This newsletter is a listing of the latest changes in export control regulations through December 31, 2022. The newsletter is provided as a complimentary service to assist exporters with their ITAR and EAR export compliance responsibilities. It provides a summary of recent changes to export control regulations or other regulatory matters of interest that may impact your company’s international trade and export compliance functions. Call us at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net with questions or comments.
See also our “Latest Sanctions Fines & Penalties” section below for an update on companies and
persons denied export privileges by the United States Government.
REGULATORY UPDATES
The President
President Biden Continued The National Emergency With Respect To Global Illicit Drug Trafficking
December 14, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 76549: In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14059 of December 15, 2021, with respect to global illicit drug trafficking.
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President Biden Continued The National Emergency With Respect To Serious Human Rights Abuse And Corruption
December 14, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 76547: - In accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), President Biden has continued for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13818 of December 20, 2017, with respect to serious human rights abuse and corruption.
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U.S. Department Of Commerce, Bureau Of Industry and Security
The U.S. Department Of Commerce, Bureau Of Industry and Security Requested Comments On Areas And Priorities For U.S. And Japan Export Control Cooperation
December 1, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 73748: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) requested public comments regarding areas and priorities for U.S. and Japan export control cooperation to help inform the work of the Japan-U.S. Commercial and Industrial Partnership (JUCIP) Export Control Working Group. Comments should address ways in which existing U.S. and/or Japanese dual-use export control policies and practices may be more transparent, more efficient and effective, and more convergent, including in identifying and controlling emerging or foundational technologies, and in better facilitating research collaboration between Japan and U.S. research organizations.
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The U.S. Department Of Commerce, Bureau of Industry And Security Extends Period For Comments On Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modification
December 7, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 74995: On October 13, 2022, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published the interim final rule Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Entity List Modification. This document extends the deadline for written comments to January 31, 2023. This extension is being made to allow for commenters to have additional time to review the interim final rule and to benefit from the significant amount of public outreach that BIS is conducting on the rule in preparing their comments.
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Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC)
DDTC Name And Address Changes Posted To Website
December 1 through 23, 2022: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following name and/or address changes on its website at
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=bd72ca0adbf8d30044f9ff621f961981:
• Change in Name and Ownership due to merger from Airbus Operations GmbH and Premium AEROTEC GmbH to Airbus Aerostructures GmbH;
• Change in Name and Ownership from Hanwha Aerospace, Hanwha Corp. (Defense business) and Hanwha Defense Corporation to Hanwha Munitions Corporation due to corporate reorganization;
• Change in Name from GMV INSYEN AG to GMV GmbH due to corporate reorganization;
• Changes in Name of the following Saab AB Brazilian entities:
Old Name New Name
Saab Aeronáutica Montagens S.A. Saab Brasil Ltda. also Saab Brasil São Bernardo do Campos
Gripen Flight Test Center Saab Brasil Ltda. also Saab Brasil Gripen Flight Test Center
Saab do Brasil Anápolis Branch Office Saab Brasil Ltda. also Saab Brasil Anápolis
Saab do Brasil São Paulo Branch Office Saab Brasil Ltda. also Saab Brasil São Paulo
Saab do Brasil Brasília Branch Office Saab Brasil Ltda. also Saab Brasil Brasília
Saab do Brasil Rio de Janeiro Branch Office Saab Brasil Ltda. also Saab Brasil Rio de Janeiro
Gripen Design and Development Network Saab Brasil Ltda. also Saab Brasil Gripen Design and Development Network
Saab Sensores & Serviços Saab Brasil Ltda. also Saab Brasil Sensores & Serviços
• Change in Address for GMV GmbH from Muenchener Str. 20, 82234 Wessling, Germany to Zeppelin Str. 16, 82205 Gilching, Germany;
• Change in Address for BMT Defence and Security UK Limited from Third Floor, 1 Park Road, Teddington, London TW11 0AP to Level 5, Zig Zag Building, 70 Victoria Street, London SW1E 6SQ;
• Change in Name from Hanwha Corp. to Hanwha Munitions Corporation due to corporate rebranding; and
• Change in Name and Address from BAE Systems plc – Enterprise IT Services, 6 Carlton Gardens, London, SW1Y 5AD, United Kingdom to BAE Systems Services Limited at Warwick House, PO Box 87, Farnborough Aerospace Centre, Farnborough, Hampshire, GU14 6YU, United Kingdom due to corporate consolidation.
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DDTC Final CJ Determinations Posted To Website
July 8, 2022 through September 23, 2022: The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) posted the following Final CJ Determinations on its website at: https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_kb_article_page&sys_id=6ea6afdcdbc36300529d368d7c96194b
Model Name Description Final Determination Date Final Determination Applicant
RMT Nomad Trigger, Model RMT Nomad Varangian Investments LLC Ergonomic trigger for semi-automatic rifles CCL ECCN 0A501.c 7/8/2022
Data Sync (TAK Plug-in), Version 1.2 TAK Product Center A plug-in used to synchronize multiple Tactical Assessment Kit (TAK) devices involved in the same exercise or event for use with the TAK application tool Seek CCATS 7/8/2022
RFnest D600 Family of RF Network Channel Emulators (Model Numbers D608, D616, D632, and D6128) BlueHalo, LLC Channel emulation devices that support RF applications USML Category XI(a)(11) 7/18/2022
Tow Bridle Load Out Kit, Model TB37000A, Part Number TB37000A Helibasket LLC Used as the integration piece for loading most rolling stock and aircraft onto cargo vessels, vehicle, or aircraft CCL ECCN 9A610.x 7/18/2022
Adeka Super TMA, Trimethylaluminum (CAS 75-24-1) Adeka USA Corporation Trimethylaluminum (CAS 75-24-1) Seek CCATS 7/22/2022
7.62 x 51mm M62 Tracer Round Olin Corporation Tracer ammunition USML Category III(a)(6) 7/22/2022
Solder Assembly RF, Revision M, Part Number 404338-001 Cobham Advanced Electronic Solutions Inc. Electrical components used in a defense article, and instructions detailing how to solder them into a housing for that defense article CCL ECCN 3A611.x - Solder Assembly RF
CCL ECCN 3E611 - Technology 8/1/2022
3.5” 960x640 DVGA Transflective NVIS Display with EMI and PCAP Touch Screen, Model and Part Number Q035-028 Q-Vio Corporation A touch screen manufactured with a filtering system that prevents the display from interfering with night vision goggles Seek CCATS 8/16/2022
WhiteKnightTwo, Model WK2 Virgin Galactic, LLC Dual fuselage aircraft whose primary function is to facilitate the ascent and release of SpaceShipTwo, a sub-orbital spacecraft CCL ECCN 9A004.g 8/16/2022
Silicon Assured Video Isolation (SAVI) Appliance consisting of Part Numbers IA21251, IA3041, IA21251-SP, IA7021-SP, IA3041-SP, GAPP-WIN-1, GAPP-LIN-2, GAPP-LIN-3, GAPP-AND-1, GAPP-IOS-1, RA-GSM01, and RA-GCB01. Garrison Technology, Ltd. Combination of hardware and software that provides web isolation for commercial customers and cross-domain access in classified government environments, that is not on the National Cross Domain Strategy and Management Office (NCDSMO) control list Seek CCATS 8/16/2022
Night Hawk HD Tracking System, Part Number 111855 PVP Advanced EO Systems, Inc. A pan and tilt tracking system for long-range surveillance USML Category XII(c)(3) 8/16/2022
Cold Key Loading Set, Part Number 3867AS145-1 GWT Aerospace, Corp. Data transfer device, whose purpose is to temporarily download encryption and decryption keys (classified and unclassified) for subsequent upload into military systems USML Category XIII(b)(1) 8/16/2022
AR-15 forging design drawing, Part Number 05-059-032-152 Palmetto State Defense, LLC Technical drawing required to produce a forging of a semi-automatic lower receiver CCL ECCN 0E501.a 8/18/2022
M1000 DHA Printed Circuit Board Set, Part Numbers 1000-142-25-XXX-1, 1000-142-25-XXX-2, 1000-182-25-XXX, 1000-232-25-XXX-1, and 1000-232-25-XXX-2 Mercury Systems, Inc Component of the Commander Display Unit of a tank USML Category XI(c)(2) 9/2/2022
Multi-Threat Locator - Dual Sensor Buried Object Detector, Model MTL-DS, Part Number 20ATL 1340-059 L3Harris Technologies, Inc Handheld buried object detector designed for commercial and humanitarian demining activities. Although capable of cataloguing specific detection signatures, the device is not capable of sharing these signatures with other devices. EAR99 9/2/2022
Advanced Microwave Mapping Probes, Models SP324 and SP2040 Compass Technology Group, LLC Hand-held devices for evaluating the surface topology of objects EAR99 9/2/2022
1) Gate-Lok Flash Comp, Model Number XHP762FCM, Part Number XHP762FCM
2) Taper Mount Hammer Comp, Model Number TMHC, Part Number TMHC305824 and TMHC91228
3) Taper Mount Linear Compensator, Model Number TMLC, Part Number TMLC
4) Blast Shield, Model Number GAMMBS1, Part Number GAMMBS1 Automated Export Processing, Inc Four separate muzzle devices that mount to firearms EAR99 9/2/2022
CA-SG010 8 Channel 25-6400 MHz Signal Generator Platform CellAntenna Corporation An 8-channel signal generator that can transmit three different onboard analog signal sources Seek CCATS 9/13/2022
Towed Vehicle Array (TVA) U.S. Army Humanitarian Demining Research and Development (HD R&D) Program Agricultural tractor, up-armored to NIJ level III, with an attached UPEX 740 Large Loop Detector that provides landmine detection USML Category IV(c) - UPEX 740
Seek CCATS - TVA without UPEX 740 9/13/2022
Very High Frequency Low Pressure Plasma Process (VHFLPP) Technology and Products Dow Inc A process for creating quantum dots with specific material properties Seek CCATS 9/13/2022
Avcon Multi-Use Pods made of (1) Fiberglass and Aluminum and (2) Fiberglass Composite with Astroquartz Butler National Corporation Multi-use pods that mount to the underside of the Beechcraft King Air turboprop airplane 1. EAR99
2. CCL ECCN 9A610.x 9/13/2022
MIL-STD-461G and IEC-60945 Rackmount System for Ship Controls and Mapping, Model AA-AO, Part Number 003492 Foxguard Solutions, Inc Rack mounted computer system that will be used for vessel navigation and mapping CCL ECCN 8A609.x 9/13/2022
65 Nanometer Unprogrammed Processor Layer, Part Number 430620 Raytheon Technologies Corporation A partially manufactured programmable logic device EAR99 9/22/2022
Thin Layer Chromatography (TLC) Paper, Model Number TL-100, Part Number 6577-TL100 Molpure, Inc Silica gel coated chromatography fiberglass membrane Seek CCATS 9/22/2022
DanInject Dart Projector, Model JM DanWild LLC CO2 powered tranquilizer-dart rifle EAR99 9/22/2022
M203Grip, Part Number 71G710 RM Equipment, Inc Detachable vertical grip for the M203 grenade launcher Seek CCATS 9/22/2022
Universal Load Bank, Model Number RL180 Series, Part Number 3746635 Universal Load Banks LLC A self-contained unit designed to provide resistive, reactive, and pulsed load aircraft testing of flightline generator sets CCL ECCN 9B610.a 9/22/2022
RTL-CHSIM-600 MHZ (Channel Simulator) Kratos RT Logic, Inc Creates radio frequency (RF) and intermediate frequency (IF) signals that precisely match those that occur when transmitters and receivers are in motion with respect to one another USML Category XI(c)(8) 9/22/2022
Series 2000 High-Resolution Thermal Imaging System, Models 2000E, 2000F, and 2000G Teledyne Technologies Incorporated Gimballed thermal imaging systems CCL ECCN 6A003.b.4.a - 2000F and 2000G
EAR99 - 2000E 9/22/2022
A. TWA Series COTS-Plus Wet Electrolytic Tantalum Capacitors (“Capacitor Family A”)
1. Model TWAE-470uf-125v / Part Number TWAE477(x)125(x)BSZ0(x)00
2. Model TWAE-750uf-100v / Part Number TWAE757(x)100(x)BEZ0(x)00
3. Model TWAE-3000uf-50v / Part Number TWAE308(x)050(x)B(x)Z0(x)00
4. Model TWAE-2200uf-60v / Part Number TWAE228M060(x)BEZ0(x)00
5. Model TWAE-560uf-125v / Part Number TWAE567(x)125(x)BSZ0(x)00
B. TWA-Y Series High Temperature COTS-Plus 200C Wet Electrolytic Tantalum Capacitors (“Capacitor Family B”)
6. Model TWAE-750uf-100v / Part Number TWAE757(x)100(x)BYZ0(x)00
7. Model TWAE-470uf-125v / Part Number TWAE477(x)125(x)BYZ0(x)00 KYOCERA AVX Components Corporation A series of wet electrolytic tantalum capacitors, five TWA series and two TWA-Y series USML Category XI(c)(5) 9/22/2022
Mortar Gunner Pack Kit, Model 98752-MC, NSN 1095-01-679-5616 MMI Outdoor, Inc Backpack that has MOLLE panels, pouches, cords, and pockets that organize and store gear to include a mortar tube system and Gustaf rounds EAR99 9/23/2022
Soldering Services BGA Technology LLC Post-manufacturing service for high reliability commodities that includes hot solder dip, trim and form, Ball Grid Array (BGA) reballing, wire lead/column attach, solderability testing, seal testing, ionic cleanliness testing, X-Ray fluorescence testing, tape and reel packaging, or bake and dry pack EAR99 9/23/2022
7.62 x 51mm Armor Piercing (AP) Sniper Ammunition, Model / Part Number 7.62 x 51mm 165AP Sentinel Precision, Inc Small arms ammunition cartridge featuring a bullet with a hardened steel core USML Category III(d)(6) 9/23/2022
Competency and Skills System (CaSS) Software Service Eduworks Corporation Competency and Skills System (CaSS) software services to include installation, operation, and maintenance Seek CCATS 9/23/2022
Omni Connector Palantir Technologies Inc Customized software plug-in that enables bidirectional communication between tactical radio software described on the USML and Palantir USML Category XI(d) 9/23/2022
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DDTC Issued New Compliance Program Guidelines
December 5, 2022: The U.S. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) issued new Compliance Program Guidelines (CPG) that are intended to provide an overview of an effective compliance program and an introduction to defense trade controls, including information on the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). More specifically, the new CPG contain information on the key elements of an effective ITAR Compliance Program (ICP) and how to design and implement an ICP for the defense industry and universities that manufacture, export, broker, or temporarily import defense articles and defense services described on the United States Munitions List (USML).
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/ddtc_public?id=ddtc_public_portal_news_and_events and https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/sys_attachment.do?sysparm_referring_url=tear_off&view=true&sys_id=1216c09a1b671d14d1f1ea02f54bcb25
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DDTC Proposed To Add Two New Entries To The International Traffic In Arms Regulations (ITAR) To Expand The Definition Of “Activities That Are Not Exports, Reexports, Retransfers, Or Temporary Imports.”
December 15, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 77046: The Department of State proposes to add two new entries to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to expand the definition of “activities that are not exports, reexports, retransfers, or temporary imports.”
First, subject to certain conditions, the taking of defense articles outside a previously approved country by the armed forces of a foreign government or United Nations personnel on a deployment or training exercise is not an export, reexport, retransfer, or temporary import.
Second, a foreign defense article that enters the United States, either permanently or temporarily, and that is subsequently exported from the United States pursuant to a license or other approval under this subchapter, is not subject to the reexport and retransfer requirements of this subchapter, provided it has not been modified, enhanced, upgraded, or otherwise altered or improved or had a U.S.-origin defense article integrated into it. Public comments are due by February 14, 2023.
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U.S. Department Of Defense/U.S. Department of State
The State Department Approved Possible FMS Sale To Finland
December 1, 2022: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Finland of FIM-92K Stinger Man Portable missiles; Production Verification Flight Test (PVFT) FIM-92K Stinger Man Portable missiles; and related equipment for an estimated cost of $380 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/finland-stinger-man-portable-ground-air-missiles
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The State Department Approved Possible FMS Sale To Poland
December 6, 2022: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Poland of M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tanks and related equipment for an estimated cost of $3.75 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/poland-m1a1-abrams-main-battle-tanks
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The State Department Approved Possible FMS Sale To South Korea
December 6, 2022: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Republic of Korea of CH-47F helicopters and related equipment for an estimated cost of $1.5 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/korea-ch-47f-chinook-helicopters
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The State Department Approved Possible FMS Sale To The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States
December 28, 2022: The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States of Volcano (vehicle-launched) anti-tank munition-laying systems and related equipment for an estimated cost of $180 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale.
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Department of the Treasury
Secretary Of The Treasury Janet L. Yellen Announcement Of The Russian Oil Price Cap
December 2, 2022: Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen released the following statement following the announcement of the price cap.
“Together, the G7, European Union, and Australia have now jointly set a cap on the price of seaborne Russian oil that will help us achieve our goal of restricting Putin’s primary source of revenue for his illegal war in Ukraine while simultaneously preserving the stability of global energy supplies. Today’s announcement is the culmination of months of effort by our coalition, and I commend the hard work of our partners in achieving this outcome.
The price cap will encourage the flow of discounted Russian oil onto global markets and is designed to help protect consumers and businesses from global supply disruptions. The price cap will particularly benefit low- and medium-income countries who have already borne the brunt of elevated energy and food prices exacerbated by Putin’s war. Whether these countries purchase energy inside or outside of the cap, the cap will enable them to bargain for steeper discounts on Russian oil and benefit from greater stability in global energy markets.
This action will also help further constrain Putin’s finances and limit the revenues he’s using to fund his brutal invasion. With Russia’s economy already contracting and its budget increasingly stretched thin, the price cap will immediately cut into Putin’s most important source of revenue.
I look forward to further close coordination with our allies on implementation of the price cap, and on our united efforts against Russia’s unprovoked aggression.”
Following agreement by the 27 Member States of the European Union (EU), the members of the G7 (the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and United Kingdom) and Australia (collectively, the “Price Cap Coalition”) are joining the EU in adopting a price cap of $60/barrel on seaborne crude oil of Russian Federation origin. The price cap is an important tool to restrict the revenue Russia receives to fund its illegal war in Ukraine, while also maintaining a reliable supply of oil onto global markets. This policy is especially critical to make oil supplies available in low- and middle-income countries hit hard by the effects of Russia’s war.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1138 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1141
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The Department Of The Treasury Has Published A Determination Pursuant To Executive Order 14071 Related To A Price Cap On Crude Oil Of Russian Federation Origin
December 5, 2022: The Department of the Treasury has published a Determination pursuant to Executive Order 14071 related to a price cap on crude oil of Russian Federation origin.
Pursuant to sections l(a)(ii), l(b), and 5 of Executive Order (E.O.) 14071 of April 6, 2022 ("Prohibiting New Investment in and Certain Services to the Russian Federation in Response to Continued Russian Federation Aggression"), and the determination on November 21, 2022 made pursuant to sections l(a)(ii), l(b), and 5 of E.O. 14071 ("Prohibitions on Certain Services as They Relate to the Maritime Transport of Crude Oil of Russian Federation Origin"), the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, hereby determines that, effective 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on December 5, 2022, the price cap on crude oil of Russian Federation origin shall be $60 per barrel.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221205
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Census Bureau
The U.S. Census Bureau Announced A New Automated Export System (AES) Informational Message
December 22, 2022: The U.S. Census Bureau announced a new Automated Export System (AES) informational message. This is intended to provide clear guidance for U.S. Principal Parties in Interest (USPPI) when the USPPI Address State and State of Origin do not match on the Electronic Export Information (EEI) in the Automated Export System (AES). If the U.S. State codes do not match, filers shall begin filing in compliance with the Foreign Trade Regulations (FTR) going forward. The message will be active in the Certification testing environment on January 10, 2023 and will go into the Production environment on February 7, 2023. This Informational Message will allow the filer to take notice of the USPPI Address and State of Origin fields being reported on the EEI in the AES when the data elements do not match and make changes.
Response Code: 26C
Narrative Text: STATE OF ORIGIN / USPPI STATE MISMATCH
Severity: INFORMATIONAL
Reason: The U.S. State of Origin Code and USPPI Address State Code do not match.
Resolution: The State of Origin and USPPI State must match and be reported as the location from which the goods actually begin the journey to the port of export as defined in section 30.6(a)(1)(ii) and 30.6(a)(4) of the Foreign Trade Regulations.
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U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Customs And Border Protection (CBP), Department Of Homeland Security Will Conduct A National Customs Automation Program Test Regarding The Electronic Transmission Of Certain Unique Entity Identifiers Through The Automated Commercial Environment
December 2, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 74157: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Homeland Security will conduct a National Customs Automation Program test regarding the electronic transmission of certain unique entity identifiers through the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE). This test, which is referred to as the “Global Business Identifier Evaluative Proof of Concept” (GBI EPoC), is for participation by entry filers (i.e., importers of record and licensed customs brokers) for merchandise imported into the United States. Test participants will voluntarily provide specific global business identifiers (GBIs) for the manufacturers, sellers, and shippers of merchandise covered by specified types of entries, which are limited for purposes of this test to certain commodities and countries of origin. Test participants may also, optionally, provide specific GBIs for exporters, distributors, and packagers associated with the covered entries. The test will permit CBP and certain Partner Government Agencies (PGAs) to access the underlying data associated with the GBIs (referred to as the “GBI data”), to determine whether the submission of GBIs at the time of entry filing will enable the enhanced tracing of the supply chains of certain commodities. This notice invites importers of record and licensed customs brokers to participate in the test, provides a description of the test, sets forth the criteria for participation, and invites public comments on all aspects of the test.
The GBI EPoC will commence on December 19, 2022, and will continue until July 21, 2023, subject to any extension, modification, or early termination as announced in the Federal Register. CBP will begin to accept requests from importers of record and licensed customs brokers to participate in the test on December 2, 2022, and CBP will continue to accept such requests until the GBI EPoC concludes. Public comments on the test are invited and may be submitted to the address set forth below at any time during the test period.
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Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control
The Department Of The Treasury's Office Of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Added Regulations To Implement "Imposing Sanctions On Foreign Persons Involved In The Global Illicit Drug Trade"
December 20, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added regulations to implement Executive Order 14059 of December 15, 2021, "Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Illicit Drug Trade". These regulations took effect on December 20, 2022. OFAC intends to supplement these regulations with a more comprehensive set of regulations, which may include additional interpretive guidance and definitions, general licenses, and other regulatory provisions.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221219 and https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/illicit_drug_trade_sanctions_regulations.pdf
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The U.S. Department Of The Treasury's Office Of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Is Publishing Preliminary Guidance On The Implementation Of The Price Cap Policy For Petroleum Products Of Russian Federation Origin
December 30, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is publishing preliminary guidance on the implementation of the price cap policy for petroleum products of Russian Federation origin. The United States is part of an international coalition, including the G7, the European Union, and Australia, that have agreed to prohibit the import of crude oil and petroleum products of Russian Federation origin (the “Price Cap Coalition”). These countries, home to many best-in-class financial and professional services, have also agreed to implement a policy with regard to a broad range of services as they relate to the maritime transport of crude oil and petroleum products of Russian Federation origin. This policy is known as the “price cap policy.” To implement the price cap policy for Russian petroleum products, the Secretary of the Treasury intends to issue, in consultation with the Secretary of State, a determination (the “petroleum products determination”) pursuant to Executive Order 14071, as it did to implement the price cap policy for Russian oil (the “crude oil determination”). The petroleum products determination, which will cover the same categories of services (the “covered services”) as the crude oil determination, will take effect at 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, February 5, 2023. As with the crude oil determination, OFAC anticipates issuing a separate determination to set the price caps for Russian petroleum products. OFAC anticipates amending General Licenses 56 and 57 to extend these authorizations to the petroleum products determination.
The price cap applies from the embarkment of maritime transport of Russian petroleum products (e.g., when the Russian petroleum products are sold by a Russian entity for maritime transport) through the first landed sale in a jurisdiction other than the Russian Federation (through customs clearance). For the purposes of the determination, “petroleum products” means articles defined at Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) heading 2710.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221230 and https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/price_cap_prelim_guidance_petroleum_products_20221230.pdf
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WTO
China Filed A Dispute With The World Trade Organization Trying To Overturn US-Imposed Export Controls On Its Semiconductor Industry
December 12, 2022: China filed a dispute with the World Trade Organization trying to overturn US-imposed export controls, which aim to limit the Asian nation’s ability to develop a domestic semiconductor industry and equip its military. China lodged the compliant with the WTO on Monday, December 12, 2022, according to a statement from its Ministry of Commerce. With the trade rules threatening its foothold in the $580 billion industry, the country is arguing that the US is unfairly using vague security-related justifications to hold back its rival.
The chip industry has become a major flashpoint for trade tensions between the two economic superpowers. Though China is the biggest maker of phones and computers, US companies still control most of the underlying chip technology. The Biden administration has argued that it needs to limit China’s access to the most advanced equipment to safeguard national security.
In Monday’s statement, China said the US is engaging in economic protectionism that undermines trade rules. The behavior also threatens the global supply chain, according to the complaint. But even if the country is successful with its case, the WTO lacks the ability to force the US to reverse its actions.
This section of our newsletter provides information on the latest sanctions, fines and penalties for export violations or matters of non-compliance with the ITAR or EAR issued by the US government enforcement agencies. It is provided as a service to exporters and associates of FD Associates to remind them of the importance of extreme due diligence in all international trade and export compliance matters, particularly those involving exports subject to the ITAR or the EAR. Don't let this happen to you or your company! Call us with questions or concerns at 703-847-5801 or email info@fdassociates.net.
Sanctions
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)
December 1, 2022: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has denied the export privileges of the following individuals:
• Jose Miguel Lazarin-Zurita;
• Mauricio Martelln ;
• Tian Min Wu;
• Mark Komoroski;
• Gene Shilman;
• Rene Sarmiento; and
• Jacqueline Castro-Aguilera.
https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/antiboycott/1429-e2771/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/antiboycott/1428-e2770/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/antiboycott/1427-e2769/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/antiboycott/1426-e2768/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/antiboycott/1424-e2767/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/antiboycott/1425-e2766/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1423-e2765/file.
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December 8, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 75173: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has amended Supplement No. 4 to EAR Part 744 by adding twenty-four entities under twenty-six entries to the Entity List. These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States and will be listed on the Entity List under the destinations of Latvia, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.). In addition, this final rule removes from the Entity List one entity listed in three entries under Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E. This rule is effective December 8, 2022.
This final rule adds the following twenty-four entities under twenty-six entries to the Entity List and includes, where appropriate, aliases:
Latvia
• Fiber Optic Solutions.
Pakistan
• Dynamic Engineering Corporation;
• EnerQuip Private, Ltd.;
• NAR Technologies General Trading LLC;
• Rainbow Solutions;
• Trojans; and
• Universal Drilling Engineers.
Russia
• AO Kraftway Corporation PSC;
• AO PKK Milandr;
• AO Scientific Research Center for Electronic Computing;
• LLC Fibersense;
• Milandr EK OOO;
• Milandr ICC JSC;
• Milur IS, OOO;
• (OOO) Microelectronic Production Complex (MPK) Milandr;
• Ruselectronics JSC; and
• Scientific Production Company Optolink.
Singapore
• Falcon International Trading Company;
• Hawk Electronic Supply Company;
• Merlin Trading Company; and
• Pulse Tech International Company.
Switzerland
• Milur SA.
United Arab Emirates
• Enerquip Ltd. (UAE);
• NAR Technologies General Trading LLC;
• Trojans; and
• Zain Enterprises FZE.
Removal From the Entity List
Safe Technical Supply Co., LLC was removed from the Entity List. Prior to removal from the Entity List by this rule, Safe Technical Supply Co., LLC was listed under Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E.
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December 5, 2022: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has renewed a Temporary Denial Order (TDO) suspending the export privileges of three U.S.-based companies, Quicksilver Manufacturing Inc., Rapid Cut LLC, and U.S. Prototype Inc., for an additional 180 days for the unauthorized export to China of technical drawings and blueprints used to 3-D print satellite, rocket, and defense-related prototypes. This order denies Quicksilver Manufacturing Inc., Rapid Cut LLC, and U.S. Prototype Inc. all of the export privileges described in part 764 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which include (but are not limited to) applying for, obtaining, or using any license, license exception, or export control document, or engaging in or benefitting from such transactions, in order to prevent imminent violations of the EAR. The order cuts off not only the companies’ ability to export from the United States, but also their ability to receive or participate in exports from the United States. As described in the TDO, Quicksilver Manufacturing Inc., Rapid Cut LLC, and U.S. Prototype Inc., collectively utilizing the same rental mailbox, received export-controlled drawings from their domestic customers to 3-D-print requested items. Without their customers’ advance consent or knowledge, these drawings were provided to manufacturers in China to 3-D-print the items without the required U.S. Government authorizations. The items were then imported into the United States to be provided to the ordering customers. The information illegally sent to China included sensitive prototype space and defense technologies. As set forth in the TDO, U.S. customers are also advised that they are prohibited from taking any action that facilitates Quicksilver Manufacturing Inc., Rapid Cut LLC, or U.S. Prototype Inc. taking possession or control of items subject to the EAR that are intended for export.
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December 13, 2022: Matthew S. Axelrod, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement, issued a Temporary Denial Order (TDO) immediately suspending the export privileges of three persons: Boris Livshits, Svetlana Skvortsova, and Aleksey Ippolitov; and two companies: Advanced Web Services, and Strandway, LLC, for 180 days for the unauthorized export of sensitive items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to Russia.
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3194-2022-12-13-bis-press-release-russian-network-tdo/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1431-livshits-tdo-signed-final-12-13-2022/file
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December 13, 2022: Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement Matthew Axelrod has renewed a Temporary Denial Order (TDO) suspending the export privileges of Belavia Belarusian Airlines for an additional 180 days. BIS' request for renewal was based upon the facts underlying the issuance of the initial TDO and the evidence developed over the course of its investigation, which indicate a blatant disregard for U.S. export controls, as well as the TDO. Specifically, the initial TDO, issued on June 16, 2022, was based on evidence that Belavia engaged in conduct prohibited by the Export Administration Regulations by operating multiple aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b on flights into Belarus after April 8, 2022, from destinations including but not limited to, Moscow, Russia; St. Petersburg, Russia; Antalya, Turkey; Istanbul, Turkey; Tbilisi, Georgia; Batumi, Georgia; Sharjah, United Arab Emirates; and Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, without the required BIS authorization. BIS’s evidence and related investigation indicated that after the issuance of the TDO, Belavia continued to fly aircraft into Belarus in violation of the EAR, including flights from St. Petersburg and Moscow Russia; Istanbul, Turkey; and Sharjah, UAE.
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December 13, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 77067: The Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”), U.S. Department of Commerce, through its Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”), has requested the issuance of an Order temporarily denying, for a period of 180 days, the export privileges under the Regulations of: Boris Livshits, Svetlana Skvortsova, Aleksey Ippolitov, Advanced Web Services, and Strandway, LCC (“Strandway”). OEE's request and related information indicates that these parties are located in the Russian Federation and New York.
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December 16, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 76924: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by removing 9 persons from the Unverified List (UVL) and adding them to the Entity List, all under the destination of Russia. BIS has been unable to verify the bona fides of all 9 persons being removed from the UVL and added to the Entity List, due to the foreign government's prevention of timely end-use checks. BIS is also amending the EAR by removing 27 persons from the UVL, one under the destination of Pakistan and 26 under the destination of China, because BIS was able to verify their bona fides.
The End User Review Committee determined to add the following entities to the Entity List pursuant to § 744.11(b)(4)(ii) under the destination of Russia:
• Alliance EG Ltd.;
• FSUE Rosmorport Far Eastern Basin Branch;
• Intercom Ltd.;
• Nasosy Ampika;
• Nuclin LLC;
• SDB IRE RAS;
• Security 2 Business Academy;
• Tavrida Microelectronics; and
• VIP Technology Ltd.
BIS removed the following 27 persons from the UVL after BIS was able to verify their bona fides. This rule removes ENGRO Polymer & Chemicals Limited under the destination of Pakistan and the following 26 persons under the destination of China:
• Beijing Naura Magnetoelectric Technology Co., Ltd.;
• CCIC Southern Electronic Product Testing Co., Ltd.;
• Center for High Pressure Science and Technology Advanced Research;
• Changchun National Extreme Precision Optics Co., Ltd.;
• Chinese Academy of Geological Sciences, Institute of Mineral Resources;
• Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) Institute of Chemistry;
• Dongguan Durun Optical Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Foshan Huaguo Optical Co., Ltd.;
• Guangdong University of Technology;
• Guangxi Intai Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Guangxi Yuchai Machinery Co., Ltd.;
• Guangzhou Hymson Laser Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Heshan Deren Electronic Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Hubei Longchang Optical Co., Ltd.;
• Hubei Sinophorus Electronic Materials Co., Ltd.;
• Kunshan Heng Rui Cheng Industrial Technology;
• Shanghai Fansheng Optoelectronic Science & Technology Co. Ltd.;
• Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (Group) Co., Ltd.;
• ShanghaiTech University;
• Southern University of Science and Technology, Department of Mechanical and Energy Engineering; University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, School of Chemical Sciences;
• University of Shanghai for Science and Technology;
• Vital Advanced Materials Co., Ltd.;
• Wuhan Juhere Photonic Tech Co., Ltd.;
• Wuxi Biologics (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.; and
• Zhongshan Thincloud Optics Co., Ltd.
December 19, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 77505: The Department of Commerce is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) by adding thirty-six entities to the Entity List. These entities have been determined by the U.S. Government to be acting contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States and will be listed on the Entity List under the destinations of the People's Republic of China (China) and Japan. This rule also revises three entries on the Entity List under the destination of China. Lastly, as a conforming change to the addition of one entity to the Entity List under the destination of China, this rule removes this entity from the Unverified List (UVL). The entity is being added to the Entity List for reasons not related to the prevention of an end-use check and is removed from the UVL for consistency with the existing policy of not listing an entity on more than one of these lists at the same time.
BIS added the following thirty-six entities to the Entity List:
China
• Anhui Cambricon Information Technology Co., Ltd.;
• AVIC Research Institute for Special Structures of Aeronautical Composites;
• AZUP International Group Co., Ltd.;
• Beijing HiFar Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Beijing Machinery Industry Automation Research Institute Co., Ltd.;
• Beijing UniStrong Science & Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Beijing Vision Strategy Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Cambricon (Hong Kong) Co., Ltd.;
• Cambricon (Kunshan) Information Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Cambricon Jixingge (Nanjing) Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Cambricon (Nanjing) Information Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Cambricon Technologies Corporation Limited;
• Cambricon (Xi'an) Integrated Circuit Co., Ltd.;
• CETC Cloud (Beijing) Technology Co., Ltd.;
• CETC LES Information System Group Co., Ltd.;
• China Electronics Technology Group Corporation No. 28 Institute;
• Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Computing Technology;
• Guangdong Qinzhi Technology Research Institute Co., Ltd.;
• Hefei Core Storage Electronic Ltd.;
• Key Laboratory of Information Systems Engineering;
• Nanjing Aixi Information Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Nanjing LES Cybersecurity and Information Technology Research Institute Co., Ltd.;
• Nanjing LES Electronic Equipment Co., Ltd.;
• Nanjing LES Information Technology Co., Ltd.;
• PXW Semiconductor Manufactory Co., Ltd.;
• Shanghai Cambricon Information Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Shanghai Integrated Circuit Research and Development Center;
• Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment (Group) Co., Ltd.;
• Shanghai Suowei Information Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Suzhou Cambricon Information Technology Co., Ltd.;
• System Equipment Co., Ltd. of the 28th Research Institute (Liyang);
• Tianjin Tiandi Weiye Technologies Co., Ltd.;
• Xiong'an Cambricon Technology Co., Ltd.;
• Yangtze Memory Technologies Co., Ltd.; and
• Zhongke Xinliang (Beijing) Technology Co., Ltd.
Japan
• Yangtze Memory Technologies (Japan) Inc.
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December 21, 2022: The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released a rule modifying the existing Entity List restrictions for the Russia-based Private Military Company Wagner (“Wagner Group”) resulting in the imposition of additional severe restrictions on the Wagner Group’s ability to acquire items globally to support the Russian government’s unprovoked war in Ukraine and ensuring that the license requirements apply to Wagner Group wherever located worldwide.
“The Wagner Group is one of the most notorious mercenary organizations in the world and is actively committing atrocities and human rights abuses across Ukraine,” said Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Alan Estevez. “Today we are sending a clear message to non-state actors seeking to pick up the baton of brutality from Putin’s faltering military that the Department of Commerce will not hesitate to act against them.” “BIS designates Russian and Belarusian military end users to make crystal clear which entities are a threat to Ukraine and need to be denied access to our technologies,” said Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration Thea D. Rozman Kendler. “The ongoing brutality and lawlessness of the Wagner Group in support of Russia’s unconscionable assault on Ukraine warrants the imposition of these severe restrictions.”
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/about-bis/newsroom/press-releases/3200-2022-12-21-bis-press-release-wagner-group-entity-listing-modification/file and https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/2022-28033/modification-to-the-entity-list
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December 20, 2022: Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement Matthew Axelrod has renewed Temporary Denial Orders (TDOs) suspending the export privileges of the following three Russia-affiliated airlines for an additional 180 days based on evidence that they continue to operate in violation of their original TDOs and/or the EAR by operating aircraft subject to the EAR and classified under ECCN 9A991.b:
• Siberian Airlines d/b/a S7 Airlines;
• Pobeda Airlines; and
• Norwind Airlines.
https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1435-e2777/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1436-e2778/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1437-e2779/file
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Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)
December 1, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took action against two individuals and two companies based in Lebanon for providing financial services to Hizballah, along with an additional individual involved in facilitating weapons procurement for Hizballah. These designations target individuals and companies that manage and enable Hizballah’s overarching financial apparatus operating throughout Lebanon, including Al-Qard Al-Hassan (AQAH) and Hizballah’s Central Finance Unit. U.S.-designated AQAH is Hizballah’s quasi-financial institution, and Hizballah’s Central Finance Unit oversees the terrorist group’s budget within Hizballah’s Executive Council at the direction of Hizballah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. OFAC also sanctioned three individuals for being officials of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK). These individuals have provided support to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
• Jon, Il Ho of North Korea;
• Khalil, Hassan of Lebanon;
• Kim, Su Gil of North Korea;
• Mansour, Adel Mohamad of Lebanon;
• Neser, Naser Hassan of Lebanon; and
• Yu, Jin of Nother Korea.
The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
• Al-Khobara For Accounting, Auditing, And Studies of Lebanon; and
• The Auditors For Accounting And Auditing of Lebanon.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1135 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1134 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221201
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December 2, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Haitian nationals Rony Celestin (Celestin) and Richard Lenine Hervé Fourcand (Fourcand) pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059 of December 15, 2021, “Imposing Sanctions on Foreign Persons Involved in the Global Illicit Drug Trade.” Celestin is a current Haitian senator. Fourcand is a former Haitian senator.
OFAC designated Celestin and Fourcand for having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production. The Government of Canada also designated Celestin and Fourcand.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
• Celestin, Rony of Haiti; and
• Fourcand, Herve of Haiti.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1137 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221202
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December 9, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Global Magnitsky General License 3, "Authorizing Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of Pingtan Marine Enterprise Ltd." and Global Magnitsky General License 4, "Authorizing the Wind Down of Transactions Involving Certain Vessels." OFAC is also issuing three Global Magnitsky-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 1100 - 1102).
Global Magnitsky General License 3: All transactions prohibited by the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 583 (GMSR), that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity of Pingtan Marine Enterprise Ltd. (PME) to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 9, 2023.
All transactions prohibited by the GMSR that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of debt or equity of PME that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, December 9, 2022, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 9, 2023.
All transactions prohibited by the GMSR that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of financial contracts or other agreements linked to the debt or equity of PME and entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, December 9, 2022 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 9, 2023, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the GMSR.
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/glomag_gl3.pdf
Global Magnitsky General License 4: All transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving any vessel in which any of the following blocked entities have an interest that are prohibited by the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 583 (GMSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 9, 2023, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the GMSR:
(1) Dalian Ocean Fishing Co., Ltd.;
(2) Fujian Provincial Pingtan County Ocean Fishing Group Co., Ltd.;
(3) Fuzhou Honglong Ocean Fishing Co., Ltd.;
(4) Pingtan Marine Enterprise Ltd.; or
(5) Any entity in which one or more of the above entities own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest.
This general license does not authorize the entry into any new commercial contracts involving the entities or vessels described above. Any transactions otherwise prohibited by the GMSR, including transactions involving any person blocked pursuant to the GMSR other than the blocked entities described above, unless separately authorized.
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/glomag_gl4.pdf
Question 1102: Do non-U.S. persons risk exposure to U.S. sanctions for engaging in transactions that U.S. persons would be authorized to engage in under Global Magnitsky General Licenses 3 and 4?
Answer: No. Non-U.S. persons may engage in the transactions authorized for U.S. persons by Global Magnitsky General License (GL) 3 and wind down transactions with the blocked persons specified in GL 4, without exposure to sanctions under Executive Order (E.O.) 13818 or the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 583, provided that such activity is consistent with those GLs. Further, such transactions involving non-U.S. persons may be processed through the U.S. financial system or involve U.S. persons as long as the transactions comply with the terms and conditions in GLs 3 and 4. Non-U.S. persons unable to wind down transactions in accordance with GLs 3 and 4 before 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 9, 2023, are encouraged to seek guidance from OFAC before that date.
Question 1101: What activity does Global Magnitsky General License 4 authorize?
Answer: On December 9, 2022, OFAC designated, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, several persons, including Dalian Ocean Fishing Co., Ltd.; Fujian Provincial Pingtan County Ocean Fishing Group Co., Ltd.; Fuzhou Honglong Ocean Fishing Co. Ltd.; and Pingtan Marine Enterprise Ltd. Concurrent with this action, OFAC issued Global Magnitsky General License (GL) 4, which authorizes all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of any transaction involving any vessel in which any of these blocked entities have an interest that would otherwise be prohibited by the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 583, through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 9, 2023, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with OFAC sanctions regulations.
The wind-down authorization in GL 4 contemplates, for example, completion of ongoing voyages, including the discharge of cargo aboard such vessels to non-blocked persons; docking or anchoring of the vessels at third-country, non-sanctioned ports; transactions related to the safety and maintenance of such vessels, such as entering into certain contracts to pay for insurance coverage, flagging, and safety and compliance inspections during the wind-down period; and transactions related to the health and safety of any crew, including the provision and processing of wages or other employee benefits, or other provision of crewing services.
After the expiration of this authorization, persons will be prohibited from engaging in such wind-down transactions with the blocked persons or vessels, unless exempt or otherwise authorized by OFAC. Persons unable to wind down transactions with the blocked persons or vessels specified in GL 4 before 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 9, 2023, are encouraged to seek guidance from OFAC before that date.
Question 1100: I am a U.S. person that owns debt or equity, including publicly traded shares, in Pingtan Marine Enterprise, Ltd. (PME), which was designated under Executive Order (E.O.) 13818. What actions am I authorized to take under Global Magnitsky General License 3?
Answer: Pursuant to Global Magnitsky General License (GL) 3, U.S. persons are authorized to engage in certain transactions that would otherwise be prohibited by the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 583, ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity of PME to a non-U.S. person through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 9, 2023.
GL 3 also authorizes transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of debt or equity of PME that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, December 9, 2022, through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 9, 2023.
GL 3 also authorizes, through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 9, 2023, transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of financial contracts or other agreements linked to the debt or equity of PME and entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, December 9, 2022, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with OFAC sanctions regulations. This authorization includes transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the delisting of PME from a U.S. securities exchange. However, GL 3 does not authorize U.S. persons to sell or facilitate the sale of debt or equity of PME to, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked, including Xinrong Zhuo, who was designated on the same day and is PME’s chairman and CEO, among other things. U.S. persons unable to wind down transactions in accordance with GL 3 before 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, March 9, 2023, are encouraged to seek guidance from OFAC before that date.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/added/2022-12-09
The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned two individuals, Li Zhenyu and Xinrong Zhuo, and the networks of entities they control, including Dalian Ocean Fishing Co., Ltd. and Pingtan Marine Enterprise, Ltd. (Nasdaq: PME) along with eight other affiliated entities. Additionally, this action identifies 157 People’s Republic of China (PRC) flagged fishing vessels in which these entities have an interest.
As a result, the following names have been added to OFAC's list of Specially Designated Nationals:
• Li, Zhenyu of China; and
• Zhuo, Xinrong of China.
The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
• Dalian Ocean Fishing Company Limited of China;
• Fujian Heyue Marine Fishing Development Co., Ltd. of China;
• Fujian Provincial Pingtan County Ocean Fishing Group Co., Ltd. of China;
• Fuzhou Honglong Ocean Fishing Co., Ltd. of China;
• Heroic Treasure Limited of the British Virgin Islands;
• Mars Harvest Co., Ltd., of the British Virgin Islands;
• Merchant Supreme Co., Ltd., of the British Virgin Islands;
• Pingtan Guansheng Ocean Fishing Co., Ltd. of China;
• Pingtan Marine Enterprise Ltd., of the Cayman Islands; and
• Prime Cheer Corporation Ltd. of China.
OFAC added one-hundred and fifty-seven Chinese fishing vessels to its SDN List.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221209 and https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1154
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December 9, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in recognition of International Anti-Corruption Day and Human Rights Day, is sanctioning a diverse array of over 40 individuals and entities that are connected to corruption or human rights abuse across nine countries.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
• Andreev, Pavel Viktorovich of Russia;
• Borisov, Igor Borisovich of Russia;
• Budarina, Natalya Alekseevna of Russia and Germany;
• Bulaev, Nikolay Ivanovich of Russia;
• Castro Ramirez, Conan Tonathiu of El Salvador;
• Castro, Oscar Rolando of El Salvador;
• Chang Navarro, Luis Alfonso of Guatemala;
• Chol, Kim Myong of France;
• Conde, Alpha of Turkey and Guinea;
• Ebzeev, Boris Safarovich of Russia;
• Jadhav, Deepak of India;
• Javidan, Ali Akbar of Iran;
• Karam Azizi, ALLAH of Iran;
• Keita, Karim of the Cote d Ivoire, Mali and France;
• Khaimourzina, Elmira Abdulbarievna of Russia;
• Kim, Yevgeniy Radionovich of Russia;
• Kolyushin, Yevgeny Ivanovich of Russia;
• Kouchakzaei, Ebrahim of Iran;
• Kurdiumov, Aleksandr Borisovich of Russia;
• Levichev, Nikolay Vladimirovich of Russia;
• Lopatin, Anton Igorevich of Russia;
• Markina, Liudmila Leonidovna of Russia;
• Mazurevskii, Konstantin Sergeevich of Russia;
• Mongush, Ochur-Suge Terimovich of Russia;
• Nesterov, Oleg Yuryevich of Russia and the Ukraine;
• Pamfilova, Ella Aleksandrovna of Russia and Uzbekistan;
• Quiboloy, Apollo Carreon, Davao of the Philippines;
• Rodriguez Reyes, Allan Estuardo of Guatemala;
• Sereda, Marina Konstantinovna of Russia and the Ukraine;
• Shevchenko, Yevgeny Aleksandrovich of Russia;
• Shutov, Andrey Yurievich of Russia;
• Vargas Morales, Jorge Estuardo of Guatemala;
• Wu, Yingjie of China;
• Zaitseva, Lyudmila Nikolaevna of Russia;
• Zhang, Hongbo of China.
The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
• 924th State Center For UAV Aviation of Russia;
• Central Election Commission Of The Russian Federation of Russia;
• Command Of The Military Transport Aviation of Russia;
• Everlasting Empire Limited of China;
• Fujian Nanan Import And Export Corporation of China;
• Funsaga PTE LTD., of Singapore;
• Kinoatis LLC of Russia;
• Konijane Strategic Marketing of the Cote d Ivoire;
• Ministry Of State Security Border Guard General Bureau of North Korea;
• Quanzhou Yiyangjin Import And Export Trade CO., LTD., of China;
• Russian Aerospace Forces of Russia;
• Tian Fang Hong Kong Holdings Limited of China; and
• Yancheng Three Line One Point Animation CO., LTD., of China.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1155 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221209_33
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December 12, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) made the following additions to its Specially Designated Nationals List.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
• Chimuka, Obey of Zimbabwe;
• Magwizi, Nqobile, Unwinsdale Dr., of Zimbabwe;
• Mnangagwa, JR., Emmerson Dambudzo of Zimbabwe; and
• Mpunga, Sandra of Zimbabwe.
The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
• Fossil Agro of Zimbabwe; and
• Fossil Contracting of Zimbabwe.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221212
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December 14, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing Counter Terrorism General License 21A "Authorizing Limited Safety and Environmental Transactions Involving Certain Vessels" and amending one Counter Terrorism Frequently Asked Question (1097).
Counter Terrorism General License 21A: All transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to one of the following activities involving the persons or vessels described below of this general license that are prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594 (GTSR), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 14, 2023, provided that any payment to a blocked person must be made into a blocked account in accordance with the GTSR:
(1) The safe docking and anchoring of any of the blocked vessels listed in paragraph (b) of this general license (“blocked vessels”) in port;
(2) The preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any of the blocked vessels; and
(3) Emergency repairs of any of the blocked vessels or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any of the blocked vessels.
The authorization of this general license applies to the following blocked persons and vessels listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List and any entity in which any of the following persons own, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest:
• Artemov, Victor Sergioyovich;
• Azul Vista Shipping Corp.;
• Blue Berri Shipping Inc.;
• Harbour Ship Management Limited;
• Pontus Navigation Corp.;
• Technology Bright International Ltd.; and
• Vista Clara Shipping Corp.
Question 1097: What does Counterterrorism-related General License 21A (GL 21A) authorize?
Answer: GL 21A authorizes all activities otherwise prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR), 31 CFR part 594, that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the limited safety and environmental activities described in paragraph (a) of GL 21A involving certain blocked persons and vessels through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 14, 2023. GL 21A does not authorize the offloading of any cargo onboard any of the blocked vessels listed in GL 21A, and any payment of claims to or for the benefit of any blocked persons or vessels would require a specific license from OFAC.
After the expiration of GL 21A, U.S. persons will be prohibited from engaging in any transactions with the blocked persons or vessels listed in GL 21A, unless otherwise exempt or authorized by OFAC. U.S. persons unable to conclude transactions authorized by GL 21A before 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 14, 2023, are encouraged to seek guidance from OFAC.
Non-U.S. persons, including foreign financial institutions, generally do not risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in transactions with blocked persons where those transactions would not require a specific license if engaged in by a U.S. person. Non-U.S. persons unable to conclude transactions authorized by GL 21A before 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 14, 2023, are encouraged to seek guidance from OFAC.
Additionally, the following name has been added to OFAC's list of Specially Designated Nationals:
The following individual has been added to OFAC's SDN List:
• Calderon Rijo, Jose of the Dominican Republic.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221214 and https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ct_gl21a.pdf and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/1097
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December 15, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued Russia-related General License 8E,"Authorizing Transactions Related to Energy," General License 58, "Authorizing the Wind Down and Rejection of Transactions Involving Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank," and General License 59, "Authorizing Transactions Related to Debt or Equity of, or Derivative Contracts Involving, Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank." OFAC is also publishing two Frequently Asked Questions (1103 & 1104).
General License 8E: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 involving one or more of the following entities that are related to energy are authorized, through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, May 16, 2023:
(1) State Corporation Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs Vnesheconombank;
(2) Public Joint Stock Company Bank Financial Corporation Otkritie;
(3) Sovcombank Open Joint Stock Company;
(4) Public Joint Stock Company Sberbank of Russia;
(5) VTB Bank Public Joint Stock Company;
(6) Joint Stock Company Alfa-Bank;
(7) Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank;
(8) Any entity in which one or more of the above persons own, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, a 50 percent or greater interest; or
(9) the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
For the purposes of this general license, the term “related to energy” means the extraction, production, refinement, liquefaction, gasification, regasification, conversion, enrichment, fabrication, transport, or purchase of petroleum, including crude oil, lease condensates, unfinished oils, natural gas liquids, petroleum products, natural gas, or other products capable of producing energy, such as coal, wood, or agricultural products used to manufacture biofuels, or uranium in any form, as well as the development, production, generation, transmission, or exchange of power, through any means, including nuclear, thermal, and renewable energy sources.
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl8e.pdf
General License 58: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions involving Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank, or any entity in which Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest (“Rosbank entities”), are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 15, 2023, provided that any payment to a Rosbank entity is made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).
U.S. persons are authorized to reject, rather than block, all transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the processing of funds involving one or more Rosbank entities as an originating, intermediary, or beneficiary financial institution, through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 15, 2023.
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl58.pdf
General License 59: All transactions prohibited by Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the divestment or transfer, or the facilitation of the divestment or transfer, of debt or equity of Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank (Rosbank), or any entity in which Rosbank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest (“covered debt or equity”), to a non-U.S. person are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 15, 2023.
All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to facilitating, clearing, and settling trades of covered debt or equity that were placed prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, December 15, 2022, are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 15, 2023.
All transactions prohibited by E.O. 14024 that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of derivative contracts entered into prior to 4:00 p.m. eastern standard time, December 15, 2022, that (i) include a blocked person described in paragraph (a) of this general license as a counterparty or (ii) are linked to covered debt or equity are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 15, 2023, provided that any payments to a blocked person are made into a blocked account in accordance with the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587 (RuHSR).
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/russia_gl59.pdf
Question 1103: Is there a wind-down period for transactions involving Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank (Rosbank), which was blocked on December 15, 2022 pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14024? What transactions are authorized during the wind-down period?
Answer: OFAC issued General Licenses (GL) 58 and 59 concurrent with the designation of Rosbank. GL 58 authorizes a wind-down period for transactions involving Rosbank or any entity in which Rosbank owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest (“Rosbank entities”) until 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 15, 2023. This includes transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to exit operations, contracts, or other agreements involving Rosbank entities that were in effect prior to December 15, 2022, provided that such transactions do not involve a debit to a blocked account on the books of a U.S. financial institution (see Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 990). Wind-down activities covered by GL 58 do not include the continued processing of funds transfers, securities trades, or other transactions that involve a Rosbank entity that were part of ongoing business activities prior to the imposition of sanctions, unless separately authorized (see, e.g., GLs 6B, 8E, or 59).
In addition, GL 58 authorizes U.S. persons, including U.S. financial institutions, to reject, rather than block, all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the processing of funds involving one or more Rosbank entities as an originating, intermediary, or beneficiary financial institution, through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 15, 2023. For individuals holding accounts at Rosbank entities, see FAQ 1080 for guidance, including GL 50, which authorizes individuals to engage in all transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to close their individual accounts held at a financial institution blocked pursuant to E.O. 14024.
GL 59 authorizes U.S. persons to divest or transfer holdings in securities of Rosbank entities to non-U.S. persons, as well as the wind down of certain derivative contracts, subject to certain conditions. Please see GL 59 for additional details.
Question 1104: Is Norilsk Nickel blocked as a result of the designation of Vladimir Potanin?
Answer: No. OFAC has not designated Norilsk Nickel and, based on information available to OFAC as of December 15, 2022, Norilsk Nickel is not owned 50% or more by blocked persons or otherwise considered the blocked property of Vladimir Potanin.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/added/2022-12-15
In addition, OFAC has updated the following lists:
The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:
• Alekseenko, Andrey Anatolevich of Russia;
• Alikhanov, Anton Andreyevich of Russia;
• Artamonov, Igor Georgiyevich of Russia;
• Artyukhov, Dmitriy Andreevich of Russia;
• Avdeyev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich of Russia;
• Azarov, Dmitriy Igorevich of Russia;
• Belousov, Andrey Removich of Russia;
• Belozyorov, Oleg Valentinovich of Russia and Latvia;
• Bobryshev, Volodymyr Mykhailovych of Russia and the Ukraine;
• Bocharov, Andrey Ivanovich of Russia;
• Bogomaz, Aleksandr Vasilyevich of Russia;
• Chernyshenko, Dmitriy Nikolaevich of Russia;
• Drozdenko, Aleksandr Yuryevich of Russia and Kazakhstan;
• Egorov, Maksim Borisovich of Russia;
• Frank, Sergey Ottovich of Russia;
• Garkusha, Gennadiy Oleksandrovych of the Ukraine;
• Gladkov, Vyacheslav Vladimirovich of Russia;
• Golubev, Vasiliy Yuryevich of Russia;
• Gusev, Alexander Viktorovich of Russia;
• Khabirov, Radiy Faritovich of Russia;
• Kuvshinnikov, Oleg Aleksandrovich of Russia;
• Kuyvashev, Evgeniy Vladimirovich of Russia;
• Lipandin, Volodymyr Vitalyovych of the Ukraine;
• Moor, Aleksandr Viktorovich of Russia;
• Nikitin, Andrey Sergeyevich of Russia;
• Nikolayev, Aysen Sergeyevich of Russia;
• Nikolayev, Oleg Alekseyevich of Russia;
• Ostrovskiy, Alexey Vladimirovich of Russia;
• Pasler, Denis Vladimirovich of Russia;
• Potanin, Ivan Vladimirovich of Russia;
• Potanin, Vladimir Olegovich of Russia;
• Potanina, Anastasia Vladimirovna of Russia;
• Potanina, Ekaterina Viktorovna of Russia;
• Sazanov, Aleksey Valerevich of Russia;
• Starovoyt, Roman Vladimirovich of Russia;
• Teksler, Aleksey Leonidovich of Russia;
• Tomenko, Viktor Petrovich of Russia;
• Travnikov, Andrey Aleksandrovich of Russia;
• Uss, Alexander Viktorovich of Russia;
• Uss, Artem Alexandrovich of Russia;
• Uyba, Vladimir Viktorovich of Russia;
• Vladimirov, Vladimir Vladimirovich of Russia;
• Vorobyev, Andrey Yuryevich of Russia;
• Vorobyev, Maxim Yuryevich of Russia.
The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
• Aktsionernoe Obshchestvo SG-Development of Russia;
• Amereus Group PTE LTD of Singapore;
• Embassy Development Limited of Jersey;
• Estate Managment Company Limited of Russia;
• ITC Consultants Cyprus Limited of Cyprus;
• Joint Stock Company Citybike of Russia;
• Joint Stock Company VTB DevelopmenT of Russia;
• Kholdingovaya Kompaniya Interros OOO of Russia;
• Kordex Joint Stock Company of Russia;
• Limited Liability Company VTB Commercial Finance of Russia;
• Limited Liability Company VTB Infrastructure Investments of Russia;
• Megacom Limited Liability Company of Russia;
• Ministry Of Emergency Situations Of The Donetsk People's Republic of the Ukraine;
• Obshchestvo S Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu Dolgovoi Tsentr of Russia;
• Obshchestvo S Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu Proekt of Russia;
• Obshchestvo S Ogranichennoi Otvetstvennostyu VTB Syryevye Tovary Kholding of Russia;
• Public Joint Stock Company Rosbank of Russia;
• Ryabinovaya OOO of Russia;
• VB-Service Company Limited of Russia;
• VTB Leasing Joint Stock Company of Russia; and
• VTB Real Estate Limited Liability Company of Russia.
The following vessel has been added to OFAC's SDN List:
• Nirvana (ZGBM) Yacht Cayman Islands flag; Vessel Registration Identification IMO 1011202.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221215
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December 16, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) made the following deletions have been made to OFAC's SDN List:
• Baldenegro Bastidas of Mexico;
Huerta Ramos, Manuel of Mexico;
• Huerta Ramos, Jesus Manuel of Mexico;
• Mejia Salazar, Pedro Claver of Colombia;
• Mejia Alzate, Victor Gabriel of Colombia;
• Arenera El Cerrejon of Colombia;
• Canteras Copacabana S.A., of Colombia;
• Tramco S.A., of Colombia;
• Tritcon S.A.S., of Colombia;
• Almequip S.A.S., of Colombia;
• Inversiones Meybar S.A.S., of Colombia;
• Promotora Turistica Sol Plaza S.A., of Colombia;
Hotel Sol Plaza of Colombia;
• Mejia Alzate Asociados Y CIA. LTDA., of Colombia;
• Bedoya Lopez, Gildardo de Jesus of Colombia;
• Representaciones Midas of Colombia;
• Garces Y Bedoya CIA. LTDA of Colombia;
• Hernandez Durango, Wilton Cesar of Colombia; and
• Euromecanica of Colombia.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221216
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December 20, 2022: Following this month’s adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2664, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took historic steps to further enable the flow of legitimate humanitarian assistance supporting the basic human needs of vulnerable populations while continuing to deny resources to malicious actors. The United States and Ireland co-led the development of UNSCR 2664, which implemented a carveout from the asset freeze provisions of UN sanctions programs. To implement this new policy across U.S. sanctions programs and as the first country in the world to implement the new UNSCR, OFAC issued or amended general licenses (GLs) to ease the delivery of humanitarian aid and ensure a baseline of authorizations for the provision of humanitarian support across many sanctions programs.
OFAC amended multiple regulations to add or revise certain general licenses (GLs) across a number of OFAC sanctions programs to ease the delivery of humanitarian aid. Specifically, OFAC issued or amended four GLs across a number of OFAC sanctions programs authorizing the following four categories of activities:
• The official business of the U.S. Government;
• The official business of certain international organizations and entities;
• Transactions in support of certain nongovernmental organizations’ activities; and
• The provision of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components, or software updates for medical devices for personal, non-commercial use.
OFAC separately updated a regulatory interpretation in several sanctions programs’ regulations to explain that the property and interests of property of an entity are blocked if one or more blocked persons own, whether individually or in the aggregate, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest in the entity.
OFAC also published four new Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 1105, 1106, 1107 and 1108) to accompany this action.
Question 1105: What actions did OFAC take to implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2664 of December 9, 2022 relating to a new UN sanctions exception for humanitarian assistance?
Answer: On December 9, 2022, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted UNSCR 2664, which establishes a humanitarian carveout to the asset freeze measure across United Nations sanctions regimes. The carveout enables the flow of legitimate humanitarian assistance and activities supporting the basic human needs of vulnerable populations while continuing to deny resources to malicious actors. On December 20, 2022, OFAC announced the issuance or amendment of four categories of general licenses (GLs) that support the conduct of U.S. government and humanitarian-related activities across a number of sanctions programs, including in OFAC sanctions programs that implement UN sanctions regimes.
Specifically, across a number of sanctions programs, OFAC issued or amended four categories of GLs authorizing the following activities:
• the official business of the U.S. government;
• the official business of certain international organizations and entities;
• transactions incident to certain humanitarian and other activities by nongovernmental organizations; and
• the provision of food and other agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components, or software updates for medical devices for personal, non-commercial use.
For more information on the sanctions programs covered by these new or amended GLs, please see the Federal Register. For information on specific exemptions or authorizations under a particular OFAC sanctions program, please see the relevant OFAC implementing regulations and OFAC’s Sanctions Programs and Country Information page.
For humanitarian-related activity that may fall outside the scope of these authorizations, OFAC considers specific license requests on a case-by-case basis and prioritizes license applications and other requests for guidance that are related to humanitarian activity. Please see OFAC’s License Application Page for additional details regarding the specific licensing process.
If individuals, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, or other entities, including financial institutions, have questions about engaging in or processing transactions related to these authorizations, they may contact the OFAC Compliance Hotline by email OFAC_Feedback@treasury.gov or by phone at (800) 540-6322 or (202) 622-2490. As with specific license requests, OFAC prioritizes responding to questions related to humanitarian activity.
Question 1106: Are financial institutions permitted to provide banking services, including processing funds transfers, related to activities authorized under the four categories of the general licenses (GLs) outlined in FAQ 1105? What are OFAC’s diligence expectations of financial institutions seeking to engage in such activities?
Answer: U.S. financial institutions may operate accounts, including processing funds transfers, for persons engaging in activities authorized by the GLs related to: (i) the official business of the U.S. government, (ii) official business of certain international organizations and entities, (iii) certain humanitarian and other specified activities by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and (iv) the provision of agricultural commodities, medicine, medical devices, replacement parts and components, or software updates for medical devices for personal, non-commercial use. In assessing whether a particular transaction is in compliance with such GLs, financial institutions may reasonably rely upon the information available to them in the ordinary course of business, provided that the financial institution does not know or have reason to know that the transaction is outside the scope of the applicable GL.
Separately, non-U.S. persons, including NGOs and other entities, as well as foreign financial institutions facilitating or assisting these activities, do not risk exposure to U.S. sanctions for engaging in or facilitating transactions that are otherwise exempt or authorized for U.S. persons pursuant to these GLs.
For general information on OFAC’s due diligence expectations and compliance programs, please see A Framework for OFAC Compliance Commitments and FAQ 819.
If financial institutions have questions about engaging in or processing transactions related to these authorizations, they may contact the OFAC Compliance Hotline by email at OFAC_Feedback@treasury.gov or by phone at (800) 540-6322 or (202) 622-2490. OFAC prioritizes responding to questions related to humanitarian activity.
Question 1107: For purposes of the OFAC general licenses related to the official business of certain international organizations and entities (IO GLs), what organizations are included within the United Nations’ “Programmes, Funds, and Other Entities and Bodies, as well as its Specialized Agencies and Related Organizations”?
Answer: For an organizational chart of the United Nations (UN), which lists the UN Programmes, Funds, and Other Entities and Bodies, as well as its Specialized Agencies and Related Organizations, including the World Bank, please see this page on the UN website. The IO GLs also authorize the activities of the fund entities administered or established by the foregoing UN organizations, as well as the activities of the international organizations and entities themselves, in addition to the activities of their employees, contractors, and grantees.
Question 1108: Does OFAC’s issuance of general licenses (GLs) as outlined in FAQ 1105 restrict the scope of any existing exemptions or OFAC authorizations for humanitarian activities?
Answer: No. OFAC’s action of December 20, 2022 does not restrict the scope of any existing exemptions or OFAC authorizations for humanitarian activities, including existing general licenses authorizing certain NGO activities in sanctioned jurisdictions such as the Crimea Region of Ukraine, Iran, and Syria, which have not been amended by this action, and pre-existing web general licenses that have been incorporated into the relevant program regulations, such as Venezuela GL 20B. Persons conducting humanitarian activities pursuant to these programs may continue to rely on existing exemptions and OFAC authorizations, subject to the applicable conditions and limitations, which may differ by sanctions program.
For information on specific exemptions or authorizations under a particular OFAC sanctions program, please see the relevant OFAC implementing regulations and OFAC’s Sanctions Programs and Country Information page.
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1175 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221220 and https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/usg_io_official_business_regulations_amendment.pdf and https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/usg_io_official_business_regulations_amendment.pdf and https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/humanitarian_standardization_regulations_amendment_ngo_ag_med.pdf and https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/humanitarian_standardization_regulations_amendment_ngo_ag_med.pdf and https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/usg_io_official_business_regulations_amendment.pdf and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/added/2022-12-20
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December 21, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published one Russia-related Frequently Asked Question (1109).
Question 1109: Are petroleum products of Russian Federation origin that are loaded onto a vessel at the port of loading for maritime transport prior to February 5, 2023, subject to the price cap?
Answer: No, provided the petroleum products are unloaded at the port of destination prior to 12:01 a.m., eastern daylight time, April 1, 2023. Petroleum products of Russian Federation origin that are loaded onto a vessel at the port of loading prior to 12:01 a.m., eastern standard time, February 5, 2023, and unloaded at the port of destination prior to 12:01 a.m., eastern daylight time, April 1, 2023, are not subject to the price cap. U.S. service providers can continue to provide services related to the maritime transport of petroleum products of Russian Federation origin purchased at a price above the price cap, provided that the petroleum products are loaded onto a vessel at the port of loading for maritime transport prior to 12:01 a.m., eastern standard time, February 5, 2023, and unloaded at the port of destination prior to 12:01 a.m., eastern daylight time, April 1, 2023.
The following is an example of a permissible transaction:
• A U.S. commodities trader signs a contract on January 1, 2023, to purchase petroleum products of Russian Federation origin for shipment to a jurisdiction that has not prohibited the import of such petroleum products. The U.S. commodities trader arranges for the petroleum products to be loaded onto a vessel at the port of loading. The vessel is loaded on February 1, 2023, and a bill of lading is issued. The petroleum products are shipped and discharged at the port of destination on February 15, 2023. U.S. insurance companies provide cover for this shipment/voyage and pay out any related claims, as appropriate.
OFAC anticipates implementing the price cap on petroleum products of Russian Federation origin by publishing a determination pursuant to Executive Order 14071 that (i) permits the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of services related to the maritime transport of petroleum products of Russian Federation origin, where the price of such petroleum products of Russian Federation origin do not exceed the price cap and (ii) prohibits such services if the petroleum products of Russian Federation origin are purchased above the relevant price cap. This determination would take effect at 12:01 a.m., eastern standard time, February 5, 2023, with respect to maritime transport of petroleum products of Russian Federation origin loaded on or after 12:01 a.m., eastern standard time, February 5, 2023.
The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
• Hassanzadeh, Hassan of Iran;
• Hosseini, Seyed Sadegh of Iran;
• Maroufi, Hossein of Iran;
• Moein, Moslem of Iran; and
• Montazeri, Mohammad Jafar of Iran.
The following entity has been added to OFAC's SDN List:
• Imen Sanat Zaman Fara Company of Iran.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221221 and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/1109
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December 22, 2022: The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the following Russian Naval entities.
The following Russian Naval entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:
• Concern Morinformsystem Agat Joint Stock Company;
• Federal State Unitary Enterprise Central Research Institute Of Structural Materials Prometey Named By I.V. Gorynin Of National Research Center Kurchatov Institute ;
• Joint Stock Company Battery Company Rigel;
• Joint Stock Company Central Research Institute Of Marine Engineering;
• Joint Stock Company Concern Avrora Scientific And Production Association;
• Joint Stock Company Concern Central Institute For Scientific Research Elektropribor;
• Joint Stock Company Obukhovskoye ;
• Marine Bridge And Navigation Systems Ltd;
• P.P. Shirshov Institute Of Oceanology Of The Russian Academy Of Sciences; and
• Technopole Company.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221222
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December 28, 2022: The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) made the following additions to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list.
• Midco Finance S.A. of Switzerland and Panama;
• Midco Financial S.A. of Switzerl and Panama;
• Montana Management Inc. of Switzerland and Panama;
• Al-Dulaimi, Khalaf of Iraq;
• Al-Dulaymi, Khalaf M.M. of Iraq.
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221228
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U.S. Department of State
December 5, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 74467: The U.S. Department of State continued the designation of HAMAS (and Other Aliases) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
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December 5, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 74465: The U.S. Department of State imposed sanctions on Anna Sergeevna Ershova and Olga Sergeevna Sobyanina, a spouse or adult child of Sergey Semyonovich Sobyanin, a person blocked whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to subsection (a)(ii) or (iii) of Section 1 of E.O. 14024.
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December 5, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 74466: The U.S. Department of State has sanctioned seven Russian individuals and six Russian entities.
The following individuals have been sanctioned:
• Kostyantyn Volodymyrovych Ivashchenko;
• Sergey Vladimirovich Yeliseyev;
• Volodymyr Vasilyovich Saldo;
• Kyrylo Serhiyovych Stremousov;
• Dmitriy Aleksandrovich Pumpyanskiy;
• Andrey Igorevich Melnichenko; and
• Alexander Anatolevich Ponomarenko.
The following entities have been sactioned.
• Joint Stock Company State Transportation Leasing Company;
• GTLK Asia Limited;
• GTLK Europe Capital Designated Activity Company;
• GTLK Europe Designated Activity Company;
• GTLK Middle East Free Zone Company; and
• Salvation Committee For Peace And Order.
The following vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction is blocked:
• AXIOMA (Linked To: Dmitriy Aleksandrovich Pumpyanskiy).
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December 5, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 74466: The U.S. Department of State has sanctioned twenty-nine Russian individuals:
• Halyna Viktorivna Danylchenko;
• Nikolay Valentinovich Andrianov;
• Vladimir Vladimirovich Artyakov;
• Natalya Vladimirovna Borisova;
• Vasily Yuryevich Brovko;
• Oleg Nikolaevich Evtushenko;
• Victor Nikolayevich Kiryanov;
• Yury Nikolayevich Koptev;
• Dmitry Yuryevich Lelikov;
• Vladimir Zalmanovich Litvin;
• Aleksander Yuryevich Nazarov;
• Pavel Mikhaylovich Osin;
• Aleksandr Nikolaevich Popov;
• Anatoly Eduardovich Serdyukov;
• Elena Oduliovna Sierra;
• Natalya Ivanova Smirnova;
• Sergey Anatolyevich Tsyb;
• Nikolai Anatolevich Volobuev;
• Maksim Vladimirovich Vybornykh;
• Igor Nikolaevich Zaviyalov;
• Dmitriy Vladimirovich Artyakov;
• Tatiana Vladimirovna Artyakova;
• Tina Kandelaki;
• Leontiy Andreyevich Kondrakhin;
• Melaniya Andreyevna Kondrakhina;
• Tatiana Borisovna Kiryanova;
• Sergey Anatolevich Serdyukov;
• Natalya Anatolevna Serdyukova; and
• Evgeniya Nikolaevna Vasileva.
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December 5, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 74467: The U.S. Department of State has sanctioned twenty-three Russian individuals:
• Volodymyr Valeriyovych Rogov;
• Oleksandr Fedorovych Saulenko;
• Volodymyr Volodymyrovich Bandura;
• Valery Mykhailovych Pakhnyts;
• Mikhail Leonidovich Rodikov;
• Vladimir Aleksandrovich Bespalov;
• Pavlo Ihorovych Filipchuk;
• Tetyana Yuriivna Tumilina;
• Hennadiy Oleksandrovych Shelestenko;
• Oleksandr Yuriyovych Kobets;
• Ihor Ihorovych Semenchev;
• Tetyana Oleksandrivna Kuz'mych;
• Serhiy Mykolayovych Cherevko;
• Yevhen Vitaliiovych Balytskyi;
• Andrey Dmitrievich Kozenko;
• Oleksiy Sergeevich Selivanov;
• Andriy Leonidovich Siguta;
• Anton Robertovich Titskiy;
• Andriy Yuriovych Trofimov;
• Anton Viktorovich Koltsov;
• Mykyta Ivanovich Samoilenko;
• Viktor Andriyovych Emelianenko; and
• Maxim Stanislavovich Oreshkin.
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Secretary of State Antony Blinken Designated Persons As Specially Designated Global Terrorists
December 15, 2022: 87 Fed. Reg. 76660: Acting under the authority of and in accordance with section 1(a)(ii)(B) of E.O. 13224 of September 23, 2001, as amended by E.O. 13268 of July 2, 2002, E.O. 13284 of January 23, 2003, and E.O. 13886 of September 9, 2019, Secretary of State Antony Blinken has determined that the persons known as Osama Mehmood (also known as Usama Mahmud, Abu Zar, Atta Ullah, Zar Wali); Atif Yahya Ghouri (also known as Yahya Shoaib Ghauri, Qari Atif, Qari Ibrahim, Atif Ghauri); and Muhammad Maruf (also known as Ali Hamzah, Maulana Musanna, Maulana Ubaidullah) are leaders of al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent, and the person known as Qari Amjad (also known as Mufti Hazrat, Mufti Muzahim) is a leader of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, groups whose property and interests in property are currently blocked pursuant to a determination by the Secretary of State pursuant to E.O. 13224, and as such, he has designated them as Specially Designated Global Terrorists.
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December 22, 2022: The Department of State is designating 10 Russian naval entities. This action imposes severe costs on Russia’s defense establishment in response to Putin’s unprovoked war of choice in Ukraine. Specifically, the Department of State has designated the following six entities pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of Executive Order (E.O.) 14024 for operating or having operated in both the defense and related materiel sector and the marine sector of the Russian Federation economy:
• Joint Stock Company Battery Company Rigel (RIGEL);
• Joint Stock Company Concern Central Institute For Scientific Research Elektropribor (ELEKTROPRIBOR);
• Joint Stock Company Concern Avrora Scientific And Production Association (AVRORA);
• Сoncern Morinformsystem Agat Joint Stock Company;
• Central Research Institute Of Structural Materials Prometey; and
• Joint Stock Company Central Research Institute Of Marine Engineering.
Additionally, the Department of State has designated the following four entities pursuant to section 1(a)(i) of E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the marine sector of the Russian Federation economy:
• P.P. Shirshov Institute Of Oceanology Of The Russian Academy Of Sciences;
• Technopole Company;
• Joint Stock Company Obukhovskoye; and
• Marine Bridge And Navigation Systems LTD.
https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-imposes-sanctions-on-russian-naval-entities/
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Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs And Border Protection
December 27, 2022: The Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) began detaining merchandise produced or manufactured by Jingde Trading Ltd., Rixin Foods, Ltd., and Zhejiang Sunrise Garment Group Co. Ltd. at all U.S. ports of entry on Dec. 5, 2022. This enforcement action is the result of a CBP investigation indicating that these companies use North Korean labor in their supply chains in violation of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
Fines and Penalties
December 7, 2022: The U.S. Department of Justice unsealed a seven-count indictment in federal court in Brooklyn charging Andrii Derkach, 55, of Ukraine, with conspiracy to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers Acts (IEEPA), bank fraud conspiracy, money laundering conspiracy, and four counts of money laundering in connection with the purchase and maintenance of two condominiums in Beverly Hills, California. Derkach allegedly concealed his interest in the transactions and violated sanctions imposed in 2020. Derkach remains at large. The charges and forfeiture action include the first use of criminal and forfeiture powers targeting the concealment of ownership by senior foreign political officials, passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2021.
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December 13 2022: A 16-count indictment was unsealed in Brooklyn, charging five Russian nationals – including a suspected Federal Security Service (FSB) officer – and two U.S. nationals with conspiracy and other charges related to a global procurement and money laundering scheme on behalf of the Russian government in which the defendants allegedly conspired to obtain military-grade and dual-use technologies from U.S. companies for Russia’s defense sector, and to smuggle sniper rifle ammunition, in violation of new U.S. sanctions imposed earlier this year.
Yevgeniy Grinin, 44, of Moscow; Aleksey Ippolitov, 57, of Moscow; Boris Livshits, 52, of St. Petersburg; Svetlana Skvortsova, 41, of Moscow; Vadim Konoshchenok, 48, of St. Petersburg; Alexey Brayman, 35, of New Hampshire; and Vadim Yermolenko, 41, of New Jersey, are charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States as to the enforcement of export controls and economic sanctions; conspiracy to violate the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA); smuggling; and failure to comply with the Automated Export System relating to the transportation of electronics.
According to the indictment, the defendants unlawfully purchased and exported highly sensitive and heavily regulated electronic components, some of which can be used in the development of nuclear and hypersonic weapons, quantum computing and other military applications.
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December 15, 2022: Arif Ugur (Ugur), 53, of Cambridge Massachusetts man was sentenced to 33 months in prison followed by two years of supervised release for a scheme to illegally export defense technical data to foreign nationals in Turkey in connection with the fraudulent manufacturing of parts and components used by the U.S. military, in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) later determined that some of the parts were substandard and unsuitable for use by the military. On Aug. 10, 2022, Ugur, pleaded guilty to two counts of wire fraud, two counts of violating the Arms Export Control Act and one count of conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act.
According to court documents, in 2015, Ugur, founded and was the sole managing partner of the Anatolia Group Limited Partnership (Anatolia), a domestic limited partnership registered in Massachusetts. Beginning in approximately July 2015, Ugur bid on and acquired numerous contracts to supply the DOD with various parts and components intended for use by the U.S. military. Many of these contracts required that the parts be manufactured in the United States. Both in bids submitted to DOD and in subsequent email communications with DOD representatives, Ugur falsely claimed that Anatolia was manufacturing the parts in the United States. In fact, Anatolia was a front company with no manufacturing facilities whatsoever. Unbeknownst to DOD, Ugur contracted with a company in Turkey to make the parts and then passed them off to DOD as if they had been manufactured by Anatolia in the United States. Because they had not been manufactured in the United States in accordance with the contacts, Ugur failed to allow DOD to inspect the parts prior to delivery to the U.S. military. Many of the parts were substandard and some could not be used at all.
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December 19, 2022: UOP LLC, doing business as Honeywell UOP, a U.S.-based subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., has agreed to pay more than $160 million to resolve parallel bribery investigations by criminal and civil authorities in the United States and Brazil stemming from bribe payments offered to a high-ranking official at Brazil’s state-owned oil company.
The U.S. Department of Justice’s resolution is coordinated with prosecutorial authorities in Brazil, as well as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
According to court documents, Honeywell UOP entered into a three-year deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the department in connection with criminal information filed in the Southern District of Texas charging the company with conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
According to the company’s admissions and court documents, between 2010 and 2014, Honeywell UOP conspired to offer an approximately $4 million bribe to a then-high-ranking executive of Petróleo Brasileiro S.A (Petrobras) in Brazil. Specifically, Honeywell UOP offered the bribe to secure improper advantages in order to obtain and retain business from Petrobras in connection with Honeywell UOP’s efforts to win an approximately $425 million contract from Petrobras to design and build an oil refinery called Premium.
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December 20, 2022: The U.S. Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has issued Orders denying the export privileges of the following two individuals:
• Priscilla Bustos Martinez - Until Nov. 24, 2028 - On November 24, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, Priscilla Bustos Martinez (“Martinez”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 554. Specifically, Martinez was convicted of fraudulently and knowingly exporting and sending or attempting to export and send from the United States to Mexico, four .22 caliber pistols without obtaining a license or written authorization for such export. As a result of her conviction, the Court sentenced Martinez to 37 months in prison, with credit for time served, three years supervised release, and a $100 special assessment; and
• Jesse Cortez-Arguelles - Until Nov. 5, 2030 - On November 5, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, Jesse Cortez-Arguelles (“Cortez-Arguelles”) was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 554(a). Specifically, Cortez-Arguelles was convicted of attempting to smuggle one 9 mm pistol, two 5.56 caliber rifles, two 9 mm firearm magazines, two 30-round 5.56 caliber firearm magazines, 1,030 rounds of 9 mm ammunition, and 1,000 rounds of 10 mm ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 554. As a result of his conviction, the Court sentenced Cortez-Arguelles to 36 months of confinement, with credit for time served, three years of supervised release and a $100 special assessment.
https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1433-e2775/file and https://efoia.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/export-violations/export-violations-2022/1434-e2776/file
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December 30, 2022: OFAC Settled with Danfoss A/S for $4,379,810 related to apparent violations of the Iran, Syria, and Sudan Sanctions Programs. Danfoss A/S (“Danfoss”), a multinational Danish company that manufactures and sells refrigeration products, air conditioners, compressors, and other cooling products, has agreed to pay $4,379,810 to settle its potential civil liability for 225 apparent violations of multiple OFAC sanctions programs. The apparent violations occurred when Danfoss FZCO, Danfoss’s wholly owned UAE subsidiary, directed customers in Iran, Syria, and Sudan to make payments to its bank account at the UAE branch of a U.S. financial institution (“U.S. Branch Account”) and when Danfoss FZCO made payments from that same account to entities in Iran and Syria. As a result of this conduct, Danfoss FZCO caused the U.S. financial institution to facilitate prohibited financial transactions and export financial services to sanctioned jurisdictions. The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that the apparent violations were non-egregious and not voluntarily self-disclosed.
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/20221230_danfoss.pdf and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20221230_33