have been updated to NIJ RF3. “Note 1 to paragraph (a)(1)” and “Note to paragraphs (a) and (d)” have also been updated to reference the new standard. “Note to paragraphs (a) and (d)” is redesignated as “Note 1 to paragraphs (a) and (d).”
USML Category XI
USML Category XI paragraphs (c)(10)(i) and (ii) are revised to reflect that certain anti-jam antennas no longer provide a critical military advantage, with increasing commercial utilization applicable to civil GPS resiliency. Following consultations with DoD, the beam switching speed criterion in paragraph (c)(10)(i) is revised from 50 milliseconds down to one millisecond, and the convergence time criterion in paragraph (c)(10)(ii) is revised from one second down to one millisecond, as the Department seeks to control only the most sensitive and effective anti-jam antennas in USML Category XI(c)(10)(i) and (ii). The Department further intends to exclude Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPAs) for Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) from paragraph (c)(10). To implement this, the Department is removing all CRPAs from paragraphs (c)(10)(i) and (ii) and adding paragraphs (c)(10)(v) and (vi) to describe the CRPAs for non-PNT applications that meet the updated criteria used in paragraphs (c)(10)(i) and (ii) the CRPA antennas were moved from. In removing CRPAs for PNT, the Department intends to facilitate civil global navigation system resiliency. CRPAs use multiple elements and advanced signal processing techniques to dynamically control their reception pattern, thereby enhancing signal reception from desired directions and suppressing interference from undesired directions. Generally, in comparing CRPAs to the antennas that remain described in paragraphs (c)(10)(i) and (ii), CRPAs are more optimized to control the reception pattern instead of the transmission beam steering or switching. This is in line with the Position, Navigation, and Timing, Advisory Board’s (PNTAB) recommendation to remove CRPAs from the USML. The antennas removed from the USML by these changes are neither subject to multilateral controls nor controlled as munitions in other countries that produce them. Once removed from the USML, these anti-jam antennas will become subject to the EAR under the jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce.
USML Category XII
USML Category XII paragraph (d)(2)(ii) is revised to update the language to reflect the current description of Positioning Service from Precise Positioning Service to Protected Positioning Service (PPS). In the 2021 Federal Radionavigation Plan published by the Departments of Defense, Transportation, and Homeland Security (available at https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/63024), PPS has been updated to “Protected” Positioning Service from the former “Precise” Positioning Service. This change accurately reflects the technology’s ability to operate in degraded environments as opposed to legacy encryption abilities that facilitate greater position precision and no longer provide a critical military advantage.
USML Category XIII
USML Category XIII paragraph (b)(4) is revised to update the name of the Unified Cross Domain Management Office (UCDMO) to the National Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office (NCDSMO).
The Department further amends Category XIII to align armor protection levels with the most recent NIJ standard, 0123.00, “Specification for NIJ Ballistic Protection Levels and Associated Test Threats.” All references to “NIJ Level III” are updated to NIJ RF1. As the new RF1 standard corresponds to the previous Type III standard, this is not a significant change in control. The reference in paragraph (m)(10) is also updated to reference the new standard.
Additionally, paragraph (e)(2) is revised for clarification and to add paragraphs (e)(2)(i) and (ii). Category XIII is further revised to add specific fluids to the USML in paragraph (j)(3). Each of these fluids was developed for one or more critical military applications for which existing fluids were unsuitable; by including a specially designed criterion, general-purpose fluids subsequently selected for use in a military application are not described by this control. Lastly, paragraph (m)(9) is amended to clarify the definitions of variables in the equation for Em.
USML Category XIV
Additional nerve agents and a defoliant are added to USML Category XIV in paragraphs (a)(1)(iv) through (viii) and (j), and controls on Chemical Agent Resistive Coatings (CARC) are clarified in paragraph (f)(7). The nerve agent additions are made pursuant to changes to Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention, while the defoliant addition is a constituent of Agent Orange, for which the Department is unaware of current commercial applications.
The clarification of CARC controls in paragraph (f)(7) is made consistent with longstanding policy published on DDTC’s website. As CARC is controlled only through the point of application and curing, export applications for CARC must specify the proposed end-users and end-uses, and export licenses for CARC impose limitations on the same. Of note, the control release for CARC that has been applied and cured only applies to USML Category XIV(f)(7); this release does not apply to coatings or materials described elsewhere on the USML. For example, when a USML Category XIII(j)(2) coating is applied to an item subject to the EAR, a DDTC license or other approval continues to be required for the coating, when the item to which the coating was applied is exported, reexported, or retransferred.
USML Category XIX
USML Category XIX paragraphs (d) and (f)(1) are amended to add specific DoD-funded aircraft engines in development that provide a critical military or intelligence advantage, as well as their specially designed parts, components, accessories, and attachments. Specifically, paragraph (d) is split into two parts, paragraphs (d)(1) and (2), and amended to include the XT900, which is a developmental engine resulting from the enumerated HPW3000 technology demonstrator.
The note to paragraph (d) is redesignated as the note to paragraph (d)(1), to continue its applicability to the engines in former paragraph (d) following their movement to paragraph (d)(1), with no change in scope. Paragraph (f)(1) is amended to include specially designed parts, components, accessories, and attachments for the engine now described in paragraph (d)(2), and to incorporate a portion of the note to paragraph (f)(1). The remainder of the note to paragraph (f)(1) is redesignated as “Note 1 to paragraph (f)(1)” and revised for clarity. Paragraph (f)(1) is further amended to clarify that parts, components, accessories, and attachments are not released if common only to a listed engine and an engine designated in USML Category XXI(a), and to add a catch-all control for XA100, XA101, XA102, XA103, and T901 engine hardware. The XA-series engines represent a substantial leap in propulsion capability. Items specially designed for these engines provides a critical military or intelligence advantage in enabling the engines to provide improved thrust-to-weight capability while addressing fuel efficiency, affordability, and sustainment for warfighter operational readiness. The T901 powers the Future Vertical Lift platform and provides 33% more thrust than, but retains the same size as, its predecessor.
Paragraph (f)(2) is amended to clarify the items described in paragraph (f)(2) by replacing a term of art (“hot section components”) with defined regulatory terms (hot section “parts” and “components”), with no change in scope, and to add related cooled structures for combustion chambers and liners. Punctuation is also updated with no change in scope.
USML Category XX
USML Category XX is amended to add paragraphs (a)(9) and (10) to control two new classes of uncrewed, untethered vessels and vehicles that provide a critical military advantage: specifically, those equipped with anti-recovery features, and larger systems with significant range or endurance. Paragraph (a)(10) includes criteria to avoid control of systems below certain weight and performance thresholds the Department assesses are best suited for scientific research or commercial applications. Tethered systems are similarly excluded from both paragraphs (a)(9) and (10).
USML Category XX(b)(2) is revised for clarity, with no change to the scope of the control.
USML Category XXI
USML Category XXI is amended to move the second sentence of paragraph (a) into a new note, and to further clarify the considerations when designating an article in USML Category XXI.
These amendments will take effect 240 days after publication, on September 15, 2025.
In addition to accepting public comment on these USML revisions, the Department is also asking specific questions in the Request for Comments section of the rule’s preamble. The comment period will be open for 60 days after publication. Interested parties may submit comments by March 18, 2025, using one of the methods described in the interim final rule.
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DDTC Final Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations Posted to Website
January 6, 2025: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following Final CJ Determinations for CJ’s that resulted in a final determination that the subject product was controlled within USML Category XXI.
Readers may find these determinations helpful when performing self-classification work.
| Model Name | Manufacturer | Description | Final Determination | Final Determination Date |
| METSS 2190-S | K&L Gates LLP | Submarine synthetic hydraulic and lubricating fluid for submarines | USML Category XXI(a), and USML Category XXI(b) for directly related technical data and defense services | 5/28/2021 |
| Echo Voyager, P/Ns 1717200-1000-1 and 1717401-2000 | The Boeing Company | Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (XLUUV) | USML Category XXI(a) (and in the second CJ, the same classification for its specially designed parts, components, accessories, and attachments) | 8/2/2019 8/2/2023 |
| Slocum Glider, Model LBS-G, P/N ASSY G-1408-DS | Teledyne Webb Research | Underwater automnomous gliding vehicle | USML Category XXI(a) | 9/27/2017 |
| Krytox XHT 500AF | The Chemours Company | Perfluorinated grease | USML Category XXI(a), and USML Category XXI(b) for directly related technical data and defense services | 5/20/2021 |
| TenCate ABDS | TenCate Advanced Composites, acquired by Toray Composites Materials America | Active blast mitigation system that suppresses vehicle flight caused by IED and mine blasts and significantly increases the protection of occupants. | USML Category XXI(a) | 6/17/2014 |
| Liner, Combustion Chamber, Turbine Engine Transition, Part Number LH50905-02 | Honeywell International | Transition element between the combustion chamber and the power turbine of an aircraft gas turbine engine | USML Category XXI(a), and USML Category XXI(b) for directly related technical data and defense services | 8/19/2021 |
| Gila Strike Multi-Threat Small Arms Ammunition | Reliant Defense, Inc. | Proprietary enhanced penetration round | USML Category XXI(a), and USML Category XXI(b) for directly related technical data and defense services | 10/2/2024 |
| MDS-10, Part Number 3130-0002 and MDS-10T, Part Number 3130-0005 | WM Industries Inc. | Handheld dual sensor detectors that combine metal detection and ground penetrating radar technologies for the purpose of detecting improvised explosive devices | USML Category XXI(a), and USML Category XXI(b) for directly related technical data and defense services | 12/19/2024 |
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Compliance Reminder
Annual sales / transfer reports for ITAR MLAs and WDAs are due now if your company files annually for the calendar year.
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DDTC Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Related To Registrations With The Department Of State
Q: Can I renew and amend my registration at the same time?
A: Yes, but only if an applicant includes administrative, material, and Mergers, Acquisitions and Divestitures (MAD) changes within the annual renewal submission. However, if the amendment is executed more than 60 days prior to the registration expiration date, then an applicant must submit a standalone amendment via the ‘Amend’ option in DECCS Registration Dashboard.
Q: How were the new fees calculated?
A: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) conducted a multi-year assessment to calculate the new registration fees. The new registration fees are based on several factors, including the last 15 years of inflation, technological advancements, and advancements in support services.
Q: Are there any special circumstances which the Department will consider to delay full payment of the registration fee?
A: Registrants whose fees are greater than $4000 may appeal to the Department for consideration of an alternate payment schedule. To be considered, registrants must provide proof that the registration fee is greater than 1 percent of the total sales in the given year. “Total sales” includes domestic and international sales and is not limited to sales of items controlled on the USML. Applicants must submit a request for special consideration to DDTC not less than 30 days prior to registration expiration. Any request received within the 30-day window will be automatically disapproved.
Q: When it comes to registration fee calculations, what is a “favorable determination”?
A: A favorable determination is an approval, an approval with provisos (sometimes also referred to as an approval with conditions), or written authorization from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) to conduct an activity regulated by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). An application that is returned without action or denied is not a type of favorable determination.
Q: How will a new registrant know their fee?
A: The fee for first time registrants is set at $3,000 (manufacturers/exporters and brokers). However, persons registering as a manufacturer/exporter may also simultaneously register as a broker with a consolidated DS-2032 Statement of Registration and not be charged a separate broker registration fee.
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Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan
January 2, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Government of Japan has requested to buy up to one thousand two hundred (1,200) AIM-120 (D-3/C-8) Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); up to twenty (20) AIM-120D-3 guidance sections, including precise positioning provided by either Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module or M-Code; and up to four (4) AIM-120C-8 guidance sections. The following non-MDE items will be included: AMRAAM propulsion sections, warheads, AIM-120 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM), missile containers, and control section spares; Common Munitions Built-in Test (BIT) Reprogramming Equipment (CMBRE); ADU-891 Adaptor Group Test Sets; munitions support and support equipment; spare and repair parts, consumables, accessories, and repair and return support; classified software delivery and support; classified publications and technical documentation; transportation support; studies and surveys; warranties; US Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistical support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $3.64 billion. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Tucson, AZ. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Saudi Arabia
January 2, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as requested to buy twenty (20) MK 54 MOD 0 Lightweight Torpedo (LWT) all up rounds. The following non-MDE items will also be included: MK 54 MOD 0 LWT spare parts; MK 54 Recoverable Exercise Torpedoes (REXTORP); handling shapes and containers; training; publications; support and test equipment; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total program cost is $78.5 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Integrated Defense Systems, located in Portsmouth, RI. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Zambia
January 13, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that The Republic of Zambia has requested to buy Bell 412 Enhanced Performance exportable medium-lift transport helicopters; radio communication and navigation systems; weather radar and transponder capabilities; qualification and transition training for pilots and maintainers; in-country Contractor Field Service Representatives support; Program Management Reviews; technical assistance and product support; associated aviation ground support equipment; peculiar ground support equipment; hardware; special tools; test equipment; basic issue items; Quality Assurance Team inspections, inventories, validations, and ground run and flight test verification testing; air freight transportation delivery; initial spare, repair, and consumable parts; operator, maintenance, and technical manuals; technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $100 million, to be funded by a combination of Foreign Military Financing and Zambian national funds. The principal contractor will be Bell Textron, located in Fort Worth, TX. The purchaser typically requires offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan
January 15, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of Japan has requested to buy up to sixteen (16) AGM-158B/B-2 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles with Extended Range (JASSM-ER). The following non-MDE items will also be included: AGM-158 JASSM Dummy Air Training Missiles (DATM) and containers; JASSM Anti-jam Global Positioning System Receivers (JAGR); munitions support and support equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories, and repair and return support; integration and test support and equipment; classified and unclassified software delivery and support; classified and unclassified publications and technical documentation; personnel training and equipment; airlift and transportation support; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical, and logistics support services; studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $39 million. Implementation of this proposed sale will not require the assignment of any additional U.S. Government or contractor representatives to Japan.
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DSCA Notifies Congress of Potential FMS Sale To Japan
January 15, 2025: The U.S. Department of Defense’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) notified Congress that the Government of Japan has requested to buy up to one hundred fifty (150) Standard Missile 6 (SM-6) Block I missiles. The following non-MDE items will also be included: MK 21 Mod 3 Vertical Launch System (VLS) canisters; component parts and support equipment; continued Engineering, Integration and Test (EI&T) materiel and support required to produce the SM-6 Block I missiles; special test and handling equipment; training and training equipment and aids; technical publications and data; U.S. Government and contractor engineering and technical assistance, including related studies and analysis support; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated total cost is $900 million. The principal contractor will be RTX Corporation, located in Camden, AR. At this time, the U.S. Government is not aware of any offset agreement proposed in connection with this potential sale. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/japan-standard-missile-6-sm-6-block-i-missiles
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Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
Commerce Issues Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to Secure Unmanned Aircraft Systems
January 2, 2025: the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) seeking public comment to inform the potential development of a rule to secure and safeguard the information and communication technology and services (ICTS) supply chain for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), or drones.
With the rapid development of advanced technology, commercial drones are now commonplace across the United States. This ANPRM explains how foreign adversary involvement in UAS ICTS supply chains – including acute threats from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia – may offer our adversaries the ability to remotely access and manipulate these devices, exposing sensitive U.S. data.
BIS seeks public feedback on several matters outlined in the ANPRM, including: definitions of UAS and components, assessments of how potential classes of ICTS transactions integral to UAS may present undue or unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, evaluations of risk posed by different foreign adversaries, potential processes for the public to request approval to engage in an otherwise prohibited transaction, the economic impact such regulation could have on certain entities, and, where feasible, potential mitigation measures.
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Export Enforcement Releases 2024 Year in Review
January 2, 2025: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Export Enforcement published its annual Year in Review, a compilation of highlights reflecting Export Enforcement’s accomplishments over the past year.
The Year in Review includes numerous initiatives from 2024, including the expansion of the Disruptive Technology Strike Force, which, to date, has brought 26 criminal cases charging sanctions and export control violations, smuggling conspiracies, and other offenses related to the transfer of sensitive information, goods, and military-grade technology to the People’s Republic of China, Russia, and Iran.
The Year in Review also highlights significant criminal and administrative enforcement actions from the past year, including several related to Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean illicit procurement networks. In addition, the Year in Review describes key partnerships with the interagency, industry, academia, and foreign governments, and it describes updates to the antiboycott enforcement program.
BIS Export Enforcement protects and promotes U.S. national security by aggressively investigating violations of export control and antiboycott regulations and by partnering with industry and academia to facilitate compliance with those regulations.
https://www.bis.gov/media/documents/bis-export-enforcement-year-review-2024 and https://www.bis.gov/news-updates/search?content_type=All&created=1&field_countries=All&field_learn_support_topics=All&field_news_updates_topic=All&news_search_query=&sort_by=created&sort_order=DESC
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Biden-Harris Administration Announces Regulatory Framework for the Responsible Diffusion of Advanced Artificial Intelligence Technology
January 13, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 4544: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced controls on advanced computing chips and certain closed artificial intelligence (AI) model weights, alongside new license exceptions and updates to the Data Center Validated End User (VEU) authorization. This new regulation serves key U.S. national security and foreign policy interests and supports the Biden-Harris Administration’s broader strategy to cultivate a secure and trusted technology ecosystem for the responsible use and diffusion of AI.
The framework adopts a three-pronged strategy.
First, the rule updates controls for advanced computing chips by requiring authorizations for exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) involving a broad set of additional countries. However, the rule also includes the following license exceptions and authorizations, which will ensure that commercial transactions that don’t pose national security risks can proceed and the benefits of AI can be broadly shared:
- Exceptions for certain allies and partners: New License Exception Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA) allows for the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of advanced computing chips, without an authorization, to a set of allies and partners. Those destinations, which are listed in paragraph (a) to Supplement No. 5 to Part 740, are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
- Exceptions for supply chains:New License Exception Advanced Compute Manufacturing (ACM) allows for the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of advanced computing chips, without an authorization, for the purposes of development, production, and storage of these chips, except to arms-embargoed countries. This license exception builds on the Temporary General License from October 2023 rule to prevent disruption of supply chains.
- Low volume exception: New License Exception Low Processing Performance (LPP) allows limited amounts of compute to flow globally, except to arms-embargoed countries.
- Update to Data Center Validated End User (VEU) Program:The rule further bifurcates Data Center VEUs into:
- Universal VEUs (UVEU):Provides U.S. and certain allied and partner country entities with the opportunity to obtain a single authorization that will allow the company to build data centers around the world without additional authorizations, except in arms-embargoed countries.
- National VEUs (NVEU):Provides entities headquartered outside arms-embargoed countries the opportunity to obtain an authorization that will allow the company to build data centers in specified locations without additional authorizations, except in arms-embargoed countries.
When a license is required to export or reexport chips to a certain destination, license applications will be reviewed under a presumption of approval until the total quantity of controlled chips exported or reexported to that country exceeds a specified allocation. After a country reaches its allocation, applications will be reviewed under a policy of denial. Consistent with previously established policy, a presumption of denial remains in place for arms-embargoed countries, regardless of quantity.
Authorized NVEUs will be able to build data centers up to a specified scale in each country. This allocation is separate from, and not impacted by, the host country’s specified country allocation. Likewise, the low-volume orders are not affected by and do not count against country-level allocations. Authorized UVEUs will be required to keep at least 75% of their controlled advanced chips within the United States and certain allied and partner countries and will be prohibited from installing more than 7% of their controlled chips in any single other country. U.S.-headquartered UVEUs will be required to keep at least 50% of their controlled advanced chips in the United States.
Second, the rule institutes new controls on the model weights of the most advanced closed-weight AI models. These controls will initially apply to the weights of models trained with 10^26 computational operations or more, and authorizations will be required to export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) such weights to a broad set of countries. Additionally, the rule creates a new foreign direct product rule that applies these controls to certain model weights produced abroad using advanced computing chips made with U.S. technology or equipment. As with advanced computing chips, however, this rule includes several license exceptions for model weights:
- Exception for deployments by U.S., ally and partner-headquartered entities: New License Exception Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA) allows for the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of otherwise controlled closed AI model weights, without an authorization, by companies headquartered in the United States and certain allies and partners (see list above), except to an arms-embargoed country.
- Exception for open models:Models with widely available model weights (i.e., open-weight models) are not subject to controls. Additionally, the model weights of closed models that are less powerful than the most advanced open-weight models, even if they exceed the 10^26 threshold, are not controlled.
Third, BIS will impose security conditions to safeguard the storage of the most advanced models in destinations to protect U.S. national security and to mitigate the risk of diversion for advanced computing chips.
https://www.bis.gov/press-release/biden-harris-administration-announces-regulatory-framework-responsible-diffusion and https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion
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Commerce Finalizes Rule to Secure Connected Vehicle Supply Chains from Foreign Adversary Threats
January 14, 2025: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced a final rule prohibiting certain transactions involving the sale or import of connected vehicles integrating specific pieces of hardware and software, or those components sold separately, with a sufficient nexus to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or Russia.
BIS and its Office of Information and Communications Technology and Services (OICTS) have found that certain technologies originating from the PRC or Russia present an undue and unacceptable risk to U.S. national security. This action represents the culmination of a months-long regulatory process to design, seek public input on, and ultimately finalize a measure to protect drivers and passengers on American roads.
The final rule establishes that hardware and software integrated into the Vehicle Connectivity System (VCS) and software integrated into the Automated Driving System (ADS), the systems in vehicles that allow for external connectivity and autonomous driving capabilities, present an undue and unacceptable risk to national security when designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons with a sufficient nexus to the PRC or Russia. Malicious access to these critical supply chains could allow our foreign adversaries to extract sensitive data, including personal information about vehicle drivers or owners, and remotely manipulate vehicles.
At this time, given the complexity of the commercial vehicle supply chain, the final rule applies only to passenger vehicles (defined as those under 10,001 pounds). BIS recognizes the acute national security threat presented by foreign adversary involvement in the commercial vehicle supply chain and intends to issue a separate rulemaking addressing the technologies present in connected commercial vehicles – including in trucks and buses – in the near future.
This final rule prohibits the import of VCS hardware or connected vehicles containing such hardware, and the import and sale of vehicles containing VCS or ADS software, with a sufficient nexus to the PRC or Russia. VCS is defined as the set of systems that allow the vehicle to communicate externally, including telematics control units, Bluetooth, cellular, satellite, and Wi-Fi modules. ADS includes the components that collectively allow a highly autonomous vehicle to operate without a driver.
The rule also prohibits manufacturers with a sufficient nexus to the PRC or Russia from selling new connected vehicles that incorporate VCS hardware or software or ADS software in the United States, even if the vehicle was made in the United States.
The software-related prohibitions will take effect for Model Year 2027. The hardware-related prohibitions will take effect for Model Year 2030, or January 1, 2029, for units without a model year. Prohibitions on the sale of connected vehicles by manufacturers with a sufficient nexus to the PRC or Russia, even if manufactured in the United States, take effect for Model Year 2027.
The rule requires certain importers and manufacturers to submit annual Declarations of Conformity to certify their compliance with the prohibitions. The final rule allows Commerce to issue General Authorizations for certain types of transactions posing lower risk. It also allows regulated parties to seek Specific Authorizations permitting them to engage in otherwise prohibited transactions, as well as advisory opinions to ask BIS for a determination if a prospective transaction may fall within the scope of the rule.
The final rule follows a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) published by BIS on September 26, 2024, and an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) published by BIS on March 1, 2024.
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Commerce Strengthens Restrictions on Advanced Computing Semiconductors to Enhance Foundry Due Diligence and Prevent Diversion to PRC
January 15, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 5298: The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released two rules: one that updates export controls on advanced computing semiconductors, and another that places additional entities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Singapore on the Entity List.
These rule’s reinforce and build on the October 7, 2022, October 17, 2023, and December 2, 2024, controls to restrict the PRC’s ability to obtain certain high-end chips critical for military advantage. These updates are necessary to maintain the effectiveness of these controls, close loopholes, and ensure they remain durable.
Among other changes, the rules:
- Impose a broader license requirement for foundries and packaging companies seeking to export certain advanced chips, unless one of three conditions is met:
- The export is to a trusted “Approved” or “Authorized” integrated circuit (IC) designer, who attests that the chips fall below the relevant performance threshold;
- The chip is packaged by a front-end fabricator in a location outside of Macau or a destination in Country Group D:5 and the fabricator verifies the transistor count of the final chip; or
- The chip is packaged by an “Approved” outsourced semiconductor assembly and test services (OSAT) company that verifies the transistor count of the final chip.
- Create a process for new companies to be added to the list of Approved IC designers and OSATs.
- Improve reporting for transactions involving newer customers who may pose a heightened risk of diversion.
- Update other parts of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), including the recent AI Diffusion rule, to ensure that license exceptions are only available for transactions involving approved or authorized IC designers.
- Make technical corrections to the December 2 export controls, including to update the definition of “advanced-node integrated circuit” in § 772.1 for Dynamic Random-Access Memory (DRAM) chips.
- Add 16 entities to the Entity List, including AI companies like Sophgo Technologies Ltd., that are acting at the behest of Beijing to further the PRC’s goals of indigenous advanced chip production, which poses a risk to U.S. and allied national security.
These controls were crafted to mitigate the PRC’s efforts to obtain high-end advanced computing semiconductors necessary to enable the development and production of technologies such as AI used in military applications. Advanced AI capabilities – facilitated by supercomputing, built on advanced semiconductors – present U.S. national security concerns because they can be used to improve the speed and accuracy of military decision making, planning, and logistics. These capabilities may also be used for cognitive electronic warfare, radar, signals intelligence, jamming, and to support facial recognition surveillance systems for human rights violations and abuses.
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Commerce Implements New Controls to Address National Security Risks Related to Biotechnology
January 15, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 4612: The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released an Interim Final Rule (IFR) implementing targeted export controls on certain laboratory instruments. The United States recognizes that ensuring the responsible use of biotechnology, particularly when combined with advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and data science, is essential to safeguard public health, agriculture and food production, and the environment. At the same time, the United States needs to address the benefits and risks of biotechnology given the potential that its use, particularly when coupled with AI and biological design tools, could strengthen the military capabilities of countries of concern and pose threats to U.S. national security.
This IFR controls the following instruments:
- High-parameter and spectral flow cytometers and cell sorters, which are used to simultaneously measure multiple features of individual cells or particles, allowing scientists to rapidly produce large, high-information biological datasets.
- Certain liquid chromatography mass spectrometers (LC/MS) specially designed for proteomics, the study of all or a significant portion of proteins produced and/or modified by an organism to elucidate the interactions, function, composition, and structures of proteins and their cellular activities.
While this IFR imposes new license requirements for these instruments, license exceptions will be available for certain destinations. Exporters will also be required to file Electronic Export Information in the Automated Export System for certain exports.
This IFR, which takes immediate effect, is the latest step in the Biden administration’s ongoing efforts to address national security and foreign policy concerns related to critical technologies. BIS invites public comments on this IFR, which must be submitted no later than 60 days after the rule’s publication in the Federal Register. Information on submitting comments can be found in the “addresses” portion of the rule’s preamble.
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U.S. Census Bureau
Happy New Year 2025
January 1, 2025: This is a friendly reminder to ensure the Estimated Date of Export is reported with the correct year. To avoid the Automated Export System (AES) generating the Compliance Alert – Shipment Reported Late, please report the year 2025 for the current AES shipments.
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Schedule B and Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) Updated in the Automated Export System (AES)
January 2, 2025: Effective immediately, the Schedule B, Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS), and HTS Codes That Are Not Valid for AES tables have been updated to accept the changes to the January 1, 2025 codes.
AES will accept shipments with outdated codes during a grace period for 30 days beyond the expiration date of December 31, 2024. Reporting an outdated code after the 30-day grace period will result in a fatal error.
The ACE AESDirect program has been updated with the 2025 codes and will accept shipments with outdated codes during the grace period as well.
The 2025 Schedule B and HTS tables are available for downloading at:
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aes/concordance.html
The current list of HTS codes that are not valid for AES are available at:
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/aes/documentlibrary/concordance/hts-not-for-aes.txt
Editor’s note: It is best practice to validate your schedule B codes each January.
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Updates to the AES Commodity Filing Response Messages – Appendix A: Response Code 5C2/5C3
January 7, 2025: CSMS # 63644218 – Updates to the AES Commodity Filing Response Messages – Appendix A: Response Code 5C2/5C3
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) recently published the following updates to the Automated Export System Trade Interface Requirements – Appendix A:
Response Code: 5C2
Narrative Text: CAT XXI DETERMINATION NBR UNKNOWN
Severity: FATAL
Proprietary Record ID/Data Elements: Input ODT Record/DDTC Commodity Jurisdiction (CJ) Number
X.12 Segment ID/Data Elements: X117
Reason: The License Code/USML Category XXI Code declared is one that requires a DDTC Category XXI determination number on the ODT record either reported empty, unknown or the Date of Export is greater than the superseded date in AES.
Resolution: The DDTC Category XXI determination number reported on the ODT record must be a known value in AES. Verify, correct, and retransmit. If DDTC has advised your commodity export is classified in Category XXI, but you do not have a unique case number, you may contact the DDTC Response Team for assistance at ddtccustomerservice@state.gov or (202) 663-1282.
Response Code: 5C3
Narrative Text: DDTC USML CATEG 55 NOT ELIG FOR LIC TYPE
Severity: FATAL
Proprietary Record ID/Data Elements: Input CL1 Record/License Code/License Exemption Code; Input ODT Record/DDTC USML Category Code
X.12 Segment ID/Data Elements: X105; X107
Reason: The DDTC USML Category Code 55 (Articles Not Listed in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)), may not be used with License Code/License Exemption Code entered.
Resolution: When the DDTC USML Category Code 55 (Articles Not Listed in the International Traffic in Arms (ITAR)) is reported but is not available for use with the License Code/License Exemption Code entered. See ‘Appendix L- DDTC USML Category Codes’ to determine the category code to report.
For further assistance, contact the licensing agency. The Response Team at the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls can be reached for this purpose at 202-663-1282 or ddtccustomerservice@state.gov.
Editor’s note: In December, we advised that Census reported updates to the AES system for reporting items classified as USML XXI via a Commodity Jurisdiction determination issued by the Department of State, the only avenue for declaration of USML XXI on EEI filings. In order to use Category XXI, you must also list the CJ case number in the EEI record.
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Tips on How to Resolve AES Response Messages
January 21, 2025: When a shipment is filed to the AES, a system response message is generated and indicates whether the shipment has been accepted or rejected. If the shipment is accepted, the AES filer receives an Internal Transaction Number (ITN) as confirmation. Though the shipment is accepted, the filer may still receive a Verify Message, Compliance Alert, Informational Message or Warning Message along with their ITN. However, if the shipment is rejected, a Fatal Error notification is received and must be corrected to receive a valid ITN.
To help you take the appropriate action for the different AES Response Messages, here are some tips on how to address the most frequent messages that were generated in AES for this month.
Response Code: 303
Narrative: To Be Sold En Route Indicator Must be Y or N
Severity: Fatal
Reason: The Party Type is identified as Ultimate Consignee and the To Be Sold En Route Indicator is not reported as Yes or No.
Resolution: The Ultimate Consignee information must be declared on an EEI including a valid To Be Sold En Route Indicator. If the Ultimate Consignee is known and reported, set the To Be Sold En Route Indicator to No. If the cargo is to be sold en route and the Ultimate Consignee is not known at the time of export, then set the To Be Sold En Route Indicator to Yes.
Verify the Ultimate Consignee and the To Be Sold En Route Indicator, correct the shipment and resubmit.
Response Code: 505
Narrative: Value of Goods Contains Non-Numerics
Severity: Fatal
Reason: The Value of Goods reported contains non-numerics or spaces.
Resolution: The Value of Goods must be reported as numerics on the EEI.
Verify the Value of Goods, correct the shipment and resubmit.
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NEW BIS LICENSE TYPES C73 – License Exceptions Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA) and C74 Advanced Compute Manufacturing (ACM)
January 28, 2025: On Monday, January 13, 2025, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) put on public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register an interim final rule with an effective date of Monday, January 13, 2025 and a compliance date of May 15 for most provisions. The IFR was published in the Federal Register on Thursday, January 16 2024 (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion).
Among other actions, this interim final rule established new controls on advanced AI chips exceeding the technical thresholds in ECCN 3A090.a and also creates License Exceptions Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA) and Advanced Compute Manufacturing (ACM).
New License Code C73 (AIA)
An update has been made to AES to create new License Code C73 Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA) which authorizes the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) of eligible advanced computing chips and associated software and technology to entities located in a destination listed in paragraph (a) of supplement no. 5 to part 740 as long as they certify compliance with specific requirements provided in EAR 740.27.
The full terms of License Exception AIA are described in § 740.27.
AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C73 (AIA) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:
- Report License Code: C73 Artificial Intelligence Authorization (AIA)
- Allowable ECCNs: 3A001.z, 3A090.a, 3A090.z, 3D001, 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 4A090.a, 4A090.z, 4D001, 4D090, 4E001, 4E091, 5A002.z, 5A004.z, 5A992.z, 5D002.z, 5D992.z, 5E002, and 5E992
- Allowable countries: All Countries listed in Supplement 5 to part 740 (Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States)
- Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
- Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)
New License Code C74 (ACM)
An update has been made to AES to create new License Code C74 Advanced Compute Manufacturing (ACM) which authorizes the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of eligible items to a ‘private sector end user’ that is located in a destination not listed in Country Group D:5 or Macau, for the purposes of development, production, and storage of these chips, except for or in arms embargoed countries (D:5 and Macau).
The full terms of License Exception ACM are described in § 740.28.
AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C74 (ACM) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:
- Report License Code: C74 Advanced Compute Manufacturing (ACM)
- Allowable ECCNs: 3A001.z, 3A090, 3D001, 3E001, 4A003.z, 4A004.z, 4A005.z, 4A090, 4D001, 4D090, 4E001, 5A002.z, 5A004.z, 5A992.z, 5D002.z, 5D992.z, 5E002, and 5E992
- Allowable countries: All Countries except Macau and destinations listed in Country Group D:5
- Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
- Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)
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NEW BIS LICENSE TYPE C75 – (LPP) License Exception Low Processing Performance (LPP)
January 29, 2025: On Monday, January 13, 2025, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) put on public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register an interim final rule with an effective date of Monday, January 13, 2025 and a compliance date of May 15 for most provisions. The IFR was published in the Federal Register on Thursday, January 16, 2024 (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion ).
Among other actions, this interim final rule established new License Exception Low Processing Performance (LPP).
New License Code C75 (LPP)
An update has been made to AES to create new License Codes C75 “Low Processing Performance” (LPP), which authorizes certain export and reexport (no transfer (in-country) of specified items in § 740.29(b) of the EAR. Allows limited quantities of advanced ICs (i.e., quantities well below the amount necessary to train the most advanced AI models) to flow globally to ultimate consignees in destinations other than those of Country Group D:5 or Macau. The threshold for LLP exception has been set at 26,900,000 Total Processing Performance (TPPs) of ECCN 3A090.a, 4A090.a, and corresponding .z items per end user, per calendar year. This license exception is not available for exports or reexports made through distributors or for in country transfers. Ultimate consignees must notify BIS when they have reached the annual TPP allocation limit.
The full terms of License Exception LPP are described in § 740.29.
AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C75 (LPP) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:
- Report License Code: C75 Low Processing Performance (LPP)
- Allowable ECCNs: 3A001.z.1.a, z.2.a, z.3.a, z.4.a; 3A090.a; 4A003.z.1.a, z.2.a; 4A004.z.1; 4A005.z.1; 4A090.a; 5A004.z.1.a, z.2.a; and 5A992.z.1
- Allowable countries: All Countries except Macau and destinations listed in Country Group D:5 Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)
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NEW BIS LICENSE TYPES C76 – Universal Validated End User (UVEU) and C77 National Validated End User (NVEU)
January 29, 2025: On Monday, January 13, 2025, the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) put on public inspection at the Office of the Federal Register an interim final rule with an effective date of Monday, January 13, 2025 and a compliance date of May 16 for most provisions. The IFR is expected to publish in the Federal Register on Thursday, January 16, 2024 (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion). Among other actions, this interim final rule established new License Exceptions C76 Universal Validated End User (UVEU) and C77 National Validated End User (NVEU).
New License Code C76 (UVEU)
An update has been made to AES to create new License Codes C76 Universal Validated End User (UVEU) which provides the data centers that own their advanced computing capacity with a single authorization that will allow a UVEU to build DCs around the world, except in Macau or destinations specified in Country Group D:5, provided that the UVEU maintains its status by following the guidelines in supplement no. 10 to part 748. The UVEU is responsible for ensuring it complies with the applicable AI TPP geographic allocations. To receive UVEU status, a DC that owns its advanced computing capacity must certify that it will follow the guidelines outlined in supplement no. 10 to part 748 and go through an intensive application process. As previously noted, if the owner of the advanced compute cannot directly certify to all of the application information requested in § 748.15, it must include in its VEU application to BIS the identities of other entities involved in the DC operations.
The full terms of License Exception UVEU are described in § 748.15.
AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C76 (UVEU) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:
- Report License Code: C76 Universal Validated End User (UVEU)
- Allowable ECCNs: See Supplement 7 to part 748 for specific end users and ECCNs.
- Allowable countries: All Countries except D:5 and Macau
- Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
- Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)
New License Code C77 (NVEU)
An update has been made to AES to create new License Codes C77 National Validated End User (NVEU) which is available to all entities headquartered in or located in a destination in Country Groups A, B, or D:1-D:4, except Macau or destinations specified in Country Group D:5, as described in revised § 748.15(b)(2). New paragraph (a)(2)(iii) of § 748.15 describes the requirements to obtain an NVEU. In order to receive NVEU Authorization, a data center operator that owns its advanced computing capacity must apply to BIS and go through an intensive application process that will be subject to interagency review. Information required to be submitted to become a VEU is described in supplement no. 8 to part 748, some provisions of which are revised by this rule, including an update to paragraph (B)(2) of the supplement to require information about business activities and corporate relationships with government or military organizations in Macau and destinations specified Country Group D:5, e.g., direct sales to or contracts with such entities.
Approved applicants for the NVEU Authorization will be listed in the EAR as NVEUs in supplement no. 7 to part 748. This listing will serve to notify exporters and reexporters that the NVEU location can receive exports and reexports under this authorization. The NVEU may choose whether to list a corporate address or a physical address of the new data center location. NVEUs will be subject to the cumulative TPP allocations identified above.
The full terms of License Exception UVEU are described in § 748.15.
AES filers must adhere to the following new reporting when using C77 (NVEU) to prevent the return of fatal errors from AES:
- Report License Code: C77 National Validated End User (NVEU)
- Allowable ECCNs: All EXCEPT 600 series and ECCNs with a reason for control: Missile Technology and/or Crime Control
- Allowable countries: All Countries except D:5 and Macau
- Allowable Export Information Codes: All except UG
Allowable Modes of Transportation: All except ‘70’ (Fixed Transport)
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Implementation of the Census Bureau Voluntary Self-Disclosure (VSD) Form
January 30, 2025: In an effort to improve the Voluntary Self Disclosure (VSD) process, the Census Bureau’s Trade Regulations Branch (TRB) has piloted the use of a fillable VSD form since August 2024. TRB’s evaluation of the pilot has shown that the data received is more timely and complete, and allows for more efficient processing of VSDs. The feedback received from VSD submitters has been positive and TRB is implementing the use of the VSD Form on March 3, 2025.
The fillable VSD form will collect the following data required under Section 30.74 of the Foreign Trade Regulations:
- The kind of violation involved, for example, failure to file EEI, failure to correct fatal errors, failure to file timely corrections;
- Describe all data that was either not reported or reported incorrectly;
- An explanation of when and how the violations occurred;
- The complete identities and addresses of all individuals and entities, whether foreign or domestic, involved in the activities giving rise to the violations;
- If the party in violation was notified of the violation by any federal agency(ies);
- Were the exports subject to any export controls from federal agency(ies)?;
- A description of any mitigating factors;
- Corrective measures taken; and
- ITNs of the missed and/or corrected shipments.
The implementation of this fillable VSD form will allow companies to submit the necessary VSD information in a uniform format.
| LATEST SANCTIONS FINES & PENALTIES |
This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don’t let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.
Fines and Penalties
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
January 6, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 599: On May 30, 2024, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, Derby Clerfe (“Clerfe”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371. Specifically, Clerfe pled guilty to conspiring with others to export from the United States to Haiti nine handguns without the required licenses and without filing Electronic Export Information in the Automated Export System. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Clerfe to one year of probation. The Director of the Office of Export Enforcement has decided to deny Clerfe’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of two years from the date of Clerfe’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Clerfe had an interest at the time of his conviction.
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January 6, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 597: On February 16, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Joel Alejandro Garza-Corona (“Garza-Corona”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 554(a). Specifically, Garza-Corona was convicted of smuggling 2,399 rounds of assorted ammunition from the United States to Mexico without the required authorization from the U.S. Department of Commerce. As a result of his conviction, the court sentenced him to 40 months in prison. The Director of the Office of Export Enforcement decided to deny Garza-Corona’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of eight years from the date of Garza-Corona’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Garza-Corona had an interest at the time of his conviction.
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January 6, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 597: On September 6, 2023, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Eric Nana Kofi Ampong-Coker (“Ampong-Coker”) was convicted of violating 50 U.S.C. 4819. Specifically, Ampong-Coker was convicted of knowingly and willfully attempting to export one (1) SCCY Industries LL.C., Model CPX-2 9mm handgun; one (1) Mossberg 9mm handgun; one (1) Smith & Wesson 9mm handgun; one (1) FIS Product, Model XD-9 9mm handgun; and one (1) Sarsilmaz (Sar Arms), 9mm handgun, which weapons were designated under ECCN 0A501 from the United States to Ghana without the required licenses. As a result of his conviction, the court sentenced Among-Coker to 30 months in prison and two years of supervised release. The Director of the Office of Export Enforcement decided to deny Ampong-Coker’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Ampong-Coker’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Ampong-Coker had an interest at the time of his conviction.
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January 6, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 599: On June 11, 2024, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Daniel Ray Lane (“Lane”), was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. 371 and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C 1701, et seq.) (“IEEPA”). Specifically, Lane was convicted of conspiring to sell sanctioned Iranian petroleum/crude oil to a refinery in China. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Lane to 45 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release.
The Director of the Office of Export Enforcement decided to deny Lane’s export privileges under the Regulations for a period of 10 years from the date of Lane’s conviction. The Office of Exporter Services has also decided to revoke any BIS-issued licenses in which Lane had an interest at the time of his conviction.
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January 8, 2025: Nikolay Goltsev, 38, of Montreal, Canada, was sentenced to 40 months in prison for conspiring to commit export control violations. Goltsev masterminded a global procurement scheme on behalf of sanctioned Russian companies, including Russian military companies. Some of the electronic components shipped by Goltsev were later found in seized Russian weapons platforms and signals intelligence equipment in Ukraine.
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January 17, 2025: As part of a coordinated enforcement effort, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed approximately $2.5 million in combined civil penalties against Haas Automation, Inc. (Haas) for alleged and apparent violations of U.S. export controls and sanctions laws, including illegal shipments of Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machine parts to Entity-Listed parties in Russia and China. The transactions charged by BIS involved parties that were added to the Entity List for supporting the defense sectors of China or Russia.
As part of a settlement agreement with Haas, BIS issued an order imposing an administrative penalty of $1.5 million, as well as an ongoing audit and reporting requirement. In addition to the BIS penalty, Haas entered a corresponding settlement with OFAC whereby Haas agreed to a $1,044,781 civil penalty to resolve apparent violations of OFAC’s sanctions regulations involving Russia and Ukraine.
Headquartered in Oxnard, California, Haas is a privately held manufacturer of machine tools and related parts, including CNC vertical and horizontal machining centers and CNC lathes. CNC machines and parts have a wide range of potential applications, including uses across the electronics, transportation, oil and gas, aerospace, marine, and military and defense industries.
On 32 occasions between April 2019 and March 2024, Haas violated the EAR by selling CNC machine parts designated as EAR99, through Haas’s authorized distributors, for export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to defense sector parties that were on the BIS Entity List in China, including Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (also known as Beihang University), Shandong Institute of Space Electronic Technology, and China Electronics Technology Group Corporation 14th Research Institute (CETC 14). Additionally, Haas violated the EAR by making nine sales to two defense sector parties on the Entity List in Russia—DJSC Factory Krasnoe Znamya and JSC LEMZ R&P Corporation—between January 2020 and November 2021.
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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
January 16, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced a $1,076,923 settlement with a Miami, Florida-based natural U.S. person and their real estate company Family International Realty LLC regarding their potential civil liability for apparent violations of OFAC’s Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions. Between 2018 and 2023, Family International Realty and its owner engaged in a willful scheme to evade OFAC sanctions by concealing the property interest of two sanctioned Russian oligarchs in luxury condominiums and profiting from the rental and sale of the properties, thereby committing 73 apparent violations of Executive Order 13685. The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that the conduct at issue was egregious and was not voluntarily self-disclosed.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933941/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250116
Sanctions
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
January 6, 2025: 90. Fed. Reg. 559: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 13 entities under 13 entries to the Entity List. These entries are listed on the Entity List under the destinations of Burma (1), China, People’s Republic of (China) (11), and Pakistan (1). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security and/or foreign policy interests of the United States. This rule also amends the EAR by making certain editorial corrections and clarifications. BIS is making the corrections and clarifications in order to minimize confusion and not impede the free flow of commerce.
The following Entities have been added:
Burma:
- Telecom International Myanmar Company Limited.
China:
- Chengdu RML Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Chengdu Yaguang Electronics Co., Ltd.;
- Chinese Academy of Sciences Changchun Institute of Optics, Fine Mechanics, and Physics;
- Hefei Starwave Communication Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Ji Hua Laboratory;
- Nanjing Simite Optical Instruments Co., Ltd.;
- Peng Cheng Laboratory;
- Shanghai Institute of Optics and Fine Mechanics;
- Suzhou Ultranano Precision Optoelectronics Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Wuhu Kewei Zhaofu Electronics Co., Ltd.; and
- Yaguang Technology Group Co., Ltd.
Pakistan:
- Emerging Future Solutions Private Limited.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/06/2024-31468/revisions-to-the-entity-list and
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January 16, 2025: 90 Fed. Reg. 4617: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 11 entities under 11 entries to the Entity List. These entries are listed on the Entity List under the destination of China, People’s Republic of (China) (11). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security and/or foreign policy interests of the United States. This rule also revises one existing entry on the Entity List under the destination of India.
China:
- Beijing Keyi Hongyuan Optoelectronics Co., Ltd.;
- Beijing Lingxin Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Beijing Yuanyin Intelligent Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Beijing Zhipu Future Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Beijing Zhipu Huazhang Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Beijing Zhipu Linghang Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Beijing Zhipu Qingyan Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Hangzhou Zhipu Huazhang Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Nanjing Zhihu Information Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Shanghai Zhipu Huanyu Technology Co., Ltd.; and
- Shenzhen Zhipu Future Technology Co., Ltd.
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January 16, 2024: 90. Fed. Reg. 4621: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amended the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding 16 entities to the Entity List, under the destinations of China, People’s Republic of (China) (14) and Singapore (2). These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
China:
- Chengdu Suanze Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Fujian Sophon Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Fujian Suanxin Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Jiangsu Suanxin Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Qingdao Sophgo Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Quliang Electronics Co., Ltd.;
- Shanghai Suanhu Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Sophgo Technologies Ltd.;
- Sophon Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd.;
- Suanli (Fujian) Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Tianjin Shunhua Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Wuhan Suanneng Technology Co., Ltd.;
- Wuxi Suanneng Technology Co., Ltd.; and
- Xiamen Sophgo Technologies Limited.
Singapore:
- Sophgo Technologies Pte.
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/16/2025-00480/additions-to-the-entity-list
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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
January 3, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Integrity Technology Group, Incorporated (Integrity Tech), a Beijing-based cybersecurity company, for its role in multiple computer intrusion incidents against U.S. victims. These incidents have been publicly attributed to Flax Typhoon, a Chinese malicious state-sponsored cyber group that has been active since at least 2021, often targeting organizations within U.S. critical infrastructure sectors.
Chinese malicious cyber actors continue to be one of the most active and most persistent threats to U.S. national security, as highlighted in the most recent Office of the Director of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment. These actors continue to target U.S. government systems as part of their efforts, including the recent targeting of Treasury’s own IT infrastructure.
The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Integrity Technology Group, Incorporated of China.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2769 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250103
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January 6, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Syria General License (GL) 24 to expand authorizations for activities and transactions in Syria following December 8, 2024. This action underscores the United States’ commitment to ensuring that U.S. sanctions do not impede activities to meet basic human needs, including the provision of public services or humanitarian assistance. This authorization is for six months, as the U.S. government continues to monitor the evolving situation on the ground.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 24: “Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances”
(a) The following transactions that are prohibited by the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 542 (SySR), the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), or the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 597 (FTOSR) are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, July 7, 2025:
(1) transactions with governing institutions in Syria following December 8, 2024;
(2) transactions in support of the sale, supply, storage, or donation of energy, including petroleum, petroleum products, natural gas, and electricity, to or within Syria; and
(3) transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to processing the transfer of noncommercial, personal remittances to Syria, including through the Central Bank of Syria.
Additionally, OFAC has also issued eight new Syria Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 1205 – 1212).
Syria FAQ 1205:
Q: What is the purpose of Syria General License (GL) 24 (“Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances”) and what does it authorize?
A: GL 24 is intended to ensure that sanctions do not impede essential governance-related services in Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad on December 8, 2024, including for the provision of public services or certain transactions related to energy or personal remittances. GL 24 complements OFAC’s existing humanitarian-related authorizations by authorizing the following transactions, with some conditions and exceptions, through July 7, 2025:
- transactions with governing institutions in Syria following December 8, 2024;
- transactions in support of the sale, supply, storage, or donation of energy, including petroleum, petroleum products, natural gas, and electricity, to or within Syria; and
- transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to processing the transfer of noncommercial, personal remittances to Syria, including through the Central Bank of Syria.
GL 24 authorizes the foregoing under the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR), the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR), and the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (FTOSR). It does not relieve any person from compliance with other Federal laws or regulations, including the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) or the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) administered by the Department of Commerce.
Syria FAQ 1206:
Q: What Syrian entities are included in the scope of “governing institutions” for the purposes of Syria General License (GL) 24 (“Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances”)?
A: Syrian governing institutions include departments, agencies, and government-run public service providers (including public hospitals, schools, and utilities) at the federal, regional, or local level in Syria following December 8, 2024, including entities involved with Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) across all geographic areas of Syria.
GL 24 does not authorize transactions involving military or intelligence entities, or any persons acting on behalf of such entities.
Syria FAQ 1207:
Q: What types of transactions are included in the authorization related to Syrian governing institutions in Syria General License (GL) 24 (“Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances”)?
A: GL 24 authorizes transactions under the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR), the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR), and the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (FTOSR).
GL 24 generally authorizes the following transactions, with the exclusion of military or intelligence entities or those acting for or on their behalf:
- providing services to, or paying for services received from, Syrian governing institutions, such as the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, or the Ministry of Water Resources, even if the ministry or leadership of the institution is blocked;
- payment of taxes, fees, or import duties to Syrian governing institutions, even if the ministry or leadership is blocked;
- purchase or receipt of permits, licenses, public utility services, or other public services;
- payment of salaries or wages to employees of governing institutions in Syria, provided such employees are not designated on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List); and
- negotiating contracts or other agreements with Syrian governing institutions.
Syria FAQ 1208:
Q: Does Syria General License (GL) 24 (“Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances”) authorize activities and transactions with a governing institution in Syria run by or led by a designated person?
A: Yes. GL 24 authorizes transactions with governing institutions in Syria, with some conditions and exceptions, through July 7, 2025, even if a designated individual has a leadership role in that governing institution.
For example, if a company engaging in otherwise authorized activity needs to make a customs payment to a governing institution led by a blocked individual following December 8, 2024, that payment is authorized.
Syria FAQ 1209:
Q: Even after the issuance of Syria General License (GL) 24 (“Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances”), may I still rely on existing sanctions authorizations for the provision of humanitarian aid?
A: Yes. The authorization in GL 24 may overlap with the authorizations in existing GLs issued under the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR), the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR), and the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (FTOSR), including:
- transactions in support of certain nongovernmental organizations’ activities (31 CFR §§ 594.520; 597.516; 542.516);
- official business of the U.S. Government (31 CFR §§ 594.518; 597.514; 542.522);
- official business of certain international organizations (31 CFR §§ 594.519; 597.515; 542.513); and
- activities in certain economic sectors in specified areas of northeast and northwest Syria (31 CFR § 542.533).
OFAC general licenses are “self-executing,” meaning that persons who determine that certain activities are authorized under a GL may proceed without further assurance from OFAC. Where multiple authorizations may apply, U.S. persons may rely on the broadest applicable authorization.
With respect to transactions in support of certain nongovernmental organizations’ activities, U.S. depository institutions, U.S. registered brokers or dealers in securities, and U.S. registered money transmitters can process such transactions and may rely on the statements of their customers that such transactions are authorized unless they know or have reason to know a transaction is not authorized. For more information, including an overview of authorized humanitarian activities in addition to GL 24, please review FAQs 231 and 938, and the OFAC Syria Compliance Communique.
Syria FAQ 1210:
Q: Does Syria General License (GL) 24 (“Authorizing Transactions with Governing Institutions in Syria and Certain Transactions Related to Energy and Personal Remittances”) remove the restrictions placed on Syria under the State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) designation?
A: No. SST restrictions on Syria remain in place.
Syria FAQ 1211:
Q: Can foreign governments or companies donate or provide subsidized fuel to Syria without facing exposure to U.S. sanctions?
A: Yes. Syria General License (GL) 24 authorizes transactions in support of the sale, supply, storage, or donation of energy, including petroleum, petroleum products, natural gas, and electricity, to or within Syria. This may include, for example, the donation of gasoline to Syrian refineries, and power plants.
However, authorizations for this activity under the general license do not relieve persons from compliance with any other laws or requirements of other federal agencies or international organizations. For example, the export or reexport of petroleum, petroleum products, natural gas, and other commodities to Syria may require additional authorization from the Department of Commerce if such items are U.S.-origin or otherwise subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).
Syria FAQ 1212:
Q: Are international organizations and nongovernmental organizations authorized to conduct transitional justice activities in Syria?
A: Yes. Activities to support the rule of law, accountability, and transparency are broadly authorized under the Syrian Sanctions Regulations (SySR), the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR), and the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (FTOSR), including transactions in support of certain nongovernmental (NGO) activities (31 CFR §§ 594.520; 597.516; 542.516), official business of the U.S. Government (31 CFR §§ 594.518; 597.514; 542.522), and official business of certain international organizations (31 CFR §§ 594.519; 597.515; 542.513) by employees, grantees, or contractors thereof.
For example, the NGO activities general licenses authorize transactions in support of activities to support democracy building, including activities to support rule of law, citizen participation, government accountability and transparency, human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to information, and civil society development projects; and activities to support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs and peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and conflict resolution programs.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2770 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933861/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/added/2025-01-06
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January 7, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Mohammad Hamdan Daglo Mousa (Hemedti), the leader of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), under Executive Order (E.O.) 14098, “Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons Destabilizing Sudan and Undermining the Goal of a Democratic Transition.” For nearly two years, Hemedti’s RSF has engaged in a brutal armed conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces for control of Sudan, killing tens of thousands, displacing 12 million Sudanese, and triggering widespread starvation.
In addition, OFAC sanctioned seven companies, and one individual linked to the RSF. The RSF’s ability to acquire military equipment and generate finances continue to fuel the conflict in Sudan. Capital Tap Holding L.L.C. (Capital Tap Holding), based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has provided money and weapons to the RSF.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Ahmmed, Abu Dharr Abdul Nabi Habiballa of the United Arab Emirates; and
- Mousa, Mohammed Hamdan Daglo of Sudan.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Al Jil Alqadem General Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
- Al Zumoroud And Al Yaqoot Gold and Jewellers Trading of the United Arab Emirates;
- Capital Tap General Trading L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
- Capital Tap Holding L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
- Capital Tap Management and Consultancies L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates;
- Creative Python L.L.C. of the United Arab Emirates; and
- Horizon Advanced Solutions General Trading – Sole Proprietorship L.L.C of the United Arab Emirates.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250107 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions
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January 7, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Antal Rogan, a senior Hungarian government official, for his involvement in corruption in Hungary. He is being designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world.
The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued Russia-related General License 13L, “Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024.”
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 13L: “Authorizing Certain Administrative Transactions Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024”
(a) U.S. persons, or entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a U.S. person, are authorized to pay taxes, fees, or import duties, and purchase or receive permits, licenses, registrations, certifications, or tax refunds to the extent such transactions are prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 14024, Prohibitions Related to Transactions Involving the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the National Wealth Fund of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, provided such transactions are ordinarily incident and necessary to the day-to-day operations in the Russian Federation of such U.S. persons or entities, through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 9, 2025.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Rogan, Antal of Hungary.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250107 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2773 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933871/download?inline
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January 10, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury took sweeping action to fulfill the G7 commitment to reduce Russian revenues from energy, including blocking two major Russian oil producers. This action also imposes sanctions on an unprecedented number of oil-carrying vessels, many of which are part of the “shadow fleet,” opaque traders of Russian oil, Russia-based oilfield service providers, and Russian energy officials. This action is underpinned by the issuance of a new determination that authorizes sanctions pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 against persons operating or having operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy. These actions substantially increase the sanctions risks associated with the Russian oil trade.
Please see full list of sanctioned individuals, entities, and vessels at the link below.
OFAC has also issued Russia-related General License 8L, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Related to Energy;” Russia-related General License 115A, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Civil Nuclear Energy;” Russia-related General License 117, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegas, and Certain Additional Entities Blocked on January 10, 2025;” Russia-related General License 118, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegas, and Certain Additional Entities Blocked on January 10, 2025;” Russia-related General License 119, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Public Joint Stock Company Gazprom Neft Related to Diplomatic and Consular Mission Operations Outside of the Russian Federation;” Russia-related General License 120, “Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions and the Unloading of Cargo Involving Certain Persons or Vessels Blocked on January 10, 2025;” Russia-related General License 121, “Authorizing Petroleum Services Related to Certain Projects;” and Russia-/Ukraine-related General License 26, “Transactions Authorized Pursuant to the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations.”
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 8L: Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Related to Energy
(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 involving one or more of the following entities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction related to energy are authorized, through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 12, 2025:
(1) State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs Vnesheconombank;
(2) Public Joint Stock Company Bank Financial Corporation Otkritie;
(3) Sovcombank Open Joint Stock Company;
(4) Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia;
(5) VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company;
(6) Joint Stock Company Alfa-Bank;
(7) Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank;
(8) Bank Zenit Public Joint Stock Company;
(9) Bank Saint-Petersburg Public Joint Stock Company;
(10) National Clearing Center (NCC);
(11) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest; or
(12) the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
(b) For the purposes of this general license, the term “related to energy” means the extraction, production, refinement, liquefaction, gasification, regasification, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, transport, or purchase of petroleum, including crude oil, lease condensates, unfinished oils, natural gas liquids, petroleum products, natural gas, or other products capable of producing energy, such as coal, wood, or agricultural products used to manufacture biofuels, or uranium in any form, as well as the development, production, generation, transmission, or exchange of power, through any means, including nuclear, thermal, and renewable energy sources.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 115A: Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Civil Nuclear Energy
(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 involving one or more of the following entities that are related to civil nuclear energy are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 30, 2025:
(1) Gazpombank Joint Stock Company;
(2) State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs Vnesheconombank;
(3) Public Joint Stock Company Bank Financial Corporation Otkritie;
(4) Sovcombank Open Joint Stock Company;
(5) Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia;
(6) VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company;
(7) Joint Stock Company Alfa-Bank;
(8) Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank;
(9) Bank Zenit Public Joint Stock Company;
(10) Bank Saint-Petersburg Public Joint Stock Company;
(11) National Clearing Center (NCC);
(12) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest; or
(13) the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
(b) For the purposes of this general license, the term “related to civil nuclear energy” means transactions undertaken solely to maintain or support civil nuclear projects initiated before November 21, 2024.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 117: Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegas, and Certain Additional Entities Blocked on January 10, 2025
(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving one or more of the blocked entities listed in the Annex to this general license, or any entity in which those blocked entities own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 27, 2025, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 118: Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Gazprom Neft, Surgutneftegas, and Certain Additional Entities Blocked on January 10, 2025
(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or the facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity issued or guaranteed by the following blocked entities (“Covered Debt or Equity”) to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 27, 2025:
(1) Ingosstrakh Insurance Company;
(2) Limited Liability Company Plant for the Production of Propeller Steering Columns Sapphire;
(3) Open Joint Stock Company Volzhsky Abrasive;
(4) Public Joint Stock Company Gazprom Neft;
(5) Surgutneftegas; or
(6) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.
(b) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of Covered Debt or Equity that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, January 10, 2025 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 27, 2025.
(c) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, January 10, 2025 that (i) include a blocked person described in paragraph (a) of this general license as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to Covered Debt or Equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 27, 2025, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 119: Authorizing Certain Transactions Involving Public Joint Stock Company Gazprom Neft Related to Diplomatic and Consular Mission Operations Outside of the Russian Federation
(a) all transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the official business of diplomatic or consular missions located outside of the Russian Federation and involving Public Joint Stock Company Gazprom Neft (Gazprom Neft), or any entity in which Gazprom Neft owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time February 27, 2025.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 120: Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions and the Unloading of Cargo Involving Certain Persons or Vessels Blocked on January 10, 2025
(a) all transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one or more of the following activities involving the blocked persons listed in the Annex to this general license, and any entity in which those blocked persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 27, 2025, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):
(1) The safe docking and anchoring in port of any vessels in which any person listed in the Annex to this general license has a property interest (the “blocked vessels”);
(2) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; or (
3) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.
(b) all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the delivery and offloading of cargo involving the blocked persons listed in the Annex to this general license are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 27, 2025, provided that the cargo was loaded prior to January 10, 2025.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 121: Authorizing Petroleum Services Related to Certain Projects
(a) all transactions prohibited by the determination of January 10, 2025 made pursuant to section 1(a)(ii) of Executive Order 14071 (“Prohibition on Petroleum Services”) that are related to the projects listed below are authorized until 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time June 28, 2025:
(1) Caspian Pipeline Consortium;
(2) Tengizchevroil; or
(3) Sakhalin-2.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 26: Transactions Authorized Pursuant to the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations
(a) all transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13662 involving one or more blocked persons listed in the Annex to this general license, or any entity in which those blocked persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are authorized or exempt under the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions authorized by a general or specific license, are authorized.
Furthermore, OFAC has issued five new, Russia-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 1213 – 1217)
FAQ 1213:
Q: For the purposes of the determination of January 10, 2025 made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 (the “January 2025 Energy Sector Determination”), what is meant by the term “energy sector of the Russian Federation economy”?
A: On January 10, 2025, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, issued a determination pursuant to E.O. 14024 that authorizes the imposition of economic sanctions on any person determined to operate or have operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy. For purposes of the January 2025 Energy Sector Determination, OFAC anticipates publishing regulations defining the term “energy sector of the Russian Federation economy” to include activities such as the procurement, exploration, extraction, drilling, mining, harvesting, production, refinement, liquefaction, gasification, regasification, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, manufacturing, testing, financing, distribution, purchase or transport to, from, or involving the Russian Federation, of petroleum, including crude oil, lease condensates, unfinished oils, natural gas, liquefied natural gas, natural gas liquids, or petroleum products, or other products capable of producing energy, such as coal, wood, or agricultural products used to manufacture biofuels; the development, production, testing, generation, transmission, financing, or exchange of power, through any means, including nuclear, electrical, thermal, and renewable, to, from, or involving the Russian Federation; and any related activities, including the provision or receipt of goods, services, or technology to, from, or involving the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy.
This definition is similar to the energy sector definition set forth under the Ukraine-/Russia-Related sanctions in 31 CFR 589.311 but includes additional language identifying specific activities and petroleum products, reflecting developments since the Department of the Treasury issued a determination pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order 13662 on July 16, 2014. OFAC intends to update the SDN List to reflect whether persons have been designated pursuant to E.O. 14024, E.O. 13662, or both.
FAQ 1214:
Q: Does the determination of January 10, 2025, made pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 (the “January 2025 Energy Sector Determination”) mean that all persons that operate or have operated in this sector of the Russian Federation economy are sanctioned by OFAC?
A: No. On January 10, 2025, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, issued a determination pursuant to E.O. 14024 that authorizes the imposition of economic sanctions on any person determined to operate or have operated in the energy sector of the Russian Federation economy.
A sector determination pursuant to E.O. 14024 exposes persons that operate or have operated in an identified sector to sanctions risk; however, a sector determination does not automatically impose sanctions on all persons who operate or have operated in the sector.
FAQ 1215:
Q: Why did OFAC issue General License (GL) 26 (“Transactions Authorized Pursuant to the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations”) in the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 589 (URSR)?
A: GL 26 applies to transactions involving specified persons identified in the Annex to GL 26, who are designated under both the URSR and the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR). The purpose of GL 26 is to ensure that transactions authorized or exempt under the RuHSR, including transactions authorized by a general or specific license, that involve those specified persons are also authorized under the URSR, to the extent such transactions are prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13662. However, GL 26 does not authorize any transaction prohibited by a directive issued pursuant to E.O. 13662, as incorporated into sections 589.202 through 589.205 of the URSR, or any transaction involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR or the URSR other than the specified persons, unless separately authorized.
FAQ 1216:
Q: What action did Treasury take on January 10, 2025 with regard to the provision of petroleum services to Russia?
A: In line with G7 efforts to reduce Russian revenues from energy, on January 10, 2025, Treasury issued a determination pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 prohibiting petroleum services to Russia. See The Determination Pursuant to Sections 1(a)(ii), 1(b), and 5 of E.O. 14071, Prohibition on Petroleum Services (“the Petroleum Services Determination”). This determination prohibits the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, to any person located in the Russian Federation of petroleum services. The Petroleum Services Determination will take effect at 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on February 27, 2025. See FAQ 1217 for additional information.
OFAC expects to issue regulations defining petroleum services to include services related to the exploration, drilling, well completion, production, refining, processing, storage, maintenance, transportation, purchase, acquisition, testing, inspection, transfer, sale, trade, distribution, or marketing of petroleum, including crude oil and petroleum products, as well as any activities that contribute to Russia’s ability to develop its domestic petroleum resources, or the maintenance or expansion of Russia’s domestic production and refining. This would include services related to natural gas as a byproduct of oil production in Russia.
Concurrently, OFAC issued GL 121 to authorize any petroleum services that would otherwise be prohibited by the Petroleum Services Determination related to the operations of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Sakhalin II, or Tengizchevroil, (2) any petroleum services related to isotopes derived from petroleum manufacturing that are used for medical, agricultural, or environmental purposes, such as Carbon-13; (3) certain covered services related to the maritime transport of crude oil and petroleum products of Russian Federation origin purchased at or below the relevant price cap; and (4) any service in connection with the wind down or divestiture of an entity located in the Russian Federation that is not owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a Russian person. See FAQ 1217 for additional information related to price cap related exclusions of the Petroleum Services Determination.
FAQ 1217:
Q: I am a U.S. service provider. Following the January 10, 2025 determinations under Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 and E.O. 14071 (the Energy Sector Determination and Petroleum Services Determination, respectively), am I still authorized to provide certain services relating to the maritime transport of Russian crude oil and Russian petroleum products to a non-sanctioned person operating in the energy sector of the Russian economy, so long as the crude oil or petroleum products are purchased at or below the price cap?
A: Yes, as long as the provision of services does not involve an entity blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024 and is not otherwise prohibited by OFAC sanctions. The price cap policy does not authorize transactions otherwise prohibited by the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the RuHSR, unless separately authorized. For more information on the price cap policy, please see OFAC’s price cap policy guidance.
See FAQ 1216 for more information on The Determination Pursuant to Sections 1(a)(ii), 1(b), and 5 of E.O. 14071, Prohibition on Petroleum Services. See FAQs 1213 and 1214 for more information on the January 2025 Energy Sector Determination, issued pursuant to E.O. 14024.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933926/download?inline
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2777
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933791/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933881/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933771/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933776/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933781/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933786/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933886/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933891/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/added/2025-01-10
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January 10, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned eight Venezuelan officials who lead key economic and security agencies enabling Nicolas Maduro’s repression and subversion of democracy in Venezuela. The individuals sanctioned, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13692, as amended, include the president of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., (PdVSA), Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, and Maduro’s Minister of Transportation and president of the Venezuelan Consortium of Aeronautical Industries and Air Services (CONVIASA), the state-owned airline. In addition, OFAC sanctioned high-level Venezuelan officials in the military and police who lead entities with roles in carrying out Maduro’s repression and human rights abuses against democratic actors.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Castillo Rengifo, Manuel Enrique of Venezuela;
- Ferrer Sandrea, Danny Ramon of Venezuela;
- Figuera Valdez, Jose Ramon of Venezuela;
- Obregon Perez, Hector Andres of Venezuela;
- Osorio Guzman, Felix Ramon of Venezuela;
- Rico Gonzalez, Douglas Arnoldo of Venezuela;
- Salazar Bello, Jhonny Rafael of Venezuela; and
- Velasquez Araguayan, Ramon Celestino of Venezuela.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2778 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250110
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January 15, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury moved against Russian efforts to evade U.S. sanctions. This action targets a sanctions evasion scheme established between actors in Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to facilitate cross-border payments for sensitive goods. In addition, Treasury designated a Kyrgyz Republic-based financial institution that coordinated with Russian officials and a U.S.-designated bank to implement a sanctions evasion scheme.
Treasury also reinforced the grave risks foreign persons face in continuing to work with Russia’s military-industrial complex by re-designating pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13662 almost 100 entities already designated pursuant to E.O. 14024. As a result of these entities’ designation pursuant to E.O. 13662, foreign persons, including foreign financial institutions, that knowingly facilitate significant transactions for or on behalf of any of these entities could be subject to mandatory secondary sanctions under the Ukraine-/Russia-related sanctions program.
The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has amended its regulations to implement for 2025 the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as amended by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015. This regulatory amendment adjusts for inflation the maximum amount of the civil monetary penalties that may be assessed under relevant OFAC regulations. The regulatory amendment is published in the Federal Register and is effective as of January 15, 2025.
OFAC also has issued Russia-related General License 122, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on January 15, 2025;” Russia-related General License 123, “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Wafangdian Bearing Company Limited;” and Russia-/Ukraine-related General License 26A, “Transactions Authorized Pursuant to the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations.”
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 122: “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Entities Blocked on January 15, 2025”
(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving one or more of the following blocked entities are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 1, 2025, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR):
(1) Haucore Ltd;
(2) Limited Liability Company Management Metallurgical Company Steel;
(3) Mining And Chemical Complex Federal State Unitary Enterprise;
(4) OJSC Keremet Bank;
(5) Oke Precision Cutting Tools Co Ltd;
(6) Public Joint Stock Company Nadezhdinskiy Metallurgicheskiy Zavod;
(7) Star Rapid Manufacturing Co Ltd;
(8) Wafangdian Bearing Company Limited; or
(9) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 123: “Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Wafangdian Bearing Company Limited”
(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or the facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity issued or guaranteed by Wafangdian Bearing Company Limited (Wafangdian), or any entity in which Wafangdian owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, (“Covered Debt or Equity”) to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 1, 2025.
(b) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of Covered Debt or Equity that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, January 15, 2025 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 1, 2025.
(c) All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, January 15, 2025 that (i) include a blocked person described in paragraph (a) of this general license as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to Covered Debt or Equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 1, 2025, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 26A: “Transactions Authorized Pursuant to the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations”
(a) All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 13662 involving one or more blocked persons listed in the Annex to this general license, or any entity in which those blocked persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest, that are authorized or exempt under the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR), including transactions authorized by a general or specific license, are authorized.
Please see link below for full list of sanctioned entities and individuals,
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2785 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933936/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933916/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933921/download?inline
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933911/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250115
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January 16, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan (Burhan), the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), under Executive Order (E.O.) 14098, “Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons Destabilizing Sudan and Undermining the Goal of a Democratic Transition.” This action follows the designation of the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Mohammad Hamdan Daglo Mousa (Hemedti), on January 7, 2025. In addition, OFAC is one company and one individual involved in weapons procurement on behalf of the Defense Industries System (DIS), a procurement arm of the SAF that OFAC sanctioned in June 2023.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Abdalla, Ahmed of the United Arab Emirates; and
- Al-burhan, Abdel Fattah of Sudan.
The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Portex Trade Limited of China.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2789
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January 16, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two individuals and four entities for generating illicit revenue for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) government.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Jong, In Chol of Laos; and
- Son, Syong Sik of China.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Chonsurim Trading Corporation of North Korea;
- Department 53 of the Ministry of The Peoples Armed Forces of North Korea;
- Korea Osong Shipping Corporation; and
- Liaoning China Trade Industry Co., Ltd.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2790
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January 16, 2025: The President signed a new Executive Order (E.O.), “Taking Additional Steps with Respect to the Situation in Syria.” The President also signed another new E.O., “Strengthening and Promoting Innovation in the Nation’s Cybersecurity.”
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933951/download?inline and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933946/download?inline
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January 17, 2025: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated five individuals and one entity that facilitate Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik (Dodik) and his family’s efforts to enrich themselves at the public’s expense. This action also targets eight individuals who, at Dodik’s direction, organized and executed the commemoration of “Republika Srpska Day” (RS Day) in January 2024, in contravention to the principles of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) and which the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Constitutional Court (CC) ruled unconstitutional.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Bojanic, Radmila of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Corovic, Pavle of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Dodik, Sinsia of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Gujanicic, Marko of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and
- Reljin, Nemanja of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- SEE MEDIA RESEARCH LTD of Cyprus.
https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20250117 and
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2793
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January 17, 2025: The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Yin Kecheng, a Shanghai-based cyber actor who was involved with the recent Department of the Treasury network compromise. Additionally, OFAC sanctioned Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Co., LTD., a Sichuan-based cybersecurity company with direct involvement in the Salt Typhoon cyber group, which recently compromised the network infrastructure of multiple major U.S. telecommunication and internet service provider companies. People’s Republic of China-linked (PRC) malicious cyber actors continue to target U.S. government systems, including the recent targeting of Treasury’s information technology (IT) systems, as well as sensitive U.S. critical infrastructure. As highlighted in the most recent Office of the Director of National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment, Chinese state-backed cyber actors continue to present some of the greatest and most persistent threats to U.S. national security.
The following individual has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Yin, Kecheng of China.
The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
- Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Co., Ltd. of China.
OFAC has issued Counter Terrorism General License 32, “Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Yemen Kuwait Bank for Trade and Investment Y.S.C.”
GENERAL LICENSE NO. 32: Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Yemen Kuwait Bank for Trade and Investment Y.S.C
(a) All transactions prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving Yemen Kuwait Bank for Trade and Investment Y.S.C (Yemen Kuwait Bank), or any entity in which Yemen Kuwait Bank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 16, 2025, provided that any payment to a blocked person is made into a blocked account in accordance with the GTSR.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2792 and
https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/933961/download?inline
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January 24, 2025: On January 20, 2025, the President signed a new Executive Order (E.O.), “Initial Rescissions Of Harmful Executive Orders And Actions,” which, among other actions, revoked E.O. 14115, “Imposing Certain Sanctions on Persons Undermining Peace, Security, and Stability in the West Bank.” To implement the President’s revocation of E.O. 14115, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) removed the West Bank-Related Sanctions program from its website and removed all persons designated under E.O. 14115 from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List). All property and interests in property blocked under E.O. 14115 are unblocked.